The Cogito Puzzle

Author(s): Peter J. Markie

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Sep., 1982, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Sep.,
1982), pp. 59-81
Published by: International Phenomenological Society

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107513

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. XLIII, No. i, September i982

The Cogito Puzzle'

PETER J. MARKIE

University of Missouri-Columbia

Descartes created the Cogito Puzzle by claiming to be certain of his exis-

tence and making several, seemingly nonequivalent, remarks about why
his claim is true. Commentators, convinced that his remarks contain
important philosophical insights, have tried to combine them into a sin-
gle cogent explanation. I shall make a new attempt to solve the Cogito. I
shall clarify Descartes' claim to certainty and then use my clarification
to give a new interpretation to Descartes' remarks about why his claim
is true. I shall also defend my interpretation against several objections.
I. Descartes tells Gassendi that his claim to be certain he exists con-
cerns "metaphysical certitude" (AT VII, 3 5z; HR II, zo7).' To under-
stand Descartes' claim, we must understand his concept of metaphysical
certainty; especially, his distinction between metaphysical certainty and
moral certainty and his criterion for metaphysical certainty.
Let us begin with Descartes' distinction between metaphysical and
moral certainty.3

If there are finally any persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God
and of their soul by the reasons which I have brought forward, I wish that they should
know that all other things of which they perhaps think themselves more assured (such as
possessing a body, and that there are stars and an earth and so on) are less certain. For,
although we have a moral assurance of these things which is such that it seems it would be
extravagant in us to doubt them, at the same time no one, unless he is devoid of reason,

Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the University of Rochester Philosophy
Department and to the i980 meeting of the American Philosophical Association West-
ern Division. Participants in both discussions made helpful comments. I am especially
indebted to Vere Chappell, Richard Feldman, Lawrence Hohm, Donald Sievert, Mar-
garet Wilson, and the referee of this journal.
References to AT are to Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tan-
nery, iA vols. (Paris: Leopold Cerf, I897-I9i0). Those to HR are to The Philosophical
Works of Descartes, trans. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, I934). I follow the familiar Haldane and Ross translation.
3 This account of metaphysical and moral certainty is a development of that given in my
"Dreams and Deceivers in Meditation One," The Philosophical Review (April, i98i).

THE COGITO PUZZLE 59

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can deny, when a metaphysical certainty is in question, that there is sufficient cause for
our not having complete assurance, by observing the fact that when asleep we may simi-
larly imagine that we have another body, and that we see other stars and another earth,
without there being anything of the kind. (AT VI, 37-38; HR I, 104; The Discourse)

Descartes says he is "less certain" that his body, the stars, and earth
exist than that his soul and God exist. He only has a moral assurance
about his body, the stars, and earth, while he has metaphysical cer-
tainty, or complete assurance, about his soul and God. Even though
moral certainty is a lower grade of certainty than metaphysical, it still
has some punch to it. Descartes says it is extravagant to doubt moral
certainties.
The distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty also comes
into play in the Meditations. After he presents the Dream and Deceiver
Arguments, Descartes describes the beliefs he has examined:

I consider them as they really are, i.e. opinions in some measure doubtful, as I have just
shown, and at the same time highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe
in them than to deny them. (AT VII, zz; HR I, 148; Meditation One)

Descartes might have put his point in slightly different terms. The
beliefs he has considered are not metaphysical certainties (they are in
some measure doubtful), but they are moral certainties (they are highly
probable). At the beginning of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes recon-
siders his belief that he has a body.

I easily understand, I say, that the imagination could be thus constituted if it is true that
body exists; and because I can discover no other convenient mode of explaining it, I con-
jecture with probability that body does exist; but this is only with probability . . . . (AT
VII, 73; HR I, 187)

Descartes again might have put his point differently. Since the proposi-
tion that he has a body gives the best explanation of data about his
imagination, it is a moral certainty (probable). Yet, the proposition's
ability to explain the data does not make it a metaphysical certainty (it
is only probable).
Descartes employs the distinction between moral and metaphysical
certainty to answer his critics. Bourdin objects that Descartes contra-
dicts himself in Meditation One when he claims to find nothing meta-
physically certain but to know there is no peril in assuming an evil
deceiver exists.

What? 'I know'? Is that certain and beyond all doubt? And has our great shipwreck of
truth left at least this driftwood floating? (AT VII, 471; HR II, 275)

Descartes replies:

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it is clearly evident that when I said 'I know' I spoke only of the moral mode of knowing,
which suffices for the regulation of life, and which I have often insisted is so vastly differ-
ent from that metaphysical mode of knowing which is here in question .... (AT VII,
475; HR II, 278)

Moral and metaphysical certainty are different modes of knowing.

There is no contradiction in saying a proposition is known in the fir
mode but not in the second.
Let us see if we can define moral certainty and metaphysical cer-
tainty.
Descartes describes moral certainty as a mode of knowing. He thinks
our moral certainties have three important characteristics. It is
"extravagant for us to doubt them" (AT VI, 37-3 8; HR I, I04), we have
"more reason to believe in them than to deny them" (AT VII, zz; HR I,
I48), and they are "highly probable, so that there is much more reason
to believe in them than to deny them" (AT VII, zz; HR I, I48; my
emphasis). The first two traits are fairly easy to appreciate. We may
adopt any of three epistemic attitudes toward a proposition: We may
believe it, deny it, or doubt it (neither believe it nor deny it). The first
trait of our moral certainties is that it is more reasonable for us to
believe them than to doubt them. The second trait is that it is more rea-
sonable for us to believe them than to deny them. The third trait (that
there is much more reason to believe moral certainties than to deny
them) is more difficult to appreciate. Descartes does not say how much
is much. I think the best interpretation of his view is that moral certain-
ties are so reasonable to believe that metaphysical certainties are the
only things, if any, more reasonable to believe.
Yet, what is the end or goal in terms of which it is much more rea-
sonable to believe a moral certainty than to doubt or deny it? Descartes
does not say, but it surely is not the end of believing only what is both
true and metaphysically certain, which he adopts as part of his scientific
method (AT VI, i8; HR I, 92z & AT VII, i8; HR I, I 45). I think moral
certainties are defined by the end set by the standard epistemic impera-
tive: Believe all and only what is true. When Descartes says it is more
reasonable to believe a moral certainty than to doubt it, he means that,
from the perspective of believing all and only what is true, believing it is
more reasonable than doubting it. When he says it is more reasonable to
believe a moral certainty than to deny it, he means that, from the per-
spective of believing all and only what is true, believing it is more rea-
sonable than denying it. When he says it is much more reasonable to
believe a moral certainty than to deny it, he means that, from the per-
spective of believing all and only what is true, metaphysical certainties
are the only things, if any, more reasonable to believe.

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 What I am suggesting is:

D i: p is a moral certainty for S = df. (i) believing p is more rea-

sonable for S from the standard perspective than doubting p
or denying p; (z) believing some proposition, q, is more
reasonable for S from the standard perspective than believing
p only if q is a metaphysical certainty for S.

A few points should be noted about the definiens.

First, to say that adopting epistemic attitude A to proposition p is
more reasonable for S from the standard perspective than adopting atti-
tude B to proposition q is, roughly, to say that adopting A to p is a bet-
ter strategy for S for attaining the goal set by the standard epistemic
imperative than adopting B to q. The evidence possessed by S regarding
the truth values of the propositions determines which strategy is better.
If Descartes has strong evidence for p and none for -p, believing p is a
better strategy for him to follow than either doubting or denying p. If
Descartes gradually loses his evidence for p, believing p ceases to be a
better strategy for him than doubting p and then ceases to be a better
strategy for him than denying p. Neither Descartes' degree of conviction
nor the truth values of the propositions determines which strategy is
better. When Descartes has strong evidence for p and none for -p,
believing p is a better strategy for him than doubting or denying p, even
if he is convinced that p is false and p is in fact false.
A second point to note about the definiens is that one attitude can be
more reasonable than another for a person from the standard perspec-
tive, even if he does not adopt the standard epistemic imperative. This
allows propositions to be moral certainties for people who guide their
epistemic attitudes by imperatives other than the standard one.4
What about metaphysical certainty? According to Descartes, meta-
physical certainty is also a mode of knowing. It is a higher grade of cer-
tainty than moral certainty; it is "complete assurance" (AT VI, 38; HR
I, 104). His point is again fairly clear. When a proposition is a metaphy-
sical certainty for us, believing it is more reasonable for us from the
standard perspective than doubting it or denying it; indeed, believing it
is as reasonable as believing ever can be from that perspective.
Metaphysical certainty may be defined by:

4 I also take the relation of being more reasonable than from the standard perspective to
be transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetrical. It is such that if doubt is not more reason-
able from the standard perspective than belief, then belief is more reasonable from that
perspective than denial. Given these restrictions, the phrase 'than denying p' in the first
clause of Di is redundant, but I include it for the sake of clarity.

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 Dz: p is a metaphysical certainty for S = df. (i) believing p is
more reasonable for S from the standard perspective than
doubting p or denying p; (z) it could never be more reason-
able from the standard perspective for S to believe some
proposition, q, than it is at present for S to believe p.

Descartes' metaphysical certainties are his best bets from the perspec-
tive of believing all and only what is true. As in the case of moral cer-
tainty, a proposition can be a metaphysical certainty for Descartes
can be a best bet from the standard perspective - even if he does not
adopt the standard epistemic imperative.5
My definitions capture Descartes' more obvious views on moral and
metaphysical certainty. They account for his view that metaphysical
certainty is a higher grade of certainty than moral certainty, by implying
that all metaphysical certainties are moral ones, but not that all moral
certainties are metaphysical ones. They account for his view that moral
and metaphysical certainty are different modes of knowing by defining
them both in terms of the standard epistemic imperative. Di captures
Descartes' view that it is "unreasonable" and "extravagant" to doubt
or deny a moral certainty; Dz that metaphysical certainty amounts to
"complete assurance.
My definitions capture a less obvious aspect of Descartes' position.
Descartes does not think of moral and metaphysical certainty as differ-
ent kinds of certainty defined by their objects. He does not think of
moral certainty as the kind of certainty possessed by propositions on
practical "moral" matters and metaphysical certainty as the kind of cer-
tainty possessed by propositions on nonpractical "metaphysical" mat-
ters. In Meditation One, he takes both the proposition that he has a
body and some mathematical truths to be moral certainties; as he puts
it, they are:

highly probable so that there is much more reason to believe in them than to deny them.
(AT VII, zz; HR I, 148; cf., AT VI, 37; HR I, 104; The Discourse)

In Meditations Five and Six, Descartes includes the same propositions

in his list of metaphysical certainties (AT VII, 7I; HR I, I85 & AT VII,
79-80; HR I, i9z). My definitions capture his view. Di lets any propo-
sition be a moral certainty, so long as Descartes has enough evidence to
make belief in it more reasonable from the standard perspective than
denial or doubt and such that metaphysical certainties are the only
things, if any, more reasonable to believe. Dz lets any proposition be a

I I rely heavily in Di and Dz on the insights of Roderick Chisholm. See his Theory of
Knowledge (znd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 7-i6.

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metaphysical certainty, so long as Descartes' evidence is strong enough
to make belief in it maximally reasonable from the standard perspec-
tive.
Di and Dz are also superior to another way of understanding moral
and metaphysical certainty. Descartes sometimes suggests that moral
and metaphysical certainty are different kinds of certainty defined by
different activities.

But we must note the distinction emphasized by me in various passages, between the prac-
tical activities of our life and an enquiry into truth; for when it is a case of regulating our
life, it would assuredly be stupid not to trust the senses, and those sceptics were quite
ridiculous who so neglected human affairs that they had to be preserved by their friends
from tumbling down precipices. It was for this reason that somewhere I announced that
no one in his sound mind seriously doubted about such matters; but when we raise an
enquiry into what is the surest knowledge which the human mind can obtain, it is clearly
unreasonable to refuse to treat them as doubtful .... (AT VII, 35i; HR II, zo6; Reply
to Gassendi)

Some may examine this passage and define moral certainties as those
propositions more reasonable to believe than to doubt or deny when
engaged in practical affairs and metaphysical certainties as those propo-
sitions more reasonable to believe than to doubt or deny when engaged
in an inquiry into truth. These definitions rely on the vague distinction
between practical affairs and an inquiry into truth. They make the mis-
take of reversing Descartes' understanding of the relation between
metaphysical certainty and an inquiry into truth. Descartes does not
explain metaphysical certainty in terms of an inquiry into truth. He
explains an inquiry into truth in terms of metaphysical certainty; it is an
inquiry "into what can be known most certainly by the human mind."
We can capture the import of Descartes' remark to Gassendi in terms
of Di and Dz. When we engage in practical affairs, we should adopt the
standard epistemic imperative and assent to both moral and metaphysi-
cal certainties. We engage in an inquiry into truth when we set out to
construct a scientific theory and restrict the standard imperative, as
Descartes does (AT VI, i8; HR I, 92X & AT VII, i8; HR I, IJ4 5), to allow
for a commitment to include in our scientific theory only what is both
true and metaphysically certain. In such a case, we should not assent to
mere moral certainties in the sense that we should not include them in
our scientific theory.6

6 I give a more detailed account of this way of understanding the relation between moral
certainty and practical affairs and between metaphysical certainty and science in my
"Dreams and Deceivers in Meditation One."

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 We can now begin to appreciate Descartes' claim to be metaphysi-
cally certain he exists. He thinks his belief in his existence is a best bet
from the standard perspective: (i) believing that he exists is more rea-
sonable for him from the standard perspective than doubting or deny-
ing that he exists; (z) believing that he exists is as reasonable for him
from that perspective as believing ever can be.
We can deepen our appreciation of Descartes' claim regarding his
existence by examining his criterion for metaphysical certainty. In his
scientific method, Descartes restricts the standard epistemic imperative
(Believe all and only what is true) to make room for the Cartesian
imperative to include in his scientific theories only what is both true and
metaphysically certain (AT VI, i8; HR I, 92z & AT VII, i8; HR I, I4I5
He formulates a criterion for separating his metaphysical certainties
from mere moral ones.

if this conviction is so strong that we have no reason to doubt concerning that of the truth
of which we have persuaded ourselves, there is nothing more to enquire about; . . . this
persuasion is clearly the same as perfect certitude. (AT VII, I44-45; HR II, 41; Reply to
Mersenne)
The question was about only that supreme kind of doubt which, I have insisted, is meta-
physical, hyperbolical and not to be transferred to the sphere of the practical needs of life
by any means. It was of this doubt also that I said the very least ground of suspicion was a
sufficient reason for causing it. (AT VII, 459-60; HR II, z66; Reply to Bourdin)

Descartes thus adopts:

MC: p is a metaphysical certainty for S if and only if p is a moral

certainty for S and S has no reason to doubt p.

Descartes does very little to clarify his concept of a reason for doubt;
he settles for such remarks as that reasons for doubt must be "powerful
and maturely considered" (AT VII, 460; HR II, z66). His examples
suggest two requirements reasons for doubt must meet, however.
Descartes says in Meditation One that the hypothesis that a god
deceives him casts doubt on his mathematical beliefs (AT VII, zi; HR I,
I47). He wipes that hypothesis off his list of reasons for doubt when he
later becomes metaphysically certain it is false (AT VII, 70; HR I, I84
& AT VIII, i6-I7; HR I, 2j3 i). He thus adopts:

RDi: q gives S a reason to doubt his morally certain belief, p, only if

q is a metaphysical possibility for S (S is not metaphysically
certain of -q).

This principle fits Descartes' remark that reasons for doubt must be
"powerful." A hypothesis is not a powerful reason for doubt, unless it is
at least a metaphysical possibility.

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 A second principle about rational doubt is suggested by a First Medi-
tation passage.

For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the
square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so
clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity. Nevertheless, I have long had fixed in
my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as
I am. But how do I know that he has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no
heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place . . . how do I know that I am not
deceived every time I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things
yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? (AT VII, zo-zi; HR I, I47)

Suppose Descartes believes a mathematical proposition on the evidence

that he has mentally added two numbers and obtained a third. Des-
cartes says the hypothesis that some god deceives him gives him a rea-
son to doubt his belief, but the one that his senses deceive him does not.
RDi does not capture the difference between the hypotheses, since each
is a metaphysical possibility for Descartes. The difference lies in their
explanatory power. The deceptive god hypothesis indicates how Des-
cartes' belief might be false despite his evidence. Some all-powerful god
might be causing him to make a mistake in addition. The deceptive
senses hypothesis does not indicate how Descartes' belief might be false
despite his evidence. His evidence concerns his performance of a mental
operation; not what he experiences through his senses.7
This example suggests that a hypothesis gives Descartes a reason to
doubt a morally certain proposition only if it indicates how that propo-
sition might be false despite his evidence for it. This is not quite right.
Suppose Descartes deduces a theorem from mathematical premises evi-
denced by his recollection of having proved them. The hypothesis that
all his recollections are false gives him a reason to doubt the conclusion
of his proof, but it does not indicate how the conclusion might be false
despite his evidence for it (despite the mathematical premises from

7 It is important to distinguish between this case and another one. Suppose Descartes
believes two numbers equal a third on the evidence that there is one number of things
to his left, another number of things to his right and a third number of things about
him over all. In this case, Descartes' evidence concerns what he experiences through his
senses, the deceptive senses hypothesis indicates how his belief might be false despite
his evidence (his senses may be deceiving him when he sees n objects about him) and
casts doubt on his belief. A similar distinction must be made with regard to Descartes'
second example in the passage. He can believe squares have four sides on the evidence
that he has mentally conceived of a square and counted its sides in his imagination, or
he can do so on the evidence that he has experienced squares in the external world and
counted their sides. Descartes' concern is with the former case. The deceptive senses
hypothesis only casts doubt in the latter, for only in that case does it indicate how his
belief might be false despite his evidence.

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which he derives it). It indicates how the premises from which he
derives the theorem might be false despite his evidence for them (despite
his recollection of having proved them). We should adopt:

RDz: q gives S a reason to doubt his morally certain belief, p, only if

(i) q indicates to S how p might be false despite his evidence
for p, or (z) q indicates to S how an essential part of his evi-
dence for p might be false despite his evidence for it.

The concepts of evidence and an essential part of evidence used in

RDz require clarification. When a morally certain proposition is self-ev-
ident, S's evidence for it consists of his act of intuiting it; when a mor-
ally certain proposition is not self-evident, S's evidence for it consists of
those morally certain propositions that constitute his reason for believ-
ing it. An essential part of S's evidence for a morally certain proposi-
tion, p, is a morally certain proposition in S's evidence for p such that S
would cease to be morally certain of p, if he ceased to be morally certain
of it. RDz also employs the concept of one proposition's indicating to S
how another might be false despite his evidence for it. I shall examine
this concept later.
RDI and RDz unpack different aspects of Descartes' concept of a
reason for doubt. I believe their necessary conditions are jointly
sufficient. Any metaphysically possible hypothesis that indicates how
Descartes' morally certain belief or an essential part of his evidence
might be false gives him a reason to doubt his belief.8
Descartes' criterion for metaphysical certanty, MC, is very plausible,
when it is understood in terms of Di, Dz, RDi, and RDz. On the one
hand, so long as a metaphysically possible hypothesis indicates how
Descartes' morally certain belief or an essential part of his evidence
might be false, he is not metaphysically certain of his belief in the sense
defined by Dz. He can increase the reasonableness of his belief from the
standard perspective by becoming metaphysically certain of the nega-
tion of every such hypothesis. On the other hand, once Descartes is
metaphysically certain of the negation of every such hypothesis, there is
no even metaphysically possible explanation of how his belief or an
essential part of his evidence might be false. He can do nothing to

Fred Feldman, "Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian Circle," Philosophical Studies
27 (I975), is the only commentator I know who might say the conditions in RDi and
RDz are not jointly sufficient. Feldman thinks a reason for doubt must be a moral pos-
sibility (its negation must not be morally certain). I criticize Feldman's view in "Fred
Feldman and the Cartesian Circle," Philosophical Studies 3' (I977); so does James
Van Cleve in "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle," The
Philosophical Review (January 1979).

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increase the reasonableness of his belief from the standard perspective.
His belief is maximally reasonable from that perspective and, therefore,
metaphysically certain in the sense defined by Dz.9
MC sheds more light on Descartes' claim to be metaphysically certain
he exists. His claim has two parts: (i) he is morally certain he exists;
(z) he has no reason to doubt his morally certain belief that he exists;
that is, no metaphysically possible hypothesis indicates how his belief or
an essential part of his evidence for it might be false. We are ready to
interpret Descartes' remarks about why his claim is true.
z. One perspective on Descartes' remarks is that he gives different
explanations in different works. In the Principles (AT VIII, 6-7; HR I,
zzi) and the Discourse (AT VI, 3z-33; HR I, ioi), Descartes empha-
sizes his performance of the inference 'I think, therefore, I am.' In the
Meditations (AT VII, 33; HR I, I 56 & AT VII, z5; HR I, I so), he does
not explicitly cite the inference but instead stresses that no hypothesis
casts doubt on his existence.'0 Yet, Descartes never says he gives differ-
ent explanations, let alone that he changes his explanation between the
Discourse and Meditations and then back again between the Medita-
tions and Principles.
My clarification of Descartes' claim to metaphysical certainty gives
us a different perspective on his remarks. Descartes' claim to metaphy-
sical certainty has two parts: (i) he is morally certain he exists;
(z) he has no reason to doubt his morally certain belief that he exists.
Descartes' explanation of why he is metaphysically certain must also
have two parts: (i) an explanation of what epistemic operation he
performs to become morally certain he exists; (z) an explanation of
why no hypothesis casts doubt on his morally certain belief that he
exists. I suggest that Descartes, without warning and perhaps without
being conscious of what he is doing, emphasizes different parts of his
explanation in different places. When he stresses his inference, he
emphasizes the first part. His remarks contain the makings of an

I say MC is plausible when it is understood in terms of Di, Dz, RDi, and RDz; I do
not say that it is clearly true. Some may question whether the absence of any metaphy-
sically possible hypothesis indicating how Descartes' morally certain belief or evidence
might be false implies that Descartes' belief is maximally reasonable in the sense
defined in Dz. I am not sure how Descartes could successfully answer this challenge;
since the correctness of my interpretation as an interpretation does not hang on his
ability to do so, I shall not explore this point further.
Harry Frankfurt believes the difference between Descartes' remarks is great enough
that we should treat his remarks in the Meditations in isolation from his remarks in
other works; see his Demons, Dreamers and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Des-
cartes's 'Meditations' (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 9z. Hereafter, I refer to
Frankfurt's book by 'F.'

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account of how he becomes morally certain he exists. When he stresses
his lack of a reason for doubt, he emphasizes the second part. His
remarks contain the makings of an explanation of why he has no reason
to doubt his morally certain belief that he exists. Descartes does not give
different explanations in different works; he emphasizes different parts
of his explanation in different works.
To pursue this line of interpretation, let us consider the passages that
are especially informative with regard to what epistemic operation
makes Descartes morally certain he exists.

immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was
absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that
this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most extrava-
gant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to
the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philoso-
phy for which I was seeking. . . . I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the
truth of other things, it very evidently and certainly followed that I was; on the other hand
if I had only ceased from thinking, even if all the rest of what I had ever imagined had
really existed, I should have no reason for thinking that I had existed. (AT VI, 3z-33; HR
I, I0I; Discourse)

Descartes presents:

I (I) I think

(z) Therefore, I am.

He also reports that he inferred his existence from the premise that he
thinks of doubting. Descartes presents (I) again in the Principles (AT
VIII, 6-7; HR I, zzi).
How does (I) make Descartes morally certain he exists? Descartes
never gives a clear answer. I think he believes that his intuition of the
premise makes him morally certain of it and that, while he intuits the
premise, he infers, and so gains moral certainty of, the conclusion. This
interpretation helps us make sense out of two difficult passages.
Descartes tells the Marquis of Newcastle:

You will surely admit that you are less assured of the presence of the objects you see than
of the truth of the proposition: I experience, therefore I am? Now this knowledge is no
product of your reasoning, no lesson that your masters have taught you; it is something
your mind sees, feels, handles; and although your imagination which insistently mixes
itself up with your thoughts, reduces the clearness of this knowledge, it is nevertheless a
proof of our soul's capacity for receiving from God an intuitive kind of knowledge. (AT
V, 137; AG, 301)"

I References to AG are to Descartes's Philosophical Writings, trans. E. Anscombe and P.

T. Geach (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

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Descartes presents (I) and says his knowledge of his existence does not
involve reasoning and is intuitive. How can his knowledge involve (I)
but not involve reasoning and be intuitive? My proposal is that his
knowledge does not involve reasoning in that it does not involve a syl-
logism or a series of inferences; his knowledge is intuitive in that he
intuits the premise that he thinks and simultaneously infers that he
exists. Descartes' statements in the Rules support this interpretation. He
there (AT X, 369-70; HR I, 8 & AT X, 389; HR I, zo & AT X, 407-8;
HR I, 3 3) extends the title 'intuitive' to knowledge gained by immedi
inference from a simultaneously intuited premise.
Descartes tells Mersenne:

when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge
derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I think, hence I am, or exist,' does
not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision,
recognizes it as if it were known per se. (AT VII, I40; HR II, 38)

Descartes again presents (I). He again suggests that his knowledge of his
existence is intuitive; this time he says he gains his knowledge in a sim-
ple act of mental vision in which he recognizes something as if it were
known per se. It is not clear what the something is. It may be that he
exists, or it may be (I). Yet, whatever the something is, how can Des-
cartes' knowledge both involve (I) and be gained in a simple act of men-
tal vision? My suggestion is that Descartes infers his existence from his
thinking in (I); he apprehends (I) in a simple act of mental vision in that
he intuits the premise that he thinks and simultaneously infers that he
exists. Descartes' statements in the Rules again support my suggestion.
He there (AT X, 407-8; HR I, 33) describes as "simple and clear" those
inferences "presented by intuition" and "grasped as a whole at the same
time by the mind."
We understand the first part of Descartes' claim to metaphysical cer-
tainty of his existence; now let us consider the second part: No meta-
physically possible hypothesis indicates how his morally certain belief
that he exists might be false despite his evidence that he thinks or how
his morally certain evidence that he thinks might be false despite his
intuition of it. Descartes' remarks in the Meditations are especially
informative with regard to this part of his position.
At the end of the Second Meditation, he writes:

What then, I who seem to perceive this piece of wax so distinctly, do I not know
myself . . . with much more truth and certainty . . .? . . . if I judge that the wax
exists from the fact that I touch it, the same thing will follow, to wit that I am; and if I
judge that my imagination, or some other cause, whatever it is, persuades me that the wax
exists, I shall still conclude the same. And what I have here remarked of the wax may be
applied to all other things which are external to me. (AT VII, 33; HR I, I 56)

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Descartes offers two points in defense of the claim that he is more cer-
tain of his own existence than he is that of the wax. First, his evidence
for the wax's existence supports his belief in his own existence. Both
beliefs, we may say, are made morally certain by evidence about what
he seems to experience. Second, hypotheses about his imagination or
some other cause deceiving him give him a reason to doubt the wax's
existence but not his own. To explain why such hypotheses do not cast
doubt on his existence, Descartes says he may conclude from them that
he exists; his point is that they entail his existence.
Descartes presents a similar position at the beginning of the Second
Meditation.

But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no
earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I
did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of some-
thing. (AT VII, z5; HR I, I 50)

Descartes tells us that in the First Meditation he was not persuaded that
he did not exist and points out that his being persuaded of something
entails his existing. I think he is calling our attention to (I). His intention
is clearer in the French edition where he says that his thinking of some-
thing entails his existing (AT IX-i, id).
Descartes goes on to explain why the conclusion of (I) resists the First
Meditation's major reason for doubt.

But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his
ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him
deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I
am something. (AT VII, z5; HR I, I50)

The hypothesis that some god deceives him does not give Descartes a
reason to doubt his existence, because his being deceived entails his
existing.
Descartes next concludes:

so that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the
definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I
pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it. (AT VII, 25; HR I, I 50)

Descartes clearly does not intend to claim that the proposition that he
exists is a logically necessary truth whenever he pronounces or con-
ceives it. At other places, he says a proposition is necessarily true, when
he clearly intends to claim that it is a metaphysical certainty for him
(AT VII, z7; HR I, 152). I think he is doing the same thing here. He has
in mind that there is no way he can be mistaken in asserting or believing
the proposition that he exists, or, more precisely, that that proposition

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is metaphysically certain for him. Indeed, in the next paragraph in the
French edition (AT IX-i, ig; HR I, 152), he describes himself as "I who
am certain that I am."
Descartes' explanation at the beginning and end of the Second Medi-
tation is fast and loose. At each place, he indicates the inference by
which he gains moral certainty of his existence, says that some hypoth-
eses about his being deceived do not cast doubt on his existence because
they entail that he exists, and decides that he has no reason to doubt his
existence, so that he is metaphysically certain he exists. To tighten his
explanation, Descartes must show that no metaphysically possible
hypothesis indicates how his belief that he exists might be false despite
the evidence that he thinks and none indicates how his evidence that he
thinks might be false despite his intuition of it.
I think Descartes would accept two principles to tighten his explana-
tion. The first is:

INi: q indicates to S how his morally certain belief, p, might be

false despite his evidence for p only if q is a proposition to the
effect that S's intellectual abilities are malfunctioning.

INi limits explanations of how Descartes might be mistaken to hypoth-

eses about his intellectual faculties being "short circuited." I think Des-
cartes would accept this limitation. He sticks to such hypotheses in the
Second Meditation passages just considered. When he lists reasons for
doubt in Meditation Five, he considers the hypothesis that some god
deceives him, and completes his list with similar hypotheses about his
intellectual state. (AT VII, 70-7I; HR I, I84-85).Iz The second princi-
ple is:

INz: q indicates to S how his morally certain belief, p, might be

false despite his evidence for p only if either (i) it is logically
necessary that p, or (z) it is logically possible that q be true of
him and p be false.

In conjunction with RDI and RDz, INi implies that if Descartes is metaphysically cer-
tain of the negation of every hypothesis about how his intellectual abilities are mal-
functioning, all his moral certainties are metaphysical ones. Some may object that INi
rules out a hypothesis that should be regarded as indicating how Descartes' morally
certain beliefs might be false despite his evidence: Some deceiver leads Descartes into
error without affecting his intellectual faculties. I think this hypothesis is too incoher-
ent to indicate how a morally certain belief might be false despite Descartes' evidence
for it. As I understand the concept of leading into error, a deceiver cannot lead Des-
cartes into error without affecting his intellectual faculties in some way.

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INz says a hypothesis indicates to Descartes how one of his morally cer-
tain contingent beliefs might be false despite his evidence for it only if it
is logically possible that the hypothesis be true of him and his belief
false. The insight behind INz is that we do not indicate to Descartes
how one of his contingent beliefs might be false despite his evidence, if
we present a hypothesis that can be true of him only if his belief is true. I
think this is Descartes' insight in the Second Meditation passages, when
he decides different hypotheses do not give him a reason to doubt his
existence because they entail that he exists."
We can now tighten Descartes' explanation of why he has no reason
to doubt his morally certain belief that he exists. According to RDz,
Descartes has reason to doubt his existence only if some hypothesis
indicates how his belief that he exists might be false despite his evidence
that he thinks or how his evidence that he thinks might be false despite
his intuition of it. According to INi, such a hypothesis must be one to
the effect that Descartes' intellectual faculties are malfunctioning.
According to INz, it must be such that it can be true of Descartes with-
out his existing or without his thinking. There is no such hypothesis.'4

3 I restrict INz to Descartes' contingent beliefs by the disjunct that p is logically neces-
sary to avoid the implication that no hypothesis ever indicates how a logically neces-
sary proposition might be false despite Descartes' evidence for it. Some may object to
INz on the grounds that, since God is necessarily good, it is logically impossible that
God deceives Descartes, and the deceptive god hypothesis, therefore, fails to satisfy
INz relative to Descartes' contingent beliefs. Yet, Descartes' deceptive god hypothesis
is that god deceives him, where the term 'god' is not defined by a kind of goodness that
precludes deception (AT VII, zi; HR I, 147 & AT VII, z5; HR I, I50).
14 Two points should be noted about this explanation of why Descartes has no reason to
doubt his existence. First, the explanation assumes that a particular treatment of
indexical expressions is false. Consider the propositions Descartes would express by:
(a) "Some god deceives the greatest i7th century philosopher."
(b) "I think."
(c) "I exist."
I say the proposition Descartes would express by (a) does not give him a reason to
doubt the ones he would express by (b) and (c), because it does not satisfy INz relative
to those propositions. The proposition Descartes would express by (a) cannot be true
of him, while those he would express by (b) and (c) are false. This is to assume that the
indexical 'I' in (b) and (c) is not replaceable salva sensu by a definite description that
describes Descartes in terms of characteristics he could exist without. Sentences (b) and
(c), uttered by Descartes, do not, for example, have the same meaning as:
(b') "The i7th century philosopher who does his best work at night thinks."
(c') "The i7th century philosopher who does his best work at night exists."
The proposition expressed by (a) can be true of Descartes, while those expressed by
(b') and (c') are false. It is logically possible that Descartes (that substance which in
fact is him) exists, is the greatest i7th century philosopher, and is deceived by some
god, but no i7th century philosopher does his best work at night.

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 My solution to the Cogito Puzzle is complete. According to my inter-
pretation, Descartes believes his intuition that he thinks is the basis of
his metaphysical certainty that he exists. His intuition makes him mor-
ally certain he thinks and, by immediate inference, morally certain he
exists. Since he has no reason to doubt these moral certainties, he is
metaphysically certain he thinks and exists.
3. It is time to consider some objections to my solution. I attribute a
deductive inference from 'I think' to 'I exist' to Descartes; Margaret
Wilson criticizes past inferential interpretations on the grounds that,
while they capture Descartes' remarks about an inference from thought
to existence, they fail to capture his remarks about lacking a reason to
doubt his existence. They fail, as she puts it, to "bring out the peculiar
relation of the cogito to the enterprise of Cartesian doubt."'5 This
objection does not apply to my interpretation. I have shown how the
claim that he has no reason to doubt his existence is an important part
of Descartes' explanation of why he is metaphysically certain he exists. I
have explained why Descartes thinks no hypothesis casts doubt on his
existence.
Wilson also objects that we should not attribute (I) to Descartes,
because (I) lacks "formal validity" (W, 55). Her objection contains less

What then is the meaning of 'I' in (b) and (c) as uttered by Descartes? Descartes
does not say, but he has at least two options. He might say 'I' functions in (b) and (c) as
a logically proper name: its meaning is that substance which is him; for this reason, the
propositions Descartes expresses by (b) and (c) must be about him and so must be true
when (a) is true of him. He might say the meaning of 'I' is his individual essence or
haecceity: a set of properties he cannot exist without and which only he can have (one
candidate is the set containing just the property of being identical to him); for this rea-
son, the propositions he expresses by (b) and (c) must be about him and so must be
true when (a) is true of him. Roderick Chisholm develops this second option in Person
and Object (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., I976), Chapter One. Hector-
Neri Castaneda criticizes Chisholm's position in "Philosophical Method and Direct
Awareness of the Self," in Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, edited by
Ernest Sosa (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, i980). Chisholm has since
rejected the second option in "The Directly Evident," in Justification and Knowledge,
ed. George Pappas (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., I978) and in The First Person
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I98I).
The second point to note is that this explanation of why Descartes lacks a reason to
doubt that he thinks and that he exists is not applicable to Descartes' beliefs about the
content of his experience, such as that he seems to see light. The deceptive god
hypothesis, for example, satisfies INi and INz with regard to Descartes' belief that he
seems to see light. To explain why Descartes has no reason to doubt beliefs about the
content of his experience, we must supplement INi and INz with further require-
ments. I do not yet know what requirements will do the trick, however.
IS Margaret Wilson, Descartes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, I978), p. 6o. Here-
after, I refer to Wilson's book by 'W.'

74 PETER J. MARKIE

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than meets the eye. The objection is not that the premise in (I) fails to
entail the conclusion or that (I) is not an instance of a valid argument
form in any formal system. The premise entails the conclusion; (I) is
valid in first-order quantification theories with existential presupposi-
tions (ones in which all constants refer to actually existing entities).
Wilson's objection is that (I) is not valid in first-order quantification
theories without existential presuppositions (ones in which some con-
stants do not refer to actually existing entities).
Wilson is right that (I) is not valid in such formal systems, but she
fails to show that Descartes is committed to using an inference valid in
such systems to gain metaphysical certainty of his existence. She
observes that some of Descartes' mathematical claims and his Fifth
Meditation argument for God's existence can only be correctly trans-
lated into formal systems that lack existential presuppositions (W,
64-65). Yet, that some of Descartes' arguments and claims can only be
correctly translated into formal systems without existential presupposi-
tions does not commit him to only giving arguments valid in such sys-
tems. Wilson might follow Hintikka and claim that Descartes' inference
is question-begging if it is only valid in formal systems with existential
presuppositions, except that she correctly rejects Hintikka's position
(W, 6z-63 ).6
Some may object to (I) on epistemic grounds. They may find it
implausible to believe Descartes becomes morally certain he exists
solely on the morally certain evidence that he thinks, without the extra
morally certain evidence that if he thinks, he exists. They may find it
implausible to believe Descartes' evidence places his morally certain
belief in his existence beyond rational doubt yet does not include the
conditional that if he thinks, he exists. We need to be told what is
implausible about these beliefs. It is difficult to see what that might be;
indeed, I have been able to explain why Descartes has no reason to
doubt his existence without once taking the conditional to be part of his
evidence.
Another objection to (I) is that it conflicts with the text.

when I stated that this proposition I think, therefore I am is the first and most certain
which presents itself to those who philosophise in orderly fashion, I did not for all that
deny that we must first of all know what is knowledge, what is existence, and what is cer-
tainty, and that in order to think we must be, and such like; .... (AT VIII, 8; HR I,
zzz; Principles)

i6 Jaakko Hintikka, "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance," The Philosophical

Review (July i966), PP. 7-8. Hereafter, I refer to Hintikka's paper by 'H.'

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Is not Descartes saying that before he can be metaphysically certain he
exists, he must first be metaphysically certain that if he thinks, he
exists ?'7
Descartes is making a different point. He says he must know what
knowledge, existence, and certainty are and that if he thinks, he exists,
before he can do something else. Becoming metaphysically certain he
exists is not the something else he has in mind. Descartes does not need
to know what knowledge and certainty are to become metaphysically
certain he exists. Gaining knowledge of why he is metaphysically cer-
tain he exists is the something else he has in mind. Descartes must know
(with moral or metaphysical certainty) what knowledge, existence, and
certainty are and that if he thinks, he exists to know (with moral or
metaphysical certainty) his explanation of why he is metaphysically cer-
tain he exists. Part of his explanation is that he infers his existence from
his thinking; another is that hypotheses about his being deceived do not
cast doubt on his existence because they entail that he thinks and so that
he exists. Descartes does not take the conditional that if he thinks, he
exists to be part of his evidence; he takes it to be part of his explanation
of why his evidence makes him metaphysically certain he exists. i8
Another objection to my interpretation is that it saddles Descartes
with the principle that all intuitions are certain, even though he rejects
that principle in the Third Meditation (AT VII, 3 5-3 6; HR I, I5 8). Wil-
son says Descartes doubts "his simplest mathematical intuitions" at
that point (W, iz8-z9). We have two principles to consider:

A: If S intuits p, then S is metaphysically certain of p.

B: If S intuits p, then S is morally certain of p.

17 Consider Frankfurt's interpretation of the passage (F, 96-97).

I8 I believe that, although Descartes claims to be metaphysically certain of the proposi-
tion that he exists and the other propositions he includes in his scientific theories, he
only claims to be morally certain that he is metaphysically certain of those proposi-
tions and he only claims to be morally certain of his explanation of why he is metaphy-
sically certain that he exists. For more on this point, see my, "Dreams and Deceivers in
Meditation One."
Those who find my solution to the Cogito Puzzle attractive can also deal with this
passage from the Principles by appealing to the well-known passage in the Conversa-
tion with Burman (AT V, I47). I prefer the strategy I use here, since the passage in the
Conversation is difficult to understand and the Conversation as a whole is a second-
hand report of Descartes' position. See F, 96-98 and W, 57 for discussions of the rele-
vant passage from the Conversation.

76 PETER J. MARKIE

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Principle A is inconsistent with Descartes' doubt of mathematical intui-
tions in Meditation Three. Principle B is consistent with Descartes'
doubt of mathematical intuitions, since he can be morally certain of a
proposition even when he has a reason to doubt it. I attribute B to Des-
cartes to explain his view that he is morally certain he thinks. I never
attribute A to him."9
Yet, perhaps I leave us with an unsolved puzzle when I attribute B to
Descartes. As Hintikka (H, 4) points out, Descartes says in the Rules
(AT X, 368; HR I, 7) that he can intuit that he exists; so if he believes all
intuitions are morally certain, why does he bother to infer his existence
from his thinking? He can gain moral certainty he exists by intuition
alone.
The solution to this puzzle is that, at least in works after the Rules,
Descartes believes he can indirectly intuit that he exists (immediately
infer his existence from simultaneously intuited premises) but denies
that he can directly intuit that he exists (intuit that he exists without
inferring his existence from intuited premises). Descartes' view that he
cannot directly intuit that he exists is especially clear in the Principles.

substance cannot be first discovered merely from the fact that it is a thing that exists, for
that fact alone is not observed by us. (AT VIII, z4-z5; HR I, z4o)

When Descartes says the fact that a thing exists "alone is not observed
by us," he means that we do not observe the fact that a thing exists,
independently of observing other facts about it. The reason we cannot
discover a substance merely by observing the fact that it exists is that we
cannot merely observe that it exists. Since direct intuition is the way
Descartes observes facts about himself independently of observing other
facts about himself, he is telling us he does not directly intuit that he
exists.20

'9 Some may think we can avoid this objection by exchanging A for the principle that all
clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain or that all natural light per-
ceptions are metaphysically certain. Yet, Descartes also rejects those principles. See my
"Metaphysical Certainty and Clear and Distinct Perception," Mind (January I979).
20 Some may object that I misinterpret Descartes' use of the term 'alone.' Perhaps Des-
cartes is not saying that we never observe the fact that a thing exists independently of
observing other facts about it. Perhaps he is saying that the only facts we never observe
are the facts that particular things exist. This interpretation contradicts Descartes'
other views. If we interpret 'observe' narrowly and take it to refer to direct intuition,
there are other facts Descartes believes he cannot directly intuit, e.g., that he is more
than five feet tall. If we give 'observe' a broad reading and take it to refer to knowledge
with metaphysical certainty, Descartes believes he can know with metaphysical cer-
tainty that particular things exist, e.g., that he exists, that God exists, that his body
exists.

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 What then are we to make of Descartes' statement in the Rules?

intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs
from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself, in that it is simpler,
though deduction, as we have noted above cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thus
each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he
thinks; .... (AT X, 368; HR I, 7)

We have two alternatives; I do not know which of them captures Des-

cartes' position. Perhaps Descartes is saying he can directly intuit that
he exists, and he later changes his mind in the Principles. Perhaps Des-
cartes is using 'intuition' broadly to cover both direct and indirect intui-
tion and using 'deduction' narrowly to refer only to inferences in which
the conclusion is not deduced from simultaneously intuited premises. If
we read the passage in this way, it is consistent with Descartes' remark
in the Principles; we may interpret the Principles passage as a
clarification of Descartes' position in the Rules rather than a rejection of
it.
The last objection to my interpretation is the charge that Descartes
does not believe he can intuit that he thinks. According to Anthony
Kenny,

When he [Descartes] thinks, he is aware of a thought - no matter, yet, to whom or what

the thought belongs. Since, by the light of nature, he knows what a thought is, he knows
that it is an attribute and not a substance."

Donald Sievert agrees with Kenny.

[Descartes' position is] that thinking substances are not observed, either alone or qua
modified, and that we only observe modifications.22

It is difficult to appreciate this objection. Suppose Descartes is think-

ing that seven and three is ten. I say Descartes believes he can reflect on
his own mental state and, in doing so, intuit both that he thinks and
that he thinks seven and three is ten. Kenny and Sievert seem to say
Descartes does not believe he can intuit these propositions; he believes

Descartes' claim that he cannot observe that a thing exists, independently of observ-
ing other facts about the thing, is one of the most important, yet often overlooked,
insights of the Cogito: the property of existence does not have the sort of content that
allows us to simply observe, by direct intuition or sense perception, the fact of its pres-
ence. The best we can do is observe, by direct intuition or sense perception, the fact
that a thing has some other property such as thought or extension, and infer that it has
existence. Stephen Schiffer also makes this point in his "Descartes on His Essence,"
The Philosophical Review (January 1976).
Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random House,
i968), p. 6o. Hereafter, I refer to Kenny's book by 'K.'
Donald Sievert, "Sellers and Descartes on the Fundmental Form of the Mental," Philo-
sophical Studies 37 (i980), p. z57. Hereafter, I refer to Sievert's paper by 'S.'

78 PETER J. MARKIE

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that when he reflects on his own mental state, he can only be aware of
thoughts, which are attributes. Yet, how can the objects of Descartes'
awareness be attributes? Kenny (K, 6o) and Sievert (S, 255) say Des-
cartes deduces the proposition that a thinking substance exists from the
object of his awareness, but Descartes can only deduce that proposition
from another proposition; not from an attribute.
Perhaps the objection is that Descartes does not believe he can intuit
that he thinks or that he thinks seven and three is ten; he only believes
he can intuit that thought is taking place and that it is being thought
that seven and three is ten. The difference between the Kenny-Sievert
position and mine then is clear. I say Descartes believes he can intuit
propositions that entail his existence (that he thinks; that he thinks
seven and three is ten). They say Descartes restricts his intuition to
propositions that do not entail his existence (that thinking is taking
place; that it is being thought that seven and three is ten).
One problem with the Kenny-Sievert objection is that it commits us
to an inadequate account of the Cogito. Because they limit Descartes'
intuition to propositions that do not entail his existence, Kenny (K, 6o)
and Sievert (S, 255) interpret him as trying to gain self-knowledge by
the inference:

II (i) Thought is taking place.

(z) Thought is an attribute.
(3) Every attribute is in a substance.

(4) Therefore, some substance is thinking.

This inference does not give Descartes what he wants. He describes
himself as "I who am certain that I am" (AT IX-i, i9; HR I, I52).
Inference II at best makes him metaphysically certain that some sub-
stance thinks, which is consistent with his not existing at all.
Kenny and Sievert do not provide adequate textual support for their
objection. Kenny first appeals to what he thinks Descartes does not say.

In stating the conclusion of the cogito Descartes several times stresses the first person by
adding a pronoun, 'ego,' which is superfluous in Latin. He does not similarly stress the
first person in the premise of the cogito. (K, 59)

Kenny is mistaken. Descartes stresses the first person in his premise

twice in the Principles and once in his Reply to Mersenne.

ego cogito, ergo sum . . . . (AT VIII, 7; HR I, zzi & AT VIII, 8; HR I, zzz & AT VII,
140; HR II, 38)

THE COGITO PUZZLE 79

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It is unlikely that Descartes would stress the first person in his premise,
if he wanted us to read the premise as 'Thought is taking place' rather
than 'I think.'
Kenny (K, 6o) and Sievert (S, 255) both cite this passage from the
Principles.

it is very manifest by the natural light which is in our souls, that no qualities or properties
pertain to nothing; and that where some are perceived there must necessarily be some
thing or substance on which they depend. And the same light shows us that we know a
thing or substance so much the better the more properties we observe in it. And we cer-
tainly observe many more qualities in our minds than in any other thing, inasmuch as
there is nothing that excites us to knowledge of whatever kind, which does not even much
more certainly compel us to a consciousness of our thought. To take an example, if I per-
suade myself that there is an earth because I touch or see it, by the very same fact, and by
yet stronger reason, I should be persuaded that my thought exists; because it may be that I
think I touch the earth even though there is possibly no earth existing at all, but it is not
possible that I who form this judgment and my mind which judges thus, should be non-ex-
istent and so in other cases. (AT VIII, 8-9; HR I, zz3)

According to Kenny and Sievert, Descartes' point is that we never

observe that a particular substance has a particular quality; we only
observe that a particular quality exists and infer, by the principle that
every quality is in something, that something has the quality. They read
a good bit into Descartes' remark. Descartes does not explicitly say we
never observe the fact that a particular substance has a particular qual-
ity. His remark about observing qualities in a substance (quo plures in
e^dem re sive substantial deprehendimus, tant6 clariu's no illam cognos-
cere) suggests he thinks we make such observations; so does the fact
that he writes of a consciousness of our thought (in mentis nostrae cog-
nitionem) rather than simply a consciousness of thought. Descartes
does not say we infer the existence of something with a particular qual-
ity from the premises that the quality exists and every quality is in some-
thing.
As I understand this passage, Descartes is relating two kinds of
knowledge: knowledge of a proposition and knowledge of a substance.
Properties exist in substances and the more propositions we know pred-
icating properties of a particular substance, the better we know the sub-
stance itself. He knows his mind better than any other substance,
because he knows more propositions predicating properties of his mind
than any other substance. My interpretation fits the title of the passage:
"How we know our mind better than our body." If we read the passage
as I suggest, it is consistent with my interpretation of the Cogito.23

'3 Examination will reveal that another passage in the Principles (AT VIII, z4-z5; HR I,
z4o) can be brought within the scope of my interpretation by a similar reading.

8o PETER J. MARKIE

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 It is worth considering a passage Kenny and Sievert do not cite but
which might be presented in their behalf.

we do not apprehend the substance itself immediately through itself, but by means only of
the fact that it is the subject of certain activities. . (AT VII, 176; HR II, 64; Reply to
Hobbes; cf., AT VII, zzz; HR II, 98; Reply to Arnauld)

Some may say Descartes here implies that he cannot intuit that he
thinks."4 The passage does not contain this implication. When Des-
cartes writes about our apprehending a substance, he is, I suggest, again
concerned with how we can come to know a substance as opposed to
knowing propositions about it. His first point is that we never know a
substance without knowing propositions to the effect that it has some
attributes. (We never know a substance "itself immediately through
itself.") His second point is that we know a substance by knowing what
attributes it has. This position is consistent with the view that Descartes
can intuit that he thinks. He knows himself by knowing what mental
attributes he has; he knows what mental attributes he has by intuiting
propositions about his mental state."5
My defense of my interpretation is complete. I know of no other
plausible objections that might be made to my position. I submit that it
is the correct solution to the Cogito Puzzle.

14 Wilson seems to have this passage in mind, when she writes: "I think there may in fact
be an irreconcilable conflict in Descartes' position, as to whether 'I' expresses a datum
or refers to an entity known only by inference. The cogito, for reasons already stated,
requires that it express a datum; Descartes' position that 'I' denotes a substance,
together with the denial that substances are apprehended directly, requires that the
referent of 'I' be (merely) inferred" (W, 67).
's Descartes' position, restricted to the case of his mind, might be called 'the theory of
modified self-awareness': he can know his self but only as a result of knowing facts
about what mental attributes he has; he can only know his self as modified in some
way. Wilson mentions this way of interpreting Descartes' position but does not
develop it (W, 67). For a contemporary version of the theory of modified self-aware-
ness, see Roderick Chisholm's Person and Object, Chapter One; for some criticisms of
Chisholm's version, see Hector-Neri Castaneda's "Philosophical Method and Direct
Awareness of the Self," and Chisholm's "The Directly Evident" and The First Person.

THE COGITO PUZZLE 8I

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