Clear and Distinct Perception and Metaphysical Certainty

Author(s): P. Markie
Source: Mind , Jan., 1979, New Series, Vol. 88, No. 349 (Jan., 1979), pp. 97-104
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2253067

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Mind

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Clear and Distinct Perception and Metaphysical Certainty'

P. MARKIE

Recent commentators on Descartes have been concerned with clarifying

the relationship between two important Cartesian concepts: clear and
distinct perception and metaphysical certainty. It is generally agreed
that to perceive a proposition clearly and distinctly is to apprehend it in
a particular manner and that a person is metaphysically certain of a
proposition just in case he does not have any reason to doubt it. Yet, it
is not clear how Descartes understands the relationship between a
person's clear and distinct perception of a proposition, on the one hand,
and his metaphysical certainty of it on the other. My aim in this paper is
to show that one interpretation of Descartes' position on this matter is
incorrect.

i. The interpretation that interests me attributes this principle to

Descartes:

(i) If S clearly and distinctly perceives p at t, S is metaphysically

certain of p at t.

Some well-known commentators have adopted this interpretation at one

time or another. Harry Frankfurt says that according to Descartes:

To perceive something clearly and distinctly . .. is to be aware of

grounds for believing it so complete that no basis for doubt remains.2

Since Frankfurt notes that not having a reason to doubt a proposition is

equivalent to being metaphysically certain of it, his statement suggests
that he attributes (i) to Descartes. Anthony Kenny seems to have (i) in
mind when he places himself in Descartes' position and writes:

Whenever I clearly and distinctly perceive something I cannot help

judging that it is so, and this will be a true judgment made on the
best possible grounds.3

I Earlier versions of this paper were generously criticized by K. Murphy

Markie and Donald Sievert.
z Harry Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers and Madmen: The Defenlse of Reason
in Descartes' Meditations (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
I970), p. I64. Frankfurt also presents this principle in his, 'Descartes'
Validation of Reason', Descartes: A Collection of Criti.cal Essays, ed. Willis
Doney (New York: Doubleday, I967), p. 2I0. Hereafter, I shall refer to
this paper as 'Frankfurt'.
3 Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random
House, I968), p. I92. Hereafter, I shall refer to this work as 'Kenny'.

4 97

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 98 P. MARKIE:

In one of his papers, Willis Doney also presents (i), claiming that, for
Descartes, 'Clear and distinct perceptions were never subject to doubt.'
This interpretation is open to serious objection. Principle (i) is
inconsistent with one of Descartes' most important claims; we do not
have enough textual evidence to justify our attributing it to Descartes
under these conditions.

2. To make my objection, I shall first extract from Descartes' state-

ments a somewhat vague version of the claim that interests me and then
clarify that claim to show that it is inconsistent with (i).
In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes writes:

For although I am of such a nature that as long as I understand

anything very clearly and distinctly, I am naturally impelled to
believe it to be true, yet because I am also of such a nature that I
cannot have my mind constantly fixed on the same object in order
to perceive it clearly ... it may happen meanwhile that other
reasons present themselves to me, which would easily cause me to
change my opinion, if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of
God, and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge, but
only vague and vacillating opinions. Thus, for example, when I
consider the nature of a [rectilinear] triangle, I . . . recognize quite
clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles, and it
is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind
to its demonstration; but so soon as I abstain from attending to the
proof, although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it,
it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant
of there being a God.2

Descartes acknowledges that he is never able to doubt a proposition

while clearly and distinctly perceiving it, but claims that until he knows
God his clear and distinct perception of some propositions, such as the
theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles, fails to give
him 'true and certain knowledge'.
Descartes makes what is essentially the same point in discussing an
atheist's epistemic abilities. He considers Mersenne's statement that:

While an Atheist knows clearly and distinctly that the three angles
of a triangle are equal to two right, yet he is far from believing
in the existence of God .... (HR II, 26).

I Willis Doney, 'The Cartesian Circle', 3ournal of the History of Ideas, xvi
(I955), 325. Hereafter, I shall refer to this work as 'Doney'. In a later paper,
Doney interprets Descartes as not accepting (i); see his 'Descartes'
Conception of Perfect Knowledge', J7ournal of the History of Philosophy,
viii (I970), 387-403. Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider Doney's argu-
ments for attributing (I) to Descartes.
2 The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.
R. T. Ross (Cambridge University Press, 1931), I, pp. I83-I84. Hereafter,
I shall refer to the two volumes of this work as 'HR I' and 'HR II'.

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION 99

Descartes replies:

That an atheist can know clearly that the three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles, I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on
the other hand, such knowledge on his part cannot constitute true
science, because no knowledge that can be rendered doubtful should
be called science. Since he is, as supposed, an Atheist, he cannot
be sure he is not deceived in the things that seem most evident to
him.... (HR II, 39).

Descartes is willing to admit that the atheist can clearly and distinctly
perceive the theorem at hand.' He insists, however, that due to the
atheist's ignorance of God, the atheist's clear and distinct perception
does not provide him with the certainty he requires for scientific know-
ledge.
These passages justify the attribution of this somewhat vague but
important principle to Descartes:

(2) Until S has knowledge of God, S's clear and distinct perception
of some propositions fails to make him certain of them in a way
required for scientific knowledge.

The importance of this principle for Descartes is clear: his acceptance

of it provides him with his motivation for trying to obtain knowledge
of God in the Third Meditation. The principle itself is vague, however.
It is not clear how we are to understand the phrase 'certain of them in a
way required for scientific knowledge'. As commentators have noted,
Descartes employs a number of different notions of certainty; to name
just a few: psychological certainty (not being able to doubt a proposition),
metaphysical certainty (not having a reason to doubt a proposition) and
moral certainty (being justified in adopting a proposition for practical
purposes). Before we can fully appreciate (2) and, in particular, determine
whether (2) is inconsistent with (i), we have to determine how Descartes
understands the notion of certainty involved in (z).
Once we consider another one of Descartes' statements, it becomes
clear that he understands (2) so that it is inconsistent with (i). Principle
(2) is inconsistent with (i) when the notion of certainty involved in (2) is
taken to be that of metaphysical certainty, and this is just how Descartes
understands (2). Consider his statement to Mersenne:

To begin with, directly we think we rightly perceive something, we

spontaneously persuade ourselves that it is true. Further, if this

I Of course, in replying to Mersenne Descartes only refers explicitly to

clarity and not to both clarity and distinctness. Yet, while he only mentions
clarity, he does not go on to deny Mersenne's claim that an atheist can
have both a clear and a distinct perception. Instead, he goes on to deny
that an atheist can have the certainty required for scientific knowledge. It
hardly seems likely that he would do this if his argument with Mersenne
was over whether an atheist could have both a clear and a distinct percep-
tion,

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 IOO P. MARKIE:

conviction is so strong that we have no reason to doubt concerning

that of the truth of which we have persuaded ourselves, there is
nothing more to enquire about; we have here all the certainty that
can be reasonably desired .... and this persuasion is clearly the
same as perfect certitude (HR II, 41).

Descartes says that if he does not have a reason to doubt a proposition,

that is, if he is metaphysically certain of it, he has all the certainty re-
garding it he can reasonably desire. In writing, then, of the certainty
required for scientific knowledge, he evidently has metaphysical certainty
in mind. Thus, he understands (2) so that it contradicts (i).
Of the commentators I am considering only Kenny considers (2) and,
appealing to a kind of certainty other than metaphysical certainty, he
interprets (2) so that it is consistent with (i). To establish my claim that
(2) is to be interpreted in terms of metaphysical certainty, I must then
show that Kenny is mistaken. He interprets (2) as involving a kind of
certainty stronger than metaphysical certainty, something he calls
'Cartesian certainty'. As I understand him, for p to be a Cartesian
certainty for S at t is for p to be a metaphysical certainty for S at t and
such that there is no later time, t', at which p is a metaphysical uncertainty
for S (Kenny, p. I92). Examination reveals that (2) is consistent with (i)
when (2) is clarified in terms of Cartesian certainty.
As support for his interpretation of (2), Kenny cites the passage
already considered from the Fifth Meditation (p. 98). Kenny interprets
Descartes as claiming that when he is ignorant of God, his clear and
distinct perceptions are not Cartesian certainties, though they are
metaphysical certainties. He takes Descartes to be saying that before he
knows God his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain
for him when he has them, but that later, when his perceptions cease,
those propositions are made metaphysically uncertain for him by the
hypothesis that God is a deceiver. Hence, he does not obtain Cartesian
certainty of those propositions by clear and distinct perception.
Consideration of a number of points reveals that Kenny's interpretation
of (2) is incorrect. First of all, his interpretation is not conclusively
established by the Fifth Meditation passage. That passage can be plausibly
interpreted so that Descartes has metaphysical certainty in mind rather
than Cartesian certainty. One might reasonably take Descartes' position
to be the following. Prior to knowing God, when he is clearly and dis-
tinctly perceiving a proposition such as the theorem mentioned in the
passage, he cannot bring himself to doubt it. Nevertheless, he has a
reason to doubt it and, so, is metaphysically uncertain of it. Furthermore,
if he ceases to perceive the theorem clearly and distinctly, he will then
be able to realize that he has a reason to doubt the theorem and to doubt
it.
Besides not being conclusively established by the Fifth Meditation
passage, Kenny's interpretation has faults which make it less preferable
than my clarification of (z) in terms of metaphysical certainty. On
Kenny's interpretation, Descarte claims that we require something
more than metaphysical certainty for scientific knowledge, we require

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 -CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION IOI

Cartesian certainty. This claim is inconsistent with the passage con-

sidered earlier in which Descartes claims that once we have metaphysical
certainty there is nothing more to enquire about. Kenny's interpretation
also forces us to attribute an extremely implausible position to Descartes:
that when he overcomes his epistemic limitations by coming to know
God, he reaches a point where his clear and distinct perception of a
proposition at a time makes that proposition a Cartesian certainty for
him at that time. This is very implausible. Not even a knowledge of God
could place Descartes in a position where his clear and distinct perception
of a theorem insured that he would not at some later time cease clearly
and distinctly perceiving the theorem, forget his evidence for it, and so
have a reason to doubt it.'
I conclude, then, that (2) is correctly interpreted in terms of the notion
of metaphysical certainty and, hence, that (i) contradicts one of Des-
cartes' most important claims. We, therefore, need strong evidence for
(i) if we are to be justified in attributing it to Descartes; there must at
least be passages in which Descartes explicitly states (i) or some principles
which imply it. I shall now argue that we do not have such evidence.

3. None of the commentators I mentioned earlier cites a passage in

which Descartes explicitly states (i) and, from my own examination of
Descartes' works, there do not appear to be any. These commentators
do argue that Descartes presents other principles which commit him to
(i), however.
Doney and Frankfurt claim that Descartes identifies his clear and
distinct perception of a proposition with his intuition of it (Doney, p. 327;
Frankfurt, p. 2io) and Doney cites passages in the Rules in which
Descartes claims his intuitions are always metaphysically certain (Doney,
p. 327). This suggests the following argument. There is strong textual
evidence for ascribing to Descartes:

(3) If S intuits p at t, S is metaphysically certain of p at t.

Since Descartes identifies intuition and clear and distinct perception,

his acceptance of (3) commits him to (i).
Descartes may in fact adopt (3); he says that whenever he intuits a
proposition he is 'wholly freed from doubt' (HR I, 7). Yet, there do
not seem to be any passages in which Descartes identifies clear and
distinct perception and intuition. Doney and Frankfurt do not cite any
textual support for their view, and Descartes' definition of intuition does
not support them.

By intuition I understand,.. the conception which an unclouded

and attentive mind gives so readily and distinctly that we are wholly
freed from doubt about that which we understand (HR I, 7).

For a more developed version of this objection to Kenny's interpretation

see F. Feldman and A. Levison, 'Anthony Kenny and the Cartesian
Circle', J7ournal of the History of Philosophy, ix (I97I), 49I-496.

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 102 P. MARKIE:

Even if we take the phrase 'readily and distinctly' here to be synonymous

with 'clearly and distinctly', Descartes' definition is that to intuit a
proposition is to perceive it clearly and distinctly in such a way that we
are wholly freed from doubt about it. For all this tells us, Descartes may
take clear and distinct perception to be only a necessary condition of
intuition.
Another passage is plausibly interpreted so as to suggest that Descartes
takes clear and distinct perception to be a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition of intuition.

two things are requisite for mental intuition. Firstly, the proposition
intuited must be clear and distinct; secondly, it must be grasped
in its totality at the same time and not successively (HR I, 33).

I take Descartes to be claiming that to intuit a proposition he must

clearly and distinctly perceive it and grasp all of its parts at once. While
it is admittedly unclear how we are to understand the second condition,
his statement suggests he does not identify clear and distinct perception
and intuition.
A second argument can be drawn from statements by Frankfurt and
Kenny. They claim that Descartes identifies his clear and distinct
perception of a proposition with his perception of it by the natural light
(Frankfurt, p. 2I2; Kenny, pp. I77-I78) and Kenny cites textual evidence
to show that Descartes believes his perception of a proposition by the
natural light makes him metaphysically certain of it (Kenny, p. I78).
This suggests the following argument. There is textual support for
attributing to Descartes:

(4) If S perceives p by the natural light at t, S is metaphysically

certain of p at t.

Since Descartes identifies his perception of a proposition by the natural

light with his clear and distinct perception of it, his acceptance of (4)
commits him to (i).
There is textual support for one premise of this argument. In the
Principles, Descartes restates his conclusion from the Meditations that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true but rephrases it as:

the light of nature or the faculty of knowledge which God has given
us, can never disclose any object which is not true inasmuch as it
comprehends it, that is, inasmuch as it apprehends it clearly and
distinctly (HR I, 23I).

By stating his conclusion in this way, Descartes seems to identify his

clear and distinct perception of a proposition with his perception of it
by the natural light.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear that Descartes accepts (4).
To show that he does so, Kenny cites the passage:

When I say that I am so instructed by nature, I merely mean a

certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to believe in this

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION- I03

connection, and not a natural light which makes me recognize that

it is true. But these two things are very different; for I cannot doubt
that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for
example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt, or
other facts of the same kind. And I possess no other faculty whereby
to distinguish truth from falsehood, which can teach me that what
this light shows me to be true really is not true, and no other faculty
that is equally trustworthy (HR I, i6o).

Descartes states here that he cannot doubt propositions that the natural
light causes him to believe. According to Kenny, he is claiming to be
metaphysically certain of any proposition he perceives by the natural
light.
I think this passage can be plausibly interpreted as Kenny suggests,
but it has at least two other plausible interpretations that do not commit
Descartes to (4). We might take Descartes to be claiming, not that he
lacks a reason to doubt any proposition he perceives by the natural
light, but that he is psychologically unable to doubt such propositions.
His distinction between being instructed by nature to believe a proposition
and his perceiving one by the natural light is then that in the latter case,
but not in the former, he is psychologically unable to doubt the pro-
position at hand.
There are a number of points in favour of this interpretation. In the
passage before us, Descartes does not explicitly state that he has no
reason for doubting propositions he perceives by the natural light; he
only says he cannot doubt them. Also, in the Fifth Meditation, he claims
that he is psychologically unable to doubt a proposition he clearly and
distinctly perceives (HR I, I84). Assuming that he identifies the natural
light with his faculty of clear and distinct perception, this suggests that
he thinks he is psychologically unable to doubt propositions he perceives
by the natural light. Finally, in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes notes
that a number of the beliefs he found to be doubtful in the First were
ones he was instructed to believe by nature (HR I, i88). Despite this
instruction, he was able to doubt those beliefs at the end of the First
Meditation by relying on the hypothesis of a deceptive god. This suggests
that he thinks he is psychologically able to doubt propositions he is
instructed to believe by nature.
As another alternative interpretation, we might take Descartes to be
claiming that he is metaphysically certain of some, but not all, of the
propositions he perceives by the natural light. The ones he has in mind
are the ones he perceives in such a way that he intuits them. There are
a couple of points in favour of this interpretation. First of all, we have
seen that Descartes regards his intuition of a proposition as involving his
clear and distinct perception of it and so, presumably, his perception of
it by the natural light. Second, as an example of the propositions that
interest him here, Descartes presents the one that his doubting implies
his existence and refers us to others of 'the same kind'. In the Principles,
he states that the proposition that his doubting implies his existence is a
common notion (HR I, 239), and in the Rules he says that he intuits
common notions (HR I, 4I-42).

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
I04 P. MARKIE: CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION

Neither of these arguments, then, provides substantial support for the

view that Descartes accepts (i). Since there does not appear to be any
other textual support for that view, and since (i) is inconsistent with an
important claim Descartes does make, I conclude that Descartes does
not accept that principle.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA

This content downloaded from

80.96.21.199 on Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:24:46 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms