ROLE OF LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION IN THE LANDMARK CASE OF MAQBOOL

HUSSAIN V. STATE OF BOMBAY

Final Draft submitted to Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai

In fulfilment of the requirement of Internal Evaluation for Interpretation of Statutes

FINAL DRAFT

SUBMITTED BY:

NAME- ATHARVA NIKAM

ENROLMENT NO.- 2019 056 (SECTION – A)

SUPERVISED BY:

PROF. ABHIJIT MORE

B.A. LL.B. (HONS.), FIFTH YEAR, NINTH SEMESTER

INTRODUCTION

The courts use a variety of notions to help them comprehend how to interpret legislation. One such
basic premise is the "Literal Rule of Interpretation." This rule advises courts to read legislation in a
straightforward, literal manner, which is why it is also known as the grammatical rule or the plain-
meaning rule. It indicates that when judges interpret statutes, they must stick to the natural or common
sense meanings of the words used in the text, rather than adopting new interpretations. In essence,
this rule emphasises the need of reading statutory language word for word, with no space for other
interpretations. If, after applying this criterion, the meaning of a legislative provision becomes crystal
evident, it must be enforced, regardless of the potential implications.

The court's responsibility is only to uphold the clear wording of the law, without regard for
prospective consequences. If any unfavourable effects develop, it is the job of the legislature to handle
them. This approach, stated by Lord Brougham, emphasises the necessity of using words in their
literal and natural meanings unless certain features of the legislation demand or modify their
interpretation. To see how this rule works in practise, see the famous case of Maqbool Hussain v.
State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325. In this case, a foreign national landed at an Indian airport and
was discovered to be in possession of illegal gold. Customs officials seized the gold and filed a lawsuit
against him under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.

The key question was whether Article 20(2) may be used to seek double jeopardy protection. The
Supreme Court's decision was based on its interpretation of the phrase "prosecution." The court
determined that the proceedings carried out by the customs authorities did not constitute a
'prosecution' in the legal sense, and that the penalty imposed was not a 'punishment' imposed by a
judicial authority. As a result, the petitioner's criminal trial was not barred. Article 20(2) was
determined to apply only where the same offence was prosecuted and punished before a legal or
judicial body.

Article 20's phrasing meant that it applied to criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial
body. The term 'prosecution' in this sense refers to the beginning of criminal proceedings in line with
the legislation controlling the offence. The Supreme Court ruled that sea customs authority did not
form a judicial tribunal, and measures done under the Sea Customs Act, such as seizure and fines, did

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not qualify as judgements or orders of a legal or judicial body, which are required to sustain a double
jeopardy plea.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Whether the Literal Rule of Interpretation was used by the Hon’ble Apex Court while delivering
its judgment in the landmark case of Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study will take a broad approach, including legal examination of India's data protection
legislation, comparisons with worldwide data privacy standards, and case studies of firms negotiating
cross-border data transfers. The study relies on the secondary research approach, often known as
armchair research. The secondary research approach is based on the examination of secondary data.
Secondary data is information that has previously been gathered, collated, and disseminated by other
researchers. This study is based on genuine secondary data gathered from a variety of sources,
including books, research papers, and internet sites.

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UNDERSTANDING LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

The Literal Rule of Interpretation, one of the oldest and most durable rules used by judges worldwide,
is a cornerstone in the legal environment. This rule is guided by the idea that it serves a critical role
in preventing judicial prejudice when it comes to political concerns. Furthermore, it functions as a
constraint, prohibiting courts from developing new legal principles by interpreting current legislation.
This regulation is notable for its devotion to following the precise text of the Legislature, guaranteeing
a consistent and straightforward interpretation of the law. Every coin has two sides, and the Literal
Rule, while important in its own right, is not without flaws.

It occasionally results in legislation that are opaque, irrational, or conflicting with the lawmakers'
original objectives. It is critical to recognise that there can be no universally defined norm for
interpretation, just as no legislation can be written without the possibility of numerous
interpretations. The Literal Rule, also known as the Plain-Meaning Rule, is a type of statutory
construction that requires the use of the normal and natural meanings of terms in a legislation. The
fundamental premise is that the law should be understood exactly as stated, without deviating from
its genuine meaning. In legal interpretation, this approach is consistent with textualism and, to a
lesser extent, originalism.

Legislators frequently include "definitions" sections into statutes to overcome any misunderstandings.
These parts expressly define essential terminology used in that law. However, some legislation either
do not have definitions or do not define certain terminology. The Plain-Meaning Rule acts as a
guiding light for the courts in such circumstances. It instructs them to interpret terms according to
their plain, usual, and literal meanings, unless the act expressly states otherwise. In essence, this rule
tries to guarantee that, in the lack of legislative definitions to the contrary, the terms used in a
legislation be given their plain, common connotations, so ensuring legal clarity and uniformity.

The first and most important guideline in reading legislation is to presume that technical terminology
are used in their technical definition if established, and in their ordinary connotation otherwise.
Furthermore, phrases and sentences should be constructed in accordance with grammatical
standards1. Initially, the ordinary, everyday meanings of the terms in a legislation are to be assigned.
Unless there is a strong cause to the contrary, the grammatical meaning should prevail when it is
plain, definite, and devoid of dispute. When there is no ambiguity in the language, interpretation is

1
P. St. J. Langan, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, p.28 (12 th ed., 2008).
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unneeded. The simple understanding of the language is the most compelling argument in legislative
interpretation. When the language is not just plain, but only allows for one meaning, the work of
interpretation becomes almost non-existent2.

The court's task is merely to interpret the statute's language in their natural and usual sense. The literal
interpretation of words is a fundamental element of legislative construction. Courts must use the terms
used by the law and apply naturally implicit meanings to them3. The widespread interpretation of a
term should also be evaluated under the Literal Rule. For example, the term "marriage" historically
meant only to conventional marriage, but with the rise of live-in couples, courts must interpret it to
meet common perception. While words may have some ambiguity in their meanings, the general rule
is that judges regard the statute's terms to be binding when they obviously connect to the matter at
hand.

This broad concept states that the court cannot apply the legislation to a circumstance that is not
expressly covered by its words, even if it is consistent with the aim of the act (casus omissus). It also
cannot limit the legislation by excluding a case that the text expressly states should be excluded.
While in ordinary life this rule may appear to neglect sophisticated language interpretation, it is
critical in legal interpretation4. The construction of Article 233(2) of the Indian Constitution was
relevant in the case of Deepak Aggarwal v Keshav Kaushik. This article lists the requirements for
being appointed as a District Judge.

The Supreme Court of India decided, using Literal Interpretation, that "has been" indicates continuous
position as an advocate from a period in the past to the present.5 As a result, at the time of their
application, such a person must still be working as an advocate. This exemplifies the notion that the
court must infer that the legislature acted deliberately and without mistake. If an interpretation results
in a consequence that is counter to the legislature's purpose, it is the job of the legislature to revise
the act, rather than the court changing the plain meaning to obtain a different result. When there is
only one plausible meaning of a legislative provision, the court cannot accept a different interpretation
simply because an other view would result in illogical or ludicrous results. This commitment to the
Literal Rule highlights the need of clarity and consistency in legislative interpretation, even if it
appears inflexible in the context of daily language use.

2
Salmond, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, p.152 (11 th ed.).
3
Supra note 2.
4
Glanville Williams, LEARNING THE LAW, p.102, 103, 105 (11 th ed., 2010).
5
Deepak Aggarwal v Keshav Kaushik, (2013) 5 SCC 277, p 331.
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ANALYSING THE LANDMARK CASE OF MAQBOOL HUSSAIN V. STATE OF BOMBAY

The double jeopardy principle, as a procedural defense, serves as a fundamental safeguard, preventing
a Defendant from facing multiple trials for the same criminal offense based on identical sets of facts.
This principle embodies the profound idea that subjecting an individual to the peril of punishment for
a crime more than once is a grave injustice. The roots of the Prosecution Doctrine trace back to the
well-established maxim of English Common Law, known as 'Nemo debit bis vexari,' which
eloquently conveys that an individual should never be convicted twice for the same crime. This
ancient legal tenet, born from the crucible of centuries of legal evolution, upholds the core values of
fairness and justice in the legal system.

In the intricate realm of Common Law, a Defendant may invoke the doctrines of 'autrefois acquit' and
'autrefois convict,' both of which hinge on the crucial premise that the Defendant has previously been
acquitted or convicted of the very same offence. When such a situation arises, it triggers a meticulous
process wherein the evidence is presented before the Court. The Court, in its wisdom, undertakes a
preliminary examination to determine whether the plea holds merit. If the plea is upheld, the projected
Trial is rendered impermissible, ensuring that the Defendant is shielded from double jeopardy.It is in
the context of these legal intricacies that we delve into the case of Maqbool Hussain v. State of
Bombay, a landmark judgment that provided profound insights into the principles of prosecution and
double jeopardy. This case not only served as a pivotal moment in legal history but also shed light on
the evolving nuances of this vital legal safeguard."

The Petitioner, an Indian citizen, arrived at Bombay's Santa Cruz airport from Jeddah on a crisp
November 6th 1949. Upon landing, he made a critical omission by failing to declare the 107.2 tolas
of gold he had brought with him. However, his oversight didn't go unnoticed, as vigilant Customs
Authorities discovered that he had contravened a government notification dating back to August 25,
1948. In response to this breach, the Customs Authorities invoked the formidable Article 167, clause
(8), of the Sea Customs Act VIII of 1878, leading to the confiscation of the concealed gold. But the
gold owner found himself facing an alternative, albeit expensive, recourse. He could opt to pay a
substantial fine of 12,000 rupees within a narrow window of four months after the issuance of the
order.

Fast forward to the 30th of January 1950, the order copy was dispatched to the Appellant, yet no one
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stepped forward to redeem the impounded gold. Consequently, the judicial wheels were set in motion.
On the 26th of November 1952, the Court decreed that the plea would be heard by the venerable Bank
of the Constitution, in conjunction with Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 1952. This decision was informed
by the recognition that an identical point of contention had also arisen concerning the venerable legal
doctrines of 'autrefois convict' or 'double jeopardy.' Issues disputed in the present case are mentioned
below:

• Whether the Plea has violated Article 20(2) of the Indian constitution and will be raised?

• Whether the jail superintendent is punished for his acts as reported by the Petitioner?

The Petitioner's Counsel raised a compelling argument, asserting that subjecting their client to a
second prosecution clearly violated the constitutional safeguard enshrined in Article 20 (2). They
emphasised that this provision was designed to shield individuals from being tried repeatedly for the
same offence. Furthermore, the Counsel contended that the actions undertaken by the Superintendent
of the Jail could be reasonably construed as a form of prosecution and punishment for an identical
offense. Such a stance, they maintained, constituted a blatant infringement of the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution.

The Petitioners went on to emphasize that Sections 45, 46, and 52 of the Prisons Act (9 of 1894)
vested the Superintendent of Jail with judicial authority to assess and prosecute inmates for similar
crimes, including detention under the Punjab Communist Detention Rules, 1950. These rules, they
argued, placed detainees within the same category as civilian prisoners, thus placing the onus squarely
on the Superintendent. Their failure to adhere to these principles, they asserted, amounted to a grave
transgression. In response, the advocate representing the Respondent articulated a counter-argument,
asserting that the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, constituted a comprehensive and self-
contained legal framework. They emphasized that the provisions of the Prisons Act, 1894, had no
relevance or applicability to the specific circumstances of this case.

Furthermore, they posited that the actions taken by the Jail Superintendent could not be characterized
as judicial proceedings, and thus, there existed no element of prosecution and punishment of the
Petitioners under the purview of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. The Respondent's legal team
proceeded to advance the contention that the actions undertaken by the Jail Superintendent were in
essence disciplinary measures, squarely falling within the scope and intent of Section 4(a) of the Act

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and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950. Consequently, they maintained that there was no
prosecutorial or punitive aspect in relation to the Petitioners as defined under Article 20(2) of the
Constitution."

The Court went on to deliver a significant ruling, emphasizing that the Sea Customs Authorities, in
their capacity, did not possess the attributes of a judicial tribunal. They underscored that the acts of
adjudicating on matters such as confiscation, the imposition of heightened duties, or penalties under
the provisions of the Sea Customs Act did not constitute a formal judgment or order emanating from
a recognized court or judicial tribunal. Consequently, such actions could not serve as the basis for
supporting a plea of prosecution under the law. Furthermore, the Court meticulously analyzed the
essence of Article 20 (2) and delineated a critical criterion.

They made it abundantly clear that in order for a citizen to invoke the protection afforded by this
constitutional provision, there must be a clear record of prosecution and subsequent punishment
pertaining to the same offence committed by the same individual within the precincts of a recognized
court of law. The very language employed in Article 20, coupled with its contextual framework,
strongly suggested that it was tailored to encompass proceedings of a distinctly criminal nature within
the purview of a court of law or a duly recognized judicial tribunal. Consequently, the term
'prosecution' in this context explicitly refers to the initiation or commencement of criminal
proceedings before a duly recognized court or judicial tribunal, following the precise procedures
prescribed by the statute governing the offence and outlining the procedure therein.

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CONCLUSION

The main rule of interpretation is the literal rule. The Courts interpret legislation in a literal and
ordinary manner under the literal rule of interpretation. They interpret the statute's language in a way
that everyone understands. It is the court's responsibility to use the grammatical meaning of
interpretation. The legislation should be read or interpreted as if there is no alternative meaning other
than the literal meaning. It is an old and well-established norm of statutory interpretation. This
interpretation rule is applied not just in England, where it originated, but also in India. The
interpretation is ambiguous if it is susceptible to multiple interpretations in one situation, but clear if
it is susceptible to different meanings in other settings. Because the norm is to follow the exact terms
of the laws, some lawyers argue that it is akin to enforcing a rule even when you know it is wrong. If
the court follows the literal norm and believes that the interpretation is ethically incorrect, it cannot
avoid providing the interpretation. Some criticise this rule, claiming that it emphasises or focuses on
the incorrect notion that words have a fixed meaning. In reality, sometimes the wording are unclear,
causing justices to impose their own preconceptions in order to discern the proper interpretation of a
legislation.

When dealing with circumstances that are all unique in some way, there cannot be a stable norm for
the purpose of interpretation. Similarly, there cannot be a legislation that is written with no room for
interpretation. According to Supreme Court Justice Donaldson, "the interpretation of laws is a skill
as much as an art and the justices, as artisans, choose and implement the proper regulations as the
instruments of their trade" . This is the oldest rule, and it is still used by judges who do not wish to
legislate. Even if a minor interpretation alters the significance, it is tantamount to forming a new law,
and hence Judges favour the original intent of words in Statute provisions. Grey states that It is the
responsibility of the the judiciary to determine the exact lawful interpretation of the terms used by the
legislature" . And the Judges are not required to adhere to any particular concept or method of
interpretation in order to do this. As courts are places of justice, the courts shouldn't pick one of the
Guidelines of Interpreting and apply it to the case; rather, the courts should consider all potential
options and reach at a balanced judgement.

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