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HUMAN NATURE
HUMAN NATURE
DAVID BERLINSKI
Copyright Notice
Copyright © 2019 by Discovery Institute. All Rights Reserved.
Publisher Information
Discovery Institute Press, 208 Columbia Street, Seattle, WA 98104
Internet: http://www.discoveryinstitutepress.com/
Published in the United States of America on acid-free paper.
First Edition, First Printing, November 2019.
Dedication
Pour les pompiers de Paris
ADVANCE PRAISE
Polymath David Berlinski’s appraisal of a transcendent human nature
is really a military history, a discourse on physics and mathematics, a
review of philosophy and linguistics, and a brilliant indictment of
scientific groupthink by an unapologetic intellectual dissident. Read it
and learn something original and incisive on every page.
—Victor Davis Hanson, Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, author of The Second World Wars
I. VIOLENCE
1. The First World War
2. The Best of Times
3. The Cause of War
II. REASON
4. Relativism—A Fish Story
5. The Dangerous Discipline
6. Necessary Nature
7. Disgusting, No?
8. Majestic Ascent: Darwin on Trial
9. Memories of Ulaanbaatar
10. Inn Keepers
III. FALL
11. The Social Set
12. Godzooks
IV. PERSONALITIES
13. A Flower of Chivalry
14. Giuseppe Peano
15. Sonja Kovalevsky
16. A Logician’s Life
17. Chronicle of a Death Foretold
V. LANGUAGE
18. The Recovery of Case
VI. PLACE
19. Prague, 1998
20. Old Hose
21. Vienna, 1981
VII. INTERVIEWS
22. A Conversation with Le Figaro
23. A Conversation with Evolution News
Endnotes
Credits
Index
INTRODUCTION
I HAVE LIVED WITHIN HALF A CITY BLOCK OF NOTRE DAME FOR THE last twenty
years. I saw the spire from my bedroom window every morning, and
on leaving my apartment, I could walk within a few feet of the
cathedral walls, dark with grime on the tail-end of the rue du Clôitre,
white and sparkling at the head of the street, the stones
steamcleaned and scrubbed. On mild winter days, I liked to wander
through the Square Jean XXIII on the east side of the cathedral. The
square was always carefully tended, a fountain and a lovely flower-
garden at its center. When I needed to get home after the metro
had closed, and I was too tired to walk, I told taxi drivers to head for
Notre Dame, and even if they had never heard of rue Chanoinesse—
my street—they knew how to get there. My father was great friends
with Pierre Cochereau, the organist at Notre Dame, and he
performed often on the great Cavaillé-Coll organ, water-logged now.
My father sometimes let me sit in the organ loft during his recitals.
From the loft, the organ seemed to boom and echo. In winter, when
there were few tourists, I would go into Notre Dame and light a
candle for my friend, M. P. Schützenberger. He told me as he was
dying that he wished to return as one of the gargoyles, and,
perhaps, he had. No building has ever been more a part of my life.
I saw the spire topple, slowly at first, and then quickly. The police
forced me to evacuate to the other side of the Seine. All of Paris was
there. I thought of myself as a Parisian, if not by birth, then, at
least, by sentiment. Twenty years is a long time. The pompiers were
in their glory that night, and, when I was allowed to return home as
dawn was breaking, they were still there, red-eyed, exhausted,
sooty, grim, and proud. The police, too. The enormous plume of
smoke had already drifted to the west and south. Later that day, I
saw the front of the cathedral. Its towers were still standing, but its
great bells, which I had heard every day, were silent.
The fire did a great deal of damage to the cathedral; it could not
be contained, and, in the end, it burnt itself out. The fourteen
hundred year old oak timbers that had supported the roof were
consumed, and the roof destroyed. President Macron spoke
optimistically of rebuilding the cathedral within five years, but no one
believed him. The structural stability of the north and south towers is
still in doubt. International architects were quick to sketch their
plans for the cathedral’s restoration, and, without exception, they
were, if not hideous, then grotesque. One firm proposed putting a
swimming pool on the roof; another, a design in which the roof and
spire would be made of glass. The destruction of Notre Dame
evoked an almost universal sense of cultural horror. Everyone quite
understood that a structure of comparable grandeur lay completely
beyond our collective competence.
Tout passe, tout casse, tout lasse.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, there must have been men
in Europe who doubted the Catholic faith, and who had little use for
its consolations. If atheism was a real presence in the early and high
Middle Ages, it was not one that the philosophers or the chroniclers
remarked. The contrast to the Moslem world is striking. Many
Moslem intellectuals undertook a journey from faith to doubt and
from doubt to despair. For many years, his physician remarked, God
had put a lock on Al-Ghazali’s tongue. The astrologer, Abu Mashar,
ended his days as an atheist. Doubt about the faith was never
endorsed in the Moslem world, but it was understood. Europe was
more conventional, its literate thinkers either in the service of the
Church or captive to its control. Of all the twelfth-century
philosophers, Peter Abelard came closest to skepticism. He provoked
and was reprimanded. Having begun his life in Holy Orders, he
ended his life in Holy Orders. He did not change.
When almost ten years ago I published The Deniable Darwin, I
was struck by the fact that the contemporary scientific community
resembled in its swaggering assurance the intellectual community of
the high Middle Ages. A professor at Harvard in the early twenty-first
century, finding himself at the University of Paris in the thirteenth,
would require only a few days to get his bearings. Nothing more
than the polarity of his beliefs would change. As an experienced
intellectual, he would have been right at home. Had the same
professor been returned to tenth-or eleventh-century Baghdad, he
would have been flustered by its intellectual diversity. There is an
irony in this that is worth remarking.
Faith in the twenty-first century is secular and scientific. If I
sometimes write to deplore the faith, it is because I am among the
faithful. My criticisms are self-criticisms. I am what I have always
been: a secular Jew. We secular Jews accept an ostentatious
commitment to logic, inference, irony, and skepticism: if they
engender an ever-present sense of emptiness, that is the price that
they command. It is the price that we are prepared to pay. In an
elegant essay published in the last decade of the twentieth century,
V. S. Naipaul made popular, or, at least, better known, the idea of a
universal civilization. He wrote as the Soviet system was collapsing,
a moment of triumph. There is little of that sense today. The idea of
a universal civilization remains, something like a complicated
Diophantine equation, one describing the modern technological
societies of the West. We know how to solve the equation, and every
society has solved the equation in the same way. The necessary
parameters are plain. The universal civilization requires an elaborate
bureaucracy and a rational legal system enforcing the law of
contracts; it requires a scientific elite; it requires science as a source
of awe; and it requires relatively free markets. A doggish form of
secular humanism prevails throughout. These are ideas—all of them
—that invite a certain cynical asperity. Whatever else it may be, the
universal civilization is emotionally and aesthetically repellent. All
that is solid melts into air, all that is Holy is profaned.
There is no society without its underlying ideology, and the
ideology of a universal civilization is expressed by a universal theory,
a Court of Last Resort. No matter the debate, whether a matter of
gender identity or global warming, the terms are drawn from the
vocabulary that the Court enforces. In arguing for a position, it is
necessary to say that science supports it, and fatal to admit that it
does not. The result is very often comic. The idea that there are any
number of genders is championed by the mentally defective and
sullenly tolerated by everyone else. On the rare occasions in which
men persuaded that they are women are pressed in debate, they are
remarkably confident in appealing to scientific authority. And for
every good reason. There is no position that some scientists will not
support, and some scientists will support any position. If in our day
competitive appeals to scientific authority are as frivolous as they are
unpersuasive, this has not always been so. Both the Nazi and the
Soviet states were pleased to observe that their genocidal
imbecilities were the overflow in action of what the scientific
community had antecedently determined. In this they were largely
correct. Racial science flourished in Germany and Marxist science in
the Soviet Union.
The universal theory is a part of the great structure of theoretical
physics, but it contains in Darwin’s theory of evolution an ancillary
rider, something like a carbuncle on the main body. There is no
obvious connection, after all, between theoretical physics and
Darwinian biology, and no esoteric connection either. A commitment
to Darwinian theory is nevertheless as imperative among academics
as a comparable commitment to the Nicene Creed is among
Catholics. However insincere, some form of genuflection is required.
Like any theory, the universal theory conveys a certain aura, one
that cannot be found in either its axioms or its conclusions. It is an
aura that thaws and resolves itself into a number of familiar
propositions: The universe is a physical object. It is nothing less, and
there is nothing more. The emergence of life on earth may be
explained by synthetic chemistry; it has already been entirely
explained by synthetic chemistry. Religions are among the delusions
of mankind and are responsible for its misfortunes. The mind is the
brain in action. There is, on the largest scales, nothing distinctive
about the earth or the abundant life it nourishes. Human beings and
all of man’s passions are inadvertent and accidental. Beyond the
laws of nature, there are no laws. The universe is large, remote,
indifferent, and strange. Human life may be enjoyed; it must, in any
case, be endured.
Even those ardent in defense of the universal theory, and the
claims that it makes, wonder whether there is some radical point of
incoherence in its structure, some fundamental deficiency that it
cannot accommodate. Some hope secretly that this is so. I am
among them. No one doubts that a great deal about the life that
men lead must forever lie beyond the reach of any theory. Neither
man nor machine has the power deductively to exhaust the premises
of a theory as well-known as quantum field theory. The question is
whether the universal theory commands its power as an ideal. In a
recent essay entitled “The Trouble with Quantum Mechanics,” Steven
Weinberg suggests what is at issue. “We want to understand,” he
writes, “the relation of humans to nature.”1 He then draws a
distinction between two ways of grasping that relationship. In the
first, the laws controlling human life are incorporated into the
universal theory as axioms. In the second, the facts of life are
deduced from premises that make no reference to human life at all.
It is in this prospect that Weinberg has invested his hopes.
My own view is that a structure from which everything about
human life follows as a deduction, if impossible in practice, is also
impossible in principle. Any theory must be interpreted in the
reflective gaze of those who appeal to it. If the universal theory
admits of no interpretation, then it remains ineffable, and if it admits
of some interpretation, then only a part of the interpretative
apparatus—its ideas, concepts, rules of procedure—can be
represented within the universal theory. Something must be left out,
and if what is left out is let in, then something new must be left out.
This process of interpretation is never-ending. This logicians know. It
is something that the physicists do not know. It is, this ignorance, a
reason for their confidence.
This book ranges over many topics, and incorporates a number
of different styles, but is unified, I think, by a common concern for
what is an indistinct concept, and that is the concept of human
nature. It is a concept severely in disfavor because it suggests that
there is something answering to human nature, some collocation of
ineliminable and necessary properties that collectively define what it
is to be a human being. There are such properties. Of course there
are. That men are men is an obvious example. Men are men is true
because men are necessarily men. And the fact that there are such
properties does involve a commitment to essentialism. No one
disposing of essentialism in biology is disposed to disregard it in
logic, mathematics, physics, or ordinary life. Human beings are not
indefinitely malleable. There are boundaries beyond which they
cannot change. We are not simply apes with larger brains or smaller
hands, and the distance between ourselves and our nearest
ancestors is what it has always appeared to be, and that is
practically infinite. Human beings are perpetually the same, even if
in some respects different.
In the preface to his Dictionary of the English Language, Dr.
Johnson remarked that his dictionary “was written with little
assistance of the learned, and without any patronage of the great;
not in the soft obscurities of retirement, or under the shelter of
academic bowers, but amidst inconvenience and distraction, in
sickness and in sorrow.”2 These are memorable words, and if I find
myself reaching for them for my own work as well, it is only because
they are true of my own life as well.
—Paris, 2019
I. VIOLENCE
The Austrian ultimatum was delivered to Serbian officials late on
the 23rd of July, almost a month after the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand. European diplomats had resigned themselves to his loss,
the European public, to his absence. Flustered Serbian officials were
unwilling to accept the Austrian ultimatum in person and unable to
read it in German. It is a pity that they did not try harder and try
harder at once. Austria was asking little enough of Serbia, so little
that one wonders, in fact, why they bothered asking anything at
all.38 The ultimatum made no demands that the Serbian government
could not evade with ease or ignore with impunity.39 A show of
Serbian compliance would have left Austrian officials fuming in
frustration. There is some evidence that a few members of the
government of Prime Minister Nikola Păsić thought originally to
accept the Austrian ultimatum without demurral, until Sazanov, in a
careless but characteristic gesture of irresponsibility, encouraged
them peevishly to scruple at one or two Austrian demands.40
Păsić delayed acceding to Austria’s ultimatum as he searched for
a way in which he might delay acceding to anything at all. He had
not survived unwounded in the jungle of Serbian politics by acting
vigorously. In moments of crisis, he preferred to scuttle. The
response the Serbians finally offered the Austrians on the 25th of
July was as incompetent as the ultimatum that the Austrians had
presented the Serbians, an exercise in cunning as low as the
original. Having agreed to eight of the ten Austrian demands,
Serbian officials hoped that Austria would overlook the other two
and regard its note as a gesture of compliance. On noting that the
Serbians had rejected two of its demands, the Austrians discounted
the other eight and regarded the Serbian note as a gesture of
defiance. Each side got not what it wished, but what it deserved.
Russia had during the same week begun what it called partial
mobilization, a charade designed to persuade the Germans that
despite the fact that the Russian state was sopping wet, it was
unacquainted with water. No one was fooled, least of all the
Germans. The Russian military, as short-sighted as it was over-
confident, began to preen itself in the glow of its imagined victories.
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