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Eco Chap 5
Eco Chap 5
Firm
In Simon’s words:
“We must expect the firms goals to be not maximising profits but
attaining a certain level or rate of profit holding a certain share of the
market or a certain level of sales.” Under conditions of uncertainty, a
firm cannot know whether profits are being maximised or not.
(b) The actual achievement is greater than the aspiration level; and
In the second situation, when the actual achievement is greater than the
aspiration level, the firm is satisfied with its commendable
performance. The firm is also satisfied in the third situation when its
actual performance matches its aspiration level. But the firm does not
feel satisfied in the first situation.
It may be that the firm has set its aspiration level very high. It will,
therefore, revise it downward and start a search activity to fulfil its
various goals in order to achieve the aspiration level in the future.
Similarly, if the firm finds that the aspiration level can be achieved, it
will be revised upward. It is through such search activity that the firm
will be able to reach the aspiration level set by the decision-maker.
Criticism:
This theory has certain weaknesses.
Despite these weaknesses, Simon’s model was the first model on which
the later behavioural models have been developed.
Instead, Cyert and March regard the modem business firm as a group
of individuals who are engaged in the decision-making process relating
to its internal structure having multiple goals. They emphasise that the
modern business firm is so complex that individuals within it have
limited information and imperfect foresight with respect to both
internal and external developments.
Organisational goals:
Cyert and March regard the modern business firm as a complex
organisation in which the decision-making process should be analysed
in variables that affect organisational goals, expectations and choices.
They look at the firm as an organisational coalition of managers,
workers, shareholders, suppliers, customers, and so on.
Looked at it from this angle, the firm can be supposed to have five
different goals: production, inventory, sales, and market share and
profit goals.
Each firm is assumed to estimate its demand and production costs and
choose its output level. If this output level does not yield the aspired
level of profits, it searches for ways to reduce costs, re-estimate demand
and, if required, to lower its profit goal.
If the firm is prepared to lower its profit goal, it will readily reduce its
price. Thus price is found to be sensitive to factors affecting costs due to
the close relationship between prices, costs and profits.
Criticism:
The Cyert and March theory of the firm has been severely
criticised on the following grounds:
1. Economists have questioned: ‘Whether it is a theory at all? It deals
with particular cases whereas a theory is expected to be a general
approximation of the behaviour of firms. Its empirical base is too
limited to provide the details of theorising. Hence it fails as a theory of
the firm.
3. The theory does not consider either the conditions of entry or the
effects on the behaviour of existing firms of a threat of potential entry
by firms.
4. The behavioural theory explains the short-run behaviour of firms and
ignores their long-run behaviour.
Conclusion:
Despite these criticisms, the behavioural theory of Cyert and March is
an important contribution to the theory of the firm which brings into
focus multiple, changing and acceptable goals in managerial decision-
making.
The managers, on the other hand, have consideration other than profit
maximisation in their utility functions. Thus the managers are
interested not only in their own emoluments but also in the size of their
staff and expenditure on them.
U = f (S, M. D).
U = f(S, D)
So that discretionary profits (D) are measured along the vertical axis
and staff expenditures (S) on the horizontal axis in Figure 1. FC is the
feasibility curve showing the combinations of D and S available to the
manager. It is also known as the profit-staff curve. UU1 and UU2 are the
indifference curves of the manager which show the combinations of D
and S.
To begin, as we move along the profit-staff curve from point F upward,
both profits and staff expenditures increase till point P is reached.
P is the profit maximisation point for the firm where SP is the maximum
profit levels when OS staff expenditures are incurred. But the
equilibrium of the firm takes place when the manager chooses the
tangency point M where his highest possible utility function UU2 and
the feasibility curve FC touch each other. Here the manager’s utility is
maximised.
The discretionary profits OD (=S1M) are less than the profit
maximisation profits SP. But the staff emoluments OS1 are maximised.
However, Williamson points out that factors like taxes, changes in
business conditions, etc. by affecting the feasibility curve can shift the
optimum tangency point, like M in Figure 1. Similarly, factors like
changes in staff, emoluments, profits of stockholders, etc. by changing
the shape of the utility function will shift the optimum position.
Criticism:
But there are some conceptual weaknesses of this model.
1. He does not clarify the basis of the derivation of his feasibility curve.
In particular, he fails to indicate the constraint in the profit-staff
relation, as shown by the shape of the feasibility curve.
2. He lumps together staff and manager’s emoluments in the utility
curve. This mixing up of non-pecuniary and pecuniary benefits of the
manager makes the utility function ambiguous.
The managers aim at the maximisation of the growth rate of the firm
and the shareholders aim at the maximisation of their dividends and
share prices. To establish a link between such a growth rate and the
share prices of the firm, Marris develops a balanced growth model in
which the manager chooses a constant growth rate at which the firm’s
sales, profits, assets, etc., grow.
As the managers are concerned more about their job security and
growth of the firm, they will choose that growth rate which maximises
the market value of shares, give satisfactory dividends to shareholders,
and avoid the take-over of the firm.
On the other hand, the owners (shareholders) also want balanced
growth of the firm because it ensures fair return on their capital. Thus
the goals of the managers may coincide with that of owners of the firm
and both try to achieve balanced growth of the firm.
Criticism:
Marris’ growth-maximisation theory has been severely
criticised for its over-simplified assumptions.
1. Marris assumes a given price structure for the firms. He, therefore,
does not explain how prices of products are determined in the market.
4. The model assumes that firms can grow continuously by creating new
products. This is unrealistic because no firm can sell anything to the
consumers. After all, consumers have their preferences for certain
brands which also change when new products enter the market.
5. The assumption that all major variables such as profits, sales and
costs increase at the same rate is highly unrealistic.
If the sales of a firm are declining, banks, creditors and the capital
market are not prepared to provide finance to it. Its own distributors
and dealers might stop taking interest in it. Consumers might not buy
its products because of its unpopularity. But if sales are large, the size
of the firm expands which, in turn, means larger profits.
Suppose the minimum profit level of the firm is represented by the line
MP. The output OK will not maximise sales as the minimum profits OM
are not being covered by total profits KS.
For sales maximisation, the firm should produce that level of output
which not only covers the minimum profits but also gives the highest
total revenue consistent with it. This level is represented by OD level of
output where the minimum profits DC (=OM) are consistent with DE
amount of total revenue at the price DE/OD, (i.e., total revenue/total
output).
Criticism:
The sales maximisation objective of the firm has been criticised on a
number of points. First, Rosenberg has criticised the use of the profit
constraint for maximising sales. He has shown that it is difficult to
specify exactly the relevant profit constraint for a firm, and choose the
sales maximisation and minimum profit constraint in Baumol’s
analysis.
Criticism:
Kafolgis’ emphasis on output maximisation as against Baumol’s sales
maximisation is not a satisfactory explanation of the objective of a firm.
If the firm simply aims at output maximisation without sales
maximisation, it may not be in a position to survive for long. Both the
objectives are complementary rather than competitive.
The desire to increase its security leads to the struggle for position and
to the setting of a price which will not be so low that it provokes
retaliation from rivals, nor so high that it encourages new entrants, and
it must be within the range which will maintain a protection against the
aggressive policies of the rivals and brine about a reasonable profit
above its cost of production Rothschild’s security-profits motive is
nothing else but profit maximisation in a little different garb.
Criticism:
Scitovsky has himself pointed out two weaknesses in his satisfaction
maximisation theory first; it is unrealistic to assume that entrepreneur’s
willingness to work is independent of his income. After all the ambition
of an entrepreneur to make money cannot be dampened by a rising
income.
It is to be noted with great care that a firm has to maximize its profits after
taking in to consideration of various factors in to account. They are as follows:
1. Pricing and business strategies of rival firms and its impact on the
working of the given firm.
2. Aggressive sales promotion policies adopted by rival firms in the
market.
3. Without inducing the workers to demand higher wages and salaries
leading to rise in operation costs.
4. Without inducing the workers to demand higher wages and salaries
government controls and takeovers.
5. Maintaining the quality of the product and services to the customers.
6. Taking various kings of risks and uncertainties in the
changing business environment.
7. Adopting a stable business policy.
8. Avoiding any sort of clash between short run and long run profits in the
business policy and maintaining proper balance between them.
9. Maintaining its reputation, name, fame and image in the market.
10. Profit maximization is necessary in both perfect and imperfect
markets. In a perfect market, a firm is a price-taker and under imperfect
market it becomes a price-searcher.
Maximise p (Q)
where p (Q) is profit, R(Q) is revenue, С (Q) are costs, and Q are the units of
output sold The two marginal rules and the profit maximisation condition
stated above are applicable both to a perfectly competitive firm and to a
monopoly firm.
6. The firm has complete knowledge about the amount of output which
can be sold at each price.
7. The firm’s own demand and costs are known with certainty.
8. New firms can enter the industry only in the long run. Entry of firms
in the short run is not possible.
10. Profits are maximised both in the short run and the long run.
Given these assumptions, the profit maximising model of the firm can
be shown under perfect competition and monopoly.
It will, however, stop further production when it reaches the OM1 level
of output where the firm satisfies both conditions of equilibrium. If it has any
plans to produce more than OM1 it will be incurring losses, for the marginal
cost exceeds the marginal revenue after the equilibrium point B. Thus the
firm maximises its profits at M1B price and at the output level OM1.
If the firm selects its output level, its price is determined by the market
demand for its product. Or, if it sets the price for its product, its output is
determined by what consumers will take at that price. In any situation, the
ultimate aim of the monopoly firm is to maximise its profits. The conditions
for equilibrium of the monopoly firm are (1) MC = MR< AR (Price), and (2) the
MC curve cuts the MR curve from below.
3. No perfect knowledge:
The profit maximisation hypothesis is based on the assumption
that all firms have perfect knowledge not only about their own costs
and revenues but also of other firms. But, in reality, firms do not
possess sufficient and accurate knowledge about the conditions under
which they operate. At the most they may have knowledge about their
own costs of production, but they can never be definite about the
market demand curve. They always operate under conditions of
uncertainty and the profit maximisation theory is weak in that it
assumes that firms are certain about everything.
7. Static theory:
The neo-classical theory of the firm is static in nature. The theory
does not tell the duration of either the short period or the long period.
The time-horizon of the neo-classical firm consists of identical and
independent time-periods. Decisions are considered as independent of
the time-period.
9. Varied Objectives:
The basis of the difference between the objectives of the neo-
classical firm and the modern corporation arises from the fact that the
profit maximisation objective relates to the entrepreneurial behaviour
while modern corporations are motivated by different objectives
because of the separate roles of shareholders and managers. In the
latter, shareholders have practically no influence over the actions of the
managers.
The managers, on the other hand, have consideration other than profit
maximisation in their utility functions. Thus the managers are interested not
only in their own emoluments but also in the size of their staff and
expenditure on them.
To pursue his goal of utility maximisation, the manager directs the firm’s
resources in three ways:
1. The manager desires to expand his staff and to increase his salaries.
“More staff is valued because they lead to the manager getting more
salary, more prestige and more security.” Such staff expenditures by
the manager are denoted by S.
U = f (S, M. D).
U = f(S, D)
So that discretionary profits (D) are measured along the vertical axis
and staff expenditures (S) on the horizontal axis in Figure 1. FC is the
feasibility curve showing the combinations of D and S available to the
manager. It is also known as the profit-staff curve. UU1 and UU2 are the
indifference curves of the manager which show the combinations of D and S.
To begin, as we move along the profit-staff curve from point F upward, both
profits and staff expenditures increase till point P is reached.
P is the profit maximisation point for the firm where SP is the maximum
profit levels when OS staff expenditures are incurred. But the equilibrium of
the firm takes place when the manager chooses the tangency point M where
his highest possible utility function UU2 and the feasibility curve FC touch
each other. Here the manager’s utility is maximised.
The discretionary profits OD (=S1M) are less than the profit
maximisation profits SP. But the staff emoluments OS1 are maximised.
However, Williamson points out that factors like taxes, changes in business
conditions, etc. by affecting the feasibility curve can shift the optimum
tangency point, like M in Figure 1. Similarly, factors like changes in staff,
emoluments, profits of stockholders, etc. by changing the shape of the utility
function will shift the optimum position.
Criticism:
But there are some conceptual weaknesses of this model.
1. He does not clarify the basis of the derivation of his feasibility curve.
In particular, he fails to indicate the constraint in the profit-staff
relation, as shown by the shape of the feasibility curve.
1. There is evidence that salaries and other earnings of top managers are
correlated more closely with sales than with profits.
2. The banks and other financial institutions keep a close eye on the sales
of firms and are more willing to finance firms with large and growing
sales.
3. Personnel problems are handled more satisfactorily when sales are
growing. The employees at all levels can be given higher earnings and
better terms of work in general.
4. Large sales, growing over time, give prestige to the managers, while
large profits go into the pockets of shareholders.
5. Managers, prefer a steady performance with satisfactory profits to
spectacular profit maximization projects. If they realize maximum high
profits in one period, they might find themselves in trouble in other
periods when profits are less than maximum.
6. Large growing sales strengthen the power to adopt competitive tactics,
while a low or declining share of the market weakens the competitive
position of the firm and its bargaining power vis-Ã -vis rivals.
Prof. Boumol has developed two models. The first is static model and
the second one is the dynamic model. We shall analyse only his static model
of sales maximisation with its variants of single product model without
advertisement.
1. The model is applicable to a particular time period and the model does
not operate at different periods of time.
2. The firm aims at maximizing its sales revenue subject to a minimum
profit constraint.
3. The demand curve of the firm slope downwards from left to right.
4. The average cost curve of the firm is unshaped one.
The Model:
Baumol’s findings of oligopoly firms in America reveal that they follow
the sales maximisation objective. According to Baumol, with the separation of
ownership and control in modern corporations, managers seek prestige and
higher salaries by trying to expand company sales even at the expense of
profits. Being a consultant to a number of firms, Baumol observes that when
asked how their business went last year, the business managers often
respond, “Our sales were up to three million dollars”. Thus, according to
Baumol, revenue or sales maximisation rather than profit maximisation is
consistent with the actual behaviour of firms. Baumol cites evidence to
suggest that short-run revenue maximisation may be consistent with long-
run profit maximisation. But sales maximisation is regarded as the short-run
and long-run goal of the management. Sales maximisation is not only a means
but an end in itself.
➢ If the sales of a firm are declining, banks, creditors and the capital
market are not prepared to provide finance to it.
➢ Its own distributors and dealers might stop taking interest in it.
➢ Firm reduces its managerial and other staff with fall in sales.
➢ But if firm’s sales are large, there are economies of scale and the firm
expands and earns large profits.
The reason for a lower price under sales maximisation is that both total
revenue and total output are equally higher while under profit maximisation
total output is much less as compared to total revenue. Imagine if QB is joined
to TR in Figure 6. “If at the point of maximum profit”, writes Baumol, “the firm
earns more profit than the required minimum, it will pay the sales maximiser
to lower his price and increase his physical output.”
Implications or Superiority of the Model:
Baumol’s sales maximisation model has some important implications
which make it superior to the profit maximisation model of the firm.
Criticism:
Baumol’s sales maximisation model is not free from certain weaknesses.
1. Rosenberg has criticised the use of the profit constraint for sales
maximisation by Baumol. Rosenberg has shown that it is difficult to
specify exactly the relevant profit constraint for a firm. This is explained
in Figure 7. Sales revenue of the firm is measured along the vertical
axis and profit on the horizontal axis. R refers to the profit constraint.
For any two combinations with profits below the constraint, the one
with the larger profit will be preferred.
3. Hawkins has shown that if the firm is engaged in any form of non-
price competition such as good packaging, free service, advertising, etc.,
Shepherd’s conclusions become invalid. When the sales maximiser
spends more on advertising, his output will be more than that of the
profit maximiser. This is because the kink of the former’s demand curve
will occur to the right of the kink of the profit maximiser.
8. The model ignores not only actual competition, but also the threat of
potential competition from rival oligopolistic firms.
10. Prof Hall in his analysis of 500 firms came to the conclusion that
firms do not operate in accordance with the object of sales
maximisation.
Despite these criticisms, there is no denying the fact that sales
maximisation forms an important goal of firms in the present-day business
world.
In the real world many changes take place which affects business
decisions of a firm. In order to include such changes, Baumol has developed
another dynamic model. This model explains how changes in advertisement
expenditure, a major determinant of demand, would affect the sales revenue
of a firm under severe competitions.
A price reduction policy may increase its sales only when the demand is
elastic and if the demand is inelastic; such a policy would have adverse effects
on sales. Hence, to promote sales, advertisements become an effective
instrument today. It is the experience of most of the firms that with an
increase in advertisement expenditure, sales of the company would also go
up.
A sales maximiser would generally incur higher amounts of advertisement
expenditure than a profit maximiser. However, it is to be remembered that
amount allotted for sales promotion should bring more than proportionate
increase in sales and total profits of a firm. Otherwise, it will have a negative
effect on business decisions. Thus, by introducing, a non-price variable in to
his model, Baumol makes a successful attempt to analyse the behaviour of a
competitive firm under oligopoly market conditions. Under oligopoly
conditions as there are only a few big firms competing with each other either
producing similar or differentiated products, would resort to heavy
advertisements as an effective means to increase their sales and sales
revenue. This appears to be more practical in the present-day situations.