Dictionary of Christian Apologists and Their Critics

A THANASIU S OF A LEXANDRIA
Nathan A. Jacobs

Athanasius of Alexandria is best known for his defense of the divinity of the Son of
God against the teachings of Arius. Well known is Arius’ position that the Son is a
creature that came into existence at the will of the Father. Less well known is Ath-
anasius’ insistence that Arianism carries a bevy of metaphysical entailments. An
examination of Athanasius’ anti-Arian polemics makes clear that he understands
the Christian faith to be metaphysically committed, and his dealings with Arius
shed light on what those commitments are. More importantly, as Athanasius em-
ploys these commitments to articulate the threat of Arianism, he makes clear his
uniquely Eastern understanding of Christianity.
Arianism is concisely summed up in Arius’ phrase, “there was [a time] when he
[the Son] was not” (ēn pote hote ouk ēn). The case for Arianism is easily grasped.
Both scripture and the Church fathers speak of Jesus Christ as God’s only begotten
(monogenēs) Son. The title “son of God” may be ascribed analogically to a nation
(Matt 2:15) or to a creature, whether due to its godlike nature (Job 1:6), its adop-
tion (Rom 8:14), or its causal origin (Luke 2:38). Yet, in the case of Jesus, only be-
gotten is added to the term (John 3:16), indicating that Christ is the only son whose
filial status is by begetting. Despite questions by biblical scholars today about the
meaning of monogenēs,1 it was evident to both Arians and pro-Nicenes in the fourth
century that the term indicates paternal causation that is singularly unique. Thus,
Arius argues that the Son, being caused by God, did not exist and then came into
being at the will of God, who became Father to the Son at his begetting.2
Not surprisingly, Athanasius responds that if the Son came into being, then he
is a creature. What is surprising is that Athanasius goes on to claim that it also fol-
lows from this that the Son is mutable, corruptible, accidentally good, and incapa-

1 For a survey of contemporary biblical studies on monogenēs, see S. J. Gathercole, The Pre-
Existent Son (Eerdmans, 2006), “Introduction.”
2 Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica, 1.5 (PG 67.42a-b).

* N.B. The following is the MS of a forthcoming article in Wiley-Blackwell Dictionary of Christian Apolo-
gists and Their Critics, eds. R. Doug Geivett and Robert B. Stewart (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell,
forthcoming 2020)
2 DICTIONARY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS

ble of granting eternal life.3 These additional entailments are less obvious than the
charge that Arius’ son of God is a creature. However, an examination of Athana-
sius’ polemics reveals a clear rationale for the case.
Athanasius’ argument is based on the doctrine of creation. Well known is the
Christian rejection of the pagan belief that God is an artificer (dēmiourgos) that
crafts the world out of pre-existent material.4 Christianity consistently advocates, to
the contrary, that God creates both the world and the matter of which it is com-
posed. Athanasius certainly affirms creation out of nothing (ouk on), but his case
against Arius introduces a different aspect of the doctrine, namely, that God calls
being (to on / einai) out of non-being (mē on / einai).5
The background of Athanasius’ claim is the Jewish reception of the Aristotelian
physics of generation. The ancient philosophers, especially the Eleatics, fretted over
how the generation of things is possible. After all, a thing either is or is not; there is
no middle. Yet, talk of “becoming” speaks as if there are gradations of existence
through which a thing moves as it transitions from not-something to something.6
Aristotle’s solution to this problem introduces the notion of potential or non-being
(mē on / einai). He suggests that entities have the potential to be other than they are
presently. For example, through physical exercise, I can become stronger than I am
now. This potential is less than actual strength, but it is more than nothing. And
this middle between nothingness and being is what accounts for the phenomenon
of becoming or generation.7
Aristotle’s exposition of generation brings together the concept of potential
with his metaphysical realism. Realism, of course, claims that common properties,
such as redness or sphericality, are real outside the mind. When we say two objects
are spherical, this attribution is not a mental invention; it identifies a real property

3 Athanasius, De Incarnatione contra Apollinarium, 1.3 (PG 26.1097a); Epistula ad Serapionem

(PG 26.592b); Epistula ad Afros Episcopos, 5 (PG 26.1037b); De Incarnatione, 3 (PG 25.99d-
102d); De Decretis Nicaenae Synodi, 20.2 (PG 25.452a); Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.5, 1.9,
1.18, 1.22, 1.28, 1.35-36, 1.48, 2.34, 4.12 (PG 26.21c, 29b, 49b, 57c, 72a, 84a-8a, 112c, 220a,
481d); Epistula encyclica, 7 (PG 18.573b).
4 E.g., Plato, Timaeus, 49c6-7; 50a4-b5, c2-6, e5-51a1, b4-6.
5 E.g., Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 4 (PG 25:104c).
6 Parmenides, Fragments, 28b2, 6, 8; Aristotle, Physica, 191b35-192b2.
7 E.g., Aristotle, Physica, 192a25-33
Athanasius of Alexandria 3

shared by the two spheres. In Aristotle’s realism, the common property is located
within the object that has the given property. Sphericality is in the sphere.8 As for
how sphericality comes to be in the sphere, Aristotle answers using the concept of
potential, and here we discover his explanation of generation. Matter, Aristotle
argues, is not atoms or particles but pure potential.9 Generation occurs when form
manifests in matter, moving material potential from non-being (or not-yet-
something) into being (something).10 We might think of the form-matter relation-
ship like the relationship between fabric and a solid object. The fabric is amor-
phous, capable of taking on any number of shapes. Were we to wrap the fabric
around a ball, the fabric would become spherical. But spherically would not belong
to the fabric per se; it would belong to the ball that communicates sphericality to
the fabric. In the same way, matter, as potential or non-being, is without properties
of its own, but it takes on properties when form enters it. The entrance of form into
matter causes matter to become a concrete something—a rock, a plant, a dog, a
human—and the stages through which matter moves as it becomes something is
what we call generation.
These same concept appears in Alexandrian Judaism. Philo of Alexandria em-
ploys the same terminology for generation, but he adds to it that God calls being
out of non-being (ta gar mē onta ekalesen eis to einai), harkening, of course, to Gene-
sis.11 Paul too adopts this language in his letter to the Romans (4:17), echoing not
only Aristotelian physics but the Philonic addition. This addition sets these Jewish
accounts apart from the pagans, both by identifying divine speech as the mode of
causation and by affirming a beginning (archē) to the cosmos.12

8 Aristotle, De anima, 412a1-4a28; Metaphysica, 1013a26-8; 1017b14-6; 1017b21-3; 1028b33-

9a33; Physica 192b8-3b21; 194b26-9.
9 Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1042b9-11; Physica, 190a31-b15.
10 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, 317a34-320b17; Physica, 189a30-192b5; Metaphysica,
986b10–987a2, 1046b29–1047b3.
11 Philo of Alexandria, De specialibus legibus 4.187. See also De specialibus legibus, 3.10; Quod Deus
immutabilis sit, 119; De somnia, 1.76; De vita Mosis, 2.267; Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin,
2.13; H. Chadwick, “Philo,” in Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford,
1966) 6-7, 44-46.
12 According to Aristotle, Plato was the only of the pagan philosophers to teach that time had be-
ginning. Aristotle, Physica, 251b16-38. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 38b.
4 DICTIONARY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS

Whether from Aristotle, Philo, Paul, or some combination, the metaphysics of

generation found their way into Alexandrian Christianity, and specifically into
Athanasius’ polemics. In response to Arius, Athanasius argues that anything that
comes to be moves from non-being (mē einai) into being (to einai). From this it
follows that the thing is mutable (alloiōtos), or capable of becoming other than it is
presently, since its existence began with a movement into being, which is a muta-
tion. Therefore, anything that is created is of necessity different in nature than the
immutable (analloiōtos) God.13 Athanasius’ description of generation is squarely in
line with Aristotle, Philo, and Paul, and his claim that any start to existence in-
volves mutation is firmly established in Aristotle’s Physics.14 The technical precision
of the claim is also confirmed by Arius himself, who states in his defense that he
does not believe the Son of God derives existence from matter.15 Arius thus under-
stands the metaphysical underpinnings of Athanasius’ case, namely that punctuated
existence begins with a movement from non-being (i.e., material potential) into
being.
Having defined creation as a movement into being, and having identified this
movement as a mutation, it follows that all creatures are mutable of metaphysical
necessity. Such is the basis for the Athanasian case that, granting Arianism, the
Son of God is mutable. Notice that Athanasius’ case is not that God has made mu-
table creatures, even though he could make immutable creatures. Rather, Athana-
sius takes “immutable creature” to connote a contradiction beyond the bounds of
omnipotence. This becomes apparent when Arius modifies his position, claiming
the Father creates the Son immutable.16 The change in strategy makes no differ-
ence to the pro-Nicenes, who see this “correction” as incoherent.17 Not even God

13 Athanasius, Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.18 (PG 26:49b); Contra gentes, 35 (PG 25:69a-
72a); Epistula ad Serapionem (PG 26:592b); De Incarnatione contra Apollinarium, 1.3 (PG
26:1097a); De Incarnatione, 3 (PG 25:99d-104c).
14 E.g., Aristotle, Physica, 192a25-33.
15 Arius, Epistula ad Eusebium Nicomediensem (PG 42:212b).
16 Arius, Epistola ad Alexandrum papam (PG 26.708c-9a).
17 Athanasius complains that the Arians shift positions, but despite efforts to claim the Son is
immutable, Athanasius never relinquishes the premise that all creatures are mutable. E.g., Ath-
anasius, Epistula ad Serapionem (PG 26.592b); De Incarnatione, 3 (PG 25.99d-102d); Orationes
tres adversus Arianos, 1.18 (PG 26.49b).
Athanasius of Alexandria 5

can make four-sided circles, free creatures that are not free, or creatures that are
immutable.
Athanasius goes on to argue that mutability entails the possibility of corruption
(negative change).18 The rationale is rooted in same physics. Recall that matter is
pure potential, having no properties of its own. Though it can become any number
of things, matter is none of the things it becomes. As in our fabric analogy, our
shapeless fabric can take on sphericality but it is not innately spherical. So, in the
same way, matter is an ontological receptacle. Every property that enters it is alien
to it, so any property it receives, it can also release. Therefore, anything that moves
from non-being into being can return to non-being. Hence, Athanasius submits
that every creature is not only mutable but corruptible.
As noted above, Athanasius draws out a host of implications beyond these,19
but the most important for our purposes is that if the Son is corruptible, then he is
“turnable” (treptos), and if the Son is turnable, then he cannot remedy the human
condition, as Christianity promises. To grasp the point, we begin with the term
treptos.
Treptos, as used here, refers to a mode of corruption unique to rational crea-
tures. In organisms, corruption indicates divergence from proper formation and
function, as determined by the telos of the thing. In the case of an eye, any change
that moves toward biological health and sight is generation, while any retreat from
health and sight is corruption.20 In the case of rational souls and spirits, generation
and corruption is likewise determined by the telos of the creature. However, because
spirits are not organisms, the change through which they move is not organic. In-
stead, the proper end of rational souls and spirits is spiritual in nature. The creature
exists to rest in God. Any movement toward God is generation (movement into
being), while any retreat from God is corruption (retreat to non-being). The sus-
ceptibility to such a retrograde movement is what Athanasius calls being “turnable”
(treptos): The creature can turn away from God.21 As with mutability and corrupti-

18 Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 4 (PG 25.104c).

19 For an exposition of the entailments, see Nathan A. Jacobs, “On the Metaphysics of God and
Creatures in the Eastern Pro-Nicenes,” Philosophy & Theology 28.1 (2016): 3-42.
20 Aristotle, Categoriae, 15a5-b15; De generatione et corruptione, 319b2-20a5.
21 Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos, 1.43; 1.51 (PG 26.100c-1c; 117b-20a).
6 DICTIONARY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS

bility generally, Athanasius and the pro-Nicenes presents this as an entailment of

the Arian teaching. To quote Alexander of Alexandria’s deposition of the Arians,
“when someone asked them [the Arians], whether the Word of God can possibly
change as the devil changed, they were not afraid to say that he can; for being
something made and created, his nature is subject to change.”22
Now, the key question: Why does Athanasius understands these entailments to un-
dermine the Christian faith? For Athanasius does not simply see these entailments as
contrary to the teachings of Christianity, but as undercutting its central hope. The
answer reveals Athanasius’ distinctively Eastern understanding of Christianity.
Rather than seeing the human condition through the lens of the Fall and a ju-
dicial predicament with our future judge, Athanasius sees the fundamental problem
as the universal corruptibility of creatures. We have seen that the Athanasian meta-
physics of creation entail that corruption threatens all God has made, even when no
creature has yet been corrupted. Hence, while corruption entered the world with
the fall of angels and of humanity, this threat loomed over the cosmos from its in-
ception. The Christian faith exists to remedy, not only manifest corruption, but
corruptibility.23 So how can the threat of corruption be overcome?
The Athanasian answer, like other Eastern fathers, consistently points to the
uncreated nature of God, which alone is incorruptible (aphthora) and unturnable
(atreptos). A creature can only put off corruption—and indeed corruptibility—by
partaking of divinity. On this view, the gospel of Jesus Christ offers humanity the
Life of the Father (Jn 5:29, 39-40) by communion with the divine nature, and this
participation in divinity makes it possible for humanity to escape corruption (2 Pet
1:4), putting off corruption for incorruption (1 Cor 15:42). This is the very purpose
of the Incarnation. The Son of God joined the divine nature to humanity that we
might participate in divine life, holiness, incorruption, and so on. The view is suc-

22 Alexander of Alexandria, Epistolae de Ariana haeresi deque Arii depositione, 3 (PG 18.573b-c).
See also Athanasius, Epistola X, 9 (PG 26.1401d-2b); Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.35 (PG
26.84a-5b).
23 Cf. Athanasius, Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.43; 1.51 (PG 26.100c-1c; 117b-20a). This
same concern echoes in Athanasius’ contemporary, Alexander, and in later fathers. See Alexan-
der of Alexandria, Epistula ad Alexandrum Constantinopolitanum, 13 (PG 18:552c); Gregory of
Nyssa, Adversus Apollinarem (PG 45:1124-1269, esp. 1128a); Maximus the Confessor, Ambigu-
um (PG 91:1057c).
Athanasius of Alexandria 7

cinctly summarized in Athanasius’ phrase, “[The Word] was made man so that we
might be made God [theōpoiēthōmen].” 24 This is the transformation the Eastern
fathers label deification (theōsis).25 And this is why Athanasius finds Arianism to be
so dangerous. If the Son is a creature, then he is subject to the very corruptibility
that binds all creatures and cannot offer the incorruptible nature of God.26
So what does Athanasius mean when he speaks of us being made God? The an-
swer, again, draws on Pauline and Alexandrian Jewish echoes of Aristotelian phys-
ics. Paul often speaks of being “energized” by God (e.g., Phil 2:13; Col 1:29; Gal
2:8).27 The term energeia has a long history in Aristotle, Alexandrian Judaism, and
the New Testament, a history that informs the Eastern Church fathers.28 The term
originates with Aristotle, initially as a point of physics and later as having theologi-
cal significance in his cosmological argument.29 In the hands of religious writers,30
two crucial developments followed. First, there emerged a distinction between
God’s essence (ousia) and his energies (energeiai). 31 Second, as David Bradshaw
explains, “the term acquires a new sense of ‘active power’ or ‘cosmic force,’ and
eventually ‘energy,’ conceived not just as a characteristic of action … but as a reser-
voir of power that can be shared by another.”32 These developments inform how
these writers understand the intersection between spirits and humans. Demoniacs
perform superhuman feats because they are energized by a foreign nature. Likewise,

24 Athanasius, De Incarnatione, 54 (PG 25:192b).

25 For similar statements see Pseudo-Macarius, Homiliae, 15.38 (PG 34:602); Basil of Caesarea,
De Spiritu Sancto, 9.23 (PG 32:109b-c); Cyril of Alexandria, Quod unus sit Christus (PG
75:1269); Maximus the Confessor, De charitate centuria, 3.52 (PG 90:1001b).
26 Athanasius, Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.43; 1.51 (PG 26.100c-1c; 117b-20a).
27 See David Bradshaw, “The Divine Energies in the New Testament,” St. Vladimir’s Theological
Quarterly 50 (2006): 189-223.
28 See David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West (Cambridge University Press, 2004), passim.
29 Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, ch. 1.
30 E.g., Philo of Alexandria, De cherubim, 87-90; Pseudo-Aristeas, Letter to Philocrates, ed. / trans.
Moses Hadas (Harper, 1951), §266.
31 Philo of Alexandria, De posteritate Caini, 19-20, 168-69; Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 62; De fuga
et inventione, 164-5; De mutatione nominum, 7-9; De specialibus legibus, 1.32-50; De praemiis et
poenis, 39-40.
32 Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, 119.
8 DICTIONARY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS

prophets, apostles, and saints do miraculous deeds because they are energized by
God.
A favorite analogy of the Eastern fathers to explain the energizing of a person is
the communion between metal and fire. Fire can heat metal to a point that it glows
and burns even after its removal from the flames. The metal remains metal, but the
energies of a foreign nature—of fire—have taken up residence within it.33 So in the
same way, the human person, though remaining human in nature, partakes of or
participates in the divine nature when energized by God. Such participation is what
Athanasius means by being made God, and he understands it to be the purpose for
which the Word was made flesh. This is the understanding of the faith Athanasius
dedicated his life to defending, a defense ultimately vindicated at the Council of
Nicea in 325 AD.

33 E.g., Basil of Caesarea, De Spiritu Sancto, 16.38 (PG 32:136a-137b); John of Damascus, Expo-
sitio fidei orthodoxae, 3.15, 17 (PG 94:1046c-61d; 1068b-72b).