Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia |, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Turkey's View of the Caucasus and Central Asia during the Soviet Era ‘After the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Fra temity between the Soviet government and the TGNA in March 1921 and following the death of Enver Pasa in 1922 in Central Asia while leading the Basmaci Movement against the Russians (see Box 1-14 in Section 1), Turkey relegated the issue of “external Turks” to the background. “The 1921 treaty contained the following provision in ar- ticle 8: “the parties undertake never to allow the forma: tion or the establishment on their territories of organiza- tions or groups that would claim to be the government of the other party or one of the territories ofthat party” In this way, Turkey agreed not to support the pro-Turanian ‘movements in the Soviet Union, while the Soviets guar- anteed that they would not support the efforts to spread ‘communism in Turkey. ‘This policy continued after the death of Atatiirk. Being fully aware of the dangers caused by the Turanian, adventure in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire, the leadership of the Turkish Republic steered clear of ex- pressing any public interest on the subject of “external ‘Yorks; especially those living in the USSR. The aim was to give the USSR no cause for complaint on the issue. ‘Notwithstanding the existence of a limited number of groups that advocated a jihad against the USSR in order to establish a Turkic Union with the Turks of Central Asia, no Turkish government displayed the slightest interest in the issue. The prevailing anti-Communist stance in Tit- key prevented even research on the Turkic peoples liv- ing under Communist rule. The USSR, in turn, was well aware of the dangers posed by the Tarkic- Muslim com- munities in its population having contacts with Turkey; ‘thus it did not allow even the Turkish Communist Party to have any contacts with these communities. Similarly, ‘the people of the Caucasus and Central Asia were under the strict control of Moscow and never had a chance to es- 730 tablish any relations with Turkey or the rest of the world, ‘AS a consequence, until the last part of the Gorbachey administration, when the Soviet grip on the component sepublics was loosened, Turkey had hardly any relations swith the peoples ofthe Caucasus and Central Asia Turkey's View of the Caucasus ‘and Central Asia after the Cold War Important developments and reappraisals took place in global politics following the destruction of the Berlin ‘Wallin 1989 and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, Turkey had been undergoing substan- tial sociopolitical And economic changes throughout the sg80s and was ineyitably affected by changes in the global scene, Turkey's pdlicy toward the Caucasus and Central ‘Asia after the end bfthe Cold War was shaped by the fol: lowing world context, 1. Both the possibilities for cooperation and the risks increased. After the disintegration of the USSR, the emer- gence of Russia and fifteen new states that abandoned the ‘Communist system and embarked on a course of iberal- ization meant that the divisions of the Cold War had been ‘overcome and, for the first time in the twentieth century, ‘created opportunities for bringing all the major powers together in cooperation on a global scale. The system for avoiding regional conflicts that had developed during the Cold War was also swept aside, however, along with the old order. There was constant instability as the internal restructuring was being carried outin the newly indepen- deat states. This was compounded by tensions between these states, The risks of internal and international wars grew alarmingly in Barasia. 2. Instability began to spread. As the Soviet system collapsed, the international alliances designed to combat it began to be seriously undermined. ‘Ihis led to serious sociopolitical instabilities beyond the territories of the former USSR. 3, Systems were changing, models were being de-bated, and regional rivalries were growing, The former re- gions and republics ofthe USSR that had onlya marginal influence on international affairs began to acquire critical importance in the new system. ‘The model that these states ‘would adopt and the debates over this issue would lead to tensions not only internally but also with neighbors and among the interested mejor powers. The competition among regional and other states that scrambled to fill the vwoid left by the Soviet withdrawal from the Caucasus and ‘Central Asia would lead to new rivalries and new tension con the international scene, 4. The rivalry between the East and West gave way to the North-South divide. As a natural consequence of the ending of the Cold War, the East-West divide began los- ing its intensity and was gradually replaced by the North- South divide. Inan environment where the bipolar system ‘of the Cold War was coming to an end, it was inevitable that regional interests would play a larger part in interna. tional affairs than global concerns. Itwas obvious that the short- and medium-term straggles for regional leader. ship in the various subsystems of the internationel system (such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and Central Asia) would become the determining factor. With the disintegration of the USSR, eight states ‘geined their independence in the Caucasus and Cfntral Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ky stan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, ‘ional interest in these countries has been growing ever since then, mainly for economic and strategic reasons. “The region has been attracting the interest not just of the major powers but-also of regional powers such as Tran, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey, due to the wealth of natural resources, the region’s closeness to the Middle Bast, and its strategic location between Europe and Asia, Outside the Soviet Bloc; the emerging new orderand, the changes it brought about affected Turkey most of al ‘Turkey had based its security and foreign policy during the Cold War on its selations with the Wester allies and the strategic importance attributed to it by theallies. With the ending of the Cold War, the Europeans found them- selves ina much more secure environment, while Turkey found itselfin an environment breeding regional conflicts ‘onal sides. In this new era when NATO’srole and neces- sity became a subject of intense debate, Turkey found it- selfin a security limbo, With the ending of the threat from the North, ‘Turkey's security links with the West and the economic, political and military benetit it derived from these links had come to an end. It was no longer possible to pursue the iusual policies based on the relative “secu- rity” and “stability” of the Cold War. Furthermore, the Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia 751 appearance of Eastern European states pursuing liberal democratic goals cteated a buffer zone between the West- ‘em European states and Russia. Tis allowed Western Eu rope to relax while Turkey remained tense as a result of the instability in its vicinity, which it perceived as threat. "This threat perception was compounded by the danger that it might be abandoned by its Western alles. This shook Turkey's security policies to the core and led to an ‘urgent reappraisal of possible threats to its security in the post-Cold Warera As the chain of events that broke up the USSR was unfolding, Turkey was reappraising its foreign policy ori- entations and its fundamental ideological assumptions. “There was increasing concern in ‘Turkey over foreign and security policies at ths time, and its place and importance in the world were the subjects of intense debate. The ap- pearance at this juncture of sixindependent Muslim states (ive of them Turkic), with a total population of 60 mil- lion living in an area totaling 6 million square kilometers, created a great stir and caused much joy in ‘Turkey. This presented Ankara with a historic opportunity to derive political, economic, and psychological benefits from this ‘transformation. In his speech at the opening of the new session of parliament on. September 991, president Tur- gut Ozal declared thatthe ending ofthe Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR had given the Turks a historic opportunity to assume regional leadership for the first time in 400 years and that this opportunity must not be missed. ‘Turkey had not expected the USSR to disintegrate so rapidly and did not have a policy of aking a close interest in the fate of external ‘Turks. As noted eatliex, during the (Cold War period it had followed a policy of staying clear of the questions of external Turks. The exceptions were the Turks of Cyprus, Western ‘Thrace, and Bulgaria, and these concerns had been forced upon Turkey by outside events. The new developments led to unrealistic expecta- tions and high hopes. The feeling of isolation going back formany years was suddenly atan end, and the shared cal- ‘tural, linguistic, and religious ties with the majority of the newly independent states of the Caucasus/Central Asia ‘were frequently cited both at home and abroad as factors ‘hat would enhance Turkey's importance in the fegion. In this framework, Turkey was presented to the new states as an example of a successful development model, ‘while Pan-Turkicand Turanian ideas began to take hold in Turkey. ‘The West and particulanly the US, openly sup- ported Turkey in the region for fear of seeing pro-Iranian Islamic regimes gain power there, For the first time in his: = tory, the Russian Federation tolereted Turkey’ influenie752 Section 7, 1990-2001: Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization in the region for the same reason, Initially, the Turkic- ‘Muslim states of Caucasus/Central Asia looked upon ‘Turkey to reinforce their independence, to gain respect- ability and statusin the world, and to carry out their trens- formation. ‘All ofthis was bound to affect Turkey ints efforts to redefine its identity at the end of the Cold Wat. Butt did rot take long for reality to reassert itself after the initial ‘excitement. The financial and technological resources of "Turkey were no match for the enormons socioeconomic requirements ofthe former Soviet republics. ‘As the initial hopes and expectations gave way to disappointment, a more serious and sober assessment began, considering Turkey's future role in the region and how this would affect Turkey's domestic and external pol- icy its identity, and so forth, After the Cold War, Turkey ‘was in fact confronted with great opportunities 2s well a8, ppotential risks in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which had to be analyzed with the greatest care. A complicating factor was that mach emphasis had been placed on the original Turkish homeland in Central Asia when a new ‘Turkish identity was being forged in the 19208. Since then, people in Turkey had lived by the myth that theirs was the last Turkish state that had resisted the onslaughts of sur- rounding enemies al these years. This myth of ‘isolation’ and “uniqueness” was suddenly brought to an end by the emergenre in the international arena of fraternal Turkic states, All ofthis compelled Turkey to make complex anal- ‘yses of its identity (Box 7-23). I. RELATIONS WITH THE REGION AND CHANGING FOREIGN POLICY In the post-Cold War era, Turkey's Caucasus/Central ‘Asia policy went through a number of different phases. From 1989 to 1991 Turkey steered cleac of nationalist cur- rents taking shape in the Soviet Republics and clung to its traditional Moscow-centered foreign policy. After the disbanding of the USSR and the emergence of indepen- dent states in the region from 1991 to 1993, Turkey was the first country to recognize these states. In this period Tar: key strove to play a leadership role and presented itselfas amodel, actively seeking to eliminate Russian influencein the region. ‘Turkic, Turanian, and Islamic motifs came to the fore amidst al the excitement in the scramble to com plete with Russia and Ian. Turkey engaged in a struggle forinfluence without any particular plan or program. From 1993 to 1995 it became increasingly clear that ‘the vacuum left in the region by the disintegration of the USSR would be filled by the Russian Federation, This was Box 7-23. Turkish-Turki- Sea, In none ofthe runes does shee thé dstncion beawetn. ain hiss aie psn Wiese er Op rie Wh Gs nes rte yoere consi i EX ue the period when Turkey was discovering its inadequacies and its limitations and was feeling disappointnjent over rot being able to establish relations with thel regional countries at the desired level. Since then Turkey has been ‘pursuing policies more in line with its means and corre- sponding to the realities of the region. This policy does not seek to exclude Russia but is more realistic and bal- anced and based on mutual cooperation. ‘A. The Gorbachev Period and Moscow- Centered Foreign Policy (1989-1991) Before Gorbachev came to power in 198s, Turkish-Soviet relations were developing rapidly, especially in the eco: nomic area, In line with the 1984 agreement for the sale. ‘of natural gas, the USSR started delivering natural gas to ‘Turkey in 1987. This led to increasing Turkish exports to the USSR and a leap in the volume of bilateral trade (see “Relations with the USSR’ in Section 6 and “Relations with Russia” below). Developing economic relations added a new incentive for Turkey's traditional policy of not getting involved in the internal affairs of the USSR. ‘Turkey maintained this traditional policy even after the closed Soviet system began to open up to the world as a result of Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika. Ankara made no attempt to establish direct links with theBox 7-24. The Distitction between Sovereianty: ‘and Indeperidence in Soviet Terthinology < Atta tt of he dnterato: of he Us the cence af sovereign nee! sits copepticies soe fs Soviet Republics; nor did it engage in any activity that ight be construed as threatening the existence of the ‘USSR. ‘Byen Turgut Oral, who was notaverse to challenging the traditional course of Turkish foreign policy, exercised extreme caution in this respect. When asked about his ‘view regarding the events that took place in Soviet Azer- Ihaijan in Jannrary oon, he replied that this was an internal affair ofthe USSR, that Turkey did not pursue a policy of ‘uniting the ‘Turkic people of that country within an em- pire, and that Ankara was attached to Atatirk’ precept of “Peace at home and peace abroad” He even went so far as to suggest that the Shiite Azerbaljanis were more the concern of Iran than of Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 19 January 1990). In fine with these views, ‘Turkey remained silent avhen Soviet troops violently sappressed the supporters of the Azerbaijan Popular Front in Baku, despite a strong current in Turkey that favored giving active support to the Azexbaijanis. Starting in 1988, Gorbachev began to grant limited autonomy to the republics in the USSR. "The people of the ‘Caucasus and Central Asia established their own struc: tures, began to set their own courses, chose their national ‘emblems, and decaied their sovereignties in the second half of 1990, Turkey then began to shiftits attention from, the center to the republics (Box 7-24). In prectice Gor- bachev’s reforms did not grant the republics the right to pursue policies without regard to the center, Nevertheless, low-level delegations began to visit Turkey frotn these re- publics to establish cooperation in fields such as culture, science, commaunications, health, and the economy. Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia 753 ‘The high-Level visits began with President zal go- ing to the USSR in March 991. Accompanied by 2 lage group of businesspeople, Ozal went to Moscow and then proceeded to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Ukraine was important forthe establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization. In Kazakhstan, the largest country in Central Asia, Qzal signed an agree ‘ment on scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and discussed Turkey's possible contribution, to the economic restructuring of Kazakhstan. He also in- dicated that direct fights between Alma Ats and Istanbul ‘would be established. Itwill be noted that none of these subjects were sensitive issues that might perturb Moscow. At this stage, Turkey was extremely careful not to offend “Moscow when itwas dealing with the republics, zal’ visit allowed Turkey to gauge the extent to which Turkey might establish links with the regional countries without provoking the USSR. High-level visits to Turkey ensued from this visit, Among these were the visits of the prime minister of Kyrgyzstan to Ankara in ‘May 1991 and the vist ofthe president of Taikistan to Is- tanbal in June, when he attended a meeting of the World Heonomic Forum. “The failed coup attempt of 19 August 1991 that has- tened the disintegrhtion of the USSR was also a turning point in Turkey’s felations with the Central Asian and Caucasus republic}. Although this coup against Gor- bachev failed, it defnonstrated to the leadership of these countries thatthe end of the USSR was approaching and enconraged them to act more independently of Moscow. At frst the leaders in Central Asia avoided declar- ing their independence in order not to upset their sizable Russian minorities. ‘The ‘Turkish visit of Kazakh leader ‘Norsultan Nazarbayev in September 1991 acquired con- siderable significance as result ofthe failed coup against Gorbachey, Although originally conceived as merely a ‘courtesy visit, it resulted in the signing of a Joint Decla- ration on Purposes and Objectives. Furthermore, it was decided to set up 2 joint consultation mechanism and establish interparliamentary relations between the two countries. In the economic field, Turkey would extend Kazalehstan a $10 million loan through the ‘Turkish Exim- ‘bank and import coal in repayment for consumer goods tobe exported to Kazakhstan. Atthat point Turkey was still maintaining friendly e- lations with Moscow while developing its relations with the republics: It waa careful, however, to make sure that relations with the republics did not cast a shadow on re- lations with the cénter, When Azerbaijan. declared its independence on 30° August 1991, the undersecretary of ©754 Section 7. 1990-2001: Turkey in the Orbit of Globelization the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ozdem Sanberk, made a statement the next day (Milliyet, 1 September 1991, p. s) that revealed Turkey's intention to maintain its balanc- ing at: [Ale this stage Turkey is observing development from Moscow's perspective. For Ankara, rela- tions with Moscow take precedence over rela- tions with the republics. That is why Turkey is preceding with caution... ‘Turkey will not rush into any race to recognize the republics that de- clare their independence. Turkey will proceed in line with its own strategy. When Muslim Turkic republics like Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan declace their independence, Turkey will respond and recognize these republics. We are in the process of explaining our motives to the Soviets. (On 31 Angust 1991 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan fol- lowed Azerbaijan and declared their independence, This attracted the public’ interest in Turkey, and the press began to call fora speedy recognition of these states, The breathtaking events in the aftermath of the failed coup in the USSR and the sudden independence of the Caucasian and Central Asian republics threw Turkish-Soviet rela- tions into uncertainty. While the government was seeking to strike a fine balance between ‘Turkey's interests and its responsibilities, the press was damoring for more sup- port forthe Turkic republics and calling on Ankara not to evade its responsibilities, Others were calling for caution in responding to the political changes taking place in the USSR. “When the MEA issued a statement on 3 September to clarify ts position with respect to relations with the Baltic countries, which had declared themselves independent, the debate over the recognition ofthe Turkic states inten. sified. The MEA’ statement declared that ‘Turkey received the news of the regaining of independence by the three Baltic States with satisfaction and announced that Turkey ‘would restore its relations with these states. As @ matter of fact, Turkey had established diplomatic relations with ‘these states in the 19308 and had never recognized theit annexation by the USSR in 1940. Consequently, it did not feel the need to recognize their independence and éon- fined its statement to declaring that it was restoring dip- Jomatic relations. ‘The government was following the process of the conversion of the USSR into the Commonviealth of In- dependent States (CIS) very closely with a view to for- lating an appropriate policy and did not want to rush into any course before the status of the new CIS republics ‘became clear. At this point the Soviet republics in Central ‘Asia had not yet made up their minds about the course they would follow, and Turkey had received no call for recognition from any of them. The Sending of Delegations In view of the confused situation, Turkey readied two delegations in September 1991 with the mandate to go to the region to lock into the situation and provide accurate firsthand information. One ofthe delegations was to go to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics, the other to ‘Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. These delegs- tions would convey Tarkey's interest and determine what these countries expected from Turkey. “The first delegation consisted of ambassador Bilal Simsis, minister plenipotentiary Kurtulug Taskent, and the first counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, Halil Alanes. ‘the delegation visited Azerbaijan, Kyrgy2- stan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmeni- stan from 1 to 17 September :901, conveyed Turkey's good wishes, and inquired about the host countries’ ex- ppectations. This was the frst foreign delegation to visit ‘Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and ‘Tajikistan fol- lowing their declaration of independence on 9 September 1991, Thanks to their good timing, these visits allowed ‘Turkey to gain an advantage overitsrivalsin the countries of the region, ‘The delegations reported that the region's countries wanted to increase trade with Turkey, engage in joint ‘ventures, and send students and personnel to Turkey for training. All of the Central Asian states, including ‘Tajiki- stan, declared that they looked upon Turkey as a model, “Theie first wish was to be granted recognition: apart from Kzakhstan, which had not yet declared its independence, all ofthe regional countries were anxious to obtain early recognition. The Turkic republics were also eager to es- tablish relations with ‘Turkey without deley. Their pres: dents wanted to make their first foreign visit to Turkey and were awaiting an invitation from Ankara ‘The delegations reported that the newly independent republics should be recognized but noted thet the timing of the recognition had to be judicious. At this point Tur- key was getting ready for parliamentary elections and was focused on the domestic scene. The election took place (on 20 October 1991; after the developments in Azerbaijan, the question of recognizing that country became topical once again, |Recognition, Starting with Azerbaijan. On 29 October 1991 the parliament of Azerbaijan ap- pealed to all countries to recognize the independence of the new state, On 1 November foreign minister Hliseyin Sadikov told Alten Karamanogha (the Turkish consut general in Baku) that they wanted Turkey to be the first country to recognize independent Azerbaijan. The prime ‘minister of Azerbaijan, Hasan Hasanoy, visited Ankara on and 4 November on his way back from Italy and had an audience with president Turgut Ozal. Hasanov informed that Italy was ready to recognize Azerbaijan but added that Turkey should be the first in granting recognition, Finally, the Tarkish government recognized the in- dependence of Azerbaijan. This was the result of public pressure and the desire not to be left behind by a possible earlier Iranian recognition. The government's awareness that Turkey's lnkewarm response to the brutal suppres sion of the Baku demonstrations by Soviet forces in Janu- ary 1990 had demaged Turkey'simage also played a partin this recognition. But Turkey continued its cautious policy of paying attention to Moscow's wishes and was careful not to offend Soviet sensibilities. This became clear when ‘Turkmenistan declared its independence ona December. President Saparmurad Niyazov (subsequently Turkmen- Dashi) paid his frst foreign vist to Turkey to cal for ec- ognition but falled to obtain satisfaction. Instead Ankara decided to set up a consulate in Turkmenistan and signed ‘an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation along with, various economic agreements. ‘When the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed in Minsk on 8 December to establish the CIS and. ‘when the Central Asian republics agreed to join it three days later at Ashichabad, it became clear that the USSR had indeed come to an end. After these developments, ‘Turkey recognized all fifteen of the newly independent states, nclnding Armenia, on 16 December without even ‘waiting for the formal dissolution of the USSR. At the same time Turkey declared its readiness to establish dip- Jomatic relations with them. Thus Turkey had become the first state to recognize all ofthe republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the seme day, Uzbekistan’ president Islam Kari- mov came to Turkey.on an offical visit to sign anumber of agreements. ‘Ihe ‘Turkish government went beyond these agreements and, in ‘addition to setting up consulates in the two countries, informed Karimoy that it was ready to establish full diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan, When, hhe arrived in Ankara.in the morning, Turkey had not yet recognized Uzbekistan and did not receive him at the air- Relations with the sus and Central Asia 75S port asa head of state, The Soviet flag was present along side the Turkish and Usbek flags, and Soviet ambassador Albert Chernishey was present o greet him. The situation changed that same afternoon, hovever, when Turkey rec- ‘ognized Unbekistan, ‘The Soviet fag, anthem, and ambas- sador were excluded from the contacts. In sense, it was ‘Turkey that confirmed Islam Karimovas the head of state of an independent state. On December Turkey decided to establish constl- ates that would be upgraded later to embassies in all of the Central Asian and Caucesus republics. The only ex- ception was Armenia, which was excluded for its role in the dispute with Azerbaijan on the question of Nagorno Karabakh and for having occupied part of the territory of Azerbaijan, Pending the establishment of these missions, ‘Turkey's relations with the former Soviet republics would be conducted under the coordination of the Turkish Em- ‘assy in Moscow. On 21 December eleven former Soviet republics met in Almati and declared that the USSR was ‘no more. A day later, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayes, and afterward (in January 1992) the president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Muttalibov, came to Ankara and signed Friendship and Cooperation Agreements. During Akayev’s visit it was decided to deliver emergency aid from ‘Turkey to Kyrgyzstan, which was suffering from an ‘unusually cold spell that winter. The aircraft thatfook Aka- yer back to Kyrgyzstan was carrying 10 tons qf Turkish ‘emergency relief aid. The Implementation of a New Policy ‘From 28 February to 6 March 992 minister of foreign af- fairs Hikmet Cetin visited all ofthe Turkic republics and Ukraine. Turkey's diplomatic initiatives were gathering ‘momentum and reached a peak two months later with Prime Minister Demirel’s Central Asia tous, ‘These visits demonstrated that Turkey was rapidly abandoning its Moscow-centered policy and replacing it with policies more in keeping with the changed circum- stances. As the awareness began to take held that there ‘were other “Turks in the world, a new feeling of excite ment and expectation gripped the Turkish public as well as the administration, The excitement was reflected in the records of the ‘TGNA on 12 and 17 December 1991, when it took up the issue of “policies to be pursued in relations with the ‘Turkish republics” At both sittings, the deputies noted that ‘Turkey could gain advantages over countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and the US. by being, fit to get actively involved in the egion, Some deputi756 Section 7. 1990-2001: ‘Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization demanded the establishment of cabinet post that would be responsible for the “external Turks.” During a foreign policy debate that took place at the TGNA on 25 Decem- ber, the news that a neighboring country (probably Iran) ‘was getting ready to open an embassy in Baku led Hlikmet Getin to announce from the podium that Turkey would open embassies in al of the new republics except Arme- nia, The minister had been advised by the personnel ofthe (MEA that Turkey had alwaysbeen firstto act in this region and that Turkish ambassadors should be the deans of the diplomatic corps in al ofthese capitals. The government formally decided to open embassies on 30 December 991 B. Relations Based on Emotion and Enthusiasm (1991-1993) By the end of 1991 Turkey had completely abandoned its Moscow-centered policy and was fully engaged in developing active relations with the post-Soviet succes sor states. Promises of support and aid were given to the leaders ofthe ‘Turkic republics, who visited Ankara one by ‘one; and by 1993 more than 140 bilateral agreements had been signed with these states. In this context, Turkey's activities in the region at least in the cultural sphere began to display Turkic motifs. ‘Turkish public opinion started to take a renewed interest in Turks living abroad, Until a few years ago, dwelling on “Turkish peoples abroad was regarded as a sign of harbor- ing racist tendencies. From 1991 to 1993 there was arising awareness of external Turks,’ however, and society began to shake offits former diffidence and deal with the subject within the framework of new perception of ethnicity In September 1991 the Economist (no. 297) referred to the people that spoke Turkish all the way “from the Adtiatie to the Great Wall of China” in the post Soviet world. This theme was picked up in ‘Turkey and used to such an ex- tent thatit became a banality.‘The distinction between the ‘Turks of Anatolia and the "ethnic Turks” of Central Asia ‘grew fuzzy asa conceptand led people to imagine that the twenty-first century would be a "Turkish century” as as- serted by Nazarbayev during his visit in September 1991 (istikbal Tikderin,” Tirkiye, 2s September 1991), ‘True, these developments were all based in largemea- sare on the emergence of independent states with which ‘Turkey shared « common culture, language, and religion But Turkey's approach to the Turkic republics in Canca- sss and Central Asia was not based exclusively on purely nationalistic and domestic policy considerations. Other important and more fundamental economic and foreign policy considerations guided Turkey's actions in the early 19906. The international environment had changed, and the bloc system was at an end. According to Kamran fnan, a former ministes, Turkey was compelled to admit that it ‘was now regional power: The changes in Turkish foreign policy were, toalarge extent, a function ofthe regionaland global transformation that was shaking the foundation on ‘which the country’s international position was based. In other words, Turkey was passing through an adaptation process imposed on it by regional and global transforma- tion, Prime Minister Demirel declared that ‘Turkey had a unique cultural, geographical, and historical position and ‘was located in the very center ofthe emerging politicaland economic structure known as Eurasia. As such, Turkey's regional and international responsibilities had grown and could no longer be avoided (Demirel, p. 89). In referring to “responsibilities,” Demirel meant that ‘Turkey had to take an active role to ensure that the newly independent regional states were linked to the outside ‘world. Turkey also had the responsibility to be helpful to te new states in their reach for their true identity. These activities included the establishment ofthe Black Sea Eco- nomic Cooperation (BSEC) initiative and the Eeonomic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which helped main. tain the stability ofthe region and thereby contributed to ‘world peace and helped the new states to establish closer relations with the outside world. The Turkish government {elt that its responsibilities also included helping the new states to become respected members ofthe international community. ‘That is why ‘Turkey was the first to recognize the newly independent states and compiled alist of principles that would guide its relations with these states. Accord- ingly, Turkey appealed to these countries to comply with the principles of “noninterference in internal affairs, the inviolability of frontiers, and respect for territorial integ- rity” and declared that it would conduct its relations with the republics on the basis of “respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and ensuring equal rights and common in- terests” (Newspot, 19 December 1991, pp.1,7). Turkey also conveyed the message thatboth Ankara and therest ofthe ‘world expected the republics to abide by the principles of ‘the UN Charter and the OSCE, to respect human rights, to comply with the obligations arising from the treaties signed by the USSR, and to have regard for the rule oflavr and the principles of democracy. Turkey expected that the opportunity for coopera- tion with the new entities would provide significant ben- fits for-its developing industries. After the Buropean ‘Commission turned down Turkey's application for full ‘membership, Ankara saw the region as an area with averyhigh potential for lucrative cooperation. In fact, Turkish entrepreneurs detected the region's attraction and oppor- ‘tunities for profit long before the state. By midag92 the number of Turkish firms with investments in the region baad already surpassed the 200 mark (Hektama,p.10). ‘Turkey also expected that it would acquire a new stat- ure inthe politics of the region as wellas the whole world asit developed its cultural and ethnic inks with the Turk- ish peoples of the region undergoing a great transforma- tion, ’This expectation was grounded on the belif that asa secular, democratic country, Turkey would be accepted as “model” by the republics of Central Asia. During this period, however, some people held con- trary views and opposed the proposed polices, especially. ‘whea these were embellished with Turkic images or ac- companied by excessive promises of aid. The public made a shatp distinction between showingan interest in the ex- ternal Turks and incurring vast expenses asa consequence ofthenew policies. Also, the public did not generally sup- pott a purely nationalistic foreign policy. The objections to such a policy were by no means groundless, even in the special conditions ofthat period. ‘There was the question of whether Turkish foreign policy should have a Western ran Fastern orientation, Some also questioned the wis- dom of Turkey's extravagant promises, made without re- gard to its huge budget deficits and high inflation. Ben in tis period ofexhilaration and excitement, voices were fre- «quently heard cautioning thatthe promises being made to the regional republics might not be met and that Turkey's capacity to deliver might have been overestimated. ‘The decision-makers, however, were under the spell of public excitement and were intent on realizing the po- tential benefits for Turkey that the region appeared to offer. Within the frst year of their independence, more than 200 Turkish delegations had visited the new states. Furthermore, anew structure was established (based on a Japanese model) that would coordinate aid activities and ensure the flow of id to the region: the Turkish Coopera- tion and Development Agency (TIKA) with headquar- ters in Ankara (Box7-25). thas to be emphasized that these activities were en- couraged by the West and particularly by the US. At this point the Western states feared that the vacuum lefty the USSR in the Caucasus and Central Asia might be filled by political Islam backed up by iran; consequently they sup- ported Muslim-populated, pro-Western, and secular Tur- keey. As President Demirel asserted, Turkey proved that Is- Iam, democracy, human rights, and the market economy could coexist harmoniously. Russia also appeared at this point t6 be closing its ‘Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia. 757 The Tuk apoyo en gee A tstablshed bys decilon ofthe Counc of Mtl dated a _ anny 1982 Oignalyaliached ithe Mjnbiy of Fatear AT oe itech tothe ot ae remote 028 ieccaicaon i ee oe z shea a ica a eyes to Turkish activites inthe region. In February i992 NATO secretary-general Manfred Wormer déclared in “Moscow that the alliance felied ini Tuckey to protec its interests and resist religious fundamentalism in Central Asia, It was significant that the Russians displayed no re- action to this assertion. Similarly, Moscow did not react to US. secretary of state James Baker when he declared in February i992 that Washington expected the Central ‘Asian republis to look to Furope and to secular Turkey and not o neighbors like Iran when charting their strate- gic orientation (Winrow, p13). Daring this period the regional counties alsolooked to’Turkey to play a more active Fole In the course of theit visits to Ankafa in December 1991, Islam Karimov (the president of Urbekistan) and Askar Akayev (the president of Kyrgyzstan) openly ited thelr expectations of support from Turkey. Karimovalso stated that he believed Usbeki- stan and the other newly independent states of Central ‘Asia had much to learn from Ankata and that he regarded’758 Section 7, 1990-2001: Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization ‘Turkey as an elder brother. He also appealed for urgent economic, political, and cultural assistance (Cumhuriyet, 20 December 1991). Karimoy’s visit was followed imme- diately by the visit of Kyrgyzstan’ president Askar Akayey ‘who compared Turkey to a “morning star” indicating the way for the Turkic republics (Turkish Daily News, 24 De- cember 9s. Looking back at these events several years ater, it can be said that the Central Asian and Caucasus republics had no stomach for a new elder brother after seventy years of Soviet experience and that Turkey may have offended them by attempting to assume such a role. Butit must not [pe forgotten that they were in dire need of support for their independence in 991 and required Turkey's help to gain wider recognition in the world. In that initial heady period, the leaders of the new republics did come under the spell oftheir long-forgotten feeling of being Turkish and did not hesitate to expressthis feeling to'Turkey. Atthe time, Turkey was eager to assume the role of elder brother, encouraged by the Western countries, the countries ofthe region, and even Rassia.'The Turkish leadership was quite “unprepared to play this rale, however, being almost com- pletely uninformed about the region and greatly overest mating Turkey's capacity to give direction to the region's sociopolitical and economictransformation. ‘At the end of 1991 Turkey felt itself to be ready, with the political support of the West, to seize the economic and political opportunities offered by the birth of the new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Following the ‘succession of visits ofthe Central Asian leaders to Ankara, Prime Minister Demirel visited the region ftom 27 April ‘03 May 1992 in order to appraise the potential of the new states and offer import credits and aid amounting to $11 Dillion, a sum that would strain Turkey's capacity to the limit. In the course of his vist, a number of cultural and economic cooperation protocols were signed. Demirel also told his hosts that it would be in their interest to leave the ruble zone. This was Turkey's first direct challenge to Russia's interests in the region. Turkey tookup issues such as the provision of military training to the Central Asian states and the construction of pipelines to market Cen- tral Asian gas and ofl through Turkey: The Central Asians ‘were also urged to switch to the Latin alphabet. Given the importance of developing links with the Contral Asian republics without going through interme- diaries, the ‘Turkish postal and telecommunications ad- ministrations (PTT) provided a grant for equipment with a capacity of ,s00 lines that would allow the region to link ‘up with the outside world without having to go through the Russian network, This equipment included ground ox 7-26: Private Turkish Educational Institutions in the Caucasus and Central Asta fermion, rom both the Tur Wistyof Eeeavon sre tha host goverment needed before the pate sib can ph a schoo in these couniries Usualy the prerses ae pro: ‘ded by the har court, ils most ofthe teachers eome “rom Tutkey. By the dnd of 600 tee ete 120 p ora nsuution estanlshed Gy foundations coinpan "Thad i cal nigige the est cu duction the fofowng ees feldou fanaiondurey henvicho@reesth foundation.) merry of Fetal Gllen Congres stations for satellite links with Turkey and the rest ofthe ‘world. Starting in May 1992, direc lights were established from Istanbul and Ankara to the capitals ofthe new states, In addition, Turkish Cultural Centers and Turkish schools were opened in several localities to strengthen cultural ties. The schools were staffed and equipped by ‘Turkey, which also provided scholarships. The schools ‘were designed to meet the need for trained workers and personnel with foreign language skills. By 2000 the region hhad scores of schools and language courses established and operated by the Turkish state or Turkish nationals as ‘well as ten universities and two faculties established with “Turkish funds (Box7-26). Given the need for well-educated cadres for eco- nomic development, Turkey launched a large program in 1991 to provide scholarships to students from the region, Each country was assigned a quota of 2,000 scholarships, of which 1,400 would be university scholarships. After overcoming many dificulties it became possible to carry out the program, which allowed thousands of students from the Caucasus and Central Asia to receive an edu cation in Turkey. By January 1999 Turkey offered 26368 scholarships, allowing 16,692 students to take advantage of the offer. Of these, 213 received degrees, while 5889 dropped out or were recalled home. In 2003 Turkey had approximately seven thousand students from the region, From 1992 to 1997 Turkey spent around $s5 million for this program (MEB 1998, pp. 93-94).‘The major difficulty in carrying out the program was the tendency of large number of scholarship holders to drop out and return home because of various problems. ‘The most frequently cited problem was the inadequacy of the stipend provided to the scholars. In a poll taken in 1998 among the scholarship holders, 361% claimed that their stipends were inadequate, and 34.9% declared that they had a fulltime job. Early in the program, there was the problem of unqualified students who had been given ‘a scholarship through their connections, Others had dif, ficulties adapting to the educational system orhad trouble with the Turkish language. It soon became clear that ‘Turkey should have opted for a system in which it would select those who would qualify for scholarships. Scholar- ships should have been given to those who would assume leadership roles in the future. Furthermore, more gener- ‘ous stipends should have been given to fewer scholars. ‘Those who dropped out without obtaining a degree did not become goodwill ambassadors for Turkey when they went home. On the contrary, they spread negative im- pressions of Turkey. A poll conducted in 1998 revealed that only 58296 of the respondents had a positive opinion about Turkey. ‘A positive development that occurred subsequently ‘was the reduction in the quotas set aside for each country. Anew difficulty cropped up, however, when scholarship holders chose not to return to their country of origin at the end of theit education. Those that did return found it difficult to get government jobs because they were consid- ered “too Turkified” after spending long years in Turkey. Furthermore, Uzbekistan started reducing the number of its stadents in Turkey after199 4, because itfeared thatthe ‘opponents ofthe regime living in Turkey might influence these students. By 1998 Uzbekistan had recalled snost of its students studying in Turkey, and Ankara reallocated the Uzbek quota to other countries, In 1998 Uzbekistan also stopped issuing visas to Turkish students wanting to study in Uzbekistan, In July 1993 the Turkish Ministry of Culture, in co- operation with its counterparts in the other’Turkic coun- tries, developed a project for joint management of Turkic cultural and artistic events (the:Turkish acronym for the projectis'TORKSOY). In Novernber igga the Ministry of ducation started preparations for common history and common literature books that would be used through- out the Turkic countries, First, committees were setup to ‘write the books; in March 1995 steps were taken to trans- late the books that had been written into the dialects of the individual countries. It has not proven possible to bring the books into use, however. In April 992 the pub- Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asin 759) licly owned television and radio network TRT (Tiekiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu) started transmitting to the region via satellite under the label “TRT Eurasia,” sub- sequently changed to “TRT-Tark” Although 2 secular country, Turkey also took steps to engage in coopera: tion in the field of religion. Tt shipped religions materials to the region and offered to provide religious education. ‘With money raised throtigh fundraising campaigns, the Religious Affairs Directorate of Turkey commissioned the building ofa mosque and a cultural center along Turk- ish architectural lines in each ofthe Turkic republics.‘The ‘Turkish Religious Affaire Foundation also contributed to the construction or repair of scores of mosques in these countries and established Faculties of Theology in Azer- baijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. A namber ofmin- {stries and state institutions in Turkey participated in vari- cous activities in these countries without the involvement ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sometimes without regard to established policies, Tn summary, Turkey took sevious steps in 1992 to be effective and play a leadership role in the region in the political, economic, cultural, military, and financial fields (Box7-27).In addition to the opportunities, however, the region also posed serious threats and risks inthe medium and long terms. Turkey chose to ignore this, The First Summit of Heads of State of Turkish-Speaking Countries and the First Disappointment (1992) ‘Asa rule, Demirel tended to be a cautious leader in mat- ters of foreign policy. But; as already itientioned above, under the influence of an article in the Economist, he de- clared in February 1992 that a giant Turkish world was ‘emerging “froma the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” (Time, 31 August 1992). This brought cries of alarm from a broad spectrum ranging ftom the ultranationalist Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic all the way to Russian officials that Turkey was pursuing the aim of empire-building ‘once again. Demirel sprang another surprise during his visit to the ‘Turkic republic from 27 Aptil to 3 May 1992 by including in his delegation Alpsslan Tires. ‘This was the man who had based his political prograin on the con- cept of Pan-Tuzkism” over the years and nov advocated the establishment of a “Turkish Union’ with the, Turkic republics under the leadership of Turkey, Duting the visit Demirel kept reassuring his hosts that ‘Turkey harbored no Turanidn ambitions, while at the sametime advocating the establishment ofan association of independent Turkic states. Tirkes in tun proposed the establishment ofa Sy preme Coincil of Turkic States with a rotating presidency760 Section 7. 1990-2001: Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization Box 7-27, Military Cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia “ inthe aftermath ofthe Cold Wa, a good numberof eplomats, pice offices and secur personel rom the caueasus and Cen: {el Aka were tained in Tukey. Man Cooperation hereon: ‘wel concider lhe counts of the feBion oer than "rena até provbions wre med or thse cous fo se sudan to Teej. Unde the procede St as Staines Frensip ane cooperation Agreements ee conc with Posbalan, Kir Salton, forget, Talesenbtan, apd Usbeli,fonas by Agrees for Millar Cooperaton In Tiina and ae Techie Gal ane Scentibe Hees conde th Iain Ate fora reer te HS tea inf ghee raring agree uth Amro, Gee Kavakhitan’ Kyrgystan; Turemenistan, and Urtelcean, wile the “Minn af Detese sone Cooper in Defer It Agternent with Kazakstan : 1 The Agreements for Miltary Cooperatio vis by itary paso its honda < Gehonga of eeeenal sing cers Yl and sending aliens an ee ee ees ‘ie tiki of er tc Seen (rove fea re " corer tht would bring together the presidents, prime ministers, ‘and foreign ministers of these states on an annual basis, Te was also decided to arrange joint consultative meetings at the level of heads ofstate and government among the “Turkic states to discuss common issues and regional and international affairs All ofthis talk came to an abrupt end after the first summit in October 1992, which ended in failare ‘The last high-level visit prior to the summit was car- ried out by foreign minister Hikmet Cetin from 16 to 18 July 1992 to Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, ‘nnd Uzbekistan. Cetin was accompanied by the secretary- {general of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumitre, "Turkey was the rotating president of the council at that time, and the purpose of the visit was to assess the eligi- bility of these states for membership in the council. By going in the company of the councils secretary-general, ‘Getin was underlining Turkey's relationship with Europe and conveying the message that the Central Asian states could establish their links with Burope through the intes- mediacy of Turkey. But this effort could not prevent the collapse of the October summit. rent of the army and a fore academies of Azerbalan. Tuy Uundertaok the tsk of raising mltary uns ofthese cours up ‘9 the leel of brigade to NATO standards by 200%, “A Caleasis Working Group was Setup f0 work jay wt he US ial Consulatve and Coordination Coural was set pee ee ‘ure and made avaliable at air tha irk lak completed manny 2001, “Turkey seat estoraten Work i he Vanya miltay Base icy of Tai tht same yea © Asa rule heft, aoe ‘he summit took place in Ankara from 30 to 31 Oc tober 1992, with the participation of the heads of state of ‘Tuckey, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Urbekistan, Kazakh stan, and Azezbafjan, Although the Tyjiks were of another ethnic stock, the president of Tajikistan had also been in- vited to the summit but failed to show up because of the civil war in his country. When the meeting got underway, it became clear that the Torkish officals had not carried ‘out prior consultations with each other or with the other leaders who were attending the summit. The Turkish del- cegation was aiming for the signing of a Political Declara- tion, an Economic Declaration, and a Press Communi- qué at the conclusion of the summit. But all the leaders, with the exception of Azerbaijan's President Elchibey, took ftight when President Ozal declared in his opening speech that the twenty-first century would be the Turk- ish century and called for the establishment of a Turkish ‘Common Market and a Turkish Development and Invest- ment Bank. Oval also exerted pressure on Kazakhstan, Usbekistan, and ‘Turkmenistan to obtain guarantees for the construction of oil and gas pipelines to Turkey. Itwas inevitable that Russia would be antagonized by this move,Pee ‘because it wanted ll such pipelines to go through its teri- tory in order to preserve its economic and political influ- encein the region. ‘The first summit of ‘Turkish-speaking states ended ‘with the signing of a single document, The Ankara Decla- ration made reference, in vague and general terms, to the need to establish coopération among the republics in the fields of culture, education, language, security, the econ- ‘omy, and judiciary affairs. ‘A protocol was signed at the summit, providing for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmen- istan to Tuskey (without specifying the route to be fol- owed) and for the construction of the terminal building at Ashkhabad airport by ‘Turkey. There was no reference in the Ankara Declacation to either the Turkish Com- mon Market or the Turkish Development and Investment Bank. Neither did it prove possible to secure the fem sup- port ofthe Central Asian states for the construction of pe- troleum pipelines. ‘Worse still Islam Karimov announced that he was against the formation of any supranational organization to coordinate activities in the Turkic world. Conscious of the large ethnic Russian population in his country, Ka- vakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev indicated that he ‘would veto any document that provided for the forma- tion of any structure based on religious or ethnic founda- tions, Furthermore he refused to sign a communiqué that seemed to suggest that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus had been recognized as an independent state. This prevented the issuing ofa press release afterthe summit. It appeared that Nazarbayey was worried about the possibil- ity of an analogy being drawn between the Russians in his country and the Turks in Cyprus. ‘Not wanting to upset Russia, the Central Asian lead- ers ignored the pleas of Turkey and Azerbaijan and re- fused to include any reference to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the Ankara Declaration. This was another ib- ication of the cleavage within the group, Even before the summit, all of the Central Asians represented in Ankara, ‘with the exception of Turkmenistan, had signed the Joint Secarity Treaty in Tashkent with Russia and Armenia (see Box 7-28). Four days after the Ankara Declaration, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met ‘with Russian prime minister Andrey Kozirev and asked Russia to intervene in Tajikistan. It was apparent that all, roads in Central Asia led to Moscow, “The disappointing results of the summit were due ‘mainly to the miscalculation of Turkey'sleaders. They had failed to note the changes that had taken place in the Cen- Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia 761 0x 7-28, The Teal) of Teshkent te the ditt ae US prehenie your that would bring ene tf the cls gether When forma Soviet publ beac et by onl os dense t “rit Risa developed he doctrn ofthe ier te a0 becen ES. yoeribes See eee a 4 alana pon uainiig thei armies Meanie =) 1 ed les os ¢ Vay oe unm et erento RE meme aime, Kazaa ayes Tat, and ae a ils ‘wth Russia. Tashkent Ff 35 May-1869 an es -{'Secaity Trea. The eaty provide ah atack xn of carson “Ingato plea akan in0fDelene and San, a ‘ral Asian states afterindependence, Firs, after the middle cof 1992, Russia had started taking a closer interest in the fate of the Russian diaspora that now found itself in the newly independent former Soviet republics. Russians ac- ‘counted for 41% of the total population in Kazakhstan and, 26% in Kyrgyzstan. Russia interest in these minorities ‘was a source of concern for both countries. In addition, the fear of radical Islam, caused by the strife in Tajikistan, ‘was compelling these countries to seek the security of Russia's protective umbrella, Demirelhad been urging his hosts to abandon the ruble zone daring his Central Asia trip. They disregarded his advice, however, and sought to benefit from Russias indirect economic support by re- ‘maining attached to the Russian currency. Finally; the Central Asian republics had acquired new self assurance by the time of the summit in October 992. ‘Turkey had intially been of great help in getting them ad- mitted to international organizations and especialy into the OIC and the ECO. But at this point they no longer needed Turkey's assistance, At the same time, the new states, having noted that Turkey’s economic means were faicly limited, were getting ready to seek economic and political support elsewhere. Forinstance, after the Ankara ‘Summit, Nazarbayevwentto ran to develop bilateral eco- nomicrelations, ‘The great expectations that had been raised over re- lations with the Central Asian republics had to be scaled762 Section 7, 1990-2001: Turkey in the Orbit of Globalization. down after the disappointing Ankara Summit. Only after this summit did the Turkish leadership realize that Cen- tral Asian leaders were glad to develop their ties with Tur- ‘ey but not at the expense of good relations with Russia; nor would they forgo the possibility of developing rela- tions with other countries that were in a position to pro- vide them with support, ¢. Disappointments and Facing Reality (1993-1995) [After the fiasco of the hastily convened Summit of the "Tarkic States’ Leaders, Turkey did not lose its interest in the region, On the contrary, dozens of visits at all levels, ‘were exchanged with the new states after the summit. The high point was the trip that President Ozal made to the whole region in 1993, shortly before his death, In Octaber 1994 President Demirel went to Turkmenistan to partici- pate in the celebration marking the third anniversary of ‘Turkmen independence. This visit laid the foundation for the pipeline designed to carry Turkmen natural gas to ‘Turkey via ian, From 21 to 23 March 1993 2 semioffcial meeting called the First Congress of Friendship, Fraternity, and Cooperation among Turkic States and Communities was hheldin Antalya, This congress wps expected to strengtnen solidarity among Turkic people It was attended also by fhe representatives of a great sfumber of Turkic groups from the Russian Federation. Much importance was at- tached to this gathering by Turkey, which was represented by both President Gzal and Prime Minister Demizel. It ‘was noted, however, thatthe proceedings of the congress ‘were being directed by Alparslan Tikes, the lexder of the ‘Nationalist Action Party. “The final communiqué of the congress contained an appeal to hold annual meetings to develop cooperation in the fields of science, technology, language, education, and culture and urged the establishment of a parliamentary ‘working group of the Turkic republics and communities swells a Supreme Council ofthe Turkic Republics. The congress also approved a 24-letter framework alphabet ‘based on the Roman script as the common alphabet of the Turkic peoples. This alphabet had been elaborated by the Alphabet Spelling Conference convened in Ankara by “TIKA from § to 10 March 1993. Bach Turkic republic or community would be able toselectts own alphabet based ‘on this framework alphabet. ‘The semioffcial congress ad- opted as its motto the phrase coined by the Turkic ideo- Jogue ismail Gaspura (Gasprinski): “Unity in Language, in Thought, and in Action” It looked like some quarters in Turkey were working toward establishing a Turkic Union or Commonwealth ‘without rousing the government's opposition. Although the Turkic republics sent delegates to such congresses, they did not agree to have them take place on their soil. ‘The concerns over Russia's reaction to such congresses and activities led the Turkic republics to remain cautious about getting too involved. As a result, notwithstanding the decision to hold these congresses ina different coun- try every year, they continued being held in Turkey every ‘time. ‘Although high-level visits from the Caucasus/Cen- tral Asia to Turkey continued to take place, it was only possible to hold the second summit of all the leaders of the Turkic states in October 199¢ in Istanbul and not in Bak in 1993, as originally planned. Because of the inter- nal turmoil there Tajikistan was left out of the official programs, Nevertheless, Tajikistan’s vice-president paid a visit to Ankara in July 1993, when he signed a bilateral ‘Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation. Looking back at this period, we can discern errors in Turkey's post-USSR Cental Asian policy axising from tiscalculation, poor planning, and hasty action, For in- stance, in his first visit to the region, foreign minister Hil ‘met Getin informed his hosts that Turkey stood ready to represent the Central Asian republics in the international sphere. This offer was accepted only by Uzbekistan. The other republics, being sensitive about asserting their in dependence and sovereignty, were offended. Similarly, Cetin’ offer to send books written in the Latin script was ‘turned down on the grounds that no formal decision had ‘been made yet to discard the Cyrillic alphabet. In the meantime it became clear that Turkey was not the only country secking to fil the oidleftby the collapse ‘of the USSR. On the contrary, a number of states were vying for influence in the rapidly changing political and- scape in the Caucasus/Central Asia region, The resulting competition was reminiscent ofthe rivalries of the impe- rialist powers that struggled for superiority in the region uring the early part of the twentieth century (Box 7-29). ‘Among those seeking to be the key actors were Russia, Turkey, Tran, Saudi Arabia, the U.S, Pakistan, China, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the BU, Four of these (Turkey, Iran, China, and South Korea) stand out as the role models for the region. Bach country had its own rea sons for engaging in the contest, and their rivalry had eco- nomic, politcal-ideological, and religious dimensions. ‘This created many possiblities for conflict. Tuckey had to avoid the risk of armed confict with Iran and/or Russa.‘Box 7:29, The Distinctive Features of the “Groat Game" arid the Second Great Game Duting the niieteenth century the Brtsh. and Russian. Empires feught one another forthe contol of the Caucasus and Cental A The ht wns ondted wither, enon a _ Spies IC as not Just ovet wealth trltny anid resources of ifuence abo plye 4 par. Rudvag ping called ys S he “creat Goer Re peel Km. he eng he USSt there was talk fuss’s rest al Inthe Caspian toxin dyna the nineteenth tsp. A Hundred years lle Ge ital que Potagonsts Were seccng i region. ARhoigh tent nse, the, WN a ecneseoboes tere The st emerge in he fel of rade but aulchy soread 1 fled fess es wel The pew Gren Gone oso had an icedigial derensiony West Ibe cemecragy venus lame iearentalt and. Seley uontan gles tn the yh ae net ring oa Be “aie in" a6 Poyig eel tothe gon Inthe Sect. oo Sadat The Issue of the “Turkish Model” ‘The peoples of the Caucasus/Central Asia region wele still in the process of establishing their identities and s¢t- ting up their nation-states. The success of Turkey's steif- {ngs in the area depended on how the regional countrits perceived themselves and how they perceived Turkey over the long term, By and large, these states were still being run by their former Communist bosses, who were now following a nationalist line to preserve their posts, For the leaders who now controlled the destiny of these states in the chaotic circumstances prevailing after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the frst priority was the consolidation oftheic power. For them, a rapid transition to democracy carried the risk of national disintegration. That is why they tended to prefer the-Chinese or South Korean model of economic development (which did not have a democratic component). ‘Turkey had consistently been striving to have the ‘Turkic republics adopt the “Turkish model” for their development. Whether Turkey could play a central role in the region depended in large measure on whether the newly independent states saw Turkey asa suitable and ac- ceptable model. At first Turkey appested to be the main alternative, with its modem and secnlar model backed bythe West. Turkey assumed this role with such zeal that Demirel went as far as submitting draft Constitutions to “resid bem 6 AM TORE GN | Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia 763 The Seeand, Giost Gabe had. cea Wisnnctve Femuies oir Whores thes had two actors this of ad vio © Po oe aya ceases ibe | Ln itl, Chine Japa, ae the EU, ond Su inveson of y advisor See eee ments, nev einen ope the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan when he visited the region in 1992, It was unlikely that the leaders would accept Constitutions based on ademo- cratic administration from a country that had failed, after trying for seventy years, to achieve a civilian Constitution orestablish a well-functioning democracy. In any case, in practice, none of the Central Asian states (with the pos- sible exception of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan) went for the Turkish model, Fven if they referred to the Turkish model now and then, for them it was not the model of the 19908, based on liberal democracy as understood in. ‘Turkey, but the model ofthe 19305, which was statist and authoritarian: ‘The acceptability of the model did not depend on ‘Turkey's international connections or the model’ ideol- ogy. It depended much more on its compatibility with the sociopolitical and economic realities of the region. “This was'an important point that ‘Turkey seemed to over- look. The models that claimed to be suitable for all ofthe region’s states and pretended to be the solution to all of its problems were bound to fail there, Notwithstanding some common features and problems, each statein the re- gion had its own special characterand problems that were not shared with its neighbors. That is why the “one model fits all” approach could not workand each state required tailo-made model,