40 Case Digest

1
HE UNITED STATES
Vs.
MANUEL BAUTISTA
Facts of the case:

On November 15th, the police chief and another officer went to the residence where the defendant was staying in order to
make the arrest. When the police arrived at the house, they asked some of the residents if the defendant was present. The
policeman who accompanied the chief of police entered the residence without authorization after learning that the
defendant was there and tried to arrest him without telling him why he was there or what it was for. According to the
police chief's testimony, the defendant resisted being taken into custody and called out to his neighbors for help, saying
they are bandits
Issue of the case:
Whether defendant liable with the crime of assault upon agents of the authorities and insulting them.
Ruling of the supreme court:
The defendant was acting in accordance with the notion that tulisanes were among those who had entered his home. The
defendant was completely right in summoning his neighbors and attempting to drive the people who had entered his home
away if he believed they were tulisanes. The offense listed in the complaint does not apply to the defendant. Therefore, the
lower court's judgment be revoked, the complaint be dismissed, and the defendant be released from detention. so
commanded.
2
SAMSON VILORIA CALDERON,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts of the case:

Appellant Samson Viloria Calderon, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was found guilty of homicide by
reckless negligence by the Court of First Instance of Manila. He shot Eustacia Rodil 3 times with an army bolo. In his
defense, he stated that he warned Rodil not to come forward and that he suspected the latter was a Huk member because
they were briefed by their officer and told that there were violent Huks in that region.
Issue of the case:
Whether appellant is acted in self defense or acted due to uncontrollable fear for an equal or greater injury?
No, Rodil's bolo, which the former had already attempted to hack him with twice, had no chance of hitting the appellant
due to their separation and the barrier. According to the defense's evidence, the appellant was sitting on a ditch when the
incident occurred, while Rodil was standing and trying to climb a fence, placing him higher than the appellant. However,
even though the former's injury should have steadily risen, if the appellant's testimony were accurate, it actually went
down. Therefore, it is clear from the evidence that the appellant was not honest or frank in his account of the events; the
Court of Appeals was completely warranted in rejecting his testimony and in adopting the prosecution's version.
The Court of Appeals did not think that appellant had acted in error of fact when he fatally shot Rodil as he approached or
reached the aforementioned barrier. Clearly, no Huk would have lighted the area with those electric bulbs if they were out
to murder the appellant. It is far less likely that Huk would have carried out or ordered to be carried out the
aforementioned acts, which had the effect of advance warning the appellant and his companions, before assaulting them.
In other words, the appellant had no reason to think Rodil was a Huk or that he planned to kill the appellant, and could not
have thought such things. It is clear from these circumstances and the fact that Rodil was shot with the intention of killing
him that the appellant is not deserving of acquittal. The Supreme Court believe and hold that the Court of Appeals'
decision should stand as it is therefore affirmed.
3
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
CONSTANCIO GUEVARRA, ET AL
Facts of the case:
Guevarra went to the residence of Mayor Melgar with Cornelio, Frayre, Mercado, and Fajardo, all of whom were police
officers assigned to Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, to find out what rewards they would receive for their work as police
officers. They then proceeded to the shop in front of the Mayor. Melgar's home, where they had wine while discussing
the notion that Andres Papasin, a failed candidate for the the abuses of the police in Naujan were the main factor in
Mayor Melgar's election defeat, according to stories . They felt resentment for Papasin. Papasin walked to the shop across
the street and had a contentious argument there. Cornelio was finally happy with Papasin's answer, but Frayre was not and
exclaimed, "Tirahin na iyan," at which point Guevarra drew out his.45 caliber gun and was ready to shoot Papasin when
someone intervened. Papasin went back to his home as the group returned to Mayor Melgar's home. After a while,
Guevarra said that he was leaving for home. Sarabia and Mercado pursued him, but Guevarra halted in front of Papasin's
house beneath a tamarind tree.
Papasin's cousin Agapito Salazar left the house and headed to the coconut groove to shorten the route back to his home,
but Salazar was unaware that Guevarra was already waiting at the location. Guevarra fired his gun at Salazar while the
two were 15 meters apart. Guevarra fled and returned to Mayor Melgar's home as Salazar collapsed and subsequently
died. Guevarra said in his statement that he mistakenly shot Salazar for Papasin. In the CFI, Guevarra and Cornelio were
both accused of murder; however, only Guevarra was found guilty, while Cornelio was found not guilty.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not Guevarra is guilty of the crime murder qualified by treachery?
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The Accused Guevarra committed murder with the element of treachery. The victim, who was unarmed and uninformed,
had no chance to protect himself since the appellant was securely hidden behind a tree when he shot the victim. Guevarra
used these techniques to ensure that the crime was committed without putting himself in danger. The fact that a person
other than the one meant to be murdered died as a result of the shootings is completely unintentional, but it does not
change the character of the crime or decrease Guevarra's criminal culpability. He is still accountable for the results of his
actions.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one
whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any way put
up defense against the attack or become aware of it," the court stated in People v. Guillen. Therefore, the judgment is
affirmed in its full, with costs imposed against the appellant.
4
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO
Facts of the case:

Some Moro convicts had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon in Zamboanga before the crime. Three people
with strange appearances were seen patrolling the area, which concerned the locals of the Municahan neighborhood in the
municipality of Zamboanga. The accused at the time was a municipal police officer, and Pacencia Delgado, Remigio
Delgado's daughter, called him and said her father would want to meet him. Remigio Delgado alerted the responding
officer that three unidentified, suspicious-looking individuals wearing blue clothing were lurking about his home.
Person dressed in dark clothes calling "Nong Miong" at 7 p.m. Neither the accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was
calling. The accused asked what he wanted, but instead of answering, he kept moving forward with his bolo in hand.
Fernando de Fernando pulled out his revolver and fired a shot into the air upon seeing this. He fired at the unknown as he
continued to ascend the staircase. The unknown vanished and ran to the house of a neighbor, Leon Torres, where he
collapsed and died on the floor. Remigio Delgado recognized the voice and ran into the parlor when he heard the shots,
grabbed the accused's arm, and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura Paulino.
Issue of the case:

Whether or not the Fernando De Fernando is exempted from criminal liability?
The appearance of an unknown man dressed in clothes similar to the prisoner's uniform and calling the owner of the
house, as well as the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not recognize the man at the time, undoubtedly led the
accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the three people who the owner of the house said were prowling
around the place. His suspicions were confirmed when he saw the man continue ascending the stairs with a bolo in his
hand, ignoring his question about who he was. He attempted to perform his duty, first firing into the air and then at the
alleged intruder, certain that he was a wrongdoer. However, what appeared to him to be the wrongdoer was the nephew of
the house's owner, who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moments, when the forces of fear and
duty were at chances, the accused was unable to fully comprehend the true situation, and the bundle of bolos appeared to
him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character attempting to enter the house. However, there is one
circumstance that should have made him suspicious. The fact that the man called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the
owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and by not asking Paciencia
Delgado who it was who was calling her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary preventative measure
that he should have used before taking such fatal action.
The court reverses the previous decision of the lower court since he acted with reckless negligence by firing the shot
without first exercising reasonable diligence. As a result, the crime committed by the cause is homicide through reckless
negligence not murder.
5
vs.
BENJAMIN AGUILAR Y PEREZ and JOSE OLIVEROS Y OLAT
Facts of the case:

April 25, 1955, in the City of Manila, the accused were the drivers in charge of a passenger jeepney bearing Plate No.
TPU 2271 (Manila) and Liberty taxicab with Plate No. 3165 did then and there drive their respective vehicles in a
careless, reckless, and imprudent manner along the corner of Requesens and Oroquieta streets. They were driving at a
faster speed than was reasonable and without taking the necessary precautions to avoid an accident. Considering the state
of vehicular traffic, persons and property damage at the time at said location, resulting from their
carelessness, recklessness, imprudence, and a lack of foresight, ended up causing the said vehicles to bump into and
collide with each other, and as a result, several passengers of the said jeepney sustained physical injuries that necessitated
medical attention for more than 1 but not more than 9 days and prevented them from engaging in their ordinary labor for
the same period of time.
The defendants filed motions to quash the information on the grounds that reckless imprudence is criminal only if the acts
complained of constitute a grave or less grave felony. The motion was granted by the municipal court. The City Fiscal
filed an appeal, and the Manila Court of First Instance upheld the ruling granting the Motions to Quash and dismissing the
case.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the CFI of Manila erred in sustaining the motion to quash?
The court decided that the ruling in People vs. Benigno Lingad, in which the accused was prosecuted for minor physical
injuries caused by reckless imprudence, should be used similarly in the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court
stated:
“While the information gives the designation of the crime as 'slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,' the body
thereof does not specify the kind of negligence or imprudence that qualifies the crime charged, for it merely alleges that it
was committed 'in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner causing by such careless, recklessness,
imprudence and lack of precaution,' the collision which resulted in the injury. Under such vague allegation of the
imprudent act, one may infer that the act may have been committed either thru reckless or simple negligence, depending
upon the nature of the evidence that may be presented by the prosecution. And even if what was intended was to qualify
the crime with reckless imprudence, still it cannot be said that the same is not punishable by law for it may still be shown
during the trial that the accused committed the act only thru simple negligence upon the theory that what is more or graver
includes the less or lighter, in the same manner as a serious physical injury includes a slight injury, or robbery includes the
crime of theft. The question, therefore, in the last analysis may boil down to a matter of evidence. In other words, the
elements of the two kinds of negligence are practically the same, the only difference lies in the degree, and this can be
substantiated by proper evidence."
In view of the foregoing, the SC set aside the order appealed from, and direct that the case be remanded to the trial court,
for hearing on the merits.
6
vs
BENIGNO LINGAD Y VITO
Facts of the case:

That on or about October 28, 1954, in Manila, Philippines, the said accused was the driver and person in command of
Pick-up bearing plate No. T-518 (Cavite-'54), did then and there drive, manage, and operate the same along Arroceros
Street, in said city, in a careless, reckless, negligent, and imprudent manner, by then and there making the same run at a
speed greater than was reasonable and proper and by not taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons or
damage to property, considering the condition of traffic in said place at the time, causing T-518 (Cavite, 1954). So he
drove, managed, and operated to hit and bump into car No. Det. Mariano Joaquin was driving the PI-2578 (Manila) at the
time, and as a result of the forceful hit, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, a passenger of the said car with plate No. PI-2573
experienced physical injuries that necessitated and will necessitate medical attention for a period of more than one but less
than ten days, and which have prohibited and will prevent said Mayor Arsenio Lacson from engaging in his normal duties
for the same period of time."
Issue of the case:

Whether or not the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to quash?
The court relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macario Ande y Marino, wherein it held that "The
law does not declare as a crime and does not provide any penalty for the execution of an act more serious as it is
committed thru reckless imprudence which, if intentional amounts to a light felony."
Supreme Court said: “While the information gives the designation of the crime as 'slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence,' the body thereof does not specify the kind of negligence or imprudence that qualifies the crime charged, for
it merely alleges that it was committed 'in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner causing by such careless,
recklessness, imprudence and lack of precaution,' the collision which resulted in the injury. Under such vague allegation
of the imprudent act, one may infer that the act may have been committed either thru reckless or simple negligence,
depending upon the nature of the evidence that may be presented by the prosecution. And even if what was intended was
to qualify the crime with reckless imprudence, still it cannot be said that the same is not punishable by law for it may still
be shown during the trial that the accused committed the act only thru simple negligence upon the theory that what is
more or graver includes the less or lighter, in the same manner as a serious physical injury includes a slight injury, or
robbery includes the crime of theft. The question, therefore, in the last analysis may boil down to a matter of evidence. In
other words, the elements of the two kinds of negligence are practically the same, the only difference lies in the degree,
and this can be substantiated by proper evidence."
In view of the foregoing, the SC set aside the order appealed from, and direct that the case be remanded to the trial court,
for hearing on the merits.
7
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs.
PEDRO RAMIREZ
Facts of the case:
On the night of February 18, 1923, one Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga,
the deceased, and Agustin Menor to go hunting at the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte's mount
Balitok. The three last mentioned went hunting, leaving Bartolome Quiaoit in a cabin about a kilometer from where the
alleged incident occurred. When the hunters reached at a location on Mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who was carrying
Bartolome Quiaoit's shotgun with a lantern, occurred to hunt a deer and then told his friends to wait there and keep an eye
on the prey while he entered the forest to catch it. The accused shot what he thought was a deer, but it was actually his
buddy Victoriano Ranga. Thus, Victoriano Ranga and Agusto Menor were waiting when the shotgun was heard, striking
Victoriano Ranga in the eye and right temple, and he died that night as a result of the wounds.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the accused acted in resentment, or motive to kill?
Ruling of the Supreme court:
No, the court believe the case from what the two witnesses Agustin Menor and Pedro Ramirez have testified to, and
taking into account that there existed no motive whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant against the offended
party, we are compelled to conclude that the act complained of constitutes homicide through reckless imprudence. The
defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions,
should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that unfortunately
occurred on the person of Victoriano Ranga.
While the defendant's donation of a carabao and a horse to the deceased's mother as an apology a few days after the event
reveals that the defendant admitted to committing the crime, it also shows that he did so without criminal purpose and
only through pure imprudence.
As a result, the punishment of one year and one day in prision correccional, with the accessories required by law, must be
imposed on him, and the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other aspects, with costs against the appellant.
8
vs.
ROMUALDO DORICO, FERNANDO DORICO, and DIONISIO BALLONICO
Facts of the case:
Rosa Dapulag, an eyewitness and the daughter of Gervacio Dapulag, testified that on October 12, 1964, at around 5
o'clock in the afternoon, as her father was traveling to the farm from Estropio Dorico's store, she saw the accused
Romualdo Dorico and Dionisio Ballonico enter the building and approach her father. Without further ado, Romualdo
stabbed her father, striking him in the upper left arm and exiting, Dionisio Ballonico, hitting him on the left side of his
back with the wound exiting on the abdomen. When her father attempted to flee the two assailants, he was met by accused
Fernando Dorico, who came from the nearby Castro Dorico store and punched him in the face, causing her father to fall to
the ground. Romualdo approached her father again and hacked him on the knee, and with her father defenseless on the
ground, the three accused began challenging everyone. Because she was only about 30 meters behind her father on her
way to the farm to help him graze their carabaos, she immediately hired a jeep to take her father to the hospital, but it was
too late.
The Doricos and Dionisio Ballonico wanted to kill her father because he insisted on filing a criminal complaint against
Romualdo Dorico for the murder of one Patrocinio Megenio, her mother's nephew who grew up with them in their home;
and that because of the death of said Patrocinio Megenio, the Doricos and Dionisio Ballonico wanted to kill her father.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not evidence of motive is required to convict Dionisio Ballonico?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that motive is only relevant when the identity of the perpetrator is in doubt.
Dionisio Ballonico was positively identified as one of the victim's assailants by credible witnesses, so proof of motive is
not required for conviction. There was no reason given why the prosecution's witnesses would charge Dionisio Ballonico
with a crime he did not commit. Similarly, the record provides no justification for rejecting the lower court's finding that
the prosecution's witnesses' testimonies are unbelievable. According to the evidence, accused Ballonico's bare denial of
participation is insufficient to overcome the positive evidence demonstrating his participation in the commission of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In People v. Portugueza, this Court ruled that:
"Although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim,
nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy."
The violent attacks were apparently carried out by appellants Romualdo Dorico and Dionisio Ballonico, who inflicted the
wounds that killed the victim. They should be found guilty of murder characterized with alevosia, although appellant
Fernando Dorico, who just boxed the deceased on the ears, should only be found guilty of slight physical injuries.
9
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
PAT. DAVID MANZANO y HERILLA, et al
Facts of the case:
On July 11, 1991, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Jovencio Nemis, driver in Mrs. Felicidad Bairan's house at 63
Doña Carmen St. Don Jose Subdivision, drove home the spouses Ongbuco who were visitors of Susan Bairan, daughter-
in-law of Mrs. Bairan. Upon returning to the Bairan house, but before he could get inside the gate, a group of armed men
poked their guns at him. Jose Raquedan, one of the students being supported by Mrs. Bairan, saw the incident. He
immediately ran to the basement of the house and told his companions to close the door and windows. Homer Gana,
another of Mrs. Bairan's supported students, forthwith went upstairs, put out the lights, and closed the door and windows.
He, however, heard someone knocking at the door, and when he opened it, he saw Jovencio Nemis and a group of armed
men with their guns poked at the latter. Instinctively he tried to close the door, but it was pushed open by the armed men
who then got inside the house.
Inside the house, the armed men gathered all the occupants in the sala and tied their arms and feet with torn clothes,
except Mrs. Bairan. In order to gain entrance into the bedroom of Mrs. Bairan inside which were Mrs. Bairan, her
daughter-in-law Susan Bairan, and the latter's three children the armed men used Jovencio Nemis to call and knock at the
bedroom's door. Once inside, the armed men ransacked the room, opened the drawers, aparador and other places where
money, jewelries and other valuables were kept. They scattered things all around and the room was in disarray.
While the room was being ransacked, accused Pat. David Manzano dragged Susan Bairan inside the adjoining bedroom.
With his gun pointed at Susan's head, Pat. Manzano told the latter, thus: "Putang ina mo, huwag kang
maingay, papatayin kita". Manzano warned Susan that if she will resist and fight back, he will kill her. He then held the
arms of Susan and forcibly made her lie down on the carpet. He removed his pants and briefs, then raised Susan's duster
or "malong" and removed her panty. While Susan was on a lying position and resisting with her two arms being held by
Manzano, the latter tried to insert his penis inside Susan's. By sheer force Manzano was ultimately able to accomplish his
evil desire, after which he warned Susan that should the latter report what happened, he will kill her. While Susan was
being raped by Manzano, somebody knocked at the door and shouted: "Ilabas mo ang babae".
Herminia Pascual was on her way to visit her cousin at Litex, she saw Jaime Balcorta inside their compound and accused
Romulo Ordoñez. she called by phone Jerry Pablo of the CIS and accompanied Larry in arresting the suspects. At the CIS
Office in Camp Crame, Pat. David Manzano, Romulo Ordoñez, Jaime Balcorta and Julito Barracas were pointed to and
identified by the victims who robbed the house of Mrs. Bairan.
Issue of the case:
Whether the court disbelieving the defense of alibi of the accused-appellants?
Whether prosecution witnesses had positively identified the accused-appellants despite the fact that they were identified
only after they were illegally arrested by the CIS?
Manzano claims that he was at Police Station 5 on the night of the incident, July 11, 1991; and that at 3 o'clock the
following morning he joined an operation to apprehend murder suspects in Lupang Pangako. Jaime Balcorta and Julito
Barracas profess that they were in Villacorta, Mabini, Pangasinan on the date of the incident attending the wake of a
nephew. Romulo Ordoñez, for his part, avers that on July 11, 1991 he was in his house at San Simon, Bani, Pangasinan,
tending to their store; that on the evening of said date he went to the house of a neighbor to attend the wake of one
deceased Anacieto Bahad and left at 3 o'clock the following morning. The alibis of accused-appellants Balcorta, Barracas
and Ordoñez are bare self-serving assertions, uncorroborated by disinterested witnesses.
Alibi, we have repeatedly held, is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses. In the face of the positive identification of accused-appellants by their very victims as the
perpetrators of the crime charged, the defense of alibi must fall. Although the alibi of Manzano appears to have been
corroborated by his fellow police officers in the precinct where he was stationed, said defense is unworthy of belief not
only because he was positively identified by the victims of the robbery and the rape but also because it has been held that
alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives and by the
same token if it is established by the accused or his friends and comrades-in-arms.
The appealed judgement is affirmed, with costs assessed against the accused-appellants.
10
vs.
ESTER DEL ROSARIO MURRAY
Facts of the case:

Mr. Murray have an secret relationship to Carla Varga
The evening of August 12, 1949, Mrs. Murray and her kids arrived at their house. Murray's pistol was taken out of a
sewing machine drawer located close to the eating area, and she put it in her white bag. Then she went to the garage and
departed in the Buick, alone, behind the wheel. She abandoned the car since it had a flat tire and asked Tagle to get the
vehicle. At 10 o'clock that night, Murray arrived and started looking for his pistol. However, he was unable to locate it
and was furious about it. The following morning, August 13, at 4:00 a.m., Murray returned home. Thirty After a short
while, Mrs. Murray entered the room where the girls were sleeping, together with their maid Maria Naral and the two
elder girls. Eddie, a young kid, was brought there by Mrs. Murray, who then ordered the maid to let him sleep next to her
before leaving and locking the door behind her. The maid heard four bullets shortly after Mrs. Murray had left, one after
the other at brief intervals. The spouses' room is where the gunfire occurred. When she needed to use the restroom, she got
up from the bed and opened the door. As she was doing so, she noticed Mrs. Murray opening the door to their room as
well.
Mrs. Murray walked down the stairs, followed by the maid. Mrs. Murray suddenly turned back in the middle of the stairs,
while the maid proceeded on her way down to the bathroom to urinate. When the maid walked up, she saw that Mrs.
Murray's two eldest daughters were already crying in the couples' bedroom, so she went inside as well. Mrs. Murray was
standing near the window, bending over her dead husband, who was bleeding and dead. "George, are you dead now?"
Mrs. Murray said in Tagalog, noticing that the two windows were slightly open, as was the door leading to the balcony.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of parricide?
The appellant wants the court to believe that an intruder entered the room and shot the dead, and to establish this, she and
her children stated that the deceased's garments were spread everywhere, and his wallet was found empty on the floor near
the balcony door. However, these claims are contradicted by the maid, who testified that when she entered the death room
for the first time, the deceased's clothes were not scattered around, and by the discovery of the first policeman who went
into the room for investigation, who discovered no footprints in the room towards the balcony.
Whether or not the appellant was aware of her husband's love affairs with Carol Varga, and her reactions to such affairs,
are matters that can only be proven by the appellant's utterances, acts, or conduct, unless such acts or statements are
admissible; an individual's inner feelings are impossible to prove in court. The testimony, therefore, of the mother of
Carol Varga as to appellant's visit on one occasion and what she (appellant) had asked about; that of Del Rosario on why
appellant refused to have the coffin of her husband opened; that of Snure as to what the deceased had told him; that of
Mrs. Pier as to the incidents testified by her; and the act of appellant's daughter in destroying the picture of the deceased
with Carol Varga — all these in the opinion of the Court, are admissible as relevant to prove the knowledge by appellant
of, and her attitude towards, her husband’s actions. To all the above the Court added the testimony of Carol Varga herself
that in the month of July, there was one whole week when she saw him every day. It is not possible that appellant's
attention could have been attracted by these continuous meetings of the deceased with Carol Varga and his much to
frequent absences from home. So, consistent with this knowledge, in the afternoon of August 12, at about 7:00 o'clock,
she drove the Buick car herself, along Santa Mesa Boulevard, evidently with the purpose of seeing if her husband was at
Varga's house again. When her husband came home at 10:00 o'clock that evening, bringing along with him some P600,
she must have suspected that he was again going out with Carol Varga; and finally, when the deceased arrived at 4:00
o'clock the following morning, again asking for some more money, as appellant herself stated, she must have convinced
herself that her husband had again come from the nightclub with Carol Varga.
None of the incidents, facts or circumstances is consistent with all the others. All of them put together produced a
conviction in the mind of the Court that it was appellant, and no other, who had a motive to end the life of the deceased,
and that it was she herself who voluntarily shot the deceased.
11
vs.
RAFAEL MARCO, SIMEON MARCO and DULCISIMO BELTRAN, RAFAEL MARCO
Facts of the case:
Simeon Marco, approached Constancio Sabelbero and flashed a hunting knife after asking him if he was the one who
boxed his (Simeon's) brother the year before, causing Constancio to flee. While jogging, he was passed by appellant, who
struck him with a cane, causing minor physical injuries. When Simeon was going to pursue Constancio, his father,
Vicente, who was in the crowd, grabbed Simeon's knife-wielding hand. When Vicente noticed that appellant, who was
holding a round cane and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he yelled to Constancio and his other son Bienvenido,
who emerged in the scene, to evacuate, which they did, while he himself freed Simeon and fled. Appellant pursued
Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter deflected the blow, injuring his left hand. Bienvenido attempted to run further,
but his feet became entangled in some vines and he collapsed. Beltran, who appeared out of nowhere, stabbed him at the
anus, and Simeon wounded him on the left side of the breast. Bienvenido died soon after. The trial court convicted
appellants Rafael, Simoen, and Beltran of murder on the basis of an obvious conspiracy. Only Rafael filed an appeal.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the appellant is as guilty as Simeon and Beltran in Bienvenido's death, is there conspiracy?
Since the existence of bad blood between the families of the deceased and the accused, which could have established
commonality of intent on the part of the three accused, was denied by both parties, the Supreme Court ruled that the act of
appellant stabbing the victim, which caused injuries to the latter's left hand, is separate from the fatal stabs inflicted by his
two co accused. Furthermore, there was no clear evidence linking the appellant's attempt to stab the deceased, which
resulted in the latter's left hand injuries, with the fatal stabs delivered by his two other co-accused. In accordance with the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court was compelled to find that he lacked homicidal
intent. Only slight physical injury can hold him criminally liable.
12
vs.
VICENTE P. CASTRO and PEDRO A. PACANA
Facts of the case:
These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents and estafa committed by means of
falsification of public documents
It is likewise admitted that the documents on which the prosecutions are based, Exhibits C, D, Q-3, Y, and X, are actually
in existence. It is the theory of the prosecution that said documents were prepared by the provincial secretary with the
connivance of the members of the provincial board for illegal purposes. To substantiate this theory, attention is
concentrated on the following prominent facts:
Exhibits C and D were seen by the chief clerk of the district auditor, Juan Callante, in the office of Pacana on the
afternoon of June 18, 1923. Copies of Exhibits C and D were made by a clerk in the office of the district auditor, Juan
Borja, on the morning of June 19, 1923. An excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 224 was received in the
office of the provincial treasurer of Misamis before 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of June 19, 1923. Another excerpt from
Exhibit C containing resolution No. 225, Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third prosecution, was received in the office of the
district engineer on June 27, 1923, and when the chief clerk of this office noted the date June 9, 1923, on the minutes and
brought it to the attention of the provincial secretary, the date was changed to June 16, 1923. The mistake of the secretary
was attempted to be rectified by the provincial board on September 20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June
16, 1923, and thus another error was perpetrated. (Exhibit B-2.) The originals of Exhibits C and D have disappeared,
possibly through the machinations of the provincial secretary. The provincial board of Misamis could not have celebrated
a session at Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because of its absence on an inspection trip, and could not have celebrated a
session on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, as claimed by the defense, because of a velada held on the same afternoon in
the intermediate school of Cagayan at which the provincial governor and member Castro were present. And finally, before
the district auditor, the three accused re-affirmed the fact that sessions of the provincial board were held on June 9 and 16,
1923. (Exhibits J, K,
Issue of the case:
Whether the accused engaged in intentional and deliberate manipulation of public documents?
The entire case appears to be a botched job by the provincial secretary. He is a man who should not be trusted with
official duties. He possesses none of the qualifications required for public office. However, criminal intent and criminal
responsibility are a far cry from hopeless ineptitude and hopeless stupidity. Even in their most favorable light, the facts
come dangerously close to the Penal Code crime of reckless imprudence.
In order for there to be a crime, evil intent must be combined with an unlawful act. Actus does not produce reum, unless
men sit rea. When the criminal mind is lacking, there can be no crime. As a general rule, honest and genuine ignorance or
mistake as to specific facts will exempt the doer from neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences,
which is equivalent to criminal intent.
There has been no loss to the government. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the accused's innocence of the crime charged and the other with their guilt,
the evidence fails the moral certainty test and is insufficient to support a conviction. As a result, the Supreme Court is
compelled to acquit the accused of the charges brought against them.
13
vs. PABLO RELOJ alias AMBOY
Facts of the case:
Justiniano Isagan, Sr. was stabbed by appellant Pablo Reloj with an ice pick wrapped in paper outside the cockpit in
Libtong, Estancia, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 7, 1963. Shortly after, Justiniano Sr. was taken to the Aklan Provincial Hospital
where a surgical procedure was carried out on him. However, despite the operation being successful and Justiniano Sr.
appearing to be recovering, he developed five (5) days later a paralytic ileum which takes place, sometimes, in
consequence of the exposure of the internal organs during the operation and then died. The corresponding information for
murder having been filed, the Court of First Instance of Aklan rendered Pablo Reloj guilty of murder.
Issue of the case:
Whether or it was incorrect for the lower court to declare the defendant accountable for Justiniano, Srdemise?
This assignment of error is predicated upon the fact that the immediate cause of the death of Justiniano Sr. was a paralysis
of the ileum that supervened five (5) days after the occurrence, when he appeared to be on the way to full recovery. It is
well settled that:
“ every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person
inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of
this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated
in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment,
which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be
deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held
responsible. But, however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment."
Where it has been established that the exposure of the internal organs in consequence of a surgical operation in the
abdomen sometimes results in a paralysis of the ileum and that said operation had to be performed on account of the
abdominal injury inflicted by appellant, the latter is responsible for the death of Justiniano, Sr., the immediate cause of
which was the said paralysis of the ileum that supervened five days after the stabbing incident.
14
Vs.
.ANTOLIN CARDENAS, ANTONIO CARDENAS and DELFIN CARDENAS, ANTOLIN CARDENAS,
Facts of the case:
The deceased Victorio Teopinto had gone to his store to buy "mallorca," but had to leave after he informed them that he
had no more "mallorca" for sale. After the two had gone down his stairs he heard whistles coming from outside his house
and store, which was next to the store and residence of the Teopintos. The deceased already walking towards his house.
But before he could reach his house appellant appellant Antolin Cardenas, together with Antonio Cardenas, Delfin
Cardenas, Hermogenes Cardenas, Zosimo Cuanico and Adriano Labian, who were then armed with bolos, attacking and
slashing Antolin Cardenas and boloed Victorio Teopinto hitting him on the left forehead . After Victorio collapsed to the
ground as a result of the blow. Upon hearing the shout of her husband, she and Igmedio Ladeño ran out of the store into
the street, and saw, she shouted, and upon hearing her, appellant Antolin Cardenas turned towards her and said: "You,
also." Upon being thus threatened by appellant, she became scared and ran away. Victorio Teopinto received 8 wounds
caused by the Cardenas.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the four Cardenas are guilty of murder in the death of Victorio Teopinto?
The court decision, four persons were charged for murder in the information filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal,
namely, Antolin Cardenas, Antonio Cardenas, Delfin Cardenas and Adolfo Mariño Hermogenes Cardenas, Zosimo
Cuanico and Adriano Labian were at large. Adolfo Mariño was discharged from the information upon petition filed by the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal to be utilized as a state witness. After trial, decision was rendered by the court a quo, which, as
already stated above, found Antolin Cardenas guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly. The court acquitted Antonio
and Delfin Cardenas on reasonable doubt.
In his brief appellant contends that the court a quo erred: (1) in rejecting his defense of alibi without weighing and
evaluating the merits thereof and the testimonies of his witnesses; and (2) in finding him guilty of the crime
notwithstanding the existence of medical testimony to the effect that it was remote that wound No. 7, which is alleged to
have been inflicted by appellant, could have caused the death of the victim.
The attack being sudden and unexpected, the killing was therefore qualified by treachery. We are not prepared to hold that
the commission of the crime was aggravated by the circumstance of evident premeditation. To properly appreciate this
circumstance, it is necessary to establish: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to
15
Vs
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO
Facts of the case:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, boarded the Bicol Express train. While in transit, both picked each a pair of
scissors and started stabbing and butchering their co- passengers, thereby causing several casualties. They were charged
with multiple murder and an attempted murder.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to
get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died and others
that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a
hold-up". He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch
as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody."
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who was
taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were
demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the death penalty imposed by the trial court is proper?
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified
be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins
upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to
defend themselves was a mode of execution that insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher
their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design. The eight killings and the
attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. They cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime
under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other".
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. As no generic mitigating and aggravating
circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion
perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted. A
separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in the attempted murder case.
16
People of the Philippines
vs.
Cosme Monleon
Facts of the case:

At about 7:00 in the evening of June 1,1970, Accused Cosme Monleon arrived home drunk and asked his wife,
Concordia, whether their carabao had been fed by their son, Marciano. Concordia assured him but upon checking by
Cosme, it was notadequately fed and he became furious. When he was about to hit Marciano, Corcordia intervened,
thereafter Cosme placed himself astride Corcodia’s chest, squeezed her neck, pressed her head against a post and
kicked her in the abdomen. The following morning, Corcordia vomitted blood and thereafter, died due to “acute
abdomen”. On June 18, 1970, Cosme thumbmarked a confessionthat he assaulted his wife and that he repented
for the wrong act which he had done to her. The CFI found him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua and payment of damages. After the judgement was read to Cosme in open cout, he asked that the
penalty be reduced. The court advise him to appeal if he was not satisfied with the penalty. The Solicitor General submits
that the judgement of conviction should be affirmed but recommends executive clemency because the penalty of
reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive considering the degree of malic exhibited by Cosme Monleon.
Issue of the case:
Whether there is enough evidence to support the Solicitor General's recommendation that the Chief Executive reduce the
penalty in Cosme Monleon's case?
YES, the criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he is intended. The maltreatment inflicted by Cosme on Corcordia was the proximate cause of her
death. He was provoked to castigate his wife because she prevented him from whipping his negligent son. The trial court
did not appreciate any mitigating circumstances in favour of Cosme. The Solicitor General is correct in finding that the
extenuation circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and intoxication which was not habitual are
present in this case. The penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua but considering that Cosme had not intention to kill
his wife, the penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive due to lack of approriate medical attendance.
Therefore there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General to recommend Cosme’s case to the Chief Executive
for a reduction of penalty
17 -18
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA
Facts of the case:

After midnight on September 13, 1952, bus no.30 of Medina Transportation operated by owner defendant Mariano
Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by Conrado Saylon. There are about 18
passengers and Bataclan is one of the passengers of the said bus who was seated beside of the driver.
At 2 o’clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until it feel into the canal on the right side of the road and the bus turned turtle. Four
passengers including Bataclan were trapped inside the bus and could not get out. After an hour, ten men came carrying
lighted torch made of bamboo fueled with petroleum. These men approached the bus and a fierce fire started, burning and
all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers. By reason of the death of Bataclan, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children filed a suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P 87, 150.
The RTC of Cavite awarded P1000 to the plaintiffs plus 600 as attorney’s fee, plus P100, value of the goods carried by
Bataclan for sale in Pasay City. This is for the reason that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus including the four passengers. That Bataclan, though he
must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive and so the damages were awarded not for his death
but for the physical inquiries suffered by him. Plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to CA but the latter
endorsed the appeal to SC because of the value involved in the claim of the complaint
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the proximate cause of Bataclan's death was the fire that burned the bus rather than the bus overturning?
Whether the carrier was negligent or not?
The Court does not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with alighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark(about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns
and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and
the call for outside help. As such the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus through the
negligence of the defendant and his agent
Yes, there is negligence, The carrier, through its driver and conductor, might also be partly blamed for the fire of the bus.
The conductor and the driver were reportedly moving back and forth on the road. Despite the fact that gasoline when
spilled, especially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, the driver should have known that in
the position that the overturned bus was in, gasoline could have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area inside
and around the bus. However, neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn
the rescuers not to bring their lit torch too close to the bus.
19
HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs.
GREGORIO REYES
Facts of the case:
The deceased Fausta Tavera had been living with the appellant Gregorio Reyes, and one evening after a barrio procession,
the two were chatting into the yard of a house, when Tavera told Reyes that she couldn't return to him and that she would
be going to her parents in Catanduanes. Reyes brought Tavera to the street and stabbed her in the chest with a fanknife,
barely injuring her when the knife failed to pierce her thoracic cavity after hitting a bone. The injured Tavera fled to the
house of the barrio lieutenant, where she died from shock as a result of the wound at the foot of the stairway. Relatives of
the dead attempted to seize Reyes, but he escaped with the help of his knife and fled the scene. On April 30, 1934, Reyes
was convicted at Camarines Sur's Court of First Instance of homicide committed against Fausta Tavera.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not, appellant Reyes is guilty of homicide?
Yes. A person is liable for the consequences of his unlawful act, and even if the deceased had been demonstrated to have a
sick heart, the appellant's assault being the proximate cause of death made him responsible for it. Furthermore, it has been
repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with a lethal weapon, such as a fan knife, on a part of the body, such as
the head, chest, or stomach, death can be reasonably expected, and the accused must be presumed to have intended the
natural consequences of his wrongful act.
20
vs.
AGUSTIN PIAMONTE, ET AL.
Facts of the case:
On October 28, 1951, early in the morning, a robbery was carried out at Magno Israel's home in the Baybay, Leyte
municipality's barrio Gabas. Israel suffered a serious injury during the robbery and was taken to the Western Leyte
Hospital in Baybay for treatment. In his affidavit, the patient stated, among other things, that the only person who came to
his house that morning was Guillermo Mascarias, who he had known for a long time. The robbers took P320 in cash from
him. He was unable to identify those who had actually injured him. Mascarias, who made a written confession after being
investigated. Piamonte and Jasme, Jr. were also arrested as a result of their confession. Magno Israel was operated on the
same day he arrived at the hospital in order to save his life. The operation was successful, but he had a difficult recovery
period. On December 19, 1951, he became ill with mucuous colitis, which developed as a result of his weak condition. On
December 28, he passed away.
Issue of the case:
Whether Israel's death was directly caused by the wounds the defendants caused?
It is a fact that he did not die right away after receiving his injuries and was able to survive for a while thanks to the
procedure to which he was exposed and the medical care provided to him at the Western Leyte Hospital. But the truth
remains that he did because of the mucuous colitis he acquired as a result of his frail health brought on by the wounds he
had sustained. The doctors who cared for him concur that while the wounds were not the primary cause of death, they
were however the proximate cause because of his weak state, which had disrupted the functions of his intestines and
allowed him to develop mucuous colitis.
21
VS.
PANAFILO LACSON
Facts of the case:
The appellant is charged with multiple counts of murder, the victims allegedly Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed the charges provisionally on March 29, 1999, citing Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure. This provisional dismissal was challenged in an earlier case (People vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002), with
the Supreme Court ruling that 1) the dismissal had the express consent of the accused and 2) Section 8, Rule 117 could be
given retroactive effect; however, it is still unclear whether the requirements for its application are met. They then
remanded the case to the RTC of Quezon City to determine whether the other conditions outlined in Section 8, Rule 117
had been met.
Issue of the case:
Whether Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable in the cases?
Whether the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application?
Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable, the requirements are prerequisites for
applying the time bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The purpose of requiring the accused's specific permission
to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to prevent him from later claiming that the resurrection of the criminal case
will subject him to double jeopardy for the same offense or an offense unavoidably included therein. The respondent has
failed to demonstrate that the first and second requirements of the first paragraph were met. The prosecution made no
petition for the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned criminal cases. The respondent, for his part, simply filed a
motion for judicial finding of probable cause and interrogation of witnesses.
The new rule's two-year time limit should not be enforced retroactively against the State. The period from April 1, 1999 to
November 30, 1999 should be removed from the computation of the 2-year term because the governing rule was not yet in
existence at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be asserted that the
State waived its right to reopen the criminal charges against respondent or was negligent in failing to do so within the new
2-year term. The new rule's two-year time limit benefits both the State and the accused. It shall not be emasculated and
diminished by an excessive retroactive application of the time-bar established therein only to assist the accused.
22
vs.
DOMINGO URAL
Facts of the case:
Brigido Alberto prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, testified, when he arrived at the municipal building about eight
o'clock, he witnessed something extraordinary. He saw Police Officer Ural inside the jail. Ural was boxing Felix Napola, a
jail prisoner. Napola collapsed on the floor as a result of the fistic punches. The tormentor, Ural, stepped on his lifeless
body. Ural exited the cell. He returned with a bottle after a short delay. He poured the liquid on Napola's prone body. He
quickly lit it with a match and exited the jail. In pain, Napola screamed. He yelled for assistance. Nobody came to his aid.
Alberto departed the municipal building, deeply disturbed by what he had just witnessed.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not Ural is criminally liable?
The trial court did not consider the mitigating factor that the defendant "had no intention to conduct such a grave wrong as
that committed" as a mitigating element. The established evidence makes it clear that Ural, the appellant, had no desire to
kill Napola. His intention was to punish him badly, perhaps because he was causing trouble within the prison cell while
intoxicated. When Ural became aware of the terrifying consequences of his criminal behavior, he let Napola to receive
medical care at the municipal dispensary. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offset the generic aggravating,
circumstance of abuse of his official position.
23
vs.
ANICETO MARTIN
Facts of the case:
Anacieto martin testimony, August 1, 1948, at about 4 o' clock, I awoke and my wife also awoke and she said to, "Why is
it that you seem to have no interest in me?, and I answered her I do not have interest in you and I did not love you with
intent to marry you because I am not the author of your pregnancy; again she said to me, "Why is it that you consented to
be wedded with me if you did not love me? and in answer, I again told her that I merely consented to be married to you,
because otherwise, you would file an action against me, I then went down to our closet west of our house at barrio No. 12,
Laoag Ilocos Norte, for major personal necessity, and my wife, Laura Luiz, came after me to the toilet with a rope in her
hands and, as she approached me while I was in the very act of ejecting waste matters inside the toilet she placed around
my neck the rope which she had in her hands, and immediately, I gripped the rope and took it off and I said, "Why did you
do this? my wife also said, "Yes because you do not love me." I snatched the rope from my wife and in turn I placed same
around her neck, and in that position I tightened the rope with my two hands and when my wife, Laura Luiz, died I laid
her then and there at the foot of the door of our closet with head towards the east. Soon after my wife expired I left her
already and I proceeded to the country where we use to go, barrio Barit, No. 55, Laoag, west of the barrio school threat.
Issue of the case:
Whether the appellant acted in complete self defense or not?

The trial court considered two mitigating circumstances in favor of the defendant: (1) that of unlawful aggression on the
part of the deceased without any sufficient provocation on the part of the defendant which in this case is equivalent to
incomplete self-defense on the part of the defendant, he should not have wound it around her neck and tightened it and (2)
the lack of instruction, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, the penalty next lower in the degree should
be imposed, which is that of reclusion temporal.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified by imposing upon the appellant the penalty of from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case on insolvency, and to
pay the costs. It is so ordered.
24
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI
Facts of the case:
A small boat was dispatched to raise the anchor of the steamer Vigan in the Pasig River on November 29, 1919. Calixto
Valdez, who was in charge of the crew, began verbally abusing the men for raising the anchor slowly. Venancio
Gargantel, one of the men, protested the offensive remarks, saying that they would be able to work better if Valdez
stopped insulting them. This was interpreted by Valdez as an act of defiance. Enraged and armed with a large knife, the
accused dashed towards the boat's bow, where Gargantel is. Gargantel decided to jump into the river before he could even
reach him. The latter, clearly believing himself to be in great and immediate danger, threw himself into the water and
vanished beneath its surface, never to be seen again. Gargantel died by drowning after throwing himself into the water
and seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The verdict in favor of the accused. After being convicted of
homicide, the accused claimed on appeal that he was only guilty of inflicting serious physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel ?
The Court ruled that Valdez is to blame for Venancio Gargantel's death. The deceased would not have jumped into the
river if it hadn't been for the threat of being stabbed by Valdez. The Court believes it is impossible to believe that
Gargantel survived the incident. Thus, despite the fact that the accused did not actually injure the deceased and that the
latter's body was never found, there is no doubt that Valdez is guilty of homicide. The fact that the accused did not intend
to commit such a serious offense was considered a mitigating factor by the trial judge.
The Supreme Court, "That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and
necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage
impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the
aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the
accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as
the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all
possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in
qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured
person was due to the act of the accused."
25
vs.
BIENVENIDO DOMINGUEZ,
Facts of the case:
At midnight on July 24, 1956, on the enclosed ground floor of Pedro's house Camerino, a group of people were playing
mahjong at a table lit by a 50-watt bulb with a conical lampshade when someone went inside, pointed a revolver, and fired
several close-range bullets at one of the players, Eduardo Lacson. The gunman vanished amid the subsequent brawl.
Lacson was given first-aid treatment before being taken that evening to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila, where
he was admitted at 12:55 a.m. in critical condition. Lacson was discharged from the hospital on September 16, 1956, and
the injuries left him permanently disabled, according to the physician. He was returned to Imus, Cavite, where he
remained paralyzed and bedridden until his death on June 5, 1957, from heart failure caused by the paralysis induced by
his spine injury. The trial court identified the accused-appellant Bienvenido Dominguez as the person who broke into the
gambling den and shot Eduardo Lacson based on 5 factors, all of which are contested as erroneous conclusions by the
appellant in his assignment of errors.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt?
The Court confirms with the appellant that the lower court erred in allowing the transcription of Lacson's hospital
declarations which Major Dawa wrote down and the victim thumb-stamped to be used as a dying declaration. In addition
to the lengthy period between the declaration's execution on July 24, 1956, and the declarant's passing on June 5, 1957,
the declaration's actual text reveals that the declarant had second thoughts about whether or not he would pass away.
Note that the expression "I don't know if I can make it," while evincing some doubt as to declarant's recovery, fails to
show that he believed himself in extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct," which is the sole
basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The claim that the declarant was playing mahjong in the alleged dying declaration is further undermined by the fact that
monte cards, not mahjong tiles, were discovered on the table by PC investigator Sergeant Tamundong, contrary to
overwhelming evidence presented by both the defense and the prosecution. Despite the error in admitting this Exhibit "D,"
the conviction should stand since other direct and indirect evidence, including that already mentioned, is sufficient to
prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
26
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS
vs.
GRACIANO PALALON
Facts of the case:
On July 20th, 1925, Roman Megio, who had already passed away, was in command of a small group of kids who were
helping Andres Mendiola gather and pile sugar cane on his plantation in Basac, Bais, Oriental Negros. Roman, a 10-year-
old boy, was lying down and doing nothing while the accuser wanted him to be acting. The accuser admonished Roman
and told him to get to work. The child was rude to the defendant, calling him "cross-eyed," "why do hurry me," and "are
you the one who pays my wages." The defendant lost his cool and hit the boy in the mouth with the back of his palm.
The prosecution's witnesses said that the youngster fell on his back onto a railroad rail while bleeding from the mouth and
nose. Despite the blow, the deceased kept working on the plantation until around 2:00 the following day, when he became
ill with a fever and was eventually driven home by his father. He passed away two and a half days later. There is no doubt
that the deceased received a strike to the lips from the defendant. However, it is pretty doubtful that the blow was the
direct or indirect cause of the death.
Issue of the case:
Whether or not the appellant is liable for the cause of death of the Roman?
It has been decisively shown that the deceased, in contrast to the doctor's theory of the case, continued to work for more
than a day after he received the blow despite the lack of a proper autopsy of the corpse and the evidence of the boy's father
and witnesses for the defense. The fact that the marks were discovered on the deceased's stomach and back suggests that
the ecchymosis that the doctor claimed to have seen may have simply been "death spots" that formed after the death.
There were no incisions performed, and the inspecting doctor, a young guy with little expertise, acknowledged that his
conclusions were founded in part on the statements of the deceased's family members. The conclusions could not have
been much more than educated guesses under these conditions. In this regard, we can state that the physician conducting
the post-mortem examination has a duty to apply the utmost caution and refrain from drawing unjustified conclusions
from outward manifestations that are open to various interpretations in cases of death under questionable circumstances.
The appellant must therefore be cleared of the charge of homicide since the Court believes there is more than a reasonable
doubt regarding the cause of the deceased's death.
27
Vs.
INOCENTES MOLDES
Facts of the case:
The dead was the master of ceremonies at a dance held in a private home on the evening of April 3rd in the Maya
neighborhood of the municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte. The deceased reprimanded the appellant for insisting on
dancing in front of everyone else. Then, using a bolo, the appellant proceeded to the porch of the residence and started
removing the decorations. He entered the house's yard and issued a challenge to combat to everyone. He repeated his call
for a fight when it became clear that he was not drawing enough attention by starting to cut at the bamboo trees.
The deceased, who was unarmed, began to descend the stairs while speaking to the appellant peaceful manner. As the
deceased was about to touch the ground, the appellant struck him with his bolo, wounding his left arm. As the deceased
fell to the ground, the appellant shot him in the back and fled the scene of the crime. The corpse was left in the care of a
local "curandero" despite the fact that the wound was examined and treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of
Abuyog. This treatment failed to halt the hemorrhaging, and the deceased passed away on April 15, 1934.
Issue of the case:
Whether the appellant acted in self defense?
Whether deceased death was directly caused by the wounds the defendants caused?
there is no element of self-defense in the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the use of a lethal
weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the
natural consequences of his act. It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant that if the deceased had secured
proper surgical treatment, the wound would not have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this assault took place,
proper modern surgical service is not available.
The general rule is." that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that
is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful
medical or surgical treatment “. Fixing the period of confinement at six years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment appealed from as thus modified is affirmed.
28
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
FILEMON BAYUTAS
Facts of the case:
On the evening of October 8, 1913, Alfonso Carvajal and Esteban Paras had just finished playing a game of pool in a
Barili hall when the defendant, Filemon Bayutas, advised placing a wager on Carvajal and against Paras. In view of the
fact that he, Paras, and the defendant were cousins and treated one another like brothers, the latter advised Bayutas not to
do so. In response, Bayutas instructed Paras to remain still and carry on playing. "All fine, as you like; name the bet; that
is my suggestion," Paras then replied. Esteban Paras was just getting ready to make the first stroke of the game with the
cue in his hand. As Paras turned to face his attacker, the accused Bayutas attacked him with a blow to the nape of the neck
with a piece of hard wood almost two inches in diameter. As a result of this second blow to the forehead, Paras passed
unconscious. One of the witnesses present at the time of the incident detained the defendant when he tried to strike Paras a
third time.
Issue of the case:
Whether the alibi of self defense of the accused will be consider by the court?
The Court believed testimony of the injured man and his witnesses unquestionably shows that Paras did not make any
prior unlawful assault, but that after a slight altercation with Paras the defendant, undoubtedly angered by Paras’ reproach
in saying that being relatives and treating each other like brothers the defendant ought not to bet against him in the billiard
game, placed himself behind and to the left of Paras at the time the latter was partly stretched out and bent over the table
in the act of making a stroke to start the game, and unexpectedly, with a thick, hard club, struck Paras a heavy blow on the
nape of the neck; that when the latter turned his face to see by whom he had been hit the defendant dealt him another blow
on the forehead which rendered him temporarily unconscious; and that Paras did not receive a third blow from his
assailant because one of the eye-witnesses, Fructuoso Bargamento, restrained Filemon Bayutas.
29
vs.
JUAN QUIANZON
Facts of the case:
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the deceased person's soul's right to vote was being performed at Victoria Cacpal's
home in a neighborhood close to the poblacion of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the customary
participation of the family and friends. Between three and four in the afternoon, the incident that gave rise to the filing of
these allegations occurred. One of the attendees, Andres Aribuabo, went to Juan Quianzon, who was at the time in the
kitchen and seemed to be in charge of the food, to beg for food. When Aribuabo approached Quianzon for the same
reason a second or third time, the latter became enraged and grabbed a firebrand, placing it on Aribuabo's neck. Aribuabo
then went to the area where the crowd was assembled, yelling that he was injured and dying. He revealed to everyone in
attendance a wound in his abdomen below the navel by lifting his shirt. On the tenth day following the incident, Aribuabo
passed away as a result of this wound. The defense contends that even if it is agreed that the accused caused Aribuabo's
fatal wound, he should only be found guilty of serious physical injuries rather than murder because the deceased would
have survived had he not twice removed the drainage that Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection.
Issue of the case:

Whether the defendant is criminally responsible for Aribuabo's death?
YES, the argument is unfounded. The infection was caused by the fecal matter from the large intestine that had been
perforated, according to the doctor who examined whether or not he could survive. The possibility, acknowledged by said
doctor, that the patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that he would
have. Even without the patient's action, a catastrophic outcome may have occurred, and the fact that the patient behaved in
this way during a fit of anguish does not change the legal ramifications of the accused's criminal crime. The law considers
someone who harms another to have committed murder if such harm directly or indirectly results in that other person's
death. Even if other factors contributed to the death, the actor is still accountable for it.
The exposure of the internal organs in consequence of a surgical operation in the abdomen sometimes results in a
paralysis of the ileum and that said operation had to be performed on account of the abdominal injury inflicted by
appellant. It is well settled that:
... every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person
inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of
this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated
in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment,
which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be
deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held
responsible. But, however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment."
30
vs.
GERARDO CORNEL
Facts of the case:
The first feature of appellant's case as presented by his counsel de officio, refers to the alleged inadequacy of the evidence
for the prosecution establishing appellant's identity Trinidad Coral, however, personally saw (1) the appellant suddenly
assault her deceased husband (Fabian Burac) with a bolo as the latter was descending the stairs of his house ; (2) after
Fabian Burac (then wounded in the forehead) fell, the appellant threw a stone which hit Fabian's right clavicle, and (3) the
appellant thereafter led in the direction of his house.
On the conjecture that Trinidad might have made a mistake in identifying her husband's assailant, considering the time of
the attack. Apart, therefore, from the testimony of another witness for the government (Caspara Bendicio) to the effect
that when she asked Fabian not long after the incident in question as to what had happened, Fabian replied that he. had
been boloed by the appeal which testimony (alleged by the appellant to be inadmisible) was accepted by the trial court
under the rule res gestae, there is sufficient proof regarding appellant identity. Moreover, it should be remembered that the
appellant was prosecuted, though only for physical injuries even before Fabian's death which occurred several days after
June 8, 1945.
Issue of the case:
Whether or whether the accused's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt?
Contrary to the appellant's claims, the testimony of Fabian Burac's wife and mother-in-law establishes his death. The civil
registrar of Tabaco's certificate from August 3, 1945, stating that the matter had not been registered in his office, only
indicates that no report had been filed up until that point; it does not, however, disprove Fabian's demise in any way.
When Fabian Burac last presented for treatment on June 15,1945, Dr. Mariano Cruel had already noted Fabian's rigid
muscles and slight lock-jaw, and it is for this very reason that he prescribed anti-tetanic serum, which, not being then
available in the place, was never actually administered on the patient. The Court had no doubt that Fabian Burac died, as
certified by Dr. Cruel, "of tetanus secondary to the infected wound." The opinion of Dr. Cruel, who actually treated
Fabian's wound and observed the symptoms of tetanus, cannot be overruled by the appellant's speculation that Fabian may
not have died from tetanus because other diseases occasionally show tetanus symptoms. Naturally, the appellant must be
held accountable for the results of his illegal action.
The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

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