CHAPTER THREE

FIXTURES

3.0 Introduction
From the legal point of view, land means not only the ground but also the
subsoil and all structures and objects such as buildings, trees and minerals
standing or lying beneath it. This concept of land is often expressed in the
Latin maxim “quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit,” (whatever is annexed to
the land becomes part of the land). A fixture is therefore a chattel or object
that has become so affixed or attached to land so as to become part of the
land. If a chattel has not become a fixture, it is known as a fitting.

3.1 Fixture or Fitting?

Disputes may arise as to whether a chattel or object has become a fixture
or not. Once a chattel has become a fixture or part of the land it cannot
generally be removed. Burn has observed that the question whether a
chattel remains a chattel or has become part of the land can arise in many
contexts1, including; whether it passes to a purchaser on the sale of land 2,
whether it is included as part of the security on the mortgage of land, 3
whether it is owned by the estate of a tenant for life or passes to the
remainderman4, whether it passes on death as realty or personalty5.
In order to resolve such types of disputes there are tests that have been
formulated to determine whether a chattel has become a fixture or not.

3.2 Tests for Determining Whether a Chattel Has Become a Fixture

In determining whether a chattel has become a fixture, a combination of

two tests is applied; viz:

(a) the degree of annexation; and

(b) the purpose of annexation.

1
Burn, E, H, Maudsley and Burn’s land law-cases and materials, 5th ed, London, Butterworths, 1986 P.
89.
2
Philips v Lamdin [1949] 2 KB 33, [1949] 1 ALL 770 (Purchaser entitled to reinstatement of Adam door
removed by vendor).
3
Lyon and Co. v London City and Midland Bank [1903] 2KB 135 (Tip up seats screwed to bolts
fastened
to floor and hired to mortgagors were held to be chattels). In Vaudeville Electric Cinema Ltd v Muriset
[1923] 2 CH 74, similar seats owned by mortgagor held to be land, Reynolds v Ashyby and Sons [1904]
Ac 466, Machine bolted to the floor held to be land.
4
Re Lord Chesterfield’s settled estates [1911] 1 ch 237; Leigh v Taylor [1902] AC 157 (tapestries
stretched over canvas and tacked thereto held to remain chattels)
5
Re, Whaley [1908] 1 CH 615 (pictures and tapestries in dining room designed as a ‘complete
specimen of
Elizabeth dwelling house’ passed under devise of house and not under bequest of chattels.

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3.2.1 The Degree of Annexation

Early law attached great importance to this test. In general, for an article
to be considered a fixture, some substantial connection with the land or a
building on it must be shown6. Unless actually fastened or connected with
the land or building in a substantial way, a chattel cannot normally
become a fixture under the degree of annexation test. A test often applied
is whether the item can be removed without causing damage or injury to
land. Where the chattel merely rests of its own weight on the land, it is
not, prima facie, a fixture.7 However, this may be rebutted when it is clear
that the object was intended as a permanent improvement of the land.
The more securely an object is affixed and the more damage that would be
caused by its removal, the more likely it is that the object was intended to
form a permanent part of the land.8

3.2.2 The Purpose of Annexation

Where the purpose of attaching a chattel is to permanently improve the

land, rather than merely to display the chattel, then a fixture is presumed.
In order to determine the purpose of annexation, the question to be asked
is, “was the intention to effect a permanent improvement of the land or building
as such; or was it merely to effect a temporary improvement or to enjoy a chattel
as a chattel?9” If the intention was to effect a permanent improvement to
the land, then the chattel is a fixture. On the other hand, if the intention
was merely to effect a temporary improvement then the chattel is a fitting.
Even if the degree of attachment is substantial, an object or chattel may
not become a fixture if the method of fixing was necessary for its proper
enjoyment.10 In Vaudeville Electric Cinema Co. Ltd. v Muriset 11, cinema
seats secured to the ground were held to be fixtures. Objects such as
statues, seats, and ornamental vases have been held to be fixtures even
though they were only held in position by their own weight, the reason
being that they formed part of the architectural design of a house or
grounds12

3.3 Common Law Exceptions

6
Hayton,D, megarry’s manual of the law of real property 6th ed, London, ELBS, 1982, p.19.
7
Hulme v Brigham [1943] 1 ALL ER 204, [1943] 1 KB 152.
8
Spyer v Phillipson [1931] 2 CH 183 at pp 209, 210.
9
Hellawell Vs Eastwood [1851] 6 ExCh 295 at 312.
10
Leigh v Taylor [1902] A C 157 -Tapestries affixed by nails and tacks were not fixtures.
11
[1923] 2 CH 74.
12
Re Whaley [1908] 1 Ch 615.

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 As a general rule, if a chattel constitutes a fixture it cannot be removed
from the land since it is part of the land. There are, however, certain
limited exceptions to this rule discussed below.

(a) Landlord and Tenant

A tenant may remove certain ‘tenant’s fixtures’ during the lease or within
a reasonable time there after. These include:

(i) Trade fixtures – Fixtures attached to land by a tenant for the

purpose of carrying on a trade or business are at Common
Law removable by the tenant at any time during the course
of the lease or shortly thereafter. In Smith V City Petroleum
Company Limited,13 it was held that petrol pumps affixed to
tanks embedded in the ground were tenant’s fixtures, and
were removable within a reasonable time after the
determination of the term and if not so removed, the
property in the pump passed on to the landlord, and a
subsequent tenant takes no interest in them. In this case
since the tenant did not remove the petrol pumps within a
reasonable time after the determination of the lease, they
became the property of the landlord.

(ii) Ornamental and domestic fixtures – A tenant may, during

the term of the lease, remove chattels he has fixed to the
house for the purpose of ornamental or domestic use. These
are chattels that can be removed without causing substantial
damage to the building.14

A mortgagor cannot remove fixtures during the course of the mortgage. 15

As for fixtures attached by the mortgagor after the date of the mortgage,
the mortgagor is not entitled to remove them.16
All fixtures attached to the land at the time of the contract of sale must be
left for the purchaser unless otherwise agreed.17

3.4 Case Law

13
[1940] 1 ALL ER 260.
14
Hayton, D, supra note 6 at p. 21.
15
Monti V Barnes [1901] I QB 205.
16
Reynolds V Ashby and Son [1904] AC 466.
17
Philips V Lamdin [1949] 1 ALL ER 770.

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(a) Fixtures – Tests for determining whether Chattel has become a fixture.

Leigh and Others Vs Taylor and Others [1902] AC 154 [HL]

Valuable tapestries were affixed by a tenant for life to the walls of a house for the purpose of ornament and better
enjoyment of them as chattels. They could be removed without doing any structural injury. On the death of a tenant for
life, a dispute arose between the estate of the tenant for life and those representing the remainderman on whether the
tapestries had become part of the house or were chattels to the estate of the tenant for life.
It was held that the tapestries put up for ornamental purpose and attached in the said manner did not pass with the
freehold to the remainderman, but formed part of the personal estate of the tenant for life, and were removable by her
executor. In delivering the Judgement, the Lord Chancelor [Earl Of Halsbury] discussed the two tests for determining
whether the chattel or object has become a fixture or not. His Lordship emphasized the point that the question is really
one of fact taking into account the changed mode of life. The case is excerpted below.
EARL OF HALSBURY L.C. My Lords, in this case we have had a long and learned argument by the two learned
counsel who have appeared for the appellants. I am not certain that I quite understand the conflict between the two'
propositions, or that I quite understand on what principle one is supposed to decide these cases apart from the facts of
each particular case.
One principle, I think, has been established from the earliest period of the law down to the present time, namely, that if
something has been made part of the house it must necessarily go to the heir, because the house goes to the heir and
it is part of the house. That seems logical enough. Another principle appears to be equally clear, namely, that where it
is something which, although it may be attached in some form or another (I will say a word in a moment about the
degree of attachment) to the walls of the house, yet, having regard to the nature of the thing itself, and the purpose of
its being placed there, is not intended to form part of the realty, but is only a mode of enjoyment of the thing while the
person is temporarily there, and is there for the purpose of his or her enjoyment, then it is removable and goes to the
executor.
My Lords, we have heard something about a suggested alteration of the law; but those two principles appear to have
been established from the earliest times, and they are principles .still in force. But the moment one comes to deal with
the facts of each particular case, I quite agree that something has changed very much: I suspect it is not the law or any
principle of law, but it is a change in the mode of life, the degree in which certain things have seemed susceptible of
being put up as mere ornament were as at an earlier period the ruder construction made it impossible sometimes to
sever the thing which was put up from the realty. If that is true, it is manifest that you can lay down no rule which will in
itself solve the question; you must apply yourself to the facts of each particular case; and I am content here to apply
myself to the facts of this case. Here are tapestries which, it is admitted are worth a great deal of money. I put the
case: suppose this had been a tenant from year to year, and she put up these things, is it conceivable that a person
would for the purpose of a tenancy from year to year put up these things exactly in this way if thereby they made a
present of 7000l. to the landlord? That I observe, startled Mr. Levett; he would not acquiesce in that; but logic I am
unable to sever the two sets of facts which I suggest. It is all very well to say that there is a difference between the
cases of an heir and executor on the one hand and a land lord and tenant on the other; but if you grant the proposition
that it must depend upon the purpose of the annexation, and you must attend to the degree of annexation. I am wholly
unable to frame a hypothesis of a state of things in which these two principles will not decide the question, whether you
are dealing with a landlord and tenant, or whether you are dealing with a tenant for life and a remainder man, or with
people standing in any other relation to theses things. In this case Madame de Falbe stood as a tenant for life to the
remainder man.
My Lords, we come then, in my view, to the determination of the question upon the principles I have pointed out,
applying them to the particular facts of this case. What are they?
Here we have of ornamentation of very great value. Undoubtedly their only function in life, if it may be so called, is the
decoration of a room. Suppose the person had intended to remove them the next month or the next year or what not, I
do not know, notwithstanding the ingenious effort that has been made by Mr Levtett, in what other way they could have
been fastened than they were. We have seen the hard match-board to which they were fastened in the first instance;
then canvas was stretched on it, and the decoration of the wall as it originally stood was perfectly preserved except to
the extent to which the nails were driven into the wall, because otherwise the tapestry could not have been stretched
out firm, as it was. I do not know any other mode by which the large one, for example, fourteen feet long, could have
been placed there as it was. One has immediately before one’s mind’s eye cases of pictures of another sort, after all,
although this tapestry is very valuable, as I understand, and very beautiful, it is only a picture made in a particular form-
it is a picture whether woven or worked or what not, made for the purpose of ornamentation. When one looks at it sees
what it is, I should have thought, if ever there was an extreme case in which it would have been impossible to suppose

46
that the person intended to dedicate it to the house, it was the case of these tapestries, which can be, and in fact have
been, removed without anything but the most trifling disturbance of the material of the wall.
Under these circumstances I can entertain no doubt, now that we have had the whole case before us, that there is
nothing which points to any intention to dedicate these tapestries to the house. There is nothing in the nature of the
attachment which is necessarily permanent. My Lords, a number of words have been used, such as “only very slightly
attached” and “not permanently attached.” They really often assume the very question in debate. Looking at the piece
of boarding on which the canvas was stretched and on which this tapestry went, I can hardly imagine how a piece of
tapestry of that extent, fourteen feet long, stretched against a wall, could be more slightly attached than this was.
Under those circumstances it appears to me that the thing is so easily susceptible of being removed, and has infact
been removed, without any damage or material injury to the structure of the wall, that to my mind, so far as it is
dependent upon a question of fact, it never was intended to form part of the structures of this house; and that, after all,
is what the meaning of “the benefit of the inheritance” comes to, though expressed in different words. It never was
intended to remain a part of the house; the contrary is evident from the very nature of the attachment, the extent and
degree of which was as slight as the nature of the thing attached would admit of. Therefore, I come to the conclusion
that this thing, put up for ornamentation and for the enjoyment of the person while occupying the house, is not under
such circumstances as these part of the house. That is the problem one has to solve in each of these cases. If it is not
part of the house, it falls under the rule now laid down for some centuries that it is a sort of ornamental fixture, and can
be removed by whoever has the right to the chattel- whose it was when it was originally put up.
My Lords, for these reasons I am of the opinion that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
I only wish to say that I do not want to add to the confusion which is suggested to have caused by differences of
opinion among the learned judges below. My own view is that, going back for some centuries, the real differences of
opinion, which apparently on the surface have been entertained by different judges, have not been at bottom
differences in the law at all, but the facts have been regarded in different aspects according to the fashion of the times,
the mode of ornamentation, and the mode in which houses were built and the degree of attachment which from time to
time became necessary or not according to the nature of the structure which was being dealt with. The principle
appears to me to be the same today as it was in the early times, and the broad principle is that, unless it has become
part of the house in any intelligible sense, it is not a thing which passes to the air. I’m of opinion that this tapestry has
not become part of the house, and was never intended in any way to become part of the house and I am, therefore of
opinion that this appeal ought to be dismissed with costs, and I move your Lordships accordingly.

(b) Fixtures- “quicquid Plantatur solo,solo cedit” – Whatever is attached or annexed to land has become part of
the land”

Namung'andu V. Lusaka City Council (1978) ZR 358 [HC]

The plaintiff erected a building on land belonging to the defendant. He had no permission to do so. The defendants
demolished the building as result of which electrical fittings, roofing sheets, window frames, electric bulbs, doors and
door frames were destroyed with the rest of the building. The plaintiff claimed damages for the value of the building
but abandoned this claim during the trial and proceeded solely with a claim for the value of the items mentioned.

NGULUBE, High Court Commissioner [as he then was],…The plaintiff having abandoned any claims asserting
proprietary rights or any rights under any permission or licence appears to base his remaining claim for failure by the
defendant to account for his goods on the basis of neglect. I can see no other basis other than an implied assertion
that the defendants were under a common law duty which they owed to the plaintiff to salvage and return to him the
various goods already referred to. The success or otherwise of this claim depends on what the legal position is in
relation to those goods.

The plaintiff does not now complain against the actual demolition. Indeed, he cannot complain about the demolition.
The evidence from the defendants themselves was that certain items are normally removed carefully and given to the
squatter. I have already said that on the facts, I believe the defendants' version which was that the plaintiff's wife and
workers had in fact been called in at the demolition. It was their duty to take the items in respect of which the plaintiff
complains.

47
If, for the sake of argument, the position was that the plaintiff's wife and workers had not in fact been called in, I would
nevertheless not hold that the practice which the defendants had evolved of rescuing certain parts of the houses being
demolished created any legal obligations on their part to do so.

Common sense demands that when notice is given of an impending demolition, it is the owner of the structure who
should take it upon himself to salvage those building materials which can be salvaged. As long as the defendants had
the right to demolish the house, they were entitled to demolish every component of such house. I can find no legal
authority for the proposition that they should and are obliged to salvage any part of the structure. The plaintiff can
therefore only succeed if the goods in question are moveable chattels in the house which are not in fact part of such
house, i.e. fixtures.

Learned counsel for the defendant has referred me to a number of authorities. These include Billing v Pill18 where Lord
Goddard posed the question, "what is a fixture?" He then said:

“First, the commonest fixture is a house. A house is built into the land, so the house, in law is
regarded as part of the land; the house and the land are one thing. Anything which is an integral
part of the house, such as for instance, lead pipes, will also be a fixture and will be attached to or
form part of the land.”

Lord Goddard in that case goes on to consider many more aspects of the question. The gravamen of his
argumentation and this is the correct legal position, that whatever has been built into a house with a view that it should
be permanently annexed thereto and be an integral part of the unexhausted improvements, becomes part of the house
and in turn part of the land. The electric appliances, doors, door frames, roofing sheets, bulbs and window frames
which the plaintiff contended were already a part of the completed house, were fixtures. Even, therefore, without
debating whether the roof was on or not, on the plaintiff's own evidence, I would find that these were all fixtures. As
there is no obligation to dismantle a house carefully when an owner of land is carrying out a lawful demolition, there is
no obligation to rescue any fixtures. The maxim quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit remains true to this day. The
plaintiff must fail even on this claim restricted to the goods.

(c) Tests for determining whether a chattel or object has become a fixture.

Berkley V Poulett (1976) 241 Estates Gazzette 911, 242 Estates Gazette 39 (CA, Stamp, Scarman and Goff) Ljj)

The eighth Earl Poulett agreed to sell the Hinton St. George Estate to Effold Ltd, and Effold Ltd agreed, as Earl Poulett
knew, to sell Lot 1 which included the mansion house to the plaintiff. The properties were duly conveyed. Prior to the
conveyance to Effold Ltd , the Earl removed a number of treasures from the house and sold them. Effold Ltd was
unconcerned; but the plaintiff claimed that, by virtue of the sub-contract between himself and Effold Ltd, he became the
owner of the treasures.
The treasures in question were -
(i) a number of pictures which, while still in their frames, had been
affixed by screws into the recesses in the paneling of the dining room
(ii) a white marble statue of a Greek athlete, weighing half a ton and a sundial; each resting by its own weight on a
plinth or pedestal outside the house.
The plaintiff claimed that these treasures were fixtures. The further question whether, assuming they were fixtures, the
plaintiff was entitled to them by virtue of this sub-contract, is omitted here.
Held: The treasures were not fixtures.
SCARMAN LJ: As so often, the difficulty is not the formulation but the application of the law. I think there is no need to
enter into research into the case law prior to Leigh v Taylor19. The answer today to the question whether objects which
were originally chattels have become fixtures, that is to say part of the freehold, depends upon the application of two
tests: (1) the method and degree of annexation,- (2) the object and purpose of the annexation- The early law attached
great importance to the first test. It proved harsh and unjust both to limited owners who had affixed valuable chattels
of their own to settled land and to tenants for years. The second test was evolved to take care primarily of the limited

18
[1953] 2 ALL ER 1061 at p. 1063.
19
[1902] AC 157.

48
 owner, for example a tenant for life. In Leigh v Taylor the House of Lords invoked it to protect the interest of the tenant
for life who had affixed large and valuable tapestries to the walls of the house for the purpose of adornment and
enjoyment of them as tapestries, as I read that decision , it was held that she had not made them fixtures. “They
remained chattels from first to last," said Lord Lindley at p. 164 of the report. In the law of landlord and tenant the
law's protection went further: even if the chattel affixed by the tenant must be held to have become a fixture, that is to
say part of the realty, a rule was evolved that it was to be treated as the property of the tenant and could be removed
by him if it fell into a class recognised by law as "tenants” fixtures. That is to say if it be a trade, agricultural, or an
ornamental fixture We are not concerned, on the view I take of the case, with "tenant's fixtures." The governing
relationship with which this case is concerned is that of a beneficial owner of the legal estate selling the freehold to a
purchaser. Such a seller can sell as much or as little of his property as he chooses. Lord Poulett excluded certain
named objects from the sale, but the contract was silent as to the objects claimed by the plaintiff. I think it was
conceded by the defendants - certainly I so read the contract of sale - that, if the pictures, statue, and sundial were
fixtures at the time of the contract, they were included in it as Part of the freehold (subject of course to a valuation if
they should prove to be tenant's fixtures). The preliminary, and basic question is therefore, whether these objects
were at that time fixtures, Since Leigh v Taylor the question is really one of fact. The two tests were explained in that
case by the Lord Chancellor (see the report at 158 and 159), who commented that not the law but our mode of life has
changed over the years; that what has changed is "the degree in which certain things have seemed susceptible of
being put up as mere ornaments whereas at our earlier period the mere construction rendered it impossible
sometimes to sever the thing which was put up from the realty." In other words, a degree of annexation which in
earlier times the law would have treated as conclusive may now prove nothing. If the purpose of the annexation be for
the better enjoyment of the object itself, it may remain a chattel, notwithstanding a high degree of physical annexation.
Clearly, however, it remains significant to discover the extent of physical disturbance of the building or the land
involved in the removal of the object. If an object cannot be removed without serious damage to, or destruction of,
some part of the realty, the case for its having become a fixture is a strong one. The relationship of the two tests to
each other requires consideration. If there is no physical annexation there is no fixture, Quic quid plantatur solo solo
cedit. Nevertheless an object, resting on the ground by its own weight alone, can be a fixture, if it be so heavy that
there is no need to tie it into a foundation, and if it were put in place to improve the realty. Prima facie, however, an
object resting on the ground by its own weight alone is not a fixture: see Megary and Wade P.716. Conversely, an
object affixed to realty but capable of being removed without much difficulty may yet be a fixture, if, for example, the
purpose of: its affixing be that of creating a beautiful room as a whole" (Neville J in Re Whaley [1908] 1 Ch 615 at
619). And in the famous instance of Lord Chesterfield's Settled Estates [1911] 1 Ch 237 Grinling Gibbons carvings,
which had been affixed to a suite of rooms 200 years earlier, were held to be fixtures. Today so great are the technical
skills of affixing and removing objects to land or buildings that the second test is more likely than the first to be
decisive. Perhaps the enduring significance of the first test is a reminder that there must be some degree of' physical
annexation before a chattel can be treated as part of the realty, The 7th Earl decided in the early part of the 20th
century to install in the two rooms the panelling and so designed it that there were recesses for pictures. It is this
feature which lends plausibility to the suggestion that the pictures, fitted into the recesses left for them, were not to be
enjoyed as objects in themselves but as Part of the grand architectural design of the two rooms. The Vice-Chancellor
rejected this view. So do I When the panelling was installed in the two rooms the design was either panelled walls with
recesses for pictures to be enjoyed as pictures, or rooms having walls which were a composite of panelling and
pictures: in other words, the pictures were to be part of a composite mural. I think the former was the truth. The
panelling was Victorian, the pictures a heterogeneous collection. According to Sothwbys' expert they were of different
dates in the 17th and l8th centuries, of different styles, by different hands, the sort of set anyone could put together at
any time, very different, I would comment, from that unity of design, the "Elizabethan Room" in the case of Re
Whaley. There was a particular Poulett family interest in "The Return" and in the two coronation portraits but this
interest focused attention not on the design of the room but on the pictures themselves. Notwithstanding the
painstaking and attractive arguments of Mr. Millett for the plaintiff, I find, applying the second test, that the pictures
were not fixtures. They were put in place on the wall to be enjoyed as pictures. The panelling presented a technical
problem in putting them up The way the carpenter, or whoever it was, solved the problem is not Decisive in
determining their legal character. But the purpose in putting them there is.
The statue and the sundial give rise in my judgment to no difficulty neither was at the time of the sale physically
attached to the realty. The sundial was a small object and, once the Earl had detached it (as he did years earlier) from
its pedestal, it ceased to be part of the realty. The statute was heavy. It weighed 10 cwt and stood 5 ft 7 in high on its
plinth.
There is an issue as to whether it was cemented into the plinth or rested on its weight. The question is not decisive,
for, even if it was attached by a cement bond, it was (as events proved) easily removable. However upon the balance

49
of probability, I agree with the Vice-Chancellor in thinking it was not attached. The best argument for the statue being a
fixture was its careful sitting in the West Lawn so as to form an integral part of the architectural design of the west
elevation of the house. The design point is a good one so far as it goes: it explains the sitting of the plinth, which
undoubtedly was a fixture But what was put upon the plinth was very much a matter for the test of the occupier of the
house for the time being. We know that at one time. the object on the plinth had been a sundial. At the time of the sale
it was this statue of a Greek athlete. The plinth's position was architecturally important it ensured that whatever stood
on it would be correctly positioned But the object it carried could be whatever appealed to the occupier for i.e. time
being. Sundial or statue - it did not matter to the design, so long as it was in the right place - a result ensured by the
plinth which was firmly fixed into the ground. Being, as I think, unattached, the statue was prima facie not a fixture, but,
even if it were attached, the application of the second test would lead to the same conclusion.

50
3.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER THREE.

This chapter has examined and considered the law relating to fixtures. In
the legal sense, land includes not only the ground, soil or earth, but also all
buildings on the land and any chattel attached thereto. Any chattel or object
which is so attached to or connected the with land or a building as to
become part of it is a fixture. Disputes may arise, under different contexts,
as to whether or not an object or chattel has become part of the land and
therefore a fixture. In determining whether a chattel or object has become a
fixture, regard must be had to the degree or extent of attachment or
annexation, and whether the object can be severed or removed without
causing substantial damage to the land. Early law placed too much
emphasis to this degree of annexation test. The modern test (purpose of
annexation) looks at the intention or purpose of attachment or annexation;
whether it was for the better enjoyment and use of the chattel or whether
the intention was to effect a permanent improvement to the land or
building. In the former case the object is not a fixture whereas in the latter
case the chattel is a fixture.
Fixtures which if domestic, ornamental or trade fixtures may be removed by
a tenant during the duration of the lease or within a reasonable time
thereafter. The cases that have been excerpted above have illustrated the
contexts in which disputes may arise as to whether a chattel or object has
become a fixture or not. The cases have also illustrated the application of the
two tests that can be used to determine whether or not an object has become
a fixture and therefore part of the land or not.

51