Relations with the Middle East ||. RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES "Turkey's relations with Arab states underwent great changes in the 1980s. Developments in Turkey's political situation and changes in the world forced Turkey to re- view its foreign policy. This in turn affected Turkey's ties with the Arab states, At this time, the Arab states were undergoing structural transformation that led to drastic changes in ‘Turkey's policies compared to the 1950s. For- erly, Turkey played an active role in the Middle Bast, acting as the spokesperson of the West. These policies ‘were unsuccessful and yielded no results. Now there was a regional policy designed to develop bilateral relations ‘with Arab states based on equality and mutual respect. ‘Tarkey had to expend efforts over a whole decade to over- come the bitterness of the Arab states occasioned by its policies during the 19508, “The process of reviewing past policies started after the coup of 27 May 1960, when all aspects of the DP gov- ‘emment's policies came under critical appraisal In the at- mosphere of freedom prevailing ater the adoption of the 196: Constitution, the tradition of keeping foreign policy above partisan politics was abandoned; these issues be- gantobe debated by the public. Another cause for change was the advent of détente, As the intensity of the Cold ‘Warbegantto abate, intrabloc differences emerged and the question of Cyprus flared up between Turkey and Greece ‘once again. Turkey became aware of its isolation among the newly independent countries, which now made wp the majority of the international community. To remedy this situation, priority was accorded to mending fences ‘with neighboring Arab states “The soos were years ofstructural change for the Arab states, The traditional order was being shaken by young officers who seized power in Iraq and Syria to modernize their backward societies. This process started in 19s2 in Egypt and resulted in Nasser assuming a leadership role in the Arab world, In the 19508 Nasserism became the ide- ology of the modernizers of the regions. In the 1960s the 4 Baath movement, describing itself as socialist and Arab nationalist, came to the fore in lag and Syria and freed these countries from Nasser’s influence (Box 5-16). A. A Different Way of Seeing the Arab States after the Coup of 27 May ‘The officers who seized power on 27 May 1960 worried that the U.S. might misinterpret the coup and intervene in Turkey on the basis of the 1959 agreement. To prevent such an intervention, the declaration issued on 27 May laid particular stress on loyalty to NATO and CENTO. It ‘was obvious that the new administration had no intention, of bringing radical change in Turkey's foreign policy. The new leadership was uncomfortable with the policies of its predecessors toward those countries carrying out na- cuonal liberation struggles, however, bearing in mind that ‘Turkey itself had emerged from a successful war of na- tional liberation, It wanted to put Turkey's relations with, the nonaligned countries, and the Third World in general, onanewbasis, “The Turkish government's program of 1 July 1960 merely mentioned that development of relations with the ‘Midile East would be given priority. But a clearer Middle Eastern policy on the issue of Algeria's war of indepen- dence, much different from that ofthe DP, was announced ashort while ater. On 16 September196o a group of mem- bers of the National Unity Committee (MBK) issued a declaration thatin the future Turkey would support those nations waging wars of national liberation andin this con- text would support Algerians in their war against France, ‘The next day, head of state Cernal Giirsel recalled that ‘Torkey had emerged from a war of national survival, so itwas only natural that it should support Algeria. He also offered to mediate between France and the Algerian na- tionalists The Algerian side accepted the offer, but France refrained from giving a formal reply ‘The new Turkish administration’ approach to the Algerian question was well received in Arab capitals.Box 546, The Baath Movement ‘The Baath Party was established in Damascus in 5940 by Mice lak, @ Greek Onhodox Christian, ard Slahaddn Bitar, a Sana ‘Musim, “Baath means reir fn Arabic. Pllc! pats that shed! to bring about an Arg renaissance by pursuing te path Of Arab socal calles themes Baath, Folensing te sagan of “unity, freedom, socials,” the Baath movement wanted 16 fstablsh an Arab cacy that was united, secuat and goweried according to sbdallst tenets. The Keolog/ could be desc a racnalist and soci, but with an Arab interpretation. The Baath Iceology aecoptee Arab unity as fs bub premise and concluded shat he bors sebrang Ago natons had Doe Inose by ‘Colonials and edo be einai ‘The faath movement releced, a elgios and sectanan deaiages al developed an understanding af rtionalsm based fn Arab unity, bul i was hot antsamie. On te contrary, Baath ideclogy accepted lian fundamental and nseporable prt of ‘rab etre, But contrary to Sunni Arab nationals the Sathits Considered [lam to be nota rational region ofthe Arabs but an Iinporant component of thn cura erage, san was the essence of Arab natinalsm: and ten Chitin Arabs uly ‘asst atonal sentient, they old understand hat the see of Arabia an But Turkey itself was in a dilemma, The members of the ‘CNU felt that they had seized power to further Atatir’s reforms and used every opportunity to reiterate their support for the Algerian nationalists out of respect for “Thdkey’s history and tmdition, Tho Ministry of Forcign Aifairs, however, was fully ave of the complications that ‘would result from a confrontation with Turkey's NATO ally France, aso bearing in mind ‘Turkeys application for membership in the European Common Market. That is ‘why no tangible action was taken on the Algerian issue, ‘with support confined to the verbal level But ‘Turkey did support the UN resolutions of 20 December 1961 that called for self determination for the Algerians. Turkey ‘was formulating its Foreign policy on the basis of a new approach compared to the policies of the DP government, ‘The Turkish intelligentsia was also in favor of supporting, ‘wars of national liberation and developing relations with ‘the nonaligned countries. ‘The change of approach to the Middle Bast that ap- peared after 27 May found its reflection in day-to-day rela tions only after a time lag ‘The administration that came topowerin Syria following the coup of 9 September 1961 decided to break away from the United Arab Republic formed with Egypt in 1958, Torkey declared this to be Syria’ internal affair and recognized the new adiinistra- tion in Damascus, in second place after Jordan, When this ‘position is conapared with the position taken by the DP iam Hissin esteteps ) S Relations with the Middle Bast 475 bax socal was aioli wah in lst etd ars aves, Acct te ash seg Sodan id 19 be nao a MG Cau fu Be aL © ‘ray wt ei tecralste Aco Ba Was rer the conc ot css wae avs Sor 6 mene tres A a naan La Brana UR) Sir aun pat ho ter ss ek ‘oul not be cared xt without plying Marve pinciples 16 Coton photog, aah sae aed pte poor) fe bed Fs pony onthe leit fk aso of Iricomne, the lose control of intemal and. exter, Hons bd cme te ke pa nae ‘of mines and natural resources, economic: < development through hip woe patton ne Seopa , rity feck power Sra 3966. On 21 Noverber J Hates ‘Assad came © power 9 co el tenes the fn ths death The Boats arid et ae cob it ag I 988° when Ge, Ane Mason SEDO: ia ead of sala Sa eet Weare Arter coe 9 Bet government that contemplated intervening in Iraq after the coup of r9s8, the change in Turkey's Middle Fastern policy becomes very clear. Turkey's decision to recognize the new Syrian administration did not go well in Cairo, however, and Bgypt broke diplomatic relation with Ter key on30 September ‘Turkey was somewhat more apprehensive about de~ vyelopments in Irag. Ankara was following closely Gen. Abdulkarim Kassemis efforts to reinforce his hol on power by seeking the support of Communists and Kurds and developing lraq’ relations withthe USSR. Unlike the DP government, the regime set up in Turkey after 27 May hhad gone back to the tough Kurdish policies ofthe past. ‘On 1 Jane 1960 it arrested 485 Kurds anid sent them to a «camp in Sivas. After being detained thore for fous months, fily-fve clan elders and chieftains were sent into exile in the weste provinces under the terms of alaw enacted on 19 October 1960. When Kassem made concessions to the Kurds of rag, Ankara grew concerned over the possibilty that this might encourage the Kurds in Torkey to make demands for similar treatment, In April 96a there was a parting of ways betvreen the Kurds ofnozthem Iraqand the Kassem regime, when they resorted to'atms under the leadership of Mallah Mustafa Barzani, The Kurds quieldy took control of thei region and declared their intention to establish an independent Kardish Republicin northern Ing. Turkey was pleased to476 Section 5, 1960-1980:Relative Autonomy—3 Hox 5-17, The Kurdish Rebellion in Northern iraq, 1962-1975 after iraq galred indenendence in 1932, the Kurds of nonthu rag ender thee lander Mulah Mustafa Razvan stares damering for an independent Kuch state in thelr region, Barzani escaped, ‘hom detention in Suleymaniyah in 1943. retumed to hs resion, and wentinta action. When the Karsh Repu of Mahabad was abled in 1946 n nother Fan then under Soviet ecuation, Barzan lef aq wit ten thousend armed tisesmen ane crossed into Mahabad, afte the USSR evacuated narthern Ian the next ya the Tehran administration got rid the Kush tate, where Upon Baréan tured to iraq, He as unable to ald op if fis reglon, howevey, and took refuge in the USSR with fe hundred cof fis peshmerga fighters. Barzan stayed there for eleven yeas ‘and only returned to ag n 1958 follwing the coup In Baghdad, ‘when Kase improved his relations wit the USSR. After Kassem fated to hore his pledge to qve the Kurds autonomy 2h uprising broke out under the leadership of Barzan, Kconthwed unt 1970, Moscow persunded Saddam to grant the Kurds autonoty and, = In fetur, promised to support req. The autonomy plan wes an ‘need on 9 March 7970, 6) nthe northern region at rag where the Kurds were concentrated they weuld have an autonomous ‘dhinsration. (2 They would be represented in the central gov- ‘ment, and ane of the vice presidents would be a Kurd.) The tives ol feds in northern aq would be placed under the super: ‘Son Of the Kurs ds of 197. Baghdad was shinalng In around ‘out way that autonomy ould come in four yeas ‘fer ths announceriont, tho USSR and aq signed a fifteen Year Friendship and Good Neightoriness Teaty on 9 April 1972 Barziri wis summoned to Moscow ahd told tend al rbalious ‘antigovemment actives. ve the Ihagl seginie as Guube but way feasfal of a shone lar uprising by its own Kurdish population. ‘Ihe uprising in Iraq did not spill over into Turkey, however, as Ankara took no direct action; but the uprising and the efforts to suppress it gave rise to numerous incidents that strained bilateral relations (Boxs-17). (On 8 July 1962 two Tragi aircraft entered "Turkish ait- space and bombed the town of Gerir in the vicinity of Hakkasi, When Turkey protested, Iraq announced that this action was the result of an error and would not rect. But on as August a similar incident occurred when Iragi aircraft carried out a further attack in the region of Hak- ka, leading to the death of three Turkish soldiers. Irag ‘was having difficulty in fully suppressing the Kurdish uprising and accused Turkey of supporting the separat- ist Kurds. "The next day, Turkish aircraft fired on the Iraqi sircraft that had intruded into ‘Turkish airspace. These in- ‘idents caused tension between Ankara and Baghdad, but thisdid not ast forlong. ‘Turkey steered clear of the numerous attempted coups that took place in Iraq and Syria, At the time, Tur- key was seeking to establish internal political stability by ‘thwarting the coup attempts of Col Talat Aydemir and This rew suaton In kag ceated some nervousness in an and ae. When Moscou’said tothe Kurds died up, ran stepped In. Wah washington’ approval, Tehran establshed contacts wth ‘Barzani and gave proms of ad. el had akeady promise to provide im wth weapons, In 972 the Kurds rebelled orca again in northern rag entered into negotations with Baghdad, which was ead fo each a agreeenton condition that the aid giver tothe Kurds would ‘ease to flow. The agieemient of alges was ged! on 6 March 17s an weull top its a oe Kurds and get bade rec: tons ns favor rear, ‘On 7 Arch Baghdad sent teary eta action aginst the Kurds giving ise to refugee problems. The fleging Kurds began to amass on the Turkish and ivan borders. When ren closed bor deta massacre of Kurds by the ql amy took place. The fifteen- Yyearold ebelion as frlly suppressed, Barzani fad Sought US. i and el the rebelion in 1972 teljng on Weshingtons prom: Js; but nan that the corctions had changes he could na longe. ‘make Ninsel heard in Washington. slah Mustafa Barzan dled in the US. 1979 without having brousht Sutonomy or Indep ence te hs people, He had been used ist by the USSR and thon by the US Fan, His Son Masa Garzanj would erergé under clfferent cumstances fa the 19905 a te leader of one ofthe ural fection i nrther rag, He wuld rely on the US. afd ‘olaborate with Turkey fom ime to tine against te PRK (M4 Fins, pursued a cautious policy towaudl its Arab neighbors by not getting involved in their internal affairs. It was at this| juncture that the Cyprus question flared up and drew Turkey's attention in that direction, “The question of Cyprus revealed to Ankara the consequences ofits Arab policies ofthe 19sos. The Arab countries refused to side with Turkey either atthe second conference of the nonaligned in October 1964 or at the ‘Twentieth Session of the UN General Assembly when the issue was debated on 16 December 196s. They were solidly behind the government of Cyprus, headed by Makarios. Before the voting in the General Assembly, Turkey had sent goodwill missions to explain the Turkish posi- tion on Cyprus to nonaligned countries, including Al- geria, Morocco, Irag, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Jordan, But it was too much to expect that a single such visit seeking support on Cyprus might bring the Arzb countries to change their foreign policies. The vote in the General Assembly on 16 December 1965 was the most crushing defeat suffered by Turkey on the Cy- rus question and clearly revealed the failure of Ankara’ policies. After this, Turkey no longer confined itself to in- effective methods like the sending of goodwill missionsand undertook changes in its foreign policies designed to develop politcal, economic, and cultural relations with the Arab States. B. The Period of Rapprochement (1965-1971) “The Justice Party (JP), which came to power in the elec- tion held in 965, clearly saw the international isolation of. ‘Tarkey brought on by the DP governments in the 19508 ‘hen Ankara acted as the spokesperson ofthe West when dealing with the Arab states, The JP decided to pursue & new policy based on a sounder foundation, ts conserva- tive constituency was also in favor of mending relations in this fashion. The Demirel government's program of 1965 announced that, starting with the fraternal” Muslim and Arab countries of the Middle Hast and the Maghreb, a multifaceted foreign policy would be developed toward the countries of Asia and Aftica. ‘To get rid of Tur negative image in the nonaligned countries of the Third ‘World, Ankara bad to start with the Arab countries with ‘many historical and culturallinks, The Middle East policy of the JP govemment differed fondamentally from that cof past governments, which saw their Middle East policy as a function of their Western policy. The JP government also developed close relations with so-called progressive countries. In thismanner, the g}vernment gained the sup- port ofits conservative constitfency by coming closer to regional states through the use ff Arab and Islamic motifs, while deflecting the disapproval of ts leftist evities by its positive approach to independence movements, “The fist positive response to Ankards new message to the Middle Bast came from Iraq, The Iraqi minister re- sponsible for foreign affairs, Adnan Pachachi, visited ‘Tur- ey on.7 to 11 February 1966 and declared that Baghdad also wanted to develop bilateral relations. He gave Iraq's support to Turkey on Cyprus by stating that Iraq consid cred the cause ofthe ‘Turkish Cypriots tobe just and that rights based on treaties had to be respected. ‘Turkey started the process of developing commer- cial and cultural ties with various Arab countries after this visit, and a succession of visits followed. When the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ha- uk Bayiilken, went to Egypt, he signed a trade agreement, ‘0n 16 March 1966.On.5 April a parliamentary delegation visited Sandi Arabia and the minister of foreign affairs, isan Sabri Gaglayangil, went to Iraq from 2 to 26 May. ‘On2g Angust King Faisal of Saudi Arabia came to Turkey, and ‘Turkey's President Sunay visited ‘Tunisia from 1 to 6 December. “Turkey’sefforts to mend fences with Arab states coin- Relations with the Middie Kast 477 cided with the initiative of King Faisal to set up an Islamic Pect or an Islamic Conference, which was the subject of an intense debate in the international comunity. Upon the invitation of the World Islamic Union, eighteen Mus- lim countries got together in May 3965 in Mecca, where ‘the prime minister of Somalia proposed holding a som- mit conference and the king of Saudi Arabia agreed to ‘make the necessary arrangements for such a meeting, At a time when the memory of the 1960 coup in Turkey was still fresh in people's minds, the reaction of the conserva- tive JP government was arousing interest, On 17 February Demirel announced that Turkey might participate in an, Islamic Conference that did not pursue political ebjec- ‘ives and did not lead to the formation of rival groups, ‘When the news started circulating that Tukey would join the Islamic conference end sever relations with Israel, ‘the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official denial. ‘Turkey's position was clear: secular Turkey was wary of getting involved with the Arab countries within a politi cal organization. ‘Ihe policy of rapprochement with the Arab states had two objectives. One was to develop eco- nomic cooperation and trade, and the other was to break tof isolation when Cyprus and other questions affect ing Turkey's national interests came up for discussion in international forums. “The Arab countries expected much more froma Tur. key, however: They wanted to see Turkey on their side on the question of Palestine, They were always ncamfort- able with Turkey as 2 CENTO member that defended the interests of the West and of the U.S, the supporter of Israel, Without living up to Arab expectations, it would be dificult for Turkey to bring its relations with the Arab states to the desired level This became even more obvious inthe Arab-Israeli War of 1967. ‘Throughout 1967 relations between the Arab states and Israel were becoming tense. This was most noticeable in the case of Syria, and a new war appeared to beim nent. Between 32 and 24 May 1967 Ankara held a meeting ofits ambassadors in the Middle Fastand reformalatedits ‘Mile Eastorn policy. Three principles were established in this context. (:) Efforts would be made to develop bi- Tateral relations in all fields with all of the Arab states. (2) ‘Tuckey would stay out of inter-Arab quarrels and would refrain from taking sides, (3) Turkey would also stay out of pacts designed to divide the Arabs. ‘When war broke out between the Arabs and Israel on s June 1967; Turkey followed a course that was markedly different from the course followed during the previous Arabelsraeli War of 1956. Gaglayangil declared that there woul be no question of using the bases in Turkey against478 Section 5. 1960~1980: Relative Autonomy—3 the Arabs. When Israel emerged as the victos, he stated that Ankara was aguinst acquiring territory and gaining the upperhand through the use of force. Ankara’ actions ‘were not confined to giving Arabs verbal support. It also sent Arab countries, starting with Syria, food, clothing, and medical supplies to alleviate their heavy war losses. Daring the debates at the UN on a2 June, Turkey sided openly with the Arabs. Ina speech delivered at the General Assembly, Gaglayangil expressed the friendly fecling of Turkey toward the Arabs and recalled that he hhad already declared Turkey's opposition to the acquisi- tion of and by the use of force, He wanted the General Assembly to insist on Israel evacuating the Arab territo- ‘res that ithad conquered. Turkey joined the Arabs in sap porting resolution 243, calling on Israel to evacuate Arab Iands occupied after sJune. The Arab countries, and espe- cially Bgypt and Syria, thanked Turkey forits stance dur- ing the 1967 war; subsequently, this signaled that relations ‘wore developing on a firm bass. ‘Turkey continued to pursue its pro-Arab polices af- ter 1967, Each time there was an armed clash between the “Anabs and Israel, Turkey protested Istaet’s action, When, British forces evacuated the region east of Suez and left 2 military vacuum in the Persian Gulf, the US. proposed that Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait con- clude a security agreement to remedy this situation, Tar- key refused to go along with this proposal ‘Turkey's policies baccd on common oonse alco in cluded issues that were dividing the Arab states, such as the Jordanian exisis of 1970, After the war of 1967, the guerrillas who took refuge in Jordan were carrying out ac- tivities that the government did not approve. When the Jordanian government tried to bring these activities un- der control, bloody clashes erupted, and Syrian forces in- torvoned on the side of the Palestinian guerrillas. Never- theless the Jordanian army mastered the situation, On 27 September 1970 King Hussein and Yasser Arafat signed an agreement bringing this inter-Arab conflict to an end in 2 ceremony witnessed by ten Arab heads of state. On 22 September Turkey issued a statement declaring that the cevents were Jordan's internal affair that foreign interven tion would make matters worse and make it harderto end the clashes and bring the affair to a peacefal conclusion. ‘Turkey also withheld permission for the US. tointervene in the crisis from the Incirlik airbase. ‘Turkey had demonstrated that it was no longer the “unquestioning representative ofthe West's interests in the ‘Middle Fast. I had interests ofits own in the region and ‘wanted to pursue policies comesponding to these inter- ‘sts even fits policies diverged from the policies of the West. In formulating this new policy, the JP government ‘was guided by the inclinations ofthe Turkish electorate as nuchasit wasby the reactions ofthe Arabstates. TheRight in Turkey was favorably disposed toward the Arabs, while the Left saw the Palestinian cause asa struggle against im. pperialism and appraised the government's Middle Bastern policies inthis light. On the issues of Arab-Israeli conflict and bilateral relations with Arab states, the government was able to count on the support ofa broad spectrum of the public. On the issue of joining an organization like the Islaunic Conference, however, the government had to pro ceed with caution, because some segments of the popu- Jation harbored misgivings about this matter. Neverthe- Jess, despite the initial arguments over the issue, Turkey's ‘membership in the Islamic Conference made an imprint (on Turkish relations with the Arab members ofthe onga- nization throughout the 1970s. The Organization of the Islamic Conference and Turkey ‘When the al-Aqsa mosque, located in the Arab quarter of Jerusalem unde Israeli oecupation, was damaged by afire ‘on 21 August 1969, there was deep indignation in all Mus- lim countries, especially the Arab countries.Jordan's King Hussein sent a message to fll Arab heads of state propos- ing a summit conference. $audi Arabia and Morocco un- dertook to make the neceshary arrangements for holding euch conference, resident Sunay also received an invitation to attend the conference. In his reply, he explained that Turkey ‘was a secular state and that he would not participate in a conference with an Islamic label, He added thatthe issue came within the responsibility ofhis government. For the ‘Turkish government, the decision to attend would have both domestic and international implications. ‘Turkey's Constitution declared it to be a secular country, and at- tending a meeting with an Islamic common denominator ‘would cause many reactions at home. In particular, the army was uneasy about the govemment’s policy and was beginning to make itsuneasiness felt more openly. Most of the countries seeking such a meeting were in thereaction- ary category; in addition to their intention of arranging a mass demonstration against Israel, they were also seek- ing to push Egypt and the revolutionary Arab states into the position of a minority, This would allow them to chal- lenge Nasser, who aspired to lead the Arab world, and to turn the Arab League into an Islamic League. Turkey was aware that such a polarization in the Middle Fast would be against its interest, Eventually, Demizel announced that the Rabat meeting was of a political and not a reli-gious nature and thatthe participation of lalamic states in the meeting would not make Turkey's participation vio- Iation of the principle of secularism—to think otherwise would require the avoidance of anything associated with the words “Islamic” and “Muslim.” Furthermore, partici pation in the Rabat meeting would not be inconsistent with the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, Turkey made the decision to participate in the meeting as an ob- serverand atthe level of foreign minister, At the Islamic Summit Conference of Rabat, two important decisions were made. A permanent secretariat ‘would be established to secure Israt’s evacuation of al the occupied tertitories; and a meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs would be held on an annual basis. This was the first step toward the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The proposal to sever diplomatic relations with Israel was not adopted, however, and the old divisions within the Arab world suefaced once again. At the conference, Caglayangil eclared that Turkey supported the contents ofthe joint communiqué to the extent that they were in conformity with the resolutions ofthe UN that ithad approved. Like Iran, it refused to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. Since no issue was discussed that conflicted with Turkey's secularstatus, Qaglayangil’ reservations were confined to the area of forcign policy. Even so, Turkish participation in the meeting attracted criticism from opposition quarters fn Turkey, Tho Arab countries alco criticized Turkey for not cutting its diplomatic ties with Israel, and CENTO's Islamic member countries were accused of acting as the spokespersons of the West at the conference, ‘When the Islamic Conference of Minister of Foreign ‘Affairs met in March 1970 in Jedda, where the first steps ‘were taken toward insttutionalization, Turkey heeded ppast criticisms and participated at a lower level, sending the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Ankara refined from getting involved in the activities of the newiy established secretariat. It also submitted @ letter to the secretary-general of the Islamic Conference in-which it declared that it would accept the decisions of the conference only tothe extent that they were compat- ible with its Constitution and the principles ofits foreign policy. Thus Turkey was stating that it would bearin mind its secular status and accept decisions only to the extent that they did not contradict this status. Despite this, the Islamic countries were satisfied with Turkey’s presence at the conference. In September 1970 Turkey reaped the frst benefits of the policy of rapprochement with Arab countries that it had been pursuing since 1965, At the Lusaka meeting of Relations with the Middle East 479 the nonaligned, the Arab countries refused to accept Ma karios’s proposals on Cyprus and drew attention to the need to safeguard the rights of the Tckish Cypriots, In the aftermath of the military intervention of 12 March 1971, there was a short pause in Turkey's efforts to develop closerties with Arab and islamic countries, When the Charter of the Islamic Conference came up for signa- ture in Jedda in March 1972, Turkey failed to sign it. The chacter containedno provision that could be construed as beingincompatible with secularism, but the preamble did contain the following passage: “Believing that their com- mon faith constitutes a powerful element to establish af finity and solidarity arming Islamic peoples; Determined todefend the spiritual, moral, social, and economic values of Islam, which shall remain an important factor in man: kind?’s progress” These words werenotin conformity with the principles of secularism, Butnevestheless Turkey con- timued to participate as de facto member of the OIC. ‘Whether Turkey i legally a member of the OIC re mains a moot question to this day. Turkey has complied ‘with none of the conditions for membership described in article8 ofthe charter. Consequently and despite Turkey’ even closer relations with the OIG, itcan be argued from, the point of view of international law and domestic law that Turkey's situation was not based on a legal founds- tion (Alpkaya, pp. 59-66). After the 12 March interlude, Turkey's relations with the OIC daring thesp7oe developed in linawiththe teed development of its relations with the Arab countries, At the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in JJedda in 1975, Turkey atonded at ministerial level forthe first time, with Cagalayangil representing Turkey, rather than the secretary-general of the ministry. The confer- ence responded by inviting the president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, RaufDenktas, minister ofstate Vedat Celik, and the muti of Cyprus o attend the contfer- ence as “guests” At the conference, Denktas spoke about the problems and aspirations of the Cypriot Turks. The deelaration adopted at the end of the conference con- tained aparagraph on Cyprus: “The conference expressed ils sympathy for the striving of the Turkish community to defend its legitimate nights and its Islamic character ‘within 2 bizonal, federal, independent, sovereign, neutral Republic of Cyprus free of foreiga bases” (Cumburiye, 16 July 1975). At this meeting, Turkey proposed and the conference accepted that the Seventh Conference of Min. {sters of Foreign Affairs be held in Istanbul. ‘The conference met in Istanbal on 12-15 May 1976. Whether to participate or notin the 1969 Rabat meeting had posed a grim dilemma for Turkey at that time. Now480 Section 5. 1960-1980: Relative Autonom the idea of developing relations with the Arab states had taken sucha strong hold that the question of whether hav- ing the conference in Istanbul was contrary to the secular character ofthe state never came up. The Istanbul confer- ‘ence opened with the reading ofa message from President Korutiitk, Prime Minister Demirel addressed the confer ence. He reiterated that Turkey would proceed in step with the Arabs on the question of Palestine, At Turkey's initiative, it was decided to set up two centers to promote cultural and scientific cooperation. One was the Islamic Conference's Center for Historical, Cultural, and Artistic Stucke, established in istanbul in 1981; and the other was , the Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Educa- tion Center of the Islamic Countries, located in Ankara Atthis session, the Turkish government undertook prep. arations for acceding to the Charter ofthe Islamic Con- ference with a reservation The bill to this effect went to the parliamentary committee for consideration; bat early elections took place in 1977, and the bill did not come up foradoption by the TGNA. ‘There was a significant development at the Confer- cence of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Morocco in 1979. It was decided to upgrade the status of the Muslim ‘Turkish community of Cyprus from guest to observer. Also, an appeal was made for providing assistance to the ‘Turkish Cypriot community to alleviate the hardship in- ficted by the Greek Cypriot embargo. “Tukey's selations with the OIC kept developing dur {ng the 970s, and important changes were obtained in the Cyprus policies ofthe Islamic states. Turkey went on reit- crating that it was a secular state, although less frequently ‘tan formerly. Starting in 1980, the 2 September military administration became a part of Washington's Green Belt Strategy (see “Relations with the USA and NATO" in Section 6), and the principle of secularism was gradually pushed wel into the background. Even closer relations ‘were established with the OIC and particularly with the “yeactionary” regimes in the OIG, starting with Saudi Arabia, There were important and disturbing differences between the policies toward the OIC pursued inthe 1970s, and the 1980s, D. Warm Relations (1973-1979) “The interim regime of 12 March 1971 abandoned the multi- faceted policies being pursued by the JP goverament since 1965 and turned its face once again toward Wash- ington, especially with its decision to ban the cultivation cof the opium poppy This caused Turkey to distance itself from the Arab countries, At this time, events took place that affected the existing balance in the Middle Bast. The Baathist regimes in neighboring lraq and Syria were de- ‘veloping their lations with the USSR. In particular the ‘Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness concluded in 1972 between Lraq and the USSR gave tise to concern among America’ allies Ian and Israel, as well asin Tur- key. Another negative factor affecting relations with Syria ‘was the flow of armed revolutionary youths from Turkey to Syria, who preceded from there to Lebanon, where they received military training in Palestinian camps be- fore returning to Turkey. As relations soured, this allowed the questions of Hatay and sharing of water resources to resurface. These questions would remain on the agenda throughout the 980 and 1990s (see "Relations with the ‘Midale East” in Section 6). ‘As relations with Iraq and Syria deteriorated, impor- tant events were taking place in Egypt. Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser upon his death, closed all Soviet mili tary installations in Egypt on 18 July972 and asked Soviet military advisors to leave the country. These were the frst signs that Egypt was improving its relations with the US. Jn September 1973 the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Haluk Bayilken, visited Egypt. Turkey's Middle Eastern policy was being revised. As Spria and iraq improved thei relations with the USSR, their place was being taken up by Egypt, which now pursued a more pro-Western policy. “When the 12 March intorlade ended in October s973, the policies that were abandoned in 1971 were resumed. ‘The coalition governments headed by Ecevit and the Na- tonalist Front governments sought to maintain relations with the Arab countries ata reasonably good level. The reason for this was that Ankara’ relations with the West cooled afier the 1974 Cyprus operation. Another reason, ‘was that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun: ‘ries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo in 1973, forcing ofl prices to triple and creating serious economic problems for Turkey. Ankara was eager to develop its relations with Arab countries in order to overcome the shortage of oil and promote trade relations with those countries. ‘Ankara had supported the Palestinians and Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and pursued the same policy in the fourth wat, which broke out on 6 October 1973. This war was different, because the Arab objective was no longer the destruction of the state of Iarael but the recov- ery of occupied Arab lands. The war also destroyed Israel’ myth ofinvinetbility when Arab armies were able to score initial snccesses. In the 1973 war Turkey announced that ncilikbase could not be usedby the US. to supply rae),while it allowed Soviet aircraft supplying the Arabs to overfy its territory. The reward came on 20 November, when members of OPEC announced that Turkey would be exempt from the cil embargo, On 2s August 1973 an agreement was signed by ‘Turkey and lraq to construct a pipeline from the Kirkuk oil eld to a terminal to be lo- cated in Turkey's Mediterranean port of Yermurtabik, This oilpipeline went into operation on 3 January 1977, whenit started supplying two-thirds of Turkey's oil requirements ‘while also providing an income from the flow of oil. An- other positive result of the development of relations with Arab countries occurted during the 1974 Cyprus opere- tion, when Libyan leader Muammar Khaddafi supplied fel and tires for the ‘Turkish combat aircraft engaged in the operation. ‘Ono November 1975 Turkey supported the resola- tion adopted by the UN General Assembly, declaring that “Zionism was form of racism. This was another demon- stration of Turkish support for the Arabs in their struggle against Israel ‘Turkey had remained ata distance from the Palestine ‘Liberation Organization (PLO) sinee its establishment in 1964. Ankara knew that some of the people engaged in terrorist activities in Turkey had been trained in PLO camps, Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1970s An- kkara started developingits relations with the PLO. When the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in October 1974 r20- ognized the PLO ac tho solo reprocontative of the Da tinians and decided that the organization should be their representative at the UN, Ankara recognized the PLO in January 1975 and established relations with it through the Turkish Embassy in Cairo, In August the chairman of the Political Bureau ofthe PLO, Faruk Khaddumi, visited ‘Turkey and discussed with ‘Turkish officials the devel opment of relations and the establishment of an office in Ankara, Turkey indicated that at the Seventh Conter- ence of Islamic Ministers of Foreign Affairs it would be announced that the PLO would be granted permission to establish a political office in Ankara. When four Palestin jan guenillas occupied the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara on 10 July 1979, Ankara did not go back on its decision. “The PLO’s Ankara office was opened by Yasser Arafat on. «October. As Turkey’srelations with the Arabs developed during the 1980s and relations with Israel cooled, Ankar’s relations with the PLO gotcloser. Despite the rapprochement with the Arabs and the PLO, it must not be forgotten that Turkey never deviated significantly from its main foreign policy orientation, An- ‘kara never severed relations with Israel, When the Camp Relations with the Middle East 481 David agreement was signed in 977 and the Arab world suspended relations with Egypt, Turkey announced that ‘it supported the peace agreement. ‘After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the US. devised new plans to safeguard its interests in the Middle East, relying on Turkey, Hgypt, and Israel. The coup of September i980 would enable Turkey to ft neatly into these plans and would also bring to an end the multifac- ted foreign policy that it had been pursuing since 1965. Starting in 1980, ‘Turkeys relations with Saudi Arabia, _ the Gulfstates, and Fgypt—all good friends of the US.— would grow closer as its relations with Syria deteriorated. ‘Muiex Frnar ann Oscar Keaxgtodiy Sources (Relations with Arab States) Alpkaya, Gkgen, "Tirkiye Cumhusiyet, slam Kongeranst Orit ve Laildtc” Prof. Dr. Muummser Aksoy'a Aragon 46,108.12 (1991): 55-68, Frat, Melek M, 1960-71 Avast Tk Dis Boia ve Kibns So. ron, Ankara: SiyasalYayinev, 097. Korkud, Selguk, “istanbul Islamic Confecence of Foreign Ministers” Fore Poi 5 no. (1975): 38-23, ‘Kirkton, Omer. ‘An Analysis of Torkish-Arab Relations” SBE Deis! 7 20.3 (4972): 07-34 ta Dojaldaki Yeni Geligmeler ve Tiskiye” SBR Derg a9, nos. s-a 1974):151-60. ey Atieude towardo tho Middle Bast Conflict? oeigh Pos, n0. (1975): 25-23 . "Tirkelrak lighdlerinde Son Geligmele” SBF Deis aa, no, 4 (1972): 247-4. “Tarkiyehin Arap Ortadogusina Kargt Politika (1g4s~ 17a), Ankara: AUSBF Yayualan, 1973 atlas, Suat. Ortadoge Vat Elis Toprlar Istanbul: Biblio- tek 1997, Soysal, Ismail, “Turkis-Arab Diplomatic Relations afte the Second Wodld War (1945-1986)? Studies on Turkish Arab Relations (Anuel, 1990): 43-15, —. Tirkiyenin Ulusleraras. Sisal Bagulans C. 1 (45 190). Ankara: ‘TTK, 1991. ‘irk Dis Poltikas 3919-173 (OTD). th ed, Ankara: AUSBE ig MiinasebetlerEnstitis, 198 ‘van Damn, Nikolaos Surbyede kldar Macadeles (original tite: “The Sinugie for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under ‘Acad andthe Batt Party) Trans, SereshIdizand Ash Fay (allan Istanbul: tii, 2000 antag, Nevzat. "Economic Relations between Turkey and Tblamnic Countries” Studion Tirkish- Arab Relations (Ane nual 3986): 317-36.482 Section S, 1960-1980: Relative Autonomy—3 1, RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB STATES A. Relations with Israet 1. Stagnating Relations a. The Arab-lsraeli War of 1967 and Turkey ‘Turkey sided openly with the Arabs during the period ‘when tension was escalating prior tothe Arab-Lracli War ‘of 1967, during the fighting, and at the UN debates over this issue “The fist season for Turkey to adopt this position was Cyprus. When Turkey decided to exercise its right to in- {ervene following the Cyprus events that erupted toward the end of:963, it wasrebuifedby the unexpected Johnson Tetterofs June 1964. From then on, Ankara decided to re "view its international relations and make the transition toa smultifaceted foreign policy. When the question of Cyprus came up for discussion at the UN and other international forums, Turkey wanted tobe able to count on the support of the Arabs, The best way to gamer this support was by siding withthe Arabsin the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Seconsi, some politcal parties in Turkey were attach ing greater importance to carrying out closer relations with the Arab countries in order to generate an advan- tage in domestic polities. The Justice Party, which came to power in 1963, had the support of the conservative reli gious masses and favored closer ties withthe Arab states, with which Turkey shared religious and cultural values. “This policy wasalso supported by the Leftand by the gen- cealpubliethetheld onti Amorican views. ‘A third reason was Turkey’ expectation of economic benefits from closer ties with the Arab states. ‘The energy crisis that resulted from the 1973 wer drove Turkey closer ‘othe Arabs, because it was almost completely dependent con imported petroleum. The energy cvsis had induced a recession inthe world economy, and Turkey was seek- ing new markets for its products, which were now in low Aemand in Europe and elsewhere The new markets were inthe now rich Arab oil-producing countries. This meant that Turkey had to deemphasize its eltions with Iral. ‘The fourth reaton was that leftist movements were in the ascendancy in the second half of the 1960s. These movements had an aversion te Israel, which they regarded as the unquestioning aly ofthe UL. in the Middle Bast. Many segments of Turkish society shared these views. Both the legal leftist organizations and the illegal ones ‘were pro-Arab inthe Arab-Lraeli conflict. The militants of legal leftist organizations were heading for the Lebanese camps of Palestinian terrorist organizations, where they received training and then carried out attacks on Israeli targelsin Tuckey, especially during the 1970s. “The frst signs of Turkey's pro-Areb policies appeared in May 1967. A series of dangerous developments oc- curred in quick succession. The United Arab Republic (Fgypt), Syria, and Jordan on the one hand and Israel on the other started challenging one another and brought their armies to a high state of alert. At Nasser’s request, the LN peacekeeping force was removed from the Sinai Peninsula on 19 May. Then Caito closed the Strait of Tian to Israeli shipping, blocking off the Gulf of Aqaba on 23 ‘May. These moves were interpreted as precursors of war in Ankara and elsewhere, After a conference of Turkish ambassadors posted in the Middle Eastern countries held in Ankara on 28 May 1967, the Turkish government issued statement and emphasized that “the government of Tur {key is also taking into consideration the existing close re- lations with Arab countries inthe framework ofits policy of friendly relations with its neighbors” ‘Turkey maintained the same course during the war. On 6 June 1967 Turkish minister of foreign affairs Cagle yangil declared that twas out ofthe question for the bases ‘on Turkish soil to be used against the Arabs. This was an. ‘unusual declaration: when the U.S, used these bases foran, operation out of NATO’ area during the landingin Leba nonin 1938, n0 one except the opposition questioned this action. Bat this time, inline with the multifaceted foreign policy, Ankara was forestalling the possiblity ofthe use ofthe bases. Furthermore, in the course of the war, the Tarkish Red Croscant cant food aid worth $100,000 to Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Following the war a further $500,000 in aid was dispatched, primarily to Syria (Armaoglu,p. 273) “Turkey continued to display an anti-Israeli policy at UN meetings after the war. When the issue came before the UN General Assembly's special session, Minister Gaglayangil declared in his speech there: “Turkey's for eign policy rests on respect for political independence and tertitorial integrity and opposition to the acquisition of territory through the use of force” (Disisleri Bakanlgt Balleteni 35 [August 1967]: 47-49). He added: “Ihe Turk ishnation takes a close interest in the fate of the holy sites in Jerusalem and regards with displeasure Israe/s attempts to camry ont a fait accompli in that city.” Gailayangil also underlined that Turkey harbored feelings of deep friend- ship and sympathy for the peoples of the Arch countries and called on the General Assembly to demand Israels immediate evacuation of the occupied territories, Turkey became a co-sponsor ofthe resolutions calling on Israel not to alter the status of Jerusalem and appealing to all ‘countries to assist the Palestine Refugees Agency. Turkey also voted with the Arab countries on resolutions calling ‘on israel to withdraw to the prewar bordersInall ofthe armed clashes that occurred between the ‘Arab countries and Israel following the war, Turkey sided with the Arabs and protested Israel's actions. Although there was a certain stagnation in Turkish- Israclirelations as aesult of the warand subsequent devel- ‘opments, no radical change in these relations took place ‘Turkey gave genetal backing to the Arabs and voted for resolutions condemning Israel, but it did not sever diplo- ‘atic relations, which were maintained at chargé affaires level. The 1967 war gave Turkey the opportunity to display the changes nits perception of the Arab Middle Bast. The 1967 war should be seen notasa time when Turkish-Iseel relations took a turn for the worse but asthe beginning of a period when Turkish-Arab relations started improving, bb. Turkey's Reactions to the Burning of the Masjid alAqsa “Another season for the stagnation in ‘Turkey's relations; ‘with Israel was the fire caused atthe Masjid al-Agse on 21 ‘Auigust 1969. This was a holy site for Mastims, located in Israeli-occupied Fast Jerusalem. “The burning of this mosque sharpened the hostility of the public toward Israel in all Islamic countries. On 22 August Prime Minister Demirel declared that Turkey stood with the other Muslim countries in the face of the disastrous fire at the Masjid al-Agsa. The public reaction had its effect on Turkey's diplomacy. On 28 August 1969 twenty-fire countsica, including Turkey called for en ‘emergency meeting of the Security Council. The council adopted resolution 271 on 1s September, ia which Israel ‘was asked to repeal all measures aimed at changing the status of Jerusalem, ‘Twenty-five countries subsequently decided to hold an Islamic Summit in Rebat, the capital of Morocco. ‘the summit conference washeldon22-25Septemberand con- sidered the issue of the fie, From the mid-1960s on, Tar- key had been pursuing a policy of seeking international support forits Cyprus policies. With the expectation that itcould gain the backing of the Mustim countries, Turkey participated inthe Islamic Summit witha delegation led by Gagleyangil "At the summit; Turkey adopted a position demon- strating that it did not want its relations with Israel, al- ready stagnating becanse of the 1967 war, to deteriorate further, Although Turkey supported the resolution call- ing on Israelto evacuate Fast Jerusalem and the territories ‘occupied after the 1967 was, it stood against the resolu. tion that called on the participants of the summit that hhad recognized Israel to sever diplomatic relations with, ‘that country. In the document adopted at the end of the ‘Relations with the Middle East 483, ‘summit, Gaglayangil inserted a phrase stating that his gor- emment supported the decisions of the summit “to the extent that they were in conformity with the resolutions approved at the UN" (Disileri Bekanls Belletent 60 [Sep tember 19651: 45). This signaled that, although Turkey ‘wanted to have close relations with the Islamic countries, it also wanted to keep its elations with Israel from cooling farther. 2. The Worsening of Relations a. Turkey and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 On 6 October 1973 the Egyptian and Sycian armies launched a surprise attackon Israel. The resulting warand its aftermath led Turkish Lsacli relations, already frayed, to deteriorate further. Asin the 967 way, Turkey declared its neutrality inthe conflict, but in practice it sided with the Arabs. While Turkey prevented the US. froma using, the Incirlik air base to assist Israel, it allowed Soviet air- ‘raft to use its airspace to supply military equipment to the Arab countries engaged in the conflict. The Turkish position was based on the following considerations. ‘As in the 3967 conlct, Ankara expected the Arab countries to reward its pro-Arab stance in this conflict ‘with support for Turkey on the question of Cyprus in in- ternational forums. A second consideration was the joint statement of the Arab countries at the beginning of the ‘war that countries supporting Israe! would be subjected ‘to an oil embargo. Ac a country that procured 707 of te oil from Arab countries, Turkey wanted to insulate its economy from the global sump that such an cil embargo ‘would produce. The third consideration was the close interest ofthe Turkish public in the struggle of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), starting in the fate 1960 to free the Palestinians living under Israeli oceupa- tion. Ihe ‘Turkish government could not ignore the fact that public opinion linked the Arab-Israeli dispute di- rectly with the Palestinian question. ‘After the cease-fire of 27 October, Turkey kept its re- lations with Israel at low level because of the decision of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Counties) at its meeting in Algiers on 26-28 November 1973 to impose an oil embargo on all countries support ing Israel At the meeting it was also decided to.establish ‘a committee consisting ofthe ministers of foreign affairs and pettoleam of the OAPEC members to classify all countries as “friendly” “neutral? and "supporters of the enemy” and treat them accordingly in supplying them with of, “At the meeting of QAPEC in Vienna in March 1974, the oil embargo was lified, but this did not improve484 Section S. 1960-1980: Relative Antonomy—3 ‘Torkey’s relations with Israel. Turkey continued to follow amore pro-Avab Foreign policy. b, Turkey and the PLO ‘One of the reasons for the coolness in Turkish-Israelirela- tions daring the 1970s was the closeness of Turkey's links with the PLO, The first contacts between Turkey and the PLO were established when the organization participated inthe Islamic summit in 969 as an observer. At Rabat in 1o74, the Arab League declared the PLO to be the sole le- gitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This was followed by a similar decision of the Islamic Conference. Finally, on 22 November 1974, the UN General Assembly ‘decided to allow the PLO to participate in the work ofall UN organs as an observer. In parallel with these devel- ‘opments, ‘Turkey changed its cautious approach toward the PLO. Jn January 1975 Ankara announced its recognition of the PLO and established relations with the organization through the Turkish Embassy in Cairo, In August 1975 the chairman of the Political Bureau of the PLO, Faruk Khaddumi, visited Turkey. In the course of the visit, the possibilities for developing relations further were ex plored. ‘Turkey’s improved relations with the PLO troubled Israel, which regarded the PLO as terrorist organization, But Ankara was influenced by the pro-PLO atmosphere prevailing iu he UN General Assembly and was ia uu ‘mood to mend fences with Israel, Ankara went even far ‘her and, on 10 November1975, voted for the resolution in the General Assembly that equated Zionism (the national policy of Israel) with racism. This resolution was to be re- scinded by the General Assembly in 1991. In May 1976 the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affoirs ofthe Islamic countries met in istanbul. On that ‘occasion Ankara announced that the PLO would be al: owed to set up a representative office in Ankara, When the vice-chairman of the Political Bureau of the PLO, Said Kamal, visited Ankara in early 1977, Ankara agreed to grant diplomatic status to the representative of the PLO in Ankara. The representative office of the PLO was of- ficilly opened by the organization's leader, Yasser Arafat, ‘on October 1979, when he came to Ankara upon the in- vitation of prime minister Bilent Ecevit. ‘Meanwhile Turkey followed closely the US. initiative that led to the conclusion of an agreement on x7 Septem- betig78 between Egypt and Israel, following negotiations at Camp David, By this agreement, the two countries reached an understanding on resolving outstanding uestions between them. This was followed by the Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed in Washing- ton on 26 March 1979, which resulted in the establish- ‘ment of diplomatic relations between the former enemies (see Box 7-57 in Section 7). After the signing of the Camp David agreement, the minister of foreign affairs, Gtinditz Okeiin, made a statement on 3 October 1978 in which he said that it was stil too early to make a fll assessment of the event but that a just solution could not be achieved ‘unless Israel pulled back its forces to its pre-1967 border and the PLO was included ina fatare settlement. This was an explicit reaffirmation of Turkey's support for the PLO, ‘After the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, Ankara issued a communiqué in which itdeclared thatthe ‘Middle East question had tobe settied by peaceful means, that peace could come to the region only through a com- prehensive agreement, and that the precondition for this ‘was Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and ‘granting the Palestinians the right to establish their own state. ‘With these statements, Turkey indicated thatit shared sotne of the concerns of the Arab countries other than Fgypt, which claimed that the Camp David and Wash- ington agreements could not, by themselves, solve the Middle East questions, But, unlike these Arab counties, ‘Turkey did not sever its diplomatic links with Egypt for havingmade peace with Israel, Turkey's approach differed from that of the other Arab countries, because Fgypt’s) recugultion uf Tsrael relieved Turkey of the stgaa thac i had carried since 1949 of being the sole Muslim country to recognize Israel. ‘The US. backing for the Egyptian- Israeli peace process also affected Turkey's approach to this issue, During the period from 1960 to 1980, Turkish Israel relations went from stagnation to frostiness, which lasted into the 1980s; bat starting in the early 1990s these rela- tions entered a period of restoration and improvement. (Gaon Estan an One KORKGOOGLU Sources (Relations with Israel) Armaoja, Fair. iit Meee ve Arap ial Savglan i948 1988). and ed, Anleara: Tckiye Ip Barkas Kaltar Yayn- lan, 199 elias, Siba."“Tiskiye ve sri: Mesael Vakaniktan Ste tej Ortakja” Liberal Disine (Winteri999): 138-5 Catan, Henry. Palestine and International Law. Beieat: Long. 10,3973 DapiseriBakanssBlleten!35 (Aug. 1967): 47-49 _Digileri Baanlis Belton 60 (Sept. 3969): 45 Dursun,Davut, Orta Dog Neves. istanbul insans09s.chao, Cam. “Hilal ve Sion Yili Tetra Hihilerinin Dini ve Baginiine Kisa Ble Balog” Mallivebler Big Dergisi 1, no. 202 (Aug-Sept. 1997): 32-38. Gruen, George E."Turkey’s Relations with Isaeland Its Arcb Neighbors” Middle East Review 37 (Spring 98s): 33-43, —. "Turkey's Relations with lal: Brom Ambivalence to ‘Open Cooperation.” In Studies on Turkish Jewish History ced. David. Altabe, Ethan Atay, and Israel Kat pp.ni2- a9, New York: Sepher-Hermon Press 1997. Karaosmanogly Ali ‘A Turkish View of Bilateral Relations ‘with Israel” In Actual Situation and Prospects of Turkeys Relations with Iouel, pp. 1-6, Ankara: Briedrich-Naumann Foundation in Turkey, 992 Keirketiofla, Omer Nishi nin Arap Orta Deja Karg Pot tikes (45-3970). Ankara Seving Matbaasi, 1972. Kt, Sule. “Plistin Soran ve Tiskiye” In Orta Dog Sorular ve Tirkiy, pp. 5-34. Istanbul: Turkiye Sosyal Ekonomi SiyasalArastumalar Val 1991. ‘Nachonaai, Aika, lvael, Tukey and Greece: Uneasy Relations inthe Fastern Mediterranean. London: Frank Cass and ‘Company, 1087. Robbins, Philip, Turkey and the Middle Bast, London: Royal Institute oflaternationa Affairs 5991. Yavuz, M, Hakan, and Mujes R. Khan, “Turkish Foreign Pol- icy toward the Arab-Israeli Confit: Duality andthe De- velopment (1950-3991) Arab Studies Quarterly 4, 20.4 (Pall1g92): 65-95. B. Relations with Iran In the final years ofthe Pahlavi dynasty, Turkish-Irantan relations were in a satisfactory state. The tivo countries ‘were able to maintain generally good relations because both were alles of the US. and both were in the anti ‘Communist camp. Despite this, five basic questions re ‘mained unresolved and kept relations from developing beyond a certain point. During this period these ques tions constituted the agenda of Turkish Irenian relations, and much time was spentin trying to resolve them. These issues are discussed here according to their order of im- portance. 1. Iran's support for dissident Kurdish. groups in Iraq: when Turkey made the decision in the 1960s to re- lax its tough policy line toward its Arab neighbors, Iran ‘was shifting to policy of confrontation with Lag Just as ‘Turkish-Iragi relations started improving, Tregitranian relations deteriorated, ‘This discordance led the shah to lookupon Turkey with suspicion, Bat twas really Turkey that had reason to be suspicious, Turkey informed ‘Teh san thatitt considezed the shah’s policy of supporting and, even instigating the Iraqi Kurds in their efforts to set up Relations with the Middle East 485, autonomous structures tobe dangerous from the point of ‘view of regional stability, but tono aval ‘Actually, Turkey's concerns went beyond the worry that a Kurdish federated state in Iraq would constitute an undesirable precedent for its own Kurdish population. The shah was pursuing a general policy of “Persfiation” in his own country and was aspiring to be the protector cofthose with Persian rootsin the Middle East. According to the shah, the Kurds were Persians who spoke a diffe ‘ent dialect. This implied that he could claim the “right” to support Turkish Kards just as he supported Iraqi Kurds. In fact, Turkey had some reasons to believe thatthe shah ‘was alzeady using this “right,” especially inthe frst half of the 1970s. For this reason, Turkey became uncomfortable ‘when the shah traveled to Turkey in an aircraft named Kurdistan, even though it was considered quite natural inkrn. ‘To overcome the differences arising from the shah’s Kurdish policies and Turkey’ efforts to achiewe a rap- prochement with Iraq, President Sunay undertook his first foreign visit to Iran in October 1966. Prime Minister Demirel subsequently went to Iran in May 1967 to convey ‘Turkey's good wishes. At. time when the northern Iraq «question was most acute, in 973, theshah came to Turkey to discuss the effects ofthe Ramadan War on the regional balance of power. Two years later, President Korutiik returned this visit, As a result of these visit, the mutual suspicion in both counmies was abated but never fly climinated. The 197s Algiers Agreement played an impor- tant ole in improving not just Iran-Iraq relations bat also ‘Turkish Iranian relations, 2, Iran’s role as regional policeman: starting in the early 19605, the shah established the objective for Iran to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and started to establish Iran’sinfluence in theregion. Support Jing the Kurds in frag was part ofthis plan. “This wasin conformity with tie Nixon Doctrine. Ua. tilthe first oll eisisin 1973, however, the shah did not have the resources necessary to achieve his objective. When the hike in oil prices provided him with the needed re- sources, the shah extended his goals and decided that Iran ‘would become the regional superpower. For this, he un- dertook a rapid rearmament program and launched vast infrastructare projects ‘At the time when the shah was undertaking these grandiose plans, Turkey was coping with extreme difficul- ties Its armiy was losing strength because ofthe US. arms ‘embargo, and its economy was in a chronic state of esis. “The balance between Iran and Turkey was tilting rapidly in Iran’ favor. When the shah paid a visit to Ankara in486 Section 5, 1960-1980: Relative Autonomy—3 October 97s to participatein the Republic Day festivities, ‘Turkey’ expectations of Iranian loans and oil sales with deferred payments remained unfalilled. Although Ankara was satisfied with the outcome of the Algicrs Agreement of 1975, it continued to be uneasy about lrar’s role as regional policeman, which prevented bilateral relations from developing to their fall potential 1n1978 street riots broke out in both Iran and Turkey. While the extremist and marginal groups were demon- stratingand taking over the streets in Turkey, large masses dominated Iranian streets. This situation led the US. to ‘change its policies in favor of Turkey and to lift the arms embargo. Tuskey had responded to the embargo by clos- ‘ing US. installations in Turkey, and the US. had tried to ‘compensate for this by seiting up similar installations on Iran's Caspian Coast. But developments demonstrated that there were no satisfactory alternatives to installations located on Turkish soil. As Iran’ relations with the US. ‘went from bad to worse during the 1980s, Turkey's stand- ingin the US. was steadily rising ‘The shah left Iran in January 1979, never to return, “This began a new era in Turkish Iranian relations 3. Ihe impression that CENTO was not adequate to eet the Soviet threat: in the 1960s a series of meetings took placein orderto erase the sbabis impression that Tur- key did not attach the necessary importnce to CENTO. Jn 1961 Turkey informed Iran that it haq no forces aval able to allocate to CEN'LO because al pt its units were under NATO command, Ankara insisted that this did not weaken CENTO, however, since the two alliances shared the same objective of checking communism and that the ‘Turkish command structure was also able to carry out joint activities within CENTO. In 1962 the minister of foreign affairs, F.C. Frkin, took up the issue of CENTO once again in ‘Tehran, That year the shah traveled to An- kara to discuss the issue with president Cemal Giirsel Despite these contacts, the shah remained unpersuaded. His misgivings about CENTO were not confined to Tar keey’s contribution to the alliance. He also complained about the inadequacy of US. military ad to Iran. The shh ‘was convinced that the US. preferred Turkey to Tran as a partner, “the military adequacy of CENTO was not a topical issue anymore in the second half of the 1960s, because both Turkeyand Iran were busy trying to develop theirre- lations with the USSR. As relations with the Soviets mel lowed, the military dimension of CENTO was pushed into the background, and the economic and cultural di. mension ofthe organization came tothe fore. 4 Ihe discord between democracy and monarchy: the ‘Turkish public became much more sensitive about freedom after the coup of 27 May 1960. The authoritarian nature of the Trenian regime, which had been ignored in the past, now came under critica scrutiny in the Turkish press. In particular the brutal suppression of protest dem- constrations by the Iranian police after the White Revo: Ttion (Box s-18) caused anger in Turkey. The anti-shah propaganda of Iranian exiles living in Trkey, including Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who lived for 2 while in Bursa) as well as Iranian students in Turkish universities, seriously damaged the shabis image. “The frst hitch in bilateral relations occurred at the inaugural session of the TGNA in November 96s when Iranian students carried out a demonstration against the shah, The shah asked Turkey to punish the demonstra- tions severely, but Ankara refased to comply, reminding him that the Turkish judiciary was independent and could notbe given instructions. In 1966 the Turkish Labor Party gave its support to Iranian students in Turkey that Tehran wanted to have deported back to Iran. ‘The matter was ‘brought to the attention of parliament by Cetin Altan, a depaty of the Labor Party. As opposition to the shah grew in his own country, 0 too did the criticism in Turkey directed at the Pahlavi dynasty. When the monarchy finally collapsed in. 1976, the revolution enjoyed a great deal of sympathy among the ‘Turkish public. '.'Ihe tailure of economic cooperation to yield tan- gible results: as the economic and cultural dimensions of CENTO gained in importance, became apparent that a new organization to cater to these needs would be desir- ble, Also, mainly in response to Pakistans request for an economic and caltural organization free from any need for nonregional countries, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan es- tablished the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in Istanbul on 2 July 964, The new oxganization ‘would have its headquarters in ‘Tehran and would seek to accelerate economic development by engaging in coop- eration in the fields of communications, transport, trade, petroleum production, tourism, banking, insurance, and ‘culture, After this, RCD would displace CENTO as the Principal vehicle for cooperation among the thrce re- ‘gional countries until it was superseded by the Economic ‘Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 198s Although RCD brought the three countries closer in their cultural contacts and helped develop transport and communications, their trade volume did not grow signif cantly. After the oil crisis, this situation caused vexation in Turkey, because the rise in ol prices led to a growing imbalance ints trade with Iran. Turkey was not receivingBox 5:18, Iran's Islamic Revolution “Thebase reason forthe amie Revolution was the sha’ attempt to wansform Han into nationstate under the protection of a U.S umbels. The shah felt that he would have trouble attaining bis goal Fst, the business community ofshopkeepersmerchanis (rien as the bazaar) and the lige landovining dass wre de termining forces in the economic ie ofthe county. Seco, the Shite de'oy representing these ive ecenoric groups, wielded ‘reat scl! authori. So he stared of by eliminating these to conoymie groups and te She cy. Hs fest radical step fn this ‘tection was the White Revolution of 1962, iuhen he launehed 2 land reform prograin. Through this reform, the shah sought to direc the age landowrer into agibusiness and manafatuis, “his woul tam rans agriculture economy Into a capitals stuc- ‘ulm which th commerce ands bourgeoe woul be dominant. Al ihe same time, the lds contrled Ly¢-the shite ‘ergy ould be distribute, ius dealing abiow to both tel eco noc independence and the standing In soy, “The shah alto saw the baozare as an impede 10 Ns ratlon-bllcing plans ar sought to eliminate ths group by er ‘couraging Tofelgn investments, He refused totake prtectioict reese in favor of the bazaars, On the contra, he rested any contracts for the multitude of construction works in progress in Iran; nor was there much Iranian investment flowing into Turkey. Daring the second half of the 19708 the “eternal friendship” of former times had pretty mach, ‘evaporated, and Turks complained that economic rela- tions were stagnating, Turkish-Iranian trade would only reach satisfactory levels after the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, The Islamic Republic At fist the declaration of the Republic in Iran was well received in Tarkey, although Ankara later would have second thoughts. Turkey formally recognized the new regime on 13 February 1979, only two days after regime change had taken place, while the Republic was declared in April Turkey was well disposed toward the new re- site, in the expectation that the problems encountered ‘with Shah M, Reza would be surmounted in the new era ‘Ankara had been concerned about the shahis policies to- ‘ward the Kurds of the Middle Bast and was relieved that the nationalist ideology ofthe Pahlavi dynasty had come toan end, Furthermore, the CHP government in power at the time and its leader, Bilent Ecevit, did not approve of the shahis undemocraticregime and its disdain for human rights. Ifanother party, such asthe Justice Party, had been in power in Turkey at the time, it would not have looked with as much sympathy on the overthrow of the shah ‘tacks of Intimidation harassment in erder to break ther” pendent owvanizations. = poles al in February i979 Relations with the Middie Bast 487 owes By breaking the back ofthe bazaars, ‘cut off the funds tha owed fo hen fo “Toward te en the moaer/baugea totake shape a8 cong, ‘ot aka turned galt u Final the growing narbers of ‘opposition, Because the shalt he whe linha pe oC < roe aT oe i een vast amour fal enue th eae aueuion Tear Cee oe nrere Stren cis i esr “The steal undertaken By he Staged Wo ata Bs oe on ad ae i i ea NE ‘ese o/h Nee MEE opiate she ae, repeal 300 through a populae uprising, given that he was a loyal ally ofthe US. and a totally cojnmitted anti-Communist. ‘Thenewregime in Irap was determined to getrid ofall dts Western entanglemenfs. The provisional government sn Tehran anounced tras withdrawal eon CENVTO on March 1974. Because CENTO could not survive geopo- Iitically without Iran, Pakistan announced its withdrawal fon 12 March, followed by Turkey's announcement on 16 ‘Macch. This development did not disturb Turkey much, because it sought economic and not military coopera: tion with Iran, Although Iran was leaving CENTO, itan- nounced that it would continue its membership in RCD. “This was enough to satisfy Turkey. “Turkey looked upon the new anti-Western regime in Ian very favorably. In June 1979 the minister of foreign af fairs, Giindiz Olin, pid an offical visit, during which an oil:purchasing agreement was concluded and, more significantly, the charismatic leader of the Islamic Revola- tion, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, met with Olin, An- other significant aspect of Oligin’ visit was that he also ‘met with Ayatollah Mohammad Kezem Sharistmadat, ‘who opposed the Iranian leadership and whose followers consisted slmostentiely of Azerbaijani This visi stirred Tanian apprchension that henceforth Tuckey might sup- port Azerbaijani nationalism in its dealings with Tehran. -Byon as the straggle against pro-shah elements raged on inthe streets, Khomeini’ backers attacked and attempted488 Section 5, 1960~1980:Relative Antonomy—3 to burn down the Turkish Consulate General in Tabriz, in the fear that Turkey might wield too much influence in Iranian Azerbaijan and might decide to support Shariat- mada. ‘The early cordial relations were soon marred in No- ‘vember 1979, when the CHP government resigned and ‘was replaced by the JP gavernmentled by. Demirel. This coincided with the occupation of the American Embassy in Teban by Iranian militants. Embassy personnel and US. citizens were taken hostage by the militants, consist- ing mostly of university students, and the hostage crisis, which was to last for a4 days, got underway. Demirel «qualified this action as an “inhuman event rarely seen in ‘history” (Cetinsaya, p. 150). Khomeini replied that “the Ankara goverment, like the former shah, could only ‘maintain itself in power at the point of a bayonet” This started a verbal duel that would bea featare ofthe Tuskish- Iranian relations fora while. “The worsening of relations was not only due to the differing views of the CHD and the JP regarding the Ira- rian regime, The real reason was that it soon became ap- parent that the new regime was not about to meet the ex: pectations or hopes that were aroused in Turkey by the Islamic Revolution. At atime when Turkey continued to suffer from the ol crisis, however, Ankara stillentertained some hopes of economic beneiits from its relations with Iran. Iherefore the JP goverament did not want to alien- ate the new regime too much. ‘Ube U.S. was informed that tie bases in Turkey could not be used to carry out an op- csation against han. Nor would Turkey participate in the US. sanctions imposed on Iran, Aslran and Turkey entered the 1980s, theirmain con- cern was to achieve internal stability. The coup of 12 Sep- tember 1980 in Turkey purportedly aimed to accomplish this objective, ut it could have marred relations. ‘The lea nian regime was convinced that the CIA was behind the ‘coup and looked askance at the Kemalist tone of the mili tary leaders who took over the administration, ‘The coup, however, did not wreck the bilateral relations; on the con: trary, they improved after 12 September. ‘The reason was the Iragi aggression against an, which occurred ten days after 12 September. It was clear that this would be along ‘war of triton. In October Turkey declared its neutrality. ‘The economicreform package of4 January 980 required ‘Turkey to find new export markets, and the Iran-Iraq War presented many opportunities in this area. Aray AKDEVELIOGLU AND Omer KORKG0OGLU Sources (Relations with Iran} ‘An, Tayyae Basa Kev ve Ortadagulda Gis Denget78-96 anded, fstanbil: Alf, 2996 Armaogl, Fait 20, Wet Siyast Tah o1480. 4th ed. An ara: Tuckiye ls Bankasy, 1987 30. Weyl Siyast Terk, g14-g0 (C.1 1980-90). 32d ed. Ankara: Tiki i Banks, 199 Boliknagy, Sta Trkiye ve Yaka Orta Doga. Ankaca: Dig Politika Ents nd Getinsaya, Goan “Tirk-tranlligkler.” In Trk Di Poti son Anal, ed. Farck Sénmezoglu, pp. 135-58. 204 ed ‘seanbul: Der 2698 Fiat, Melek. "iran slim Devrimi ve Trk-lran lier (1979 87)! Postgraduate thesis, Ankara Universite Sosyal Bil {mer Enstits6, 198. Gift, William .“Ian’s Foreign Policyin the Pablavi "In ‘ironunder the Pahlavi ed. 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