VILLAVICENCIO v.

LUKBAN
39 PHIL 778

FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One hundred and seventy women were
deported to Davao without their knowledge and consent. The women were received as laborers in a banana plantation.
Some of the women were able to escape and return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao

Whether the petitioners had standing to file the petition for habeas corpus

Whether the women were illegally restrained of their liberty

1. Yes. When it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, another person may submit
it in his/her behalf. In the case at bar, the way the expulsion was conducted by the officials made it impossible for the
women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. They were first isolated from society and then shipped. It was consequently
proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf, in this case, the petitioners who were relatives and friends
of the deportees.

2. Yes. The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of their liberty & their freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. In this case, there was no law, order, or regulation which justified the action
of the respondents in restraining the petitioners of their liberty. There was no showing of any law or order which
authorized or conferred upon the Mayor of the city or the Chief of Police the right to force the women to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Phil. penal law during that time specifically punishes any
public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

ESCRA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT OF DOMICILE; LlBERTY; HABEAS CORpus; CONTEMPT.—One hundred and seventy
women, who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the
Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night, without their
consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila
or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila
who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to comply with the order of the
court. Villavicencio vs. Lukban., 39 Phil., 778, No. 14639 March 25, 1919

These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.

4.ID.; ID.—The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in American
jurisprudence.

5.HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE.—The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

6.ID. ; PARTIES.—Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is proper for
the writ to be submitted by some person in his behalf.

7.ID.; JURISDICTION.—It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the Court of First Instance. Villavicencio vs.
Lukban., 39 Phil., 778, No. 14639 March 25, 1919

RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY.—A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

11.ID.; ID.—The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if
they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.

COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT.—For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas corpus, three
courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2)
they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these ,persons could not safely be brought
before the Court; or (3) they could have. presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present. Villavicencio vs. Lukban., 39 Phil., 778, No. 14639 March 25, 1919

When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court
must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned
or fined.

18.ID.—An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ -of habeas corpus, when he has power
to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.

No official, however high, is above the law.

21.ID.; ID.—The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. \