Poland 1956 Gluchowski 1991

THE COLLAPSE OF STALINIST RULE IN POLAND:
THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS’ PARTY

FROM THE XX CPSU CONGRESS TO THE VIII KC PZPR PLENUM,
FEBRUARY-OCTOBER 1956
By
Leszek Wlodzimierz Gluchowski

King's College
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
September 1991
Submitted to the Board of Graduate Studies of the University of

the University of Cambridge in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES .......................................... v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................... vi
PREFACE ................................................. viii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................. 1
Gomulka and the 'Rightist-Nationalist Deviation' ........ 3

Khrushchev and the PZPR Activists of Jewish Origin ...... 7
The November 1954 Conference of the Central Party Aktiv . 9
Summary ................................................. 12
CHAPTER TWO: THE XX CPSU CONGRESS ...................... 14
Diverging Roads to Socialism ............................ 15

Mikoyan and the Myth of Stalin .......................... 18
The KPP Rehabilitated ................................... 19
Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' ............................ 22
Summary ................................................. 24
CHAPTER THREE: THE MARCH CONFERENCE OF

THE CENTRAL PARTY AKTIV ................. 26
The Politburo Defends Orthodoxy ......................... 27

The Central Party Aktiv Reacts ......................... 29
The KPP Issue ........................................... 31
Pulawy Versus Natolin ………………..................... ....... 33
Summary ................................................. 36
CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTERREGNUM .......................... 38
The Politburo Meeting of 6 March ........................ 39

The Spychalski Crisis ................................... 41
The Leadership's Interim Position ....................... 45
Bierut's Death .......................................... 47
Summary ................................................. 49
CHAPTER FIVE: NUMERUS CLAUSUS .......................... 51
Bierut's Funeral ........................................ 52

'Muscovites', 'Natives', 'Emigres' and 'Jews' ........... 54
Khrushchev and the Ancien Regime ........................ 56
The PZPR and Activists of Jewish Origin ................. 59
Summary ................................................. 61
CHAPTER SIX: THE VI KC PZPR PLENUM ..................... 63
Summary ................................................. 69
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE TIME OF TROUBLES .................... 74
The 'Secret Speech' Unleashed ........................... 75

Unrest Among the Intellectuals .......................... 80
The Party in Turmoil .................................... 83
The Witaszewski Affair .................................. 87
Ochab's Demise .......................................... 89
Gomulka and Power ....................................... 91
The KPP Rehabilitation Commission ....................... 98
Summary ................................................. 99
Page
- ii -
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE PARTY APPARATUS ..................... 104
PZPR Membership by Vocation ............................. 105

Bierut and the Party Apparatus .......................... 107
The 'Dogmatism' of the Apparat .......................... 109
Ochab's 'Programme' of Party Renewal .................... 110
Summary ................................................. 112
CHAPTER NINE: THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY ................. 116
The 'Shortcomings' of the Six-Year Plan ................. 116

The Public Debate About the State of the Economy ........ 119
Summary ................................................. 122
CHAPTER TEN: THE POZNAN REVOLT ......................... 125
The Strike Begins ....................................... 126

The Decision to Take Military Action .................... 130
The First Official Explanation of the 'Poznan Events' ... 131
The Party Membership and Society Reacts ................. 133
The Gierek Report ....................................... 135
The 7 July Conference of KW First Secretaries ........... 138
Summary ................................................. 140
CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE VII KC PZPR PLENUM ................. 143
The 'Poznan Events' ..................................... 144

The Economy ............................................. 147
The 'Democratization Campaign' .......................... 150
The Press ............................................... 151
Factionalism and Anti-Semitism .......................... 152
Gomulka ................................................. 157
Summary ................................................. 160
CHAPTER TWELVE: GOMULKA'S ROAD TO POWER ................ 163
Nation-Wide Unrest ...................................... 165

The Party Activists and Gomulka ......................... 168
The Politburo and Gomulka ............................... 171
The Politburo Meeting of 12 October ..................... 173
Rokossowski and the Soviet Advisors ..................... 175
Summary ................................................. 178
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE VIII KC PZPR PLENUM .............. 181
The Threat of Soviet Intervention ....................... 182

The Soviets Arrive in Warsaw ............................ 184
The Plenum Commences .................................... 186
The Soviet-Polish Confrontation ......................... 188
Preparations for the Defence of Warsaw .................. 191
The Plenum Resumes ...................................... 195
Summary ................................................. 196
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONCLUSIONS .......................... 198
Factionalism in the PZPR ................................ 199

Summary ................................................. 202
- iii -
Page
APPENDICES ................................................... 204
I. KC PPR and PZPR Plenums, Party Congresses and Party

Conferences (Selected), June 1948-March 1959 .......... 204
II. KC (PPR) PZPR Politburo, 1945-1957 .................... 206
III. KC (PPR) PZPR Secretaries, 1947-1957 .................. 207
IV. KC PZPR (Selected) Secretariat Department Directors,

1954-1957 ............................................. 208
V. KW PZPR (Selected) First Secretaries, 1954-1957 ....... 210
VI. PRL Government, 21 November 1952 to 20 July 1957 ...... 211
VII. Excerpts from Berman's Self-Criticism ................. 213
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 215
- iv -
TABLES
Page
I. Vocational Membership in ZMP,

December 1953, 1955 and 1956 ......................... 84
II. Vocational Membership in PZPR, 1948-1959 ............. 105
III. Social and Political Activists by Vocation,

1953-1954 ............................................ 106
IV. Social and Political Activists by Vocation, 1956 ..... 107
- v -
ABBREVIATIONS
AK Armia Krajowa
Home Army
AL Armia Ludowa
People's Army
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CKKP Centralna Komisja Kontroli Partyjnej

Central Control Commission of the Party
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza
CRZZ Centralna Rada Zwiazkow Zawodowych

Central Council of Trade Unions
GL Gwardia Ludowa
People's Guard
GZI WP Glowny Zarzad Informacji Wojska Polskiego

Main Information Bureau of the Polish Army
GZP WP Glowny Zarzad Polityczny Wojska Polskiego

Main Political Bureau of the Polish Army
IKKN Instytut Ksztalcenie Kadr Naukowych

Institute for the Instruction of Academic Cadres
INS Instytut Nauk Spolecznych

Institute of Social Sciences
KBW Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego

Internal Security Corps
KC PZPR Komitet Centralny

Central Committee
KD Komitet Dzielnicowy
Precinct Committee
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

Committee of State Security
KP Komitet Powiatowy
District Committee
KM Komitet Miastowy
City Committee
KPP Komunistyczna Partia Polski

Communist Party of Poland
KSBP Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego

Committee for Public Security Affairs
KW Komitet Wojewodzki
Provincial Committee
KZ Komitet Zakladowy
Workers' Factory Committee
- vi -
MBP Ministerstwo Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego
Ministry of Public Security
MO Milicja Obywatelska
Citizens' Militia
NSC National Security Council
MSW Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych

Ministry of Internal Affairs
MVD Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del

Ministry of Internal Affairs
NKVD Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del

People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
PAP Polska Agencja Prasowa

Polish Press Agency
PAX Stowarzyszenie PAX

Progressive Catholic Association
PKPG Panstwowa Komisja Planowania Gospodarczego

State Economic Planning Commission
POP Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna

Basic Party Organization
PPR Polska Partia Robotnicza

Polish Workers’ Party
PPRN Prezydium Powiatowej Rady Narodowej

Presidium of the People's District Council
PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna

Polish Socialist Party
PRL Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa

Polish People's Republic
PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza

Polish United Workers’ Party
RFE Radio Free Europe
RKiS Rada Kultury i Sztuki

Council of Art and Culture
SB Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa
Security Service
SDKPiL Socjaldemokracja Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy

Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania
UB Urzad Bezpieczenstwa
Security Office
VKP(b) Vsesoiuznoe Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol'shevikov)

All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
ZISPO Zaklady Imieniem Stalina Poznan

The Poznan 'Stalin' Works
ZLP Zwiazek Literatow Polskich

Union of Polish Writers
ZMP Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej

Union of Polish Youth
- vii -
PREFACE
Apart from the monumental revolutions that swept the 'Other

Europe' in 1989, and the notable Solidarity experience of 1980-1981,
four other major events stand out in the postwar political history of
Eastern Europe. These include Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union
in 1948, the Polish events of 1956, the Hungarian uprising of the same
year, and the Czechoslovak 'Spring', followed by the Warsaw Pact
invasion of 1968.
Yet it is perplexing to discover that the 'Polish October' has
not been analyzed as comprehensively as the other political crises by
Western scholars. Indeed, the one noticeable characteristic of the
historiography on the 'Polish October' is the complete absence of an
authoritative study of the kind that exists on all the additional East
European crises.
The Polish events of 1956 had been broad-based and included every
major segment of society: industrial workers, peasants, intellectuals
(and students), and the only organized force outside the PZPR: the
military (the Catholic Church played a minor role). The revolt against
the Stalinist regime in Poland led to a breakdown of Party discipline,
resulted in powerful restraints on further Sovietization, successfully
resisted the threat of Soviet military intervention, and brought to
power the first (and last) truly popular communist leader in Poland.
The events of 1956 also engendered the largest single protest by the
working class in the Soviet bloc, when the workers of Poznan rose against
the regime. All subsequent crises in Poland (1968, 1970, 1976,
1980-81) were grounded on the precedent set in 1956. Even the fall of
communism in Poland owes much of its genesis to the 'Polish October'.
However, the 1956 struggle against Stalinist rule in Poland also had
its darker moments. The opponents of de-Stalinization unleased the
spectre of anti-Semitism against their rivals in the Party. The
anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic campaign initiated by the PZPR in
1968 had its roots in the 'Polish October'.
The general aim of my doctoral dissertation is to examine in detail
the Polish events from the XX CPSU Congress of February 1956 to the VIII
KC PZPR Plenum of October 1956 and critically assess the many
assumptions that have been made about the 'Polish October' over the past
three decades. The principal aim, however, is to discover why a large
- viii -
group of zealous Stalinist functionaries among the PZPR elite opted for
comprehensive de-Stalinization.
I would like to acknowledge the assistance extended to me by a
number of institutions. My appreciation goes to the Provost and
Fellows of King's College and the staff at the Faculty of Social and
Political Sciences for allowing me to carry out my research at the
University of Cambridge; the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada for generously funding my years at Cambridge; the
University of Warsaw, where I spent 8 months researching this project
before being unceremoniously expelled from Poland in 1988 by the
guardians of the old regime; and to the staff of the CA KC PZPR, the
DDE Library, the PISM Library, the PRO, the RFE/RL Library, the British
Library, and the Cambridge University Library.
A number of individuals helped me at various stages of my research.
A special debt of thanks goes to my research supervisor Dr. John Barber.
His insightful comments, generosity, patience, and gentle nudges turned
a dream into reality. I am also grateful to Professor Jerzy Wiatr of
the University of Warsaw, Dr. Jonathan Haslam, Dr. George Sanford,
Professor Andrzej Werblan, Mr. Antoni Zambrowski, Professor Jerzy
Holzer, and especially Dr. Wieslaw Wladyka, who kindly gave me a copy
of the manuscript he prepared with Zbyslaw Rykowski on the 'Polish
October'.
I received a tremendous amount of intellectual stimulation and
assistance from a number of dear friends. Thanks to Sarah Bond, Mark
and Karina Gillard, David Goldblatt, Edward Rogerson, John and Asha
Shaw, Damon Silvers, Jarek Szkaradek, and Taduesz Szubka Britain became
a second home. A debt that can never be repaid goes to my greatest
supporter and dearest friend Lorna Rowell, to whom I dedicate this
dissertation.
Declaration
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing
which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. I also declare that
the dissertation does not exceed the 80,000 word limit.
L.W. Gluchowski
King's College
- ix -
In December 1989, as Nicolae Ceausescu was
led out from the courtroom in Tirgoviste
to his summary execution, he began to hum
the opening bars of the 'Internationale'.
More than four decades earlier, Primo Levi
recalled that as the Red Army speechlessly
liberated the fortunate few from
Auschwitz, a fellow survivor, a German
named Thylle, sat on his bunk and sang the
'International' too: 'in a low stridulous
voice, grotesque and solemn at the same
time'.
When Ceausescu of the Swiss bank
account's sings, we feel sick. When
Thylle, ten long years in the Lager,
sings, we weep. It is a reminder that the
Communist tradition has left its imprint
deep in the souls of many different people
from many different countries, and that
those who identify with it are neither
only oppressors nor only oppressed. They
are not all wicked nor all noble, but a
mixture of these and every other quality.
This is the only spirit in which the
history of the Communist movement can
1
properly be understood [...]
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The origin of the far-reaching and ultimately successful

Polish resistance to communist rule can be traced to the violent
imposition of the system by force; made possible by the presence of
the Red Army on Polish soil after World War II.2 For almost five
decades, Poland's communist rulers had been unable to distance
themselves effectively from their illegitimate roots.3 The only
period in the history of Poland's communist system when the PZPR
gained a measure of genuine political legitimacy had been during
its struggle against Stalinism. The evolving debate concerning the
end of communist rule in Poland will inevitably lead students of
postwar Polish politics back to the year 1956.
"In a country where historically politics and nationalism are
interwoven," as Zbigniew Pelczynski put it, "a regime to be
1
Martin Kettle, "Goodbye to the Comintern," London Review of Books (21
February 1991), p. 20. Review of Francis King and George Matthews, ed., About
Turn, The Communist Party and the Outbreak of the Second World War: The
Verbatim Record of the Central Committee Meetings 1939 (London, 1990).
2
See John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947 (Leicester,
1986).
3
J.F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern
Europe (Durham, 1991), pp. 2-4.
- 2 -
regarded as legitimate must be seen to express at least some facets

of that nationalism."4 Since Polish nationalism had been
inextricably linked to anti-communist and especially anti-Soviet
attitudes in 1956, an important question arises. What made a large
group of zealous Stalinist functionaries among the PZPR elite, who
had earlier participated in the purge of so-called 'national
communists' from the Party ranks, disavow their 'internationalist'
past, opt for comprehensive de-Stalinization, and eventually lend
support to their 'sworn enemy': Wladyslaw Gomulka? A thorough
analysis of this apparent dilemma is the subject of this disserta-
tion.
The solution to the above question lies in the complex array
of events that took place in Poland following the XX CPSU Congress
in February 1956. Although the period from Stalin's death in March
1953 to the XX Congress was instrumental in setting the tone of the
de-Stalinization campaign in Poland, it had a relatively weaker
impact on what has become known as the 'Polish October'. From 1953
until the end of 1955, Poland's de-Stalinization campaign 'from the
top' followed a pattern similar to the one observed in the Soviet
Union and the other countries of the Soviet bloc.5 That which was
unique in the Polish experience came to the fore in March 1956.
Accordingly, with the exception of this and the following chapter,
our discussion is based on a review of the political manoeuvring
and debates that gripped the PZPR elite from the March conference
of the central Party aktiv to the VIII KC PZPR Plenum of October
1956. In light of the extensive documentary evidence that has been
recently published, or otherwise made accessible to independent
inquiry, it is now possible to reconstruct in great detail the
events of 1956.
In order to fully appreciate the context of the debates that
took place in the PZPR in 1956, however, it is necessary to analyze
three factors that influenced the PZPR's de-Stalinization campaign
in 1956. The first is the 1948-1949 campaign against the
'rightist-nationalist deviation' and Gomulka's fall from power.
The second is Khrushchev's attitude towards PZPR activists of
Jewish origin during the so-called 'thaw'. The third is the
4
Pelczynski in R.F. Leslie, ed., The History of Poland since 1863
(Cambridge, 1983), pp. 365-366.
5
Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge,
Mass., 1967), pp. 155-210.
- 3 -
November 1954 conference of the central Party aktiv, which marked

the beginning of the divisions that gripped the Party elite in
1956.
GOMULKA AND THE 'RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST DEVIATION'

After a number of deliberations between Stalin and other
European communists on the need to "facilitate the coordination and
exchange of views among communist parties," the PPR General
Secretary invited delegates from eight communist parties for a
series of meetings on 22-27 February 1947.6 The actual purpose of
the gathering was not fully appreciated by Gomulka.7 The delegates
to the February meeting in Poland decided to abandon the cautious
and gradual imposition of communist rule on the satellite states of
Eastern Europe and replace it with an accelerated programme of
Sovietization. Talk about diverging roads to socialism was soon
replaced with the rhetoric of a single, Soviet-directed road to
socialism.
The most significant postwar dispute inside the PPR was
ignited by its General Secretary. The "first clash with Gomulka,"
as Buro member Jakub Berman recently characterized it,8 took place
soon after the PPR leader defied Stalin and publicly voiced his
opposition to the policies of 'The Information Bureau of Communist
and Workers' Parties' (Cominform), founded in September 1947.9
Gomulka had precipitated the crisis when he addressed the KC PPR
Plenum of June 1948.
The main subject of the June Plenum was the platform for the
soon to be formed PZPR. The PPR General Secretary hit a raw nerve
when he began to discuss the history of the revolutionary workers'
movement in Poland and its traditional hostility towards Polish
independence.10 Gomulka maintained that the PZPR should repudiate
6
Narada Informacyja dziewieciu partii (Warsaw, 1947), p. 1.
7
The meeting was officially named 'The Information Conference of
Representatives from Nine Communist and Workers' Parties' and included partici-
pants from the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
France, and Italy. Poland's delegates included: Gomulka, Berman, Hilary Minc,
Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Aleksander Zawadzki, and the conference secretary, Roman
Zambrowski. Marian Spychalski and Boleslaw Bierut also attended the meetings.
See Andrzej Werblan, Wladyslaw Gomulka: Sekretarz Generalny PPR (Warsaw, 1988),
pp. 505-506.
8
Interview with Berman in Teresa Toranska, Oni: Stalin's Polish Puppets
[hereafter Toranska] (London, 1987), p. 281.
9
For further details see Bogdan Brzezinski, "Gomulka a Kominform," Zycie
Literackie, no. 4/5 (1982); and Werblan, Wladyslaw Gomulka, pp. 503-520.
10
For a complete review of the 1948 crisis see ibid., pp. 542-598.
- 4 -
the SDKPiL/KPP line that steadfastly opposed an independent Polish

state and move to assimilate the constructive tradition of the PPS
on the question of Polish independence.11 He wrote the speech
without consulting the Politburo.
Gomulka sharply criticized the SDKPiL, PPS-Left, and the KPP
for not advocating Poland's self-determination. He pointed to a
direct relationship between the anti-independence position of the
prewar revolutionary workers' movement and the narrow social base
of the PPR after World War II.12 According to Gomulka:
The struggle for an independent Poland belongs to the most beautiful

traditions of the PPS, which we should adopt as the basis for the
13
united party.
The PPR General Secretary also suggested that the successor

to the PPR must be created on the basis of a genuine structural and
ideological synthesis between the PPR and PPS. He added that only
by fusing the "historic achievements" of the PPS with those of the
PPR would the struggle for a 'Polish road to socialism' be success-
ful:
It would have been futile to search the writings of the founders of

Marxism for descriptions of political changes which would be similar to
those presently taking place in our country and in the other People's
Democracies. Socialism is common to all worker's of the world, but the
road to socialism is not and cannot be identical at every stage in
14
history.
Gomulka unequivocally rejected large parts of the Soviet experience

for the future development of Polish socialism. During the ensuing
debate at the June Plenum, eighteen KC PPR members stood to
challenge the General Secretary.15
11
Gomulka's speech to the June Plenum has been published in "Przemowienie
tow. Wieslawa na plenarnym posiedzeniu KC PPR w dniu 3 czerwca 1948 roku,"
Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 34 (1975), pp. 54-71; and Gomulka [ed. by Werblan],
"Referat na Plenum KC PPR - 3 czerwca 1948 r," Miesiecznik Literacki, no. 2
(1983), pp. 77-87.
12
Gomulka also noted: "The SDKPiL was not a Marxist Party. It was
Luxemburgist." As for Rosa Luxemburg, Gomulka stated that "she never understood
the road to socialism." On the KPP and its political programme, Gomulka argued:
"Abstract revolutionism and dogmatic Marxism neither leads to revolution nor
Marxism." See "Przemowienie tow. Wieslawa," pp. 57-58 and 60.
13
ibid., p. 60.
14
ibid., pp. 64-65.
15
For further details of the debate see Bronislaw Syzdek, Spor w
kierownictwie partii o tradycje Polskiego ruchu robotniczego: Zbior dokumentow
(Warsaw [limited edition], 1983); and his article in Z Pola Walki, no. 1 (1983),
pp. 71-90.
- 5 -
Eleven Central Committee members disputed Gomulka's unflat-

tering history of the SDKPiL/KPP.16 Three speakers had been
critical of the approach taken by the General Secretary, but
endeavoured to support some of Gomulka's assertions.17 Others,
including Buro member Roman Zambrowski, attacked Gomulka for his
"attempt to exculpate" the PPS.18 The harshest criticisms,
however, came from those who denounced the PPR leader for "attempt-
ing to equate" the mistakes of the SDKPiL and KPP with those of the
PPS.19 Ochab recently described Gomulka's views thus:
Gomulka basically attacked the Leninist traditions of the KPP; he told

us to learn patriotism from the PPS. He did admit the KPP-ists were
dedicated revolutionaries, but he said they didn't understand national
concerns, because independence was a primary issue to which all other
issues should be subordinated. Basically he also favoured, though not
20
completely, the general ideas of Pilsudski.
After the debate, Gomulka refused to retract his statements,

although he acknowledged that the discussants had made "a number of
important points."21
At the Politburo meeting of 4 June, which Gomulka did not
attend, Bierut launched an attack against Gomulka's critique of the
revolutionary workers' movement in Poland. The Buro also decided
that its membership would individually submit critical comments on
the speech by the General Secretary.22 Bierut's authority had not
been questioned by any of the Politburo members. As Khrushchev put
it in his memoirs: "Stalin had more confidence in Bierut than
23
Gomulka." Zambrowski later confirmed:
Stalin, while fully accepting Gomulka as the leader of the Party, still
considered Bierut to be his man in the Politburo. And we all knew
24
this.
16
Including Roman Werfel, Edward Ochab, Jan Izydorczyk, Julian Finkel-
sztein, Edward Uzdanski, Tadeusz Daniszewski, Julia Brystygierowa, Jerzy
Tepicht, Wladyslaw Wolski, Jerzy Borejsza, and Leon Lasman.
17
Namely Lucjan Marek, Maria Turlejska, and Ostap Dluski.
18
Including Artur Starewicz, Jerzy Albrecht, and Helena Kozlowska.
19
Namely Edward Ochab and Wladyslaw Wolski. For details see Werblan,
Wladyslaw Gomulka, p. 547.
20
Interview with Ochab in Toranska, p. 40.
21
Werblan, Wladyslaw Gomulka, p. 547. Werfel recently added that "Gomulka
had a habit of saying, `Yes, but...'." Interview in Toranska, p. 95.
22
Werblan, Wladyslaw Gomulka, p. 548. The Politburo first intended to
correct Gomulka's text, but it was later decided to write a new document. As
related to Werblan by Ignacy Loga-Sowinski. Interview with Werblan, March 1988.
23
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament [hereafter The Last
Testament] (Boston, 1974), p. 181.
24
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 28 February 1971, Krytyka, no. 6 (1980), p. 66.
- 6 -
The Politburo approved a composite critique of the speech

made by Gomulka at the June Plenum. They rejected Gomulka's
analysis and accused the General Secretary of succumbing to a
"rightist deviation," because he advocated the "nationalist and
opportunist" traditions of the PPS as a programme for the PZPR.25
The collective comments of the Politburo contained six charges
against Gomulka.26 Only the last two points, involving the KPP,
concern us at this stage.
The PPR Politburo maintained that Gomulka's interpretation of
the KPP was entirely incorrect. They argued that the "simple view"
of the KPP as an "agent of Moscow" blindly "accepted the legends
disseminated by class enemies." Gomulka "incorrectly focused" on
the "Luxemburgist tendencies" within the KPP, which alone opposed
Polish independence. The PPR Politburo asserted that the programme
of "the KPP stood primarily on the foundations of independence" and
Gomulka misinterpreted the so-called "abstract revolutionism" of
the KPP. He failed to realize that the KPP "trained a great number
of functionaries who were prepared to fight both the class struggle
and the struggle against the Soviet Union." They concluded that in
light of "the evidence against Comrade Gomulka," his interpretation
of the working class movement falls into the category of
"bourgeois-nationalism and reformism." The new Party, the PPR
leadership concluded, must reflect a "Marxist-Leninist base" and
cannot accept "bourgeois ideology" into its programme.27
Gomulka responded to the Buro on 15 June in a long letter and
candidly rejected all the criticisms of his June speech.28 He
endeavoured to "correct" the Politburo's historiography and warned
the leadership of succumbing to "the sectarian errors of the KPP,"
which also spelled the "return to faulty and injurious KPP tradit-
ions."29 Gomulka thus isolated himself from the PPR leadership.
While the dispute over the ideological traditions of the KPP
and the future programme of the PZPR became acute, the relations
between Stalin and Tito worsened. The rulers of Eastern Europe had
25
The entire document has been reprinted under the title "Stanowisko Biura
Politycznego KC PPR w sprawie referatu Wladyslawa Gomulki wygolszonego dnia 3 VI
1948" in Jakub Andrzejewski, ed., Gomulka i inni: Dokumenty z Archiwum KC, 1948-
1982 [hereafter Gomulka i inni] (London, 1987), pp. 13-16.
26
On the first four points see ibid., pp. 13-14.
27
ibid., pp. 14-15.
28
"Odpowiedz Wladyslawa Gomulki z dnia 15 VI 1948 na stanowisko Biura
Politycznego KC PPR" in ibid., pp. 16-28.
29
ibid., pp. 26-28.
- 7 -
accepted undivided Soviet leadership of the communist movement and

decided to adopt Soviet economic practice. Gomulka had been the
only leader in the region, excluding Tito, who resisted Stalin's
demands.
The death knell of Gomulka's 'Polish road to socialism' came
at the Cominform conference held in Rumania at the end of June.
The resolution of the Cominform approved the total collectivization
of agriculture, the liquidation of the 'kulaks', and called for the
intensification of the class struggle in the construction of
socialism. The Cominform also attacked all forms of 'rightist-
nationalist deviation' and demanded that the Yugoslav communists
purge Tito and install an "internationalist leadership."30
The criticisms against Gomulka put forward by the PPR
Politburo and the July resolutions of the Cominform were formally
adopted by the KC PPR at the July Plenum of 1948.31 Bierut drafted
the resolution which explained the struggle against the 'rightist-
nationalist deviation' and delivered it at the August-September
Plenum.32 He argued that the 'rightist deviation' had been in
total contradiction to the Party line and the major tenants of
Marxism-Leninism.33 Bierut accused Gomulka of rejecting the Soviet
model of development and the leading role of the USSR among all
socialist states. Thirty-seven KC members followed Bierut and
attacked the General Secretary. The resolution against the
'rightist deviation' was passed unanimously and Bierut replaced
Gomulka as the First Secretary of the PPR. The purge of those
34
connected to Gomulka began shortly thereafter.
KHRUSHCHEV AND PZPR ACTIVISTS OF JEWISH ORIGIN

One of the first indications of the official wave of anti-
Semitism that rolled into Poland from the USSR came on the heels of
the infamous 'Kremlin doctors plot' of 1953, under the guise of
'anti-Zionism'. An article in Nowe Drogi, entitled "Murders in
White Aprons" and written by Michal Mirski, defended the charges
against the doctors on the grounds that they were Zionists and thus
30
Cited in Werblan, Wladyslaw Gomulka, pp. 550-552.
31
See the debate in Nowe Drogi, no. 10 (1948).
32
Jan Michasiewicz and Wladyslaw Namiotkiewicz, "Z kroniki zycia i
dzialalnosci Wladyslawa Gomulki," Miesiecznik Literacki, no. 6 (1984), pp. 82-
83.
33
See the debate in Nowe Droge, no. 11 (1948).
34
Gomulka was arrested on 12 August 1951.
- 8 -
worked for the forces of reaction and imperialism.35 Although

Mirski's article was inspired by the Soviet-led security apparatus
and published while Beria was still in power, it was never repudi-
ated during the 'thaw'.
In a self-criticism submitted on 5 May 1956 to the PZPR
Politburo, Berman confirmed that the Soviets were planning to purge
PZPR activists of Jewish origin.36 The head of the Buro's commis-
sion on security affairs from 1948 to 1953 reported:
In 1953, together with the Soviet advisors, Comrade [Georgii] Popov37

prepared a special and thorough study of former Trotskyists in the
Party. The Tenth Department then furnished very wide-ranging plans
[Purges] on this subject. On the recommendation of Comrade [Bierut] I
became familiar with these plans and voiced my opinion that they be
38
markedly constricted. In any case, the plans were not realized.
Nevertheless, anti-Semitism had been a factor in the numerous

changes that took place within the highest-echelons of the PZPR in
early 1954. The Soviet policy towards Poland's activists of Jewish
origin was recently described by Stefan Staszewski thus:
Soviet ambassador Popov, in an official demarche, demanded the

dismissal of Staszewski, [Artur] Starewicz, [Leon] Kasman and about two
other comrades. They had got back on their old anti-Semitic course,
and we were Jews. Bierut said to me outright: it pains me, but it's
39
not our decision.
Khrushchev also managed "to pressure" Bierut in March 1954 to

remove the three senior Party leaders of Jewish origin -- Berman,
Minc and Zambrowski -- from the PZPR Secretariat.40
According to Berman, Khrushchev "claimed there were too many
Jews in the [Polish] administration" and therefore demanded that
they be dismissed or demoted. He continued:
Khrushchev thought it would be conducive to calming the atmosphere and

defusing the situation if I were dismissed and all the blame for the
41
preceding period fell on me.
35
See Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism
(New York, 1982), p. 92 [Nowe Drogi, no. 2 (1953)].
36
Jews were cryptically referred to as 'Trotskyists'.
37
Popov was appointed Soviet ambassador to Poland on 22 June 1953.
38
"Oswiadczenie tow. Bermana do protokolu BP, 5 V 1956 r., Protokol Biura
Politycznego, KC PZPR," CA KC PZPR 325/Jakub Berman -- archiwum.
39
Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, p. 145.
40
Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 343.
41
ibid.
- 9 -
Berman added that the "words" of the Soviet leader "were zealously
taken up by others and put forward as arguments."42 Khrushchev
wrote in his memoirs that Bierut "relied" too much on Jews who had
"great influence" in the PZPR:
Berman had great influence on Bierut. Anything he wanted to do he

could do through Bierut...Berman's attitude toward native Polish cadres
was incorrect,43 and it resulted in certain difficulties for the
[PZPR]44...[Minc] too was one of Bierut's key advisors and supporters.
But, like Berman, Minc demonstrated certain peculiarities for which he
later had to be censured by the Party. I would have to say that Bierut
45
may have relied on both these men more than he should have.
THE NOVEMBER 1954 CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PARTY AKTIV

The so-called political 'thaw' that followed the adoption of
the 'new course' by the PZPR at the IX Plenum of October 1953 had
become a permanent feature of Polish political life only after the
4 November 1954 conference of the Central Party aktiv. The
conference had been the most important meeting held by the PZPR
before the XX Congress. Until November 1954, the leading Party
activists continued to publicly uphold the correctness of the
Stalinist system.
The November conference was called by the PZPR leadership as
a result of the events that followed the liquidation of Stalin's
secret police chief. A few days after the CPSU announced on 4
December 1953 that Beria had been executed, Colonel Jozef Swiatlo
of the Tenth Department of the MBP defected to the West.46
Furthermore, Swiatlo proceeded to broadcast a series of sensational
revelations on the Party elite and the security apparatus on Radio
Free Europe in September 1954.47 The defection led to the quiet
42
ibid.
43
`Native' cadres in this context means gentiles rather than those PZPR
activists who served in Poland during World War II.
44
A reference to Berman's appointment of Polish Jews to senior positions
within the security apparatus.
45
The Last Testament, p. 179.
46
See Zbigniew Blazynski, ed., Mowi Jozef Swiatlo: Za kulisami bezpieki i
partii, 1940-55 [hereafter Mowi Jozef Swiatlo] (London, 1986). Swiatlo was head
of the department dealing with 'enemies within the Party'. He was responsible
for the arrest of Gomulka and Spychalski.
47
Swiatlo's disclosures were also printed on leaflets and dropped via bal-
loons over Poland. For further details on 'Operation Spotlight' see Mowi Jozef
Swiatlo, pp. 84-86; Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, Wojna w eterze: Wspomnienia (1948-
1956), vol. I (London, 1986), pp. 159-162; Adam Bromke, "Akcja Balonowa,"
Polityka (7 October 1989), p. 13; and "Freedom to the Oppressed Peoples -- Aim
of American Foreign Policy, 23 January 1956," DDE Library, Jackson Papers, Box
45/Folder 2.
- 10 -
removal of the two most notorious Soviet advisors in the security

apparatus and brought about a purge of leading functionaries in the
MBP.48 Swiatlo's defection served to heighten the failures of the
Stalinist system among the Party elite.49 The fact that Swiatlo as
well as other MBP officials were of Jewish origin also engendered
questions about the future role of Jewish activists in the PZPR.
Since a Party conference had no right to pass resolutions,
the November meeting served to gauge the mood of the Party elite.
The anger displayed by the leading Party activists had exceeded the
worst fears of the leadership. Ochab conceded: "I remember the
mood of the Party aktiv after the November conference of 1954, when
the leadership actually found itself isolated."50
The security apparatus had been the main object of criticism
at the November Conference, including a heated discussion on the
responsibility for the period of so-called 'errors and distort-
ions'.51 The speech of Wiktor Klosiewicz, the chairman of the
Central Council of Trade Unions, had dominated the meeting. He
argued that the leadership had no grounds for keeping Gomulka
imprisoned and demanded the release of the former General Secre-
tary.52 The initial remarks by Klosiewicz were greeted with
overwhelming support by the delegates until the CRZZ Chairman added
that the responsibility for the crimes committed by the security
apparatus lay with Berman. He also listed a number of other Party
functionaries responsible for the security apparatus, all of them
of Jewish origin, and proposed a public trial.53
48
Namely Colonel Dymitr Wozniesienski of the GZI and his deputy Colonel
Antoni Skulbaszewski. See Interview with Skulbaszewski in Michal Komar and
Krzysztof Lang, "Mysmy juz o tym mowili, prosze Pana..." Zeszyty Historyczne,
no. 91 (1990).
49
On the Polish security apparatus see the excellent account by Wojciech
Lizak, "Aparat represji w Polsce w latach 1948-1952," Res Publica, no. 6 (June
1988); and his "Aparat represji w Polsce w latach 1953-1955," ibid., no. 7
(1988).
50
Nowe Drogi, no. 10 (October 1956), p. 115.
51
See the comments by one of the participants Jerzy Putrament, Pol Wieku:
Literaci, vol. IV (Warsaw, 1971), p. 251.
52
Klosiewicz in Eugeniusz Wasik, "Kompleks odnowy" (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 83-
84.
53
Interview with Klosiewicz in Toranska, Oni [hereafter Toranska (Polish)]
(London, 1985), pp. 176-179. Of course there had been anti-Jewish purges in
Poland during Bierut's reign, but much of that was left to the Soviet advisors
in the GZI WP. Bierut focused his attention on the 'national communists'. Cf.
"Z archiwum Boleslaw Bieruta" in Maria Turlejska, ed., Te pokolenia zalobami
czarne: Skazani na smierc i ich sedziowie 1944-1954 (London, 1989). See also
George H. Hodos, Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954
(New York, 1987); Checinski, Poland; Flora Lewis, Red Pawn: The Story of Noel
- 11 -
Klosiewicz and some of his political allies, the "minority of

die-hard Stalinists," as Pelczynski called the core of the so-
called `Natolin group', decided to focus blame for the Party's lack
of political legitimacy on activists of Jewish origin.54 In a
recent response to a question about the attempt to restrict the
number of Jews in the Party apparatus and other state institutions,
Klosiewicz responded thus:
Zenek [Nowak] said what people felt and thought. He did this very
delicately, in fact. After going to Gdansk in 1954 he realized that
there were too many Jewish professors at the academies, so he demanded
that the Party do something about it. Of course, they called this
55
discrimination.
At this early stage of the mounting crisis, those Party

activists who supported cadre policies with clearly anti-Jewish
overtones also tended to vociferously support Gomulka's release
from prison.56 The apparent coincidence did not go unnoticed by
the majority of the leading central Party activists, especially
those of Jewish origins. The November conference had marked the
beginning of the divisions within the central apparatus of power.
The debate turned to the question of responsibility for the period
of 'errors and distortions'.57
It was also at the November 1954 conference of the central
Party aktiv that the nucleus of the so-called Natolin 'faction'
(sometimes called 'Boors' or 'Yokels' by their detractors) first
surfaced.58 For the moment, however, it is only necessary to list
the names of those who have been most often cited as the leading
'members' associated with this group: Stanislaw Brodzinski, Hilary
Chelchowski, Franciszek Jozwiak, Wiktor Klosiewicz, Wladyslaw
Kruczek, Stanislaw Lapot, Stefan Matuszewski, Kazimierz Mijal,
Zenon Nowak, Konstanty Rokossowski, Boleslaw Ruminski, Feliks
Field (New York, 1965); and Interview with Skulbaszewski in Komar and Lang, op.
cit.
54
Pelczynski in Leslie, op. cit., p. 335.
55
Klosiewicz in Wasik, op. cit. p. 86. See also the discussion on the
question of anti-Semitism among PZPR functionaries in ibid., pp. 85-93.
56
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 25 February 1971, Krytyka, no. 6 (1980), pp. 61-
62.
57
For a detailed account of the period between Stalin's death and the XX
CPSU Congress see Lizak, "Przyczyny Kryzysu w Pazdzierniku 1956 r. na tle
sytuacji w Europejskich krajach socjalistycznych," (Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, Poznan, 1986).
58
The Natolin group, named after a district in Warsaw where the 'members'
reportedly met, never organized themselves into a formal Party faction. For a
more detailed discussion on the Pulawy and Natolin group see chapter 3.
- 12 -
Stolinski, Jan Trusz, Kazimierz Witaszewski, and occasionally

Aleksander Zawadzki.59
SUMMARY
From the end of 1954 to the end of 1955 the Bierut regime
merely toyed with the idea of reform. The actual Soviet attitude
towards de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe remained unclear. The
PZPR Politburo appeared to shift in favour of greater reforms at
the end of December 1955, but the situation faced by the working
class and the peasantry had only moderately improved during the
'thaw'.
The decision to weaken the grotesquely powerful security
forces after November 1954 also shifted the balance away from the
hardliners in the Politburo. This explains why heightened social
criticism and other 'revisionist' tendencies were largely advanced
by Poland's tiny Marxist intelligentsia before the XX Congress.60
The governing elite could no longer depend on the security forces
to control and manipulate the Party and society. The ensuing
period of ideological confusion, political uncertainty, and general
demoralization threatened the whole structure of the regime. In
short, a plethora of uncertainties about the future evolution of
Polish communism had been generated immediately upon the death of
Stalin.
The spark that ignited the de-Stalinization campaign in
Poland, however, was the XX Congress and Khrushchev's attack on
Stalin. It is difficult today to appreciate the almost
revolutionary nature of the turmoil which gripped international
communism after the revelations about the 'cult of personality and
its consequences' had been announced in Moscow. For approximately
thirty years, communists from around the world had been taught to
regard the decisions taken by Stalin, on all matters of communist
theory and practice, as virtually irrefutable.61 As Gomulka later
59
Cf. Witold Jedlicki, "Chamy i Zydy," Kultura, no. 12 (1962), p. 13; and
Jerzy Eisler, Marzec 1968: Geneza, Przebieg, Konsekwencje (Warsaw, 1991), pp.
22-23.
60
Echoes of dissent from Poland's intellectuals had been well established
in 1955. Discussion clubs for intellectuals grew rapidly from late 1955 until
the summer of 1956. The most famous was the Crooked Circle Club in Warsaw,
which was founded by the staff of Po Prostu. For more information on the clubs
see Jedlicki, Klub Krzywego Kola (Paris, 1963), esp. ch. 2.
61
See Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origins, Growth and
Dissolution, vol. III (Oxford, 1981), pp. 451-453.
- 13 -
confirmed, shortly before the events of the 'Polish October' had

come to a close:
The XX Congress of the CPSU incited a shift in the political life of

the country. A heated, healthy current moved the mass of the Party,
the working class, the entire society. People began to walk tall.
Silent, enslaved minds began to shake off the poison of duplicity,
62
falsehood, and hypocrisy.
62
Excerpt from Gomulka's speech to the VIII KC PZPR Plenum, Nowe Drogi, no.
10 (October 1956), p. 28.
CHAPTER TWO
THE XX CPSU CONGRESS
The theoretical contribution of the XX CPSU Congress towards an

understanding of the future domestic evolution of communism in Eastern
Europe was marginal. Although the XX Congress reaffirmed the right of
a communist state to deviate from the more or less uniform pattern of
development which had hitherto guided the Eastern European communist
and workers' parties from 1948, the primary contribution of the XX
Congress was the official denunciation of Stalin the consequences of
the so-called 'cult of personality'. Mikoyan and Khrushchev opened the
door to a more realistic assessment of Stalinist policies in the region
and the legacy it had left in its path.
In 1955 Khrushchev had articulated a new theory to govern
relations between the communist states in light of the relaxation of
tensions between East and West, the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation, and
Moscow's subsequent acknowledgment of 'different roads to socialism'.
In a leading article in the CPSU's theoretical journal, Khrushchev's
new line towards the East European states was explicitly declared:
A new, socialist type of international relations arose with the formulation

of the commonwealth of socialist states. These relations are based on fully
equal rights...fraternal cooperation in the sphere of politics, economics,
and culture, and mutual assistance in the construction of a new life. These
relations are determined by the nature of the social-economic system...of
the socialist camp; by the unity of their fundamental interests and ultimate
great aim, the building of communism; and by the single Marxist-Leninist
1
world view of the Communist and Workers' parties [...]
The editorial in Kommunist did not suggest the end of Soviet hegemony
in East Europe, but the notion of a 'socialist commonwealth' indicated
that the Soviets were willing to accept some kind of diversity among
the People's Democracies. The problem was that the Kremlin left it to
the 'fraternal' allies to define the content and limits of any future
deviation, even after the XX Congress.2
In response to the 'commonwealth' article, the theoretical
journal of the PZPR delineated the limits of the 'Polish road to
socialism'. The editors of Nowe Drogi admitted:
We have paid too little attention to that which is innate in our movement,
in our historical road, in our methods of construction, in our struggle and
1
Emphasis added. Kommunist (September 1955), trans. in Brzezinski, The
Soviet Bloc, p. 181.
2
See esp. ibid., pp. 155-180.
- 15 -
slogans, to that which arises from the specific conditions in the development
of our country and from our historical past [...]
The PZPR sought to guard against any possible misinterpretations. The

same article warned that it would not tolerate
general ideological chaos...nihilistic tendencies to disregard the

achievements of the past ten years, particularly in the field of socialist
culture and morality...tendencies to revise our ideological principles,
attempts at an allegedly creative 'supplementation' of Marxism...various
concepts of liberalism, solidarism, relativism, cultural autonomy...an
autonomy conceived as being independent of the class struggle, of politics,
3
and of the leading role of the Party.
The PZPR simultaneously promised greater political diversity away from

the Soviet model and attacked the growing movement for reform; a
movement that took its lead from the policy changes introduced in the
Soviet Union. The XX Congress underlined the duplicity of the PZPR's
position.
DIVERGING ROADS TO SOCIALISM

The first CPSU Congress since Stalin's death opened on 14 February
in the Soviet capital and closed on 25 February after twenty sessions.
1355 voting delegates and 81 delegates with consultive status,
including representatives from fifty-five foreign communist and
worker's parties, met in the Kremlin's Great Palace.4 The large Polish
delegation departed for Moscow on 12 February and included: Bierut,
Berman, Zawadzki, Cyrankiewicz, and Morawski. 5 The following day,
Pravda published an article by Bierut in which he stressed the complete
loyalty of the PZPR to the CPSU and "Stalin's model of
industrialization."6
The proceedings began with a lengthy report from Khrushchev.7 His
first speech to the Congress focused on the need for the pragmatic
3
Nowe Drogi, no. 10 (October 1955), trans. in Paul E. Zinner, ed., National
Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events
in Poland and Hungary [hereafter National Communism] (New York, 1956), p. 8.
4
The PZPR was listed second, after the Chinese, in the ranking of foreign
delegations at the Congress. Current Digest of the Soviet Press [hereafter Current
Digest], no. 6, vol. VIII (1956), pp. 10-14.
5
A photograph of the Polish delegation is reproduced in Henryk Rechowicz's
hagiography, Boleslaw Bierut, 1892-1956 (Warsaw, 1974).
6
Bierut's article was reproduced in Trybuna Ludu (14 February 1956).
7
Wolfgang Leonhard [The Kremlin since Stalin (London, 1962), p. 122] suggested
that the East Europeans were forewarned that the Congress would be critical of Stalin.
Berman argued that the Poles had been surprised by the assault on Stalin. Interview
with Berman in Toranska, p. 345.
- 16 -
application of theory in order to transform Soviet society from

socialism to communism. The Soviet struggle to overtake the indus-
trially more advanced countries was to be won by a combination of
practical measures.8 Khrushchev also called for a permanent return to
the principal of collective leadership, which had been apart of his
reform programme since 1953.
The Soviet leader made a number of remarks about the so-called
'errors and distortions' of the recent past. Although Stalin's name
was not used, Khrushchev roundly attacked the notorious theory of the
sharpening of class conflict in the course of socialist construction.9
He declared the theory false at the Congress, emphasizing the
disappearance of antagonistic social classes in the Soviet Union. The
Poles took this to mean the end to large-scale repression in Eastern
Europe.10 If there were doubts among the Congress delegates about the
future role of the security apparatus in the Soviet state structure,
Khrushchev laid that question to rest:
Experience teaches us that the slightest weakening of socialist legality

is used by the enemies of the Soviet state in their infamous diversionary
activities. Such activities were conducted by the gang of Beria...which
had attempted to remove the state security organs from the control of the
Party and the government, and to create there an atmosphere of lawlessness
and license...this gang fabricated accusations against honest leading Party
11
workers and other Soviet citizens.
The Soviet leader's reassertion that there was no single formula

for the building of socialism also had direct bearing on Eastern Europe.
He added:
Much of what is unique in socialist construction is being contributed by

the Chinese...possessing an economy that was exceedingly backward and bore
a semi-feudal and semi-colonial character until the triumph of the
revolution...The leadership that has been taken in the great cause of
socialist construction by the Communist Party of China and the Communist
and Workers' Parties of the other people's democracies in keeping with the
peculiarities and specific features of each country is creative Marxism in
action. The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, where power belongs
to the working people and society, is founded on the public ownership of
8
Current Digest, no. 4, pp. 3-12. See also XX S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii
Sovetskogo Soiuza, 14-25 fevralia 1956 g. Stenograficheskii otchet [hereafter XX
S'ezd], vol. I (Moscow, 1956).
9
This theory was formulated by Stalin in his struggle against Bukharin in 1929
and used again in the mid-1930's to justify the Great Purge of that period. See
Stalin's speech to the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum of 29 April 1929 in Problems
of Leninism (Moscow, 1953), p. 309.
10
See Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 345.
11
Current Digest, no. 6, p. 8.
- 17 -
the means of production and possesses unique and specific forms of economic
management and organization of the state apparatus, which had arisen in the
12
process of socialist construction.
Khrushchev acknowledged that the transition to socialism was not

"always bound up with civil war," as had been the case with the USSR,
and added that since the ascendency of the Bolsheviks in Russia
"fundamental changes have taken place which make it possible to approach
the question [of building socialism] in a new way."13
M.A. Suslov, a leading CPSU ideologue, later declared: according
to Lenin, "while the path to socialism would essentially be one and the
same for all, the transition to socialism would not be entirely
identical."14 In an interview with the editors of Trybuna Ludu, Suslov
emphasised the replacement of the phrase "socialist bloc" with "a world
socialist economic system," where the states of Eastern Europe
cooperated with the USSR because of a common economic system and other
shared values.15
After Khrushchev's first speech, it was evident that the changes
initiated earlier by the Soviet Union were to continue. Indeed, during
the opening session, the Soviet leader asked the delegates to stand in
honour of three recently deceased "outstanding leaders of the communist
movement - Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Klement Gottwald and Kyuchi
Tokuda."16 Khrushchev publicly demoted Stalin by equating him with the
former Czechoslovak President and a relatively unknown Japanese
communist. The Soviets also stopped the hitherto endless stream of
praise reserved for Stalin at such occasions. Enver Hoxha, the Albania
First Secretary, described the Congress thus:
The liberal spirit pervaded the whole atmosphere...it prevailed in the

corridors and the congress halls, it was apparent in people's faces, gestures
17
and words.
Although a number of unsavoury events from Stalin's past had been

exposed earlier in the Soviet press, Beria remained the central object
of official condemnation for the crimes of the past. No one in the CPSU
12
ibid., no. 4, p. 11.
13
ibid.
14
Cited in Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record
of the Twentieth Party Congress and its Aftermath, vol. II (New York, 1957), p. 49.
15
Trybuna Ludu (18 February 1956).
16
17
Hoxha, The Khrushchevites: Memoirs (Tirana, 1980), p. 181. This highly
partisan and myopic volume nevertheless makes a number of pertinent references to
the XX Congress.
- 18 -
ruling elite publicly risked the mildest correlation between Stalin and
the outrages associated with Beria. As Khrushchev later explained:
For a while we gave the Party and the people incorrect explanations about
what had happened; we blamed everything on Beria. He was a convenient
figure. We did everything we could to shield Stalin, not yet fully realizing
18
that we were harbouring a criminal, an assassin, a mass murderer!
MIKOYAN AND THE MYTH OF STALIN

Bierut's inaugural speech to the Congress, presented on 16
February, showed no sign of the new thinking hitherto articulated by
the Soviets. In a short and uninspiring address, Bierut repeated the
usual platitudes about the "heroic CPSU" and the "complete allegiance"
of the PZPR, the Polish working class, and the Polish nation to the
Soviet Union and the Soviet Party. 19 While the post-Stalin CPSU
leadership reaffirmed their intention to review Moscow's dominant role
in Eastern Europe, the PZPR First Secretary swore fidelity to the Soviet
Union. Such a position was hardly popular in Poland. The Bierut
leadership also isolated itself from their patrons in Moscow.
The next significant speech was delivered on the fourth day of
the proceedings by Mikoyan, the leading Khrushchev supporter in the CPSU
Politburo. Mikoyan was the first person at the Congress to explicitly
criticize the Stalin years:
For...a party of the Leninist type, the principle of collective leadership

is elementary. However, this...must be emphasized because for about twenty
years we had in fact no collective leadership; the cult of the individual
flourished -- a cult that had been condemned by Marx and later by Lenin --
and this, of course, could not fail to have an extremely negative effect
20
on the situation within the Party and on its work.
He also condemned two of the leading theoretical texts of the Stalin-

ist period: Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, and the grossly
falsified history of the CPSU, A Short Course.21
Mikoyan's speech was reportedly received with enthusiasm by a
number of the Polish delegates. Berman, who probably recognized that
18
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers [hereafter Khrushchev Remembers] (Boston,
1970), p. 343.
19
"Przemowienie powitalne I sekretarza Komitetu Centralnego PZPR B. Bieruta
na XX Zjezdzie KPZR," Dokumenty i materialy do historii stosunkow Polsko-Radzieckich,
vol. X (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 15-17; and Trybuna Ludu and Pravda (17 February 1956).
20
21
ibid., pp. 322-325.
- 19 -
he still had to answer for the purges in Poland, recalled that Mikoyan's
speech "contained a promise of renewal." He added: "I succumbed to
the exalted mood and, influenced by these joyful happenings, drank a
bruderschaft with Morawski."22
Mikoyan's attack on the former Soviet leader symbolized more than
the official unmasking of Stalin's ruthlessness. His disclosures
confirmed the Soviet leadership's desire to cease the systematic use
of terror against loyal communists. Again, according to Berman:
Mikoyan naturally didn't make any revelations, but the way the accents in
23
his speech were distributed indicated that we were entering a new phase.
The myth of Stalin, while not repudiated by Mikoyan, had been challenged
on 17 February 1956.
THE KPP REHABILITATED

The first public criticism of Stalin was followed by a striking
communique from Moscow. On 19 February, Trybuna Ludu proclaimed the
rehabilitation of the KPP.24 The announcement had bearing on the future
development of events in Poland. According to the rehabilitation
communique: "the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party was
25
groundless." It was signed at the Congress on behalf of the central
committees of five communist parties, the CPSU, PZPR, Italian Communist
Party, Bulgarian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Finland.26
The exact circumstances surrounding the elimination of the KPP are not
22
23
ibid.
24
Rehabilitation was also extended to the youth wing of the KPP and to the
Communist Party of Western Belorussia, affiliated to the KPP; although its
rehabilitation had been slightly delayed because the communist resistance group in
Minsk was doubly accused of being 'provocatory' during the war. The rehabilitation
of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, also affiliated to the KPP, did not take
place until 1963. See "Za pravilnoe osveshchenie istorii Kommunisticheskoi Partii
Zapadnoi Ukrainy," Kommunist, no. 10 (1963).
Most members of the affiliated organizations were rehabilitated with the
members of the KPP or by a special joint CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party resolution
passed in August 1956. The case of individuals was expedited because the PZPR (and
CPSU) had many Western Belorussian and Western Ukrainian members within their ranks
(Marian Naszkowski, Poland's deputy foreign minister, and Roman Werfel, a leading
PZPR ideologue) and there was a need to alleviate a shortage of cadres. For details
see Borys Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1952-1980 (Edmonton,
1984), pp. 20-21.
25
Reprinted in National Communism, p. 37.
26
Pravda published the communique on 21 February.
- 20 -
known, but it is possible that representatives from four of the above

mentioned parties signed the original decree to dissolve the KPP.
The KPP, whose command structure was almost entirely liquidated
during the bloody purges of 1938, had the dubious distinction of having
been the only communist party completely disgraced and disbanded by the
Comintern. The communique declared that the KPP had been dissolved
because of "an accusation made at that time concerning wide-scale
penetration by enemy agents into the ranks of its leading Party aktiv."
Upon further investigation, it was ascertained that "this accusation
was based on materials which were falsified by subsequently exposed
provocateurs."27 An editorial which augmented the Polish communique
added that the 'evidence' "had been faked by a gang of saboteurs and
provocateurs whose real role was only brought to light after Beria was
unmasked."28 Bierut refused to connect Stalin to the elimination of
the KPP.29
The timing of the communique was significant for two reasons.
First, it was in Khrushchev's interest to rehabilitate the KPP at the
Congress because it served to embarrass the staunchly Stalinist Polish
First Secretary. Bierut, a former Comintern agent, had supported the
1938 charges against the KPP and now looked foolish.30 In light of the
stormy debates at the November conference of the central PZPR aktiv of
1954, where the rehabilitation of the KPP was first broached by Leon
Bielski, the Soviet leader recognized that a resolution of the KPP issue
was popular with the PZPR activists. 31 It appears certain that
Khrushchev was not in favour of the Polish leader's continuing
stewardship of the PZPR. Bierut was Stalin's man in Warsaw, not
Khrushchev's.32 The communique also strengthened Khrushchev's hand in
Moscow. The rehabilitation of the KPP furthered the process of
de-Stalinization and ensured that another 'deformity' from the Stalin-
ist past was put to rest.
Second, at a time when the former line against Gomulka and the
'rightist-nationalist deviation' was becoming obfuscated, and the
27
National Communism, p. 37.
28
Trybuna Ludu (19 February 1956).
29
On Stalin and the KPP see Jan Ptasinski, "Dlaczego Stalin nie lubil KPP,"
Zycie Literacki (1 May 1988), p. 4.
30
31
Jan Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow, czyli Gomulka u szczytu powodzenia,"
in Marek Jaworski, ed., Pazdziernik '56 (Warsaw, 1987), p. 89.
32
Khrushchev characterized Bierut as "Stalin's number one confident" in
Poland. Khrushchev, The Last Testament, p. 172.
- 21 -
ousted General Secretary's claim for a 'separate road to socialism'

appeared providential, the PZPR leadership agreed to restore the
revolutionary honour of the internationalist KPP. For some former KPP
members, the Comintern decision of 1938 ensured that the PPR (and PZPR)
had a fresh start. They wanted to create a more nationally-based Party
after the war, which was untainted by its opposition to Polish indepen-
dence. Gomulka already attacked the KPP and its traditions in 1948,
while Bierut defended the KPP and appealed to its supporters against
the former General Secretary.
Bierut turned the rehabilitation of the KPP to his advantage. He
made another concession to some of his critics in the PZPR and was able
to continue the Party's 1948 assault against the 'rightist-nationalist
deviation.33 Almost any strategy would have been employed by Bierut
to discredit Gomulka in the eyes of the Party activists. PZPR activists
with an intense devotion to the KPP's internationalism and activists
loyal to Stalin probably did the most to rehabilitate the old party.34
Rehabilitation of the KPP at the XX Congress must be seen through the
prism of Bierut's campaign against Gomulka. As Zambrowski put it in
his diary: "I understood, only too well, that Gomulka's return to the
Party marked at the minimum his return to the Politburo."35 Although
it is difficult to gauge the attitude of all the Politburo members
towards Bierut's aims at this point, Ochab and Zawadzki probably
supported the First Secretary in order to boost their own leadership
chances. Moreover, almost all the PZPR leaders played a pivotal role
in Gomulka's humiliating fall from power in 1948-1949. It would be
difficult to imagine that Gomulka's return to the Party -- at this stage
-- was desired by anyone in the Polish leadership.
33
This should not suggest that Bierut had been unconcerned about the fate of
the leading KPP activists that went missing during the Great Purges. Stefan
Staszewski recently said that around 1950 "Bierut returned so shaken from one of his
trips to Moscow...that he came back here and described it. He'd gone to see Stalin
[about the fate of KPP activists]...Stalin repeated his little circus with [Beria],
and Bierut and Beria left Stalin's office together, whereupon Beria said to him...why
are you fucking around with Iosif Vissarianovich? You fuck off and leave him alone.
That's my advice to you, or you'll regret it." Interview with Staszewski in Toranska,
p. 146. On Bierut and the KPP see also Alicja Zawadzka-Wetz, Refleksje pewnego zycia
(Paris, 1967), pp. 43-44; and Stanislaw Szwalbe in "Czy Bierut byl 'Polskim
Stalinem'?" Polityka (25 February 1989), p. 14.
34
On the KPP, the national question, and Jewish membership in the Party see
Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Motory i hamulce socjalizmu (Paris, 1969), pp. 45-46.
35
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 25 February 1971, p. 61.
- 22 -
KHRUSHCHEV'S 'SECRET SPEECH'

The most explosive speech at the XX Congress came on 24 and 25
February. The CPSU delegates concluded the Congress with the election
of a new Central Committee and with the unanimous election of Khrushchev
to the post of First Secretary. During the short recess between
Khrushchev's election and the nomination of the Presidium, at most
overnight, the Soviet leader seized the opportunity given by this
"period of unchecked power" and called for an immediate extension of
the already adjourned Congress.36 After many of the Soviet delegates
had been forced to return to the Kremlin from their hotels, Khrushchev
announced that the Congress would continue in closed session. No one
from the foreign delegations was allowed into the main conference hall.
About half an hour before midnight, Khrushchev began his historic
four-hour speech. He launched the first official debate about the
extent of Stalin's crimes towards the Soviet Party and the USSR.
The closed evening session was a bombshell. In the words of
Zhores and Roy Medvedev, "the delegates listened to Khrushchev in shock
and silence, only from time to time could one hear expressions of
astonishment and indignation." 37 There was no discussion after the
speech. During the early morning of 25 February the XX Congress was
finally brought to a close. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin,
entitled "On the cult of personality and its consequences," has been
thoroughly analyzed in a number of studies and the contents of the speech
do not have direct bearing on our discussion.38 Some of the reasons
for Khrushchev's decision to denounce Stalin, however, do relate to our
argument.39
The period from the arrest of Beria in June 1953 until the XX
Congress "was make-or-break for Khrushchev." 40 In September 1953,
Khrushchev assumed the post of First Secretary. While Malenkov,
Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and Voroshilov, had not resigned
36
Roy A. and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (Oxford,
1977), p. 69.
37
Z.A. and R.A. Medvedev, ed., The 'Secret' Speech by N.S. Khrushchev
[hereafter The 'Secret' Speech] (Nottingham, 1976), pp. 9-10.
38
See for instance ibid., esp. pp. 9-18; Boris I. Nicolaevsky, ed., The Crimes
of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. By Nikita S. Khrushchev (New York, 1962); and Kolakowski, Main
Currents, vol. III, pp. 450-456.
39
Khrushchev's own reasoning is provided in Khrushchev Remembers, pp.
341-353.
40
Edward Crankshaw in ibid, p. 341.
- 23 -
themselves to defeat, they did little to counter Khrushchev. The

Soviet leader outmanoeuvred his rivals until they fell into line on
almost all domestic and foreign policy issues favoured by the First
Secretary. Khrushchev personalized key domestic policy initiatives
and ensured that his name became known throughout the USSR. He also
made every effort during his official trips abroad to portray himself
as the uncontested leader within the Soviet Party and state apparatus.
Even Malenkov, Khrushchev's major adversary at this stage, had been
forced to resign his post as Prime Minister in February 1955 and thereby
relinquish his power base.41 No one in the CPSU Politburo appears to
have been as well suited for Kremlin political intrigue as the First
Secretary. Although Khrushchev had well over a year to go before he
enjoyed a supreme position within the Soviet leadership, during the
Congress he held the commanding position.42
But Khrushchev had been vulnerable in February 1956. The 'secret
speech' became one of the most important risks the Soviet leader took
during his political ascent. He had no intention of presenting the
speech and attacking Stalin until he understood the mood of the Congress
delegates.43 Mikoyan took the first step. Khrushchev's decision to
read the speech at the last minute was particularly brilliant. The
boldness of the move ensured that Khrushchev would gain almost complete
credit for the course of de-Stalinization. He ignited a flame which
set the communist world afire and in one fell swoop had turned the once
omnipotent and omniscient Stalin into a mostly mediocre, brutal, and
cold-blooded despot.44
41
For further analysis of this period see Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 155-209.
42
Khrushchev's position stabilized only after the removal of the so-called
Anti-Party Group in June 1957. In brief, the Anti-Party Group had been a loose
coalition of Stalinists who unsuccessfully made an attempt to oust Khrushchev from
his post as First Secretary. The Group gathered the majority of the Presidium against
Khrushchev, but with the aid of Marshal Zhukov and a military airlift of enough Central
Committee members to Moscow, Khrushchev had been able to reverse the Presidium and
turn the tables on his opponents. The three leading figures in the Group were
Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, although the charges also extended to Bulganin,
Voroshilov and others. Mikoyan, after a brief eclipse, was the only major personality
in the immediate post-Stalin leadership to escape Khrushchev's purge.
43
See the remarks made by Veljko Micunovic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow,
in his Moscow Diary (New York, 1980), 2 April 1956, p. 27.
44
See the following comments in The 'Secret' Speech: pp. 24-25, pars. 5 and
6; p. 26, pars. 3 and 4; p. 28, par. 1; p. 30, par. 2; p. 35, par. 2; p. 44, par.
5; and p. 45, par. 2. Cf. also The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism:
A Selection of Documents (New York, 1956).
- 24 -
SUMMARY
Bierut, along with the first secretaries of the 'sister' parties,
received a copy of the 'secret speech' on the evening of 25 February.45
According to Khrushchev:
We took measures to make sure that copies of it were circulated to the fraternal
46
Communist Parties so that they could familiarize themselves with it.
He added:
we gave it out to the heads of the delegations present so they could study it.
47
Comrade Bierut received it and sent it back to Warsaw.
The first secretaries naturally passed their copies to close Politburo

allies.48 Berman later confirmed:
On the last day of the Congress Khrushchev made a speech in a closed meeting that
was for delegates only. Foreign guests were not invited into the conference
hall. I was due to return to Poland the following day. Bierut received a
49
copy of this speech and he lent it to me on the final night.
Berman passed on Bierut's copy of the speech to some of the other

PZPR delegates. Jozef Winiewicz, who helped represent the Polish
foreign ministry at the XX Congress, remembered delivering a copy of
Khrushchev's speech, entirely by chance, to Zenon Nowak in Warsaw some
time before 12 March. Winiewicz claims that deputy foreign minister
Naszkowski, who headed the delegation from the ministry, handed him the
speech in Minsk with instructions to pass the manuscript back to Berman.
However, the two men had just missed each other in Warsaw because Berman
had flown back to Moscow. 50 Winiewicz added that Nowak was already
aware of the contents and value of Khrushchev's 'secret speech'.51
The reaction of the Polish delegation to the speech was uniform.
Berman recently declared that "Bierut was staggered." 52 Ochab said
45
Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 345; and Hoxha, op. cit., p. 183.
46
Khrushchev Remembers, p. 351.
47
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes [hereafter The
Glasnost Tapes] (Boston, 1990), p. 43.
48
Cf. Hoxha, op. cit., p. 183.
49
50
Naszkowski had been forced to delay his return to Poland due to illness.
Berman flew back to Moscow on 11 March because Bierut, who remained in the Soviet
Union after the Congress, was dying.
51
Winiewicz, Co pamietam z dlugiej drogi zycia (Poznan, 1985), pp. 532-533.
Winiewicz retired with the rank of deputy foreign minister from the Polish diplomatic
corps in the late 1970s and wrote, until recently, a weekly column on international
affairs in Literatura.
52
Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 345. See also Interview with Ochab
in Toranska, p. 54. Berman added: "In fact Bierut should also have had some. After
all, 'Jasia' Fornalska's entire family had been terribly hacked up during the Great
Purge...But when you only know of individual instances, the process is different from
what it is when everything is laid before you."
- 25 -
that it "was like being hit over the head with a hammer." He added:
"Khrushchev's speech was a sudden blow for everyone."53 The shock of
Khrushchev's revelations also resonated throughout the Soviet power
elite. According to Veljko Micunovic:
In official contacts with us the Russians mostly do not wish to talk about
Khrushchev's secret speech or his condemnation of Stalin. I have already
made more than fifteen calls on Soviet leaders and top officials, but only
54
Khrushchev and Bulganin spoke about the speech.
Khrushchev had demonstrated that a good part of the history of

the Soviet Party when Stalin had been at its head consisted of countless
criminal acts, prolonged periods of lawlessness and terror, murder, and
inept leadership. The consequences of Khrushchev's 'secret speech'
would be felt throughout Poland by the end of March, but it is doubtful
that the Soviets foresaw the repercussions which their new thinking was
about to have.55
Malgorzata (Jasia) Fornalska was Bierut's first wife. She helped organize the
Polish Provisional Committee founded by Feliks Dzierzinski, Feliks Kon, and Julian
Marchlewski during the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 and was part of the Second Initiative
Group of the PPR which had parachuted into Poland in 1942. She was arrested by the
Gestapo in 1943 and shot.
53
ibid., p. 55.
54
Micunovic, op. cit., 18 April 1956, p. 35.
55
See the remarks made by Khrushchev to Micunovic, ibid., 2 April 1956, pp.
30-32.
CHAPTER THREE
THE MARCH CONFERENCE OF THE CENTRAL PARTY AKTIV
The Polish delegates to the XX Congress returned to Warsaw on 26

February. Bierut was reportedly stricken with a bout of influenza and
decided to stay in the Soviet capital for medical observations. It
appears that the First Secretary had been nursing the illness well
before he had departed for the Congress. 1 But it should not be
overlooked that Bierut had been jostled by Khrushchev's attack on
Stalin. He understood only too well that the closing session on the
Congress left him politically bankrupt. Bierut may not have wanted to
return to Warsaw. Colonel Ferdynand Grzybowski, chief of security for
the Polish delegation,2 and Wanda Gorska, Bierut's longtime confiden-
tial secretary, also remained in Moscow.3
The Politburo met without Bierut during a day long session on 27
February. Senior Party leaders had been briefed by Zawadzki,
Cyrankiewicz and Morawski on Bierut's state of health, the Congress,
and Khrushchev's 'secret speech'.4 On the following day, the lead-
ership reportedly considered the possibility of calling a formal plenum
to discuss the XX Congress, but Bierut notified Berman by telephone that
he was opposed to a plenum.5
Poland's communists monitored the Congress by following the
deliberations in the Soviet and Polish press. The implications of the
Moscow debates became apparent to PZPR activists after the full text
of Mikoyan speech had been published in Pravda.6 Mikoyan's assault on
Stalin and the communique announcing the rehabilitation of the KPP
demanded prompt action from the Politburo. The leadership met again
on 18 February and resolved to call a conference of the central Party
aktiv for 3 March. However, they decided not to discuss the 'secret
speech' with the Party aktiv.
The Politburo thought they could quell the rumours about what had
actually transpired on the final day of the Congress and contain the
1
Rechowicz, op. cit., p. 267.
2
Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," p. 93. Grzybowski was also the director
of the Government Protection Department at the KSBP.
3
Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 346. On Gorska see Mowi Jozef Swiatlo,
p. 95.
4
Cf. Interview with Morawski in Barbara Lopienska and Ewa Szymanska, Stare
Numery [Po Prostu] [hereafter Stare Numery] (London, 1986), p. 49.
5
Staszewski in Jerzy Holzer, "Notatka z relacji ustnej Stefana Staszewskiego
[i inni] o wydarzeniach Pazdziernikowych 1956 r.," (Warsaw, 1978), p. 2.
(Typewritten); and Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, p. 163.
6
Pravda (15 and 18 February 1956).
- 27 -
growing unease among activists by managing a modest one-day Party

conference.7 Their only objective at this point, until Bierut returned
from Moscow, was damage control. The decision to hold a Party
conference was also taken in response to pressure exerted by the Party
activists. Staszewski, the Warsaw Party First Secretary, expressed
the view of the activists in the following manner:
We didn't have the patience to wait for Bierut to come back before hearing
the report from the Twentieth Congress, and demanded that a conference be
called. Rumours had already begun leaking through to Central Committee
members and party activists that something had happened there. So Central
Committee members began demanding a report from the delegation, and indeed
within a few days a conference of the central Party activists was called
8
[...]
THE POLITBURO DEFENDS ORTHODOXY

Zawadzki opened the deliberations by acknowledging that the most
important aspect of the Congress had been the debate on the 'cult of
personality', especially the speech by Mikoyan. The conference
chairman is even reported to have struck an emotional cord with the
select audience when he recalled Khrushchev's briefing on the personal-
ity cult to a special gathering of foreign delegates, and the subsequent
"toast" hailing the Leninist victory over the cult.9
Zawadzki hypothesized that a satisfactory understanding of the
Congress could only be achieved through its "Polonization," and the
careful "working out of its materials at all Party levels throughout
the country."10 During his examination of Stalin's personality cult,
Zawadzki discussed the problems that lay ahead for the Party:
Our Party aktiv must be prepared for the difficult task of providing clear
and concrete answers to questions which will be put forward by people in
connection to the Congress...concerning comrade Stalin, as well as questions
regarding the dissolving of the KPP and the rehabilitation of its leadership,
pertaining to Gomulka and his group, Spychalski, and others. There are also
many questions relating to conditions of work and pay, pensions, our
relationship to the individual, his constitutional rights, and the
7
Approximately one hundred of the PZPR elite were sent invitations to partici-
pate in the conference.
8
9
Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw Wladyka, "Polska proba: Pazdziernik '56
[hereafter "Polska proba"]" (Warsaw, 1987 [Typewritten Manuscript]), p. 119.
10
"Protokol narady centralnego aktywu partyjnego w 6 III 1956 r.," CA KC PZPR,
237/V-231. See also "Polska proba," pp. 119-120; and Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech,"
pp. 95-96.
- 28 -
infringements of legality, etc. -- all connected to the resolutions passed

by the XX Congress.
He concluded:
Unfortunately, we [the Politburo] are still unable to grant, at least for

the moment, complete and unambiguous answers to the problems listed above.
The other delegates to the Congress also presented their

interpretations of the CPSU assembly to the Party aktiv. Berman noted
that the Congress released the communist movement from a number of
disastrous dogmas, chiefly Stalin's thesis on the intensification of
the class struggle. He concluded that the thesis "tragically
forestalled socialist progress" and caused "irreparable damage to the
Soviet Party" and Soviet society. Morawski confined his analysis of
the Congress to administrative problems. He demanded that the
activists renew their efforts at building a stronger Party through
improved forms of discipline and organization. The KC Secretary
stressed the importance of collective leadership in Party work and the
need for closer cooperation between the senior Party leaders and other
Party activists. Morawski also called for an end to all the burdensome
bureaucratic procedures and mechanisms that continued to restrict the
authority of the Party in society.11
Cyrankiewicz focused his discussion on the economic debates that
took place at the Congress. The discussants then summarized the most
important lessons the PZPR could draw from the Soviet gathering.
Berman noted that the tempo of reforms demanded in the resolutions
passed by the III Plenum of January 1955 ought to be accelerated,
primarily those reforms that affected the security organs. Morawski
followed with a recommendation that a plenum on the national economy
be convened in order to deal with past 'mistakes and errors'. His call
was the only concrete proposal made by a member of the leadership. The
remaining remarks included an ambiguous suggestion for further review
of the XX Congress and a general call to reverse the 'delays and breaks'
on the resolutions passed at the III Plenum.
11
Staszewski suggested that after Morawski's speech the conference
participants began to suspect that the leadership was holding back something import-
ant. See the discussion in Holzer, op. cit., p. 2.
- 29 -
THE CENTRAL PARTY AKTIV REACTS

Mikoyan's public assault on the cult of personality, and the
statements at the Congress which recognized distinct roads to
socialism, helped set the tone of the two day conference in Warsaw.
Mikoyan's speech was also used by many conference delegates as a shield,
principally after they launched their volleys of criticism against the
Politburo. The very fact that Bierut had not attended the conference,
while no other clearly dominant figure emerged from the ranks of the
Politburo, must have added to the irritated atmosphere.
While there is no evidence to suggest that anyone at the conference
seriously thought that Gomulka would ever be reinstated into the
Politburo, many Party activists nevertheless wanted the question of a
'Polish road to socialism' more clearly outlined by the leadership.12
Marian Rybicki voiced an opinion widely shared by the delegates:
It is true that in Poland, when compared to other countries, heads did not roll,
even after considerable pressure was exerted by Beria and his henchmen.
The future Prosecutor General added:
However, every citizen, who knew that Gomulka and Spychalski directed
extremely important sectors of our political life, equally wants to
understand...what was their actual guilt, their actual political error.
Roman Werfel, editor-in-chief of Nowe Drogi, advised the leadership to

tread lightly on the Gomulka issue. He told the Politburo that it
should "quickly take into its hands" the whole affair before it
continued to fester and generated another potentially divisive incident
within the Party.
Berman undertook the responsibility of examining the Gomulka
issue on behalf of the leadership. He explained to the delegates that
while the resolutions of the Congress recognized the concept of a
"separate road to socialism," the Polish Party could not accept, ipso
facto, that Gomulka had been correct. Berman asserted that Gomulka's
arguments regarding a specifically "Polish road to socialism" had been
based on an entirely spurious thesis:
Gomulka and his group aimed at maintaining a three pronged policy in

agriculture, a notion...in opposition to the socialist transformation of
agriculture. The consequences of such a policy would have led to the rigid
planting of capitalist elements in the countryside...to the predominance
of capitalism...An attempt to build a road with no particular socialist
12
See also Eleonora and Bronislaw Syzdek, Polityczne dylematy Wladyslawa
Gomulki (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 135-137.
- 30 -
distinctions is therefore manifestly antagonistic to the Soviet road, the

road to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
He argued that the KC PZPR did not need to adopt any new resolutions
concerning a Polish road to socialism because the Party had already
constructed a separate road to socialism. Berman outlined the main
features of Polish socialism thus:
The line adopted by our Party aimed at constantly widening and developing
socialism throughout the economy, in the cultural sphere, and in all other
human endeavours. The most profound aspect of our line is characterized
by its ideological unity with the Soviet road to the dictatorship of the
proletariate, while taking into account, however, a number of concrete
conditions related to the distinct development of the Polish historical
process and its specific traits.
He added that "as far as the question of separateness is concerned, it

is only necessary to relate the distinct manner in which our Party had
been formed." Berman then listed the "dominant" institutions which
characterized and distinguished Polish socialism from the Soviet model:
The foundation of the PZPR rests upon the union between the distinct
traditions of the PPR and PPS; the parliamentary process had been preserved;
we tolerate distinctive political parties; varied forms of development and
cooperatives exist in the countryside; we continue to uphold a different
perspective on the manner in which the capitalist elements in the countryside
are to be eliminated; other methods are employed to regulate our relations
towards the Church; and so on.
Some of the delegates turned their attention to Marian Spychal-

ski and other communists arrested during the campaign against the
'rightist-nationalist deviation'. Stefan Wierblowski and Jerzy
Albrecht voiced the strongest appeals for an end to the Spychalski
affair. The status of the cases against Zenon Kliszko and Jozef
Kuropieska were also discussed.13 Additional voices demanded the full
rehabilitation of Waclaw Komar and his colleagues. Staszewski asked:
What is it that makes rehabilitation in Poland an act of legal clemency?

Rehabilitation is not an act of clemency. It's an act of justice, which
should be combined with self-criticism on the part of those who allowed it
to get to this point.
Klosiewicz and others renewed their call for the Politburo to name
all of the guilty individuals who had committed the numerous unlawful
acts against fellow communists. They also demanded that criminal
13
Some of the more outspoken delegates included: Helena Kozlowska, who
directed the Party Schools, Romana Granas, the head of the KC PZPR Party School and
KC Secretary Wladyslaw Matwin.
- 31 -
charges be laid against the culprits.14 Wierblowski noted that among

the present Party leaders there were those who remained apprehensive
about the reform process. He added that leadership changes ought to
take place at the next plenum so that reforms could be adopted in
earnest. Eugeniusz Szyr, who replaced Minc as the PKPG chairman,
admonished the leadership for trying to stall the democratization
process and accused them of pursuing half measures on economic reform.
Many activists also let it be known that they no longer had
confidence in the security apparatus, suggesting that the Party had
enough of the countless accusations against loyal communists. They
declared that the cycle of endless anti-communist conspiracies was
having adverse affects on the normal evolution of the PZPR. Yet there
were also expressions of support for the security apparatus. The call
for prudence was led by Dworakowski, the last chairman of the KSBP to
serve in the PZPR Politburo. Dworakowski reasserted the need for vigi-
lance against imperialism and uttered the customary words of caution
about the potential dangers of an unduly emasculated security service.
The conference also considered the role of Stalin throughout the
period of terror. Since most Polish communists were as yet unaware of
the 'secret speech', the debate on this topic was composed. The
delegates generally agreed that there had been both 'pros and cons' to
Stalin's actions and policies. A number of the activists, led by
Kazimierz Mijal and Boleslaw Ruminski, warned the audience not to forget
the "monumental accomplishments" of the late Soviet General Secretary,
adding that Mikoyan had gone too far in his assault on Stalin. They
emphasized that Beria and his agents had been responsible for the
'errors and distortions' committed during the Great Purge. The
leadership concluded that the PZPR would not tolerate any form of
criticism against Stalin beyond the views expressed in the Soviet press.
THE KPP ISSUE

The story of the 'groundless' accusations made against the KPP
and its purged leaders had significant emotional reverberations for
many of Poland's communists.15 A number of the delegates demanded that
the Party rehabilitate all the former leaders of the KPP and that the
14
Another veiled reference to Berman, Radkiewicz, Romkowski, Fejgin and
Rozanski. Klosiewicz and others continued to press for a public purge.
15
See the article on the KPP by Artur Hajnicz in Zycie Warszawy (21 February
1956).
- 32 -
official rehabilitation communique be clarified. They argued that the

proclamation was inadequate since it could also infer that the
rehabilitation had been an act of clemency rather than an act of justice.
The figures are sketchy, but the entire PPR initiative group
consisted of former KPP members and one-third of the approximately 8,000
PPR members in 1943 had been KPP activists.16 The one variable that
linked most of the PZPR elite during the early postwar period had been
their membership in the KPP or its youth affiliate.17 Poland's leading
communists welcomed the rehabilitation of the KPP essentially because
it restored the revolutionary honour of their communist movement. The
rehabilitation of the KPP also ended nearly two decades of political
stigmatization.
From the time of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 until
Stalin's death in 1953, many surviving KPP members faced official
rejection, harassment, or imprisonment by the Communist authorities.18
A number of Polish communists who had disapproved of the 1938 Comintern
decision had been questioned and detained during the 1949-1954 purges.19
It also appears that some of the captured records of the prewar Polish
security police implicated a few KPP members as police informers. 20
Although none of the reported informants succeeded in penetrating the
KPP leadership, the prewar records had been used by the security
apparatus against innocent communists.21
The delegates resolved to have the KC PZPR constitute a special
rehabilitation commission to look into false charges against former KPP
activists.22 It was the only uncontroversial issue discussed at the
March conference.23 Explicitly referring to the tragic liquidation of
16
Cf. Norbert Kolomejczyk and Marian Malinowski, Polska Partia Robotnicza,
1942-1948 (Warsaw, 1948), pp. 26-29; "Depesze KC PPR do Georgii Dymitrowa
(1942-1943)," Z Pola Walki, no. 4 (1961), p. 178; and Interview with Berman in
Toranska, p. 219.
17
Calculated by Richard F. Starr, Poland, 1944-1962: The Sovietization of
a Captive People (New Orleans, 1962), Table 18, p. 156.
18
As Khrushchev put it: "We received a directive from Moscow [in 1939] not
to recognize anyone [from Poland] as member of the Communist Party, not to transfer
memberships." Khrushchev Remembers, p. 152.
19
Mowi Jozef Swiatlo, pp. 158-160.
20
Checinski, Poland, p. 69.
21
Interview with Werfel in Toranska, p. 103.
22
Most of the remaining delegates had been supporters of the prewar PPS or
PPS-Left (Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki, Werblan, Sokorski), the VKP(b) (Mazur, Rokossowski)
or other Communist movements. Klosiewicz for instance was a member of the French
Communist Party during the interwar period, while Gierek was a member of the Belgian
Communist Party until 1948.
23
Interview with Werfel in Toranska, p. 103.
- 33 -
the KPP, Zawadzki described the rehabilitation as "joy disturbed by

sadness." Berman hypothesized that "the KPP tragedy belongs to an
unfortunate category of past repressions which were, at times, blindly
emphasized." The KPP commission also became an ideal instrument to
orchestrate a campaign which would show that the revolutionary
traditions of the KPP belonged to the contemporary communist movement,
while Gomulka's views pandered to parochial nationalism.
PULAWY VERSUS NATOLIN

It was at the March conference that the nucleus of the so-called
Pulawy 'faction' (sometimes called 'Zydy' or the 'Jews' by their detrac-
tors) first surfaced. 24 The leading Party activists most often
associated with this group included: Jerzy Albrecht, Antoni Alster,
Celina Budzynska, Tadeusz Daniszewski, Ostap Dluski, Teodora Feder,
Edward Gierek, Romana Granas, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Helena Jaworska, Leon
Kasman, Julian Kole, Jan Kowarz, Wincenty Krasko, Stanislaw Kuzinski,
Wladyslaw Matwin, Jerzy Morawski, Marian Naszkowski, Roman Nowak,
Mateusz Oks, Jozef Olszewski, Mieczyslaw Popiel, Jerzy Putrament,
Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Adam Schaff, Artur Starewicz, Stefan Staszewski,
Jerzy Sztachelski, Michalina Tatarkowna-Majkowska, Zygmunt Trowinski,
Roman Werfel, Roman Zambrowski, Janusz Zarzycki, and occasionally
Edward Ochab.25
The Pulawy group, named after a street in Warsaw where a number
of the 'members' reportedly met, never organized themselves into a
formal Party faction.26 Such a move would have been an anathema to Pol-
and's communists in March 1956. The very existence of a Pulawy
'faction', or a Natolin 'faction' for that matter, is doubtful.27 As
historian Jerzy Eisler recently pointed out, it would be incorrect to
suggest "that person X was a member of the Pulawy group, while Y belonged
24
Mieczyslaw Jaworski ["Kryzys spoleczno-polityczny 1956 roku" in Marek
Jaworski, op. cit., p. 21], has suggested that the Pulawy and Natolin 'factions' were
formed at the VI Plenum of 20 March. However, Jaworski's interpretation is based
on the premise that the two factions actually existed.
25
Cf. Jedlicki, "Chamy i Zydy," p. 13; and Eisler, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
26
In his interview with Toranska (p. 166), Staszewski recalled that the "name
came from the fact that Klosiewicz, in order to defend himself against the charge
of creating a 'Natolin' faction within the Party, retorted that 'Natolin' was not
the only such group, because there was also a 'Pulawy' group, which met at 24-26
Pulawska street."
27
Staszewski recently declared for instance that Pulawy "never existed."
ibid., p. 167.
- 34 -
to the Natolin group."28 On the other hand, PZPR activists denounced

for belonging to one group gladly spoke about the existence of the other
group. Throughout the months that followed the March conference -- and
the three decades since -- those who were labelled Natolinists never
questioned the existence of a Pulawy faction, while those who were
labelled Pulawists never questioned the existence of a Natolin faction
in the Party. Alleged membership in either group was thoroughly arbit-
rary.29
The central Party apparat was relatively heterogeneous and the
two aforementioned groups never articulated a consistent or intel-
ligible political programme. Among Pulawists and Natolinists -- as
will be outlined in the following chapters -- a lack of unanimity on
such pivotal issues as responsibility for the period of 'errors and
distortions', the 'rightist-nationalist deviation', Gomulka's return
to the Party, and the future progress of the 'democratization' campaign,
was not uncommon.
Nevertheless, a number of characteristics 'united' the Pulawy
group in the eyes Natolin. The following list does not apply to all
the Pulawists, but the majority of the above mentioned Party activists
embraced five of the six traits. (1) The Pulawy group spent the bulk
of World War II in the Soviet Union. They entered Poland in 1944 with
the Red Army or the Polish divisions under Soviet command. (2) A
significant number of the functionaries identified with Pulawy were
Polish Jews. They felt indebted to Stalin and the Soviet Union, not only
because they survived the Holocaust but also for their subsequent
political fortunes. (3) Most of the Pulawists emphatically supported
the Sovietization of Poland after World War II. (4) The Pulawy group
also included individuals who held prominent Party or government posts
during the first decade of communist rule in Poland. The Natolinists
naturally suggested that the Pulawists exploited their privileged
positions and enriched themselves during the Stalinist years. (5)
Pulawy typically emphasized the internationalist accents of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They were particularly suspicious of those
who argued that the political role of Poland's ethnic minorities ought
28
Eisler, op. cit., p. 23.
29
Jedlicki, who popularized the existence of the two groups in his famous
article "Chamy i Zydy," accepted at face value the accusations made by individual
Party members about the existence of competing and organized factions in the PZPR
during the October crisis.
- 35 -
to be reduced in order to increase legitimacy for the fledgling PZPR.30

(6) The Pulawy label was often extended to former PPS activists who also
became leading PZPR functionaries, namely Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Tadeusz
Dietrich, Henryk Jablonski, Oskar Lange, Adam Rapacki, Marian Rybicki,
and Andrzej Werblan.31
The evolution of the group began in January 1954, although it
remains difficult to generalize because each person who chose the path
of reform inevitably had his own reasons. The Jews in the Party felt
threatened when Berman, Minc and -- principally -- Zambrowski were
removed from the Secretariat at the II PZPR Congress of March 1954. The
Soviet embassy in Warsaw had put pressure on Bierut to demote "former
Trotskyists" soon after Swiatlo defected to the West in December 1953.32
The dismissal of Cyrankiewicz, Nowak and Zawadzki from the Secretariat,
also at the II Congress, suggests that the Soviets were primarily
interested in weakening Bierut's hold on the PZPR, but the coincidence
did not go unnoticed. Furthermore, Bierut's brakes on the 'new
course', in direct opposition to Khrushchev and the growing reform
movement in Poland, forced the leading Party activists to take a stand.
Many of them opted to back the Soviet-led reform process; indeed, to
surpass the Kremlin. The focal point for the reformers was the Warsaw
Party Committee, led by Staszewski and Stanislaw Kuzinski.
The Pulawy group did have a strong Stalinist past. Yet the same
can be said of the Natolinists. If there was a single factor that
distinguished the two informal groups it was that Jews and former PPS
supporters were conspicuously absent from the list of Natolin
supporters. The other differences relate directly to the preceding
point. Pulawists looked for support among the intellectuals and youth
inhabiting the large cities, and were distrustful of the Soviets. The
Natolinists sought potential allies in the CPSU and had frequent
contacts with Soviet diplomats in Warsaw plus the Soviet military
leadership. They were also hostile to intellectuals and some of them
were anti-Semitic. The Natolin group insisted on personnel changes in
the Party elite and the crudest among them were not above suggesting
30
It is difficult to gauge the actual thoughts and intentions of any individual
member of the central Party apparat, but the stress on internationalism was partly
motivated by lingering loyalty to the Soviet Union and international socialism, a
fear of unbridled nationalism, and self-preservation.
31
See also Eisler, op. cit., p. 24.
32
"Oswiadczenie tow. Bermana do protokolu BP, 5 V 1956 r.," Protokol Biura
Politycznego, CA KC PZPR 237/V"; and Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, p. 145.
- 36 -
that 'Jews govern Poland' in order to gain support from elements in

Polish society hostile to ethnic minorities.
The Pulawy group was more inclined to call for extensive --
although cautious -- political and economic change. Support for reform
had four advantages: it was popular with the progressive segments in
Polish society; it fell into line with Soviet initiatives (Khrushchev's
anti-Jewish policies notwithstanding); it disengaged the proponents of
reform from Bierut and his closest associates in the Politburo; and it
answered the demands of those in the PZPR who merely wanted to purge
select Stalinist functionaries.
SUMMARY
The leadership had been paralysed at the March conference. They
appeared to resolve that it was correct for the CPSU to consider its
mistakes but the actions of the PZPR Politburo were beyond reproach.
By the time the proceedings of the conference had closed many of the
leading activists were convinced that Bierut's Politburo was unable to
govern effectively. The fact that Bierut had been attempting to
supervise the events in Warsaw, as he lay in bed in the Soviet Union,
only complicated matters. According to Berman:
Echoes of all these events reached Bierut from various sources. He often
phoned from Moscow, mostly to me, and was very upset at the disorder which
had arisen in Warsaw. I sensed he was a little upset at me for not being
able to control the situation.
In response to Bierut's calls for a return to order within the ranks

of the Party, Berman added:
I tried to calm him as best I could, saying that the situation was indeed
33
difficult but that he shouldn't worry, we would get it under control.
But Berman's assurances to Bierut were futile. Furthermore, Staszew-

ski recalled that
transcripts of this conference were sent off to Moscow...Khrushchev told

34
me about them when he came to Warsaw for Bierut's funeral.
The Soviet First Secretary was therefore aware of the uneasy situation
in the Polish Party.
33
34
- 37 -
The most important result of the March conference was that it

emboldened the central Party aktiv, primarily the reformers. They had
been unable to force the Buro to implement the modest resolutions passed
by the KC PZPR following Stalin's death. The Party reformers finally
gathered the courage to demand greater changes to Poland's Stalinist
system on 3 March. The resolutions of the XX Congress, Mikoyan's
criticism of the Stalin years, and Bierut's puzzling absence, created
the conditions for Party activists like Albrecht, Granas, Kozlowska,
Matwin, Staszewski, and many others, to insist that the Politburo
outline and implement an extensive programme of political and economic
reform. The March conference of the central Party aktiv became the
second decisive episode, after the XX Congress, on the road to the
'Polish October'. Staszewski recently characterized the conference
thus: "Everything took a furious bashing...Passions became inflamed
and a great attack was launched against Bierut and the whole
leadership."35
35
ibid., p. 163.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTERREGNUM
From Moscow Colonel Grzybowski reported daily on Bierut's state

of health to Antoni Alster, the first deputy chairman of the KSBP.
According to Ptasinski, until 11 March "no disquieting reports were
submitted" by Grzybowski and none were ever received by the Politburo.1
It appeared that the First Secretary's convalescence was progressing
normally. Bierut was also reported to have left his bed for the first
time in over a week on 6 March.2 Yet he was still unable to return from
Moscow. Not even the debates of the March conference were sufficient
to force Bierut back to Poland.
Whatever the reason for Bierut's prolonged stay in the Soviet
Union, by 6 March it became transparent that Bierut was either unwilling
or unable to resume his Party duties.3 The leadership could not wait
for the First Secretary to return at his own leisure. Resolute
direction was demanded by the Party. The majority of the Politburo
henceforth discarded Bierut from the decision-making process.
It was during this interregnum that the leadership began to
prepare the ground for changes to the political landscape. It was also
at this juncture that the Buro experienced the first split on a
fundamental issues of public policy since the crisis of 1948. At the
next session of the Politburo, the leadership attempted to placate the
Party activists. The situation was complicated by two disquieting
factors: Khrushchev's attack on Stalin had yet to be released to the
Party, and the ongoing Soviet power struggle had not run its course.4
There was little doubt that Khrushchev's 'secret speech' would
be received with "shock," as Ochab recently put it, by the PZPR and
Polish society.5 The speech corroborated the countless accusations of
criminality levelled at the security forces by critics of the PRL.
Bierut had gambled a considerable part of the regime's prestige and
legitimacy on many of the same repressive features which were criticized
at the XX Congress. He accepted Stalin's ruthless leadership of the
1
Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," p. 93. See also Interview with Berman
in Toranska, p. 346.
2
Rechowicz, op. cit., p. 268.
3
According to Staszewski, Khrushchev told him: "Comrade Bierut got so upset
about [the conference] while he was ill that at some point he suffered a heart attack."
4
Cf. Khrushchev's analysis of the Soviet domestic situation in Khrushchev
Remembers, ch. 9; and The Last Testament, ch. 1.
5
Interview with Ochab in Toranska, pp. 55-56.
- 39 -
CPSU and the international communist movement, and supported the

immense power wielded by the massive security apparatus. Khrushchev's
speech posed a threat to the PZPR.
THE POLITBURO MEETING OF 6 MARCH

The Politburo met to review the repercussions of the March
conference on 6 March. The summary from the 6 March meeting reads as
follows:
independent of certain incorrect suggestions, the basic direction of the

critical pronouncements were correct, and charges against the leadership
regarding specific delays and stoppages in realizing the resolutions of the
III Plenum are generally justified.
The Buro also resolved that the primary cause of the "delays and
stoppages" was caused by "the incomplete fulfilment of the principles
of collectivity in the work of the leadership."6
The leaderless Politburo ostensibly hinted that blame for many
of the so-called 'errors and distortions' resided with Bierut's auto-
cratic methods of governance. The Buro stopped short of accusing
Bierut of instituting his own 'cult of personality'. The veiled
criticism of the First Secretary also applied to Berman and Minc;
Bierut's leading associates. Together they constituted the infamous
triumvirate that administered Stalinism in Poland. The implications
of the 6 March resolution could not have gone unnoticed by either man.
The Politburo then agreed to a number of the demands put forward
at the March conference. After prolonged deliberation, the Buro
unanimously decided to "settle" the rehabilitation issue "in an
accelerated manner" under a rehabilitation commission chaired by
Ochab. 7 The commission was to expedite the process of reinstating
Party membership to formerly disgraced Communists. The authority of
Ochab's commission, however, was limited to the cases where committal
proceedings against an individual had been terminated earlier.8 Yet
the new rehabilitation policy departed from the orthodox position
adopted at the meeting of 23 January 1956. 9 At that time it was
concluded that the rehabilitation question
6
From the minutes of the Politburo meeting of 6 March [CA KC PZPR, 237/V-231]
as cited in "Polska proba," p. 121.
7
Cited in ibid. The commission included: Jozwiak, Zambrowski, Albrecht,
Adam Dolinski, General Jerzy Bordzilowski, and Eugeniusz Szyr.
8
"Polska proba," p. 121.
9
See the Interviews with Ochab and Berman in Toranska, pp. 53-54 and 344.
- 40 -
should follow, above all, the line employed in claims for legal clemency
and only in those isolated cases where the committal proceedings are well
10
on the road to a legal discontinuance.
The amended policy ensured that the victims received genuine

exoneration from the authorities and deliberately embraced many
outstanding cases omitted by the position taken in January.
The decision to release General Spychalski was a different matter.
The resolution on Spychalski read as follows:
The majority of the Politburo voted to terminate further criminal

proceedings against Spychalski and decided to release the accused in
accordance with the [1952] Amnesty Act.11 The Politburo also established
a commission, to include Comrades Cyrankiewicz, Ochab and Berman, which was
to draft the official act [of clemency] on behalf of the Office of the State
Prosecutor and prepare a draft of the KC PZPR letter to the Party activists
12
regarding this matter.
But the Buro upheld Spychalski's "conspicuous abuse of authority,"

persistent "nationalist outlooks and aims," and a "hostile and
deceitful" attitude "toward the Party."13 The leadership added that
Spychalski was "guilty of the [original] charges filed against him"
under "article 140 of the criminal code."14
The leadership continued to argue that Spychalski was responsible
for the mushrooming of nationalist elements among the officer corps of
the People's Army through a series of careless and unwise recruiting
methods.15 He was also singled out for advancing the careers of Alfred
Jaroszewicz and Wlodzimierz Lechowicz. 16 The decision to bring the
10
Cited in "Polska proba," p. 121.
11
For details on how the Amnesty Act of 22 July 1952 was applied in Poland
see Lizak, "Przyczyny kryzysu w Pazdzierniku 1956 r.," pp. 219-259.
12
13
Cited in ibid.
14
Cited in ibid, p. 121. Article 140 of the Small Penal Code (Maly Kodeks
Karny -- replaced in 1969) concerned perjury. Spychalski was accused of "Knowingly
submitting false statements while testifying in court or to another state organ."
See Kodeks Karny: Prawo o wykroczeniach. Wazniejsze ustawy zwiazkowe (Warsaw,
1949), p. 28.
15
Zenobiusz Kozik, PZPR w latach 1954-1957: Szkic historyczny (Warsaw,
1982), pp. 186-197; and Interview with Ochab in Toranska, p. 54.
16
Jaroszewicz was minster of supplies until he was arrested in 1948, together
with Lechowicz, the minister of provisions. Both had been charged with espionage,
tortured, and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in 1953. They were
rehabilitated in March and April 1956. Berman admitted that he supported the lesser
charges of 'gross incompetence' against Spychalski, adding that the accusations
"weren't entirely without foundation." He also doubted the innocence of Jaroszewicz
and Lechowicz. See Interview with Berman, pp. 311-312 and 322-324.
- 41 -
Spychalski case before the Politburo came from Ochab, who took responsi-
bility for the leadership during the interregnum.17
THE SPYCHALSKI CRISIS

The Politburo had been unable to resolve the Spychalski issue for
quite some time; indeed, as late as January 1956, Bierut insisted that
the former chief of the Polish General Staff be put on trial for
treason.18 The Spychalski trial was intended to provide the bulk of
the circumstantial evidence against Gomulka. 19 Ochab recalled that
Bierut refused to acknowledge that the security forces had acted
unlawfully against Spychalski, even after being told that "the evidence
gathered by the security apparatus gave rise to doubts."20
Throughout the latter half of 1955, Stefan Kalinowski, the
Prosecutor General, provided Bierut with information about Spychal-
ski's innocence on the most serious of the charges. The First Secretary
systematically chose to ignore it. Kalinowski sent Bierut a memorandum
on 12 December 1955, which contained the conclusions of the report
prepared by a special commission appointed to look into the charges
against Spychalski.21 The commission determined that the evidence did
not warrant a trial, but Bierut refused to accept the findings. 22
Ochab's recollection of the events between December 1955 and the XX
Congress are telling:
[Bierut]...Rokossowski and Jozwiak were in favour of trying [Spychalski],

and some comrades abstained from taking a stand. So then, when Bierut
realized what the Politburo's stand in the matter might be, he went off to
Moscow to complain about me...[and] the whole Politburo: Spychalski's case
didn't come before the Politburo, it's true, but it was discussed outside
the Buro's session and Bierut knew that most of the comrades were against
23
putting Spychalski on trial.
The First Secretary resolved to let the Soviets decide on

Spychalski's fate. During a meeting between the two First Secretaries
17
Ochab stated that he made the decision "as First Secretary." However,
Spychalski's case was brought to the Buro on 6 March, some two weeks earlier. It
is possible that Ochab's memory failed him on this small point. See Interview with
Ochab in Toranska, p. 54.
18
"Z archiwum Boleslaw Bieruta" in Turlejska, op. cit., pp. 410-417.
19
See ibid., p. 417-421.
20
21
Kalinowski's memorandum had been provided to the entire Buro before the
official submission date of 12 December 1955.
22
Turlejska, op. cit., p. 416.
23
- 42 -
at the XX Congress, Khrushchev reportedly said, "it's your affair, and

you should take care of it at home."24 The Soviet leader revealed in
his memoirs that
there were absolutely no grounds at all for arresting Gomulka, any more than
there were grounds for arresting Spychalski...or any other comrades who were
25
arrested at the time.
In his exchange with Toranska, Berman concluded:
[Bierut's]...mind was full of a whole complex of suspicions which I couldn't

cut through. I blame this on his rigid, doctrinaire view, which also account
for, among other things, his faith in all those documents that security
slipped him. He believed in them; really believed in them.
For me those suspicions were totally discredited by them, but not for him.
It depends on your attitude to the investigative documents you read: one
person interprets them in a certain way because he wants to clear the suspect
while someone else gives more credence to the interrogators. Bierut
26
continued to believe the accusations [...]
However, ideological dogmatism does not fully explain Bierut's

intransigence. The First Secretary required Spychalski's conviction
on charges of treason in order to keep Gomulka out of the Party.
It was during the interregnum that the first recorded crisis in
the 'leaderless' Politburo's collective decision-making process took
place. Rokossowski and Jozwiak refused to join the majority at the 6
March meeting and voted against Spychalski's release from prison. 27
Bierut's struggle against Gomulka and the subsequent votes cast against
Spychalski by Rokossowski and Jozwiak were almost inseparable.28 For
Rokossowski, Spychalski was a 'nationalist' and a danger to the newly
reorganized Polish Army. The extent of Jozwiak's opposition to
Spychalski's release was extraordinary.
24
ibid., p. 54. Ochab added that Bierut refused to take him to the XX Congress
because they argued over his continued opposition to having Spychalski put on trial.
25
The Last Testament, pp. 182. Cf. also Khrushchev Remembers, p. 359.
26
27
28
According to Ochab (ibid.), "some comrades avoided taking a definite stand"
on the Spychalski issue. Mazur "claimed he had to go to Moscow for [immediate medical]
treatment." His refusal to attend the 6 March meeting may have been another indica-
tion from Khrushchev that the CPSU preferred to let the PZPR resolve the Spychalski
affair. Certainly it could not have gone unnoticed that Mazur, one of Moscow's most
trusted agents in the Polish Party, who had been responsible for the GZI in the Secre-
tariat, kept silent on Spychalski. See Berman's comments on Mazur in Toranska, pp.
263-264; and Interview with Antoni Skulbaszewski in Michal Komar and Krzysztof Lang,
"Mysmy juz o tym mowili, prosze Pana...," Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 91 (1990), p. 182,
footnote no. 5.
- 43 -
Jozwiak's disagreements with Gomulka and Spychalski went back to

late 1943 and the PPR's factional disputes over the construction of a
national front policy.29 Gomulka proposed that the Party follow a broad
'patriotic' front policy in order to rest power on the shoulders of the
Communists, Socialists and Peasants. Bierut and Jozwiak were opposed
to a broad coalition and opted insisted for a narrow 'democratic' front
of parties who supported the Communists. 30 Bierut's conflict with
Gomulka came to a head in 1948. Since Jozwiak had played a vital part
in the wartime PPR leadership, his usefulness against Gomulka
multiplied during Bierut's assault on the 'rightist-nationalist
deviation'. As a leading 'native' in the Party,31 Jozwiak's denunci-
ation of Gomulka's 'reactionary tendencies' helped to solidify the case
against the General Secretary.32
Jozwiak had demonstrated his loyalty to Bierut and segregated
himself from future assaults against the 'natives'. 33 Although he
never exercised the political prestige of Berman or Minc, Jozwiak became
the dutiful instrument of Bierut's political will. As head of the
Central Commission of Party Control from 1948 until 1956, he purged
Gomulka's allies, including Spychalski, from the Party ranks.
In a memorandum dated 6 December 1955, Jozwiak proposed the
following counter-recommendations to Kalinowski's report: the
Politburo should order the Prosecutor General to prepare an act of
indictment against Spychalski "in no less than 6 weeks" and then move
to have the affair "quickly dealt with" by the courts; the Prosecutor
General should also "prepare and connect the Kuropieska affair with the
Spychalski" case; and the Buro should relieve "General Zarakowski, who
is largely responsible for the confusion surrounding the Spychalski
affair." Jozwiak also added a note to the December memorandum. He
argued that the First Secretary should consider Kalinowski's future and
that of his entire staff.34
29
Spychalski, "Wspomnienia o partyjnej robocie (1931-1944)," Archiwum Ruchu
Robotniczego, vol. II (1975), p. 335.
30
For a detailed analysis see Coutouvidis and Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 123-135.
31
The 'Natives', like Gomulka and Spychalski, served with the PPR in Poland
during the war. The 'Muscovites' spent the war in the USSR, especially the communist
emigres connected to the Moscow-based CBKP.
32
See "Notatka Franciszka Jozwiaka z dnia 21 VIII 1948 dla Biura Politycznego
KC PPR" in Gomulka i inni, pp. 29-30.
33
Jozwiak was replaced as commandant of the MO in March 1949 during the purge
of 'natives' from the military, militia and security services.
34
Full text cited in Turlejska, op. cit., pp. 416-417.
- 44 -
When Cyrankiewicz's commission finally instructed the military

prosecutor to return the act of indictment against Spychalski, Jozwiak
endeavoured to have the Buro's order rescinded. It is still difficult
to gauge the extent to which Jozwiak was working in concert with Bierut
or Rokossowski, but there can be no doubt that he supported Bierut.
Jozwiak had good contacts in the military prosecutor's office.35 Ochab
described the incident thus:
We instructed the Supreme Prosecutor to return the act of indictment to us;

but instead of doing so they informed Jozwiak, who, in defiance of the
Politburo's decision, instructed the staff of the military prosecutor's
office to hold on to the act of indictment and told them he was on his way
36
over there.
In response to Jozwiak's attempt to countermand the Politburo's

orders, Ochab also went to the office of the military prosecutor:
I took a car and went as well. In a sense I did it deliberately, so that

the staff at the office of the military prosecutor and the officer lawyers
would also know what they were dealing with. Jozwiak said to me that he
had read the indictment through once more and that everything in it was
correct. I said: comrade, the Politburo has made a decision. You can
disagree with it, you can resign if you want, but we will carry out the
37
Politburo's decision.
Jozwiak capitulated and the military prosecutor promptly returned the

act of indictment to Ochab.38 The Supreme Military Court eventually
signed the legal decree to release Spychalski from prison.
After two years of recalcitrance on the part of Bierut and his
supporters, the security forces finally released Spychalski. 39 The
military prosecutor also withdrew the charges of espionage and the other
35
As chief of staff of the communist-led underground army, and the first
commandant of the postwar Citizens' Militia, Jozwiak held the rank of general in the
Polish Army and MO. On Jozwiak's and the MO see Zenon Jakubowski, Milicja
Obywatelska, 1944-1948 (Warsaw, 1988), esp. pp. 495-496.
36
Interview with Ochab in Toranska, pp. 54. In the English text of Toranska's
volume, 'Supreme Prosecutor' [military] is translated to read 'General
Prosecutor'[civilian]. Interview with Toranska (Polish), p. 45.
37
ibid., pp. 54-55.
38
In one of the more picturesque characterizations of Jozwiak, Ochab declared:
"a corporal if I ever saw one, volunteered for the legions when he was a young worker,
and as an older man also sometimes behaved with the soldierly unconcern of a volunteer.
He gazed with awe at the USSR as if it were an oracle." Interview with Ochab in
Toranska, p. 55.
39
Rykowski and Wladyka, Kalendarium Polskie, 1944-1984 (Warsaw, 1987), p. 43.
The Politburo delayed announcing that Gomulka and Spychalski had been released until
a conference of the Warsaw Party aktiv on 6 April 1956. This is still before the
date given by some scholars for Spychalski's release, May 1956, and some three weeks
before the general amnesty had been announced by the Sejm. Cf. Turlejska, op. cit.,
p. 390.
- 45 -
serious accusations of anti-government activities against

40
Spychalski. The Politburo's reversal of Bierut's position on the
Spychalski affair effectively ended his leadership of the PZPR.
THE LEADERSHIP'S INTERIM POSITION

Morawski chaired a number of subordinate Party conferences during
the same period that the Politburo had been meeting to review the March
conference. As the principal ideologue inside the central Party
apparatus, it had been Morawski's duty to translate and transmit the
Party's position on the XX Congress. The conservatism displayed by the
leadership at the March conference had been echoed by Morawski.
Conversely, many of the same questions that haunted the leadership also
materialized at Morawski's engagements. His task was to calm the
middle-level Party apparat.
A case in point was the conference of KW propaganda secretaries
and Party press editors held on 6 March at the Committee for Public
Security. The KC Secretary was swamped with a multitude of questions
at this meeting, including demands for an explanation of the assault
on Stalin.41 But it was the Gomulka problem which Morawski stressed
to the KW propaganda chiefs. When he was asked to throw light on the
fallacy inherent in Gomulka's formulation of the 'Polish road to
socialism', he replied with the standard line:
When speaking of a Polish road to socialism, the Party leadership puts a

different meaning on this concept than the false thesis launched by the
Gomulka group.
Morawski also cautioned:
Even if today many things are being rehabilitated, then errors should not
be a part of this process. Gomulka and his group exemplified a position
contrary to the programme hammered out by our Party, a programme of socialist
revolution in industry and agriculture and in culture and education. The
erroneous posture that had been formulated by Gomulka was in its class
42
contents contradictory to the Soviet line.
40
Kozik, PZPR w latach, pp. 186-197.
41
Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," pp. 96-97.
42
"Przemowienie tow. J. Morawskiego na Naradzie Sekretarzy Propagandy KW,
Lektorow i Redaktorow prasy partyjnej, 6 III 1956 r." as cited in Barbara Fijalkowska,
Polityka i tworcy (1948-1959) (Warsaw, 1985), p. 299.
- 46 -
With the rehabilitation of the KPP at the XX Congress as a backdrop,

Morawski attempted to discredit Gomulka by adding that he had attacked
the revolutionary traditions of the KPP in June 1948.43
The first public airing of the Party's line towards the XX Congress
was supplied in an unsigned newspaper editorial. "On the Cult of
Personality and its Consequences" was also the first Polish article to
publicly criticize Stalin.44 The authorities confirmed that
in the 1930s Stalin began to position himself above the Party, moulding the
Party according to his own will...All this caused immeasurably harmful
damage to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the international
workers' movement. At the XX Congress the various excesses were
discussed...Excessive centralization of the Party and state organs was
especially criticized because it finally revealed one of its most painful
outcomes -- the dreadful violation of revolutionary law and order.
The article in Trybuna Ludu augmented Khrushchev's thesis and

focused attention on certain general features of Poland's Stalinist
system. The authors emphasized that the cult of personality "contains
certain tendencies which cause it to grow and expand" thereby
"establishing a characteristic hierarchy of individual
decision-makers" in all walks of life. It was also admitted that the
"results of the cult of personality had been felt throughout the
international workers' movement -- including Poland."
The reader was reminded that the process of political reform and
transformation began in Poland at the III Plenum, stressing that in many
fields "there were still specific and obvious delays" in the struggle
to reintroduce "Leninist principles into Party life." The root of
these problems, the article continued, were "old habits and customs"
which "created in practice serious resistance towards the fulfilment
and complete realization of the resolutions passed at the III PZPR
Plenum." It was suggested that the Party still lacked "the strength
and the power needed to overcome these obstructions" to Leninist
principles.
In order to vanquish the obstacles to reform, the slogan put
forward by Minc at the November conference of 1954 was again stressed:
'Reeducation of the Party.' The article announced:
43
Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," p. 97.
44
Editorial, Trybuna Ludu (10 March 1956).
- 47 -
A great process of reeducation is under way in our Party...Reeducation must

begin with the self, with a profound review of personal habits, personal
methods of work, and personal methods of reasoning.
Party activists were to be reeducated in order to "quickly raise the

qualifications of those Party workers who deserve to remain in the Party
apparatus."
There still had not been any public mention of Gomulka or his
concept of a 'Polish road to socialism'. The leadership focused its
criticism on Stalin and the negative consequences of the 'cult of
personality' in Poland. The Trybuna Ludu article implied that the
hardships and crimes of the preceding decade had been caused by
misguided individuals, not inept policies. The editorial of 10 March
also indicates that the Party's principal target were the unrecon-
structed Stalinists at the lower levels of the Party and state
apparatus.
BIERUT'S DEATH
On the morning of 11 March Berman received a phone call from
Gorska. She indicated that Bierut had contracted pneumonia and was
dying.45 The Politburo decided to send Berman and the First Secretary's
personal physician, Professor Mieczyslaw Fejgin, to Moscow.46 The next
day, the Politburo secretly notified the Central Committee and the KW
First Secretaries that "on the grave matter of comrade Bierut's state
of health...after contracting pneumonia comrade 'Tomasz' on 11 March
suffered serious heart complications." The communique also noted
Berman's arrival in Moscow and assured the KC membership that they would
be "systematically" (sic) informed of the First Secretary's medical
condition.47
Berman later recalled that he received a chilly reception from
his Soviet hosts:
I flew to Moscow immediately....and after being greeted at the airport went

directly to see Bierut. Wanda [Gorska], who had been sitting with
45
46
Nowak, Wojna w eterze, vol. I, p. 227; and Aleksandra Stypulkowska,
"Tajemnica smierci Boleslawa Bieruta," Na Antenie, no. 91 (October 1970), p. 5. Nowak
headed the Polish section of RFE. It has never been adequately explained why Fejgin,
the chief consultant cardiologist at the ministry of health, was called to Moscow
at such a late date. Fejgin reportedly accompanied Bierut on all his trips abroad.
47
Cited in Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," pp. 93-94. 'Tomasz' was one
Bierut's nom de guerre.
- 48 -
him...left the room. I asked the Soviet doctor [Professor Markov]48 who had
been assigned to look after Bierut permanently for permission to see him,
but he said no...His refusal was very unconvincing and probably the result
of instructions he'd received. It was painful to me...they wouldn't let
49
me in. I gave way to despair.
Ochab took advantage of Bierut's demise. The leadership voted

on 12 March to accept the conclusions of Ochab's rehabilitation
commission, which had decided to reinstate a number of former purge
victims, including Generals Komar and Kuropieska, to the Party. The
Buro then sanctioned the cessation of all legal proceedings against
Kliszko, one of Gomulka's closest associates. They also accepted the
conclusions of the Zawadzki commission, which had been examining the
indictments against General Stanislaw Tatar and his AK compatriots, and
ordered that Jerzy Kirchmayer and Stefan Mossor be released from prison
because of their "poor state of health."50 The Buro ordered that all
legal proceedings against a further thirty military officers be
abandoned because of a lack of evidence.51
Colonel Grzybowski telephoned Alster from Moscow on the evening
of 12 March to advise him that at 23.35 hours (Moscow time), Bierut had
died of a heart attack. 52 On the following day, Polish state radio
sombrely broadcast the news of Bierut's death. Unaware of Bierut's
illness, Polish citizens awoke to the following announcement: "To all
working people and to the Polish nation," the sixty-four year old First
Secretary of the PZPR "and unyielding soldier of communism" had suddenly
died in the Soviet Union.53
One of Poland's leading Catholic writers, Jerzy Zawieyski, wrote
the following passage in his diary on 13 March:
Went for a walk...Barren, quiet. Extraordinary news on the return trip:

President Boleslaw Bierut died; in Moscow! What is mortifying and ominous
is that no one is thinking about the death of a person, but about the political
events that now have to follow...Holy mass planned for the President...E-
48
Professor A.M. Markov was Khrushchev's principal physician. See
Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 320-321.
49
Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 346. The name of the Soviet doctor
is cited in the Polish text of the Berman's Interview with Toranska (Polish), p. 351.
The English text generally omits the names of lesser known Polish and Soviet personal-
ities.
50
Cited in "Polska Proba," p. 122. Both men had been senior officers in the
AK. They were arrested for treason in 1951 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
51
Tadeusz Pioro, "Generalowie przed sadem," Polityka (10 September 1988); and
his "Przed Najwyzszym Sadem Wojskowym, 1951-1953: Procesy odpryskowe," Polityka (17
September 1988).
52
53
Trybuna Ludu (14 March 1956).
- 49 -
veryone is talking about the death and providing different

54
interpretations.
The ambiguous Soviet-Polish communique that accompanied the death

announcement begged more questions than it resolved.55 As Zawieyski
put it on 14 March:
The papers today are supplying terse communiques about Bierut's death.
Bierut's biography announced by the Party and government -- very deficient,
matter-of-fact. And no articles, no commentaries. Striking! Khrushchev
is to travel to Warsaw. The dominant general opinion is that Bierut's death
signifies the liquidation of Stalinism in the Peoples' Democracies. It was
56
announced that there will be a three-day period of national mourning.
SUMMARY
Bierut's unwillingness or inability to return from Moscow
permitted the Politburo to accelerate the rehabilitation process.
Ochab seized the initiative at the Buro meeting of 6 March, where he
proposed a vote on the most controversial issues dividing the
leadership: the fate of Spychalski.
From the time Spychalski was accused of the so-called 'right-
ist-nationalist deviation', Bierut personally took charge of the
'investigation' to prepare a more convincing case against Gomulka.
Ochab's astute political manoeuvring -- probably aided by Khrushchev
-- enabled him to garner a majority of the Buro's votes and thus
guarantee Spychalski's eventual release from prison. The decisions
taken at the 6 March meeting thus began the process of healing within
the purge-ridden Party. The Buro's actions compounded Bierut's
isolation and secured the First Secretary's political eclipse.
The truth of the matter was that during the interregnum Ochab
accumulated the lion share of political power inside the Politburo --
at a time when Bierut was presumably recuperating in Moscow. There can
be little doubt that Ochab's leadership was supported by some powerful
figures in the Soviet Union, especially the CPSU First Secretary. As
early as 1955, Swiatlo wrote that Ochab was already rumoured to be
Bierut's successor:
54
Zawieyski, 13 March 1956, "Kartki z dziennika," Kierunki, no. 32 (18 April
1982), p. 10. Kierunki reproduce the entries made by Zawieyski which were deleted
by the censors from the version of his diaries published a year later. See Kartki
z dziennika, 1955-1969 (Warsaw, 1983).
55
Rechowicz, op. cit., p. 268. It was signed by four Soviet physicians,
Professors N. Vasilenko, A. Markov, A. Strukov and Dr. N. Voslanov, and Fejgin.
56
Zawieyski, 14 March 1956, "Kartki z dziennika," p. 10.
- 50 -
Ochab is a prewar Communist, with a frank and direct manner, largely admired
by his underlings. He always finds time for people, many of whom he has
known for years. Ochab is not a sectarian -- he's too smart for that. But
he represents an extreme form of Stalinist-Bolshevism. Ochab is also the
man of the future, at least that's the way he's mentioned today. Over many
years he has been steered purely towards Party work, never having entered
the government. Ochab is being educated and trained to become the future
57
Party leader -- Bierut's successor.
There is still no concrete evidence to implicate Khrushchev in Bierut's

timely death, but the possibility cannot be overlooked.
Bierut's death instantly accelerated the anti-Stalin campaign in
Poland. Comparing the events in Hungary, Paul Zinner concluded:
Between March and October, 1956, events in Poland and Hungary developed along
parallel lines, but on closer examination contrasts came to light that yield
valuable clues for an understanding why that tumultuous period ended so
differently in the two countries.
One important distinction was due to chance. In Poland, the post of
First Secretary...was vacated...as a result of the death of Boleslaw Bierut,
the country's chief Stalinist...In Hungary, [Matyas] Rakosi remained at the
head of the Party and blocked every attempt at a liquidation of Stalinism.
It took four and a half months to remove him from office.
Thus in Poland the anti-Stalin campaign gained immediate momentum and
pointed toward broad political, economic, and cultural reforms and toward
changes in leadership, while Hungary still inched ahead toward the removal
58
of the remnants of Stalinism.
57
Emphasis added. Mowi Jozef Swiatlo, p. 45.
58
Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, 1962), pp. 203-204.
CHAPTER FIVE
NUMERUS CLAUSUS
Four members of the Politburo joined Berman in Moscow on 13 March:

Cyrankiewicz, Mazur, Ochab and Zawadzki. Nowak made arrangements for
Bierut's state funeral in Warsaw.1 The remaining members of the ruling
elite, were not invited to the Kremlin. The Buro members who went to
Moscow met with Khrushchev and other CPSU officials in order to discuss
the "succession question."2 The details of the bilateral discussions
are unknown, but it is still possible to draw some general conclusions.
Berman's political career was terminated by the Soviets
immediately after Bierut's death. As he described it:
Zawadzki was supposed to give a speech at the House of the Soviets and I
helped him to edit it...Then they displayed the coffin at the House of the
Soviets...I was put in one of the farther rows, while Mazur was assigned
a place in a nearer one; I took this to be a sign which explained why I hadn't
been let in to see Bierut and I realized that this was the end.3
Bierut's death, the fact that Minc was not invited to Moscow, and
Berman's humiliation at the House of Soviets, marked a turning point
in the evolution of postwar Polish politics. Khrushchev struck the
final death knell to the PZPR's infamous Stalinist "Troika."4
There is no evidence that Bierut left any instructions about his
successor and there were probably a number of contenders. Party
historian Zenobiusz Kozik argued that it was evident "Ochab became First
Secretary after having been just one of a large number of potential
candidates from the leadership circle. With doubt, Zambrowski or Nowak
for instance could have become First Secretary."5 In theory, Kozik is
correct. But his argument obscures an uncomfortable factor which
determined the boundaries of a leadership contest: anti-Semitism.
The likelihood of a popular backlash against the election of a Polish
Jew to the top Party post ensured that Zambrowski was not a candidate
-- even if he wanted the position.
If a candidate other than Ochab was proposed for the top post,
it was Zawadzki. When Toranska asked Ochab: "Who were the other
1
2
See discussion in Holzer, op. cit., p. 2.
3
Interview with Berman in Toranska, pp. 346-347. Berman's version corrects
a popular perception that the Soviets actually assigned him an honoured place at the
House of Soviets on 13 March. Cf. Andrzej Skrzypek, "Stosunki Polsko-Radzieckie w
latach 1956-1957," Kwartalnik Historyczny, no. 4/XCIII (1987), p. 1039.
4
The word was used by Berman. See his Interview with Toranska, p. 310.
5
Kozik in "Wydarzenia kryzysowe w Polsce w latach 1955-1957 (Stenogram
dyskusji redakcyjnej)," Z Pola Walki, no. 1-2 (1982), p. 124.
- 52 -
candidates for the post?" Ochab simply replied: "I don't know. I
proposed Aleksander Zawadzki."6 Khrushchev wanted the PZPR to replace
Bierut with someone who had impeccable Party credentials. Zambrowski
wrote in his journal that after Stalin's death
Khrushchev wanted to strengthen...the position of the Party apparat and the

guiding role played by the Party...[However] Bierut did not change in any
fundamental way his methods and style of work. Bierut would sooner continue
to steer the ship of state than the Party; he would sooner act in concert
with Politburo and Central Committee members who held government posts than
7
through the KC Secretaries and departments.
Ochab was the ideal candidate from the Party apparatus. He had not held
a government post, was a member of the Politburo from 1948, and he was
the senior Party Secretary.8
Ochab was ambitious. Staszewski recalled that Ochab "aspired to
the position of First Secretary" and that "the majority [in the KC]
supported him."9 He was regarded by his colleagues as a mediator.10
Khrushchev also admired Ochab:
I personally had very good relations with Ochab and respected him. He was
an old Communist. He was of working-class origin and, as we say, graduated
11
from the school of Polish prison.
Even Stalin reportedly thought highly of Ochab. According to Swiatlo,

Stalin once called Ochab a "good and toothy Bolshevik."12
BIERUT'S FUNERAL
The joint USSR-PRL delegation that returned to Poland on 14 March
with Bierut's body included the former head of the wartime ZPP, Wanda
Wasilewska, and N.V. Podgorny and K.T. Mazurov, the heads of the
Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics. 13 The chairman of the joint
delegation -- Khrushchev, travelled to Poland on the following day.
6
7
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 15 September 1971, p. 95. Zambrowski also added
(p.94) that Bierut ruled primarily with Minc (first deputy premier and chairman of
the PKPG), Berman (deputy premier) and Zawadzki (chairman of the Council of State,
the titular head of state).
8
Zambrowski served on the Secretariat from July 1944 until March 1954.
9
Cited in Holzer, op. cit., p. 2.
10
Cf. Mowi Swiatlo, p. 56.
11
The Glasnost Tapes, p. 113.
12
Mowi Jozef Swiatlo, p. 45.
13
Trybuna Ludu (14 March 1956). For further details see Interview with
Staszewski in Toranska, p. 166.
- 53 -
Immediately after Khrushchev's train crossed the river Bug, he was

joined on the final leg of the journey by Nowak, Ochab, and the Soviet
Union's ambassador to Warsaw, Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko.14
Bierut's state funeral was held on 16 March. Meanwhile, stories
about what had 'actually' happened to Bierut spread like wildfire
throughout the country.15 Flora Lewis, who had been in Poland at the
time, described the rumours thus:
The story circulated that Bierut had stood up to Moscow to demand more
independence for Poland and therefore the Soviet leaders decided to get rid
16
of him.
The story seemed plausible.17 Some years earlier, Bulgaria's Georgii

Dimitrov and Czechoslovakia's Klement Gottwald had also died in Moscow.
It was difficult not to notice the coincidence.18
The rumours unleashed an avalanche of nationalistic fervour which
guaranteed Bierut a brief period of posthumous popularity. Thousands
of Poles paid homage to the former First Secretary while his body lay
in state.19 On one occasion, the military had to be called up in order
to quash a riot during the state funeral.20 The confusion concerning
Bierut's untimely passing was compounded by the puzzling remarks made
by some of Poland's leaders in late March 1956.21 In a Trybuna Ludu
article devoted to the discussions that took place at the VI Plenum,
Cyrankiewicz described Bierut's death as "a blow that took us all by
surprise."22 In another eulogy, reprinted in Nowe Drogi, Ochab stated
14
Ponomarenko was ambassador to Poland from 1955-1957.
15
Confirmed by the daily newspaper reports from Philippe Ben of Le Monde [and
Tel-Aviv's Maariv] and Sydney Gruson of The New York Times.
16
Lewis, A Case History of Hope: The Story of Poland's Peaceful Revolutions
(Garden City, 1958), p. 100.
17
RFE broadcasts to Poland suggested that Bierut had probably committed
suicide, if he was not murdered by the Soviets. See Nowak-Jezioranski, Wojna w
eterze, pp. 227-228; and Stypulkowska, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
18
The Albanian First Secretary also pressed the theory that Bierut was
murdered. He later wrote: "Dimitrov, Gottwald and Bierut, all died in Moscow. What
a coincidence!" Hoxha, op. cit., p. 148.
19
Eulogies at the funeral were delivered by Zawadzki, Cyrankiewicz, Khrush-
chev, Chou T'eh of China, Antoni Novotny of Czechoslovakia, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo
of Yugoslavia, Jacques Duclos of France, and Ochab. For further details see For a
Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy (23 March 1956), pp. 4-5.
20
See Lewis, A Case History of Hope, p. 100.
21
Cf. Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Polish Revolution of 1956 (London,
1957), p. 33.
22
- 54 -
that Bierut was "engaged in the affairs of the Party and State until
the end" and that he was "preparing to return" to Warsaw.23
While the Party tried to secure an honourable place for the first
President of People's Poland, direct reference to the rumours about
Bierut's 'mysterious' death were carelessly sidestepped by the official
press organs. The leadership decided to focus on Bierut's allegedly
"constant and unyielding concern" for the motherland, including his
desire to immediately return to Poland and "serve his people."24 The
authorities failed to contain the rumours and the puzzling mixture of
signals left a cloud of doubt over the official explanation.
'MUSCOVITES', 'NATIVES', 'EMIGRES' AND 'JEWS'

Sometime between 13 and 16 March, the leadership decided to expand
the Secretariat. Reports surfaced which suggested that at the upcoming
leadership plenum, along with Ochab, the Politburo was going to nominate
Jerzy Albrecht and Edward Gierek to the Secretariat. The new
candidates represented, as Pelczynski put it, "the three main sections
of the Polish communist elite," the 'Muscovites', 'natives' and
'emigres'. 25 The post-Bierut Secretariat was to be composed of the
following: two 'Muscovites', Ochab and Matwin; two 'natives',
Morawski and Albrecht; and one emigre, Gierek.26
The proposed expansion of the Secretariat was not altogether a
surrender to the reformist forces but the concessions were substantial.
The inclusion of a 'native' who had been suspected of harbouring
sympathies towards Gomulka -- Albrecht -- was a significant step towards
Party reform.27 The addition of an 'emigre' into the leadership was
23
Nowe Drogi, no. 3 (March 1956), p. 23.
24
See esp. the attempt to turn Bierut into a legend by Leon Kruczkowski in
For a Lasting Peace (23 March 1956), p. 5.
25
Pelczynski in Leslie, op. cit., p. 474, footnote no. 5.
26
Ochab spent part of the war as a labourer in the Soviet Union and served
with the Kosciuszko Division from 1943 as a political officer. Matwin served with
the Red Army and the Polish Army under Soviet command. He was appointed secretary
of the PKWN embassy in Moscow in 1945. Both Ochab and Matwin were members of the
wartime ZPP. Morawski, together with Wladyslaw Bienkowski and Zenon Kliszko, edited
the leading PPR press organ during the war. He thus worked with two of Gomulka's
political allies during the war and became a PPR Secretary for the occupied territories
in July 1945. Albrecht worked with Gomulka during the occupation and was a PPR
Secretary from 1942. During the latter part of the war he was arrested by the Gestapo
and sent to a concentration camp. Gierek was active in the Belgian anti-Nazi
resistance and trade union movement.
27
Albrecht was removed as head of the propaganda department of the Secretariat
in May 1950, but he was not purged from the Party.
- 55 -
certainly a drastic departure from the past. Witold Rodzinski, a

former diplomat who was posted in Beijing during the 'Polish October',
suggested that many leading Party activists who had spent the war
outside Poland and the Soviet Union often felt that their loyalty was
in doubt during the Stalinist period.28
The Politburo was already represented by two former Socialists,
Cyrankiewicz and Rapacki;29 two 'natives' -- sympathetic to Bierut --
Jozwiak and Chelchowski; seven 'Muscovites', Berman, Dworakowski,
Mazur, Minc, Nowak, Ochab and Zambrowski. Rokossowski was obviously
in a category all his own. The Buro also included three Polish Jews:
Berman, Minc and Zambrowski. Conspicuously absent from the nominally
harmonious list of Secretaries was an activist of Jewish origin. While
'Jews' were not strictly a fourth section of Poland's communist elite,
the removal of Berman, Minc and Zambrowski from the Secretariat in 1954,
and the subsequent exclusion of a Polish Jew from the new list, was not
taken lightly by many leading activists. Khrushchev's influence with
Bierut over the leadership issue in 1954 had already caused some dismay
among the large group of Jewish activists. The new round of leadership
talks, on the eve of the VI Plenum, forced many reformers to associate
Khrushchev's interference with the prospect of a purge of Jews from the
Party elite.
The situation was complicated by the fact that most of the activist
of Jewish origin fitted squarely into the category of 'Muscovites'.
Many of Poland's leading communists of Jewish descent played a major
role in the Soviet-sponsored ZPP and CBKP.30 The 'Jews' were not only
pitted against the Soviets, but also some of their rivals among the
'natives'. The search for allies began in earnest. With the aid of
the non-Jewish Party activists who deplored anti-Semitism, mainly from
the ranks of the reformers, the activists of Jewish origin hoped to
strengthen their position inside the Party.
28
Interview with Rodzinski, November 1988. Rodzinski joined the Communist
movement during the interwar period. He served in the United States Army Air Force
during World War II and later became Poland's ambassador to Great Britain (1960-1964)
and the People's Republic of China (1966-1969).
29
Rapacki spent the war in Switzerland. Jerzy Urban reported that Rapacki
never attended a Buro meeting while Bierut was First Secretary. See Urban's Alfabet
Urbana: Od UA do Z (Warsaw, 1990), p. 40.
30
The ZPP was founded in June 1943 in order to 'unite' Polish citizens on Soviet
soil and included the following senior postwar Party leaders: Berman, Jaroszewicz,
Minc, Ochab, Radkiewicz, Zambrowski, and Zawadzki. The ZPP was subordinated in
January 1944 to the CBKP (subordinated in turn to Dimitrov) and in effect controlled
the PPR in Poland. It was founded by Berman, Minc and Wierblowski, and included
General Swierczewski, Wasilewska and Radkiewicz. It was later directed by Zawadzki.
- 56 -
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ANCIEN REGIME

An important aspects of the constraints faced by the power elite
during the leadership contest must be viewed through the prism of the
continuing Soviet power struggle. In the aftermath of the XX Congress
and in light of the growing opposition to the anti-Stalin campaign,
Khrushchev was determined to eliminate both his political rivals in the
CPSU and their allies in the Soviet bloc. "There was opposition" to
the 'secret speech' by those Soviet and East European leaders who
resisted reform; indeed, the "document was particularly bitter for
Poles to read," the Soviet leader later recalled.31
Bierut always had a low opinion of Khrushchev as CPSU First
Secretary. Zambrowski summarized Bierut's views thus:
From 1948-53, influence on Bierut's policies were directly exerted,

sometimes through Malenkov or Molotov, by Stalin. From 1953-56,
Khrushchev's influence on Bierut was never as strong as that of
Stalin...Bierut simply refused to accept Khrushchev as the definitive leader
after Stalin's death...upon meeting Khrushchev as PZPR First Secretary,
Bierut did not consider Khrushchev's authority to be greater than that of
the other leaders in the Soviet Presidium, such as Molotov, Malenkov or
32
Mikoyan.
The importance of Bierut's resistance to Khrushchev's anti-Stalin

initiatives cannot be underestimated. Bierut not only commanded
considerable respect throughout the Soviet bloc, primarily from other
hardliners, but he had been the leader of Moscow's largest political
and military ally in Europe. Enver Hoxha admitted that he admired
Bierut, characterizing him as a senior "communist-statesman" and
valuable partner. 33 Certainly Molotov supported Bierut, who
frequently dealt with "the leaders of the fraternal Communist
parties."34 And as Strobe Talbott, the editor of Khrushchev's memoirs,
noted: "After Stalin's death, Molotov opposed Khrushchev at every
major turn."35
When the close relationship between Molotov and Bierut is taken
into account, the previous PZPR leadership posed a threat to
Khrushchev's domination of the CPSU.36 Ochab refused to be precise but
31
32
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 15 September 1971, p. 94.
33
Hoxha, op. cit., p. 183.
34
The Glasnost Years, p. 110.
35
Talbott in Khrushchev Remembers, p. 553.
36
Cf. Interview with Berman in Toranska, p. 343.
- 57 -
he acknowledged that Khrushchev's opponents, the so-called Anti-Party

Group, had followers in Poland:
It's possible that this group might have had sympathizers in Poland, and
37
perhaps not only sympathizers, but people more closely connected with it.
Khrushchev wanted to supervise the PZPR leadership so that they did not
reward Molotov's supporters.
Khrushchev was not simply interested in championing the cause of
the self-styled reformers inside the KC PZPR. He also wanted to advance
functionaries who would be obedient to the Soviet Union and its leader.
This explains why Dworakowski Jozwiak, Mazur, Nowak, and especially
Rokossowski, were not threatened with demotion by the Soviets. The
politics of the Soviet power struggle therefore only partially explains
why Khrushchev was intent on guiding the leadership process in Poland.
Khrushchev's unwillingness to contain his criticisms of the
'errors in Leninist norms' committed by Berman and Minc to non-ethnic
criteria manifestly exposed his other goal. The Soviet leader wrote
that Berman and Minc, "both of whom happened to be Jews," were "two of
the men who contributed to the troubles in the Polish leadership."38
Khrushchev was bent on denying Polish Jews further access to positions
of power. After Bierut's death, according to Khrushchev, "the question
of favouritism in appointments for Jews arose in the Party leader-
ship."39 He laid the blame for the so-called "unfair promotion of Jews
over Poles" on "the personnel policies of Berman, Minc and most of all,
Zambrowski."40
The return of Berman or Minc to the Secretariat would have been
met with hostility from the KC PZPR, but Zambrowski's popularity
continued unabated among a significant section of the central Party
apparatus. Some of Khrushchev's most unflattering comments about
Poland's communist elite were reserved for Zambrowski. Khrushchev
also admitted that
[Zambrowski] and I kept our distance from each other. Unlike the others,
41
he didn't join us for vacations in the south.
The Soviet leader added:

37
38
39
40
The Last Testament, pp. 180-181.
41
ibid., pp. 196-197.
- 58 -
Everyone knew where he stood. He was the head of the Personnel

Section of the Central Committee, and he was accused of having pro-Zionist
sympathies...But because he was a Jew and because more Jews than Poles got
promoted to key economic and political posts, Zambrowski was accused of
showing patronage toward other Jewish comrades. Zambrowski was not a stupid
man...But he did get a reputation for cold-shouldering the Polish cadres
in a Polish state and promoting Jewish cadres when there was no objective
42
grounds for choosing them over Poles.
Khrushchev was convinced that a "Jew, appointed to an important

post, immediately surrounds himself with assistants of Jewish birth."43
He conceded that Zambrowski knew of his intentions:
[Zambrowski] could barely conceal [his] resentment toward us. This was
perfectly understandable: we'd told Bierut more than once he should replace
Zambrowski with someone of Polish nationality as head of the Personnel
Section in the Central Committee, and Bierut had obviously told Zambrowski
44
what we said.
Khrushchev's constant references to an activists' Jewish origin

was both boundless and distressing. 45 One of his more disquieting
observations was about the 'anti-Zionist' show trials that took place
in Romania in the early fifties:
After the XX Party Congress I spoke with the Romanian comrades about arrests
in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej told me that it was right to have arrested Anna
Pauker and Vasile Luca. 46 There was a predominance of Jews among the
leadership of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe and in the Romanian
Party leadership. After all those arrests the national leadership included
47
only Romanians, with the exception of one [ethnic] Hungarian.
Khrushchev's anti-Semitism became the key impediment to a

relatively uneventful debate at the VI Plenum.48 He would never have
consented to a Polish Jew in the top post.49 Khrushchev was no less
42
Emphasis added. ibid., p. 180.
43
Cited in Benjamin Pinkus, The Soviet Government and the Jews, 1948-1967:
A Documented Study (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 93.
44
45
Cf. ibid., pp. 173-174, 180-181, and 197.
46
Pauker, a rabbi's daughter, was a former Comintern official and Romanian
foreign minister. Luca, of Hungarian Jewish descent, was a former Communist
organizer in the Polish Ukraine and Romanian finance minister. According to Hodos
(op. cit., p. 103): "Someone, probably Molotov, intervened on the side of Anna
Pauker" and her life was therefore spared.
47
48
The discussion centred on Khrushchev's anti-Semitism. However, since
their social and political background resembled that of the CPSU First Secretary,
there can be little doubt that the majority of high and low-echelon Party officials
took a similar approach -- including the Soviet advisors in Poland.
49
For more information on Khrushchev's anti-Semitism see Crankshaw,
Khrushchev: A Career (New York, 1966), pp. 78 and 160-162.
- 59 -
determined to ensure that the PZPR replaced its leading cadres of Jewish
origin with gentiles or so-called 'newly created cadres'. 50 In an
absolutely uncritical comment on the ethnicity of the majority of the
functionaries in the PZPR, the Soviet leader suggested that "everywhere
only Jews were in positions of influence and there was no place for
Poles."51
THE PZPR AND ACTIVISTS OF JEWISH ORIGIN

Aspects of an unofficial anti-Jewish policy, the purpose of which
was to denying some of the top posts to activists of Jewish origin, was
supported by the PZPR elite immediately after the communists seized
power in Poland. The spectre of popular anti-Semitism, especially
among the proletarian Party activists, ensured that it would have been
impossible for a Jew to hold the post of First Secretary. Subsequent
attempts by the Soviets and PZPR hardliners to institute a formal quota
against Jews was a new development.
Senior activists who supported reform agreed that the election
of a Jewish First Secretary was undesirable because it would have been
received with hostility from the Party rank-and-file. Staszewski,
himself a Jew, conceded that the Party always employed a kind of
unwritten policy with the aim of denying the top post to those who were
"badly born":
Zambrowski's candidacy was never a possibility, for one thing because

Zambrowski was a Jew. It's true that no statue forbids it, but it was just
self-evident that would be going too far. Thus Minc or Berman, for instance,
could never have been First Secretary. At least formally, the limits of
52
the posts they could take up were determined from the outset.
Berman confirmed Staszewski's appraisal. However, he also attempted

to disavow the immense political power he once wielded: "I was aware
of the fact that as a Jew I either shouldn't or wouldn't be able to fill
any of the highest [sic] posts."53
50
Khrushchev was apparently willing to make an exception for Mazur, who was
of Ukrainian extraction.
51
52
Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, p. 169. Ochab [in Toranska, p. 51]
used the term "badly born" with mocking irony to refer to the main targets of the
1948-1954 purges.
53
- 60 -
Berman maintained that "because Polish society as a whole is very

anti-Semitic," from 1948 he supported the employment, "like Bierut,"
of an unofficial numerus clausus for Jews. He rationalized his
decision thus:
I was against too large a concentration of Jews in certain institutions;

it wasn't the right thing to do and it was a necessary evil that we'd been
forced into when we took power, when the Polish intelligentsia was boycotting
54
us.
Berman reportedly suggested that Polish Jews keep a low profile,

presumably because he felt his own position to be threatened.55
The idea of instituting an official anti-Jewish policy gained
popularity and support only after Stalin's death and especially after
Khrushchev came to power.56 The pressure for a "theory of regulation"
[teorii regulacyjnej], as Nowak characterized the call for a Jewish
quota at the time, was exerted by influential hardliners. 57
Klosiewicz's recent comment illustrates the hostility his group
exhibited against Jews:
If the Communists in America took power and all of the important positions
were occupied by Negroes, we would tell them: don't do that because you
will lose your influence. What would this mean, that we are racists?...A
settling of accounts came in 1955 and unfortunately it so happened that all
58
the department directors of the Security Office [UB] were Jews.
He also described Poland's leadership struggle in terms of a dichotomy

between 'Poles' and 'Jews', and added that "people didn't hide their
views and beliefs in their pockets. We all knew who stood for whom,
who was for Zambrowski, and who wanted Rokossowski out."59
54
ibid., p. 321.
55
For further details see Checinski, Poland, pp. 93-94.
56
See Antoni Czubinski, Czerwiec 1956 w poznaniu (Poznan, 1986), p. 9; and
57
See also Jerzy Borun and Klosiewicz in Wasik, op. cit. p. 86.
58
Interview with Klosiewicz in Toranska (Polish), p. 184.
59
Klosiewicz in Wasik, op. cit. p. 86. It is only in this respect that Jedli-
cki's Chamy versus Zydy characterization retains it potency.
- 61 -
SUMMARY
It was extremely important for Zambrowski and his allies to gain
control of the Secretariat. Article 30 of the Party statues (of 1954)
stipulated that the Secretariat "directs current work, mainly in the
field of organizing control over the implementation of Party
resolutions and selection of cadres." 60 As Ochab stated at the II
Congress of 1954, the KC PZPR was to rely on the Secretariat "for the
direction of every-day work, especially in matters of organizing
control and execution of Party decisions," while relying upon the
Politburo for direction of the activities of the KC PZPR between all
plenary sessions.61 The Secretariat not only had day-to-day control
of the Party's activities, but also the vast nomenklatura system.
In all the communist states of Eastern Europe no important
association, institution or other social organization was able to
conduct its personnel policy without prior approval from a dominant or
superior Party organ. This procedure became known as the nomenklatura
system. 62 The nomenklatura system generally meant that a superior
organ controlled two separate lists. The first list was an inventory
of posts. A nomination for one of those posts required confirmation
in advance by the superior organ. Only the Party possessed such a list,
although some state agencies and trade union associations were also
known to maintain them. The second list was a directory of people who
were already vetted and therefore entitled to occupy those posts. Both
lists tended to operate the same way and were kept strictly confiden-
tial.63 It was to the 'list of people' that some Party hardliners wanted
to apply the so-called 'regulation theory' against Jews.
The nomenklatura system was slowly introduced to Poland in 1944
and a decade later it effected almost all institutional structures in
society. It is still difficult to estimate the exact number of
individuals directly encompassed by the nomenklatura system in 1956,
60
"Statut PZPR zatwierdzony przez II Zjazd Partii," Trybuna Ludu (19 March
1954).
61
Ochab, "O niektorych zadaniach organizacyjnych i zmianach w Statucie
Partii," Trybuna Ludu (17 March 1954). Cf. also Richard F. Starr, "The Secretariat
of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR)," Journal of Central European Affairs,
vol. XV, no. 3 (October 1955), pp. 272-273.
62
On the nomenklatura system see Thomas Lowit, "Y a-t-il des Etats en Europe
de l'Est?" Revue francaise de sociologie, no. 2, vol. 20 (1979), pp. 431-466; Takayuki
Ito, "Controversy over Nomenklatura in Poland: Twilight of a Monopolistic Instrument
for Social Control," Acta Slavica Iaponica, vol. I (1983), pp. 57-103; and Michael
Voslensky, Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class (London, 1984).
63
Ito, op. cit., p. 58.
- 62 -
but it probably covered 350,00 to 600,000 people.64 The proficiency

of the nomenklatura system, its actual ability to penetrate Polish
institutions and control personnel policy, met with varying degrees of
success. The most obvious failure was the Party's inability to
infiltrate the Roman Catholic church.
In 1956 Poland's nomenklatura system embraced the entire Party
apparatus, central and local state administration, military, security,
the legal system, police, press and publishing houses, universities,
industrial and other economic enterprises, trade unions, farming
collectives, the writers' union and other cultural institutions,
organizations for women, youth and student associations, and so on. As
a consequence of the progressive subordination of the personnel
policies of the numerous political, economic and social organizations
to their supervising Party organs, a definite hierarchy of authorities
was constructed in People's Poland. The result of this process was that
the Secretariat administered the ubiquitous personnel policy. Jews in
the Party could not expect to protect themselves from a purge without
a defender inside the Secretariat.
The hardliners and anti-Semites in the Party -- the two did not
necessarily go hand-in-hand -- were no less determined to safeguard
their positions. And, paradoxically, they were emboldened by the
Soviet leader's six-day visit to Poland. Khrushchev ostensibly
travelled to Warsaw for Bierut's funeral. But he stayed in order to
lobby the Central Committee on behalf of Ochab; indeed, to lend his
support to the de-Stalinization campaign. He also realized that the
KC PZPR might support Zambrowski's appointment to the Secretariat. It
appears that Khrushchev decided to attend the VI Plenum to ensure that
a Polish Jew was not reinstated to the Secretariat.
64
Based on my own calculations and interviews.
CHAPTER SIX
THE VI KC PZPR PLENUM
The Central Committee gathered to elect a new First Secretary on

20 March. 1 Khrushchev became the first -- and last -- CPSU First
Secretary to attend a plenary session of the KC PZPR.2 The meeting was
chaired by Zawadzki. After greeting the Soviet leader (in Russian),
Zawadzki opened the meeting with the following appeal:
What kind of bearing and posture are we to take? The only one ever selected
by communists under such circumstances: to strive for united action, to
collectively fill the vacancy and replace the loss which the death of Comrade
Bierut has brought. And this we shall do.
Cyrankiewicz detailed the medical circumstances surrounding

Bierut's fatal illness. The chairman of the Council of Ministers also
remarked that in order to refute the widespread "rumours and heresies"
which Bierut's death had precipitated, the government was going to
release to the public the same information that he had outlined to the
Central Committee. Ochab summarized the decisions reached by the
Politburo concerning rehabilitations. He revealed that "individuals
who were arrested illegally" would be fully rehabilitated, while others
would be released on the basis of a "legal clemency...because of a lack
of evidence" against them. Ochab also announced that Kirchmayer,
Kliszko, Komar, Kuropieska, Spychalski, Tatar, and others were either
rehabilitated or no longer under suspicion.
With the formalities concluded, Zawadzki returned to the dominant
concern of the plenum and announced: "The Politburo collectively
nominates Comrade Edward Ochab for the position of PZPR First
Secretary." There was no discussion following Ochab's nomination and
no other person was put forward for the top post. Ochab was unanimously
elected by the Central Committee.
The new First Secretary thanked the delegates for their
"confidence" and then went on to the next point. On behalf of the
Politburo, Ochab nominated Albrecht and Gierek to join him at the Secre-
tariat. The plenum shifted its attention to the election of Party
Secretaries.
1
"Protokol plenarnego posiedzienia Komitetu Centralnego w 20 III 1956 r. [CA KC PZPR,
237/II-13]" as cited in "Polska proba," pp. 124-127; and Interview with Klosiewicz in
Toranska (Polish), pp. 180-183.
2
Khrushchev wanted to conceal his attendance at the VI Plenum. He wrote: "In 1956
Comrade Bierut died. There was a special plenum of the Polish Central Committee. I did
not attend the plenum because we didn't want the Soviet Union to be accused of interference
in the internal affairs of the Polish Communist party." Khrushchev added, without
exaggeration, "The meeting was stormy and many of those who spoke expressed disaffection
with the Soviet Union." Emphasis added. The Glasnost Tapes, p. 113.
- 64 -
Albrecht was the first person from the floor to take the platform.
He told the gathering that he was not a good candidate. "Comrades,"
he stated, "I...do not measure up to this specific task." Khrushchev
immediately intervened. The Soviet leader responded to Albrecht's
comments -- in Russian -- with a declaration that communists had a duty
and responsibility to take up the work tendered to them by the Party.
He told the new candidate: "Marshal's are not born with those
epaulettes on their shoulders," reportedly pointing to Rokossowski,
"they're sewn on later." But Albrecht reminded his listeners that from
mid-1950 he was not allowed to work in the apparat because he was
considered untrustworthy. He petitioned the Politburo to reconsider
its nomination:
I have a deep conviction that there are more suitable comrades, with a great
deal more experience, better knowledge about Party work, and with a great
deal more influence.
Gierek echoed Albrecht's unease:
Comrades, I understand that Party Secretaries are not created out of the
blue. That's obvious. However, I would like you to take into consideration
the following: I have worked in the apparat for almost ten years and I have
been in the Party for just over twenty years, but I have never worked in
a position of such responsibility. I would also like to mention one more
thing to the comrades: I have a serious problem with writing and
composition.
Gierek also concluded with an appeal for the leadership to reexamine

his candidacy:
I am already the director of a Party department [heavy industry] and other

comrades even tell me they're satisfied with my work. Comrades, I can
honestly say that I would rather be a good director than a poor Secretary.
Roman Nowak, KW First Secretary in Opole, then addressed the

plenum. He suggested that the delegates ought to consider another
candidate for the post of Party Secretary: Roman Zambrowski. Nowak
reminded the Central Committee that Zambrowski "has considerable
experience" and that his reinstatement would strengthen the Party.
Zambrowski responded straightaway to Nowak's nomination:
Comrades, I am a member of the Politburo and I must remind you that we are
unanimous in our decision to nominate Comrades Albrecht and Gierek to the
Secretariat.
He asked Nowak to withdraw the nomination. But Nowak refused and said
that it was up to the Central Committee to decide if his candidacy should
remain on the agenda. Zambrowski's nomination was then endorsed by
- 65 -
Michalina Tatarkowna-Majkowska, the First Secretary of the Lodz Party,

and Apolonia Lewinska, who was the acting director of the Secretariat's
education department. As Lewinska put it: "Today, Party members
express themselves with their own conscience."
The question of Zambrowski's ethnic origin emerged when
Klosiewicz "felt obliged to respond."3 His first comment was reserved
for Albrecht and Gierek:
Comrades, I have to say that I don't quite understand the posture taken by
the Politburo's candidates. I'll tell you why, because the question is not
about Comrade Roman Zambrowski leaving the leadership. After all, Comrade
Zambrowski is already a member of the Politburo...he is not being removed
from the leadership. It's a question of strengthening and expanding the
Secretariat.
Klosiewicz continued:
I don't agree with the declaration made by Comrade Albrecht, with his opinion
of himself...We, as members of the KC, have the right to our own appreciation
of his work and his usefulness. I think it's modesty on his part. We are
acquainted with Comrade Albrecht and we know that he is not a novice when
it comes to work in the Party apparatus. He steered the important work of
the propaganda department and, in my personal opinion, Comrade Albrecht is
fully qualified for the position of Party Secretary. As far as the candidacy
of Comrade Gierek is concerned, I agree with him that everyone has some
limitations, certain weaknesses. But it also has to be taken into account
that he has worked for ten years in the Party apparat. He is director of
an important department, he is of working class origin and he worked for
many years as a coal miner.
He also suggested to Gierek that his past experiences were a source of

strength, not weakness. Klosiewicz added: "don't tell us that you
write poorly and have an inadequate education."
Focusing on Roman Nowak's nomination and -- indirectly -- to the
question of Zambrowski's Jewish origin, Klosiewicz warned:
Those of us who must vote have to take into consideration not only the views
of the KC, but also anticipate how these elections will be seen by the Party
as a whole. How will the nation view the elections that take place here?
The oblique reference to the spectre of anti-Semitism, especially

Klosiewicz's recommendation that the Party pay heed to it, was not
missed by anyone at the plenum.
Klosiewicz recently recalled that some of the delegates tried to
stop him from speaking after he made reference to Zambrowski's ethnic
origin. When he reminded his critics that no one interfered with their
comments, someone from the hall reportedly shouted: "Because we didn't
3
- 66 -
say such ridiculous things." 4 The chairman of the CRZZ refused to

concede. Klosiewicz continued:
don't assume that no one else knows what the nation thinks. I have great
affection for Comrade Zambrowski and deeply value him for his work and his
contribution. For a while I was also a Secretary5 and at times I turned
to Comrade Zambrowski for advice and help, but no one is trying to force
him from any position. He remains a member of the Politburo and minister
of state control [...]
The director of the central PZPR school, Celina Budzynska, accused

Klosiewicz of libel:
Comrade Klosiewicz allowed himself to speak in the name of the nation. It's
true that I'm not the head of the CRZZ, but I thing that I'm in touch with
the nation no less than Comrade Klosiewicz. And I think that what he said,
to put it bluntly, is a slander against the nation...It seems to me that
nobody, neither the Party aktiv, the rank-and-file, nor the nation, would
find even the slightest cause to dispute Comrade Zambrowski's candidacy.
Our nation admires and values intelligent people. They know how to assess
Party activists.
Jerzy Putrament, head of the influential POP attached to the

Warsaw branch of the ZLP, voiced the most uncompromising outcry against
Klosiewicz at the plenum.6 Putrament reportedly shout out his remarks:
Comrades, I decided to speak only after listening to Comrade Klosiewicz.

I am extremely concerned about what he said. What he said was very
disagreeable. You know, if we are to pitch everything that is good in order
to strengthen the Party, especially at a time when our Party is passing
through a difficult period, how can we allude to those evil things which
may exist in this or that section of our nation? How can we summon those
things which disgrace and shame us? Our Party always appeals to that which
is the best in our nation and not to that which is backward. I think that
if we don't admit Comrade Zambrowski to the Secretariat, it's precisely at
that moment that we have nothing to say to the Party. What would be our
reasoning? I think very highly of Comrade Albrecht. Although I barely know
Comrade Gierek I like him very much. I don't know if it states in the Party
statutes that there can be only five rather than six Secretaries. Maybe
we should elect all three. Comrade Zambrowski is indispensable, all the
Party aktiv is in agreement. If we don't do this the Politburo will be
forced, again and again, to explain its decision to the Party. And what
explanation will it give? I call for all three comrades to be placed in
the Secretariat.7
Calm was restored to the meeting after Wlodzimierz Sokorski, the

art and culture minister, suggested to the Central Committee: "in so
far as strengthening the Secretariat is concerned, this issue ought to
be scheduled for the next KC plenum." However, he added: "If it comes
4
ibid., p. 181.
5
Klosiewicz was KW PPR First Secretary in Cracow and later Szczecin.
6
Putrament was also Poland's ambassador to Paris (1945-1950), member of the KC PZPR
until 1981 and the editor-in-chief of Literatura.
7
Emphasis added.
- 67 -
to an election, I'll vote for Comrade Zambrowski's candidacy." Sokor-

ski's compromise motion was not accepted by the leadership. Stefan
Jedrychowski, chairman of the PKPG and a future Politburo member,
supported Putrament's call for the election of all three nominees.
Another member of the PKPG, Mieczyslaw Popiel, also backed Roman Nowak's
nomination and added that "Comrade Zambrowski, in the opinion of many
comrades, is the leading authority on our agricultural policy."8
Hilary Chelchowski, a candidate member of the Politburo,
reiterated Ochab's firm opposition to Zambrowski's candidacy. He also
backed the statements made by Klosiewicz. Chelchowski added that the
Central Committee "must employ new people in positions responsible for
the selection of cadres." He then criticized Albrecht and Gierek for
their reluctance to join the Secretariat. Chelchowski continued:
"What is Comrade Gierek talking about when he says that he doesn't know
how to write?" Gierek "can get himself a secretary."
Klosiewicz returned to the fray. In response to Putrament's
comments, as Klosiewicz recently put it, "I had to speak again." 9
"Comrades," he began, "I would like to shed some light on a number of
things at this point...I thought that after the III Plenum something
had changed in our Party." Klosiewicz demanded that his critics stop
putting words into his mouth and charged them with "insinuated those
things" which he had not "thought." His harshest remarks were
naturally reserved for Putrament:
Well, what did I say from this platform? That the nation will accept these
elections? Why does Comrade Putrament all of the sudden come forward in
order to say that the words I expressed from this platform are an insult
to our Party? What insult? That the Secretariat is going to be expanded
by two? About Comrade Gierek, who is known to the Silesian working class
as a worker? That Comrade Albrecht, who is well known, will be promoted?
What? Is the nation not going to accept them? So, now I have no right to
say that advancing these candidates on behalf of the Politburo will be
positively accepted by the Party, including the working class and the nation?
Comrade Putrament, don't tie my hands down. When it becomes necessary, I'll
buy a straightjacket [nie przyszywajcie mi rekawow do kamizelki, jak mi beda
potrzebne -- kupie sobie waciak].
Returning to the question of Zambrowski's candidacy, Klosiewicz

concluded:
I've already said that I have confidence in Comrade Zambrowski. I said

nothing will change because he is already in the Politburo...We're
8
According to Antoni Zambrowski, Stalin recommended to Bierut that he discharge Roman
Zambrowski from his duties as the Secretary responsible for agricultural policy. See
Antoni Zambrowski, "Zamiast przedmowy," Krytyka no. 6 (1980), p. 14.
9
- 68 -
discussing two candidates. I don't know why all of the sudden everyone is
going out of their way to argue that the Party will collapse if Comrade
Zambrowski does not enter the Secretariat. No changes to the Politburo will
take place...two new comrades are being added to the Secretariat. Will it
be strengthened or will it not? It's clear, it will be strengthened and
that's why I still stand by my earlier statements.
Khrushchev then asked to speak to the divided plenum. He said

that the Soviets had no intention of intervening in the internal person-
nel policies of the Polish Party and that he merely wanted to stress
a number of technical points. Khrushchev informed the Central
Committee that talks had already been held with the PZPR Politburo on
how the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat operated. He added: "I think
that it's no better here than it is there." However, Khrushchev
suggested that the Soviet Secretariat and the Polish Secretariat had
different political functions. He argued that under his leadership the
CPSU ensured that its Secretariat was not stronger than the Presidium.
Khrushchev noted that he did not allow the Soviet Secretariat to concern
itself with public policy and that it was not allowed to override the
Presidium.
Romana Granas, director of the Party school at the Central
Committee, interrupted Khrushchev and said in Russian: "It's not a
threat to us." Khrushchev misinterpreted Granas and apparently
thought she said: 'He's a threat to us'. A period of confusion ensued.
Khrushchev vociferously protested that he was not trying to interfere
in the internal affairs of the PZPR and the he was astonished by the
reaction to his comments. He explained that he was merely trying to
pass on information about Soviet experiences:
Why are you rejecting our latest mutual exchange of experiences?...We

understand our significance and we can afford not to meddle in your affairs.
We don't get involved in them at all.
Khrushchev then went on to defend the Polish leadership for its nominat-
ion of Albrecht and Gierek to the Secretariat. He bluntly told the
delegates that the Politburo was obliged to use "intelligence" rather
than "sentiment."
The confusion over Granas's remark was eventually rectified and
Khrushchev calmed down. The Soviet leader resumed his examination of
the Soviet political system, addressing the relations between the
Presidium and the Council of Ministers. He also stressed the
importance of collective leadership and the need to ensure that one
person did not accumulate power. Khrushchev concluded his speech with
- 69 -
the statement: "Who ever you want, that's who you'll choose." At this
point, a short recess was called.
The Politburo held a meeting during the intermission. Khrushchev
did not return to the hall when the VI Plenum resumed proceedings.
Ochab took the platform and told the gathering that the Buro was
unanimous in its decision to nominate only Albrecht and Gierek. Minc
followed the First Secretary and recommended that the plenum make its
choice with the following considerations in mind:
Point one: with courage [z goracym sercem], but with a cool head. The
person who does not act with a cool head will harm the Party. Point two:
it is a problem of uniformity in the Party -- in the broadest sense of the
word. Point three: the Politburo is unanimous -- the plenum will either
10
agree with the Politburo or it will not.
The majority of the KC members recognized that they were left with
no other option but to accept the leadership's candidates. Shortly
before the election was held, however, Albrecht petitioned the plenum
to reject his candidacy. He failed. The Central Committee voted
unanimously in favour of Albrecht and Gierek.
Another discussion concerning Roman Nowak's nomination of
Zambrowski followed the election. It was suggested that the Central
Committee also vote on Zambrowski's candidacy. The last-ditch attempt
to subvert the Politburo was rejected. Putrament was one of the last
persons to speak at the VI Plenum. He probably summed up the opinion
of the majority of the KC members:
I am not persisting with my personal views, but I have to say that I am not
convinced by the arguments which were put forward today. What is more, I'm
leaving this plenum with a heavy heart.
SUMMARY
Khrushchev's performance at the plenum was the source of consider-
able alarm for the majority of the KC members. The Soviet leader's
endorsement of the sentiments expressed by Klosiewicz and others,
confirmed the opinion of many that Khrushchev also wanted to remove
Jewish cadres from the PZPR.
Khrushchev recently indicated that his goal was to thwart
Zambrowski's election to the Secretariat; indeed to set the stage for
his eventual removal from the leadership:
10
Emphasis added.
- 70 -
We in the Soviet leadership were for removing the Party Secretary

[Zambrowski] responsible for personnel, but he was too powerful and kept
his position.
Support for Zambrowski fuelled Khrushchev's baseless suspicion that the

KC PZPR was mostly occupied, and appointed, by activists of Jewish
origin. Khrushchev rationalized his opposition to Zambrowski on the
pretext of preserving ethnic harmony:
We opposed him because...a Jew who occupies a high place in the Party
structure promotes only Jews, he will do more harm than any anti-Semite,
11
because such actions stir up ethnic enmity and conflicts.
Zambrowski was no less clear about Khrushchev's aim:
At the VI Plenum -- the first in the postwar history of the Party in which
the CPSU leader participated -- Khrushchev spoke twice in order to torpedo
12
my candidacy to the KC Secretariat.
Klosiewicz's recent statement that "Anti-Semitism was not a

constant feature of the political game" is thus put into question. He
also claimed that anti-Semitism at the plenum was a dimension "advanced
by the Jewish comrades, who were sensitive on these issues."13 But the
evidence contradicts Klosiewicz's appraisal. He conveniently
dismisses the various outbursts by non-Jews, especially Putrament,
against his remarks about 'how the working class and nation' would view
the KC elections. Putrament wrote in his memoirs that Klosiewicz's
opposition to Zambrowski was explicitly understood by the KC delegates
"as an allusion to the ethnic origin of the candidate." He went on to
describe Klosiewicz's presentation as "one of those incidents that left
me speechless, so glaring was the discrimination."14
Poland's trade union boss also suggested that conflict at the VI
Plenum was masterminded by a 'group' determined to aid Zambrowski's
accumulation of political power. He saw his own role as merely that
of someone who tried to weaken the power of one individual. Klosiewicz
explained his remarks at the VI Plenum in the following manner:
First we said: don't accumulate functions...At this time Zambrowski was

already a member of the Buro and a minister -- maybe that's enough.
Zambrowski was put forward by a group which was later called 'Pulawy' and
I didn't connect myself with them. Chelchowski didn't join either. They
didn't expect that. For example, [Julian] Kole was very surprised that I
didn't support Zambrowski. Before that we spoke frequently to each other.
Before the III Plenum in July 1954, when he knew I would speak against Berman,
11
ibid., p. 113.
12
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 12 October 1971, p. 97.
13
14
Putrament, Pol Wieku: Poslizg, vol. IV (Warsaw, 1980), p. 20.
- 71 -
he first tried to deter me. Later he came to me and told me: maybe we should
give it to him, but not too hard, just a little. Over the next year we kept
in contact, but that group cut its contacts with me and only at the time
of Zambrowski's election did the KC divide itself. Moreover, they claimed
I was an anti-Semite because Zambrowski was a Jew, though that did not
15
interest me.
Staszewski's recollection of the leadership debate partly contradicts

Klosiewicz:
The KC proceeded to the election of members to the Secretariat, and this

was when we encountered blatant anti-Semitism on the part of the 'Natolin'
group. To people who were active and involved...this came as a shock. The
issue of nationality emerged when Zambrowski was put forward as a candidate
16
from the floor.
The apprehension displayed by Albrecht and Gierek was

significant. They were very much aware of the developing conflicts
among the Party elite following Bierut's death.17 Khrushchev's trans-
parent opposition to Roman Nowak's proposal added to their misgivings.
Albrecht and Gierek must have been anxious about their future role in
an explosive environment.
Albrecht recently argued that he had to be forced into the
Secretariat because he was unwilling to work with the hardliners in the
Buro. He also feared that his moderate views would eventually lead to
his dismissal from the Party:
I was chosen to be a Party Secretary against my will at the VI Plenum. I

tried to defend myself against it, pleading in order that they would not
choose me. I did not feel up to it because I knew who was in the Politburo.
I was forced. There was a KC resolution and Khrushchev sat in the
hall...When I spoke against the 'rightist-nationalist deviation' it never
entered my head that Gomulka would be arrested. I thought these were natural
18
political differences.
Gierek recently acknowledged that he was also uneasy about the divisions
that emerged in the Party. Gierek added that he was weary of an
association with Ochab:
I was a relatively new person in Warsaw, unconnected with the old guard.
For Ochab, my neutrality was significant...I was also not compromised by
any activities from which the Party wanted to disentangle itself. Ochab,
like all new First Secretaries, was looking for new people, whose advance
was tied with his name. Also, as a rule, it is logical that all new members
15
Klosiewicz in Toranska (Polish), p. 183.
16
17
Kazimierz Mijal, a former chief of Bierut's chancellory, notified the KC at their
plenum of July 1956 "about the attempts to get [Antoni Alster -- a Zambrowski supporter]
elected to the Secretariat." Excerpt of Mijal's speech to the VII Plenum. See chapter
IX. Mijal, one of Klosiewicz's most ardent backers, confirmed that there was a consider-
able amount of negotiating going on in Warsaw before the VI Plenum.
18
Albrecht in Wasik, op. cit., p. 81.
- 72 -
of the Party leadership feel tied and indebted to the First Secretary.
19
Besides, I'll honestly admit that...I thought my promotion was premature.
In direct contradiction to the interpretations hitherto presented

in many studies of the power struggle that ensued at the VI Plenum, Zenon
Nowak, Franciszek Mazur, and Roman Zambrowski, were not put forward as
candidates for the top post.20 Previous statements about the candidacy
of either Nowak or Mazur were largely based on the false assumption that
Zambrowski was also nominated for the post of First Secretary. The root
cause of this misunderstanding can be traced to the apparent certainty
on the part of many pundits that Zambrowski's political manoeuvring was
aimed at securing the top post.
Zambrowski was aware of the external and internal constraints put
on Jews in the central Party apparatus. He may have been ambitious,
but he was not reckless. Zambrowski was also aware of his political
weaknesses:
I had lively, not only official, contacts with Morawski, Albrecht and Matwin
in the Secretariat, and with Cyrankiewicz and Rapacki in the Politburo. I
also had good relations, dating back for years, with Ochab and Jedrychowski.
21
However, I was not in a strong position.
The remarks made by Boleslaw Ruminski, the chemical industry

minister, at the plenum of October 1956 were often used as evidence that
Zambrowski was a candidate for the top post. A closer look at Rumin-
ski's comments indicate that he was misinterpreted. In response to a
question from Staszewski at the VIII Plenum, Ruminski responded thus:
You told me that Poland cannot be independent because the Soviet comrades
do not allow it and interfere in everything. You told me also that
Khrushchev raised the matter of Comrade Zambrowski at the VI Plenum and
22
raised the Jewish problem.
Zbigniew Brzezinski's verdict that "Ruminski's reference to Khrushchev

pertains to the selection of Bierut's successor in March 1956" is
unsustainable. 23 On the other hand, those who had access to Party
19
Interview with Gierek in Janusz Rolicki, Edward Gierek: Przerwana dekada (Warsaw,
1990), p. 34.
20
Cf. Lewis, A Case History of Hope, p. 102; Jedlicki, "Chamy i Zydy," p. 12; "USSR
and the Politics of Polish Antisemitism 1956-68," Soviet Jewish Affairs, no. 1 (June 1971),
p. 20; Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 245 and 534, footnote no. 21; Checinski, Poland,
p. 110; Antoni Czubinski, "Kryzysy polityczny 1956 roku w polsce," in his Kryzysy
spoleczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej: Geneza, charakter, sposoby przewyciezenia
(Warsaw, 1983), pp. 98-99; Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution
(Princeton, 1984), p. 287; and Andrzej Albert, Najnowsza historia Polski, 1918-1980
(London, 1989), p. 706.
21
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 12 October 1971, p. 97.
22
Excerpt from Ruminski's speech to the VIII KC PZPR Plenum, Nowe Drogi, no. 10
(October 1956), p. 148.
23
Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 259.
- 73 -
archives did little to dispel the story that Zambrowski was a candidate
for the top post. Kozik admitted in 1982 that Ochab was elected
unanimously to the post of First Secretary at the VI Plenum, but added
to the confusion by merely stating that Zambrowski was unable to gain
the majority support of the Central Committee "despite a lively discus-
sion."24 The role played by Khrushchev was passed over altogether by
Party historians.
The highlight of the plenum was not the election of a First
Secretary, but the election of Party Secretaries. All past references
to Ochab as a so-called 'compromise candidate' missed the point
entirely.25 Ochab was to be Khrushchev's man in Poland in almost the
same way that Bierut was Stalin's loyal protege. Nothing temporary or
conciliatory was intended by Ochab's unanimous election.
Zambrowski's position within the leadership was weakened after
20 March. Although many of the KC members supported him, the Party
elite was in no position to disobey its Soviet sponsor. The PZPR also
lacked the domestic political legitimacy required for the KC to insist
on the election of its preferred nominee -- especially a candidate of
Jewish origin. Zambrowski nevertheless remained an important force in
the Politburo and Central Committee. The anti-Jewish position
enunciated by Klosiewicz and others guaranteed that he continued to
command support from a significant section of the central Party aktiv.
Anti-Semitism was a factor in the developing crisis. The debates
at the VI Plenum questioned the continued participation of Polish Jews
in the political life of the PZPR. The character of the post-Stalin
emergency was transformed from a crisis of confidence in the Bierut
regime, to an unreconcilable split within the Party apparat. Ochab's
unwillingness to support Zambrowski's candidacy was an important
ingredient in that split.26 The First Secretary lost his appeal and
influence among many of the reform-minded activists in the Party.
24
Kozik, PZPR w latach, p. 159.
25
The notable exception is Bethell's biography of Gomulka. But even Bethell
portrays Ochab as a transitory leader because Gomulka's return to the leadership is
accepted as a foregone conclusion.
26
There is no evidence to suggest that Ochab was anti-Jewish. Indeed, he resigned
from all his posts in 1968 in protest against the anti-Semitic campaign launched in Poland
by Mieczyslaw Moczar and Gomulka.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE TIME OF TROUBLES
The process of de-Stalinization from above continued after the

leadership plenum. The "time of troubles," as Khrushchev described the
months following Bierut's death, was marked by the PZPR's extraordinary
relaxation of control over the propaganda apparatus. 1 From the VI
Plenum until the strikes in Poznan at the end of June, Poland went
through a period of 'glasnost'. The Party applied more caution in the
area of economic reconstruction, although the tempo and rigidity of
rapid industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture also
continued to weaken.
At the Secretariat meeting of 21 March, Ochab took charge of the
Organization department and the central Party aktiv. Mazur retained
control of the territorial apparat. Matwin acquired the ZMP, an
organization he once chaired. Control of the industrial sector was
transferred to Gierek. The departments of Education, Party History,
and Social Services went to Albrecht, including responsibility for Nowe
Drogi, Trybuna Ludu, and the Party commission which supervised the Sejm.
Morawski was to oversee the departments of Propaganda, Press and Radio,
and Culture and Science. He also gained control of the All-Polish
Committee of the National Unity Front, 2 the Party commission
responsible for education, and the editorial board of Zycia Partii.3
Matwin, Morawski and Albrecht -- the so-called 'Young Secretaries' --
acquired the daily management of Party propaganda, ideology, culture,
education, and the youth-wing of the Party.4
While the Politburo remained the dominant political institution
in the Party, the campaign for a 'return to Leninist norms' was directed
by the Secretariat. Important decisions on matters of public policy,
as Pelczynski argued, were "broadly sanctioned" by the Politburo, "but
interpreted in detail" by the Secretariat.5 The decision to release
1
2
The committee contained representatives of all principal social and
political organizations and corresponding regional and local committees.
3
Biuletyn Informacyjny Biura Sekretariatu KC PZPR [hereafter Biuletyn], 30
March 1956, no. 25, p. 2. See also Wladyslaw M. Grabski, "Rok 1956 na lamach
'Biuletynu Informacyjnego Sekretariatu KC PZPR'," Z pola walki [hereafter Grabski],
no. 1 (1985), p. 36.
4
Feliks Baranowski replaced Lewinska (she supported Zambrowski), who was the
acting director, as director of the Education department; Andrzej Werblan became
director of the Propaganda department; and Jozef Niedzwiecki became acting director
of the Heavy Industry department. See Appendix IV.
5
- 75 -
Khrushchev's 'secret speech' to the apparat was the cornerstone of the

policy of 'openness'.
THE 'SECRET SPEECH' UNLEASHED

Khrushchev, sometime during his visit to Warsaw, convinced the
PZPR leadership to circulate the 'secret speech'.6 He wanted the PZPR
to guide the process before the speech became public knowledge. As
Morawski recently commented: "Khrushchev let us know that its quite
possible his speech will be published." 7 A few days before the VI
Plenum a copy of the 'secret speech' was deposited in the KC chancellory.
Members of the central Party aktiv were then given permission to read
the text (in Russian) of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.8
The next step was more decisive. The Secretariat was authorized
to translate and distribute the 'secret speech' to all "Party organiz-
ations," Ochab recently recalled, "where it was [to be] read out and
discussed." 9 Morawski outlined the motivation behind the Polish
decision:
We understood that it was also necessary for us to print and distribute the
speech. Many people in the leadership were against it, although that didn't
surprise me. A person had to go to [Party] meetings, answer questions --
he felt like a criminal. But I realized that Khrushchev's words were the
most effective instruments in exposing the Stalinist methods of rule in
10
Poland.
Khrushchev confirmed that the Poles was apprehensive about distribut-

ing the 'secret speech':
When I discussed our policy of exposing Stalin's crimes with the Polish
11
leadership, they were reluctant to conduct a similar campaign in Poland.
The Secretariat directive of 21 March read as follows:

The Secretariat authorized Comrades [Walenty] Titkow and [Ryszard] Majchrzak to
establish a distribution index in order to circulate a Polish translation
12
of Comrade Khrushchev's speech at the closed session of the XX Congress.
6
On the day of Bierut's funeral (16 March) the Polish press agency confirmed
that Khrushchev spoke to a closed session of the XX Congress.
7
Interview with Morawski in Stare numery, p. 49.
8
See ibid.; and Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, p. 173.
9
10
11
The Glasnost Years, p. 114. On Ochab's apprehensions about releasing the
'secret speech' see his Interview with Toranska, p. 55.
- 76 -
The distribution of the speech to the Party aktiv was not unique.
The Secretariat of the CPSU also issued a directive for the speech to
be read to activists throughout the Soviet Union.13 The uniqueness of
the PZPR's directive rested with the translation of Khrushchev's
speech, which was unprecedented in Eastern Europe. The PZPR was the
only non-Soviet Party to conduct extensive discussions about
Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. 14 Unauthorized copies of the speech
were also printed and circulated outside the confines of the Party.
Staszewski recently submitted that he and other members of the Warsaw
Party executive, as well as the printers, were responsible for the
unauthorized distribution of the speech:
After some hesitation it was agreed by me and a few numbers of the [Warsaw]
executive that the speech was an important document which everyone ought
to read. We made an official announcement that we would print a run of three
thousand numbered copies; unofficially we told the printers to run off
fifteen thousand, repeating the numbers, the printers themselves ran off
some additional copies on top of that, and thus the seal of silence on
15
Khrushchev's speech was broken.
Henryk Korotynski, former editor of Zycie Warszawy and not a Party

member, confirmed that "Staszewski...on his own initiative, gave me the
confidential speech by Khrushchev in March 1956." 16 The editorial
board of Po Prostu also received the text in March:
In March 1956, the printers who were on friendly terms with Po Prostu, brought
a freshly copied pamphlet, entitled "On the Cult of Personality and its
Consequences," to the editorial board. A note was attached: "For
17
exclusive use by Party organizations."
It was even reported in April 1956 that copies of the speech were being
sold for 100 zlotys at Warsaw's Rozycki bazaar.18
Khrushchev was aware of the unofficial distribution of his speech:
After Bierut's death there were divisions in the Polish leadership, and as
a result copies of the speech became accessible to the public. I was told
12
Cited in "Polska proba," p. 127. Titkow headed the Organization Department
of the Secretariat from March 1955. Majchrzak was chairman of the Polish Students'
Association, an autonomous section of the ZMP, from December 1955.
13
See Roy and Zhores Medvedev, op. cit., p. 70.
14
Rakosi "confidently looked forward to Khrushchev's fall" and did nothing
about the 'secret speech' until it was published in the West. Zinner, Revolution
in Hungary, p. 212.
15
Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, pp. 173-174.
16
Korotynski, Trzy czwarte prawdy: Wspomnienia (Warsaw, 1987), p. 184.
17
Stare numery, p. 49.
18
Nowak-Jezioranski, Wojna w eterze, p. 227.
- 77 -
that in Poland you could buy...copies in the market...In this way it became
19
available to the forces of world reaction.
Party historian Norbert Kolomejczyk recalled that the PZPR "received

a request from the Bulgarian comrades to pass over a copy of the
speech."20 According to Ochab: "Thanks to us the communists from the
Soviet Union and other countries had the chance to acquaint themselves
with it."21
The motives of those who unofficially released the speech may
never be fully gauged, but there can be no doubt that their primary
concern was to ensure that the de-Stalinization campaign continued
unabated. There is also no evidence that the Soviets did anything to
forestall the wider distribution of the 'secret speech'. Ochab
recalled that the Soviet leader was merely "annoyed...that we had dis-
tributed material from the XX Congress very widely and that not all
numbered copies had made their way back to the KC."22 As Khrushchev
put it: "Polish comrades who were hostile [sic] to the Soviet
Union...used my speech for their own purposes and made copies of it."23
But Khrushchev could only have profited from the fact that his speech
was widely distributed in Poland and eventually published in the West.
Public knowledge of the speech weakened his rivals in the CPSU, because
they were forced to acknowledge Stalin's crimes. Wider distribution
of the speech also strengthened Khrushchev's power base in the Soviet
bloc.
The Eisenhower administration was ambivalent towards Khrush-
chev's de-Stalinization campaign. Rumours concerning the 'secret
speech' circulated in Washington from 25 February, but US intelligence
questioned the authenticity of the fragments that had surfaced in early
March. It was not until 22 March that CIA director Allen Dulles advised
Eisenhower
that the alleged now famous final meeting at the Twentieth Congress...at
which Khrushchev so violently criticized Stalin...indicate the basic truth
of the allegation that the attack on Stalin had taken place.
"Nevertheless," Dulles argued, "it was significant that there was yet
no visible tendency to reverse the trend in the direction of destroying
19
20
Kolomejczyk in "Wydarzenia kryzysowe," p. 124.
21
22
ibid., p. 58.
23
- 78 -
Stalin's influence." Dulles warned the President that the Soviets were
probably searching for "respectability abroad." He noted that
Khrushchev's presumed attack on Stalin simply displayed a "Communist
penchant for self-criticism," adding that there "was always the
possibility, of course, that Khrushchev had been drunk." 24 US
intelligence concluded that Khrushchev delivered a speech critical of
Stalin, but they remained sceptical. 25 Eisenhower and John Foster
Dulles, the Secretary of State, continued to diminish the significance
of the XX Congress in their public statements.26
Khrushchev was determined to improve Soviet-American relations,
especially in the area of East-West trade:
While some of America's partners were already willing to enter into certain
economic contacts for the purchase of our raw material, the United States
27
was still holing out.
It is not difficult to imagine that Khrushchev found it in his interest

to have the text of the speech authenticated in the West.28 The CPSU
First Secretary was prepared to release the 'secret speech' to the
Soviet public soon after the XX Congress. According to Roy and Zhores
Medvedev:
One million copes of the booklet with Khrushchev's speech were printed for
open sale. After a more moderate resolution in June 1956, the whole printing
29
was destroyed. A few copies survived [...]
Opposition in the Presidium to the publication of the 'secret speech'

apparently forced Khrushchev to take matters into his own hands.
24
"Discussion at the 280th Meeting of the NSC, March 22, 1956," DDE Library,
Whitman File, NSCS, Box 7.
25
Dr. Moses Harvey gave a briefing to the US Operations Coordinating Board
(OCB) on the XX Congress. According to the notes: "He felt its most important
feature was the complete discrediting of Stalin by Mikoyan and Khrushchev." This
assessment may have persuaded the administration to remain open-minded. See "Notes
on the Harvey Briefing March 16, 1956. The 20th Party Congress of the USSR," DDE
Library, WHO/NSCS/OCBC, Files Series, Box 1.
26
Eisenhower's press conference of 21 March in Public Papers of the
Presidents: Eisenhower, 1956, p. 330; and John Foster Dulles's press conference of
3 April in Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXXIV (16 April 1956), p. 642.
27
28
Paul B. Comstock of the OCB, writing what he called a "minority report,"
concluded: "After considerable study and reflection, I am convinced that the
so-called Khrushchev speech to the 20th Party Congress was initially planted by the
Kremlin in such a way that it would be picked up and publicized in the free world."
See "Briefing Note for Mr. Staats on Khrushchev's speech," DDE Library, WHO/NSCS/OCBC,
File Series, Box 1.
29
Roy and Zhores Medvedev, op. cit., p. 70. The events in Poland during the
spring of 1956 may have been the trigger that caused the Soviets to destroy the printed
copies of Khrushchev's speech.
- 79 -
Washington's endorsement of the de-Stalinization campaign created

better conditions for the expansion of East-West trade. Such a formula
would enhance the Soviet Union's standing in the world and guarantee
Khrushchev's leading position in the CPSU.
The CIA ultimately obtained a copy of Khrushchev's speech in early
April 1956. The manuscript was reportedly delivered to the Americans
by Israeli intelligence.30 Charles E. Bohlen, at the time US ambassador
in Moscow, wrote in his memoirs that he "received from Washington the
text of a document obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency in War-
saw."31 Staszewski suggested that he
handed a copy, hot off the press, to Philippe Ben, the Le Monde [and
Tel-Aviv's Ma'ariv] correspondent, and to [Sydney] Gruson from the Herald
Tribune and Flora Lewis from the New York Times...[and] in this way I violated
32
all the principles of Party discipline.
According to Dan Ravin and Yossi Melman, Flora Lewis denied

receiving a copy of the 'secret speech' from Staszewski, but the former
Warsaw Party boss "still insists that he personally gave a Khrushchev
text to Philippe Ben." As Ravin and Melman put it: "Was Ben the secret
agent who provided the speech to Israel...?"33 This puzzle may never
be solved. However, Ben had been the best informed journalist in Warsaw
at the time and his writings clearly reflected an intimate relationship
with a leading PZPR reformer.34 The head of the Polish section of RFE
during this period -- Jan Nowak, wrote that Ben insisted on keeping his
PZPR contacts secret until his death. Nowak added: Ben's source "was
probably a KC member, maybe even a KC Secretary who represented the 'lib-
erals'."35
30
Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: The Untold History of
Israeli Intelligence (London, 1991), pp. 168-171; and John Ranelagh, The Agency: The
Rise and the Decline of the CIA (New York, 1987), p. 286.
31
Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York, 1973), p. 398.
32
33
Dan Ravin and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of
Israel's Intelligence Community (Boston, 1990), p. 87-88. The authors corresponded
with Lewis and the editors of Ma'ariv. They added: "One of Ben's longtime colleagues
at Ma'ariv says it is 'not impossible' and perhaps 'only natural' that Ben helped
his country's security agencies with information from the various cities he visited."
34
Ben was born in Lodz in 1913 as Norbert Nieswiski. He served in the Polish
Army in 1939 and escaped with his unit from the Nazis to the Soviet Union and later
to the Middle East. His Jewish identity asserted itself in 1943 and he settled in
Palestine. Ben was hired by Le Monde in 1952 and served in Warsaw until the Polish
authorities expelled him after the Poznan revolt. See ibid., p. 87; and
Nowak-Jezioranski, Wojna w eterze, p. 244.
35
ibid., p. 245.
- 80 -
In mid-April, as John Lewis Gaddis observed, "an abrupt shift"

in the US position towards the de-Stalinization campaign took place.36
Allen Dulles, together with his brother John Foster Dulles, convinced
the President sometime in late May to give the State Department
permission to release the 'secret speech' to The New York Times, where
it appeared on 4 June 1956.37
UNREST AMONG THE INTELLECTUALS

The clearest attacks on the Stalinists system came from Poland's
leading intellectuals. At the XIX Session of the RKiS, held on 24-25
March, Jan Kott mourned the grave falsification of truth in art and lit-
erature during the past decade. He condemned the "great historical
abstractions" that no longer served "future generations" or the
"individual," but nevertheless occupied the time of so many writers.
Antoni Slonimski acknowledged that Kott spoke "in the name" of that
"mass" of intellectuals "settling its accounts with the creditors" for
their obtuse support of the Party's cultural policy. He described
'socialist realism' as a "machine" designed to obliterate art and
operated by apparatchiks who used it with "vigour and assiduity."
Slonimski concluded with a demand for "a real democratization of public
life, the restoration of public opinion, and the return
from...Czarism."
A note of caution was introduced by Stefan Zolkiewski. The
director of the KC department of Science and Culture, reminded the
delegates to be cautious:
Not all the problems have been solved, but who taught us to speak in this
spirit? We were taught by Marxism-Leninism and we were taught by the
38
Party...It is their right to create a new future.
Those who attacked the Party at the XIX Session were undeterred. 39
Other sections of the intelligentsia joined the chorus of criticism.40
36
Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiry into the History of the Cold War (Oxford,
1987), p. 189.
37
For further details see The New York Times (30 November 1976).
38
Report on the RKiS meeting in Przeglad Kulturalny, nos. 14-15, and 41-42
(1956).
39
On the intellectuals during this period see Fijalkowska, op. cit., ch. IV.
40
The National Conference of Architects, at their meeting of 26-28 March,
condemned the Party's urban and architectural policy. See Jadwiga Szarfenbergowa,
Materialy do charakterystyki zawodu i pozycji spolecznej architektow. Fragment
opracowanych badan (Wroclaw, 1966), p. 18.
- 81 -
At the meeting of social science professors in Sopot, held on 3-5

May with officials from the Ministry of Higher Education, changes were
made to the 1956/1957 university curriculum. The reforms included:
greater autonomy for students in the choice of courses; increase in the
availability of elective courses; termination of obligatory courses in
Marxism-Leninism and the Russian language; and the lengthening of the
magisterium degree from four to five years.41
The Polish Association of Lawyers, at their meeting on 12-13 May,
called for the Party to relax its control over the judicial system.
They recommended that the legal profession be placed under greater state
supervision. Special scorn was reserved for Stalin's theory of the
sharpening of class conflict in the course of socialist construction.
One of the delegates, Maria Mazur, argued that Stalin's theory lasted
"far too long" and that it contained the seeds of "permanence without
a clear indication that the state of affairs would end." She added:
Our justice and the freedom it represents cannot be...less than the justice
and freedom available in the most liberal countries of the capitalist
42
world.
An open meeting of the POP in the faculty of philosophy at the

University of Warsaw was held on 24 May. The tone of the debate was
set by Leszek Kolakowski, who examined the relationship between
politics and philosophy. He condemned the "pressure" put on scholars
by functionaries, with no "competence" in the areas of philosophy and
sociology, to tailor their views to the official Party line.
Kolakowski also welcomed the renewal that was taking place in Polish
political thought since "the advent of a debased and theological
Marxism."43
At the PAN General Assembly, held on 11-12 June, members of the
Academy agreed to offer scholars facilities and coordination, not close
supervision. Academy president Jan Dembowski argued that the XX
Congress challenged all the inviolable political and scientific
authorities, and opened a new phase in the evolution of Polish
scholarship. He echoed the views held by many when he declared that
the Academy has "broken with the cult of authorities, both our own and
41
Report on the meeting in Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol. LXII, no. 1 (1956),
171.
42
Cited in "Polska Proba," pp. 148-149.
43
Cited in Fijalkowska, op. cit., pp. 350-351. See also Kolakowski, Main
Currents, vol III, p. 173.
- 82 -
foreign." Adam Schaff, the director of the KC INS, reminded the General
Assembly of its responsibilities to the Party.44 He insisted that the
Academy should continue to "shape" the attitudes of scholars and provide
"guidance" in all fields of science and learning. The majority
rejected Schaff's position and called for the restoration of autonomy
to Poland's scholars.45
Historians at the Scientific Council of the History Institute
conference of 25-26 June, made a series of sweeping demands for the
introduction of pluralism in the historical profession.46 Witold Kula
criticized the assumptions made by Party historians, especially the
"vulgar" application of dialectical materialism to all areas of
historical study. He also condemned the intentional falsification of
history and the wilful suppression of documentary evidence.47 Other
historians were more vociferous in their attacks of the PZPR's monopoly
over the profession and the power wielded by historians associated with
the Party.48 The historians at the KC Party History department focused
their critique on the need to restore the "scientific character of Marx-
ism". 49 Their attention was centred on the need to present a more
"objective analysis of the Polish workers' movement".50
It was the news of Khrushchev's speech which emboldened the
intellectuals. Jerzy Kossak, who worked on the editorial board of Po
Prostu and was a doctoral candidate at the INS, recalled asking his
professors why students were not told about the crimes committed by
Stalin. "Their response," he noted, "was that they didn't want to
poison young minds." The most conservative of the professors
apparently felt "that disclosing the truth about socialism could
disintegrate into social-democracy. And this would then by
44
The INS (1954-1956), formerly the IKKN (1950-1954), trained the bulk of the
Party cadres at the institutes of higher learning, where courses in Marxism-Leninism
(usually lasting eleven-months) were taught.
45
Report on the PAN meeting in Nauka Polska, no. 4, vol. V (1956), pp. 147-169.
46
See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Sovietization and Liberalization in Polish
Postwar Historiography," Journal of Central European Affairs, no. 2, vol. 19 (July
1959); and "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland,
1945-1983, Slavic Review, no. 4, vol. 44 (Winter 1985).
47
See Kula's speech in Kwartalnik Historyczny, no. 3, vol. LXIII (1956), p.
151-166.
48
Report on the meeting in ibid, no. 6, vol. LXII (1956).
49
Feliks Tych, "Przeciwko upraszczaniu historii polskiego ruchu
robotniczego," Nowe Drogi, no. 6 (June 1956).
50
Jerzy Kowalski, "O szersze spojrzenie na dzieje polskiego ruchu
robotniczego," ibid., no. 5 (May 1956).
- 83 -
terrifying."51 The fear of revealing the truth about Stalin's crimes

and the history of the socialist movement in Poland, on the part of
orthodox Party intellectuals, ensured Marxist 'revisionism' an almost
universal appeal among the young intellectuals.52 At the institutes
of higher learning, postgraduate students of history, economics, and
other subjects in the humanities took up the texts written by formerly
banned or shunned Polish socialists (Kelles-Krauz, Limanowski,
Niedzialkowski, Perl and Zaremba) with zeal.53 Schaff mused in 1956:
"We must admit that for the broad circles of the intellectuals, the
authority of Marxist ideology has been undermined."54
THE PARTY IN TURMOIL

The first official discussion of the 'secret speech' in Poland
was held on 22-28 March at KC headquarters, during a seminar for KW
activists engaged in propaganda. After the speech was read to the
participants, Morawski was besieged by some 300 questions.55 According
to one report: "The comrades deeply and painfully experienced the
documents on the cult of personality." Many of the activists at the
seminar also "talked of their fear that what happened in the USSR could
happen in Poland." "Almost all of them" added that they found the
speech "shocking," emphasizing that the situation in the Party was no
less "scandalous."56
The crisis in the Party was best expressed at the conference for
leading ZMP activists, held on 23 March. The debate focused on the need
for the union to conform to the resolutions of the XX Congress. The
51
Interview with Kossak in Stare numery, p. 50.
52
According to Kolakowski: "the term 'revisionism' was used by the party
authorities...to stigmatize those who, while remaining party members or Marxists,
attacked various Communist dogmas. No precise meaning was attached to it, or indeed
to the label of 'dogmatism' affixed to party 'conservatives' who opposed the
post-Stalin reforms, but as a rule the term 'revisionism' connoted democratic and
rationalist tendencies." Main Currents, vol. III, pp. 456-457.
53
Drozdowski, "Warszawa wobec wydarzen Poznanskich: Refleksje osobiste" in
Edmund Makowski, ed., Wydarzenia Czerwcowe w Poznaniu, 1956: Materialy z konferencji
naukowej zorganizowanej przez Instytut Historii UAM w dniu 4 V 1981 roku (Poznan,
1981), pp. 130-131.
54
Schaff, Aktualne zagadnienia polityki kulturalnej w dziedzinie filozofi i
sociologii (Warsaw, 1956), p. 43.
55
Benon Dymek, Z dziejow PZPR w latach 1956-1970 (Warsaw, [limited
circulation] 1987), p. 9. At a related meeting of the Party aktiv, held on 26 March
at the Szczecin Polytechnic, the discussions stared at 5.00 pm and lasted until 2.00
am. Over 110 questions concerned Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.
56
Biuletyn, 31 March 1956, no. 25, pp. 14-15.
- 84 -
discussion turned into a sweeping reappraisal of the activities of the

ZMP throughout its tenure of existence. The 'self-criticism' was aimed
at the union's inability to improve the lot of Poland's youth in the
areas of culture, sport, education, and work. The activists also
attacked the Party's consistent one-way transmission of orders, which
effectively silenced the youth associations. 57 Attention had been
drawn to the ZMP's relatively poor performance after the large increase
in the union's membership (see TABLE I) following Stalin's death.58
TABLE I - Vocational Membership in ZMP, December 1953, 1955 and 1956
ENVIRONMENT59 1953 % 1955 % 1956 %
Workers 329,525 25.9 519,848 25.7 490,086 26.6

Farm Labours 47,782 3.5 82,463 4.1 87,213 4.7
Rural Circles 221,346 18.0 449,245 22.3 473,234 25.7
White Collar Workers 232,326 18.2 258,703 12.8 183,113 9.9
Students 358,046 28.0 586,641 29.1 489,713 26.5
University 81,277 6.4 97,940 4.8 95,856 5.2
Regional Circles N/A N/A 23,765 1.2 26,092 1.4
TOTAL 1,270,302 2,018,605 1,845,307
SOURCE: Hillebrandt, Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej, p. 283, Table 3.
No where was the drive for reform more public than in the Polish
press. The press vigorously addressed many formerly taboo topics:
new trends in Western culture; the injustice towards the KPP and AK;
the decaying state of the economy and the agricultural sector; and
bureaucratic tendencies and corruption in the Party and state
administration. 60 Poland's journalists, as 'agents of the Party',
gained access to Party documents. They began to ask uncomfortable
questions and became supporters of the reformers among the Party
57
Bogdan Hillebrandt, Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej (Warsaw, 1980), pp. 395-397.
58
ZMP membership in April 1956 was at 1,825,641.
59
For further details see following chapter.
60
Some of the leading articles from the Polish press during this period have
been published in Wieslaw Wladyka, ed., Na czolowce: Prasa w Pazdzierniku 1956 roku
(Lodz, 1989), Pt. II.
- 85 -
61
elite. The exposes written by Poland's reporters about the
shortcomings of the Six-Year Plan, and the continued 'dogmatism' of the
apparatchiks at the lower Party levels, gave them enormous political
power.62
The weeklies, Po Prostu, Przeglad Kulturalny, Nowa Kultura and
Zycie Gospodarcze (biweekly), and Warsaw's dailies, Sztandard Mlodych
(the ZMP organ) and Zycie Warszawy, played a major part in the
de-Stalinization campaign.63 As Jane Curry discovered:
editors were no longer filters that kept journalists from knowing the "dirt
of local politics." Journalists now heard about the machinations of local
Party organizations through their own contacts. Individual Party officials
either acted directly against the press or...as partners. Newsrooms...were
filled with constant discussions of the new revelations...These were led
often by young, unestablished journalists...Each day's events were simply
64
so consuming that few thought of the future.
The position of Poland's censors was particularly perplexing.

Contradictory signals were being sent to the press censors from various
senior Party figures. 65 One censors, Mieczyslaw Owczarczyk,
remembered getting an order in April not to release for printing the
latest issues of Po Prostu, Nowa Kultura and Przeglad Kulturalny. But
the issues in question were printed.66 After the censor who allowed
the publication of a controversial article in Zycie Warszawy was
dismissed from his position, the editors of the Warsaw daily engaged
him on their staff.67 Politburo members by-passed the Secretariat's
61
One prominent Party journalist recently said: "My skin crawled when I
realized I had condemned my old professor who now became a hero wronged in actions
that went against everything I thought the Party I joined had stood for. Never again
have I believed anything I did not see with my own eyes." Cited in Jane Curry Leftwich,
Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics (Cambridge, 1990), p. 260,
endnote no. 108.
62
On the role of the journalists see ibid., pp. 48-58.
63
On the role of Po Prostu see Stare numery. A collection of the leading
articles in Po Prostu is available in Jerzy Urban, ed., Po Prostu, 1955-1956: Wybor
artykulow (Warsaw, 1956).
64
Curry, op. cit., p. 52.
65
Wojciech Adamski, who worked in the censorship office in 1956, said that
when a critical letter by Polish journalists was published in Zycie Warszawy in summer
1956, with permission from someone in the Politburo, the censor who had condoned the
letter was fired and quietly relocated to a better position. Staniszkis, op. cit.,
p. 302, footnote no. 23.
66
Interview with Owczarczyk in ibid., p. 51. Owczarczyk added: "We enjoyed
reading Po Prostu".
67
"Polska proba," p. 155. The article, "An open letter to the Minister of
Justice," was published on 28 March and written by Jan Dziedzic and Jacek Wejroch.
The authors criticised the fact that Spychalski, Komar, and others, were quietly
released and rehabilitated without prior announcement from either the Party or
government.
- 86 -
press department and took censorship directives personally to the

censors.68
The situation in the press was analyzed by the leadership on a
daily basis. 69 Ochab directed his attention to the press at the
conference of the Warsaw Party aktiv, held on 6-7 April.70 He warned
the activists
that some comrades seem to be losing their sense of balance...This shows

an unhealthy, anarchistic tendency, the loss of a feeling of Party
71
responsibility, and a confusion of ideas.
A few days after the Warsaw Party conference, the leadership

concluded that a number of articles in the press, "mainly in the literary
journals," espoused positions "which should have been resisted" and
posited arguments which "fundamentally polemicized with the Party's
position." They added that "in none of these cases did Trybuna Ludu
ever attempt to take the offensive on behalf of the central Party
organs."72 The editors of Trybuna Ludu admitted that their journalists
did not treat "the paper as the organ of the Party leadership" when
attending Party meetings.73 On 10 April, the Secretariat resolved to
"limit" the reading of Khrushchev's speech to the central Party
apparatus and POP secretaries. The POP secretaries were merely to
inform Party members "about the fundamental problems included in
Khrushchev's speech."74
68
Stare numery, p. 51.
69
Some of the most outspoken critics of the political system were the
journalists who participated in the meetings held by the central Party institutions,
especially Polish State Radio, the publishing house 'Ksiazka i Wiedza', and the
gathering of ZMP activists. Biuletyn, 15 April 1956, no. 26, pp. 2-3.
70
Ochab's speech to the April conference is presented in separate parts
throughout this chapter.
71
Ochab's speech to the Warsaw conference in Trybuna Ludu (7 April 1956).
Selections reprinted in National Communism, p. 80.
72
Trybuna Ludu decided to publish only parts of Ochab's speech to the Warsaw
aktiv in April.
73
Biuletyn, 15 April 1956, no. 26, p. 2. See also the letter by Ochab to the
KW First Secretaries and Party editors, which concluded that the "Press ought to play
a greater role then it has done so far in helping the Party direct discussions" about
reform. See ibid., no. 28, 15 May 1956, pp. 4-6.
74
ibid., 15 April 1956, no. 26, p. 3.
- 87 -
THE WITASZEWSKI AFFAIR

The most volatile meeting was organized by the ZLP POP and held
on 20 and 27 April. The meetings were open, but only to members of the
writers union. They were chaired by Jerzy Putrament and attended by
Morawski. 75 Almost every contentious issue was discussed by the
writers: the causes and responsibility for the 'errors and
distortions'; bureaucratic inertness; the slow process of political and
economic reform; the future of collectivization; and the need for
greater changes in Party and state administration.
The most heated exchanges concerned Gomulka's political future
and Ochab's continued leadership of the PZPR. Jan Pytalkowski
suggested that Gomulka should have the right to voice his own thoughts
on the so-called 'rightist-nationalist deviation' in either the Sejm
or through the press.76 Jan Wyka told the writers that reforms were
being stalled by Ochab, who was a "Stalinist."77 A Party tribunal later
admonished Wyka for his remarks. Undeterred, at the second ZLP
meeting, Wyka "explained his thesis and stuck to it."78
Other topics included: demands for the relaxation of tensions
between church and state; a call by Antoni Wasilewski for the release
of Poland's Roman Catholic Primate, Archbishop Stefan Wyszynski; the
future development of Soviet-Polish relations and whether socialism was
actually constructed in the Soviet Union; the censorship of art; free
speech; and the Party's control of culture. Stefan Kisielewski's
suggestion, that non-Marxist and independent Catholic periodicals be
established in Poland, was also warmly received. 79 Putrament and
Morawski did their utmost to defend the Party's position, but they were
unable to calm the writers.
The most animated and far-reaching discussions surrounded the
attack on intellectuals (widely interpreted as also anti-Semitic) in
early-April by General Kazimierz Witaszewski, the vice-minister of
defence and chief of the GZP WP, to workers at the Stalin Textile Plant
75
Cf. the accounts of the meeting in Putrament, Poslizg, p. 33; Zawieyski,
Kartki, pp. 83-85 and 86-87.
76
Zawieyski (ibid., p. 84) wrote that there was "long and warm applause" every
time Gomulka was discussed. Pytalkowski, according to Zawieyski (p. 84), also said
-- implying the Soviets -- that "neither Ochab nor the KC are making the decisions
about Gomulka."
77
Zawieyski described Wyka's remarks as "truly revolutionary."
78
ibid.
79
ibid., pp. 84-86.
- 88 -
in Lodz.80 Roman Karst read parts of Witaszewski's Lodz speech to his

ZLP colleagues:
Slonimski wants to return to the days of the Sanacja81. He doesn't like this
system. First he wrote hostile verses in London, at a time when we were
rebuilding with our won hands, our homes and places of work. Now Mr.
Slonimski and other similar writers don't like this system.82 They have
contempt for you and for the working masses. Slonimski and other writers
don't like the fact that steel rolls off the Lenin Works. But we say that
everything that is done in our country is done by the hands of the working
class and only you have the right to judge its worthiness. If that Slonimski
came here, to the Scheibler Plant,83 he'd have to put on a safety helmet so
that his head would not burst...There is great disarray among the
intelligentsia, among the writers and journalists. They are the cause of
the disarray in our country...It all carries like froth which must be
84
cleansed and we will cleanse it.
Others added that Witaszewski said the Party could defend itself against
"anti-Party elements" by employing a "knuckle-buster [gazrurek]" to
restore order."85
The Witaszewski affair precipitated the first public confirmation
of the divisions that riddled the PZPR elite. "It must be said,"
Morawski told the ZLP delegates, that Witaszewski's comments
place in opposition the intelligentsia and working class [and] have nothing
in common with the views of the Party. And I would like to inform the
comrades that Comrade Witaszewski was summoned to the KC to answer for his
86
actions in this affair.
The delegates passed a resolution condemning Witaszewski's attempts to

drive a wedge between the intelligentsia and working class. 87
Morawski's announcement broke one of the cardinal rules of Party
discipline: to keep criticisms of PZPR activists within the Party.
80
Witaszewski, like Klosiewicz, had close connections to the trade union
movement. He was CRZZ general secretary from 1944-1947. Witaszewski, a close ally
of Rokossowski's, was also one of the few non-Soviet officers appointed (1952-1956)
to a senior post in the Polish military.
81
Sanacja was the name given to the Pilsudski regime in Poland.
82
Witaszewski also mentioned Jan Wyka and Jerzy Piorkowski.
83
The prewar name for the plant.
84
Slonimski, with a touch of humour, corrected Karst and told him Witaszewski
did not say "his head would burst," but rather "his head would fall," which would
be "a little drastic."
85
86
ibid. Morawski's statement received applause.
87
See also Edda Werfel, "Skad i dlaczego nastroje antyinteligenckie?" Po
Prostu (17 June 1956) reprinted in Wladyka, Na czolowce, pp. 277-285.
- 89 -
OCHAB'S DEMISE
The ZLP meetings set the tone for Ochab's article in Pravda on
20 April:
One of the most important principles of Leninism is the collegiality of

leadership on all levels...There were many, many incidents in the past of
openly breaking this fundamental principle in the PZPR, too; these did the
Party considerable damage. Even now we have incidents of only superficial
adherence to this principle [...]
Ochab added that "among the petit-bourgeoisie of Poland and of certain

other nations" there is hostile pressure to exploit "the mistakes of
Joseph Stalin" in order to "undermine" the CPSU. He also suggested that
"Certain newspapers in Poland failed to guard themselves against this
unsteadiness, too." The First Secretary concluded:
These facts create resentment among the working people...The Polish nation
and especially the Polish working class know how to resist slanders and
opportunists, know how to uncover anti-Soviet sallies hostile to Poland,
88
even if these are masked with lofty phrases.
The Secretariat issued an internal Party declaration on the

Witaszewski affair on 8 May:
The Secretariat appreciates the need to make pronouncements against

anti-Party and anti-Soviet incidents...but the statements by Comrade
Witaszewski were inappropriately accented and unjustly formulated. It has
been decided that at another public meeting Comrade Witaszewski will stress
the significant and constant work for even stronger ties between the intelli-
gentsia and the leading force in society, the working class.
The Secretariat also advised "members of the Party hierarchy" to conduct

themselves properly when refuting publications "that import views
hostile to the Party." They added that it was imperative to use an
"appropriate tone" and "precise formulation" when conducting polemics
"at public meetings."89
The Kremlin's anxiety over the evolution of events in Poland was
reflected by the Soviet embassy's direct involvement in Polish affairs.
Morawski recalled that "Ochab, Minc, Zambrowski and the Soviet ambassa-
dor, Ponomarenko, invited" him "to a villa" and told him: "You'll go
to Trybuna Ludu and clean it up."90 The Politburo also decided "to
strengthen the Trybuna Ludu editorial board." Roman Werfel was
88
National Communism, pp. 123-124.
89
Biuletyn, 15 May 1956, no. 28, pp. 3-4 and 7.
90
- 90 -
relieved from his post as editor-in-chief of the daily and replaced by

"KC Secretary Jerzy Morawski for a period of a few months" on 30 April.91
After meeting with Khrushchev and Poland's ambassador to the
Soviet Union in early May, Micunovic wrote in his diary:
Khrushchev...immediately started to criticize the present situation in

Poland. Some of the leaders there were now turning their backs on the Soviet
Union, were looking to the West, and wanted to split Poland off from the
"fraternal community," he said. We are going to fight against that,
Khrushchev shouted, banging his fist on the table. Pointing to the Polish
ambassador, [Waclaw] Lewikowski, he went on: "You have your sovereignty,
but what you are doing today in Poland is against your sovereignty and against
socialism. We deeply regret the death of Bierut, who was a
Communist-internationalist, while Ochab has allowed anti-socialist
elements to have their own way in Poland. They need to have their knuckles
rapped."
The Yugoslav envoy continued: "But, to my great surprise Polish

ambassador Lewikowski supported him and even amplified his remarks in
this sense."92
Ochab's authority was also being questioned in Warsaw.93 Staszew-
ski recent comments are telling:
By May 1956...Ochab was neither able to make up his mind in favour of serious
and far-reaching reforms nor capable of coping with the mounting tension
in the country, and that things might reach the point where his position
as First Secretary would no longer be tenable, since the line he represented
diverged too much from society's expectations.
The Warsaw boss added:
That was when some of us began to consider the possibility of putting

Cyrankiewicz up for the post of First Secretary. Apart from him and Rapacki
everyone was discredited...I talked to Rapacki and Zambrowski about him and
94
they both agreed he was a possible candidate.
91
Biuletyn, 15 May 1956, no. 28, p. 2. Morawski's deputies at Trybuna Ludu
included: Wiktor Borowski, Artur Starewicz, Jerzy Baumritter, Leszek Krzemien, and
Czeslaw Koniecki.
92
Emphasis added. Micunovic, 3 May 1956, op. cit., p. 44. Lewikowski had
been responsible for the Tenth Department of the MBP in the Secretariat, working
closely with Mazur. He was ambassador to Moscow from 1952 until 1956. Checinski
(Poland, p. 70) argued that Lewikowski was "the confidential agent of the KGB through
whom the Tenth Department had its own channel of communication with Moscow".
93
Drozdowski (op. cit., p. 132) wrote that during the celebrations on 1 May
a popular slogans was: "Wiecej schabow, mniej Ochabow."
94
Staszewski's reasons for preferring Cyrankiewicz were given as follows:
"Cyrankiewicz had a beautiful [sic] past: Auschwitz, the resistance movement -- and
he also held very liberal and reformist views. In addition, he had many valuable
personal and intellectual qualities, and was indisputably an agile politician,
intelligent and respected. His PPS past had ceased to be and impediment and could
become and advantage in dealing with society, a bridge between society and the Party."
Interview in Toranska, p. 175.
- 91 -
The 10 April resolution to limit internal Party discussions of

the 'secret speech' as well as the move to appoint Morawski
editor-in-chief of Trybuna Ludu were futile gestures. The Warsaw Party
executive had ensured that the press obtained private copies of
Khrushchev's speech, while the new editors of Trybuna Ludu did little
to change the operations of the Party's daily. The assault on
intellectuals and an unwillingness to adhere to the principles of Party
discipline deepened the divide between the hardliners and reformers.
GOMULKA AND POWER

The Gomulka question was brought to the fore by the publication
on 26 March of an article in Trybuna Ludu, written by Morawski and
entitled "The Lessons of the XX CPSU Congress." The author declared
that the decisions made by the KC PPR in 1948, concerning the
'rightist-nationalist deviation', were valid. Morawski indicated
that Gomulka was considered persona non grata by the leadership:
The Gomulka group tried to detach the Polish working class from the Polish
workers' movement...by rejecting its revolutionary attainments -- the
SDKPiL and the KPP -- and by whitewashing...the nationalist and reformist
traditions of the right-wing of the PPS.
The Gomulka group propagated the theory of a 'Polish road to socialism'.
It was not the slogan itself that was false, but the class content...put
into this slogan -- holding up the process of revolutionary
transformations...in the countryside...the economy...in culture, science
and education.
In its essence this was not a variation of the Soviet road but its
95
contradiction...an outright negation of the road to socialism.
The former General Secretary sent an unapologetic letter to the

Trybuna Ludu editorial board on 27 March. Gomulka edged himself into
the political arena for the first time since his quiet release in
December 1954. His reply was to the point:
On 26 March, Trybuna Ludu published an article by J. Morawski...The

said article speaks of the so-called Gomulka deviation, which is
automatically associated with my own view point.
Therefore, I would like to state that the views expressed by the author
of the above mentioned article have very little in common with my past views
on the topics mentioned therein.
I assume that Trybuna Ludu, which in the past occasionally printed
article directed against me, filled with lies, perversions of truth,
96
slanders and dirty innuendos will feel obliged to publish this letter.
95
Morawski, "Nauki XX Zjazdu KPZR," Nowe Drogi, no. 3 (March 1956); and Trybuna
Ludu (26 March 1956). Reprinted in National Communism, pp. 55-79.
- 92 -
Ochab responded to Gomulka's unpublished letter at the Warsaw

Party conference. 97 He told the Warsaw activists that they had to
consider "the political aspect of the correct struggle of the Party
against Gomulka." Ochab described it thus:
Of great importance to the socialist development of the Party...was the

struggle against the opportunistic and nationalistic deviation represented
by Wladyslaw Gomulka...This was also the period when the historic task
of...the unification of the PPR and PPS on the basis of Marxism-Leninism,
had to be dealt with.
Gomulka...represented...a break with revolutionary tendencies of the heroic
KPP and rejected Marxism-Leninism...He tried to infuse the concept of a
Polish road to socialism...with a foreign content, which meant essentially
the abandonment of the development of socialist construction in Poland [...]
In an open and sharp ideological struggle, the Party defeated Gomulka's
views. Gomulka was completely isolated. He did not submit to the will of
the Party and increasingly adopted anti-Party positions.
Ochab also announced that Gomulka had been released from prison.
He said that the Politburo decided to drop the charges of 'diversionary
activities' against the former General Secretary:
But it is worth declaring with great emphasis that Gomulka's arrest...in

the atmosphere created by Beriaism...was unjustified and without
foundation. The accusations of diversionary activity advanced against him
not only harmed him, but also misled public opinion. The struggle against
abuses on the part of security organs started by the Party has led to Gomulka
being cleared of these accusations and released. It must be stated clearly,
however, that the correction of the injustice done to Wladyslaw Gomulka does
not...change the correct content of the political and ideological struggle,
98
which the Party has conducted and continues to conduct against...Gomulka.
Ochab added that Gomulka's opposition to Stalin over Yugoslavia

and the campaign against Titoism had placed the Party in jeopardy. He
then suggested that Gomulka's removal from the Party saved the PZPR from
the pattern of fratricidal show trails which gripped the rest of Eastern
Europe between 1948-1954, namely the trials of Slansky and Rajk in
Czechoslovakia. 99 The reference to a purge with overwhelmingly
anti-Semitic overtones, could not have gone unnoticed by the audi-
ence.100
96
"List Wladyslawa Gomulki z dnia 27 III 1956 r. do redakcji Trybuna Ludu"
in Gomulka i inni, pp. 82-83.
97
The conference was also attended by Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki, Matwin,
Albrecht, and chaired by Staszewski.
98
Cited in National Communism, pp. 80-82.
99
See the exchange between Staszewski and Michnik in Holzer, op. cit., p. 7.
100
On the Czechoslovak purges see Karel Kaplan, Report on the Murder of the
General Secretary (London, 1990).
- 93 -
One of the delegates to the Warsaw Party conference, Professor

Muszkat, argued that "Gomulka had been correct in many respects. Even
the workers say this. I have a feeling that he was right about
Yugoslavia and was right about the pace of socialists construction."
Jadwiga Siekierska, who also chose to disagree with Ochab, added:
I am deeply convinced, after all I had attended the June Plenum [of 1948],
of the absolute incorrectness of Gomulka's views when it comes the KPP and
other the related issues. But I also have serious doubts...whether it is
101
possible to fault Gomulka on Yugoslavia in light of recent events.
Most of the delegates applauded Gomulka's release from confine-

ment, but few actually supported his unconditional return to the Party.
Henryk Holland echoed the opinion of many of the delegates when he
suggested that Gomulka's refusal to accept the Party's position
indicated that he was not yet ready to rejoin the Party. He added that
of "all of Gomulka's errors the most far-reaching was the matter of
Jugoslavia" and "it cannot be overlooked that the affair over Jugoslavia
had been the catalyst which led to the other errors." Holland con-
cluded: "The question [of Gomulka's return to the Party] is a difficult
one...Definite class processes are also in operation because Gomulka
has become, in spite of his intentions, a barometer to the forces of
reaction and not only in Poland." Staszewski was more blunt. He
defended Ochab's opposition to Gomulka's full rehabilitation and closed
the conference with a denunciation of the former General Secretary's
stance at the June Plenum: "Who remembers that performance, that
opinion on cosmopolitanism and those resourceless cosmopolitans, it's
definitely easy to calculate."102
The former General Secretary posted a letter to the Politburo on
9 April:
From the speech delivered by the...First Secretary...I have learned

about my rehabilitation and the withdrawal of slanderous accusations of
subversive activities which had been levelled against me.
I would like to express my gratitude towards all those who have
contributed to my rehabilitation.
At the same time, I have the right to demand that those responsible
for the campaign of slanders and provocations...are brought to justice.
101
Cited in Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," p. 101.
102
Cited in ibid., p. 102. Staszewski attempted to conceal his criticism of
Gomulka. He said in 1973 that when Ochab asked him to recapitulate the leadership's
position on Gomulka, he responded by saying that he "was in no position" to do so.
See Holzer, op. cit., p. 7.
- 94 -
In the above mentioned speech, especially in the parts concerning the

so-called opportunist and nationalist deviation, there were utterances
concerning me which have considerably distorted my viewpoint.
It is clear that the Party leadership can...judge every issue according to
its own opinions...The point is, however, the leadership should consider
the entire truth...not conjectures and distorted facts.
Since the Party leadership has considered it necessary to inform the
Party and public opinion about my views...I have the full right to demand
that this information should be objective...Unfortunately, this did not
happen.
Furthermore, I would like to ask the Party leadership where it stands
concerning...[the] organizational resolutions adopted by plenary meetings
103
of the KC which are known or, as might be the case, not known to me.
Gomulka rejected the First Secretary's veiled suggestion that he

'submit to the will of the Party'. He turned the tables and demanded
to know where the entire Politburo stood on the deviation question.
Gomulka also pointed out to the leadership the conditions for his return
to the Party: the removal of those responsible for his purge and the
repudiation of all Party resolutions concerning the 1948 purge. He was
not prepared to return with a cloud over his head. Gomulka was aware
that an unsullied record would guarantee his status as a victim of
Stalinism and eliminate the only obstacle on the road to the Politburo.
Gomulka included another letter in his dispatch to the Politburo.
It concerned the return of materials confiscated after his arrest and
was addressed to Cyrankiewicz:
On the basis of a resolution of the PRL government which was delivered

to me in written form, signed by...Radkiewicz, I was arrested on 2 August
1951 and placed in isolation.
I was set free on 13 December 1954...Dworakowski informed me of the
reason for my arrest: 'in the interest of the state'.
After my arrest (with my wife, who was also imprisoned for 3 years
without a binding decision of the Procuracy), employees of the former MBP
carried out a search of my apartment (without witnesses) and
confiscated...copies of my letters to the KC, including a copy of my letter
to Stalin from December 1948...and so on.104 All the above mentioned objects
were MY PRIVATE PROPERTY.
103
"List Wladyslawa Gomulki z dnia 9 IV 1956 r. do Biura Politycznego KC PZPR"
104
After the deviation campaign, but before the founding of the PZPR, Gomulka
was invited by Stalin to Moscow. At the meeting, also attended by Molotov and Beria,
Stalin proposed that the Gomulka join the PZPR Politburo. He refused. Gomulka would
only join the KC since he could no longer work with Bierut. Stalin then proposed
that he take over the directorship of "an important periodical." Again, Gomulka
refused. The subject of this letter was his meeting with Stalin. It was never
returned to Gomulka. Cf. Werblan, Wladyslaw Gomulka, pp. 601-602; and Ptasinski,
Pierwszy z trzech zwrotow, p. 117-118.
- 95 -
A detailed list of all confiscated materials...is contained in an

inventory which I prepared before my arrest...[and] signed by employees of
the former MBP, who carried out the search.105
The above mentioned materials have so far not been returned to me...I
would like to ask the...government to issue an order requesting the immediate
return of all confiscated materials...This should eliminate yet another
106
illegal deed.
Gomulka was not going to leave any stones unturned in his effort to gain
unconditional rehabilitation.
Unofficial discussions among the Party leaders during the
following week focused on Gomulka's return to the Party. Ochab
characterized the situation thus: "the Gomulka affair had become
pressing and some comrades were beginning to exploit it in their own
Party infighting."107 He added that
on the leadership level we talked about what we might offer [Gomulka]. At

that time I was still considering making him a member of the Central
Committee...but not for the record, just unofficially, during the backstage
talk at some Buro meeting. I later discussed the subject with Aleksander
Zawadzki and Adam Rapacki: let him enter the Politburo, maybe as deputy
premier, let him carry the burden for a while, and then, perhaps after some
time, sooner or later, we could decide. I told them: you know how proud
108
he is, how hungry for power, how limited; we shouldn't hurry this.
The Soviets also began to show a proclivity towards Gomulka. At

the closing meeting of the Comintern, held on 17 April in Moscow, Ochab
recalled that he had been "attacked" by Khrushchev over Gomulka's
continued political isolation.109 The abolition of the Cominform not
only "removed the last institutional remnant" of Stalin's campaign
against Titoism, as Brzezinski argued, but it set the stage for a
reevaluation of the 'rightists-nationalist deviation' in Poland.110 It
was in this context that the Politburo finally decided to meet on 19
April to discuss Gomulka's correspondence and his return to the
Party.111
105
Swiatlo arrested Gomulka. The letter to Stalin was reportedly found hidden
behind a dresser mirror. See ibid., p. 118; and Mowi Jozef Swiatlo, pp. 143-148.
106
"List Wladyslawa Gomulki z dnia 9 IV 1956 r. do Prezydium Rzadu" in Gomulka
i inni, p. 84.
107
108
ibid., p. 66.
109
ibid.
110
Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 187; and Micunovic, 26 June 1956, op. cit., pp.
75-76.
111
Namiotkiewicz, ed., Dzialalnosc Wladyslawa Gomulki: Fakty, wspomnienia,
opinie (Warsaw, 1985), p. 530.
- 96 -
While some of the reformers considered Cyrankiewicz or Rapacki

as possible candidates to replace Ochab, the hardliners in the
leadership took the lead and embraced Gomulka; the candidate pursued
by Klosiewicz and his allies from November 1954. Mazur and Nowak were
appointed to conduct the first round of discussions with the former
General Secretary.112 The date set for the first meeting was 9 May.
Ochab had been forced to unlock the door for Gomulka's return to the
Party. Seven years of political exile had come to an end for the former
General Secretary. The best Ochab could manage in mid-April was to
delay the moves to have Gomulka reinstated.
Wladyslaw Bienkowski, a prominent Gomulka supporter, argued that
"from March, Gomulka began gathering his forces." 113 Around 2 May,
Grzegorz Korczynski, one of Gomulka's closest friends, held a party to
celebrate his own release from prison.114 A number of leading Party
members attended the gathering. Staszewski remembered that "there
were 30-40 people at Korczynski's home, suddenly Wieslaw [Gomulka]
appeared, he was late -- they all greeted him like a commander!"115 As
Bienkowski concluded: "The vision of Gomulka as First Secretary
already existed."116
The details of the 9 May negotiations are not known, although after
the Buro gathered on 10 May to discuss the first official meeting with
Gomulka, it was announced that "the talks with 'Wieslaw' went well".117
The use of the familiar 'Wieslaw', indicates that there was growing
support in the Politburo for Gomulka. 118 The Buro chose Mazur and
Zawadzki on 17 May to hold the next round of talks with Gomulka. Nowak
probably withdrew because he decided to support Gomulka's return to the
112
Mazur served in the Tsarist Army, participated in the October Revolution
and later joined the VKP(b). In 1930 he was sent to Polish prison for six years.
He spent the war in the Soviet Union. Nowak was a leading KPP functionary from
1932-1938. He spent some time in a Soviet labour camp until he joined the Soviet
Army in 1945. He was in Kiev from 1945 to 1947, at the time when Khrushchev was the
Ukrainian Party boss.
113
Bienkowski in Holzer, op. cit., p. 8.
114
Namiotkiewicz, op. cit., p. 530. General Korczynski, a Spanish Civil War
veteran, had been dismissed from the KC in 1948 for "manifesting unsound ideological
tendencies," and arrested on 21 May 1950. He returned to the KC in 1959 and was the
deputy minister of national defence from that period until 1971. From 1948 until
his arrest, Korczynski and Gomulka kept in close contact. See Werblan, Wladyslaw
Gomulka, p. 616.
115
Staszewski in Holzer, op. cit., p. 8. 'Wieslaw' was Gomulka's nom de
guerre.
116
ibid.
117
Biuletyn, 15 May 1956, no. 28, p. 3.
118
See Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 15 September 1971, p. 97.
- 97 -
Party.119 Mazur and Zawadzki met with Gomulka on 19 May.120 The details
of these discussions are also unknown, but Gomulka's wife had her Party
card reinstated on 24 May.
Gomulka's next letter to the Politburo, dated 29 May, was
addressed to Zawadzki, not Ochab. He wrote:
With reference to the discussions that took place between

representatives of the Buro and myself on 9 and 19 May 1956, and Comrade
Zawadzki's suggestion for further talks, I would like to ask for answers
to the following questions:
1. In 1951, the Politburo adopted unpublished resolutions concerning
my exclusion from the Party based on the same reasons that were used as a
pretext for my groundless arrest and confinement, lasting nearly three and
a half years.
-- What is the position of the current Politburo concerning the
annulment of the above mentioned resolution and my reinstatement to the
Party?
2. The Politburo is still upholding the accusations of the so-called
rightist-nationalist deviation of which I was supposed to have been a
representative.
-- The basic accusations which formed the axis of all accusations of
deviations have been solved with time and in accordance with my past views.
-- Some of the most crucial issues forming the basis of my disagreements
with other members of the Politburo have never been made public during the
KC PPR Plenum of August-September 1948. Other issues were presented in a
distorted or even false manner.
-- In the past, when the so-called rightist-nationalist deviation was
being discussed, there were no mechanisms which would have allowed me to
present to the KC the overall circumstance concerning my position on those
matters which were the subject of criticism at the Party's plenary sessions.
I would therefore like to ask:
-- Will I be allowed to present my case at the next KC Plenum regarding
the Politburo's position upholding the view that the basic thesis concerning
the rightist-nationalist deviation is different from the Party line?
3. Since the members of the Politburo have referred to my
self-criticism, I would like to state that events have made that
self-criticism superfluous. I would like to add that I criticized myself
without justification and that my views concerning basic issues contained
in the criticism and self-criticism proved to be correct.
I am appealing for answers to the above questions, not because they
affect me, but because I believe that they have a crucial bearing on the
whole Party. It would also allow me to make decision which directly concern
me.
I would also like to ask when the materials confiscated during the
search of my house will be returned to me? I have already appealed to the
121
Presidium of the government in a letter dated 9 April 1956.
119
Nowak met with Gomulka on his own -- or Khrushchev's -- initiative on 15
June. See Namiotkiewicz, op. cit., p. 531.
120
This helps explain why Klosiewicz attacked Mazur at the VII Plenum.
Klosiewicz met with Gomulka on his own initiative on 24 June. See chapter VIII; and
Namiotkiewicz, op. cit., p. 532.
121
"List Wladyslawa Gomulki z dnia 29 V 1956 r. do Biura Politycznego KC PZPR"
- 98 -
The leadership's refusal to overturn the resolutions on the

'rightist deviation' was forcefully upheld by Ochab and aided by
Zambrowski. The attempt to continue Bierut's struggle against the
deviation provided Ochab with an excuse to prolong the process of
Gomulka's full rehabilitation, presumably until the First Secretary
consolidated his own position in the Party.122 He recently character-
ized his position thus:
I believed Gomulka's case had to be dealt with cautiously and slowly,

applying some brakes, because otherwise it would be too much of an upheaval
for the Party. I said at the Politburo meeting: we must recognize and admit
with bitterness that we committed a great mistake in accusing Gomulka of
anticommunist conspiracy, and we must make it up to him politically...I
upheld my opinion concerning the ideological errors of so-called right-wing
deviationism, but I also said: to a large extent this affair had been
overtaken by life, and we have other problems to see to; we shouldn't
123
discriminate against Gomulka or hinder his return to the Party.
THE KPP REHABILITATION COMMISSION

The leadership appointed "a rehabilitation commission to look
into the false charges against former KPP members" in May 1956.124 This
was followed by a special KC resolution calling for the public celebra-
tion of "the revolutionary history and traditions of the KPP."125 The
Secretariat called on the propaganda organs to stress the ideological
significance of the KPP's rehabilitation.126 The campaign to celebrate
the traditions of the KPP was focused on the younger Party faithful and
society generally. The aim was to arouse interest in the ideas of
Poland's prewar communist movement. The press organs, "free of
dogmatism," were to stress the "deeply patriotic and internationalist"
nature of the KPP and emphasize its "close ties to the masses." The
"deep humanism" and, for the sake of the youth, "the high moral standing"
of the KPP were also to be stressed.127
The campaign engendered wide ranging discussions within the
Party.128 Some young scholars and students at the universities passed
122
Staszewski (Holzer, p. 7), did not mix his words: "Ochab didn't give a
shit about the deviation [Odchylenie gowno go obchodzilo]."
123
124
Interview with Werfel in Toranska, pp. 103.
125
Biuletyn, 15 May 1956, no. 28, p. 3.
126
ibid.
127
Emphasis added. ibid., pp. 4-8.
128
See Kozik in "Wydarzenia kryzysowe," p. 124.
- 99 -
motions in order to pay official homage to the KPP, while others invited
surviving KPP activists to lecture on the history of the prewar
communist movement.129 But there is no evidence that the KPP aroused
any noteworthy interest outside the Party and its satellite
institutions. Kozik concluded that "the KPP issue and the
rehabilitation of its members was primarily of concern to specific Party
circles and the Party as such."130
Contrary to the aims of the KPP Commission, Party discussions
concerning the KPP led to a demand for the complete rehabilitation of
other individuals and organizations declared subversive during the
Stalinist era. Numerous meetings of former KPZU activists became
widespread at this stage, where they demanded the rehabilitation of
their Party.131 The first courageous moves towards the rehabilitation
of the AK also gained ground during this period. 132 The wider
rehabilitation debates nurtured the idea that Gomulka, who gained
popularity among rank-and-file Party members, ought to be permitted to
rejoin the Party and leadership. It was precisely these wider debates
that aroused the attention of the public.133 As Party historian Wlady-
slaw Grabski put it, the rehabilitation of the KPP "sped up the process
of destabilization in Poland and the international worker's move-
ment."134
SUMMARY
At the Warsaw Party conference, Ochab acknowledged the "painful
and bitter truth about the mistakes of Joseph Stalin, in whom we saw
the example of revolutionary virtues [and about whom] there were ardent
words not only in our mouths, but in our hearts too". He announced that
the Party regretted succumbing "to a spy complex" and added that at "the
beginning of last month, full Party rights were restored to comrades
129
130
Kozik in "Wydarzenia kryzysowe," p. 124.
131
Lewytzkyj, op. cit., p.20.
132
See Jerzy Ambrowicz, Walery Namiotkiewicz and Jan Olszewski, "Na spotkanie
ludziom z AK," Po Prostu (11 March 1956). See also the articles by Jerzy Piorkowski,
Zbigniew Florczak, Edmund Osmanczyk, and Kazimierz Kozniewski in Nowa Kultura; and
the article, condemning the "second-class citizenship," of former AK members was
published in Trybuna Ludu (15 April) by Alicja Solska.
133
See Wladyka, Na czolowce, pp. 44-91.
134
Grabski, "Swiadomosc kryzysu 1956," p. 26.
- 100 -
Szczesny Dobrowolski, Jozef Kuropieska, and Waclaw Komar."135 Ochab

went on:
I should like to deal shortly with the case...Spychalski, who was arrested
on the accusation of criminal activities in the Polish Army...has recognized
his guilt toward the people's authority and has been released from prison.
I wish also to inform the comrades that, of those sentenced in the trial
of Tatar and Kirchmayer and other former Sanacja officers, the sentence
imposed on [them]...has been reduced as an act of mercy and a break in the
136
sentence has been granted them because of ill health.
Cyrankiewicz, in his long speech to the plenary session of the

Sejm, which met between 23-27 April, outlined his views on the XX
Congress. 137 He described the reaction of Polish society to the
Congress thus:
The healthy wave of criticism, the increased volume and the basic direction
of discussions at Party and non-Party meetings, the discussions in the
press...proves that a never-ending, national conference of political
138
activists on the problems of socialism is taking place.
The parliament announced on 27 April a sweeping general amnesty. They

also decided to amend the criminal code. Approximately 80,000 individ-
uals took advantage of the amnesty decree, including over 9,000
political prisoners. By 22 May, some 34,644 people were freed from
prison, about 4,500 of those released had been charged with offenses
against the state.139
A series of dramatic personnel changes during the month of April
shook the power elite. The following individuals had been dismissed
from the government: Stanislaw Radkiewicz, minister of State Farms
(former Buro member and minister of Public Security); Stefan
Kalinowski, the Prosecutor General; Stanislaw Zarakowski, the Supreme
Military Prosecutor; Henryk Swiatkowski, minister of Justice;
135
Including Komar's subordinates, Flato and Leder.
136
Cited in National Communism, pp. 79-80.
137
On the 'revival' of the Polish parliament after March 1956 see "Legislative
Committees in Polish Lawmaking," Slavic Review, no. 2, vol. XXV (June 1966).
138
National Communism, pp. 84-123.
139
Only 6,910 (1,062 charged for 'crimes' during the interwar period)
political prisoners were initially effected by the amnesty. See Grabski, "Swiadomosc
kryzysu 1956 r. w PZPR (Przed wydarzeniami czerwcowymi 1956 r.)" in Hillebrandt,
Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i konflikty lat 1956-1970 (Warsaw, [limited
circulation] 1986), p. 33. From 1954 until the end of 1956, the Supreme Military
Court lowered or annulled the sentences of 4,832 prisoners. The Politburo dealt with
25 cases. In 1956, the Prosecutor General also investigated charges of torture and
other illegal methods of interrogation in over 200 cases. See Dymek, "Sytuacja
ideowopolityczna w PZPR w latach 1956-1959" in ibid., pp. 107, endnote nos. 36 and
37.
- 101 -
Wlodzimierz Sokorski, minister of Culture and Arts; and Stanislaw

Skrzeszewski, minister of Foreign Affairs. 140 The status of the
chairman of the Committee for Public Security Affairs was downgraded,
and the security organs were placed under greater Politburo supervision
when Dworakowski was 'reassigned' to work in the Central Committee.141
The Politburo also decided to disband the Internal Security Corps as
of 1 November 1956.142 The resolution suggested "that under present
political conditions there exists no further need for the KBW."143
The most ominous chain of dismissals occurred on 23 April, when
the press announced that two leading MBP functionaries had been
arrested: Roman Romkowski, the former deputy minster of Public
Security; and Anatol Fejgin, the former director of the infamous Tenth
Department. They were to be charged with violating socialist
144
legality. The Politburo met to discuss Berman's future during a
series of meetings held from 2 to 5 May. He was widely known inside
and outside the Party to have supervised the security apparatus during
the Stalinist years. The Politburo forced Berman to resign all his
offices on 3 May.145 The Buro also ordered Berman to submit his written
self-criticism on 5 May, added as an appendix to the relevant Politburo
minutes.146 The official press release read as follows:
As a result of an investigation carried out by the Politburo, involving the

errors and distortions in Party and government work that took place in the
140
The position of the foreign minster was elevated when Rapacki was appointed
to that portfolio.
141
Edmund Pszczolkowski, formerly the minister of Agriculture, took charge
of the KSBP.
142
Mieczyslaw Jaworski, Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego, 1945-1965
(Warsaw, 1984), p. 258.
143
Biuletyn, 30 April 1956, no. 27, p. 2. The KBW had been the principal
military formation used by the Party to suppress social unrest. Immediately after
World War II, the KBW led the fight against anti-communist guerrillas, especially
the AK and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The KBW also carried out the infamous 'Akcja
Wisla': the forced resettlement of thousands of Ukrainian peasants from eastern
Poland to the recovered territories and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. On 'Akcja
Wisla' see Antoni Szozesniak and Wieslaw Szota, Droga do Nikad (Warsaw, 1973); Jan
Lukaszow, "Walki polsko-ukrainskie, 1943-1947," Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 90 (1990);
and Peter Potichnyj, "'Akcja Wisla' - The Forcible Relocation of Ukrainian Population
in Poland," Paper Presented to the Conference on Forcible Repatriation After World
War II, University of Oxford, 20-22 March 1987.
144
Both of them had been assigned to interrogate Gomulka.
145
Kozik actually argued that Berman "resigned" and that he stopped
participating in Party meetings "due to his health." See his "Przemiany polityczne
w Polsce w swietle VII i VIII Plenum KC PZPR w 1956 r.," Z pola walki, no. 2, vol.
XXIII (1980), p. 76.
146
For details see Appendix VII.
- 102 -
recent years...Comrade Berman resigned from his post as a member of the

147
Politburo and as Deputy Premier of the Government.
Few communists mourned the fate of either Berman, Radkiewicz, or

Romkowski and Fejgin. Many agreed they had to pay for a their brutality
and ruthlessness. The problem was that Party functionaries of Jewish
origin were chiefly identified as having abused their positions of power
while supervising the apparatus of terror.148 This 'coincidence' could
not have gone unnoticed by the Party activists and the general public.
Bierut and Mazur, whose responsibility was at least equal to Berman and
Radkiewicz, were never publicly ostracized by the communist authorities
for their role during the period of 'errors and distortions'.149 The
excesses of other officials who had been connected with the security
forces, such as Ambassador Lewikowski, Henryk Piasecki, Waclaw
Michalak, or the Soviet advisors (Voznesensky, Skulbaszewski and
Nikolashkin), also remained undisclosed. Their culpability for the
crimes committed during the Stalinist years paralleled Romkowski and
Fejgin.150
The search for scapegoats, principally the crude attempt on the
part of some Party hardliners to draw a symmetry between 'Jews' and
'secret police', was also the backdrop to a series of anti-Semitic and
other xenophobic incidents that took place in Poland during the 'time
of troubles'. Attacks against Jews had taken place in a number of
Polish cities.151 Ukrainians resettled in the recovered territories as
a result of the so-called 'Akcja Wisla' also reported hostility from
some of their Polish neighbours.152 The Politburo had been aware of
these incidents, but only Poland's intellectuals, and the emigre and
147
Trybuna Ludu (6 May 1956).
148
Radkiewicz's wife was Jewish -- this seems to have mattered. Khrushchev,
while discussing Zambrowski in his memoirs, interjected with the comment: "Bierut's
wife was of Jewish nationality, but she was a good comrade." Glasnost Years, p. 113.
149
The Politburo established a commission in June to edit and publish Bierut's
writings in a series of Collected Works.
150
See Checinski, op. cit., pp. 100-101.
151
In Wroclaw (pop. 341,000 -- all population statistics from 1950 census),
Bytom (120,000), Walbrzych (pop. 81,260), Legica (pop. 59,940), and Dzierzniow. For
details see Checinski, op. cit., pp. 126-127; and Nowa Kultura (6 January 1957) and
Trybuna Ludu (6 January 1957).
152
Biuletyn, 15 June 1956, no. 30, p. 5; Wladyslaw Wicha, "Przemowienie
ministra spraw wewnetrznych Wladyslawa Wichy wygloszone na zebraniu aktywu
partyjnego-sluzbowego MSW," W sluzbie narodu, no. 28 (1956); and Zbigniew Lakomski,
"W obronie czlowieczenstwa," ibid., no. 30 (1958).
- 103 -
Western press, found the subject worthy of condemnation and extensive

public discourse.153
The spring and early summer of 1956 was a period of tremendous
upheaval in the Party. The PZPR; indeed, the leadership, was under
seige and divided. No one in the Party articulated a comprehensive pro-
gramme of reform, short of the universal calls for a 'return to Leninist
norms'. Poland's anti-Stalin campaign was best described in two
briefings prepared for the US State Department. An intelligence report
prepared in April concluded:
Poland is still far in the lead within the Soviet bloc, both in repeating
detailed charges against Stalin and in encouraging a frank discussion of
154
mistakes committed by the Polish regime.
Another report concluded:
Poland remains in the lead among the satellites both in repeating the
detailed charges against Stalin and in launching a broad campaign of
155
criticism against manifold shortcomings in Polish national life.
The pace of change in Poland created the conditions for Stanislaw

Cat-Mackiewicz, the prominent emigre politician and journalist, to
return from exile in London on 14 June 1956.
153
Especially Kultura (Paris), The New York Times, and Le Monde. See esp.
the articles by Kolakowski, "Antysemicki - piec tez nienowych i przestroga," Po Prostu
(27 May 1956) reprinted in Wladyka, Na czolowce, pp. 266-276; and K.A Jelenski, "Od
Endekow do Stalinistow," Kultura, no. 9 (1956).
154
"Department of State Intelligence Briefing (no. 1912.2), April 24, 1956.
Current Status of the Anti-Stalin Campaign in the Soviet Bloc," DDE Library,
WHO/NSCS/OCBC, Files Series, Box 1.
155
"Department of State Intelligence Briefing (no. 1912.3), May 5, 1956,"
ibid.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE PARTY APPARATUS
Reformist tendencies in the Party apparatus were confined to the

major urban centres. This explains why the leading reform-minded KW
(and city) First Secretaries, Jan Kowarz (Wroclaw), Jozef Olszewski
(Katowice), and Tatarkowna-Majkowska (City of Lodz), retained their
posts throughout the October crisis.1 The Cracow Party was also a hub
of reform, but acting First Secretary Stanislaw Brodzinski supported
the hardliners in the leadership. The most powerful base for the
reformers continued to be the capital city, especially Staszewski's
Warsaw Party organization.
The agricultural sector and the industrial trade unions were
supervised by two hardliners, Nowak and Klosiewicz, who ensured that
organizations representing the peasants and workers remained on the
sidelines. 2 Most of the other nineteen KW First Secretaries also
resisted the campaign for a 'return to Leninist norms in Party life'.3
The territorial apparat was subordinate to the provincial Party
hierarchy and Mazur in the Secretariat.
While many central Party activists hailed the de-Stalinization
campaign because of its liberating features, the lower level and
territorial apparatchiks saw the attacks on Stalinism as a threat to
their livelihood. These apparatchiks were determined to forestall
reforms to a system that guaranteed their jobs and privileges.
Nurtured on a steady diet of orthodox Stalinism from 1950, the apparat
was the least prepared for the intensity of Khrushchev's assault on the
'cult of personalty'. Between April 1950 and 30 September 1953, before
Bierut officially adopted the 'new course' at the IX Plenum of 29 October
1953, some 234,104 candidates joined the PZPR.4 A total of 523,934
candidates joined the Party during much of Bierut's tenure from 1949
to 1954.5
1
For further details see Appendix V.
2
The peasants did not enter the debate until the final stages of the October
crisis. The position of the workers is detailed in the two following chapter.
3
A notable exception was Roman Nowak.
4
Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954 (Warsaw, 1989), p. 300, Table 19.
5
ibid., p. 301. During the official commemorations of Stalin's death, about
1,000 blue collar workers, 290 engineers, technicians, and teachers, and 200 students
applied for Party membership. The Party enroled 15,000 candidates in March and April
1953 alone. ibid., p. 302, footnote no. 45.
- 105 -
PZPR MEMBERSHIP BY VOCATION

PZPR membership has been divided into four general categories (see
TABLE II below): WORKERS; PEASANTS; WHITE COLLAR WORKERS; and OTHERS.
The Party's statistics included blue collar workers in light and heavy
industries, foremen and master tradesmen, and farm labourers in the
WORKERS category, although separate numbers have been provided for farm
labourers. From 1955, foremen and master tradesmen had been placed in
both the WORKERS and WHITE COLLAR WORKERS category, which was actually
labelled 'intelligentsia' in Party statistics. 6 The WHITE COLLAR
WORKERS category also embraced 'social and political activists' and
'civil servants'. Werfel wrote that the former consisted of "full-time
Party functionaries, workers in the state and economic apparatus,
factory and rural activists, [and] workers in education and culture."7
The latter comprised trade union officials, functionaries in various
social organizations, the Militia and prison guards, and junior level
apparatchiks; such as typists, file clerks, post office workers, and
railway employees. The OTHERS category encompassed artisans,
shopkeepers, and homemakers.
TABLE II - Vocational Membership in PZPR, 1948-1959
YEAR TOTAL WORKERS PEASANTS WHITE COLLAR WORKERS OTHERS
1948 1,442,794 56.9/4.0 (60.0) 15.3 21.9 1.9

1949 1,347,135 51.8/4.8 (56.6) 14.3 26.3 2.8
1950 1,240,965 47.0/3.7 (50.7) 13.6 33.4 2.3
1951 1,138,430 45.7/3.6 (49.3) 13.3 15.7/19.3 (35.0) 2.2
1952 1,146,928 44.5/3.7 (48.2) 13.4 16.9/19.3 (36.2) 2.2
1953 1,150,589 44.0/3.7 (47.7) 13.0 18.0/19.1 (37.1) 2.2
1954 1,298,126 43.1/5.0 (48.1) 13.8 18.4/17.7 (36.1) 2.0
1955 1,343,837 42.6/3.8 (46.4) 13.3 37.7 2.6
1956 1,376,651 40.8/2.8 (43.6) 12.7 17.0/22.0 (39.0) 4.7
1957 1,283,083 39.9/1.3 (40.6) 12.0 38.3 8.5
1958 1,023,425 41.4/0.5 (41.9) 12.2 42.0 3.9
1959 1,018,466 40.0/0.3 (40.3) 11.5 43.2 5.0
SOURCE: PZPR w liczbach od II do III Zjazdu (Warsaw, 1959); and Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954,
pp. 322-323, Table 25. The second set of figures in the WORKERS and WHITE COLLAR WORKERS
categories represent farm labourers and (when applicable) civil servants respectively.
The numbers in parenthesis are the totals in each category.
6
ibid., p. 310. Foremen and master tradesmen had been placed exclusively in
the WHITE COLLAR WORKERS category prior to 1951.
7
Nowe Drogi, vol. XI (August 1957), p. 41.
- 106 -
The Party's social and political activists were sub-divided into

twelve groups (see TABLE III and TABLE IV below) of functionaries: 1)
the KC apparat, ZMP, and security organs; 2) the national councils as
well as the PRL government; 3) economic administrators and managers of
state industries; 4) engineers and other technicians; 5) activists in
the agricultural sector, zoologists, and veterinarians; 6) university
professors, other educational workers, and administrators at the
institutes of higher learning; 7) primary, technical, and secondary
school teachers as well as school directors; 8) qualified physicians,
pharmacists, dentists, and nurses; 9) Writers, artisans, and journal-
ists; 10) judges and prosecutors; 11) post-secondary school students;
and 12) the administrators of various socio-cultural institutions; such
as physical education instructors, librarians, and community centre
operators.
The KC apparat, ZMP, and security organs included candidates and
members of the Central Committee as well as the Politburo, Secretariat,
Central Control Commission, Audit Commission, and staff workers
attached to those bodies; KW secretaries and workers in provincial
committees; directors in provincial committees and their deputies; the
ZMP leadership and staff workers; and full-time administrators and
functionaries of the UB.8
TABLE III - Social and Political Activists by Vocation, 1953-1954
WHITE COLLAR 1953 % 1954 %

TOTAL of PZPR Membership 207,098 18.0 239,468 18.4
KC apparat, ZMP, and security organs 98,223 8.5 97,375 7.5

National councils and PRL government 11,116 1.0 16,596 1.3
Economic and industrial apparat 22,596 2.0 26,254 2.0
Engineers and technicians 26,232 2.3 36,633 2.8
Agricultural activists, veterinarians, etc. N/D N/D 2,745 0.2
Professors, academic workers, etc. 2,451 0.2 3,263 0.3
Primary and secondary teachers, etc. 22,611 2.0 28,890 2.2
Physicians and other medical workers 5,226 0.5 6,982 0.5
Writers, artists, and journalists 2,519 0.2 3,068 0.2
Judges and prosecutors 1,662 0.1 2,113 0.2
Post-secondary school students 11,894 1.0 12,156 0.9
Social and cultural administrators, etc. 2,568 0.2 3,375 0.3
SOURCE: Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954, pp. 333, Table 25.
8
See also Starr, Poland, 1944-1962, p. 173.
- 107 -
TABLE IV - Social and Political Activists by Vocation, 1956
WHITE COLLAR 1956 %

TOTAL of PZPR Membership 234,150 17.0
KC apparat, ZMP, and security organs 62,121 4.5

National councils and PRL government 24,254 1.7
Economic and industrial apparat 32,623 2.4
Engineers and technicians 44,774 3.3
Agriculture activists, veterinarians, etc. 4,309 0.3
Professors, academic workers, etc. 1,812 0.1
Primary and secondary teachers, etc. 34,527 2.5
Physicians and other medical workers 7,202 0.5
Writers, artists, and journalists 1,224 0.1
Judges and prosecutors 2,744 0.2
Post-secondary school students 13,431 1.0
Social and cultural administrators, etc. 5,129 0.4
SOURCE: CA KC PZPR, 237/VII-3830; and my own calculations.
BIERUT AND THE PARTY APPARATUS

At the II PZPR Congress of March 1954, Bierut had already decided
to recruit Party candidates more selectively from among "industrial
shock-workers." 9 He also called for an increase in the number of
'intellectuals' in the Party, while stressing the need to continue with
the expulsions and deletions of indifferent, passive, or unreliable
activists from the Party list. The PZPR did not treat the candidates
and members who had been expelled (usually for questioning the Party's
methods of work) any differently from those deleted (usually for
inactivity) from the Party list.10 Both groups tended to be shunned
by Party activists and their employers.11
Between 1954 and 1955, the percentage of 'workers' in the PZPR
declined from 48.1% to 46.4% (farm labourers from 5.0% to 3.8%), 12
while 'white collar workers' rose from 36.1% to 37.7%. The percentage
of 'peasants' also decreased from 13.8% in 1954 to 13.3% in 1955. About
53.2% (97,312) of the Party's new candidates in 1954 were 'workers',
including 11,519 farm labourers. 'White collar workers' accounted for
9
"II Kongress PZPR, 10-17 III 1954 r.," CA KC PZPR, 237/I/2, II dzien obrad,
p. 36.
10
The CKKP, chaired by Jozwiak until October 1956, was responsible for
expelling and deleting candidates and members from the PZPR.
11
See the remarks by Jozwiak in Dymek, PZPR 1984-1954, p. 303.
12
Foremen and master tradesmen constituted 3.1% (41,810) of the 'Workers' in
1955.
- 108 -
27.0% (49,501);13 'peasants' accounted for 19.0% (34,789); and 'others'

accounted for 0.8% (1,422) of the candidates. A total of 183,024
candidates were inducted into the Party that year.14 Some 123,843 new
candidates joined the Party in 1955. 'Workers' accounted for 48.7%
(60,312), including 4,319 farm labourers; 'white collar workers'
accounted for 40.0% (49,501), including 10,795 civil servants;
'peasants' accounted for 11.1% (13,746); and 'others' accounted for
0.2% (284) of the new candidates.15 Furthermore, in 1954 and 1955, some
53,607 and 57,083 candidates and members had been expelled or -- the
majority -- deleted from the Party list. Over 65% had served less than
three years in the PZPR.16
The total number of social and political activists in the Party
also grew between 1953 and 1954. Detailed figures for 1955 were not
available. The systematic increase in the total number of 'white
collar workers', or 'intelligentsia', began in 1954. The substantial
growth in the number of Party activists employed by the National
Councils and PRL government is particularly revealing.17 The activists
in this group totalled 10,529 in 1951; 11,709 in 1952; 11,116 in 1953;
and 16,596 in 1954.18 Only the number of full-time activists employed
by the KC apparat, the ZMP, and the security organs, had been reduced
in 1954. This decrease is also revealing. Activists in this group
totalled 87,921 in 1951; 94,257 in 1953; 98,223 in 1953; and 97,375 in
1954. 19 A more detailed breakdown is not available, but the PZPR
leadership's decision to curtail the power and authority of the security
apparatus shortly before the II Congress must have had an impact on the
lower number.
13
The figures for 'white collar workers' in 1954 were not sub-divided.
14
About 55.6% (43,514) of the new candidates in 1953 were 'workers', including
4,173 farm labourers. 'White collar workers' accounted for 30.6% (23,991), including
7,766 civil servants; 'peasants' accounted for 13.0% (10,169); and 'others' accounted
for 0.8% (672) of the candidates accepted into the Party in 1953.
15
PZPR w liczbach, p. 24; and Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954, p. 318, Table 23.
16
ibid., p. 303; and his Z dziejow PZPR, p. 209, endnote no. 56.
17
Zambrowski's earlier observations, that "Bierut did not change in any
fundamental way his methods and style of work" when pressured by Khrushchev to
implement reforms; and that "Bierut would sooner continue to steer the ship of state
than the Party," are corroborated by the statistics. See chapter 5, footnote no.
7.
18
ibid.
19
Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954, pp. 332, Table 25.
- 109 -
THE 'DOGMATISM' OF THE APPARAT

The apparat was discussed in great detail at the May conference
for directors of the KW Organization departments. The delegates
reported that
the discussions underscored the opinions already presented by the KW

administrators in their written reports to the Secretariat; namely, there
is a great renewal in political life, particularly at the level of the city
Party organizations. But there is also a calmer discussion of views.20 The
sharpest criticisms come from many of the central Party institutions.
The conference concluded, however, that "there is less courage in the

criticism coming from the lower Party levels," especially among "POP,
KZ and KP secretaries, PPRN chairmen and other managers of Party
activists in the provinces." They added:
among functionaries there exists a certain uneasy -- particularly with

regard to those comrades who worked longer in the Party apparat and those
21
unprepared in light of their poor general and political education.
At the June meeting of KC Secretaries, directors, and

deputy-directors of all departments, the attitude of the functionaries
who worked at the lower Party levels was characterized accordingly:22
as a consequence of poor planning, not all the workers in the apparat are
prepared to fulfil the decisions which were put forward by the Party at the
III KC Plenum and the XX CPSU Congress. This explains the definite
resistance displayed among parts of the apparat, mainly in the provinces,
towards the introduction of Leninist norms and in the struggle for democratic
life. In many apparat cells one can observe ossification, the desire to
hold on to the old methods, and anxiety about the new situation introduced
23
by the III Plenum and XX Congress.
The concerns voiced by the workers and peasants were interpreted

by functionaries who tended to be hostile to the anti-Stalin campaign
and filtered upward through equally hostile KW Secretaries. By the
time the Politburo and Secretariat, which also included hardliners,
received details reports on the daily problems of those whom they
20
During the 29 March conference of Party activists at the institutes of higher
education, the criticisms were piercing, but the reaction to Khrushchev's speech was
measured. See the speech by Zolkiewski in Fijalkowska, op. cit., pp. 347-348; and
Schaff, op. cit., pp. 14-22.
21
Biuletyn, 15 May 1956, no. 28, pp. 14-16.
22
Below the nineteen provincial committees were almost three hundred district
committees and some nine thousand village, precinct, and municipal committees. POP's
were attached to most institutions (professional organizations, university
faculties, factories, state farms, mines, military units, collective farms) and some
village communities. Larger factories incorporated a number of POP's under a KZ.
23
- 110 -
purported to represent, the information was usually outlined in a series

of platitudes. The following is a list of typical comments attributed
to the lower Party functionaries: "people are still afraid to tell the
whole truth openly"; "workers sharply criticizing the defective
organization of work"; "the majority of the meetings in the countryside
have not yet been assessed"; or "there is criticism of the work done
by parliamentarians, who have yet to be seen in the countryside."24
The 'programme' outlined by the leadership for extracting the
Party from its predicament was put forward by Ochab at the Warsaw
conference and expressed in a number of motivational slogans:
"democratization," "openness in political life" and "collective
leadership and the collectivist approach to work." Of particular
importance to the functionaries at the lowest levels were the negative
slogans: "the struggle against the strangling of criticism," "against
bureaucracy and dignitarianism" and "against corporal-like behaviour."
All of it subordinate to the phrase: "the return to Leninist norms in
Party life."25 Ochab declared that the Party sought to strengthen all
social organizations, and the national and local councils, by improving
the efficiency of Party and state administrators. He also informed the
Warsaw Party activists at their April meeting that one quarter of the
full-time functionaries in the apparat were to be replaced by unpaid
activists who would "implement the will of the Party, the working class
and working peasantry."26
OCHAB'S 'PROGRAMME' OF PARTY RENEWAL

PZPR membership increased by 32,814 in 1956, the bulk during
Ochab's tenure. Between 1955 and 1956, the percentage of 'workers' in
the PZPR again declined, from 46.4% to 43.6% (farm labourers from 3.8%
to 2.8%),27 while 'white collar workers' rose from 37.7% to 39.0%. The
percentage of 'peasants' also decreased from 13.3% in 1955 to 12.7% in
1956. The number of candidates accepted into the Party in 1956 totalled
88,724. About 26.6% (23,601) of the new candidates were 'workers',
including 3,411 farm labourers. 'White collar workers' accounted for
24
Biuletyn, 15 May 1956, no. 28, p. 14-16.
25
Ochab's speech in Trybuna Ludu (7 April 1956).
26
See also Wlodzimierz Skulski in ibid. (23 November 1956). Khrushchev
announced at the XX Congress that the CPSU apparat was to be cut by one quarter.
27
Foremen and master tradesmen constituted 3.9% (53,689) of the 'Workers' in
1956.
- 111 -
65.0% (57,670), including 21,897 civil servants; 'peasants' accounted

for 8.3% (7,364); and 'others' accounted for 0.1% (89) of the candidates
received in 1956.28 A total of 50,683 candidates and members had been
expelled or deleted that same year, although only 13,892 members (3,230
candidates) actually faced expulsion. The remaining 36,171 members
(15,173 candidates) had been deleted from the Party list for inactiv-
ity.29 About 41.8% of those expelled or deleted were 'workers'; 31,4%
'white collar workers'; 18.9% 'peasants'; and 7.9% 'others'. The
majority, some 66.3%, had been under the age of 40 and over 65% served
less than four years in the Party.30
The social and political activists faced tremendous changes in
1956. Their total number decreased in 1956, but nearly every group in
this category experienced an increase when compared to the 1954 figures.
The figure for civil servants also grew in 1956. At the same time, the
number of candidates and members in the Warsaw Party organization
declined.31 The fall in Party membership among intellectuals, or the
'creative intelligentsia' as the Party called them, was indicative of
the changes that took place in the Party. The number of professors and
academic workers decreased from 3,263 in 1954 to 1,812 in 1956.32 The
number of writers, artists, and journalists connected with the Party
plummeted from 3,068 to 1,1224 during the same period.
The loss of some 36,102 cadres in the KC apparat, ZMP, and security
organs between 1954 and 1956, was the most significant development in
the PZPR since the purges of 1950-1953. The process of Party
reorganization began in March 1956, although the actual number of social
and political activists expelled, deleted, or transferred during
Ochab's tenure is unknown. 33 Out of a total of 61,857 Party
functionaries in the UB, MO, and prison services in 1954, some 39,303
remained at the end of 1956. Of the 37,455 Party functionaries in the
KC apparat, trade unions, ZMP, and other social organizations in 1954,
28
CA KC PZPR, 237/VII-3830.
29
"Many thousands" deleted for inactivity actually left the Party en masse
after the Poznan strikes, according to Stanislaw Kuzinski, "Pazdziernik 1956 r. Ze
wspomnien sekretarza Warszawy," Polityka (10 October 1981).
30
See also Dymek, Z dziejow PZPR, pp. 179.
31
ibid., p. 217.
32
The fall continued in 1957. At the end of 1958, PAN employed 2,466 academic
workers, but only 294 remained in the PZPR. At the other institutes of higher
education, out of a total of 5,010 academic workers in 1958, only 593 remained Party
members. Dymek, ibid., pp. 187 and 218.
33
The number of nomenklatura positions controlled by the KC had been cut by
half during Bierut's tenure. "Polska proba," p. 163.
- 112 -
about 32,233 still held their positions in 1956. 34 After a cut of

one-third, KC headquarters retained 270 full-time staffers in November
1956.35
The sharp increase in the number of the so-called 'technical
intelligentsia' in the Party also began in March 1956. The figures for
engineers and technicians went up from 36,633 in 1954 to 44,774 in 1956.
Corresponding growth in Party membership impacted economic and
industrial managers as well as the agricultural activists. The rising
strength of the 'technical intelligentsia' steadily weakened the power
of former PPR and PPS activists in the PZPR, including the number of
Jews and other ethnic minorities in the Party. The percentage of PPR
and PPS activists fell from 54.8% and 29.0% in 1953 to 25.4% and 32.1%
respectively at the end of 1956.36 About 21.8% of the Party's members
in 1958 joined between 1954 and 1956.37
SUMMARY
The majority of the functionaries in the Party apparat and state
bureaucracy, including the trade union apparatus, the officer corps
(and NCO's) of the military and Militia, and the security organs were
of working class or peasant origin. The percentage of Party members
and candidates of working class and peasant origin constituted 67.1%
and 27.7% respectively of the total PZPR membership at the end of 1954.38
But the extensive promotion of workers and peasants into the Party and
state bureaucracy and the technical and managerial strata during the
Stalinist period had only marginally benefited either class. The
'newly created cadres' assimilation to a remarkable degree to the values
of the prewar bourgeoisie or the more exclusive cast of Party or security
functionaries.39 As Pelczynski argued: "the members of the new elite
34
Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954, p. 308; and CA KC PZPR, 237/VII-3830.
35
Trybuna Ludu (23 November 1956).
36
Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954, p. 333, Table 29; and CA KC PZPR, 237/VII-3832. PPR
and PPS activists made up 33.5% of total PZPR membership in 1963. Dymek, ibid., p.
336, footnote no. 66.
37
Only 16.3% of the PZPR membership in 1970 joined before 1948. ibid.
38
ibid., p. 316, Table 21.
39
See the conclusions reached by sociologist Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society
(New York, 1970), pp. 113-130. The disintegration of Stalinism as the official
ideology as well as the Party's subsequent assault on Marxist revisionism helps
explain why nationalism became a dominant characteristic of Polish communism after
1956. On the role of nationalism in Polish politics after 1956 see Adam Bromke,
Poland's Politics: Idealism versus Realism (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), part II; and
Checinski, Poland, parts III-IV. Nationalism had already been a major element of
- 113 -
ceased to count as workers, to share and express their point of view

and to show special sensitivity to workers' problems."40
The territorial and lower level apparatchiks were also receiving
conflicting directives from their superiors throughout the 'time of
troubles'. Party historian Wladyslaw Maria Grabski concluded that a
study of the "documents delivered by the central authorities in May and
June [1956] to KW and KD secretaries" indicates that "mixed signals"
were sent to "the lower Party levels in order to maintain unity within
the Politburo."41 The clash between hardline and reformist forces at
the highest Party echelons as well as the struggle between nationalist
and internationalist tendencies merely confused the apparatchiks.
Even the moves to strengthen the role of 'white collar workers'
in the Party, principally from among the 'technical intelligentsia',
could not guarantee a better educated or more sophisticated pool of
cadres.42 Of the approximately two million white collar workers (Party
and non-Party) employed in Poland in 1955, more than half of them had
not yet completed secondary education.43 State employees in particu-
lar had inadequate education and training, but the level of education
in the Party was also poor. About 38.7% of the Party's candidates and
members had not completed primary school in 1955. Only 42.6% graduated
from a primary school, 16.0% from a secondary school, and 2.7% from a
post-secondary institution. During the same period, 40.2% of the Party
members were over forty years of age.44
In short, most of the Party activists had little formal education,
limited management experience, and had been trained during the
Stalinist years to transmit orders without discussion to their under-
the official ideology before 1950. According to Kolakowski, from 1945 to 1950 "the
party ideology did not stress Communist themes but patriotic, nationalist, or
anti-German ones." Main Currents, vol. III, p. 172.
40
41
Grabski, "Swiadomosc kryzysu," p. 35.
42
80% of the participants to Party conferences at the KW level were 'white
collar workers' in 1956 and 1957. Kozik, PZPR w latach., p. 299.
43
The substantial growth of this category from 1949 to 1955 guaranteed that
their educational level was relatively low. Overall spending and investment (in
million zlotys) in higher education went up from 2175,9 and 404,6 respectively in
1953 to 2511,8 and 466,3 respectively in 1956. For further details see Rocznik
Statystyczny 1955 (Warsaw 1956), Table 2, p. 207; ibid [1956] (Warsaw, 1956), Table
3, p. 296; and ibid [1957] (Warsaw, 1957), Table 3, p. 290.
44
Dymek, PZPR 1948-1954, pp. 309, 311, Table 33 and 339. Statistics on
illiteracy in the Party were not kept, but the number of Party members who could not
read or write must have been relatively low by 1956. The postwar campaign against
illiteracy was extremely successful. However, even in the Warsaw and Lodz wojewod-
ships, over half of the Party members in 1955 had not completed primary school. See
ibid., p. 341, footnote no. 68.
- 114 -
lings. The low level of education among Party members was of particular
concern to the leadership from 1954. At the March conference of the
central Party aktiv, Morawski remarked that of the 6,100 Party
instructors at the KP and KD levels -- excluding Warsaw and Lodz --
barely 16% (680) graduated from secondary school, while 30% (1,850)
never completed their primary education. He added that half of the
instructors had been unskilled workers. 45 The debate about the
'unpreparedness' of the apparat forced the leadership to reconsider the
entire system of cadre training in the Party schools and the KC INS.46
In May 1956, a number of resolutions restructured the Party schools.
The most important among them was the decision to liquidate the INS in
Warsaw and transfer the education and history of philosophy departments
to the University of Warsaw.47 The Party also decided to combine the
Party School and the Central School into a Higher Party School, which
would offer a three-year course of study.48
The PZPR remained a Stalinist institution throughout Ochab's
short tenure as First Secretary. Ochab showed no inclination to
initiate a sweeping purge of the Party's 'dogmatists'. There was also
opposition to a purge of the apparat from the hardliners in the leader-
ship and most of the KW Secretaries. And it was they who supervised
the lower Party levels. The hardliners targeted a select group of
leading Party activists and lay the blame for the period of 'errors and
distortions' on them. It was the pace of the de-Stalinization
campaign, especially those who supported it, that the hardliners
resisted.
The Party's reformers were in no position to reorganize the
apparat during the spring of 1956. Their strength was confined to three
or four large cities, sections of the central Party aktiv, and the
propaganda apparatus centred in Warsaw. The bulk of their supporters
45
"Protokol narady centralnego aktywu partyjnego w 6 III 1956 r." as cited
in "Polska proba," p. 163.
46
From 1950 until 1956, the INS (formerly IKKN) trained 296 candidates. About
132 were employed at the institutes of higher learning, 96 went to work in the Party
apparat, and 70 for the press and other Party-directed institutions. See PZPR w
liczbach, p. 89, Table 2.
47
Biuletyn, 15 June 1956, no. 30, p. 1 and 5. Another factor in the decision
to disband the INS was the defection to the West of Seweryn Bialer (the prominent
scholar and Sovietologist at Columbia University in New York), an INS instructor.
Interview with Rodzinski (formerly an INS instructor), November 1988. The case of
the so-called "provocateur," as Bialer is characterized in the Biuletyn, was widely
discussed. See ibid., pp. 25-27.
48
ibid., 30 May 1956, no. 29, p. 3. In August 1957, the Party schools were
disbanded.
- 115 -
were activists in the Warsaw Party organization, intellectuals and

journalists, and former Socialists. The first two had been targeted
by the hardliners, while the strength of past PPR and PPS activists
steadily deteriorated as a result of the infusion of 'newly created
cadres' into the PZPR.
CHAPTER NINE
THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY
On the state of Poland's economy, Ochab explained to the April

conference of the Warsaw Party activists that he rejected claims to the
effect that the Six-Year Plan had made no impact on the living standards.
"An increase in the living standards," Ochab suggested, "albeit insuf-
ficient and not equally distributed...had taken place and was reflected
in the increase of per capita consumption, of both industrial and --
to a lesser degree -- agricultural products." He voiced his opposition
against the tendency in the press to mock the "achievements" of the Plan,
although Ochab conceded the attempts to "conceal difficulties and
shortages"1 But Ochab's optimistic assessment of the Stalinist Plan
belied the severity of the economic and social realities faced by the
working class in mid-1956.2
Six Party economists attached to the INS at the Central Committee,
namely Wlodzimierz Brus, Henryk Fiszel, Bogdan Glinski, Kazimierz
Laski, Zofia Morecka, and Jozef Pajestka sent a letter to the First
Secretary on 5 May, which contained a more critical analysis of the
country's economic difficulties. The signatories proposed a series of
changes to facilitate an improvement in the living standards and
stressed the need to introduce without delay systemic reforms to the
Polish economy. They also asked for a meeting with the Party leaders,
but the request was rejected.3
THE 'SHORTCOMINGS' OF THE SIX-YEAR PLAN

The Six-Year Plan ended on 31 December 1955, although a series
of 'corrections' had been made from the II Congress of March 1955.4 At
the V Plenum of July 1950, where the targets for the Plan had been set,
Bierut stated that "as a result of the achievements of the Six-Year Plan,
Poland will be transformed into one of the most industrialized European
countries."5 The Plan was greeted with much enthusiasm by Poland's
communists. It was supposed to set the foundations for the revolution-
1
Ochab's speech in Trybuna Ludu (7 April 1956).
2
An exhaustive comparative and statistical analysis of the East European economies
from 1950 to 1956 is supplied by Wlodzimierz Brus, "1950 to 1953: The Peak of Stalinism;"
and "1953 to 1956: The 'Thaw' and the 'New Course'" in M.G. Kaser, gen. ed., The Economic
History of Eastern Europe, 1919-1975, Volume III (Oxford, 1986), pp 3-70.
3
Kozik, PZPR w latach, p. 174.
4
For a detailed review of the Six-Year Plan in English see Pelczynski in Leslie,
op. cit., pp. 311-322.
5
See Bierut's speech to the V Plenum KC PZPR, 15-18 VII 1950, Nowe Drogi, no. 4 (1950).
- 117 -
ary transformation of Poland's economy and usher in the era of

socialism.
The mark set by the planners for industrial growth had exceeded
their aim by 13.4%, but the targets had not been met. The projected
rise in national income fell 38.8% short of the target, investment fell
4.0% short, agricultural production fell 37.0% short, real earnings
fell 36.3% short, consumption by the head of household fell 20.1% short,
and employment fell 4.0% short.6 The most important setback affected
the standard of living of the working class. According to Andrzej
Jezierski and Barbara Petz, real wages in 1952-1953 were lower than in
1949.7 While there had been "a reversal of a decline" in the living
standards from 1954 to 1956, as Brus demonstrates in his study, the
changes did not make up for three years of ruthless exploitation.8 Even
the rise in consumption was largely due to increased employment. And
the distribution of both income and consumption depended heavily on the
type of employment undertaken by the working class.
The failure to achieve the projected targets as well as the
plethora of 'errors' committed in overall economic management from 1950
to 1956 generated an economic crisis in the Polish economy. A "crisis
in a planned, centralized and politically directed economy," as
Rykowski and Wladyka succinctly put it, "was automatically an
indication of a political crisis."9 The popularity of the Party and
the government as well as the confidence of the ruling elite declined
markedly by mid-1956. Notwithstanding the optimism echoed by Ochab
about the performance of the Polish economy, the excitement generated
by the Plan during the first months of its inception had disappeared.
The leadership failed to cope with the mounting economic crisis.
The Politburo's inability to respond effectively to the frustrations
of the working class overshadowed whatever 'achievements' -- in eyes
of the Party leadership -- the Plan had produced. The enormous social
transformation of Polish society as a result of the Plan could not hide
the miserable conditions faced on a daily basis by the working class.10
The Politburo received reports of widespread shortages of meat, butter,
6
Andrzej Jezierski and Barbara Petz, Historia gospodarcza Polski Ludowej 1944-1975
(Warsaw, 1982), p 153, Table 15.
7
ibid., pp. 169-170.
8
Brus, "1950-1953," in Kaser, op. cit., p. 56. Jezierski and Petz (op. cit., p.
169) maintain that the average income of the head of household in 1953 rose from 5,700
to 6,600 zlotys in 1954.
9
"Polska proba," pp. 165-166.
10
On the transformation of Polish society see the assessment by Party economist
Janusz Kalinski, Polityka gospodarcza Polski w latach 1948-1956 (Warsaw, 1987).
- 118 -
animal fats, and coal as late as January and February 1956.11 According
to another report submitted to the Politburo, the inability to provide
a sufficient amount of coal resulted in open protests by workers at the
Gorzow Rail Depot and at the textile factory in Chodakow. In each case
the Militia had been used to subdue the protests. At the Gdansk
Shipyards, the walls had been covered with the slogan: "Either we get
a pay rise or we go on strike!"12
The workers were not adverse to voicing their disappointments and
anger at the state of the economy as well as the inability of the system
to fulfil the myriad of promises made to the working class. Sociologist
Hanna Swida, who worked on a study of the working class in 1949-1951,
recently declared:
We were simply allowed to enter places of work and speak to the workers
and managers, we were able to participate in their meetings and production
councils...
I was not opposed to Peoples' Poland. It was taken for granted in
those days, even among the workers. My mother was a physician in the
provinces and we knew the views of the so-called average person. But I was
truly shocked by what those workers had to say about the new system -- loudly,
publicly, and often. Among intellectuals in those days it was
13
unthinkable.
The leadership recognized that the Six-Year Plan inflated the

promises made to the working class concerning a rise in the standard
of living, but they also tried to gloss over the failures. When the
central Party activists met on 23 December 1955 to review the results
of the Plan, Hilary Minc admitted that "the tasks related to increasing
the living standard had been fulfilled only partially." The architect
of the Six-Year Plan added that instead of a 40.0% rise in real wages,
the actual increase had been below 27.0%.
Minc blamed the "partial failure" on the backwardness of Poland's
agriculture sector and the worsening international situation --
especially the Korean War -- during the initial years of the Plan. He
continued:
During the period 1951-52 we had been forced to spend billions of zlotys
modernizing our weapons and building Poland's defense industry. It was a
tremendous effort which could not be measured simply in terms of financial
investments in the armed forces, industry, airports, roads and railways.
One has to remember that the defense industry requires not just money but
also the very best materials and people.
11
Biuletyn, 31 March 1956, no. 28, p. 4.
12
13
Swida [Interview], "Robotnicy 1950," Tygodnik Solidarnosc, no. 3 (1981).
- 119 -
He then added:
We are aware that the lessening of international tension [as a result of

the 1955 East-West Summit] in Geneva had been achieved by the strengthening
of the military potential of the socialist camp. We also played a modest
role in that process.
Minc finally argued that the average wage increased among miners,
steel workers, workers in the construction industry, and toolmakers,
but wages of other workers remained the same or rose slightly. He
continued:
What do those figures prove? They prove the strength of our system which
is capable of developing the military and industrial potential of Poland
despite bureaucracy, ossification and the hostile activities of the enemy.
At the same time, despite all the obstacles, this system is capable of
14
improving the lives of the majority of our people.
At another Central Committee conference on the state of the

economy, held on 2 January 1956, Franciszek Blinowski argued that the
activists must stress that real wages had grown by 26.0% in Poland as
a result of the Plan. But one of the participants asked: "Could
comrade Blinowski tell us how to make the masses believe in a 26%
increase when the people experience the opposite?" Blinowski replied:
In my opinion the main thing is for the Party activists themselves to believe
it...if one believes in something...one can convince the masses that an
increase in the living standards had actually taken place, despite the fact
15
that people don't feel it.
THE PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

Reporters from Po Prostu, in an article entitled "There they
forgot about socialism," characterized the conditions of the workers
at the cotton works in Zambrowa thus:
We were deeply affected by the kind of frustration experienced by those who

suddenly had to face the gulf between theory and practice, by those who
expected to see happiness and instead witnessed injustice.
The authors went on to describe a half-finished industrial plant

equipped with outdated machinery, brutal working conditions, and
several thousand men and women living in crowded dormitories. The
sanitary conditions were so bad that almost two-thirds of the workforce
complained of lice. Many of the young women earned between 400 and 600
14
Cited in "Polska proba," pp. 166-167.
15
Emphasis added. Cited in ibid., p. 167.
- 120 -
zlotys, and after paying for their board and lodgings, they were left
with a mere 20 zlotys.16
The central authorities were aware of the desperate conditions
faced by many workers. According to information gathered by the KC
organization department:
18,000 young people work in the collective farms in the Koszalin region.
Very often they live in difficult conditions. The average wage stood
between 280 and 4,500 zlotys in the winter. Only those working in animal
husbandry earned more. After having paid for the food in the canteen, the
workers were left with just two or three zlotys, but sometimes the cost of
food exceeded wages...There are only four spoons and forks for fifteen
people...In Nowosilka there are only two plates for ten people and the
17
workers often have their meals...outdoors.
The hardships faced by Poland's workers contrasted sharply with

the privileges enjoyed by the Party apparatus -- a topic covered with
enthusiasm by the extraordinarily reform-minded Polish press. An
article in Nowa Kultura, entitled "The speech delivered at the opening
of a new special shop in Mokotowska Street in Warsaw," unconditionally
condemned the privileges of the few:
Who will become loyal other than a person given a substantial meal without
much effort on his part? Who will follow every new slogan other than those
who...shall have access to a special shop? By shielding our best men against
the sentiments often expressed in a queue at a meat store, we ensure their
unwavering attitude and readiness to follow every order. They are like the
Praetorian Guard, separated form society, but vital for the struggle against
deviations. Our great teacher Karl Marx said: "Being determines con-
sciousness." The special and well supplied store, devoid of queues,
guarantees the cast-iron consciousness of our activists and makes them
18
immune to the urgent demands made by a frenzied mob.
A series of commentaries on economic waste and managerial

responsibility were also published by Po prostu. The leading article,
entitled "The pit of millions," discussed the management style of the
Rosa Luxemburg Auto Plant in Warsaw. The catalog of billions of wasted
zlotys was almost endless:
These are painful and alarming problems, even more so because those billions
had been lost for ever. Those losses had been paid for by the sacrifices
made by every working man, by countless personal tragedies, by the most
treasured of all things -- health. Who can count all those suffering from
tuberculosis, caused by inadequate housing, poor food, and deficient safety
regulations? We think that the time has come to find those responsible for
the sorry state of our economy. And it is not simply a matter of
16
Jerzy Ambromozwiewicz and Ryszard Wisniowski, Po Prostu (27 November 1955). See
also the articles in Wladyka, Na czolowce; and Urban, Po Prostu, 1955-1956.
17
18
Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz, Nowa Kultura, no. 15 (1956).
- 121 -
self-criticism. We are of the opinion that those people should be punished.

If a worker gets several years of imprisonment for stealing a screw, what
kind of a sentence could be passed for wasting billions?...The huge financial
losses involved force us to reject the thesis propagated by some activists
that we are dealing simply with errors and deviations committed in an
otherwise correct economic system. The lost billions force us to take a
completely opposite view. Our system was not correct. It was far from
ideal...our economic system was wrong and harmful to the interests of the
people, and the so-called deviations were its natural, immanent result.
The authors were keenly aware of the resistance to reform within the
Party apparatus:
this system has produced a social stratum consisting of people ready to

defend it to the bitter end. After all, their own vested interests are at
stake...We are facing a struggle not only in the economic sphere, but also
a struggle against certain individuals who support the existing system and
19
who are singularly interested in its preservation.
The uncompromising tone of the press debates on the state of the

economy set the stage for the II Congress of Polish Economists, which
took place in Warsaw between 7-9 June 1956. The Congress was attended
by some 800 academics, industrialists, and other economic
administrators. 20 The participation of leading functionaries who
directed the economy throughout the Six-Year Plan, particularly plant
managers, ensured that the condemnations of the Stalinist system voiced
earlier by such groups as the writers and historians were not emulated
by the Congress delegates.
None the less the academics at the Congress did prepared the ground
for more candid appraisals of the economy during the coming years.
Oskar Lange denounced the retreat from a scientific approach to
socialist construction:
In the absence of a Marxist analysis the subjective, voluntarist approach

reared its ugly head. Policies based on Marxism had been replaced by
21
appeals, moralising, and an administrative command system.
Although Lange embraced the 'achievements' of the Six-Year Plan, he

stressed the extremely uneven distribution of wealth, incomes, and
economic growth.
Other economists also blamed the crisis on the burdensome 'bureau-
cratization' of the economy, which strangled the flow of reliable data
about the progress and effects of the Plan as well as information about
19
Emphasis added. Wlodzimierz Godek and Ryszard Turski, Po prostu (1 May 1956).
20
Other prominent discussants included Edward Lipinski, who was elected President
of the Polish Society of Economists, Michal Kalecki, Bronislaw Minc, Wlodzimierz Brus,
and Stefan Kurowski.
21
- 122 -
technical innovations. They argued that the inflexibility of economic

managers, a preference for moral and political appeals at the expense
of economic laws, and the universal application of administrative
decrees effectively blocked the 'normal' development of socialism.
The economists appealed to the government to create a special Economic
Council of experts directed by the Prime Minister, with a mandate to
recommend extensive reforms to the economic system.
SUMMARY
The actual systemic changes introduced by the Ochab regime were
extremely modest, especially when compared to the expectations
engendered by the press.22 The Party leadership also faced problems
with the preparations for the new Five-Year Plan as well as consider-
able external pressures, especially the repayment schedule for the
credits granted to Poland by the Soviet Union. Ochab recently
described the pressures put on the Polish economy by the CMEA over
Poland's declining coal exports:
In June 1956 I went to Moscow to attend a meeting of the CMEA. [Erno] Gero
made a fiery speech in which he attacked the Polish leadership for lacking
the spirit of international solidarity. He was presumably instructed to
say this...Pravda had run an article about how a Soviet journalist had been
making the rounds of Polish mines and all the miners were surprised at their
low output, because they could be mining more...[Walter] Ulbricht, and then
[Antoni] Novotny as well, launched an attack on the Polish delegation to
the effect that the Poles didn't want to provide coal and were forgetting
internationalism...I pointed out to our comrades...that we were better able
than they and their most distinguished correspondents to say what Poland
could provide and what it couldn't...[As Hoxha later put it] Ochab came out
with a fundamental objection: you want Polish coal, give us some money for
23
investment.
One of the most poorly conceived reforms concerned the

leadership's decision to adopt a two-year plan to adjust and regulate
wage policies. Ochab announced at the April conference of the Warsaw
Party aktiv that a total of 2.5 billion zlotys had been earmarked for
wage increases to farm labourers as well as industrial and white collar
workers, while 275 million zlotys had been allocated for pensions. The
increases in wages and pensions were relatively small and inadequately
distributed. They were also followed by a string of decrees aimed to
increase productivity, including the introduction of new production
22
A joint resolution of the KC and the Council of Ministers on 19 April introduced
a plan to widen the prerogatives of managing directors, but on 25 May, Trybuna Ludu admitted
that the authorities had not yet prepared the decree.
23
- 123 -
norms and proclamations on discipline at the workplace. The informa-

tion package on wage increases issued by the leadership to the Party
apparat declared:
In many areas of the economy one can feel the growing pressure to increase
wages. It is perfectly natural that people are concerned about their
earnings...Some social groups have high hopes regarding the moves being
currently prepared by the KC and the government. But it is also necessary
to realise that those moves are not exclusively dependent on the government.
They are inextricably tied to the quality of work and the economic results
24
achieved by our enterprises.
The consequences of the leadership's decisions on economic

matters were presented in a report submitted to the KC from the
Stalinograd region on 14 June. It referred to "open manifestations"
by the miners of Ruda Slask after the minster of mines outlined the wage
increases to miners in a published address. Franciszek Waniolka
suggested in his speech that the lowest wage of a miner rose to 1100
zlotys, but the actual increase never exceeded 900 zlotys. According
to the 14 June report:
The miners are saying that the wage increase is a sham. A miner from one
pit simply said: "Stop lying to us. Before the war, in a capitalist mine,
I could have bought 6 kg of lard for a day's wage. Today...I can only buy
1 kg of lard. One of the managers got beaten up here, and at another pit
25
workers thrashed the manager responsible for mining production."
The Six-Year Plan increased the tempo of industrialization and

modernized the social structure in Poland, but it also planted the seeds
of widespread social discontent. Stalinist economic planning brought
with it about 1.5 million unskilled workers, most of whom worked on
construction sites. Almost 2 million peasants migrated from the
countryside to the towns and cities. In six years the proportion of
urban to rural population increased some 36:64 to 44:56 by the end of
1955. The size of Poland's working class rose by about 1.5 to 4 million,
while the increase in the number of employees in the state sector grew
from 4 to 6.5 million.26 But the relentless pace of industrialization
also produced massive social dislocation.
Brus has suggested that economic growth during the Stalinist years
"brought about some spectacular achievements, particularly when
measured against prewar performance." He added:
24
25
ibid.
26
- 124 -
However, even the overall results must have been less striking in the
peoples' democracies than in the USSR in the thirties...Even in Poland, where
industrial production...was above the planned level, more than half of
industrial products in physical terms...were well under the planned
level...The results reflected clearly the privileged position of heavy
industry, and particulary the armament industry, which skimmed all the cream
off the economy...[and] the neglect of the consumer-goods industry was enor-
mous...What is more, the contrast was seen as between the American Marshal
Plan and the policy of the Soviet Union, which not only imposed on the
peoples' democracies a disadvantageous industrial and foreign-trade
27
pattern, but clearly exploited most of the countries in a direct way.
A decade of working class helplessness and failed promises

generated absenteeism, the illegal changing of jobs, and the evasion
or outright falsification of production norms as well as other economic
orders and decrees. The system of so-called 'socialist completion' --
the Soviet stakhanovite strategy -- had been openly mocked and often
displaced by shoddy labour and quality control. Plant equipment and
other materials were neglected and, as Pelczynski put it, "anything that
could be was stolen and sold on the black market."28 The economic crisis
also provoked working class anger, which culminated in the Poznan revolt
of 28 June.
In November 1956, Wincenty Krasko, the Party's propaganda chief
in Poznan, characterized the workers' protest thus:
While the intelligentsia rejected the personality cult almost solely in

debates and polemics, the working class expressed its hatred of the system
by using traditional and much more direct methods: strikes and street
29
demonstrations.
Sociologist Jozef Chalasinski wrote in 1958 that the working class

revolted "not only against the isolation of the Party and government
leaders from the masses, but also against the isolation of the masses
from the intelligentsia, who propagated socialism."30
27
Brus in Tucker, op. cit., pp. 253-254.
28
29
Cited in Jan Sandorski, "Procesy poznanskie z 1956 roku: Watpliwosci, polemiki,
klimaty" in Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, ed., Poznanski Czerwiec 1956
(Poznan, 1981), p. 192.
30
Chalasinski, Przeszlosc i przyszlosc inteligencji polskiej (Warsaw, 1958), p. 15.
CHAPTER TEN
THE POZNAN REVOLT
Poznan was the fourth largest city in Poland and had a population
of approximately 375,000 in 1956. At the city's ZISPO Plant, also known
as the Cegielski Plant, the workers presented their grievances to the
trade union at numerous production meetings throughout May and June.1
When the trade union functionaries did not act on the complaints, the
workers delivered their demands in a series of letters to the
management. No one responded to the peaceful acts of protests.
Discontent increased during a number of clamorous mass meetings held
by the workers and culminated in a short work stoppage. The Poznan KW
First Secretary, Leon Stasiak, the chairman of the local council, and
a representative of the CRZZ visited the plant on 20 June. They made
a series of promises, but again nothing changed.
The Cegielski workers then decided to elect a delegation of seven-
teen workers to take their demands to Warsaw. The delegates arrived
in Warsaw on 26 June and presented their grievances to the Main Director-
ate of the Steel Workers Union as well as officials at the Ministry of
Machine Industry. The functionaries in Warsaw appeared to be
sympathetic to the plight of the workers. Machine industry minister
Roman Fidelski and his deputy accompanied CRZZ chairman Wiktor
Klosiewicz to the ZISPO Plant on 27 June. During a rather acrimonious
discussion with the workers, however, Klosiewicz and Fidelski also
failed to give calm the workforce. The Cegielski workers finally
decided to take matters into their own hands.
When the sirens at the ZISPO Plant sounded at 6:30 am on 28 June,
they marked the start of Poland's first major postwar strike by the
industrial working class.2 The workers on night-shift from factory W-3
had just completed their rotation, when they met the replacement shift
at the main gate. Workers from other divisions inside the Plant soon
joined the W-3 strikers. 3 The day of the strike had been chosen
1
See Aleksander Ziemkowski, "Proba chronologicznej rekonstrukcji
wydarzen" in Maciejewski and Trojanowicz, op. cit., pp. 56-110.
2
ibid. See also -- the source for all the statistics cited -- Andrzej
Choniawko, "Przebieg wydarzen czerwcowych" in Makowski, op. cit., pp. 29-71; his
PZPR w Wielkopolsce, 1948-1984 (Poznan, 1987), pp. 100-117; Czubinski, Czerwiec
1956 w poznaniu (Poznan, 1986); Ptasinski, Wydarzenia Poznanskie, Czerwiec 1956
(Warsaw, 1986); and "Poznan 1956: Chronologia wydarzen," W sluzbie narodu, no.
25 (1981).
3
W-3 employed over 2,200 people, including some 2,000 workers. The PZPR
counted 670 candidates and members at W-3 on the day of the strike.
- 126 -
carefully by the Cegielski workers. The city was hosting the Poznan
International Trade Fair and the protest took place before the eyes of
foreign businessmen and journalists.4
THE STRIKE BEGINS

The factory gates were opened at 7:30 am and the ZISPO workers
began to march down Dzierzynski Street. The strikers formed a huge
column of approximately 4,000 workers and proceeded to march towards
Stalin Square.5 At the head of the column the strikers carried the
Polish national flag and a poster which read: "WE WANT BREAD." A
loudspeaker van moved alongside the demonstrators and called on the
public to embrace the procession. Their demands were economic: wage
increases and lower food prices. Workers from nearby factories and
enterprises as well as people travelling to work joined the growing
column. Smaller groups of workers from the Cegielski Plant went to
other large industrial enterprises in the city, such as the Poznan Rail-
way Engineering Plant and the regional transport headquarters, to
enlist wider support for the strike.6
News of the strike spread quickly throughout Poznan. At 9:00 am,
thousands of strikers and others poured into the city centre, near the
City Council and the Provincial Party headquarters. More people joined
the protest over the next two-hours. The total number of people at
Stalin Square quickly passed 100,000. As the Cegielski strike evolved
into a city-wide demonstration, the character of the protest shifted.
The large crowd demanded to meet representatives from the highest Party
and state authorities. The call for bread changed to a demand for
freedom. The new slogan became: "BREAD AND FREEDOM." People began
to sing the national anthem, patriotic songs, and religious hymns.
Their chants also reflected the evolving nature of the demonstration:
"Free elections under the UN!" "Free Poland!" "Out with the Russians!"
4
Party executives at the Cegielski Works notified Stanislaw Piasecki, the
Poznan KM Secretary, of the strike. He transmitted the information to the
Provincial Party leaders.
5
Between 130-150 Cegielski employees remained at work, including 120 PZPR
members. Of the 89 Party executives at the Plant, 46 joined the strike. Over
80% of the Cegielski workforce participated in the strike and the three mile march
to the city centre.
6
From a total of 1,420 regional transport workers on the first shift, only
157 stayed on the job, including 49 of the 294 PZPR members.
- 127 -
"Down with the Bolsheviks!" "Freedom for Primate Wyszynski!" The

strike against economic exploitation and poor living standards, quickly
became a manifestation against the Party and government. The cheerful
atmosphere turned into anger. A group of protestors at the main gate
of the square began to chant: "Free the innocent prisoners!"
Local Party activists and Leon Stasiak attempted to stop more
protestors from reaching the main square, but they failed. In front
of the Poznan citadel, Franciszek Frackowiak, the chairman of the City
Council, desperately announced that he would hold talks in his office
with a delegation representing the Cegielski workers. A group of
workers and others, standing near Frackowiak, were thrust forward to
represent the protestors. The delegation included a student at the
Poznan Polytechnic -- Tadeusz Bieniek, who spontaneously became their
'leader'.7 The workers presented Frackowiak with demands for higher
wages, lower food (and other commodity) prices, and a radical revision
to the production quotas.
Frackowiak, shocked and confused, pleaded with the workers that
he was not in any position to negotiate such matters. The frustrated
delegates left Frackowiak's office. The protestors then demanded to
hold talks with Ochab or Cyrankiewicz. There was no actual leadership
at this mass demonstration, and no one made any preparations for the
events that followed. Even the ZISPO workers found themselves lost in
the crowd. The protestors were swayed by a series of impromptu speakers
who spoke to the crowd from a swiftly constructed platform. Most of
the speakers condemned the trade unions, the government, the Party, and
the Russians. At the same time, a constant murmur of rumours spread
through the crowd, occasionally capturing the imagination of the
protestors.
Wincenty Krasko, the propaganda chief, tried to speak to the
protestors on two occasions, but he faced a barrage of indignant
whistles and shouts. The local authorities promised that the demands
of the strikers would be sent to the central authorities. Someone in
the crowd then shouted that the delegation of Cegielski workers sent
to Warsaw on 27 June had been arrested by the local Militia. The
allegation electrified the demonstrators. The manifestation also
acquired a clear objective. The ZISPO strike was transformed once
again.
7
Bieniek was also a PZPR member and ZMP activists.
- 128 -
One group of protestors pushed their way into the City Council
building and the Provincial Party headquarters. Although three
lorries of Militiamen appeared on the square, they merely watched the
demonstration. Another group of several thousand protestors, shouting
"Free the prisoners!" marched towards the Mylanska Street prison in
order to 'release' their comrades. The demonstrators entered the
premises, set free the inmates, and disarmed the guards.8 Within a few
hours, the prison armoury was stripped of all weapons and ammunition.
The arms were dispersed among the angry demonstrators. Another group
of protestors took over the Regional Court of Justice and proceeded to
destroy all the files and documents. They also smashed electronic
equipment, suspecting it might be a radio-jamming station.9
The most portentous incident took place in Kochanowski Street at
the Provincial Security Office. A group of about 200 demonstrators,
shouting "Down with the secret police!" concluded that their colleagues
were being held by the security organs. The UB functionaries, however,
refused to surrender their headquarters. The protestors -- a number
of them carrying the weapons seized at the prison armoury -- decided
to storm the building. The first shots were fired around 11:00 am, but
it has not been established who fired first. A boy of thirteen became
one of the first victim of 'Black Thursday'. Chalasinski, the
University of Lodz sociologist, described the tragedy at the subsequent
show trials of the so-called 'hooligans' as follows:
The psychological foundations of the manifestation had been influenced very

early on, but the news that the UB had started shooting children activated
the still fresh memories of the lawlessness and tortures of the past
period...The cruelty of the shot that wounded a female tram driver in front
of the UB building and the killing of the boy who took a banner from her
hands, intensified moral revulsion to its breaking point and led to the fire
being returned by the protestors. I do not want to say that cruelty existed
only on one side of the barricade. The tragedy of the events was shared
10
by all those involved in them.
The seige of the Poznan Security Office was still in progress when
a company of cadets from the Tank and Armoured Infantry School appeared
8
257 inmates had been freed, but 5 refused to leave. At the end of July
about 55 prisoners still remained at-large.
9
After the prison was attacked, the role of persons aged 15-20 years grew
sharply.
10
"Stanalem wobec Wysokiego Sadu jako polski uczony...Odtworzony na
podstawie zapisku magnetofonowego fragment 'pocesu dziesieciu' z dnia 15
pazdziernika 1956 roku z wystapieniem profesora Jozefa Chalasinskiego" in
Maciejewski and Trojanowicz, op. cit., pp. 392.
- 129 -
in the city. These soldiers arrived with orders not to use their
weapons. At about 2:00 pm, seasoned troops of the Nineteenth Armoured
Division of the IV Corps of the Silesian Army, more cadets from the Tank
School, KBW units, and Militia reinforcements, entered Poznan with a
mandate to bring order to the city -- at all costs. That same evening
thousands of fresh troops entered Poznan. Late in the afternoon of 29
June tens of thousands of army regulars crushed the stubborn resistance
and brought the so-called 'Poznan events' to a close.
The protest by the workers of Poznan became a tragic blood-bath.
Mostly unarmed and pursued by the army and KBW troops, thousands of
demonstrators moved randomly about the city streets over a period of
twenty-four hours -- overturning trucks and trams, building barricades,
and attacking uniformed Militiamen. The homes of known UB
11
functionaries were also demolished. Some of those who rioted had been
armed, while others searched for guns and ammunition. 12 The riots
consisted of a series of fierce and largely unorganized attacks against
the symbols of oppression.13 The demonstrators stormed the Provincial
Party headquarters, the prison, the courts, and the Security Office,
but none of them attempt to seize control of strategic points in the
city. The airport, the railway station, and the telephone exchange
remained untouched. The Poznan revolt lacked coherent leadership and
the organizers of the ZISPO strike had no control over the riots.14
11
According to all eye-witness accounts of the Poznan riots, the incidents
of looting had been minimal. No bank or jewellery stores were reported to have
been attacked by the crowd.
12
The authorities claimed to have confiscated about 400 small arms, although
this figure is probably an exaggeration.
13
For details on the importance of symbolic objects of repression during
civil unrest see Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World
Politics (January 1968).
14
Similar conclusions were reached by two Trybuna Ludu journalists, Roman
Jurys and Krzysztof Wolicki, who witnessed the events and prepared a confidential
report for the Politburo. See "Notatce dla Biura Politycznego KC PZPR (29 VI
1956)," CA KC PZPR, 237/V-274; and "Polska proba," p. 300, endnote no. 7.
- 130 -
THE DECISION TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION

The decisions and actions taken by the authorities can be
reconstructed only partially. It is known that Stasiak informed Ochab
of the strikes at 7:00 am on 28 June. The Politburo did not gather until
10:00 am. No decision was made to open a dialogue with the
demonstrators while the situation remained peaceful. According Party
historian to Andrzej Choniawko, the local authorities pressed for such
a solution.15 The Politburo waited for the first sign of violence in
Poznan and then concluded that a political solution was out of the
question.
The Buro's determination to use military force was strongly
recommended by Marshal Rokossowski. As Ochab recently put it:
[Rokossowski] suggested using army units against the armed hooligans who
were attacking state offices. He also asked to be given a free hand and
said he would take care of everything. I agreed, because we had to act
quickly. My decision was accepted by the Politburo. But in the end
Rokossowski didn't do a very good job of taking care of things; he got
together several army divisions and set off to attack Poznan, and he brought
in too many troops, far too many. It should have been dome more calmly and
16
more quickly.
The leadership also decided to dispatch Cyrankiewicz, Klosiewicz,

Morawski, and Gierek to Poznan.17
Rokossowski selected the commander of the land forces, General
Poplawski, to direct the military operation. The Buro's delegation as
well as Poplawski and his staff arrived in Poznan at noon. The entire
campaign was directed from the airport. Until the arrival of the
Cyrankiewicz delegation and Poplawski, the Poznan KBW, Militia, and the
prison guards, were forbidden to use their weapons. The decision to
defend the building housing the Security Office had been taken by the
security apparatus in Warsaw. Poplawski gave the local KBW commander
Colonel Jozef Lipinski the order to suppress the demonstrations by force
at 1:30 pm.18
The PZPR leadership was taken by surprise by the strikes and
demonstrations. The Politburo first abandoned the local Party
officials and then transferred complete control of the situation to the
15
Choniawko, "Przebieg wydarzen czerwcowych," p. 38.
16
17
Gierek had set off for Poznan immediately after hearing the first news
of the disturbances.
18
For further details on the military operation see the recollections of
Poland's KBW commander in June 1956, General Wlodzimierz Mus, "Z tamtej strony
barakady," Polityka (26 June 1982).
- 131 -
military. The entire operation in Poznan was treated by the political

and military authorities as a counter-revolution, inspired and led by
'imperialist agents'.19 Immediately after Poplawski gained control of
the city centre, the organizers and leading participants of the
Cegielski strike and the demonstration at Stalin Square were rounded
up and detained by the security forces.20
The exact number of dead may never be known, but there were no
fewer than 74 fatalities; the overwhelming majority civilian
casualties.21 In addition, between six and seven hundred people were
either wounded or injured.22 Some 456 individuals were detained by the
security forces from 28 June until 2 July. A further 303 persons had
been arrested on July 5, including 197 workers, 5 students, and 51 people
without full-time employment. The arrests continued on a sporadic
basis for another two-weeks. The overwhelming majority of those
detained and questioned were under twenty-one years of age and included
10 PZPR candidates or members and 38 ZMP activists. By the end of July
the UB detained a total of 658 persons and the MO detained 88 people.23
The revolt revealed the complete unpreparedness of the local and
national authorities, while the Party's reaction exposed the ruthless-
ness of the regime.
THE FIRST OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE 'POZNAN EVENTS'

The PZPR's main concern immediately after the military clampdown
was to explain the workers' revolt in a 'socialist' state. The first
official version blamed the entire incident on 'imperialist plots' and
argued that the working class had supported the military crackdown.
The PAP communique of 29 June proclaimed:
On 28 June enemy agents succeeded in provoking street riots. Certain public

buildings came under attack, which led to a loss of life. The authorities
19
ibid.; and Interview with Ochab in Toranska, p. 59.
20
About 5-10% of the workers in Poznan's main factories stayed away or had
been prevented from resuming their jobs after 30 June. See Choniawko, PZPR w
Wielkopolsce, p. 109.
21
See "Lista zabitych" in Maciejewski and Trojanowicz, op. cit., pp. 94-98.
22
According to official data published by the regime, 51 people died in the
fighting, including 3 militiamen, one KBW soldier, and one cadet from the Tank
School; the remainder were civilian casualties, including 32 workers. In
addition, 575 people suffered bullet wounds.
23
On the subsequent show trials see Sandorski, "Procesy poznanskie z 1956
roku. Tezy obrony i oskarzenia" in Makowski, op. cit., pp. 72-117; and
Maciejewski and Trojanowicz, op. cit., pp. 94-141 and 312-338. The trials began
on 27 September and the authorities claimed -- without justification -- that only
'hooligans' had been charged in order to falsify the true character of the revolt.
- 132 -
together with the politically-mature sections of the working class brought

24
the situation under control and restored order in the city.
The views of the Party leadership were expressed by Cyrankiewicz in his

radio broadcast from Poznan on the evening of 29 June:
Every provocateur or madman who dares to raise his hand against the peoples'
power must be certain that the authorities will cut off his hand in the
interest of the working class, in the interest of the toiling peasantry and
the intelligentsia, in the interest of raising the living standards of the
population, in the interest of the further democratization of our life, in
25
the interest of our Fatherland.
The Politburo's letter of 29 June, addressed to all Party

activists, contained a similar interpretation of events:
The attitude of the Party members towards this provocation serves as a litmus
test of their political awareness, of their true character as soldiers of
the peoples' power and socialism. Every Party member must show unwavering
resolve in his struggle against all hostile subversive actions. You must
immediately act against all provocations in the factories. You must unmask
all attempts to organize work stoppages...You must neutralize all the
rumours with which the enemy is trying to destabilize the country. In all
conflicts you must exemplify your wisdom, determination, and calm. You must
show that you care about the workers. You must guard and guarantee the
smooth operation of our entire transport system, the railway network, shops,
services: in other words at all places of work in Poland. We shall not
allow the provocation to destroy the unity of the toiling masses and their
26
government.
The Soviet also blamed the Poznan revolt on the West and
'imperialist plots'. On 29 June, the Kremlin dispatched two warships
to Poland on the pretext of celebrating Navy and Merchant Marine Day.
The warships arrived at the port of Gdynia with Admiral W. Bakayev, the
Soviet minister of the navy, on 30 June and stayed until 1 July.27 Wolf-
gang Leonhard has already demonstrated, as Pelczynski put it, "that the
Soviet press, which had up to then been propagating destalinization,
abruptly changed its tone after the Poznan riots and began defending
the Soviet system against criticism."28
The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow wrote extensively in his journal
on 30 June about the Soviet reaction to the Poznan revolt:
24
Reproduced in ibid., p. 293.
25
ibid., p. 294. The hand alluded to by Cyrankiewicz was the symbol of
imperialism, which strangled the proletarian masses, used on a countless number
of posters throughout the Stalinist years.
26
"List Biura Politicznego do czlonkow partii z 29 VI 1956," CA KC PZPR,"
237/B 64580.
27
"1956 czerwiec 29, Moskwa -- Nota Ministerstwa spraw Zagranicznych ZSSR
do Ambasady PRL w Moskwie w sprawie wyslania do Gdyni dwoch radzieckich okretow
wojennych na obchody Swieta Morza w Polsce," Dokumenty i materialy do historii
stosunkow Polsko-Radzieckich, vol. X, p. 48.
28
Pelczynski in Leslie, op. cit., p. 351. See also the press analysis by
Leonhard, op. cit., p. 209; and Zinner, National Communism, pp. 126-142.
- 133 -
The events in Poland came as a great shock to the Russians. They see
in this the beginning of the counterrevolution which, as they put it here,
the West, led by the United States, has organized with the object of splitting
the "camp" and separating Poland and the other socialist states from the
Soviet Union. We have not been able to find anybody among the Russians who
interpret the bloodshed in Poznan otherwise that as an "imperialist plot."
None of the officials associates the Poles' discontent with the regime which
Stalin imposed on Poland. You can even hear comments in Moscow to the effect
that the people responsible are those who condemned Stalin.
One should not be surprised...After all, Khrushchev himself recently
adopted a similar position when he threatened the Poles, accused them of
wanting to "go to the West," and warned everyone in Poland and in the "camp"
as a whole not to try and change the present relations. The preservation
of the "camp" and Soviet domination over it is an imperative of the new Soviet
foreign policy as it was of the old one. The policy of de-Stalinization
does not only not permit the disintegration of the "camp"; it counts on its
further consolidation.
In the view of the Soviet leaders the policy of de-Stalinization is
strictly an internal affair of the Soviet party and government, actually
of the Presidium of the party, which measures out doses of the new political
medicine like a pharmacist. But for three months now they have not been
29
able to hit on the right amount and they keep on writing new prescriptions.
The Poznan demonstrations persuaded the Soviets and especially

Khrushchev of the need for stricter control over the de-Stalinization
process in Poland.
THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND SOCIETY REACTS

At the Politburo meeting of 30 June, the leadership resolved to
"organize meetings of workers in all large industrial enterprises. The
resolutions passed by those meetings are going to condemn the Poznan
events." 30 The PZPR POP's prepared the meetings and drafted the
appropriate resolutions. But not all the meetings went according to
plan. Workers at the armoured vehicle division of the Poznan Auto Plant
rejected the PZPR resolution in its entirety. Out of the 70 workers
and engineers at the design division of the auto factory, 30 refused
to sign the Party's text. Not a single ZMP activists at the factory
supported the motion attacking the Poznan revolt. During some of the
meetings in Lodz, the anti-Poznan motions had passed in utter silence.
At the Harnama factory only the chairwoman of the ZMP committee made
a speech in favour of the PZPR resolution.31
A resolution passed by the employees of Poznan university stated:
We the undersigned fully support the workers of Poznan and their justified
economic demands. We demand that those who are guilty of abusing the vital
interests of the working class be punished. We also demand the punishment
of those guilty of publishing false information and misleading society. We
29
Emphasis added. Micunovic, op. cit., 30 June 1956, pp. 76-77.
30
31
ibid., p. 185.
- 134 -
demand the full truth about the situation in Poznan and the rest of the
country.
The resolution adopted by the Party activists at the State Scientific

Publishing House declared:
Poor living standards among the working class, coupled with the recently
revealed errors, and incompetence and wastage in the national economy demand
reforms. The trust earned by our Party's bold disclosures and criticisms
of past mistakes is being squandered because of the absence of a coherent
32
plan for economic reforms.
Many work stoppages in support of the Poznan workers also took

place in Poland throughout the month of July. Protests by construction
workers took place in Nowy Tych, Dabrowa Gornicza and Chorzow, at the
steam-engine depots of Kielce, Sedziszow, Szczecin and Gdansk, at the
Celwiskoza Plant in Wroclaw, and many other places. 33 Using the
Cegielski example, Poland's working class began to elect trade union
delegates who promised to deliver workers' demands to the Party
authorities.
The Poznan revolt truly shook Polish society and the PZPR.34 Even
members of the Militia were reported in 1956 to have resigned "in droves"
from the MO. 35 The atmosphere in the armed forces was also tense.
Czeslaw Mojsiewicz recalled in 1957:
We in the army felt very deeply about Poznan, deeper than anyone else in
fact. First of all we had been directly involved in those events. For us
it was a violent shock. The servicemen could not come to terms with the
use of the army against ordinary people. They could not explain it to
36
themselves.
Almost no one in Poland accepted the PZPR's self-serving explanation

of the Poznan revolt.
The Politburo resolved on 29 June "to carry out a deeper analysis
of the causes of the Poznan events." The following day, the Buro
received the military report on the Poznan action. According to
Poplawski:
the turn of events clearly pointed to a hostile action carried out by the
enemy. An underground decision-making centre orchestrated and directed the
revolt. German made weapons had been used.
32
Cited in ibid., p. 185.
33
ibid.
34
On the hostile reaction by the Party's rank-and-file to the military
response in Poznan see Kuzinski, op. cit.
35
See the discussion on the Poznan events in W sluzbie narodu, no. 31 (1965).
36
Mojsiewicz, "Tak to bylo," Nowa Kultura (20 October 1957).
- 135 -
The leadership was not satisfied with Poplawski's crude interpretation

and decided instead to dispatch a commission "to become thoroughly
informed about causes of the revolt and to prepare an analysis of the
current situation in Poznan." 37 The commission stayed in Poznan
between 2 and 6 July and included Klosiewicz, Stefan Misiaszek, and
Gierek, who headed the delegation.
While the Poznan commission was formulating its findings, on 3
July the Politburo prepared its own draft evaluation of the revolt.
Their appraisal focused on three points:
The Poznan events had been caused by 1) discontent of certain sections of

the working class, by deformations in the economic policy of the state, by
the bureaucratic attitude towards problems and grievances of the workers,
by voluntarism, and unacceptable decisions made by some department directors
and ministries. Those feelings of discontent had been exploited by the
class enemy. 2) Errors and deformations in the ideological and political
work, the bureaucratization of many Party organs and the fact that a part
of the apparatus had fallen prey to hostile ideology. Errors and deforma-
tions in the propaganda work of many newspapers and cultural journals
provided a breeding ground for hostile feelings and views. By abusing the
right to criticise, especially after the XX Congress, some newspapers under-
mined the authority of the Party and state leaders. 3) The de-mobilization
of the security apparatus and a lack of vigilance helped the enemy in
38
surprising the masses.
Even before the Gierek report was completed, the official Polish version
of the Poznan revolt equally emphasized the discontent of the workers,
errors in the Party's political work, and the hostile activities of the
West.
THE GIEREK REPORT

The Gierek report concluded that foreign intervention had been
at the root of the Poznan revolt:
As a result of careful study of all the facts, combined with many eye-witness
accounts and numerous meetings with Party and trade union activists, one
has to conclude that the Poznan events were of a hostile, anti-people nature.
They were a manifestation of subversive activities and of political
provocation engineered and coordinated by an enemy centre. The place and
timing of those events, together with direction of the enemy's attack and
the methods and tactics used, confirm in full the thesis that our enemy had
for some time been preparing for the Poznan subversion in order to exploit
the International Fair by utilising the discontent of the workers of
39
Poznan.
37
From the Politburo protocols as cited in "Polska proba," p. 186.
38
Cited in ibid., pp. 186-187.
39
See the report in Rykowski and Wladyka, "Poznan '56: Raport Gierka,"
Polityka (9 January 1988).
- 136 -
The commission also argued that the provocation succeeded because "the
feelings of discontent have been growing in Poznan's factories for quite
some time as a result of the economic situation of the workers." The
report noted "the long-standing deafness of the economic administration
to the justified grievances and demands made by the workers" and "the
ill-thought out decisions regarding wages which have been made in the
last few months." But the report suggested that the workers' demands
were "constantly reinforced by hostile elements coming up with yet new
demands, which were impossible to meet."
The report went on to criticized the security forces for gathering
poor intelligence on the situation in Poznan:
The lack of intelligence prevented the repulsion of the enemy attacks and
was the main cause of the Party leadership's surprise at the scale and
audacity of the subversion. It made the hostile elements more bold.
On the local Party organization in Poznan, the report found that
many of the rank-and-file members and even some activists had not only
expressed solidarity with the strikers, but also took part in organizing
work stoppages. The strike theory, as a legitimate weapon of the working
class in socialism, had become more popular throughout the Party...Some
basic Party organizations participated in the street demonstrations of 28
June and certain Party activists became engaged in hostile agitation, some
even led the disturbances.
On the ZMP, the commission concluded:
The majority of the ZMP activists and other youths took part in the
demonstration. Some of them even participated in the riots and the
destruction of state buildings. Many young people took part in armed combat
against the people's power during the first as well as the second day of
the events, although it was difficult to distinguish between ZMP members
and other, non-organized youths.
The trade unions, the commission submitted, "had completely lost their
influence over the workforce; many trade union activists participated
in organizing strike actions in their factories."
The report also blamed the pace of change in Poland on the
disturbances in Poznan:
It would be correct to suggest that one of the basic causes of the

de-mobilization and disorientation of the Poznan Party organization is the
overall situation in the country and within the Party. Basic Party
organizations were not prepared to receive and correctly understand the
speech of Comrade Khrushchev concerning the personality cult. His
revelations have deeply and painfully affected many Party activists, making
them despondent...Party organizations failed to understand the nature of
democratization correctly and appeared to be disorientated. Some speeches
of the members of the Party leadership, and in particular the numerous
articles in the press, have created the impression that the whole of our
past political and economic activity had been incorrect. Many Party
activists did not know who to believe. Many of them misunderstood the
- 137 -
democratization campaign, the return to the rule of law [and] the return
to Leninist norms in Party life...[This] has led to the lowering of Party
vigilance...against hostile utterances, camouflaged by the apparent concern
for the welfare of the workers; even an open retreat from socialism. Honest
Party workers and many non-Party members often blame the Party for allowing
the flood of unchecked criticism of the people's government and its economic
policies. They blame the Party for not replying to the attacks carried out
by the media, for leaving people in the dark about what is wrong and what
is right.
The report singled out Morawski for his lack of vigilance:
Many honest workers are blaming Comrade Morawski for not distancing himself
from the demagogic speeches made during his visit [of 30 June] to the ZISPO
plant, for agreeing with the critics and at the same time for not solving
the numerous genuine problems mentioned in his presence.
The Gierek commission made the following recommendations to the

Party elite: 1) an immediate plenary meeting of the Central Committee
in order to evaluate the Six-Year Plan; 2) a campaign to popularize the
Five-Year Plan and the moves to increase the living standards of the
working class; 3) a plan to draw upon financial reserves in order to
increase the real wages of low-income families; 3) an end to price rises;
4) the immediate payment of coal allowances, an end to the tax disputes,
and the delivery of protective clothing to the industrial workers. The
commission also called for greater progress towards the "decentra-
lization of economic management" and "an expanded role for the workers
over production, including the participation of workers in the
distribution of profits earned over and above the planned target."
The report concluded with a series of vague recommendations that
the Party strengthen its control over the media, consolidate the
internal security organs as well as the KBW, and "purge the Poznan Party
organization of alien and hostile elements."40 In short, the Gierek
report reflected the two main currents dividing the Party. The body
of the report was intended to satisfy the hardliners, who wanted to blame
the democratization campaign and its supporters for the Poznan revolt.
The recommendations in the report were aimed to appease the reformers,
who wanted to emphasize the economic and structural faults in the
system.
40
The Poznan provincial Party Control Commission reviewed the cases of 159
Party members and candidates. They decided to expel 56 activists, including 5
POP secretaries and 7 Party executives. About 18 different kinds of censures
were issued to the remainder. The greatest number of expulsions or censures had
been issued to Party activists employed at the Cegielski Works (mainly from
factory W-3) and the Railway Engineering Plant. See Choniawko, PZPR w
Wielkopolsce, pp. 110-111.
- 138 -
THE 7 JULY CONFERENCE OF KW FIRST SECRETARIES

The report on the 'Poznan events' was presented on 7 July by Gierek
to the conference of KW First Secretaries.41 The reform-minded provin-
cial Party secretaries stressed the economic causes of the workers'
revolt and emphasized that no region in Poland was immune to the problems
faced by the Poznan workers. Jozef Olszewski (Stalinograd/Katowice)
remarked:
It would be wrong to maintain that Poznan was a special case and that the
events that had taken place there could not have been repeated in other
places. It would be wrong to say that in the rest of the country the
situation was good and everything was all right. The level of discontent
among the working class is high. This applies also to the Silesian
region...We've got there almost 100,000 people earning less than 600 zlotys
[per month].42 Can this be a source of contentment and satisfaction?
He added that "the situation was explosive all over the place. We are
like firemen putting down one fire after another."
Tatarkowna-Majkowska (Lodz) agreed with Olszewski. She also
admitted that workers of Lodz suffered from a shortage of goods and
housing. But Tatarkowna-Majkowska was less impressed with Gierek's
suggestion that 'imperialist agents' planned the revolt:
If we are saying that the imperialists were behind those events we must show
them to the public. Otherwise we could end up in real trouble. In my
opinion, we should first consider our own economic foundations, which caused
those conditions and we should do something about it fast. If we do nothing
we risk a repetition of the riots in Warsaw, Lodz and Stalinograd.
All the KW First Secretaries were aware of the drastic economic

situation and of the growing social discontent that led to the Poznan
revolt, but the thesis of an "imperialist provocation" continued to
provided the entire Party elite with a convenient public excuse for the
PZPR's failures.
Wladyslaw Kruczek (Bydgoszcz) voiced an opinion popular with the
Party hardliners at the conference: "Our recent speeches have been
practically devoid of [Stalin's] thesis of the intensification of the
class struggle, despite the fact that this struggle has intensified
considerably over the last few months." He reminded the delegates that
a neglect of Stalin's thesis led to the emasculation of the security
apparatus at a time when the Party "called upon the KBW, the army and
its generals" to restore order. Kruczek went on:
41
"Protokol narad pierwszych sekretarzy Komitetow Wojewodzkich w 7 VII 1956
r.," CA KC PZPR, 237/V-237.
42
See the table in Gomulka, Sytuacja w partii i w kraju: Referat wygloszony
na X Plenum KC PZPR, 24 X 1957 (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 36-37.
- 139 -
I must say that not only the army but also the militia and the UB have been
demobilized. First, they had no weapons, and second, they had no bullets.
Their equipment was covered in grease and had to be cleaned. Because of
our decision to democratize and disarm...the UB officers had to clean their
weapons throughout the night to make them usable.
The press, however, became the main target of the hardliners at

the conference. They accused the media of creating an atmosphere of
social discontent, of undermining the authority of the government, and
of irresponsible criticism. Citing the comments of "honest workers,"
even Gierek said: "I would like to repeat what Comrade Misiaszek and
I heard at the ZISPO Plant. Workers told me that if we catch a
correspondent of Po Prostu in our factory he will be sorry." Kruczek
also attacked Po Prostu:
We have placed the assessment of our achievements in the hands of completely

untested people...Po Prostu is of course the leader of this smear
campaign...people are beginning to think that it is impossible to live under
socialism.
The debate then turned to the question of responsibility. Kruczek

continued: "In the country, popular opinion has divided the Party into
liberals and oppressors." "I would like to say that it is not right
that some comrades speak out in order to gain favour with public opinion.
Our role is to shape and influence those sentiments...Comrades Morawski
and Matwin do not enjoy a high opinion in the Party outside Warsaw."
Ochab was the last person to speak at the conference. His speech,
more than any other, reflected the fear and confusion experienced of
the Party leadership as a result of the workers' revolt. Ochab repeated
the usual arguments about the shortcomings of the Six-Year Plan,
emphasized the 'advances achieved' during the Stalinist years, and
attacked the press:
There is no doubt that when we speak of a 20% increase in real wages we are
close to the truth. It is immaterial to speculate on the exact figure: is
it 23% or 27%. I certainly cannot answer that question and I doubt that
anyone here can...We must, however, fight for the further development of
our industry and for the retention of our power. We must use all the means
available to us. We have allowed too great a liberalism in the treatment
of various rumour-mongers who were attempting to undermine our authority.
We failed to establish the limits of justified criticism. We allowed our
system to be attacked and defamed...The right-wing petty bourgeois
sentiments engulfed the country. The population remains under the
influence of various half-baked ideas peddled by the press. The numbers
of copies of those newspapers run into the millions. People trust those
papers thinking that they are our legal press. This in turn creates
confusion exploited by our enemies...We -- the Party leaders are responsible
for failing to unmask the petty bourgeois hoodlums influencing the tone of
many of our press organs.
- 140 -
Ochab demanded an end to "the shameful anti-Party and anti-state

campaign waged with determination by many of our press organs." He
suggested that journals such as Przeglad Kulturalny, Swiat, Po Prostu,
and sometimes Trybuna Ludu "sunk to the level of Radio Free Europe."
He then announced a series of restrictive measures against the press,
which were to be accompanied by radical personnel changes: "It is
possible that a lot of noise will be made about those changes, about
our retreat from reformist positions...We no not mind that. The main
thing is to avoid more blood-shed."
The First Secretary admitted that the press had not been the main
cause of the Poznan events, but he insisted it was the fuel that fed
the fire. Ochab also made a veiled plea for support from the reformers
in the Party:
What are they [the press] playing for? They are hoping to topple our
government, our leadership. They are not quite certain who should replace
the current leadership. They think that some of those clever 'passengers'
of Po Prostu or Przeglad Kulturalny could do it. But should they succeed
the new rulers would be those who now sing religious hymns and those who
shout: down with Jew-Communism.
He maintained that "not only the kulak, the imperialist agent, but,
above all, the petty bourgeois scum who does not understand the nature
of socialist construction and who feeds on false slogans is our main
class enemy."
Ochab concluded his remarks with an angry condemnation of the
"pseudo-revolutionaries" who went around quoting Lenin, but he made no
direct reference to the divisions in the Party that threatened his
leadership:
It is worthwhile to read Lenin's works in their entirety and not only selected
passages. It is worthwhile to know Lenin's views on petty bourgeois
revolutionaries, with their uncertainties; on those who struggle against
the iron discipline of the Party; on the intelligentsia wailers; on those
who know socialism only from books and want to instruct the most hardened
and experiences Party cadres.
SUMMARY
The Politburo replaced Morawski as editor-in-chief of Trybuna
Ludu with Walenty Titkow on 6 July, although Morawski still supervised
the propaganda apparatus. The Politburo also decided to relieve Stasiak
from his post as KW First Secretary in Poznan on 10 July, but the
subsequent plenum of the Poznan provincial committee of 11 July delayed
- 141 -
his removal. 43 Gierek represented the central authorities at the

Poznan Party meeting. During the long discussion of the workers'
revolt, every delegate emphasized economic problems and the grievances
of the working class. No one mentioned the role of 'imperialist agents'
as a possible cause of the disturbances. When Stasiak announced his
forced resignation, twenty-two speakers came to his defence. They
argued that one individual cannot be held responsible for the mistakes
of many. Gierek said that he would advise the Politburo of the plenum's
strong support for Stasiak.
The Party immediately began to search for quick economic solutions
in order to improve the living conditions of the working class. The
Politburo formally asked the USSR to postpone for five years the
repayment of one half of the outstanding national debt, for a 100 million
ruble loan, and for permission to pay for Soviet raw materials in barter.
The Soviets were no less determined to forestall another workers' revolt
and acquiesced to the arrangement on 10 July.
Probably the most significant aftermath of the Poznan revolt was
the fact that the PZPR disagreed with the Kremlin over the causes of
the 'Poznan events'. For the first time in its history, the Polish
Party was at odds with the CPSU on a pivotal issue of policy. The
reformers in the PZPR gained the most from the Gierek report and the
subsequent disagreement with Moscow. They emphasized that the poor
state of the economy and that even the Party had been partly responsible
for the workers' revolt. The hardliners were forced to support the
Kremlin, who stuck to the 'imperialist plot' hypothesis. Since almost
no one in Poland believed the new conspiracy theory, the hardliners
found themselves isolated from their potential base of support -- the
working class.
Although the difference between much of the intelligentsia and
the bulk of the working class remained profound in 1956, their
opposition to the last remnants of the Stalinist regime was almost
indistinguishable. Furthermore, the Poznan events, wrote Bienkowski,
"have shown that political activism was not limited to only one group,
the intelligentsia; that in all basic points there exists a unanimity
of the whole society."44
43
See the discussion in Choniawko, PZPR w Wielkopolsce, p. 111.
44
Bienkowski, Socjologia kleski (Paris, 1971), p. 17.
- 142 -
The chances for Ochab's continued leadership of the PZPR ended

with the Poznan revolt. The First Secretary had already lost support
of the intelligentsia and he could no longer count on either the Party
elite, the working class, or the Soviets. Gomulka became the only
serious contender untainted by the workers' revolt. Even Cyrankiewicz
lost his appeal in the aftermath of the 'Poznan events'. As Staszewski
recently put it:
Poznan ruined his changes, although I thought his speech was more the result
of lack of character than of lack of imagination. Those were his
instructions, and he carried them out...In 1956 it was decided not to
negotiate, not to attempt to mediate, but to strike out and crush the revolt.
Cyrankiewicz followed those directives...At that point my plans became
45
outdated.
The "lesson" of the Poznan revolt loomed large when Gomulka made
his triumphant speech to the VIII Plenum of October 1956:
The working class recently taught a painful lesson to the Party

leadership and the government. When seizing the strike weapon and going
out to demonstrate in the streets on Black Thursday in June, the Poznan
workers shouted in a powerful voice: "Enough! This cannot go on any
longer! Turn back from the false road!...
The clumsy attempt to present the painful Poznan tragedy as the work
of imperialist agents and provocateurs was very naive politically. Agents
and provocateurs can be and act anywhere, but never and nowhere can they
determine the attitude of the working class...
The working class has never resorted to strikes as a weapon of struggle
for its rights in a thoughtless manner. It is obvious that the measure was
46
exceeded and one can never exceed the measure with impunity.
45
Interview with Staszewski in Toranska, pp. 175-176.
46
Excerpt from Gomulka's speech to the VIII KC PZPR Plenum, Nowe Drogi, no.
10 (October 1956), p. 27.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE VII KC PZPR PLENUM
The revolt in Poznan continued to haunt the moribund Party

throughout July 1956.1 During the same period, Gomulka virtually held
court at a health spa in Ciechocinku. He had become the most popular
communist in Poland as a result of the 'Poznan events'. At the
beginning of July the former PPR General Secretary met with Boleslaw
Ruminski, one of the principal hardliners in the state apparatus.2 The
details of Gomulka's meeting with the chemical minister are not known,
but Ruminski became one of the most vocal supporters of Gomulka's return
to the Party and the leadership shortly after the encounter. Gomulka
also met with one of his closest political allies on 15 July, Ignacy
Loga-Sowinski, who brought with him a leading PZPR reformer -- Warsaw
Party Secretary Stanislaw Kuzinski.3 The discussion centred on the
causes of the Poznan revolt and also the question of Gomulka's return
to the Party.4 The reformers in the Party had made their first contact
with Gomulka.
At Ochab's Moscow meeting over the question of Soviet economic
aid, Khrushchev suggested to the PZPR First Secretary: "What would you
say if...Gomulka came to the Soviet Union for a rest in the Crimea, on
the Black Sea, or in the Caucasus?"5 Ochab's recalled the meeting thus:
I said I saw no need to bring up the matter with Gomulka or to try to persuade
him of the merits of Soviet doctors, and that if [the Soviets]...wanted to invite
him over, they should ask him themselves.6
Although the Soviets did not press the issue, Ochab could hardly be
unaware of the fact that the hardliners, the Soviets, and even the
reformers directed their attention towards Gomulka. The VII KC PZPR
Plenum was held in the double shadow of Poznan and Gomulka.
The plenum convened on 18 July and lasting until 28 July, with
a two-day break on 24 and 25 July.7 The agenda included: the 'Poznan
events'; the economy; the 'democratization campaign'; the role of the
1
The leadership carried on with a number of high-level changes in the government.
Roman Fidelski was replaced as industry minister with Boleslaw Jaszczuk on 7 July and Stefan
Jedrychowski replaced Eugeniusz Szyr as chairman of the PKPG on 11 July. The authorities
also decreased the taxes levied on the working class by 30.0%.
2
Namiotkiewicz, op. cit., p. 532.
3
ibid., p. 533. Loga-Sowinski had been a member of the PPR Politburo from 1944-1948.
He was given a number of junior posts as a result of the 'rightist-nationalist deviation'
purges. At the VIII Plenum he was appointed a member of the Politburo and chairman of
the CRZZ.
4
Interview with Werblan, November 1988.
5
6
7
"Protokol plenarnego posiedzienia Komitetu Centralnego w 18-28 VII 1956 r.," CA
KC PZPR, 237/II-14/15/16.
- 144 -
press; the elections of new Politburo and Secretariat members; and

Gomulka's return to the Party. After Ochab and Cyrankiewicz presented
the main reports, ninety-five delegates took part in the discussions.
The tone of the debates had been so fierce that a considerable time was
spent by many of the delegates in acrimonious personal attacks and
accusations. These peripheral, but no less important, controversies
focused on the purported formation and operation of factions in the
Party as well as an exchange concerning the future role of Jews in the
Party.
THE 'POZNAN EVENTS'

Ochab's speech to the plenum on the Poznan revolt appealed
predominantly to those who blamed the workers' revolt on the Party's
style of work and the poor state of the economy. Those who stressed
the role of so-called 'imperialists agents', however, also found words
of support in Ochab's speech. According to the First Secretary:
In assessing the causes of those events one should not concentrate predominantly
on the plots and machinations of provocateurs and agents of imperialism. First
of all, it is necessary to seek out the social roots of those disturbances, which
served as a warning and reflected serious problems in the relations between the
Party and individual sections of the working class.
He conceded that the results of the Six-Year Plan had been "unsatisf-
actory" and the Party's "efforts to raise the living standards of the
masses had been insufficient, not robust enough and not always consist-
ent."
Ochab suggested that the Party "had failed to make the lives of
the working masses much easier and better." The failure to increase
the standard of living resulted in the creation of social discontent
"among the working masses who looked to the Six-Year Plan with high
hopes." He stressed that bureaucratic obstacles prevented the
grievances of the workers from being properly addressed. The First
Secretary went on:
The Poznan events reflected all the above phenomena. It appears that a lack
of compassion and bureaucratism on the part of the central and local authorities
contributed to those events. Poorly thought out measures adopted in recent
months have worsened the economic situation of some workers at the Poznan plant.
It should be stressed, however, that this happened against the intentions of
the Party and the government.
Ochab argued, on the other hand, that "louts and demagogues

succeeded in causing strikes and street demonstrations in Poznan" by
exploiting economic failures, while the "bloody provocation and riots"
- 145 -
had been organized by "the counter-revolutionary underground." He

added that "muddled discussions", "political errors", "the cult of
personality", "poor propaganda", and the "lowering of revolutionary
vigilance" also shared blame for the revolt. The "unfortunate" moves
to "politically de-mobilized" the security apparatus as well as "the
inactivity and disorientation" of Party organizations received special
mention.
The focus of Ochab's criticism was directed against the Party
apparat. He warned "those in question" that
in its struggle for democratization and the observance of Leninist norms, the
Party will mercilessly fight all bureaucratic habits and indifference...that
it will sort out those 'fiefdoms' in the administrative and economic apparatus
who have cotton in their ears and who forget their responsibilities.
Ochab stated that the protests did not spread beyond Poznan because they
were met "with justified criticism from public opinion." But Ochab
added that the Poznan revolt "threw new light on the political situation
in Poland." On the question of the regime's political legitimacy, the
First Secretary said:
Our Party is a workers' party, it is the flesh and blood of the proletarian Polish
masses. Inseparable from the working class, our Party has led it for many
decades in the political struggle towards historic victories. The difficulties
in the relations between the Party and a section of the working class can only
be temporary.
Almost every KC member made reference to Poznan. Staszewski

argued:
I, and I think all of us, should be grateful to the comrades from the
Politburo...for rejecting the easy but ultimately fruitless and confusing
option. I think we were right in doing what we have done because the causes
of the Poznan events lie in a spontaneous reaction of the masses against hardship,
against the lack of honest dialogue, against ignoring their rightful demands,
against bureaucratic methods.
Marian Rybicki informed the plenum that the investigation "has so far
failed to uncover any activities of imperialist agents." He added:
In my opinion, the power in Poznan lay in the streets and on the pavement for
the greater part of the day...Had the enemy wanted to take the town or even its
key points...he could have unfortunately done so, with one exception -- the UB
building which managed to defend itself.
Celina Budzynska unequivocally stressed economic failures as the main

cause of the strikes:
We, as Marxists, understand...that first it is necessary to seek out the economic

causes, but one should not adopt the simplistic view that the workers are angry
with us because they are hungry...The workers will understand the difficulties
and sacrifices of constructing socialism, but only when we tell them the truth.
They will understand that we have to walk the socialist path in boots that are
- 146 -
falling apart, but they will not understand why there have to be sharp nails
in them.
Janusz Zarzycki faulted the Party:
At the root of these terrible events lie the errors of our economic policy and
the administrative methods of Party work. Ministers and Party organizations
were more preoccupied with the fulfilment of the plan and with economic
indicators than with people, their thoughts and lives. This is how we lost touch
with the working class, this is how we lost direction.
Romana Granas was more direct:
We are talking about the Party losing touch with the masses. This is not the
most precise expression...We -- the Central Committee have drifted away from
the masses.
Stasiak provide the plenum with a detailed assessment of the

Poznan economy and then submitted his self-criticism:
We did not know enough about the life of the workers, about their feelings, needs,
problems, and grievances. Often the most justified demands were treated by the
Party as exaggerated and impossible to meet under current circumstances...Only
now I realise how little we knew about the real situation of many working class
families. It is with a great degree of shame that I now admit how little I knew.
Our speeches were so far removed from reality, so many things were glossed over
or pushed under the carpet, there was so much unjustified, bureaucratic optimism.
The hardliners, who constituted a minority at the plenum,

continued to focus on the 'subversive agents' theory as the cause of
the workers' revolt. According to Kazimierz Mijal:
Despite various preventable economic and other difficulties it is impossible

to talk about Poznan other than a counterrevolutionary action directed against
peoples' power.
He protested against a "tendency to stress economic causes" and added:
Such an approach is wrong, de-mobilising. It does not point to the existence

of hostile underground networks that worked against the Party not only in Poznan
but in other places too. It would be wrong to assume that the elimination of
taxes, wages or other mistakes would have been able to prevent the events in
question. Such reasoning does not take into account the participation in the
class struggle of our enemy and imperialist agents. Only those who turn a blind
eye to the existence of the class enemy can come up with conclusions based
entirely on economic issues.
Jan Izydorczyk echoed Mijal's interpretation:
The underground, the social scum, the hooligans, and the agents -- I don't know
who was more active in directing the riots -- acted according with certain
strategic and tactical principles of street warfare. It means that they were
prepared, organized, placed in the most important spots and able to attack
certain targets. Nonetheless, neither the Politburo, nor Comrades
Pszczolkowski, Rybicki or Stasiak are telling us who those people were. Who
were their leaders?
Franciszek Jozwiak agreed with Mijal. He added that "all the def-
iciencies and errors could not have created armed, organized riots."
Jozwiak argued that the living conditions of the workers
- 147 -
had been exploited as a pretext to wage a hateful propaganda campaign against

the Party and peoples' power. All this propaganda was intended to push weak
and politically inexperienced workers into an open struggle against their own
Party and their own government...The Poznan events did not appear out of noth-
ing. They had been organized...It looks as if everyone has forgotten that a
class struggle directed by the underground and assisted and inspired by imper-
ialist centres is still active in Poland.
THE ECONOMY
Ochab's speech included a reassessment of the Six-Year Plan,
especially as it applied to the living standards of the working class.
He noted that the figures provided by the Main Office of Statistics
showed that the real growth in wages reached 27.6%. But Ochab added
that
there is serious doubts about the correctness of the methods of calculation and
the figures are not in accordance with popular feelings.
The First Secretary then cited the findings of a special KC commission,

which showed that between 1951 and 1955 real wages increased by only
13.0%. He also conceded that between 1951 and 1953 real wages had
actually dropped in relation to 1949 levels. Ochab continued:
a considerable number of workers experienced no improvement in their living

standard compared to 1949, and some groups of workers had actually suffered a
deterioration in their economic situation.
Ochab suggested that the militarization of the economy had not

played a major part in the decline of living standards:
Is it true that the living standards failed to rise simply because we had been
forced to spend so much on defence? No, we have committed some serious mistakes.
We must talk about them openly.
He blamed "ill-thought out plans to increase agriculture production"

and "mistakes made in our policies towards working peasants as well as
the unnecessary harshness towards kulaks." Ochab also condemned "the
mad rush to build new factories without taking into consideration the
potential of the existing ones."
The First Secretary stressed the "errors" committed by an admin-
istrative apparat that "exercised poor judgement over investment
policy" and adopted a system of central planning and management which
inflated and made permanent every mistake ever made, and which hampered attempts
to put things right. They paralysed local initiatives...[and] treated economic
growth not as a means but as an end.
During the ensuing discussion, most of the KC members emphasized

that the "achievements of the Six-Year Plan" had been minimized, and
- 148 -
in some cases abrogated, by an "over-bureaucratised economic

management." But the hardliners continued to focus on personalities.
Stanislaw Lapot put the blame on the failure of the Plan to reach its
targets entirely on Minc:8
The degree of personal responsibility can vary form one person to another. I
am deeply convinced that Comrade Minc's authoritarian tendencies, his conceit,
his feudal-like attitude towards Party activists, and his uncompromising way
of treating the cadres played a major role in influencing the adoption of
incorrect economic policies...Comrade Minc is a negation of everything we have
been discussing at this plenum in connection with democratization and the return
to Leninist norms in Party life. Comrades, despite the fact that he has called
for the re-education of the whole Party apparatus, I have serious doubts. I
do not believe that Comrade Minc would be able to submit himself to that
re-education and thus ensure collective leadership of the economy.
Ryszard Strzelecki agreed:
During the Six-Year Plan we had to endure de-facto anarchy, and an economic
dictatorship -- with all its errors and consequences. The economy is now having
to pay dearly for that...Comrade Minc was always ready to use the stick regardless
of circumstances. We all know this. But in the economy things were not going
so well. Our present situation is the best evidence of this.
Ruminski simply stated that "we have failed to fulfil the Plan"
and that Minc had to go:
It is clear that not every one was responsible in equal measure. There is a
difference between the accountability of a minister and the person in charge
of the Party's economic policies...Comrade Minc failed to learn anything from
the III Plenum. He never noticed his own mistakes and is unwilling to do so
now...Comrade Minc should understand that such a manager cannot remain a manager
any longer. It was he who said in 1947 that a new economy must be commanded
by new people.
Klosiewicz, Witaszewski, and Mijal agreed with Ruminski, although Mijal

added that "Zambrowski had not learned from the III Plenum" and should
be replaced as a result of his "responsibility for the failures in
agricultural policy."9
The concerted assault on Minc and Zambrowski brought about a
series of responses against the moves to blame a select group of Party
leaders for the problems faced by the PZPR. Jedrychowski countered
with the following comment:
8
Minc did not attend the plenum "due to his poor state of health."
9
Mijal, who later argued that he was Stalin's greatest supporter in Poland, fell
out with the Party at the III PZPR Congress in March 1959. During the III Congress, Mijal
met with a group of some 1,400 opponents to the political programme outlined by Gomulka
and accused the Party of "turning towards capitalism." Mijal publicly blamed the Jews
in the Party for Poland's political and economic woes from 1959 until he flew to Albania
in 1964 and founded the Communist Party of Poland. Among other things, Mijal argued in
1966 that "we [cannot] tolerate the appearance in Poland of a Zionist, Trotskyite, group
of Jewish nationalists who...[aspire] to establish Jewish domination over thirty million
Poles." See Peter Raina, Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977 (London, 1978), pp.
461-467; and Eisler, op. cit., pp. 26-29.
- 149 -
While I'm far from endorsing Comrade Minc's style of work and his attitude towards
Party activists, I'm at the same time against this search for scapegoats. To
apportion the whole blame for the results of the Six-Year Plan on Comrade Minc
looks to me like the personality cult in reverse. I also think that in the search
for answers one must be directed by the principle of political pragmatism. I'm
of the opinion that these calls for the heads of Politburo members will not serve
the cause of the Party and its standing among the masses.
Edmund Pszczolkowski and Jerzy Tepicht agreed with Jedrychowski's

effort to counter the calls for Minc's removal.
Staszewski was more direct. He noted that although there was
"widespread dissatisfaction with the results of the Plan," the working
class was "particularly worried about the mistakes being made today."
The "current mistakes" revolved around "the bureaucratic tendencies
inside the Party, state, and trade-union apparatus" and "those
responsible for Poznan and the wave of discontent" in the country.
Staszewski continued:
We all know that Comrade [Roman] Fidelski is guilty and should explain him-
self...But then the following questions arise: where was the deputy prime
minister in charge of industry -- Comrade Lapot? Where was the chairman of the
CRZZ -- Comrade Klosiewicz -- before Poznan?10 What did they do to prevent the
Poznan events? Were they blind...People had to cope with hardships month after
month and those comrades could have solved the problems within a couple of hours.
Janusz Zarzycki also blamed Lapot for the Poznan revolt. Tepicht
focused his attack on the "leader of the trade union movement." Helena
Kozlowska agreed Zarzycki and Tepicht. In a reference to Klosiewicz's
remarks at the VI Plenum, Kozlowska remarked:
We did not have enough respect for the voice of the masses. We did not concern
ourselves with the working people, not even with their pleas. By the way, it
is astonishing that Comrades Lapot and Klosiewicz, who constantly consider
themselves distinguished representatives of the working class, remained deaf
to the pleas.11
Klosiewicz, however, was ready for the assault. He responded to

the attacks by making a series of appeals for an immediate raise in the
wages of the lowest paid workers as well as increased spending on social
security. Klosiewicz then added that the money ought to come from those
who "had lived privileged lives" over the last decade by simply
"limiting conspicuous consumption" among certain Party leaders. He
suggested that the "resulting budgetary savings" would appeal to
society, because the subject was "high on the list of workers'
priorities." Klosiewicz's response naturally precipitated another
round of acrimonious recriminations.
10
A reference to Klosiewicz's visit to the Cegielski Plant on 27 June.
11
Emphasis added.
- 150 -
THE 'DEMOCRATIZATION CAMPAIGN'

The so-called 'democratization campaign' became the main target
of criticism by the Party's hardliners. Some reproached the campaign
for its "spontaneity", "extremism", and "pessimism". Others accused
the proponents of sweeping de-Stalinization of trying to "lower the
vigilance of the Party activists" and of "undermining the fraternal
alliance between the Soviet Union and the Polish Peoples' Republic."
Klosiewicz stated:
For some time now we have been noticing a deepening ideological and economic
chaos, largely due to the passive attitude of the Party, which seems to lack
the will to deal energetically with this phenomena.
Stanislaw Skrzeszewski added:
The nation-wide discussion has slipped out of our hands. We have lost the
helm...From the day's of firm leadership, we have moved to a policy of letting
people and organizations make their own decisions in very important areas. The
leadership was not leading because it has stopped issuing firm political
guidelines. The ensuing vacuum has been filled by our enemy's activities.
Lapot said that the 'democratization campaign'
is taking place in a spontaneous, uncontrolled way. Sometimes it even seems

that it has escaped from our hands and goes on above our heads.
He asked "who is benefiting from all this chaos" and answered that the
real beneficiaries were "the bourgeois-liberals who assumed the role
of defenders of democracy." Zenon Nowak agreed:
the reactionaries want democratization and the enemy wants democratization.

That is why they're lending support to it, so they can go on with their subversive
work.
Franciszek Jozwiak suggested that the de-Stalinization campaign

adversely impacted on Party discipline:
We must prevent a slow-down in the healthy process of democratisation in Party

and social life. But democratisation does not mean anarchy, anti-Party
statements. On the contrary, it means strengthening the discipline in the Party
and at the work-place.
The reformers, on the other hand, continued to firmly support the

de-Stalinization campaign. Artur Starewicz said:
It would be possible to rule Poland without popular mandate...It would be

possible, but not permissible. It would not be democracy or socialism but a
sad caricature of socialist democracy.
Kozlowska agreed:
Comrades, in my opinion it was precisely the lack of faith in the political

maturity of the working class that led to a slow down in de-centralization and
democratization, both in the Party and the economic apparatus. Here, in my
- 151 -
opinion, lies the cause of the underdevelopment of socialist democracy in our

country.
Andrzej Werblan emphasised that "the process of democratizat-

ion...despite its zig-zags and difficulties" was irreversible:
It is impossible to stop or reverse it simply because it would mean a complete

restoration of the old order...Nobody wants to return to the past because of
the threat it would pose to our Party, but also because of the economic
implications of such a regression.
Werblan noted that it was "naive" to focus on "the negative aspects of

the democratization process." He added:
It would be much more correct to seek out the roots of our current problems in
the inconsistent way we implemented democratization as well as in the existing
political errors and deformations in Party life.
Werblan went on:
during the debates that followed the III Plenum and the XX CPSU Congress a
phenomenon which we often forget appeared...despite everything during the last
six to eight years we have taught many Poles the basics of Marxism. They are
now using this knowledge to bring about many positive changes, which sometimes
causes some trouble. This trouble, however, is constructive because it is a
justified, Party-minded, and Marxist.
Ochab argued that the 'democratization campaign' was "a struggle

against bureaucratism, private political fiefdoms, against the
stifling of criticism, against the breaches of socialist legality" and
based on the development of "creative criticism and social initiative."
But he also argued that it contained
measures preventing the misuse of the right to criticise by hostile elements

who wished to disseminate alien, anti-Marxist views, and measures to prevent
attacks against peoples' power.
Ochab added that the campaign was "designed to widen social

participation in government", although the "actions taken by the masses
had to be guided by the Party." He said that the move towards 'demo-
cratization' "must not be made in a haphazard, spontaneous manner" and
must "take into consideration the continuing class struggle."
THE PRESS
Many delegates at the plenum sharply criticised the press. But
some unequivocally supported the reform-minded media. Rybicki argued:
After a period of creative infertility, boredom, cliches, and the stifling of

fresh ideas has come a period of bold criticism...and imaginative proposals for
putting our Polish house in order. We, as a Party and as a nation, should be
truly proud of this explosion of socialist Polish thought.
Zarzycki also vigorously defended the press:

- 152 -
We must put all manner of things into perspective. First and foremost, we should
applaud the huge and valuable input of the Press on the debates after the XX
Congress...the criticism...had been sharp, healthy, and based on sound
principles. Second, we must also admit that...unnecessary and harmful articles
had been written by Antoni Slonimski, Wladyslaw Machejek, Krzysztof Teodor
Toeplitz, and others. But we have to balance the sheets, so to speak. Those
few harmful articles constituted a natural price, which must be paid in order
to make the press more bold, more free, so it could regain the trust of the masses.
Those who criticised the media highlighted the "political errors"

of "certain reform-minded Party leaders." According to Mijal:
When the democratization process brought with it the publication of harmful

articles in some papers, those articles influenced not only the rank-and-file
[Party] members but also certain people at the very top. The liberal attitude
towards provocative statements published by the press points to remarkable
political complacency, to an inability to notice the enemy on the right.
Zenon Nowak named the authors of that "liberal" press policy:
There is a rumour circulating in Warsaw, and in the rest of the country, that
there exists a group of 'tough guys' and a group of 'liberals'.12 I do not see
any particular difference between the Politburo members. The Party
Secretaries, on the other hand, are an altogether different lot. I'm going to
say what I want to say, whether some people want to hear me out or not. The
'liberals' are the three Secretaries -- Comrades Albrecht, Matwin and Morawski
-- who want democratization, who want to pull it out of the Politburo's throat.
When it comes to the press, these comrades have a different vision of democratiz-
ation than we have. We, the members of the Politburo, have often said that order
must be restored to the Press. Yet nothing has been done. We sent Comrade
Morawski, but he didn't do anything.
The so-called 'Young Secretaries' largely rejected the claims of

their critics. Albrecht conceded that "sometimes he was too lenient
and failed to react more decisively." But he was of the opinion that
the press "was a major asset on the overall balance sheet" and that
"after the III Plenum and the XX Congress" the press "had taken a number
of long strides forward." Matwin also agreed that "many comrades in
the media had to be brought to book." At the same time, he warned
against a return to the old order and defended the reform-minded press:
Conservatism, the forces of inertia and subjectivity, which to some extend exist
within all of us, is hostile not only towards irresponsible acts and anarchy,
but also towards healthy, bold, and progressive criticism in the Party...We
should, by all means, deal with extremists and rabble-rousers, but at the same
time we must be very careful not to hurt our own people. This would only help
the conservatives.
FACTIONALISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

The constant tug-of-war over every major issue discussed at the
plenum accentuated the competing ideological tendencies within the
Party. The debate was marked by a series of personal attacks and mutual
12
A reference to the so-called Natolin and Pulawy factions.
- 153 -
accusations. The hardliners and the reformers blamed each other for
undermining the unity of the Party and for factionalism.
Klosiewicz accused Berman, Minc, Zambrowski, and Mazur of
personally making the decision to arrest Gomulka. He continued:
The following question arises: are the hands and consciences of these comrades
really clean?
Ochab denied the allegation and said that "the matter of Gomulka's
arrest had been much more complicated." Klosiewicz then called for
Party unity, but he set a condition for such a unity:
one cannot really talk of unity without eliminating from the leadership those
who have lost the trust of the Party and the workers.
Klosiewicz's call for the dismissal of a number of the Party

leaders caused an uproar at the plenum. Staszewski replied thus:
I would like to know the real reasons behind his speech. It is clear that Comrade
Klosiewicz wants to instigate a purge...Is this really necessary? Political
infighting here at the plenum and outside this hall would only renew the talk
of critical splits in the Central Committee and of a crisis in the Politburo.
What is Comrade Klosiewicz's vision of leadership as well as his role in it?
Out with it, Comrade Klosiewicz. Tell us frankly what you think, because your
idea is very harmful and dangerous...If the Party follows the Leninist road its
unity becomes our most treasured value. We won't let it be undermined. The
Party won't let others dictate the conditions of its unity. The KC will never
allow it. One has to remember this.
Lapot then attacked Morawski for "not defending the ideological

purity of the Party", Matwin for "getting lost", and Mazur for "sitting
on the fence and wavering between various factions." He continued:
One could be excused for thinking that there are at least two different tendencies
within the Politburo. Even those who are not as close to the leadership as we
are notice this. I do not want to make assumptions or guesses. Therefore, I
would like to ask those comrades to tell the plenum the truth in this matter.
He was also anxious to know Zambrowski's views on the matter of factions.

Mijal claimed that he was a supporter of consolidation and
increased unity, but "the appearance of unity or consolidation or simply
a formal unity is neither desired nor acceptable." He first accused
Morawski, Matwin and Albrecht of "not distancing themselves from the
writer Slonimski but of drifting away from Comrade Witaszewski
instead." Mijal added:
We have always stressed the need for Party unity, but there can be only one unity,
based on Marxism-Leninism, on our struggle against the petty-bourgeoisie,
liberalism, opportunism, and on the basis of our struggle against the lack of
faith in the strength of the working class, against all those who do not see
the danger coming from the capitalist, right-wing elements.
- 154 -
Mijal then suggested to the plenum that the Party elite included a
"bourgeois right-wing group." As evidence, Mijal made reference to a
conversation he had shortly before the VI Plenum with Antoni Alster:
It seems to me that the conversation was a provocation by this group and that
Comrade Alster acted on behalf of the faction. Therefore, I think that Comrade
Zambrowski should also take part in this debate, especially after the strange
happenings at the VI Plenum. Comrade Zambrowski played a prominent role during
that plenum. He must have had a prior knowledge of my conversation with Comrade
Alster and about the attempts to get him elected to the Secretariat.
Mijal asked Alster:
What are the aims and the programme of this group...who belongs to it and which
current Politburo members would they like to eliminate the most.
Marian Naszkowski responded immediately to Mijal's charges about

the existence of a "liberal faction" in the Party:
I know nothing about the existence of such a group. But it is possible to assume
that this is just an attempt to draw our attention away from a group that really
does exist.
Alster stated that Mijal
twisted the true contents of their conversation..."Tell us who they are," cries
Comrade Mijal. "Reveal your programme." This is a typical example of Beria's
methods..."Give us those people, let us see their plans." This really smacks
of Beria. Comrade Mijal, if you really want to know, I'm the only member of
your "group" and my programme is a programme of consolidating our leadership...As
far as the other group is concerned, the one mentioned by Comrade Naszkowski,
I can only say that I feel sorry for any group incorporating Comrade Mijal.
Others also took exception to the speeches by Klosiewicz, Lapot

and Mijal. Granas charged:
Despite putting up a smoke screen, it is impossible to conceal the true nature

of their programme. Their programme includes breaking up the Politburo and the
Secretariat, which would inevitably lead to a crisis in our Party...It does not
take much to prove that those people have no ideology and that their main
objective is to carve spectacular careers for themselves.
Witaszewski replied to Granas by attacking her, Morawski, and Matwin

for not "adhering to the basic laws of Party discipline." He added:
Our Party conscience and not some unidentified group tells us how to approach
every issue. And lets not talk about people devoid of ideals. This would only
aggravate the situation. Every one has his own Party conscience and uses his
firm convictions while addressing the problems that have arisen during this
plenum.
Ruminski supported Witaszewski's assertions and added that his

supporters had the backing of the Party rank-and-file and the working
class:
There are many incorrect opinions about this matter -- all of them dating from
the period of the personality cult. I mean that some comrades think that
personal attacks must inevitably weaken our unity and lead to a split. Such
- 155 -
an approach is totally wrong. By unity, we understand it to mean the unity of

the Party with its members, with the working class, and with the nation. And
for the sake of this unity we are now expelling from the leadership those who
have become compromised and those who have abused the trust of the Party. In
the name of this unity and responsibility we must insist and sometimes even demand
that some comrades explain certain complicated matters.
During the debate on organizational matters, many delegates

argued whether Berman would be removed only from the Politburo or from
the Central Committee as well; whether to expel Minc or take into
consideration his illness and wait until the next plenum. The majority
decided to wait. The attacks grew sharper when the elections to the
Politburo and Secretariat were called. Ochab proposed Edward Gierek,
Roman Nowak, and Adam Rapacki for full membership as well as Stefan
Jedrychowski and Eugeniusz Stawinski for candidate membership to the
Politburo. The leaders also put forward Witold Jarosinski to the
Secretariat. They were all duly elected.
When Piotr Jaroszewicz was nominated for the post of Party
Secretary from the floor, Witaszewski intervened and hinted that the
deputy prime minister had "a shady prewar past."13 Ochab rejected the
call for Jaroszewicz's nomination, but Witaszewski's innuendo forced
the First Secretary to caution the general "against the use of
knuckle-busters at the meeting of the Central Committee." The gibe
about 'knuckle-busters' renewed the rancorous factionalism debate.
The commander of the GZP WP furnished his own account of the
infamous Lodz speech, which contrasted with the version put forward
during the ZLP meeting only in interpretation rather than substance.
Witaszewski also accused Morawski and Matwin of "creating the theory
of putting a wedge between the working class and intelligentsia" and
added:
A witch-hunt has begun. And against whom? Against me, an old communist. Who
did they want to defend and against what? They wanted to defend those who smeared
the name of the Party, peoples' power, the Soviet Union, and Communism.
Mijal then made the following comment:
Many misguided theories concerning the intelligentsia and anti-intellectual

feelings are currently circulating in Poland. There also exists a theory about
attempts to prevent the so-called lowering of political standards, which in
practice means a reluctance to place workers in positions of responsibility
because of their alleged lack of qualifications. These are liberal,
petty-bourgeois theories, which reflect the lack of trust in the working class
and its activists. The proponents of those theories would like to replace
workers with people of petty-bourgeois origin who are allegedly better suited
to management.
13
Jaroszewicz had been removed from the post of deputy minister of defence in 1950
during Rokossowski's purge of 'nationalist elements' from the military.
- 156 -
Zarzycki, however, took issue with Mijal's views:
There had been times, before the war, when in order to divert the attention of
the masses away from those responsible for the bad economic situation. the Jews
were made scapegoats. The guilty were always the Jews and the bicyclists. Now-
adays a new scapegoat has been found, namely the intelligentsia and the
journalists in particular. One has to say that the views presented here by
Comrade Witaszewski are in my opinion, quite dangerous...This whole theory is
nothing more than a camouflage. Is a division commander a labourer, an
industrial worker? No, he is a member of the intelligentsia. And if the whole
of the intelligentsia is as rotten as it is alleged one could be excused for
harbouring certain suspicions towards that general.
Zenon Nowak poured oil on the flames and enraged many KC members
when he began to talk about the press articles directed against
anti-Semitism:
Is it really true that the situation has changed so dramatically that it now
calls for a nation-wide debate on anti-Semitism? Are Jews being mistreated?
Undoubtedly, some are. But we will not solve this by letting the whole world
know about such things. I do not know who needs all this, who is benefiting
from it...Accusations of anti-Semitism are being levelled at the Politburo
members. Individuals are being named. Ochab -- anti-Semite, Zawadzki --
anti-Semite, Rokossowski -- anti-Semite, Nowak -- anti-Semite, Mazur --
anti-Semite. This, comrades, is a concerted campaign which is not designed to
strengthen the authority of the leadership, the authority of the Polit-
buro...What is going on then? When I was still a local Party activist we analyzed
the ethnic composition of the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces
and of the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office. Almost all comrades employed
there were of Jewish extraction. I do not want to say that they were not good
Party members. With some exceptions, most were. I even assume that all of them
were exemplary Party members. I am not going to ask if it is proper for almost
all Party leaders in the armed forces to be of Jewish origin. I think that this
is an abnormal situation. What is more, the Politburo knew all about it and
came to its own conclusion. And there was not a single comrade, be it Zambrowski,
Minc or Berman, who held a different view.
Comrades, I ask you whether it was correct to arrest Romkowski, Fejgin
and Rozanski for abuses in the security apparatus? I think that we have reacted
properly. It is good that they have been arrested, but it is bad that they are
Jews. I do not know how it is now, but previously all departmental directors
in the security apparatus, and their deputies, were Jews. Was it right or wrong?
People are saying: "Jews are arresting Poles"...And look at the Foreign
Ministry or the Polish Economic Committee. I, we at this plenum, a thousand
or even a hundred thousand people see it differently. But the 27 million Poles
out there may think that a Pole cannot be trusted and should not be employed
in the security apparatus or is too stupid to work in the Foreign Office or in
the Economic Committee. And this is the way ordinary people think, whether we
like it or not.14
Jerzy Sztachelski, Stefan Zolkiewski, Maria Oks, Tepicht,

Kozlowska, and Cyrankiewicz were just a few who reacted to Nowak's
remarks. Cyrankiewicz put it thus:
It was the tone and not the contents that has added new dimensions to the problem.
Those new dimensions can cause a qualitative transformation of the whole issue.
As soon as the Pandora's Box of Polish anti-Semitism has been opened, it is
extremely difficult to contain that phenomenon.
The Prime Minister also condemned Nowak for using the "weapon of ethnic
origin" in "a personal feud." Nowak categorically rejected the allega-
14
See also Nowak's interview with Lewis, A Case History, p. 120.
- 157 -
tion the he was an anti-Semite. He added that the problem of the "con-
centration of Jews" in certain areas of the state and Party apparatus
"had been previously discussed by the entire Politburo." Nowak
maintained that his only motive behind the speech was the desire "to
stop the rumours" of anti-Semitism in the Party leadership. He went
on:
In my view this is a concerted campaign to paint some Politburo members as

anti-Semites and thus turn them into reactionaries, unfit to implement the policy
of democratization.
Staszewski, echoing the views of the majority, suggested that Nowak had
demonstrated "with his own words...the real motive behind the speech"
and that the plenum would not tolerate a one-sided interpretation of
the Party's evolution during the past decade.
GOMULKA
The Central Committee turned to the question of rehabilitations.
Ochab informed the plenum that the Politburo decided to reinstate Party
membership to Marian Spychalski and Grzegorz Korczynski. Rybicki
attacked the breaches of socialist legality by the security apparatus
as well as certain "methods of physical and psychological terror worthy
of the Inquisition." He stressed the need to solve some of the more
outstanding cases, including those concerning former PPS members and
the people connected to the Lechowicz-Jaroszewicz case. Mieczyslaw
Moczar demanded that "the record of Gwardia Ludowa and Armia Ludowa [the
communist wartime military organizations] be put straight." He argued
that their records had been "tainted during the period of the cult of
personality and in subsequent debates."
The plenum then focused on the question of Gomulka's return to
the Party. The KC members received copies of the letters written by
Gomulka to the Party leaders, while Ochab briefed the delegates on the
state of the negotiations between Gomulka and the Politburo. Ochab
emphasized that the former General Secretary maintained in every detail
the correctness of the position he adopted in 1948. The First Secretary
added that Gomulka would like the opportunity to "retract his
self-criticism of 1949 and address the plenum" in order to present
first-hand "his political opinions to the Central Committee."
The Politburo, Ochab continued, resolved to reinstate Gomulka's
Party membership, although it was opposed "to a re-examination of the
'rightist-nationalist deviation'" on the grounds that "it would not be
- 158 -
advantageous" to re-open the debate over Gomulka's dismissal from the

Party. The leadership also opposed Gomulka's challenge to confront the
plenum. Klosiewicz was the first delegate to speak on the issue. He
said that Gomulka should be invited to the plenum and that his Party
card ought to be returned unconditionally. Over thirty-five other KC
members spoke on the question of Gomulka's return to the Party.
Gierek, Cyrankiewicz, and Werblan defended the Politburo's
position, but Werblan also argued that the former leader still had to
repent for 1948. Lapot supported Klosiewicz and formally asked the
plenum to overturn the KC resolutions barring Gomulka from
participating in the Party leadership. He also criticised the
Politburo for "not inviting Wladyslaw Gomulka to a sitting of the
Politburo." Mieczyslaw Popiel supported the calls to invite Gomulka
to the plenum. Jedrychowski stood to speak in support of the leadership
and suggested that the Gomulka issue had to be solved because it
threatened Party unity. Staszewski agreed with Jedrychowski, implied
that Gomulka was an opportunist, and attacked Klosiewicz.
Mijal agreed with Klosiewicz and Lapot. Naszkowski also attacked
Klosiewicz and added that Gomulka "should come to the Party, not the
other way around." Jan Olszewski said the Party did not need another
debate about the 'rightist-nationalist deviation', but a debate about
a new programme. Boleslaw Jaszczuk supported Gomulka's full
rehabilitation. Zofia Wasilowska argued that the Party needed to end
the Gomulka affair before it created problems for the PZPR. Morawski
appealed to the delegates to invite Gomulka to the plenum. Zawadzki
outlined his last meeting with Gomulka and said that after five hours
of discussions, the former General Secretary refused to adjust his
political position. Rybicki suggested that the Politburo's position
was contradictory and called for Gomulka's unconditional return to the
Party. Kozlowska sided with the Politburo. Granas stood to attack
Klosiewicz, Lapot, and Mijal for attempting to divide the leadership.
Witaszewski also supported Gomulka's return to the Party, but
added that Party unity was more important than any other issue. Matwin
said that those who disagree with the Politburo on the Gomulka question
are forcing the plenum to stray from more important problems.
Stanislaw Skrzeszewski suggested that both sides had their good points.
Albrecht supported Gomulka's return to the Party on the grounds that
the former leader had been wrongfully accused. He added that the
"meetings with Gomulka were a de facto recognition of the correctness
- 159 -
of his position." Artur Starewicz supported the anti-Gomulka

resolution of 1949, although he added that Gomulka had been correct on
the Yugoslav issue. Moczar agreed with Popiel and called for Gomulka's
immediate return to the Party.
Stanislaw Tkaczow put forward a suggestion that the KC be included
in all other meetings with Gomulka. Feliks Baranowski agreed with
Tkaczow and attacked Staszewski for impugning Gomulka's character.
Jerzy Putrament polemicized with everyone and added that Gomulka's
"critical" position towards the Soviet Union and collectivization was
popular with the public. Ostap Dluski supported Gomulka on the
condition he accept the official Party line on the 'rightist deviation'.
Zambrowski reiterated the official Politburo position and called
Gomulka's attitude "brutal" and threatening. Ruminski gave his
complete support to Gomulka and asked why the KC had not been allowed
to participate in the earlier meetings with the former leader. Jozwiak
argued that the "Gomulka matter was a question of Party unity."
Zarzycki was not pleased with Gomulka's attitude, but he conceded that
"Gomulka's return to the Party should take its normal course."
Mieczyslaw Hoffman agreed with Zarzycki.
Janusz Kalinowski said that he sensed there were "personal
motives" behind many of the speech's on Gomulka. Stanislaw Pawlak went
further than anyone at the plenum and called for Gomulka's appointment
to the Politburo. Mazur again recapitulated the Politburo's position
and added that Gomulka's return to the Party would strengthen it. Zenon
Nowak came close to breaking with the leadership. He said there was
no "reason why the Party could not adjust its position" on the proposal
for Gomulka to speak to the plenum. Ryszard Sztrzelecki called for an
annulment of the 1949 resolutions against Gomulka. Jan Izydorczyk
called "for a compromise position." He said Gomulka should be allowed
to return to the Party while a KC commission reviewed the 1949 resolution
as it applied to Gomulka, Spychalski, and Kliszko. In short, the
majority of the Central Committee approved the Politburo's position.
Tepicht articulated another opinion held by the majority of the
delegates at the plenum when he concluded:
I think that the Party could find an accommodation with Gomulka pretty fast...but
without the middlemen -- like the ones we have seen at the plenum today...Let
him return to us, but not under their banner.
- 160 -
SUMMARY
The compromise programme outlined by the Party at the plenum had
been moderately far-reaching. The resolution adopted by the KC
included: the introduction of limited workers' democracy in
industrial enterprises; a "radical improvement of industrial safety and
hygiene conditions"; an "end to the abnormal working conditions in the
coal industry"; a reduction -- leading to abolition -- in "the number
of planned working Sundays"; a raise in "family allowances for families
of lower paid workers"; a greater political and economic role for local
government as well as the Sejm; stricter observance of socialist
legality; democratization of Party life and restrictions on the role
of the Party apparatus in economic matters; and an expanded role for
trade unions and other social organizations in the political life of
the country.15 However, as Rykowski and Wladyka concluded, "it soon
became apparent that it was too little too late."16 The Party's pro-
gramme fell short of society's demand for radical changes to the system.
The hardliners and reformers had managed to block each other and
effectively weaken the power of the Politburo. The Party was in
desperate need of a popular 'saviour' and Gomulka became the candidate
of the Central Committee. The Party elite indirectly decided to let
Gomulka break the political stalemate in the leadership. The VII
Plenum proclaimed that the resolution calling for Gomulka's dismissal
for the Politburo and PZPR passed at the III Plenum of 1949 was null
and void and ensured the former General Secretary's return to both the
Party and the leadership. The hardliners assumed that Gomulka would
support their minimalist position on political and economic reform,
because they had been the first to embrace the former leader. In light
of the workers' revolt in Poznan, however, many of the reformers
suspected that Gomulka had no other option but to embrace their calls
for rapid de-Stalinization.
The debate on Gomulka at the VII Plenum bore relatively little
relationship to the hardliners versus reformers dichotomy evident
during discussions of the 'Poznan events', the state of the economy,
the 'democratization campaign', and the reform-minded Polish press.
While Gomulka's return to the Party had been a constant feature of
15
For details on the resolutions passed at the plenum see "Resolution Adopted by
the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party at its Seventh Plenary Session,
July 18-28, 1956," Zinner, National Communism, pp. 145-186. The resolution did not
mention Gomulka.
16
"Polska proba," p. 213.
- 161 -
Klosiewicz's political struggle from 1954, most of the other hardliners

in the Party turned to Gomulka in response to the turbulent weeks
following the VI Plenum or as a result of the 'Poznan events'.
The workers' revolt in Poznan had especially influenced the
attitudes of the reformers in the Party elite towards Gomulka's
political future. For some of them, like Albrecht, Morawski, and
Rybicki, Gomulka's rehabilitation was also a matter of principle. Only
a small group of reformers in the Central Committee, namely Zambrowski
and Staszewski, continued to exhibit any degree of hostility towards
Gomulka. They could neither come to terms with Gomulka's fierce attack
in 1948 against the exclusively internationalist traditions of SDKPiL
and KPP nor with the fact that the former leader had become the cause
celebre of their arch rivals in the Party: Klosiewicz, Lapot, Mijal,
Ruminski, and Witaszewski. Although the First Secretary successfully
blocked Gomulka's attempt to speak to the plenum as well as his immediate
return to the leadership, the Politburo consensus began to disinte-
grate.
A combination of the Kremlin's displeasure with Ochab, especial-
ly after the Poznan revolt, and the enthusiasm displayed at the VII
Plenum for Gomulka by some of the Soviet Union's most loyal supporters
in the PZPR fuelled Khrushchev's desire to meet with the former PPR
General Secretary. More important, the workers' revolt in Poznan and
the PZPR's compromise resolution concerning its origin left Khrushchev
in a weakened position vis-a-vis the unreconstructed Stalinist in the
CPSU Politburo. A Soviet delegation headed by Bulganin and Marshal
Zhukov, the Soviet defence minister, arrived in Poland on 20 July to
participate in the twentieth anniversary celebrations of Poland's
liberation from Nazi occupation. They stayed until the VII Plenum
ended.
Morawski recently recalled that the Soviets "arrived well
prepared, with a briefcase full of Polish press cuttings." 17 As a
result of one meeting between Bulganin and Ochab, Morawski made a weekly
visit to the editorial boards of the major papers and periodicals in
order to ensure that the Polish press curtailed its attacks on the
system. Morawski also said that Ochab told him after the Soviet visit:
"You'll see, if you don't straighten out the press, we'll all be throwing
up blood shortly."18
17
Interview with Morawski in Stare Numery, p. 64.
18
ibid., p. 66.
- 162 -
Bulganin delivered the following warning to the press and PZPR

in Warsaw on 21 July:
It would be wrong not to notice that the campaign against the personality cult
has revived not only the activities of our enemies but also revealed those in
our ranks who waver in their convictions. Misled by the enemy propaganda, these
people sometimes give incorrect interpretations of certain issues connected with
the personality cult. Such erroneous views have recently been reflected in
articles appearing in...Poland...Some leaders of these press organs have given
way to inimical influence [and]...have fallen under the influence of our
enemies.19
On 25 July the Soviet delegation also issued a declaration on "The

Western Borders of Poland," which reminded the Poles that the "western
frontier and Silesia are now forever Polish. The Guarantee of this will
be the friendship of the...Polish and Soviet peoples."20 The oblique
reference to Poland's military dependence on the USSR against the
spectre of German revanchism was also meant as a warning to the Poles.
19
Trybuna Ludu (22 July 1956).
20
Cited in Zinner, National Communism, p. 145.
CHAPTER TWELVE
GOMULKA'S ROAD TO POWER
The period from the end of July to the Politburo meeting of 12

October is crucial to the understanding of the dynamics that led to the
Soviet-Polish confrontation. The divisive issue of Gomulka's return
to the Party had been settled at the VII Plenum. The PZPR elite and
the Soviets began to focus their attention on Gomulka's future role in
the Party. The Politburo gathered on 30 July and appointed Ochab and
Zawadzki to conduct all subsequent official discussions with the former
PPR General Secretary.1
The two Buro members invited Gomulka to the Central Committee on
31 July. It was to be their only encounter until October. Ochab
continued to resist Gomulka's nomination to the Politburo. According
to the First Secretary:
I told [Gomulka]: the suspicion that you took part in a conspiracy has done
you a grave and unjustified injury...you displayed admirable
far-sightedness in your assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia; we in
the Politburo didn't see the danger...but even if we had seen it, there was
little we could have done. Now our country has new problems...We want to
use you in active Party work; we want to settle the question of your
membership in the Party, and we will take it up at the Politburo, but first
you must say whether you want to be a Party member. Gomulka just said yes,
2
he did...I didn't offer him anything else.
Ochab and Zawadzki also informed Gomulka that the Politburo agreed to
reinstate Party membership's to other communists purged during the
campaign against the 'rightist-nationalist deviation', including his
three closest political allies in 1948: Spychalski, Kliszko, and
Korczynski. As a gesture to the unrepentant former leader, however,
Ochab and the Politburo appointed Kliszko to a senior post at the
Ministry of Justice on 5 August.3
Gomulka travelled to Ciechocinku shortly after the July meeting
and waited for the Politburo to reverse its position on his return to
the leadership.4 Polish state radio announced Gomulka's reinstatement
in a special evening news bulletin on 4 August, followed by a front page
1
Namiotkiewicz, op.cit., p. 533.
2
Depending on the source, from 30 July to 30 September Gomulka was offered
the post of deputy prime minister, leadership of the Wroclaw Party organization,
membership in the Central Committee, membership in the Politburo, and so on. Gomulka
met with so many individuals during this period that it is difficult to untangle the
rumours and speculations from fact.
3
Kliszko's was appointed Under Secretary of State in the ministry. Trybuna
Ludu (5 August).
4
Stefan Misiaszek, secretary of the KC POP, visited Gomulka at the health spa
on 2 August and officially returned with his Party card. See Ptasinski, "Drugi z
trzech zwrotow," p. 112.
- 164 -
communique in Trybuna Ludu on the following day.5 Korczynski and KC

member Mieczyslaw Moczar,6 two former AL commanders, met with 'Comrade
Wieslaw' around 4 August in order to discuss the future role of Soviet
military 'advisors' in Poland.7 Korczynski stayed with Gomulka and
helped arrange his subsequent meetings with a long list of Party
activists.8
The reformers made their second contact with Gomulka sometime
after 5 August. The first delegation included Jastrzebski, Starewicz,
and Maria Rutkiewiczowa, who later become a mediator between Gomulka
and Zambrowski. A second delegation of reformers, led by Albrecht,
Morawski, and Starewicz, met with Gomulka a short time later. The aim
of both groups was to gauge Gomulka's position on the 'democratization
campaign' as well as the overall situation in the country and Party.
While the hardliners continued their contacts with Gomulka, they were
no longer in a privileged position.9 Gomulka's growing catalogue of
supporters now included the majority of the reformers in the Party
elite. At various Politburo meetings, according to Zambrowski,
Rokossowski, Zawadzki, and Nowak had already "manifested their
sympathy" towards Gomulka.10 The former General Secretary shifted his
attention towards two other senior Politburo members: Cyrankiewicz
and Zambrowski. And it is not difficult to imagine that Gomulka chose
his works carefully during his official and unofficial discussions with
the Party's leading activists; phrasing his comments in such a way that
both the hardliners and reformers felt that they could count Gomulka's
patronage.
Morawski recently recalled that after a meeting with Gomulka, he
was convinced that the hardliners "were no company for Gomulka." "I
began to understand," he continued, "that Gomulka wanted to return [to
the leadership], but only as the First Secretary" and "it became
5
Reproduced in Zinner, National Communism, p. 187.
6
Moczar's real name was Diemko. (Throughout his political life, Moczar
refused to admit that he was of Ukrainian descent or that his father had been married
on two occasions to women of Jewish descent.) He was recruited by the NKVD in 1941
and led the so-called 'Partisans' with Korczynski in the 1960's. They gathered
together the leading Polish nationalists in the PZPR and mounted the anti-intellectual
and anti-Semitic purge of 1968. For further details see Eisler, op. cit., pp. 41-49.
7
By 'advisors', it is generally meant former Soviet Army officers who
functioned as Polish citizens in the Polish military.
8
The list included friends and former colleagues like Loga-Sowinski, Kliszko,
Bienkowski, Spychalski, Osobka-Morawski, Gluck, and many others.
9
Klosiewicz met with Gomulka around 7 August. See Namiotkiewicz, op. cit.,
p. 534.
10
See Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 25 February 1971, p. 62.
- 165 -
apparent that with his opinions, Gomulka could not return at the head
of a conservative faction." Morawski added that Gomulka did not want
to be connected with the hardliners because they maintained
uncomfortably close contacts with unfriendly Soviet diplomats in
Warsaw.11
Ochab remained Gomulka's only uncompromising opponent in the
Politburo. The First Secretary managed to survive the 'time of troub-
les', the Poznan revolt, and Soviet indignation. He was determined to
weather Gomulka's return to the Party. But Ochab's self-appointed role
as the Party's mediator was markedly weakened after 4 August. The
attempts to court Gomulka on the part of the reformers further strained
Ochab's position. The Politburo and the Central Committee no longer
needed an arbitrator. The Party elite was searching for a decisive
leader. The turbulent months of August and September determined the
political future of both Gomulka and the First Secretary.
NATION-WIDE UNREST
The governing body of the All-Polish Committee of the National
Unity Front met in Warsaw on 13 August for a two-day meeting. The
organization appealed to Polish citizens to support the programme of
reform adopted by the Party at the VII Plenum.12 An editorial on the
National Front session in Trybuna Ludu on 18 August stressed that
in the present situation it has become clearer than ever before that
socialism cannot be built by...Party members alone. The purposeful and
13
conscious cooperation of millions of hands and minds is required.
The Polish 'masses', however, were in no mood to cooperate with

the Party and its current leadership. Every spectrum of Polish society
was drawn together to press their demand for democratization and
de-Stalinization. 14 As Thomas V. Atkins put it: "The slogan of
'national unity' took on a new meaning -- the unity of the people against
the communist regime."15 Concerted popular unrest ensured the demise
11
Interview with Morawski in Stare Numery, p. 62.
12
See the declaration in Zinner, National Communism, pp. 188-189.
13
14
For further details see Thomas V. Atkins, "The Dynamics of a Popular Revolt:
A Case Study of Poland, 1956-1957," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The New School
of Social Research, 1977), ch. 5. See also Syrop, Spring in October, ch. 6; Lewis,
A Case History, ch. 10; and Hiscocks, op. cit., pp. 201-206.
15
Atkins, op. cit., p. 86.
- 166 -
of Poland's Stalinist system. Bienkowski described the ease with which

the Polish people abandoned the regime in the following manner:
The Stalinist system as a whole, had been rejected because the system was
generally regarded as an alien imposition, and to the logic of
development...a temporary plague. It was shaken off as one shakes off a
16
nightmare on a sunny morning.
At the III plenary session of the governing council of the ZMP,

held on 18 August, the leadership of the youth organization admitted
that a
moral crisis arose in a large part of the younger generation...A serious

crisis also arose in the life and activity of the ZMP...[which] did not
adequately fill its role as the guiding force of the younger generation...As
a result of sectarianism, dogmatism, and cliches on the one hand and a lack
of understanding of the character of the masses on the other hand, the
'jellylike' quality of the organization and the insignificance of its
17
ideological and political character became even more evident.
The ZMP leaders also called for an Extraordinary ZMP Congress, to be

held in February 1957, in order to revitalize the PZPR's primary base
for younger recruits. But the ZMP ceased to be an effective force in
Polish society.18 A major source of the Party's legitimacy, including
its ability to penetrate and assimilate future generations, collapsed
as a result of the de-Stalinization campaign.
Some of the most important developments took place outside the
confines of officially sanctioned assemblies. In cities, towns, and
villages throughout the country, Poland's workers and peasants took
their own initiatives. They refused to wait for the appropriate laws
and decrees to be passed by the government and spontaneously began to
introduce radical changes to the system.
The series of work stoppages that followed the Poznan revolt
increased during this period. Demands for wage hikes and immediate
improvements to the living standards were augmented by calls for the
right to participate in the management of state enterprises, to help
in the preparation of plans and quotas, and to decide on the distribution
of capital allocated to enterprises for social services. Workers
continued to elect their own representatives and shunned the officially
sanctioned trade union committees and other Party organizations.
At the VIII plenary session of the CRZZ on 18 August, the growing
discontent among the rank-and-file was reflected in the resolution
16
Bienkowski, Socjologia kleski (Paris, 1971), pp. 11-12.
17
18
The decision to disband the ZMP was taken on 10 January 1957.
- 167 -
passed by the trade union delegates. It stressed the need for greater
democracy "within the unions in the election of new officers" and called
on the CRZZ to "review and abolish all decisions which stifle the
independence and democracy of trade unions."19 The CRZZ also drafted
a decree that legalized Workers' Councils and submitted it to the Sejm
for ratification. The legislative committee of the Sejm refused to
endorse the radical plan, approved by the Council of State, on technical
grounds.20 But this did not prevent workers in Warsaw and other cities
from setting up independent Workers' Councils.21
The weakness of the authorities provided the peasants with the
opportunity to resist compulsory deliveries and even to sell their
produce for profit in the thriving black market trade that unofficially
operated in many towns and cities. Unrest in the countryside reached
the stage at the end of August where peasants began to reclaim land and
livestock seized during the collectivization drive. In some places,
entire collectives elected to disband and return land to their original
owners. Since the Party leadership was unwilling to resort to
violence, the apparatchiks in the countryside were powerless to reverse
the process of de-collectivization. Atkins, who was a journalist in
Poland during this period, recalled how some peasants "forcibly ejected
the Communist Party secretaries from their villages by putting their
household goods into a cart, and whipping the horses away at a gallop."22
The government instead decided to radically alter its agricultural
policy on 11 September and announced the closing of the infamous State
Machinery Centres, which had been used to control the peasants through
a system that monopolized the leasing of tractors and other agricultural
machinery in the countryside.23
The traditionally Roman Catholic peasantry also demanded the
restoration of religious instruction in the schools. In some towns and
villages, people marched into the classrooms with their priest and
ordered the school authorities to allocate periods of religious
instruction during school hours. Bienkowski, who later served as
Gomulka's education minister, argues that the normalization of
19
20
ibid., p. 191.
21
Express Wieczorny (29 September 1956).
22
Atkins, op. cit., p. 93.
23
Trybuna Ludu (25 September 1956).
- 168 -
Church-State relations following the Polish October had its roots in

such manifestations:
The often repeated statements that the Gomulka leadership has made a
breakthrough in the relations with the Church by reintroduction the teaching
of religion in the schools, is an obvious misunderstanding. In fact, the
new authorities have been confronted with a situation, in which they have
found themselves without power to resist the pressure of society, and had
to accept the existing situation. (As someone at that time said: 'We could
have resisted the introduction of religion into the schools, but only if
24
we were willing to use tanks.')
The greatest threat to the Party and Ochab's leadership came

during the weeks that followed 26 August. Approximately 1.5 million
Poles, according to the official count at the time, eventually paid a
visit to the shrine at the Jasna Gora monastery in Czestochowa. The
faithful travelled to celebrate the three-hundredth anniversary of the
'Black Madonna'. And the political focus of the religious man-
ifestation was clear to everyone in the country: Poland's overwhelming
Catholic majority demanded political rights and the release from
confinement of their Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski.
THE PARTY ACTIVISTS AND GOMULKA

At a meeting of Party activists at the Committee for Public
Security in early September, Ochab described the situation in the
country as a "sharp class struggle" and called for activists to "defend
the revolution." He described the 26 August manifestation as a "threat
to the Party" and argued that "nationalism and anti-Sovietism" was
spreading in Poland. 25 All to no avail. The emasculated security
apparatus was unable to act without a clear mandate from the divided
Party. The debates at the VII Plenum already forced the Party to alter
its interpretation of the causes of the Poznan revolt and future
military options had been effectively ruled out. The nation-wide
unrest continued under the watchful eye of the Soviets.26
24
Bienkowski, Socjologia kleski, pp. 41-42.
25
See Ptasinski, "Drugi z trzech zwrotow," p. 112.
26
Rokossowski flew to the Soviet Union for consultations on 24 August.
Cyrankiewicz and Ochab took the opportunity to appoint General Waclaw Komar commander
of the Internal Army (WW - Wojsko Wewnetrzne) while Rokossowski was on his way to
Moscow. Most studies on October 1956 mistakenly suggest that Komar was appointed
commander of the KBW. See for instance Andrew A. Michta, Red Eagle: The Army in
Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Stanford, 1990), p. 50. The WW should not be confused
with the KBW, which was directed by the MSW. The WW, under the command of the MON
and therefore Rokossowski, controlled the regular army units and garrisons in Poland
- 169 -
On September 11, Ochab, Jozwiak, Oskar Lange, and Mieczyslaw

Marzec travelled to Beijing to attend the VIII Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party.27 According to Ochab:
I was well aware that in the event of serious conflict in Poland the Soviet
Union would not hesitate to deal with it, however grave the complications.
That's why I tried to prevent a crisis situation and at the same time the
isolation of the PZPR in our socialist camp. We thought it particularly
important for the Chinese Party to be well informed (so that they would not
be surprised if anything happened) about our firm insistence on maintaining
the socialist course in the national and international policies.
The First Secretary could not longer deal with the crisis without
Gomulka's aid. Ochab continued:
In my conversations with Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai and Chou Te, I tried
to get across to our Chinese comrades some idea of our difficulties and our
plan for socialist victory over the crisis...[and] that we were intending
28
to include Gomulka in the Polish Party leadership.
Cyrankiewicz made unofficial contact with Gomulka on 11

September. The topic of their meeting centred on Cyrankiewicz's
political future and Gomulka's return to the Politburo.29 But the most
important political development in September was Zambrowski's decision
to support Gomulka. The two men also held their first meeting in secret
while Ochab negotiated with the Chinese leaders. Zambrowski put it
thus:
I came to the conclusion that I should meet with [Gomulka]. I turned to

Marysia Rutkiewiczowa, who acted as an intermediary during our discussions.
The talks lasted for hours...I asked him if he supported Po Prostu and if
that were normally on reserve within the Warsaw Treaty Organization military command
structure. The WW units usually focused their training on defensive manoeuvres.
Komar commanded the Second Unit, the military intelligence directorate at the
General Staff, until his arrest in 1952. All the accused in the 'Spaniards' case,
including Cols. Stanislaw Flato and Witold Leder, were Jews. (Komar served as
commanding officer of the Dabrowski Battalion and later the 129th International
Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. Flato served as a physician in Spain.)
Following almost a year of interrogation and torture, Komar confessed to the charges
of espionage but added that Bierut and Berman had been the actual heads of 'his American
spy network'. The interrogators decided to delay the trial of the 'Spaniards' in
order to continue the investigation. For further details see Michal Komar, "Listy
do redakcji," Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 91 (1990); Jozef Lewandowski, "Ludowe Wojsko
Polskie," ibid., no. 89 (1989); Tadeusz Pioro, "Przed Najwyzszym Sadem Wojskowym,
1951-1953: Procesy Odpryskowe," Polityka (17 September 1988); Wojciech Lizak,
"Aparat represji w Polsce w latach 1953-1955," Res Publica, no. 7 (1988); and Interview
with Antoni Skulbaszewski [the Soviet advisor in the GZI WP who interrogated Komar]
in Michal Komar and Lang, op. cit., pp. 174-189.
27
For details of the Chinese-Polish meeting see Jacques Levesque, "Chiny wobec
wydarzen pazdziernikowych 1956 r," Aneks, no. 18 (1978); and Interview with Ochab
in Toranska, pp. 64-71.
28
ibid., p. 67.
29
Namiotkiewicz, op. cit., p. 534. See also Ochab's comments in Toranska,
p. 65.
- 170 -
he also came to be swayed by their programme.30 We did not speak about his
return to the leadership. The situation in the country drove us to that
31
decision.
The First Secretary realized upon his return from Beijing that it was
the beginning of the end:
I'd heard earlier about various meetings that comrades from the leadership
were organizing for...[Gomulka] unofficially and behind my back.
Zambrowski started it; he laboured under the illusion that Gomulka had
changed...Zambrowski zealously strove to gain the support of the majority
in the Politburo for his claim that 'Wieslaw' had changed, had stopped
32
shouting and insulting his comrades.
The movement in the Party to appoint Gomulka to the Politburo also

mounted. "Party organizations in the great factories" as well as other
social institutions, Zambrowski recalled, "continuously demanded
Gomulka's return to the position of First Secretary."33 The resolution
adopted by the ZLP POP at its plenary meeting on September 28 stated:
The debates at the VII Plenum, which incidentally have not yet been made
available despite the need to uphold the principle of openness in Party life,
and many subsequent events in our political life, have revealed the existence
of a deep crisis of the leadership. It has also uncovered the existence
in the Central Committee and the Politburo of tendencies that block the
struggle for socialist democracy...The unhealthy compromise which concluded
the VII Plenum perpetuates the loss of trust in the Party among rank-and-file
Party members and...of the whole nation to the Party itself...We would like
to ask Comrade Gomulka, who by his unbowed stance has won the trust of the
nation, to present to the Party and the working class his views concerning
34
the basic problems of our life and the construction of socialism in Poland.
Over one thousand university students and representatives of

Warsaw's twenty largest enterprises took part in a mass meeting at the
University of Warsaw on 9 October. The protestors drafted an open
letter to all Polish students that called for the creation of a "new,
truly revolutionary political youth organization" which would "fight
for openness in political life, for the observance of the principle of
political responsibility, for a thorough review of the past, for workers
democracy and for a revolutionary transformation of the ZMP." The
letter also stated:
30
Gomulka met with Po Prostu journalists Walery Namiotkiewicz, Jan
Ambroziewicz, and Jan Olszewski on 6 September. Gomulka apparently made a great
impression of the journalists. See Namiotkiewicz, op. cit., p. 534; and Stare Numery,
pp. 60-61.
31
Emphasis added. Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 25 February 1971, pp. 62-63.
32
Emphasis added. Interview with Ochab in Toranska, p. 65.
33
34
Emphasis added. "Rezolucja POP przy ZLP w Warszawie z dnia 28 IX 1956" in
Gomulka i inni, pp. 98-100. See also "Rezolucja POP przy ZG ZLP z dnia 29 IX 1956"
in ibid., pp. 100-102.
- 171 -
Due to the existing system of press censorship, we should use all available
means to inform the inhabitants of Warsaw about the current situation. We
must use leaflets, exhibitions of satirical cartoons, mass meetings, and
35
so on.
The resolution passed on 11 October and presented to the Central

Committee by the KC INS POP read as follows:
The current economic and political situation in the country is alarming and
calls for the immediate creation of a reconstruction programme...We believe
it is imperative that Comrade Gomulka be allowed to take part in the
proceedings at the next KC plenum and is given the opportunity to present
his political position with full disclosure of those views to all Party
36
members.
The October resolution passed by Party organization at the WFM

machine plant in Warsaw also supported Gomulka's return to the
leadership and added:
We demand that the leadership end with the practice of secrecy in all
political and economic matters immediately...We must know precisely our
economic situation and our economic capabilities...One has to make the bold
decision to sack all those who either do not want or are afraid of
democracy...Under no circumstances should we return to the past practices,
when the Central Committee would decide and we would implement their
decisions. We want to participate in adopting resolutions, in working-out
37
of the Party's programme.
THE POLITBURO AND GOMULKA

The leadership assessed the political situation in the country
for the first time since Ochab's return from his two-week visit to China
during the Politburo meetings of 1 and 2 October. The first subject
on the agenda concerned Gomulka's views on the developing crisis. The
leadership therefore appointed the First Secretary to invite Gomulka
to the Buro's next meeting in order that the former PPR leader could
put forward his programme. The decision had been unavoidable and the
logical continuation of Gomulka's secret talks with individual
Politburo members. The details of Ochab's negotiations with Gomulka
are not known and the conditions under which Gomulka agreed to speak
to the Buro also remain uncovered. However, Gomulka probably demanded
that Ochab surrender the post of PZPR First Secretary. Zambrowski
35
36
Emphasis added. "Uchwala zebrania partyjnego POP INS przy KC PZPR z dnia
10-11 X 1956" in Gomulka i inni, pp. 104-107. See also "Rezolucja POP przy Instytucie
Historii Kultury Materialnej PAN z dnia 2 X 1956" in ibid., pp. 102-104; and "List
otwarty POP Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego z 13 X 1956 do KC PZPR" in ibid., pp. 107-109.
37
Zycie Partii, no. 10 (October 1956).
- 172 -
suggested that Ochab was angered by the turn of events and recalled the
First Secretary's reaction: "Then why did all of you choose me for only
a few months?"38
It appears that Gomulka's conditions were not met when the
Politburo gathered for their next round of meetings on 8 and 10 October.
The leadership continued to discuss the situation in the country and
concluded that
it was extremely difficult; that there were elements of a crisis, growing

distrust with the Party leadership and the government, demagogic demands
for wage increases, the spread of anti-soviet sentiments, and dissemination
39
of various little counterrevolutionary theories.
The Politburo blamed the press for its predicament:
there is no rejection of hostile views, there is no polemic with false

ideological stances. The Party press has failed to fulfil its task, it has
failed to launch an ideological offensive. On the contrary, it often adopts
incorrect positions -- thus deepening the existing ideological chaos.
The leadership also faulted Nowak for its troubles:
the incorrect speech concerning comrades of Jewish origin and delivered by

Comrade Nowak has caused a lot of harm, pushed the debates after the VII
Plenum in a wrong direction, and caused a huge wave of anti-semitism to engulf
40
Poland.
The Party leaders complained about "various rumours being spread

throughout the country and the leaking of comments made during
Politburo's meetings to the outside world" as well as the "particularly
difficult situation" in the ZLP. They also criticized the "activ-
ization of the clergy" and the "reactionary elements" within the ZSL
and SD. The leadership then condemned "the absence of unity in the
Politburo and discords concerning some aspects of democratization" and
the "lack of strong ties between the leadership and Party activists"
for the mushrooming of popular unrest. They added that the absence of
an "authoritative voice in the leadership" and "incorrect Polish-Soviet
relations" had been responsible for the wave of growing anti-Soviet
feelings.
38
39
Excerpts from the protocols of the 10 and 11 October Politburo meetings are
reprinted in "Polska proba," pp. 228-229.
40
Widespread rumours to the effect that Nowak had sanctioned at the VII Plenum
attacks against Polish Jews in the Party, for their 'complicity' during the Stalinist
years, fuelled anti-Semitic incidents in the country. Party activists of Jewish
origin demanded that the leadership initiate disciplinary procedures against Nowak,
Klosiewicz, Ruminski, and others. See Biuletyn, 5 October 1956, no. 33, p. 1.
- 173 -
Politburo members cited the burdensome coal prices demanded by

the Soviets, including the Kremlin's "refusal to accept Polish citizen-
ship by senior military commanders,"41 as the fundamental causes of "the
anti-Soviet manifestations" in Poland. The most scathing remark was
reserved for Ponomarenko and "the constant meddling of the Soviet
Ambassador in the internal affairs of Poland." The Politburo also
resolved to consider the "emotional and pressing matter of the return
to Poland of Polish citizens still held in the USSR" and the "issue of
Soviet officers serving in the Polish Army." The most important
decision, however, concerned Hilary Minc, the architect of the Six-Year
Plan. The PZPR leaders demanded and received Minc's resignation from
the Politburo and the government on 10 October.
THE POLITBURO MEETING OF 12 OCTOBER

Two days after the last member of Poland's Stalinist triumvirate
had been removed from power, Gomulka agreed to attend his first Polit-
buro meeting since the campaign against the 'rightist-nationalist
deviation' of 1948-1949. Ochab began the 12 October meeting by stating
that the Party continued to experience difficulties because of "errors
committed in the past" and as a result of the "strong pressure exerted
by hostile and alien tendencies" in the PZPR. 42 Gomulka, however,
disagreed with the First Secretary and outlined his programme.43 He
argued that Poland's
current state of affairs is not a result of the past few months, but of a
concrete policy carried out during the Six-Year Plan...our present economic
situation reflects the whole of that period...Here lie the answers to our
current problems. Comrades, you see the causes of the difficulties only
in the political sphere. This is not correct. Our present political
situation is a result of economic failures. We are not talking about a
precise evaluation of the past, but if the evaluation contained in the
resolution of the VII Plenum is true, why are things so bad? We have created
a massive industrial infrastructure and that should have given us a colossal
increase in production. Why are the shortages so acute? Why is there a
hole in our budget? Comrades, your evaluation of the Six-Year Plan is not
correct.
Gomulka continued:
41
For details see below.
42
"Notatka o posiedzeniu Biura Politycznego KC PZPR w dniu 12 X 1956" in
Gomulka i inni, pp. 89-90.
43
"Tresc wystapienia Wladyslawa Gomulki w dniu 12 X 1956 na posiedzeniu Biura
Politycznego KC PZPR" in ibid., pp. 90-96.
- 174 -
A great harm has been done, but no one takes responsibility for those losses,
as if public funds could have been used in any way. It seems that it is
possible to waste public wealth...We simply cannot grant ourselves an
amnesty just like that.
The former leader also criticised the system of collective farming

and the Party's attempts to eradicate private farms:
Only economic results should allow us to speak of this or that policy as

being desirable. It is absolutely clear to me that we have put socialism
in the countryside on its head. Comrade Ochab said that collective farms
were our goal and that we would never abandon it. All right, but please
tell me -- do we have a programme of limiting agricultural production? No,
we do not have such a programme. But the practical results tells us just
that. That is why I'm questioning the validity of the agricultural policy
presented in the VII Plenum, which was based on the resolution adopted at
the V Plenum.
On the question of political responsibility for the Stalinist

past, Gomulka told the Politburo that "every person has the right to
hold his own views...[but] certain people must be punished" for
"deliberate provocations." Gomulka added:
Many things were clear, but Politburo members did not want to investigate
them in a conclusive manner. Members of various commissions set up in the
past investigated themselves. Comrades, the personality cult and the Beria
deviation are two different things. We have so far failed to reach the
necessary conclusions. Those guilty of abuses have been arrested - and this
is good - but they are not the only guilty people. I would like to stress
that this matter is still facing the leadership and the Party.
Gomulka stressed that the problem of Soviet advisors in Poland's

security apparatus needed to be "untangled" and that the Soviet control
of the Polish military was "not an example of normal relations." He
argued that "Polish-Soviet relations is a great problem" which had to
be "normalized" in order to "forestall anti-Soviet manifestations."
Gomulka stressed that the "Polish raison d'etre as well as the fact that
we are also building socialism demanded that...future relations [with
the Kremlin] be devoid of conflicts."
On the existence of so-called factions in the Party, Gomulka again
disagreed with Ochab and maintained:
I do not see these factions or splinter groups. Party members and, above
all, those in the leadership simply cannot voice their views, especially
if those views differ with other Party leaders. A 'group' must have its
own distinctive platform...Where are those anonymous groups? Since when
have Communists adopted such a stance? If you want to lead a Party of one
and a half million members...[you must realize that] there comes a time when
the differences within the leadership may divide the Party. We must
approach the Party organizations with our differences and have a genuine
debate about them.
Gomulka concluded his remarks to the Politburo with the following

statement:
- 175 -
The resolutions of the VII Plenum are not going to solve the problems of
our country...Comrades, you have failed to notice the climate prevailing
among the working class and the nation...Everything that has so far been
done...was wrong...It is possible to rule a nation without enjoying its
trust, but such rule can only be maintained with bayonets. Whoever chooses
that option also chooses the path of universal calamity. We cannot return
to the old methods. Our current difficulties stem from the Party's
weakness, from our inconsistency.
He also insisted that the leadership recommend to the Central Committee

his appointment to the PZPR Politburo:
I do not have enough strength to take up the challenges of active work and
present conditions do not encourage one to do so. However, a peculiar
political situation has arisen and one simply cannot escape its
consequences. This is why I shall not refrain from political
activities...Until now you have prevented me from doing so, but should you
change your minds today I will not say no. I would like to emphasise that...I
consider my views to be correct and I will not retreat. I will be appealing
to the Party leadership and even to Party organizations throughout the
country. I will make my doubts known. I am a stubborn person. I would
like you to know this.
Ochab agreed to nominate Gomulka as well as some of his closest

political allies for membership in the Politburo at the VIII Plenum,
which was set to take place on 17 October. The Buro also established
a 'leadership-search' commission consisting of Cyrankiewicz, Ochab,
Zawadzki, and Gomulka. The mandate of the special commission, which
excluded the leading hardliners, was to prepare a list of candidates
for the new Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Presidium of the Council
of Ministers.
The hardliners in the Politburo must have felt betrayed by
Gomulka's apparent shift towards the reformers. It was also through
the hardliners, and Marshal Rokossowski specifically, that the Soviets
received word of Gomulka's programme. Rokossowski and his allies in
the Party took the initiative and began to prepare a campaign of threats
against the Politburo and the proposed changes to Party policies
outlined by Gomulka.
ROKOSSOWSKI AND THE SOVIET ADVISORS

Rokossowski's first loyalty was to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev
characterized the Marshal in his memoirs thus: "Although he was a Pole,
he was not a Polish Pole, but a Soviet Pole."44 While Rokossowski became
the symbol of Soviet domination and some outside observers considered
44
The Glasnost Tapes, p. 119. See also The Last Testament, p. 176.
- 176 -
him the real ruler of Poland,45 the Marshal largely confined himself
to military affairs and generally did not interfere in Party matters.
Swiatlo confirmed that Rokossowski attended Politburo meetings only on
occasion and added that the minster of defence rarely discussed the
military with the Buro.46 Rokossowski finally entered the debate over
de-Stalinization when Gomulka threatened to dismiss the Soviet advisors
in the Polish military.
The Marshal's orders came directly from the Kremlin and it is
doubtful that the CPSU Politburo had changed its policy towards the
maintenance of a modern, reliable Polish military loyal to the Soviet
Union. 47 Rokossowski's principal duty was to safeguard the
'Sovietized' status of the Polish officer corps, which Soviet officers
had constructed after Spychalski was removed from the Polish Army in
1949. 48 The expansion of the Polish military during the Stalinist
years, combined with the purge of the officer corps during the 'rightist
deviation' campaign, created the requisite conditions for the massive
recruitment of young officers from among Polish workers and peasants.
During Rokossowski's tenure in Poland, the percentage of officers from
the working class and peasantry rose from 60.0% in 1946 to 86.0% in 1957.
Most of the new officers also received their leadership and political
training in the USSR.49
The Polish officer corps had been the most 'Sovietized' in Eastern
Europe. There were also Soviet general officers, usually with Polish
or Polish-sounding names, in command of almost every senior military
post in October 1956: Marshal Rokossowski, minister of defence and
commander-in-chief; General Bordzilowski, vice-minister and chief of
the General Staff; and General Poplawski, commander of the land forces.
Soviet generals also commanded the four military districts of Warsaw,
Bydgoszcz, Wroclaw, and Cracow.50
45
U.S. ambassador Richard T. Davies labelled Rokossowski the "Soviet viceroy"
in Poland. See his "The View From Poland" in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., Witnesses to
the Origins of the Cold War (Seattle, 1982), p. 272.
46
Mowi Jozef Swiatlo, pp. 41-42.
47
On the modernization of the Polish Army see J.M. Mackintosh, "The Satellite
Armies" in B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Soviet Army (London, 1956), pp. 439-460.
48
On 19 August the government already issued an order to reduce the size of
the military, including the officer corps, by 50,000. Trybuna Ludu (19 August 1956).
49
Jozef Graczyk, "Social Promotion in the Polish People's Army," in Jacques
van Doorn, ed., Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts
(The Hague and Paris, 1969), p. 88.
50
Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 439-445.
- 177 -
Almost all the Soviet advisors resided in postwar Poland for over
a decade and it was reported that a number of them had been reluctant
to return to the Soviet Union. The former vice-minister of defence and
chief of the General Staff, General Wladyslaw Korczyc, had to be ordered
back to the USSR in 1954 because he had apparently "caught the Polish
bug." 51 Gomulka clearly indicated his desire to have the Soviets
removed from Poland, while it was not evident that the unique services
of all the Soviet advisors would be required back in the Soviet Union.
He informed the Politburo on 12 December that the Soviets had broken
an agreement negotiated with Stalin in 1948 on the exact role and number
of Soviet advisors in Poland.52 The Kremlin must have felt that the
loyalty of the Polish Army was threatened by the reinstatement of Poles
into the upper echelons of the military.53
Zambrowski wrote in his diary that in addition to the military
advisors, the Soviet embassy in Warsaw controlled a sophisticated
network of agents and informers who penetrated all areas of political
and economic life in Poland:
In the most sensitive areas, there simply existed a state within a

state...Soviet interference in our internal affairs was more or less an open
occurrence sometimes sanctioned by official agreements...[We were] aware
of the existence also of covert cells of various kinds of Soviet agents and
54
informers inside the Party apparatus.
As of 1 July 1945, some 16,400 officers from a total of 40,000

in the Polish Army had been former Red Army officers. 55 Soviet
advisors made up 7.7% of the Polish officer corps in 1947. The figure
had dropped to 3.6% in 1950 and to 0.4%, about 168 senior and general
officers, in 1956.56 This did not include the Soviet officers stationed
51
Cited in Checinski, Poland, p. 58, footnote no. 4. Korczyc eventually
returned and resettled in Poland after 1956.
52
Gomulka i inni, p. 94. No further information was given by Gomulka.
53
Bordzilowski replaced Rokossowski from 21 October to 13 November 1956.
Another thirty-two high-ranking Soviet officers were ordered back to the Soviet Union
on 5 November. Bordzilowski, however, did not return to the Soviet Union until 1968,
when he finally retired from active duty in the Polish Army. Teresa
Rakowska-Harmstone; Christopher Jones; and Ivan Sylvain, Warsaw Pact: The Question
of Cohesion (Ottawa, 1984), p. 63.
54
Zambrowski, "Dziennik," 30 March 1971, p. 80. There are no reliable
statistics on the number of Soviet civilian advisors that operated in Poland during
this period. But such a list would have included thousands of officials who worked
inside the security and Party apparatus, state administration, and industry.
55
This figure fell from 40.0% in January 1945.
56
See Ignacy Blum, "Rola partii w organizacji i ksztaltowaniu ludowego
charakteru Wojska Polskiego," Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny, no. 2, vol. 7 (January
1962), pp. 86 and 91; Graczyk, Problemy socjologiczne Ludowego Wojska Polskiego
(Warsaw, 1972), p. 73; and Tadeusz Konecki, "Zawodowe szkolnictwo Ludowego Wojska
- 178 -
with Red Army troops on Polish soil. While the number of Soviet
advisors declined significantly, especially after 1953, the Polish
General Staff was largely manned by the Soviets in October 1956. Any
attempt to 'Polonize' the Polish Army would have created considerable
problems for Rokossowski and the other Soviets who had remained in
Poland.
SUMMARY
The extent to which the popular unrest as well as the turmoil in
the Party had been introduced by the reformers among the Central Party
aktiv rather than spontaneously induced remains a controversial
question. There can be no doubt, however, that the preceding events
were more than the mere product of what sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis
calls "artificial negativity." 57 Her argument that the
de-Stalinization campaign between the VII and VIII Plenum "was
apparently directed by that part of the ruling elite ["Zambrowski's
faction," as Staniszkis calls them] that was aware of the urgent need
for some symbolic gestures if only to relieve social frustrations" is
only partially true. 58 Staniszkis underestimates the tenacity and
collective power of both Polish society and the Party rank-and-file in
1956. The ultimate objective of those who opposed the communist system
generally as compared to those who wanted to reform it may have been
significantly different, but for many the immediate goal was the same:
the return of Gomulka to power.
Staniszkis also assumes that the accusations levelled at the
hardliners by the reformers were merely ploys to confuse public opinion.
She argues:
the debates [at the VII Plenum] were held in closed session and the full
texts of the speeches were not published...[The reformers] extensively
exploited rumours and gossip [about the hardliners] to pin such labels as
'anti-intellectuals', 'anti-Semites', 'yokels', and 'enemies of democracy'
upon certain Central Committee members...thus tuning the people's attention
away from fundamental problems. The labels were based on word-of-mouth
versions of speeches at the Seventh Plenum, very often at variance with the
59
real statements.
Polskiego w pierwszym powojennym dziesiecioleciu," Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny,

no. 2, vol. 19 (April-June 1974), p. 358.
57
Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 278.
58
ibid.
59
ibid., pp. 293-294. This part of Staniszkis's argument is based on the
conclusions reached by Jedlicki, also a sociologist, in his article "Chamy i Zydy."
- 179 -
To suggest, as Staniszkis does, that the reformers simply wanted to

"manoeuvre" and "whitewash and certainly divert public attention from
such members of the ruling group as Cyrankiewicz...Zambrowski...and
some others" who were responsible for the Stalinist period, while the
"'yokels' like Klosiewicz, Lapot...Ruminski, and Nowak were labelled
'neo-Stalinists' and 'anti-intellectuals', and were thrown as prey to
the public," belies the documentary evidence.60
Some of the reformers may have magnified their own partiality to
radical democratization of the political and economic system, but they
hardly exaggerated the anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic bent of many
of the hardliners, including the desire on the part of the hardliners
to reemploy Stalinist methods. The Witaszewski affair, Nowak's speech
to the VII Plenum, and the mixed conclusions reached by the Gierek report
in particular, attests to the unreconstructed dogmatism of the
hardliners. Furthermore, both the reformers and the hardliners
equally attempted to 'whitewash' their role during the Stalinist years
throughout the period following the XX CPSU Congress.
The reformers had indeed wanted to protect their privileged
positions. Yet so did the hardliners. Many PZPR activists of Jewish
origin also feared -- not without good cause -- that they would be made
the scapegoats for the so-called 'errors and distortions' of the past.
Staniszkis misunderstood the nature of the political struggle that took
place in 1956. Her suggestion that "Staszewski...arranged the popular
'spontaneous' support for Gomulka" in order to direct attention from
his active involvement "in carrying out collectivization in the
country" is also questionable.61 There is no evidence that Staszewski
ever truly fell under Gomulka's spell, except for his own often
contradictory statements made many years later. Gomulka's leading
advocates among the ruling elite included people who were at odds with
one another: Klosiewicz, Ruminski, Albrecht, Morawski, and later
Zambrowski. For a short period before 12 October Gomulka could also
count on Rokossowski and possibly even Khrushchev, while his most ardent
critic remained Ochab.
The events from February to October and from July to the VIII
Plenum in particular were more than the consequence of 'reform from
above'. While the reformers controlled and supervised the propaganda
60
ibid., p. 254.
61
ibid., p. 294.
- 180 -
apparatus, they lacked coherent organization, leadership, and a

programme. The hardliners and reformers adjusted their political
positions according to the prevailing mood in the country. When the
winds of change shifted in favour of the reformers, the hardliners
decided to act against the wishes of public opinion and the interests
of the Polish state.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE VIII KC PZPR PLENUM
The most important political problems facing the PZPR were

resolved between 19 and 21 October. The VIII KC PZPR Plenum was held
during this period, as were the unscheduled talks between the leadership
of the Polish Party and a high-powered delegation from the Soviet Union.
The three days in October resolved two outstanding political contests:
the struggle between the hardliners and the reformers in the power
elite, and the conflict between the Party and society. Furthermore,
the Soviet-Polish confrontation established a new framework of
relations between the CPSU and the PZPR. The whole country took part
in the events that led to the demise of the hardliners and created the
conditions for a more equitable relationship between the Soviet Union
and the PRL. Almost every Pole who participated in the events of
October 1956 felt that he or she had made history.
The debate over the VIII Plenum continued in the Politburo on
October 15. The leadership concluded that "there would be no keynote
speech and Comrade Ochab's introductory remarks would merely present
the situation within the Politburo." 1 They also decided to hold
another Buro meeting and postpone the plenum until 19 October. The
Politburo then released a short communique to the press, published on
16 October, which announced the date of the plenum as well as the first
public indication that Gomulka participated in a Politburo meeting.2
At the Buro meeting held on 17 October, Ochab revealed that "Roman
Nowak, Chelchowski, and Stawinski resigned from the leadership." He
added that on the recommendation of the 'leadership-search' commission
the following were to be nominated to the new Politburo: Cyrankiewicz,
Gomulka, Jedrychowski, Loga-Sowinski, Morawski, Ochab, Rapacki, and
Zambrowski. The new Secretariat was to include Albrecht, Gierek,
Gomulka, Jarosinski, Ochab, Matwin, and Zambrowski. Spychalski and
Kliszko were to be coopted into the Central Committee. Ochab also
offered the post of First Secretary to Gomulka. The commission
excluded all the leading hardliners from the Politburo and Secretariat,
including Dworakowski, Jozwiak, Mazur, Zenon Nowak, and Rokossowski.3
At a conference of the Party aktiv in Rzeszow on 22 December,
Gomulka declared that there had been one vote against and one abstention
1
Excerpts from the protocols of the 15 and 17 October Politburo meetings are
reprinted in "Polska proba," pp. 228-229.
2
3
See "Polska proba," pp. 228-229.
- 182 -
during the Buro's debate on the leadership question. 4 In another

speech, given on 27 October to the Party activists in the Polish Army,
Gomulka announced: "It could be said that I had considerable influence
on the choice of all the new candidates to the Politburo." 5 Ochab
admitted that he had been forced into surrendering the top post to
Gomulka:
I didn't hand [power] over: I submitted to the will of...the Politburo. I

handed it over with a heavy heart...I had a choice: either put the matter of
Gomulka's election to the post of First Secretary at the KC forum and come out
against it, which would in fact be playing along with the slogans or suggestions
of the interveners, or go along with the majority decision of the Politburo.6
THE THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

The Soviet threat came to the fore when the leader of the so-called
'progressive Catholics' in Poland, Boleslaw Piasecki, a known non-Party
supporter of the PZPR hardliners, published his infamous warning to
Polish society.7 The article, entitled "The Instinct of the State,"
appeared on 16 October. According to the leader of the PAX Association:
Only a feeling of responsibility for the nation and the state can limit the debate
[on democratization]...in the present situation the possibility of governing
Poland depends on setting a limit to this discussion...otherwise we shall
provoke, instead of democratization, the necessity for a brutal implementation
of the raison d'etat, in circumstances similar to martial law.8
Piasecki's allusion to Soviet military intervention in Poland was

clearly understood by Polish society.9
4
CA KC PZPR, 237/V-280. Werblan recently argued that Mazur abstained and
Rokossowski voted against the proposed changes in the leadership. Interview with
Werblan, November 1988.
5
"Przemowienie tow. Wladyslawa Gomulki-Wieslawa wygloszone w dniu 27
pazdzierniku 1956 r. na ogolnokrajowej naradzie aktywu partyjnego Wojska Polskiego"
(Warsaw, 1956), p. 4.
6
7
Piasecki was the leader of the National-Radical Camp, an extreme right-wing
and anti-Semitic group, during the interwar period. Piasecki fought the Nazis and
the Soviets during World War II. He was arrested and subsequently recruited by the
NKVD in 1945 in order to help subvert Poland's Roman Catholic Church. Piasecki
founded the PAX Association and became editor-in-chief of the 'progressive Catholic'
press, namely Slowo Powszechne and Kierunki, shortly after his release by the NKVD.
Although Piasecki opposed Gomulka in 1956, he remained a prominent figure in Polish
politics until his death in 1979. See Antoni Dudek and Grzegorz Pytel, Boleslaw
Piasecki: Proba biografii politycznej (London, 1990), ch. 4; and Lucjan Blit, The
Eastern Pretender. Boleslaw Piasecki: His Life and Times (London, 1965).
8
The Slowo Powszechne article is reprinted in Kozik and Eugeniusz Grzedzinski,
Polska w latach 1945-1956: Wybor tekstow zrodlowych do nauczania historii (Warsaw,
1987), p. 169-173.
9
Another threat of Soviet intervention came from Klemens Krzyzagorski, in an
article in Glos Pracy (18 October 1956), entitled "Beware demagogues." Glos Pracy
was the propaganda arm of the CRZZ and controlled by Klosiewicz.
- 183 -
The atmosphere in Warsaw grew extremely tense when news spread

that the Politburo's nomination of Gomulka for the post of First
Secretary was opposed by Rokossowski and the Party hardliners. The
threat of marshal law, coupled with reports about the imminent arrest
of Party reformers, resulted in the further mobilization of Polish
society, and particularly the inhabitants of Warsaw. Ochab and the
PZPR Politburo was not unaware of the threats:
I don't know whether any plans to deal with us in the event of intervention had
been prepared...I imagine that some lackeys from the [Soviet] embassy, in
security and in the army must also have received their instructions...perhaps
some lists did exist of who was to be arrested...My name was on top of that list
[of 700 names]...In my opinion the whole thing was instigated by Rokossowski
and the people who had contact with the Soviet embassy.10
In the days immediately preceding the VIII Plenum, thousands of people

in Warsaw and in other Polish cities were afraid to stay in their homes
overnight. Persistent rumours to the effect that the hardliners were
planning a coup d'état, radically transformed the political situation
in Poland.
A long series of spontaneous mass meetings, some inspired or
organized by Party reformers and rank-and-file activists, took place
throughout Poland in factories, enterprises, and universities.11 As
Warsaw Party secretary Kuzinski recently declared:
I decided...to seek support in several large industrial enterprises...The fact

that I had known [Lechoslaw] Godzik [the charismatic leader of the Zeran workers]
made the Zeran workforce the best informed part of Warsaw's working class. They
were the first to learn about the arguments and tendencies within the leadership,
which were never described in the press...The divisions...were a fact and it
was simply impossible to conceal them from the workers' activists. So I kept
them informed, but I divulged those facts only to several of the largest
factories.12
10
Interview with Ochab in Toranska, p. 77. Mazur repeated his performance of
6 March (during the Buro's conflict with Rokossowski over Spychalski), and flew to
Moscow on 13 October. He did not return to Poland until 6 November 1956. For further
details see Chapter 4, footnote no. 28. The New York Times reported on 9 November
1956 that Mazur went to the Soviet Union to "play the role of Kadar" and Poland's
ambassador, Lewikowski, asked for political asylum in the Soviet Union. Although
these allegations cannot be proven without access to Soviet documents, they were
widely believed at the time.
11
Zambrowski is largely credited for gaining the backing of the pro-Gomulka
constituency among the KW secretaries and other middle and lower-level Party and
government functionaries who had previously sided with the hardliners in the
leadership, but who were reluctant to withdraw their support for Gomulka after the
dramatic turn of events following the 12 October Politburo meeting. See "Projekt
listu KC PZPR do instancji partyjnych z pazdziernika 1956" in Gomulka i inni, pp.
86-89; and "Narada I sekretarzy komitetow wojewodzkich i kierownikow wydzialow KC
5 X 1956" in ibid., pp. 72-78.
12
Kuzinski, op. cit.
- 184 -
The protesters aimed to ensure that the democratization campaign

continued. They were also determined to prevent Soviet intervention
in Polish affairs. Kolakowski described the process thus:
apart from articulated propaganda, there exists also an esoteric propaganda,

which is sometimes more important, and which cannot be formulated in speeches
and articles, but must somehow be conveyed to the people...This unspoken ideology
is an ideology of the fear of Soviet tanks, imparted by the use of the most varied
forms of allusion.13
Workers, students, and anyone else who wanted to join the mass
protests called for unity against the hardliners in the Party and
demanded the restoration of Polish independence. The rhetoric of
nationalism and socialism was used to gain wide support for Gomulka.
The Party organization at the Zeran truck factory in Warsaw sent the
following message to the Central Committee during a rally on 18 October:
We expect that the VIII Plenum will adopt a resolution, apart from the correct
political and economic decisions, pertaining to personnel matters reflecting
the views of the Party rank-and-file. We believe deeply that the Politburo to
be elected at the VIII Plenum will understand and support our demands and will
lead the creative movement which has recently appeared in our Party.14
The mixed gathering of workers and students who participated in a

meeting at the Warsaw Polytechnic drafted the following letter on the
eve of the plenum:
We think that the alliance with the USSR, China, and other people's democracies
should remain the foundation of our foreign and economic policy. This alliance
cannot, however, in any way encroach upon the sovereignty of the allies and their
ability to chose their own road to socialism.15
THE SOVIETS ARRIVE IN WARSAW

Ponomarenko, the Soviet ambassador, informed Ochab on the evening
of 18 October that the CPSU Politburo had decided to send a delegation
to Warsaw in order to discuss the situation in the PZPR and the country
with the Polish leadership. Ponomarenko added that Moscow was alarmed
by the growing anti-Soviet manifestation in Poland. 16 Ochab
immediately gathered the Politburo to meet with Ponomarenko at the
13
Kolakowski, "Hope and Hopelessness," Survey (Summer 1971), p. 46.
14
Cited in Mojsiewicz, op. cit.
15
Cited in ibid. See also Krzysztof Pomian, "Narodziny organizacji
studenckiej," Zycie Partii (October 1956).
16
Anti-Soviet episodes were best reflected in numerous attacks on buildings
housing Polish-Soviet Friendship Societies, in acts of sabotage of Polish exports
to the Soviet Union, and public boycotts of Soviet cultural events. University
students also printed and distributed thousands of leaflets with unfavourable
caricatures of the Kremlin leadership and their supporters in the Polish Party.
- 185 -
Central Committee. They suggested to Ponomarenko that the Soviet

delegation arrive during the second or the third day of the plenum.
Only Rokossowski was of the opinion that the Soviet delegation should
be met before the plenum. Ponomarenko agreed with Rokossowski and
informed the Polish leaders that a Soviet delegation, headed by
Khrushchev, would arrive in Warsaw shortly before the plenum began on
the morning of 19 October.17
The CPSU delegation arrived in Warsaw uninvited at about 7:00 a.m.
According to Khrushchev:
We learned from our ambassador [in Warsaw] that the tensions which had been
building up had boiled over. Tumultuous demonstrations and general turmoil had
broken out at factories in some cities. These outbreaks had distinctly
anti-Soviet overtones. Some Poles were criticizing Soviet policy toward
Poland, saying that the treaty signed was unequal and that the Soviet Union was
taking unfair advantage of Poland economically [...]
The demonstrators also demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish
territory...We had further reason to worry when certain elements began to protest
the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army was Marshal Rokossowski
[...]
As the opposition gained strength, it began to have an impact on the
leadership. In no time at all Ochab became impotent. He could no longer
determine policy. People stopped obeying him [...]
In short, it looked to us as though the developments in Poland were rushing
forward on the crest of a giant anti-Soviet wave. Meetings were being held all
over the country, and we were afraid Poland might break away from us at any
moment...The situation was such we had to be ready to resort to arms.18
The Soviet leader added:

the Soviet Union was being reviled with abusive language and the [Polish]
government was close to being overthrown. The people rising to the top were
those whose mood was anti-Soviet. This might threaten our lines of
communication and access to Germany through Poland. Therefore, we decided to
take certain measures to maintain contact with our troops in the German
Democratic Republic.
We decided to send a delegation to Poland and have a talk with the Polish
leadership. They recommended that we not come. Their reluctance to meet with
us heightened our concern even more. So we decided to go there in a large
delegation.
Khrushchev's dramatic encounter with Ochab, Cyrankiewicz,

Zawadzki, Zambrowski, and Gomulka at Warsaw airport, began on an angry
note. The Soviet leader recalled that the "meeting was cool. You
could see great concern on the face of Ochab. We began speaking harshly
in raised voices."19 Ochab's recollection of the meeting was similar
to the account given by Khrushchev:
17
See Interview with Ochab in Toranska, pp. 73-75.
18
The Last Testament, pp. 199-200.
19
The Glasnost Years, pp. 114-115. Philippe Ben reported in Le Monde on 22
November 1956 that Khrushchev called the Polish leaders "traitors" and accused them
of having plotted with the United States and "the Zionists" to force Poland out of
the Soviet bloc.
- 186 -
I went to the airport...Khrushchev arrived about a quarter of an hour later.

He'd barely come off the plane when he began demonstratively to shake his fist
at us from a distance. He went up to the Soviet generals, a whole row of them,
and greeted them first. It was only after that he came up to us and started
brandishing his fist under my nose again.
Ochab continued:
I said to him: we are at our own Polish capital; there's no need to make a scene
at the airport. We're going to the Belvedere [Presidential] Palace, which is
where we normally receive our guests. Once at the Belvedere I told him: we
won't call off the plenum. I've spent a good few years in prison and I'm not
afraid...We're responsible for our country and we do whatever we think fit,
because they're our internal affairs. We're not doing anything to jeopardize
the interests of our allies, particulary the interests of the Soviet Union.
He also added:
Khrushchev was still shouting: we'll see who's an enemy of the Soviet Union!
Then Gomulka spoke: Ochab's an enemy, Gomulka's enemy, it's the same thing all
over again, just as before. Then Khrushchev said to him: we're happy to see
you, we bring you greetings; we have nothing against you, but he -- pointing
at me -- he didn't consult us.20
The first meeting with the Soviets lasted until about 9:30 a.m.
The Poles and the Soviets agreed that the plenum would begin that morning
in order for Gomulka to be elected to the Central Committee, but no other
decision would be taken by the plenum until the meeting with the Soviets
had ended.
THE PLENUM COMMENCES

The long-awaited VIII Plenum began at 10:00 a.m. Ochab opened
the gathering with a brief statement and added: "I shall limit myself
in this introduction to a report on the latest decisions of the
Politburo." 21 He announced that the Buro had decided to include
Gomulka, Spychalski, Kliszko, and Loga-Sowinski in the Central
Committee. Ochab continued:
the Politburo proposes serious changes to its composition, for the number of
its members to be limited to nine in order to secure unity and greater efficiency,
and proposes the election of Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka for the post of First
Secretary.
Ochab appealed to the plenum for "responsibility and wisdom" and

declared: "We are meeting here in a difficult political situation."
His next comment came as a shock to many of the delegates:
20
21
The quotations from the VIII Plenum are taken from the extensive report of
the proceedings published in a special issue of Nowe Drogi, no. 10 (October 1956).
See also Syrop, op. cit., pp. 89-97.
- 187 -
I would also like to inform you, Comrades, that a delegation of the Presidium
of the Central Committee of the CPSU, composed of Comrades Khrushchev,
Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov arrived in Warsaw this morning. The delegation
wishes to conduct talks with our Politburo.
Ochab suggested that the plenum accept Gomulka and his colleagues
into the Central Committee and that the proceedings be delayed until
6:00 p.m. Jaworska interjected and demanded to know why it was
necessary to adjourn the plenum. Ochab quickly explained: "It arises
out of the necessity to conduct talks with the delegation of the
Presidium of the CPSU, which is already in Warsaw."
Tatarkowna-Majkowska wanted to know who would represent the Polish
delegation during the discussions with the Soviets and proposed that
a new Politburo be elected to take part in the talks. Her motion was
rejected. Granas asked Ochab to outline the topic of the Buro's meeting
with the Soviets. Ochab abruptly replied: "Soviet-Polish relations"
and called for an immediate vote on the Buro's decision to readmit
Gomulka and the others to the Central Committee. The plenum unanimous-
ly accepted Ochab's proposition. The old Politburo and Gomulka were
also empowered to conduct talks with the CPSU delegation.
The debate barely lasted half an hour before the plenum was
deferred. The Polish delegation that went to the Belvedere Palace to
meet with the Soviets included: Cyrankiewicz, Dworakowski, Gierek,
Jozwiak, Roman Nowak, Zenon Nowak, Ochab, Rapacki, Rokossowski,
Zambrowski, Zawadzki, Chelchowski, Jedrychowski, Stawinski, and
Gomulka. The Soviet delegation consisted of the following political
and military leaders: Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, the
Soviet minister of defence, Marshal Zhukov, the commander of the Warsaw
Pact forces, Marshal Konev, and the Chief of Staff of the Red Army,
General Antonov.
The Soviet leadership largely accepted the hostile dispatches
sent by Ponomarenko, Rokossowski, Lewikowski, and the other hardliners
at face value. While the plenum debated Gomulka's return to the Central
Committee, Khrushchev held a meeting with his generals. The CPSU First
Secretary wrote in his memoirs:
Marshal Konev and I held separate consultations with Comrade Rokossowski, who
was more obedient to us but had less authority than the other Polish leaders.
He told us that anti-Soviet, nationalistic, and reactionary forces were growing
in strength, and that if it were necessary to arrest the growth of these
counterrevolutionary elements by force of arms, he was at our disposal; we could
rely on him to do whatever was necessary to preserve Poland's socialist gains
and to assure Poland's continuing fidelity and friendship. That was all very
well and good, but as we began to analyze the problem in more detail and calculate
which Polish regiments we could count on to obey Rokossowski, the situation began
- 188 -
to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed strength far exceeded that
of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use of our own troops [...]
After the first Soviet encounter with Gomulka, however,

Khrushchev must have been reassured that the newly proposed PZPR First
Secretary was not as hostile to the Soviet Union as some of the
hardliners suggested. His first instinct, based on the initial support
given to Gomulka by the PZPR hardliners, had been to favour Gomulka's
return to the leadership. The invitation extended some months earlier
to Gomulka through Ochab for a meeting in the Crimea attests to this.
The Soviet leadership decided to act, but not recklessly.
Khrushchev wanted to gauge Gomulka's loyalty to the Soviet Union.
As he later put it:
our embassy informed us that a genuine revolt was on the verge of breaking out
in Warsaw. For the most part these demonstrations were being organized in
support of the new leadership headed by Gomulka, which we too were prepared to
support, but the demonstrations also had a dangerously anti-Soviet character.22
The Soviet leader added that Gomulka held
a position which was most advantageous for us. Here was a man who had come to
power on the crest of an anti-Soviet wave, yet who could now speak forcefully
about the need to preserve Poland's friendly relations with the Soviet Union
and the Soviet Communist Party.23
Ochab recently confirmed that Khrushchev manifested a sympathetic

attitude towards Gomulka: "Basically our Soviet friends wanted to make
Gomulka First Secretary." He continued:
At one point Khrushchev said to [Gomulka]: we bring you greetings. Presumably

they thought Gomulka would put the country in order and was the one to stake
their bets on...But Gomulka...displayed considerable toughness of character
during those difficult talks.24
THE SOVIET-POLISH CONFRONTATION

The Soviet-Polish talks began at about 11:00 a.m. on 19 October
and ended at 3:00 a.m. on 20 October. Ochab returned to the plenum at
6:00 p.m. on 19 October and presented a brief report to the Central
Committee:
I would like to inform you, Comrades, that conversations between our Politburo
and the Soviets, which were conducted in a forthright manner, have lasted several
hours. They concern the most fundamental problems of the relations between our
countries and our Parties...Since our Soviet comrades unexpectedly had to take
the decision to fly to Warsaw and they are anxious to return as soon as possible,
22
23
ibid., p. 205.
24
- 189 -
we would like to continue our talks tonight and the Politburo recommends that
the plenum be adjourned till tomorrow morning.
The details of the heated discussions are not known, although the
focus had been largely on Gomulka and Rokossowski. Until the Soviets
could be sure of Gomulka's position they were determined to guarantee
that no changes in the PZPR Politburo took place. During the initial
stages of the discussions, the Soviet delegation argued for a return
of their trusted allies in the Polish leadership, especially
Rokossowski. Khrushchev's trump card was the threat of Soviet military
intervention.
The turning point came when "Gomulka made an anxious but sincere
declaration," as Khrushchev characterized it. The CPSU First
Secretary added that Gomulka declared:
Poland needs friendship with Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs
friendship with Poland. Can it be that we failed to understand our situation?
Without the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our borders with the West. We are
dealing with our internal problems, our relations with the Soviet Union will
remain unchanged. We will still be friends and allies.
According to Khrushchev, Gomulka "said all this with such intensity and
such sincerity that I believed his words...I said to our delegation,
'I think there is no reason not to believe Comrade Gomulka.'"25 The
Soviet leader added:
We believed him when he said he realized we faced a common enemy, Western

imperialism...We took his word as a promissory note from a man whose good faith
we believed in.26
The next contentious point concerned Rokossowski's exclusion from

the new Politburo. Gomulka continued to oppose Rokossowski because he
apparently feared the reaction of Polish society. 27 The Soviets
continued to press Gomulka on the Rokossowski issue but the prolonged
discussions only aggravated the situation in the country. The mere
threat of Soviet military intervention was not enough to frighten the
Poles into submission. Khrushchev later argued:
The people of Warsaw had been prepared to defend themselves and resist Soviet
troops entering the city...A clash would have been good for no one but our
enemies. It would be a fatal conflict, with grave consequences that would have
been felt for many years to come.28
25
26
Khrushchev Remembers, p. 205. Zambrowski's account of the meeting is largely
in agreement with Khrushchev's account. See his "Dziennik," 18 March 1971, pp. 71-73.
27
For details see Gomulka's speech of 29 October in 6 Lat Temu...(Kulisy
Polskiego Pazdziernika) (Paris, 1962), pp. 72-73.
28
- 190 -
He added:
With Poland in particular, I always tried to be sympathetic to flare-ups of

anti-Soviet sentiment. Sympathetic in the sense that you have to remember
history and that czarist Russia was a party to Poland being carved up among the
Germans, the Austrians, and the Russians. That left its stamp on the Polish
soul.29
The Soviet delegation decided to forego the military option and give
Gomulka a chance. The Soviet-Polish confrontation ended peacefully,
despite the tense atmosphere of the talks at the Belvedere Palace.
The Polish delegation was given permission to continue with the
VIII Plenum. The Soviets decided to let the PZPR Central Committee sort
out its own problems, including the political future of Rokossowski and
the other hardliners. Further talks between a delegation chosen by the
Polish leadership and representatives of the CPSU and Soviet government
were scheduled for late December in Moscow.30
The unity of Polish society against Soviet armed intervention as
well as its overwhelming support for a communist leader who gained
Khrushchev's trust ensured that sanity prevailed. The Poles had
managed to avoid the tragic fate of the Hungarians. In the context of
the geopolitical conditions that existed in 1956, Gomulka's return to
the post of First Secretary was the only sensible alternative available
to both Polish society and the Kremlin. The joint Soviet-Polish commu-
nique of 20 October stated:
The debates were held in an atmosphere of Party-like and friendly sincerity.

It was agreed that a delegation of the PZPR Politburo would go to Moscow in the
nearest future to discuss with the Presidium of the CPSU problems of further
strengthening the political and economic cooperation between the PRL and the
Soviet Union, and to further consolidating the fraternal friendship and
coexistence of the PZPR and the CPSU.31
The entire Soviet delegation returned to Moscow at 6:45 a.m. on 20

October.
29
30
The meeting was delayed due to the rising tensions in Hungary and the
subsequent Soviet invasion on 2 November. See the communique issued after the
Soviet-Polish meeting of 15-18 November in Zinner, op. cit., pp. 306-314.
31
- 191 -
PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF WARSAW

Much of the behind-the-scene military manoeuvring is still
shrouded in mystery. Very little for instance is known about the
attitude of the Polish officer corps and the entire General Staff
towards the anti-Stalin campaign, including their attitude to the
threat of Soviet military intervention. A recent debate on this
subject in Poland, initiated by the comments made by General Czeslaw
Kiszczak, however, has thrown some new light on this sensitive
episode.32
In an interview in Tygodnik Powszechny, Kiszczak articulated what
many others have argued over the years: "the Polish People's Army had
given unequivocal support to the changes introduced in October 1956."33
It is the standard reply of those who ceaselessly argue that the Polish
People's Army always defended the interests of the Polish state. But
General Juliusz Hibner, the deputy interior minister in October 1956
denied Kiszczak's assertion in a letter to Tygodnik Powszechny. Hibner
argued that it was the KBW, the interior ministry troops not
subordinated to Rokossowski, who had "lent their support to the October
reforms." 34 General Edwin Rozlubirski, a leading apologist for the
"patriotism of the Polish Army," protested vigorously against Hibner's
version of events.35 Rozlubirski was offended by the suggestion that
the Polish Army played no role in the military defence of Warsaw, that
it did not attempt to shield Gomulka's return to the PZPR leadership,
and that the Polish Army offered its support to Rokossowski.
General Wlodzimierz Mus, the KBW commander in 1956, tried to put
the record straight in his reply to Rozlubirski, Hibner, and Kiszczak.36
He argued that Rozlubirski was correct in asserting that the border
troops attempted to defend the frontiers from Soviet intervention.37
But Mus argued that Rozlubirski "attempts to gloss over the possibil-
ity of armed [Soviet] intervention." It is also "a lie" to deny "that
32
Kiszczak was the interior minister until the 1989 collapse of communism in
Poland.
33
Kiszczak [Interview], "Glos ma druga strona," Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 51
(1989).
34
Hibner [Letter to the editor], "Generalowi Kiszczakowi o Pazdzierniku 56,"
ibid., no. 12 (1990).
35
Rozlubirski [Letter to the editor], ibid., no. 17 1990). Rozlubirski served
as a major in territorial air defence in 1956.
36
Mus, "Czolgi szly na Warszawe," ibid. (8 November 1988); and his "Czy grozila
interwencja zbrojna?" Polityka (29 October 1990).
37
The local commander of the border troops in Slubice refused to let a Soviet
tank company from Frankfurt enter Poland on 19 October because they did not have the
appropriate written authorization. The Soviet commander withdrew without incident.
- 192 -
some Polish Army detachments took part in the advance on Warsaw." Mus
added that Rozlubirski
repeats a version of events peddled years later by certain members of the Natolin
group who wanted to make Gomulka believe that there had been no military activ-
ity...that any talk about it was a crude provocation devised by Hibner, Komar
and the so-called revisionists from the Pulawy group.38
During a meeting organized by Pszczolkowski and Alster at the KSBP

on the evening of 18 October, which was also attended by the interior
minister, Wladyslaw Wicha, Hibner, Mus, and Komar, the nucleus of the
pro-Gomulka forces in the Polish military and security apparatus was
founded. This group of loyalists concluded that the use of force
against the new Politburo by select Polish Army units loyal to
Rokossowski, as Mus put it, "looked very likely."39 They decided that
any attempt to use regular army troops to defend Warsaw was out of the
question, since they did not know which units Rokossowski intended to
use against the Central Committee. Komar was assigned to prepare the
defence of Warsaw. The pro-Gomulka forces also expected an attack by
troops from the Polish Army loyal to Rokossowski rather than direct
Soviet intervention.
Whatever the views of the Polish officer corps may have been
towards the de-Stalinization campaign and specifically Gomulka's
return to the Politburo, the military was effectively paralysed. Mus
and his colleagues understood that
the General Staff, the commands of the various forces and regional commands had
been staffed by Soviet generals and officers. In the divisions and corps
commanded by Poles, there existed powerful groups of Soviet military advisers
capable of blocking any 'undesirable' decision...if there had been two
simultaneous orders...one from Ochab and the other from Khrushchev, the latter
would have been undoubtedly implemented...it followed that one could
not...[rely] on the loyalty of the military commanders.40
The new Politburo depended on the KBW and individual officers who
came forward to defend the VIII Plenum. These men were aware of the
numerical weakness of their forces and made no real effort to prepare
for a decisive battle. The pro-Gomulka commanders merely wanted to
show the Soviets that they were willing to defend the PZPR as well as
the sovereignty and national dignity of the nation against the Party
hardliners. Although they did not trust Rokossowski, they continued
38
Mus, "Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?"
39
ibid.
40
ibid.
- 193 -
to have faith in the Kremlin's ability to distinguish between those who

wanted to defend socialism and those who, in their eyes, wanted to
destroy it. They hoped that Ochab would make the case for Gomulka to
the Soviet leadership before Rokossowski made a decisive move against
Warsaw. Apart from those who attended the KSBP meeting, Ochab was told
that units of the Polish Navy, under Vice-Admiral Jan Wisniewski and
its Chief of staff, Commander Ludwik Kanczyszyn, including units of the
Polish Air Force under General Jan Frey-Bielecki (who resigned his
position), had also pledged their loyalty to Gomulka.
In the early hours of 19 October dispatches from various local
militia headquarters detailed the advance by Soviet armoured brigades
from Lower Silesia and Western Pomerania towards Warsaw. When the news
about the advance reached the loyalists, they promptly informed Ochab
by telephone at the Presidential Palace. Ochab immediately asked
Marshals Zhukov and Konev about the advance of Soviet troops on Moscow.
The Soviets replied that their troops were simply taking part in
scheduled exercises.41
At 11:00 a.m. the militia reports referred to advancing infantry
and tank units from Legionow, Kazum, Wyszkowo, and Zambrowo. The
situation became serious because those units could have reached Warsaw
in a matter of hours. Mus received an unwritten order from Hibner not
to let the Soviet-led troops into Warsaw. The forces at the disposal
of the loyalists consisted of three thousand infantry, including a
brigade and a battalion of artillery. Mus ordered the infantry and
artillery units to take up positions near bridges. He also dispatched
some detachments to the KBW to the airfield at Bielany in order to stop
the Soviet troops advancing from Kazun. Komar organized the remaining
KBW troops and the Warsaw militia in defensive positions throughout the
city centre. But the loyal officers also decided against arming the
Zeran workers, who asked to participate in the defence of their city.42
By late afternoon, the loyalists began to fear that the troops
advancing on Warsaw would enter the city unchecked. Mus telephoned the
Palace and talked to Zdzislaw Paszkowski, the KSBP Party secretary, who
was sitting in a room next to the one where the Soviet-Polish talks were
taking place, and appraised him of the measures taken to defend the
41
See The Glasnost Years, p. 118.
42
For further details on the numerous public meetings and gatherings in support
of Gomulka that took place between 18-21 October see Syrop, op. cit., pp. 132-155;
and the excellent account in Janusz Zablocki, "Zapiski z pazdziernika. Wiec," Lad,
no. 24 (1981).
- 194 -
capital. The KSBP secretary told him: "Here they know all about it.
Be careful."43 Ochab described the events thus:
After consulting [Zawadzki], I talked with General Komar...I approved his plan
to place units of the KBW in readiness for possible action...I also instructed
Comrade Alster to prepare, along with General Komar, an order...concerning
placing the KBW in a state of readiness [...]
I thought it would be catastrophic for us...[had there been a clash],
a great tragedy, but I couldn't renounce that advantage -- of being able, at
any time, to say to our Soviet comrades: is that what you want, is that what
you'd like to happen? We're only managing our internal affairs...That was a
very risky and very difficult game, of course. Khrushchev suspected it...All
in all it happened more or less the way I'd anticipated, but they did get a
considerable shock.44
The pro-Gomulka forces calculated that the troops loyal to the

government would not open fire on the advancing Soviets and that the
attitude of their troops was in fact the same as the workers and students
of Warsaw. The loyalists and Ochab had gambled on the troops under
their command and won. The Soviet advance was halted, without
violence, when the forward units loyal to the pro-Gomulka commanders
confronted the troops loyal to Rokossowski on the outskirts of Warsaw
in Lomianki and Henrykow.
After reaching Leczyca and Gostynin, Rokossowski gave the order
to stop the advance. During the early hours of 20 October, however,
news arrived that a Soviet detachment had been seen near a church in
the Wola District of Warsaw. Colonel Wladyslaw Trylinski of the KBW
took a motorcycle company to investigate and found a Soviet battalion.
The Soviet commander explained that he was lost and added that his troops
had come "to the rescue of Warsaw's workers". 45 After a series of
delicate negotiations the Soviet battalion began to withdraw to the
outskirts of the city. Rokossowski's troops continued their 'military
exercises' around Warsaw.
43
44
45
- 195 -
THE PLENUM RESUMES

The VIII Plenum resumed proceedings at 11:00 a.m. on 20 October.
The details of the debates have been available from 1956 and it is not
necessary to relate them here.46 During the next two days, the PZPR
Central Committee engaged in the same kind of acrimonious discussions
that marked the VII Plenum. The sharp divisions in the Party continued.
The major difference was that the hardliners were clearly on the
defensive.
Gomulka's long speech, broadcast to the nation on state radio,
set the tone of the debate. He uncompromisingly condemned Stalinism
and its political and economic consequences in Poland. The substance
of Gomulka's speech was not significantly different from the programme
he outlined to the Politburo on 12 October. He attacked the attempts
to blame imperialist forces for the Poznan revolt and demanded that the
Party learn from the bitter lesson taught by the working class. Gomulka
demanded an investigation into the illegal activities of the security
apparatus. He gave his support to the 'democratization campaign'
initiated at the VII Plenum, but also denounced the industrial and
agricultural failures of the Six-Year Plan.
Gomulka's 'Polish road to socialism' was not a call for the return
to capitalism. He said the Party need to democratize the political
system, but there would be no parliamentary democracy. Gomulka called
for Party unity and argued that the PZPR had to function along the lines
of democratic centralism and tightly control the process of
'democratization'. He accepted that the PZPR needed greater
independence from the Soviet Union, based on equality, but also declared
that the Polish Party was not about to weaken its formal ties and close
relations with the Soviets.
The controversy over Rokossowski was the most animated part of
the debate. The Marshal explained his position:
The army has not received any decision from the leadership that there should
be no movements of units and even if such a decision were received it would take
several days to implement it. Comrades are aware that this is the time when
the army conducts tactical exercises...Indeed Soviet forces were moving. They
were conducting autumn manoeuvres...They were moving in the direction of Lodz
and Bydgoszcz...I asked Marshal Konev...that the eastward movement of the
northern group should stop and the units return to their bases...That is all
I know.
46
"VIII Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PZPR," Nowe Drogi, no. 10 (October 1956).
See also the extensive translations in Syrop, op. cit., pp. 92-122; the translation
of Gomulka's two-hour speech in Zinner, op. cit., pp. 197-239. For the resolution
adopted at the plenum see ibid., pp. 239-262.
- 196 -
The Party leaders were sensitive to Khrushchev's accusations of

anti-Soviet passions in Poland and therefore kept a lid on the mounting
attacks against Rokossowski and the hardliners.
The elections to the Politburo began at 5:30 p.m. Ochab attempted
soften the blow to the hardliners over Rokossowski's removal from the
Politburo with the following statement:
I would just like to point out briefly that to nominate someone does not by any
means indicate a lack of confidence...Comrade Rokossowski's case is simply one
of the many personal matters.
Ruminski insisted that the election of the First Secretary take place
by a show of hands so that the delegates could "demonstrate their
attitude to the changes which were taking place." Gomulka opposed such
a move.
The following were elected to the Politburo by the Central
Committee in a secret ballot: Cyrankiewicz (73 votes of 75 votes);
Gomulka (74); Jedrychowski (72); Loga-Sowinski (74); Morawski (56);
Ochab (75); Rapacki (72); Zambrowski (56); and Zawadzki (68).
Rokossowski only received 23 votes and failed to get elected. The
following were elected to the Secretariat: Albrecht (73); Gierek (75);
Gomulka (74); Jarosinski (74); Matwin (68); Ochab (75); and Zambrowski
(57). In an open ballot the KC unanimously, and without a show of hands,
elected Gomulka to the post of First Secretary.
SUMMARY
The election confirmed Gomulka's supremacy in the Party. The new
Politburo and Secretariat contained only those individuals approved by
the new First Secretary. Both the hardliners and the reformers found
themselves weakened after the plenum. Although the hardliners had been
eliminated from the Party leadership, the reformers barely elected
Zambrowski and Morawski to the Politburo. The reformers managed to
squeeze Zambrowski, the only candidate of Jewish origin, into the
Secretariat, but it cost them Morawski. Only Gomulka could have gained
by the election results.
The overwhelming success of the two leading pillars of the
Stalinist regime, Ochab and Cyrankiewicz, attests to the neutrality of
both Party leaders during the political struggle that took place in the
PZPR from the XX CPSU Congress to the VIII Plenum. Gomulka's victory
began a process which eventually displaced such labels as 'Stalinist',
- 197 -
'reformer', and 'hardliner'. Future debates inside the PZPR reflected

the new political reality that came to dominate Polish domestic politics
after October 1956.
Polish state radio ceased its normal programming on 21 October
at 10:27 p.m. and broadcast the election results to the nation. The
Warsaw press immediately issued an extra edition and distributed the
announcement to the thousands of workers and students who waited in
anticipation for the results of the VIII Plenum. The front page of
Trybuna Ludu declared:
Today we have a leadership capable of implementing the programme worked out after
the VII and VIII Plenum. This leadership is capable of getting the support of
the toiling masses of the whole country.
Within the next few days an almost endless stream of letters poured into
the Central Committee from individual Party activists as well as from
Party-directed institutions. The overwhelming majority of the Party
rank-and-file approved of the decisions taken by the plenum and wrote
approvingly of Gomulka's election to the post of First Secretary.47
Gomulka held his victory speech on 24 October outside the Palace
of Culture in Warsaw. Over 300,000 people gathered to hear the First
Secretary, the largest meeting of its kind in Poland until the visit
of Pope John Paul II in 1979. No other First Secretary in the history
of the PZPR ever received such an outpouring of popular support.
Gomulka appeared on the balcony, surrounded by the new Politburo and
members of the Warsaw Party organization, and proceeded to read to the
cheering audience "a more popular version" of the plenum speech, as
Syrop aptly described it.48 The crowds greeted Gomulka's speech with
shouts of 'Down with Rokossowski!' and 'Katyn, Katyn...'. Over the
next three decades the PZPR fought a futile political struggled to live
down its Stalinist past.
47
See for instance "List p.o. szefa Zarzadu Propagandy GZP WP Ignacego Bluma
i p.o. Zarzadu Organizacyjnego GZP Franciszka Malczewskiego z dnia 22 X 1956 do czlonka
Biura Politycznego, sekretarza KC PZPR Romana Zambrowskiego" in Gomulka i inni, pp.
110-111; and "Rezolucja podstawowych organizacji partyjnych naczelnych organow
prokuratury i sadownictwa wojskowego z 22 X 1956" in ibid., pp. 111-112, taken from
Zolnierz Wolnosci (23 October 1956).
48
Syrop, op. cit., p. 144. See the 24 October speech in "Przemowienie I
Sekretarza KC PZPR na wiecu ludnosci Warszawy 24 X 1956 r." in Jaworski, op. cit.,
p. 153-156.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
CONCLUSIONS
The pace of political change from 24 October to the end of December

1956 was tremendous.1 The Polish military elite was the first victim
of the VIII Plenum. The Politburo replaced Witaszewski on 23 October
and temporarily nominated Spychalski to head the political directorate
of the Polish Army. Spychalski issued his first directive, co-signed
by Bordzilowski, on 27 October and formally re-appointed almost all the
senior Polish officers who had been purged in 1948-1949, including those
who resigned after Rokossowski mobilized the army against the Central
Committee. 2 More important, on 13 November the Sejm officially
withdrew Polish citizenship from Rokossowski and the other Soviet
generals in the Polish Army.3 Rokossowski was also relieved of command
and replaced by Spychalski, who became the new deputy premier and
minister of defence.
The transformations in the Party verged on chaos. Every
provincial, city, town, and regional Party committee literally held its
own version of the VIII Plenum in late October or early November. Not
a single Party committee in the country managed to avoid the wrath of
the Party rank-and-file. Eleven of the nineteen KW Party organizations
held secret ballot elections for the post of First Secretary. In three
cases the post of KW First Secretary changed twice in one month. The
Bialystok Party committee changed its newly elected First Secretary,
Antoni Laskowski, after only twenty-one days. Wladyslaw Kozdra of
Lublin lasted for twenty-three days. Jan Ptasinski held his post in
Bydgoszcz for a mere six days. Although a large number of the lower
and middle-level Party secretaries who had been replaced eventually
returned to their former posts, the Central Committee wisely decided
to stay out of the whole process until the anger and frustrations of
the Party rank-and-file subsided.4
1
For details see Rykowski and Wladyka, Kalendarium Polskie, pp. 46-48.
2
Generals Zugmunt Duszynski, Jozef Kuropieska, and Jan Frey-Bielecki were
restored to their former positions in the Polish military on 31 December.
3
The PZPR and CPSU also signed a new agreement on the stationing of Soviet
troops in Poland on 17 December.
4
A total of 33 KC members and candidates, 51 KW executives, 23 chairs and
deputies of provincial councils, 35 ministers and deputy minister, mostly among the
hardliners, received official reprimands for their actions during the October crisis.
Biuletyn, no. 36, 20 March 1956, p. 3.
- 199 -
The new Party leadership also decided to reassess its attitude

towards the Roman Catholic Church. 5 Zenon Kliszko and Wladyslaw
Bienkowski were dispatched by Gomulka on 24 October to negotiate the
release of Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski. The secret talks lasted for two
days, after which the Primate of the Catholic Church was escorted back
to Warsaw. Furthermore, the Supreme Military Court overturned on 28
October the death sentence imposed on Bishop Czeslaw Kaczmarek in 1953
and ordered his release from prison.
The most important economic decree was taken on 26 October when
the Politburo issued an official order to stop the forced collectiviz-
ation of agriculture. It was followed on 19 November with universal
pay rises for the working class.6 In the area of foreign relations,
Gomulka made a historic -- and extremely -- popular decision on 4
November when he ordered the Polish ambassador to the United Nations
to abstain from the vote on the resolution condemning the Soviet
invasion of Hungary.7 Poland and Hungary were the only countries in
the Soviet bloc that refused to vote against the resolution.
FACTIONALISM IN THE PZPR

Two so-called 'factions' became identified with the 1956 events
in Poland.8 For Staszewski, the Natolinists were
conservative, opposed to any kind of change, in favour of maintaining the

status quo, and often supported informally by various people from the state
administration and the economic apparatus, who were by definition hostile
to reforms or democratization of any kind.
5
For further details see Stefania Szlek Miller, "Church-State Relations in
Poland, 1956-1970. The Znak Group: 'Priests' or 'Jesters'?" (Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, Toronto, 1976).
6
Klosiewicz was deposed as CRZZ chairman on 25 October.
7
A number of anti-Soviet outbursts occurred in December 1956, the largest was
in Szczecin on 17 December. Many Soviet citizens returned to the Soviet Union under
police protection. Attacks against Polish Jews had been so widespread that the
government decided to ease the emigration restrictions to allow Jews to leave Poland.
Over 40,000 (probably half of them recent repatriates from the Soviet Union) of the
approximately 70,000 Polish Jews eventually took advantage of the new policy. The
inability to enforce the laws against anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic manifestations
was further evidence of the breakdown of the authority of the regime. See Checinski,
Poland, pp. 123-134.
8
Part of the following analysis is indebted to the review of factions during
the 1956 events put forward by Ray Taras, "Factional Activity in Eastern European
Communist Parties: Crisis Management and Leadership Change" in his Leadership Change
in Communist States (Boston, 1989), pp. 159-164.
- 200 -
The other 'faction' was Pulawy. Staszewski argues that Pulawy was
extremely heterogenous: "if anything linked them it was only this:
that they were all firm opponents of the 'Natolin' group." 9 This
"two-line" approach, as Ray Taras rightly suggests, continues to
overshadow analysis of the events of 1956. While Taras admits that
"this has oversimplified elite conflict of the period," he adds that
Pulawy and Natolin "were indeed organized factions." 10 But the
conclusions reached in this study belie such a hypothesis.
A similar deduction, acknowledged by Taras, was reached by Jakub
Andrzejewski. He argues for instance that the four "opinion groups"
could be identified in the KC PZPR: the "conservatives," which
included most of the territorial Party apparat as well as Zenon Nowak,
Mazur, Klosiewicz, Witaszewski, and possibly Zawadzki; the "centrist
group," largely represented by Ochab and Cyrankiewicz; the "reformers,"
which consisted of Zambrowski, Albrecht, Morawski, and Staszewski; and
the "radicals" in the Polish press and among the younger Party members
in Warsaw and Krakow. Gomulka and his closest allies, Andrzejewski
rightly argues, stood above the intraparty struggles.11
However, the 'reformers' versus 'hardliners' dichotomy, as
employed in this study, is considerably more satisfying than the more
popular Pulawy versus Natolin dichotomy. First, it acknowledges that
there is no evidence to suggest that organized factions existed in the
Party during the 1956 crisis. Second, a broader 'two-line' approach,
as Taras points out, "possesses explanatory power, accurately conveys
the balance of forces in the party, and corresponds to the
self-perceptions of political leaders themselves." The 'two-line'
approach also helps explain the 'revisionist' versus 'dogmatist' debate
that engulfed the Party after Gomulka took power. In order to rid the
Party of the opposing tendencies in the Party and consolidate power,
Gomulka carried out a nonviolent purge of the Party ranks from 1957 to
1959.
Although Gomulka was ostensibly committed to a two-front struggle
against 'revisionists' and 'dogmatists', he focused the purge on the
'revisionists', whom he compared with tuberculosis: "Influenza, even
9
10
Taras, op. cit., p. 160.
11
Andrzejewski in Gomulka i inni, pp. 52-53.
- 201 -
in its most serious form, cannot be cured by contracting tuberculosis,

just as dogmatism cannot be cured by revisionism"12 As Taras put it:
While riding the factional struggle to power during the party's identity
crisis in 1956, his resolution of this crisis was to give the party a utopian
rather than liberal identity. In fact Gomulka may have been Poland's last
utopian leader who took Marxist dogma seriously. As a result, however, he
had to undertake what we may term a "campaign against zealots" - the
revisionists waiting for a "second stage" of political reform after 1956.
From the end of 1956 to the end of 1959, Party membership dropped
by a total of 358,185. Approximately 280,786 members were dismissed
from the Party (42,442 were expelled and 238,344 were deleted for
inactivity). A total of 64,960 individuals voluntarily left the Party
soon after the VIII Plenum until the III PZPR Congress of March 1959.
Between the beginning of 1957 and the end of 1958, some 15.5% of the
Party membership was dismissed, while every seventh Party member quit
the PZPR.13
Some 9,667 people were either expelled of left the central Party
apparat of their own accord between October 1956 and August 1967.14 At
the end of 1959 the total number of functionaries employed in the apparat
at the end of 1959 dropped to 8,200. 15 The peak period of the
'verification' campaign, or compulsory review of Party membership, was
from 24 October 1957 to 15 April 1958, when 99.8% of the POP's completed
their 'verification'.16 Of the 199,104 individuals dismissed from the
Party (about 16.1% of the Party membership), 171,137 were deleted and
27,967 were expelled for 'revisionism', 'dogmatism', 'nationalism' or
'corruption'. About 49.2% were 'workers', 15.4% were 'peasants', and
24.7% were 'white collar workers'.
By the beginning of the III PZPR Congress and the end of the
'verification of membership' campaign, 209,683 individuals -- some
15.5% of the entire PZPR membership -- were dismissed from the Party.
12
Gomulka, Przemowienia: Wrzesien 1957-Grudzien 1958 (Warsaw, 1959), p. 36.
13
Dymek, Z dziejow PZPR, pp. 218-219.
14
Jerzy Smietanski, "Operacja sie udala -- a pacjent?" Polityka (21 August
1957). The MSW lost some 11,000 employees (a total of 27,000 in the first half of
1957) from October 24 to 1 January 1956. Biuletyn, no. 37, 5 April 1957, p. 6.
15
Mieczyslaw Marzec, "Z problemow pracy partyjnej," Nowe Droge, no. 4 (1964),
p. 107.
16
Significantly, only 153 of the 3,000 members of the Polish Association of
Journalists were removed from the Party during the 'verification' campaign of
1957-1958. See Curry, op. cit., p. 61. However, the academics did not fare as well.
Of the 10,701 PZPR members among the 'workers' at the institutions of higher learning
in October 1958, some 20.3% had been expelled or deleted from the Party list by the
end of December. Of the 2,466 'workers' at the Academy of Sciences, only 294 remained
in the Party. See Dymek, Z dziejow PZPR, pp. 186-187.
- 202 -
A total of 86.0% were deleted, while 14.0% were expelled from the PZPR.
About 47.8% were 'workers', 15.1% were 'peasants', and 26.6% were 'white
collar workers'. Between the X Plenum and XII Plenum (October 1957 and
October 1958), Gomulka acknowledged that 792 senior Party members were
expelled directly by the CKKP for "their revisionist views." 17
Furthermore, during Gomulka's 'verification', the CKKP was asked to
review the "ideological character" of 1,963 suspect Party members.
Accordingly, 607 were accused of 'revisionism', 820 were accused of
'dogmatism', and 274 of 'nationalism'.
Gomulka vanquished the 'revisionists' (many of the reformers
during the 1956 de-Stalinization struggle) within the PZPR in 1959, but
the First Secretary had been unable to conquer the 'revisionists' who
came after 1959, including those who began to operate outside the Party.
The defeat of the 'revisionists' became the revenge of the democratic
opposition.18 Historian J.F. Brown put it thus:
Poland's democratic revolution of 1989 can be traced directly to the

Polish "October" thirty-three years before. The frustrations associated
with the aftermath of that apparent "victory," the rapid demolition of its
gains, the way Poles felt insultingly deceived, cut deep into the national
consciousness. The coalition of reform communists with a militant society
seemed to have won a stable victory in October 1956. United under Wladyslaw
Gomulka...Poland seemed set to evolve toward a status that, if still
underestimated, held promise of both national dignity and domestic progress.
Polish hope soon lapsed into despair. Gomulka lost little time
demolishing the liberal pedestal on which most Poles had placed him...Poland
then settled into a continuum of disappointment and decline, punctuated by
19
the upheavals in 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1981.
SUMMARY
The key to an understanding of why the de-Stalinization campaign
markedly accelerated in Poland in 1956 can be summarized in the
following six points. (1) The initial assault on Stalin by Mikoyan at
the XX Congress shielded the leading exponents of reform in the PZPR,
who launched their own attack on the hardliners in the Politburo in March
1956. Soon after Khrushchev's devastating 'secret speech' was
released to the PZPR elite the Party reformers seized the opportunity
17
Gomulka, Przemowienia, p. 339.
18
See the analysis by Jacques Rupnik, "Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: The End
of Revisionism and the Rebirth of the Civil Society" in Rudolf L. Tokes, ed.,
Opposition in Eastern Europe (Baltimore, 1979), pp. 60-112.
19
Brown, op. cit., p. 71.
- 203 -
and had the speech widely distributed throughout Poland. (2) The
leading exponent of Stalinism in the PZPR suddenly died in Moscow in
March 1956. Bierut's death opened the door to a thorough reassessment
of the Stalinist system among the Party elite. However, his death also
ended the relative 'protection' extended to Party activists of Jewish
origin from the anti-Jewish forces that operated inside the PZPR and
the CPSU. The fear of an anti-Semitic purge galvanized the Party
reformers and propelled the anti-Stalin campaign in Poland. (3) It was
after the VI KC PZPR Plenum of March 1956 that the future participation
of Polish Jews in the political life of the PZPR became a dominant
concern of the central Party aktiv. Although Khrushchev's
anti-Semitism as well as the anti-Jewish agenda of a number of leading
PZPR functionaries had been detected before 1956, Khrushchev's
interference in the selection of a new PZPR Secretariat ensured that
the reformers in the Polish Party became the leading supporters of
greater Polish independence from the USSR. The 'Jewish question' in
the PZPR created a curious alliance between Khrushchev, the chief
exponent of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, and the 'die-hard'
Stalinists in the PZPR. (4) The fierce political struggle between the
reformers and the hardliners in the Party also came to the fore after
the XX Congress. The debate between these two tendencies revolved
around the questions of de-Stalinization, Gomulka's return to the
Party, and responsibility for the Stalinist period. The ensuing
stalemate heightened tensions in Polish society and led to a series of
piecemeal reforms, while the calls for greater de-Stalinization mounted
in the press. (5) The revolt by workers in Poznan brought the crisis
to a climax. In order to forestall a nation-wide revolt, the Party
reformers and hardliners united for a short period and demanded the
return of Gomulka to the leadership of the PZPR. (6) Gomulka's return
to the Party saved the PZPR from the wrath of Polish society. While
it also precipitated a confrontation with the Soviets, Ochab was able
to forestall armed Soviet intervention until Gomulka had a chance to
outline his programme and prove that the new Polish leadership remained
loyal to Moscow.
APPENDIX I*
KC PPR AND PZPR PLENUMS, PARTY CONGRESSES AND PARTY

CONFERENCES (SELECTED), JUNE 1948-MARCH 1959
DATE MEETING MAIN TOPICS
3 June 1948 PPR Plenum Gomulka criticized DKPiL and KPP internationalism
6-7 July PPR Plenum Cominform resolutions; Gomulka absent
31 August-3 September PPR Plenum 'Rightist-nationalist deviation' attacked; Bierut

elected PPR General Secretary
6 September PPR Conference Bierut accused Gomulka of ‘rightist-nationalist

deviation'
15-21 December Unity Congress PPR and PPS united to form PZPR
of PPR and PPS
21-21 April 1949 II PZPR Plenum Critical of 'rightist-nationalist deviation'
11-13 November III Plenum KC ejects Gomulka, Kliszko and Spychalski
8-10 May 1950 IV Plenum Purge of Party cadres
15-18 July V Plenum Targets for the Six-Year Plan
17-18 February 1951 VI Plenum International tensions; Six-Year Plan
28 March 1953 VIII Plenum Stalin's death
29-30 October IX Plenum Adoption of 'New Course'
10-17 March 1954 II Congress Corrections to Six-Year Plan
24-25 November Conference Highly critical of leadership
21-24 January 1955 III Plenum Return to Leninist norms
15-16 July IV Plenum Attack against Agriculture policy
23 December Conference Results of the Six-Year Plan
8-9 February 1956 V Plenum 'Retreat' to Stalinist Agricultural policy
(14-25 February XX CPSU Congress Khrushchev's 'secret speech'
3 March Conference XX Congress; critical of leadership
20 March VI Plenum Ochab elected First Secretary; Khrushchev attends
18-28 July VII Plenum Poznan events; Gomulka's return to Party
*
SOURCE: PPR, PPS, PZPR. Zjazdy i kongresy, posiedzenia plenarne oraz sklad wladz
naczelnych, 1944-1977 (Warsaw, 1977).
- 204 -
DATE MEETING MAIN TOPICS
19-21 October VIII Plenum Soviet leadership arrived uninvited to Warsaw;

hardliners ousted from PZPR Politburo; Gomulka
elected First Secretary
15-18 May 1957 IX Plenum Attack against 'dogmatism' and

'revisionism'; verification campaign
24-26 October X Plenum Situation in Party and society
15-18 October 1958 XII Plenum 1959-65 development plan
10-19 March 1959 III Congress KC elections; changes in Party statutes
- 205 -
APPENDIX II*
KC (PPR) PZPR POLITBURO, 1945-1957
FULL MEMBERS
Jakub BERMAN Marian SPYCHALSKI

12 Dec 45 - 3 May 56 12 Dec 45 - 13 Nov 49 (purged);
(returns 19 Mar 59)
Boleslaw BIERUT
2 Dec 45 - 3 Sep 48 (secret); Henryk SWIATKOWSKI
3 Sep 48 - 12 Mar 56 (died) 21 Dec 48 - 10 May 50
Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ Roman ZAMBROWSKI

21 Dec 48 - 12 Dec 45 - (removed 3 Jul 63)
Wladyslaw DWORAKOWSKI Aleksander ZAWADZKI
17 Mar 54 - 21 Oct 56 3 Nov 48 -
Edward GIEREK
28 Jul 56 - 21 Oct 56; CANDIDATE MEMBERS
(returns 19 Mar 59)
Hilary CHELCHOWSKI
Wladyslaw GOMULKA 3 Nov 48 - 21 Oct 56
12 Dec 45 - 3 Sep 48 (purged);
(returns) 21 Oct 56 - Wladyslaw DWORAKOWSKI
15 Jun 52 - 17 Mar 54 (promoted)
Stefan JEDRYCHOWSKI
21 Oct 56 - Stefan JEDRYCHOWSKI
28 Jul 56 - 21 Oct 56 (promoted)
Franciszek JOZWIAK
3 Sep 48 - 21 Oct 56 Franciszek MAZUR
3 Nov 48 - 17 Mar 54 (promoted)
Zenon KLISZKO
(appointed 19 Mar 59) Stefan MATUSZEWSKI
21 Dec 48 - 17 Mar 54
Ignacy LOGA-SOWINSKI
21 Oct 56 - Edward OCHAB
3 Nov 48 - 17 Mar 54 (promoted)
Franciszek MAZUR
17 Mar 54 - 21 Oct 56 Adam RAPACKI
17 Mar 54 - 28 Jul 56 (promoted)
Hilary MINC
12 Dec 45 - 10 Oct 56 Eugeniusz STAWINSKI
28 Jul 56 - 21 Oct 56
Jerzy MORAWSKI
21 Oct 56 - (removed 21 Jan 60) Aleksander ZAWADZKI
21 Dec 45 - 3 Nov 48 (promoted)
Roman NOWAK
28 Jul 56 - 21 Oct 56
Zenon NOWAK
10 May 50 - 21 Oct 56
Edward OCHAB
17 Mar 54 -
Stanislaw RADKIEWICZ
12 Dec 45 - 16 Jul 55
Adam RAPACKI
21 Dec 48 - 17 Mar 54 (demoted);
(returns) 28 Jul 56 -
Konstanty ROKOSSOWSKI
10 May 50 - 21 Oct 56
*
SOURCE: PPR, PPS, PZPR. Struktura aparat centralnego: Kierownictwo i zastepcy
kierownikow, 1944-1980 (Warsaw, 1980).
- 206 -
APPENDIX III*
KC (PPR) PZPR SECRETARIES, 1945-1957
(GENERAL) FIRST SECRETARY
Boleslaw BIERUT
3 Sep 48 - 12 Mar 56 (died)
Wladyslaw GOMULKA
14 Nov 43 - 3 Sep 48 (purged);
(returns) 21 Oct 56 – 1970
Edward OCHAB
20 Mar 56 - 21 Oct 56 (replaced)
SECRETARIES
Antoni ALSTER Hilary MINC

3 Sep 48 - 21 Dec 48 21 Dec 48 - 17 Mar 54
Jerzy ALBRECHT Jerzy MORAWSKI

20 Mar 56 - (removed 21 Jan 61) 24 Jan 55 - 21 Oct 56;
(returns) 19 May 57 -
Jakub BERMAN (removed 22 Jan 60)
21 Dec 48 - 17 Mar 54
Zenon NOWAK
Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ 10 May 50 - 17 Mar 54
21 Dec 48 - 17 Mar 54
Edward OCHAB
Wladyslaw DWORAKOWSKI 3 Sep 48 - 21 Dec 48;
3 Sep 48 - 21 Dec 48; (returns) 10 May 50 - 20 Mar 56;
(returns) 15 Jun 52 - 24 Jan 55 (returns) 21 Oct 56 - 19 May 57; (returns
22 Jan 60)
Edward GIEREK
20 Mar 56 - Henryk SWIATKOWSKI
21 Dec 48 - 10 May 50
Witold JAROSINSKI
28 Jul 56 - Roman ZAMBROWSKI
22 Jul 44 - 17 Mar 54;
Zenon KLISZKO (returns) 21 Oct 56 -
14 Nov 43 - 3 Sep 48 (purged); (removed 3 Jul 63)
(returns) 19 May 57 -
Aleksander ZAWADZKI
Wladyslaw MATWIN 21 Dec 48 - 17 Mar 54
24 Jan 55 -
Franciszek MAZUR
10 May 50 - 21 Oct 56
*
- 207 -
APPENDIX IV*
KC PZPR (SELECTED) SECRETARIAT DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS, 1954-1957
Administration Heavy Industry

(until Jan 57) (to Mar 57)
Kazimierz LEGOMSKI Edward GIEREK
(Mar-Nov 54) (Apr 54-Mar 56)
Stanislaw SZYMANSKI (Acting) Jozef NIEDZWIECKI

(Mar 55-Jan 57) (Mar 56-Mar 57)
Agriculture KC PZPR Institute of Social Sciences
(until Aug 57)
Mieczyslaw JAGIELSKI
(Dec 53-Dec 56) Adam SCHAFF
(Mar 50-Aug 57)
Edmund PSZCZOLKOWSKI
(Feb 57-Aug 63) KC PZPR Party School
(until Aug 57)
Central Party Youth Group
Romana GRANAS
Stanislaw Pilawka (May 50-Aug 57)
(Jun 53-Oct 54)
Light Industry
Helena Jaworska (until Jun 57)
(Oct 54-Jan 57)
Mieczyslaw MARZEC
Communications (Jan 54-Jun 57)
(to Jan 57)
Military [GZP WP]
Boleslaw KOWALSKI
(Nov 52-Jan 57) Kazimierz Witaszewski
(until Oct 56)
Culture
(until Apr 55 and from Jun 56) Marian Spychalski
(from Oct 56)
Pawel HOFFMAN
(Aug 50-Aug 54) Organization
(Acting) Tadeusz KSIAZEK Antoni ALSTER

(Aug 54-Mar 55) (Apr 52-Mar 55)
(Acting) Wanda MARKOWSKA Walenty TITKOW

(Jun-Nov 56) (Mar 55-Jan 60)
Education Party History
(until Jan 57) (until Jan 57)
(Acting) Apolonia LEWINSKA Tadeusz DANISZEWSKI

(Aug 53-Mar 56) (Dec 48-Jan 57)
Feliks BARANOWSKI Party Schools

(Mar-Sep 56) (until Aug 57)
Foreign Department Helena Kozlowska
(until Aug 57)
(Acting) Wladyslaw GORALSKI
(Nov 53-Oct 56) Press Bureau
(from Dec 56)
(Acting) Jozef CZESAK
(Oct 56-Apr 57) Artur STAREWICZ
(Dec 56-Jul 63)
Jozef CZESAK
(Apr 57-Apr 71)
*
- 208 -
Press, Radio and Publishing (from Nov 55 to
Aug 56)
Tadeusz GALINSKI
(Nov 55-Aug 56)
Propaganda
(name and structure often changed)
Jerzy MORAWSKI
(Feb 54-Jan 55)
Andrzej WERBLAN
(Mar 56-Jan 60)
PZPR Central School
(until Aug 57)
Celina BUDZYNSKA
(Dec 48-Aug 57)
Science
(until Apr 55 and from Jun 56)
(Acting) Zofia ZEMANKOWA

(Apr 52-Apr 55/Jun 56-Feb 57)
Science and Culture
(from Apr 55 to Jun 56)
Stefan ZOLKIEWSKI
(Apr 55-Jun 56)
Trade and Finance
(until Jun 57)
Stanislaw KUBICZEK
(Jun 54-Jun 57)
- 209 -
APPENDIX V*
KW PZPR (SELECTED) FIRST SECRETARIES, 1954-1957
Bydgoszcz Poznan
Wladyslaw KRUCZEK Leon STASIAK

(Nov 52-Oct 56) (Jun 52-Sep 56)
Jan PTASINSKI Jan IZYDORCZYK

(6 Days/October) (Sep-Nov 56)
(Acting) Leon WISNIEWSKI Wincenty KRASKO
(Nov-Dec 56) (Nov 56-Feb 60)
Feliks BARANOWSKI Rzeszow

(Dec 56-Sep 58)
Arkadiusz LASZEWICZ
Cracow (Mar 52-Mar 56)
Walenty TITKOW Zenon WROBLEWSKI
(Feb 53-Feb 55) (May-Dec 56)
(Acting) Edward GABARA Wladyslaw KRUCZEK

(Feb-Sep 55) (Dec 56-Jan 71)
(Acting) Stanislaw BRODZINSKI City of Warsaw

(Sep 55-Oct 56)
Wladyslaw MATWIN
Boleslaw DROBNER (Dec 52-Feb 54)
(Oct 56-Feb 57)
Stanislaw PAWLAK
Gdansk (Feb 54-Sep 55)
Jan TRUSZ Stefan STASZEWSKI

(Jun 51-Oct 56) (Sep 55-Feb 57)
Jozef MACHNO Wroclaw

(Oct 56-Feb 60)
Jan KOWARZ
Katowice (Stalinograd) (Dec 52-Mar 57)
Jozef OLSZEWSKI Wladyslaw MATWIN

(Feb 50-Mar 57) (Mar 57-Oct 63)
Edward GIEREK
(Mar 57-Dec 70)
City of Lodz
Jan JABLONSKI
(Nov 52-Sep 55)
Michalina TATARKOWNA-MAJKOWSKA
(Sep 55-Dec 64)
Lublin
Bazyli Holod
(Feb 55-Oct 56)
Wladyslaw Kozdra
(23 Days/October-November)
(Returns Dec 56-Jan 71)
*
The remaining KW Secretaries in April 1956 included: Jan Jablonski (Bialystok);
Franciszek Wachowicz (Kielce); Stanislaw Wasilewski (Koszalin); Jerzy Pryma (Lodz); Jan
Klecha (Olsztyn); Roman Nowak (Opole); Franciszek Sielanczuk (Szczecin); Stanislaw Pawlak
(Warsaw); Feliks Lorek (Zielona Gora).
- 210 -
APPENDIX VI*
PRL GOVERNMENT
21 NOVEMBER 1952 TO 20 JULY 1957
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE ECONOMIC PLANNING

COMMISSION
Boleslaw BIERUT (from 15 Nov 56 Chairman of the Planning
(to 18 Mar 54) Commission at the Council of Ministers)
Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ Hilary MINC

(from 18 Mar 54) (to 17 Mar 54)
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Eugeniusz SZYR
(from 18 Mar 54 to 11 Jul 56)
Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ
(to 18 Mar 54) Stefan JEDRYCHOWSKI
(from 11 Jul 56)
Wladyslaw DWORAKOWSKI
(to 18 Mar 54) CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC SECURITY
(formed 7 Dec 54 after Ministry of Public
Tadeusz GEDE Security disbanded; dissolved 13 Nov 56)
(to 24 Oct 56)
Wladyslaw DWORAKOWSKI
Piotr JAROSZEWICZ (from 7 Dec 54 to 30 Mar 56)
Stefan JEDRYCHOWSKI Edmund PSZCZOLKOWSKI
(to 24 Oct 56) (from 30 Mar 56)
Hilary MINC MINISTRIES

(from 18 Mar 54
and deputy to the chairman; Agriculture
position repealed 10 Oct 56)
Jan DAB-KOCIOL
Zenon NOWAK (to 18 Mar 54)
(from 18 Mar 54 and deputy
to the chairman until 10 Oct 56; Edmund PSZCZOLKOWSKI
deputy chairman from 24 Oct 56) (from 18 Mar 54 to 30 Mar 56)
Konstanty ROKOSSOWSKI Antoni KULIGOWSKI

(to 13 Nov 56) (from 30 Mar 56 to 10 Jan 57)
Jakub BERMAN Edward OCHAB

(from 18 Mar 54 to 3 May 56) (from 10 Jan 57)
Stanislaw LAPOT Art and Culture

(from 14 May 54 to 24 Oct 56)
Wlodzimierz SOKORSKI
Franciszek JOZWIAK (to 19 Apr 56)
(from 16 Apr 55 to 24 Oct 56)
Karol KURYLUK
Eugeniusz STAWINSKI (from 19 Apr 56)
(from 4 May to 24 Oct 56)
Chemical Industry
Stefan IGNAR
(from 24 Oct 56) Boleslaw Ruminski
*
SOURCE: Marek Jaworski, ed., Pazdziernik '56 (Warsaw, 1987), Aneks 8, pp. 197-199.
There were a total of 38 ministries in 1956.
- 211 -
Education Mining
Witold JAROSINSKI Ryszard NIESZPOREK

(to 4 Aug 56) (to 14 May 54)
Feliks BARANOWSKI Piotr JAROSZEWICZ
(from 11 Sep to 13 Nov 56) (from 14 May 54 to 23 Mar 56)
Wladyslaw BIENKOWSKI Franciszek WANIOLKA

(from 13 Nov 56) (from 23 Mar 56)
Energy National Defence
Boleslaw JASZCZUK Konstanty ROKOSSOWSKI

(to 7 Jul 56) (officially to 13 Nov 56)
Finance (Acting) Jerzy Bordzilowski
(from 21 Oct 56 to 13 Nov 56)
Tadeusz DIETRICH
Marian SPYCHALSKI
Foreign Affairs (from 13 Nov 56)
Stanislaw SKRZESZEWSKI Public Security (existed to 7 Dec 54; later

(to 27 Apr 56) the Committee for Public Security and
Ministry of Internal Affairs)
Adam RAPACKI
(from 27 Apr 56) Stanislaw RADKIEWICZ
Foreign Trade State Agriculture
(existed to 13 Nov 56)
Konstanty DABROWSKI
(to 9 Dec 56) Hilary CHELCHOWSKI
(to 7 Dec 54)
Witold TRAMPCZYNSKI
(from Dec 56) Stanislaw RADKIEWICZ
(from 7 Dec 54 to 19 Apr 56)
Higher Education
Mieczyslaw MOCZAR
Adam RAPACKI (from 19 Apr 56)
(to 27 Apr 56)
State Control
Stefan ZOLKIEWSKI
(from 27 Apr 56) Franciszek JOZWIAK
(to 16 Apr 55)
Internal affairs
(from 7 Dec 54) Roman ZAMBROWSKI
(from 16 Apr 55 to 24 Oct 56)
Wladyslaw WICHA
Justice
Henryk SWIATKOWSKI
(to 21 Apr 56)
Zofia WASILKOWSKA
(from 27 Apr 56)
Light Industry
Eugeniusz STAWINSKI
Machine Industry
Julian TOKARSKI
(to 16 Apr 55)
Roman FIDELSKI
(from 16 Apr 55 to 7 Jul 56)
Boleslaw JASZCZUK
(from 7 Jul 56)
- 212 -
APPENDIX VII*
EXCERPTS FROM BERMAN'S SELF-CRITICISM
The long self-criticism was attached to the minutes of the 5 May 1956
Politburo meeting. Berman acknowledged that from 1948-1953, he was a member
of Politburo's commission on security affairs. The commission was chaired
by Bierut. He made the following statement:
While participating in the said commission, I took part in discussions

connected with the struggle against the hostile activities carried out by
the armed guerilla resistance and also by foreign intelligence agencies.
I always endeavoured to help the comrades of the MBP in their difficult
work. It is possible that in some instances, based on the materials presented
to me, my guidance or advice was incorrect. However, I always tried to get
to the truth of the matter. My deepest convictions always reflected the
interests of the Party and our cause. In many instances, with the help of
Comrade Tomasz, I managed to prevent unjust decisions, which were based upon
superficial investigations, false and distorted data...I must [also] stress
that the period from the end of 1949 until Beria's liquidation, was a terrible
time of anguish and torture for me. In those years, I lived under a burden
of suspicion because Beria's people, supported by Stalin, constantly repeated
accusations of spying and treachery against me.
Berman also outlined his role in some of the most important cases dealt
with by the security forces from 1949. Concerning the Lechowicz-Jaroszewicz
case, Berman wrote:
Information arriving in 1951-2, and the official denunciations concerning

a number of suspects which were made available in 1951-5, had been unclear.
The fact that prohibitive methods of interrogation were also used in this
case was concealed from the leadership by the [security] authorities. On
many occasions, Comrade Tomasz sharply warned against using prohibitive
methods of interrogation, while Comrade Radkiewicz kept issuing orders
concerning this problem. His orders, however, were ignored by various links
of the security apparatus and, above all, by the section managed by [Jacek]
Rozanski. The section commanded by Rozanski was guilty of breaking the
accused and of perverted tortures against those arrested.
On the case against Tatar:
Information concerning that case [sent from the GZI WP], which arrived at
my desk, including the official protocols sent to me by Comrade Tomasz, were
of doubtful value. I shared my doubts with Comrade Tomasz...I strongly
resisted the decisions taken by the military prosecutors office concerning
death sentences in this case. I also had no influence in other cases
conducted by the GZI WP.
On the case against Gomulka and Spychalski:
I kept protesting against Gomulka's arrest for quite a long time. The
decision to arrest Gomulka had been influenced by the Tatar trial and by
information about Gomulka's hostile attitude at that time. After Gomulka's
arrest, together with Comrade Tomasz, I demanded the establishment of truth
and strongly opposed the falsification of information. I also opposed the
arrest of Spychalski...I demanded the establishment of hard facts. I also
resisted the repeated requests of [Lt. Col. Antoni] Skulbaszewski to transfer
the Spychalski case to the GZI. This became the source of unambiguous suspi-
*
"Oswiadczenie tow. Bermana do protokolu BP, 5 V 1956 r., Protokol Biura Politycznego,"
CA KC PZPR 237/Jakub Berman -- archiwum. See also "Polska proba," pp. 146-147.
- 213 -
cions directed against me. I upheld that view point in conversations with
Comrade Tomasz...We rejected the draft of the indictment against Spychalski
on several occasions, like in 1952 -- because we considered it artificial
and far-fetched. All that time, I spared no effort in trying to get to the
truth of the matter in order to prevent a mistake.
On the case against Komar "and his comrades":
I never believed in the accusations levelled against them. Subsequently,

what I knew for sure, was that the investigation had been conducted
improperly. I played a crucial part in the forming of a special commission
led by Comrade Ochab, and I tried to speed up the process of revealing the
truth.
Berman ended this part of the self-criticism with the following statement:
In that particularly difficult and tragic period, I did my best and always
acted according to my Party conscience. I tried to prevent unjust
accusations which would lead to trials based on falsified information.
As the Politburo member also responsible for cultural affairs, Berman

wrote that he acted according to the "prevailing criteria." He conceded
that "mistakes" had been made, namely his "interference" in Aleksander
Scibor-Rylski's 1952 screenplay, Szymek Bielas; Jerzy Andrzejewski's 1955
novel, Lamentu papeirowej glowy; and Adam Wazyk's 1955 poem, Poematu dla
doroslych. Berman concluded: "However, as a rule, I never used state inter-
vention in the creative process."
Note:
Staszewski summarized Berman's departure thus:

Berman was totally discredited...Often people who are thrown out don't
know exactly why they got thrown out, but they understand that the Party
has to suffer some loses, and they're ready to sacrifice themselves for
it. Naturally, they think removing them is a mistake, since after all
they served the Party faithfully and guarded its strength and unity,
but they understand that in a difficult social situation the Party
sometimes has to yield to the pressure of society's demands and make
it appear that it's embarking on a new course. And a new course requires
new people and new faces. So they leave, considering it a sacrifice offered
up on the altar of the Party, and are ready to return when the Party
summons them.
Interview in Toranska, p. 165.
See also the KC report on the findings of the Roman Nowak commission
on the security apparatus during the Stalinist period, established in
1957, and the excerpts of Berman's 'interrogation'. Edited by Rykowski
and Wladyka and appropriately entitled "NO ONE REMEMBERS ANYTHING,"
Polityka (1 October 1988).
- 214 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Bibliography is divided into the following sections:
I. Archives
II. Interviews
III. Published Documents, Collections of Documents and Speeches
IV. Published Memoirs, Interviews, Discussions and Recollections
V. Secondary Sources
A. Books
B. Articles/Chapters in Books
C. Periodical Articles
VI. Occasional and Conference Papers
VII. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations
VIII. Unpublished Typewritten Documents and Manuscripts
IX. Newspapers and Periodicals

A. Polish
B. Soviet
C. Western
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Jan Ptasinski
Witold Rodzinski
Stefan Staszewski
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B. Articles/Chapters in Books
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Kolankiewicz, George and Ray Taras. "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?" in

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C. Periodical Articles
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i Polska Partia Socialistyczna a Polskim Stronnictwem Ludowym
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robotnicza a pracujacym chlopstwem w okresie przejsciowym."
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Soviet Studies, no. 1/XXXIII (January 1981).
Checinski, Michael. "An Intended Polish Explanation, December 1956."

Soviet Jewish Affairs, no. 3 (May 1972).
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Chrypinski, Vincent C. "Legislative Committees in Polish Lawmaking."

Slavic Review, no. 2/XXV (June 1966).
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Jaworski, Feliks Tych, Andrzej Paczkowski, Eugeniusz Duraczynski,
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Andrzej Garlicki, Zenobiusz Kozik, Jerzy Morawski and Stanislaw

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Dymek, Benon. "Polowanie na odchylenie prawicowo-nacjonalistyczne." Zycie

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(1948-1954)." Z Pola Walki, no. 3-4 (1983).
Dziewanowski, M.K. "Poland, 1950-1954 'New Course' or 'New Look'." Journal

of Central European Affairs, no. 4/XV (January, 1956).
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Erlich, Stanislaw. "Niezbedne Wyjasnienie: 'Sekcja Tajna', czyli wymiar

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of Communism, no. 3-4/XXXVII (May-August 1988).
Fritzhand, Marek. "Z doswiadczen katedry materializmu dialektycznego i

historycznego Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego." Zycie Szkol Wyzszej, no.
12 (1953).
Gac, Stanislaw. "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie (1943-1975)." Historia Militaris

Polonica, no. 2 (1977).
Gati, Charles. "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953-56." Problems of Communism, no.
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"Gomulka 1956-1957." Kultura, no. 4 (1968).
Grabski, Wladyslaw M. "Rok 1956 na lamach 'Biuletynu Informacjnego

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Gurr, Ted. "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." World Politics

(January 1968).
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VI. OCCASIONAL AND CONFERENCE PAPERS
Checinski, Michael. Terror and Politics in Communist Poland. Research Paper

No. 53. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Soviet and
East European Research Centre, 1983 [Typewritten].
Potichnyj, Peter J. "'Akcja Wisla' - The Forcible Relocation of Ukrainian

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- 246 -
VII. UNPUBLISHED DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS
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1956-1957." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The New School of
Social Research (New York), 1977.
Lizak, Wojciech. "Przyczyny Kryzysu w Pazdzierniku 1956 r. na tle sytuacji

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Szlek Miller, Stefania. "Church-State Relations in Poland, 1956-1970. The

Znak Group: 'Priests' or 'Jesters'?" Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, The University of Toronto, 1976.
VIII. UNPUBLISHED TYPEWRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND MANUSCRIPTS
"Discussion on Jedlicki's Article 'Chamy i Zydy'." RFE Round Table

Discussions - no. 276, 278, 279 and 1874 with W. Jedlicki, J. Nowak,
T. Zawadzki and K. Jelenski. Munich: Radio Free Europe,
February-March 1963 [Typewritten].
Holzer, Jerzy, ed. "Notatka z relacji ustnej Stefana Staszewskiego [i inni]

o wydarzeniach Pazdziernikowych 1956 r." Warsaw, 1978 [Typewritten].
Nowak, Jan. "Analysis of Developments in Poland Since October 1956 (Strictly

Confidential)." Munich: Radio Free Europe, 14 May 1958
[Typewritten].
Rykowski, Zbyslaw and Wieslaw Wladyka. "Polska proba: Pazdziernik '56."

Warsaw, 1987 [Typewritten Manuscript].
Wladyka, Wieslaw. "Na czolowce: Prasa w Pazdzierniku 1956 roku." Warsaw,

1988 [Typewritten Manuscript].
IX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS (1953-1957)
A. Polish
Express Wieczorny; Glos Pracy; Nowa Kultura; Nowe Drogi; Po Prostu; Prasa
Polska; Prawo i Zycie; Przeglad Kulturalny; Slowo Powszechne; Sztandard
Mlodych; Trybuna Ludu; Tygodnik Powszechny; Zycie Gospodarcze; Zycie Partii;
Zycie Warszawy
B. Soviet
For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!; Izvestiya; Kommunist; Pravda
C. Western
Jewish Chronicle (London); Le Monde (Paris); Manchester Guardian; New York

Times; Observer (London); Time (New York); Times (London)

Poland 1956 Gluchowski 1991

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THE COLLAPSE OF STALINIST RULE IN POLAND:

THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS’ PARTY

Leszek Wlodzimierz Gluchowski

Submitted to the Board of Graduate Studies of the University of

LIST OF TABLES .......................................... v

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................... vi

PREFACE ................................................. viii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................. 1

Gomulka and the 'Rightist-Nationalist Deviation' ........ 3

CHAPTER TWO: THE XX CPSU CONGRESS ...................... 14

Diverging Roads to Socialism ............................ 15

CHAPTER THREE: THE MARCH CONFERENCE OF

The Politburo Defends Orthodoxy ......................... 27

CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTERREGNUM .......................... 38

The Politburo Meeting of 6 March ........................ 39

CHAPTER FIVE: NUMERUS CLAUSUS .......................... 51

Bierut's Funeral ........................................ 52

CHAPTER SIX: THE VI KC PZPR PLENUM ..................... 63

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE TIME OF TROUBLES .................... 74

The 'Secret Speech' Unleashed ........................... 75

PZPR Membership by Vocation ............................. 105

CHAPTER NINE: THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY ................. 116

The 'Shortcomings' of the Six-Year Plan ................. 116

CHAPTER TEN: THE POZNAN REVOLT ......................... 125

The Strike Begins ....................................... 126

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE VII KC PZPR PLENUM ................. 143

The 'Poznan Events' ..................................... 144

CHAPTER TWELVE: GOMULKA'S ROAD TO POWER ................ 163

Nation-Wide Unrest ...................................... 165

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE VIII KC PZPR PLENUM .............. 181

The Threat of Soviet Intervention ....................... 182

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONCLUSIONS .......................... 198

Factionalism in the PZPR ................................ 199

APPENDICES ................................................... 204

I. KC PPR and PZPR Plenums, Party Congresses and Party

II. KC (PPR) PZPR Politburo, 1945-1957 .................... 206

III. KC (PPR) PZPR Secretaries, 1947-1957 .................. 207

IV. KC PZPR (Selected) Secretariat Department Directors,

V. KW PZPR (Selected) First Secretaries, 1954-1957 ....... 210

VI. PRL Government, 21 November 1952 to 20 July 1957 ...... 211

VII. Excerpts from Berman's Self-Criticism ................. 213

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 215

I. Vocational Membership in ZMP,

II. Vocational Membership in PZPR, 1948-1959 ............. 105

III. Social and Political Activists by Vocation,

IV. Social and Political Activists by Vocation, 1956 ..... 107

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CKKP Centralna Komisja Kontroli Partyjnej

CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CRZZ Centralna Rada Zwiazkow Zawodowych

GZI WP Glowny Zarzad Informacji Wojska Polskiego

GZP WP Glowny Zarzad Polityczny Wojska Polskiego

IKKN Instytut Ksztalcenie Kadr Naukowych

INS Instytut Nauk Spolecznych

KBW Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego

KC PZPR Komitet Centralny

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

KPP Komunistyczna Partia Polski

KSBP Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego

NSC National Security Council

MSW Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych

MVD Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del

NKVD Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del