Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Sale & Lease Notes 2016
Sale & Lease Notes 2016
Sale & Lease Notes 2016
SALE:
Title: it’s not an essentialia of a contract of sale that the seller of the
thing undertake to stand in for his title – a clause in the contract that
the seller should guarantee his title – ie. That he is the owner of the
thing! THE SELLER DOES NOT NEED TO BE THE OWNER OF THE
THING FOR A VALID CONTRACT OF SALE TO TAKE PLACE, NOR
DOES DELIVERY NEED TO TAKE PLACE OR PAYMENT TO BE
MADE. ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SELLER
TO DELIVER AND AN UNDERTAKING BY THE BUYER TO PAY THE
PURCHASE PRICE.
As long as the parties agree that the seller will, in exchange for
payment, give possession of the thing to the buyer = contract of sale,
even though both parties are well aware that the seller isn’t the owner
= BUT it is a naturalia that the seller stand in for the eviction of the
purchaser.
The emptio rei speratae (sale of a future thing) and the empti spei (sale
of pure chance:
Contract where one party undertakes to deliver a thing not yet in
existence to another in exchange for a sum of money – can be a sale
even if the thing doesn’t exist at the time of the conclusion of the
contract.
The seller then has a duty to deliver the thing and also see that the
thing materializes.
It must be possible to deliver the thing as from the conclusion of ht
contract – if not the contract will be of no force and effect =
impossibility of performance.
Correct construction:
a) The buyer cant claim the thing immediately because a party to
the contract can claim performance only after a reasonable time
has elapsed - the buyer must aloe the seller a reasonable time
to prepare the thing
b) The seller carries the risk that the thing sold wont materialize,
because that is what the parties agreed.
3. Emptio spei
When a thing, which hasn’t yet come into existence, is sold and it’s
agreed that the buyer will be liable for the purchase price even if the
thing never materializes.
If the price was originally expressed in money and the parties later
agree that the buyer may render performance in another form or the
seller is released from his obligation.
The parties are agreed that a price is being stipulated the only
question is the extent of the price.
It’s a question of legal policy whether such a contract should be a
valid contract of sale.
Two possibilities:
a) Where the seller is a merchant, it can be said that there’s a tacit
agreement that the sellers usual price has to be paid
b) Where the seller doesn’t have a usual price it can be said that
there’s a tacit agreement that the market price has to be paid
The seller of a movable need not seek out the buyer (duty not
necessarily positive), but must place the thing at the disposal of the
buyer.
He must ensure that the thing is ready for delivery. There is also a
duty on him to give the buyer notice – see MCQ (Q about a moveable
sold, and must it be delivered to the buyer’s house BY LAW?).
The act of delivery must be of such a nature that the buyer will get
undisturbed possession of the thing by taking delivery of it – ie.
vacua possessio.
Seller of immovable property must remove from the property sold all
movables, which aren’t included in the sale agreement – and remove
all unlawful and lawful possessors.
York: when the duty to give possession is considered. With
trespassers, the mere fact of their physical presence, if it results in
deprivation of the buyer’s right to secure the enjoyment in possession
of his purchase is enough to justify the purchaser in claiming that the
seller has failed to carry out his obligation.
Does the mere fact that there’s a person other than the seller who has
a right to the thing sold (servitude) mean that the seller can’t give
undisturbed possession? – Means a bona fide seller of a thing, which
belongs to someone else, could never give undisturbed possession,
which isn’t in accordance with law.
Mostert: undisturbed possession: at the time when transfer of
possession takes place, there must be no interference with the
physical possession of the buyer and that the existence of a servitude
doesn’t mean that there’s interference with the buyers physical
possession.
Such interference only takes place if the holder of the right is
exercising his right at the time possession is transferred to the buyer
= correct. THUS, IF THE HOLDER OF THE SERVITUDE IS
EXCERCISING HIS RIGHT (THUS WALKING OVER THE LAND) WHEN
NEW OWNER MOVES IN, THE SELLER HAS NOT GIVEN THE NEW
OWNER (BUYER) VACUA POSSESSIO. ITS NOT THE EXISTENCE OF
THE SERVITUDE THAT PREVENTS VACUA POSSESSIO, BUT THE
The thing must be delivered in the condition it was when the contract
was concluded.
The seller must deliver all accessories and attachments, except where
they are excluded by agreement.
With immovable, any objects, which have lost their movable character
by attachment, must be regarded as the thing sold. Even if the objects
haven’t been rendered immovable by attachment but which intended
for permanent use of the house, such as covering of a well, bolts,
hooks and keys must be delivered with the principal thing.
Attachments to movables remain movables – but could form one unit
= keys to the car.
The seller must transfer to the buyer all fruits and profits produced by
the thing after the sale has become perfecta.
This rule is based on the principal that, since risk attached to the
buyer after the sale is perfecta, the profit must follow the prejudice.
Onus: the seller who has transferred possession of the thing to the
buyer in accordance with the requirements has discharged his
obligation to provide undisturbed possession of the thing. The onus
rests on the seller to prove that he has complied with these
requirements.
Seller’s obligation to take care of the thing until it’s handed over:
After the contract has been entered into but before delivery of the
thing – the seller is obliged to look after the thing. The purchaser
carries the risk of accidental damage or destruction of the thing sold
after the contract is perfecta.
The seller is liable if the damage or destruction of the thing is her
fault.
Degree of care:
That of a reasonable person – but it may be agreed that the seller use
less or more care – the onus of proving that he bestowed the required
care rests on the seller.
If there is a mora (delay) on the part of the buyer with accepting
delivery = mora creditoris – the seller will only be liable if the thing is
damaged or destroyed intentionally or by gross negligence.
Purchaser’s remedies:
he may cancel the contract because of the seller’s neglect of his duty
of custody. May also claim damages for full loss.
Where the damage or destruction can be imputed to a 3rd party, the
seller incurs no liability. If the risk is the buyers the seller must cede
any claim, which he has against a 3rd party.
The seller may be sued in terms of the actio empti, which is the
general action afforded for breach of contract. South African courts
have held that the actio empti may also be used by a buyer to claim
damages from a seller who misrepresents the characteristics of the
thing sold. In this case, it is not breach of contract, but delict, which
is the ground for the actio empti.
The actio empti may also be used to claim damages from
manufacturers or dealers whose products are defective. However, it is
not certain whether the liability is based on the breach of an ex lege
warranty (warranty implied by law) or misrepresentation. The actio
empti is also employed here irrespective of whether the ground for its
employment is contractual or delictual express or tacit guarantee.
The seller may be sued in terms of the actio empti if his performance
is defective. The seller's performance will be defective if he delivers a
defective article after guaranteeing (expressly or tacitly) the absence of
such defects, or delivers a thing without the commendable
Trade-ins:
The courts are divided on the question whether the aedilition actions
are also available to the seller for dicta et promissa made by the
purchaser in regard to the thing traded in as part of the purchase
price. The courts have held that the aedilition actions are not available
to the seller (Mountbatten Investments).
However, in Janse van Rensburg, the court held that the aedilition
remedies should be available to the seller for dicta et promissa made
by the purchaser regarding the trade-in, because this is an instance
where the common law should be extended and adapted. In a trade-in
agreement, it would be unjust, inequitable and unreasonable should
the seller be liable for latent defects in, and misrepresentations
relating to, the vehicle sold by him, while no such liability attaches to
the purchaser in regard to the vehicle traded-in by him. The
purchaser would in fact be at large, while proclaiming his innocence
and good faith, to deliver a defective trade-in vehicle in the knowledge
that the seller will have no recourse against him by means of the
aedilitian actions. If the aedilitian actions are available to the one, so
also should they be available to the other. It would also be in conflict
with public policy, which represents the balanced interests of all
members of a community, including those participating in commercial
interaction with one another.
The courts regarded the extension of the application of the aedilitian
actions to be in line with the spirit and values contained in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. The approach in the Janse van Rensburg
case is to be preferred.
SA law holds a seller liable if she sells a thing with latent defects, even
if she did not give an express or tacit guarantee.
not imply that there can be only one defect which renders the thing
less useful; it is possible for a number of minor defects to culminate in
an impairment of the
thing's usefulness for the purpose for which it is normally intended.
In Knight v Trollip – a similar definition, but, it is added, that, if the
thing does not comply with the special purpose for which it was
bought to the knowledge of the seller, this must be regarded as a
defect. Some modern writers hold the same view. Where the thing is
bought for a special purpose, of which the seller is aware, it would
appear, however, that it is assumed either that representations were
made (which, according to the circumstances of the case, constitute
an express guarantee or a misrepresentation), or that the parties
tacitly agreed that the thing was suitable for a special purpose.
Although this will give rise to the aedilitian actions as well, it is
actually a case which should fall within the scope of liability for
misrepresentation or faulty performance.
In a number of cases, the courts correctly held that the seller tacitly
guaranteed fitness of purpose.
It would appear that our courts regard the presence of a servitude
which was not communicated to the purchaser when the contract was
entered into, as a latent defect. In Southern Life Association v Segall,
a servitude was regarded as a defect, but, with reference to Voet, it
was stated that the purchaser may act only in terms of the actio
quanti minoris. A further requirement laid down is that the seller
must deliberately have concealed the servitude (ie made an intentional
misrepresentation), or have guaranteed that the thing was free of any
servitudes (ie breach of contract).
person would have discovered the defect, it is said that the purchaser
should have known about it.
The nature of the inspection which a reasonable person would have
conducted, will not always be the same. For example, if there are
indications that latent defects are reasonably to be expected, a
reasonable person will conduct a far more careful inspection, as in the
case of the sale of a very old car.
A reasonable person will always notice very obvious defects.
Where we are dealing with an expert purchaser (or an expert who
conducts an inspection for latent defects on behalf of the purchaser),
she should have known of the defect in the thing as a matter of
course.
The balance of authority seems to be against any rule that a
purchaser who has employed an expert is taken to have known of a
defect which should have been discoverable by that expert, but the
fact that there has been expert examination may in some cases go to
show that there has in fact been knowledge of the defect.
The modern writers support this. The position is thus that, if the
defect would have been reasonably discovered by a reasonable person
possessing the same knowledge as the expert, knowledge of the defect
is ascribed to her (or her principal).
5. The defect must have existed at the time the contract was
entered into.
This is a question of fact: did the defect exist when the agreement was
entered into, or did it develop later? If it developed after the conclusion
of the contract, the prejudice is naturally that of the purchaser.
However, it will sometimes be difficult to prove that the defect was
present at the time the contract was entered into. The onus of proving
this fact rests on the purchaser. If she proves that the defect existed
shortly after the agreement was entered into, this may contribute to
the discharge of the onus.
i) Actio redhibitoria:
The actio redhibitoria is available if the purchaser can prove that a
reasonable person would not have bought the article had she been
aware of the defects. Where more than one article has been bought
and one is affected by a serious defect, there must be restitution of
not only the single article but of all the articles, provided that it is
apparent that it was the intention to sell the articles as a unit, and the
purchaser can prove that a reasonable person would not have bought
it had she been aware of the defect in the article. If this is not the
case, there can be restitution of no more than the single article.
The purchaser may set the contract aside and claim restitutio in
integrum under the actio redhibitoria. This means that the seller must
repay the purchase price with interest and compensate for all
reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the thing from the
time of its receipt. For her part, the purchaser must return the thing,
unless it has been destroyed through no fault of her own. If it is her
own fault that the thing has been destroyed or materially damaged,
the action is not available.
Where the purchaser has alienated the thing, there can be no
rescission if the intention to waive her right of rescission can be
deduced from her conduct.
Trade-ins:
In Wastie, it was held that not only the buyer but also the seller can
invoke the aedilitian actions where the thing traded in has a latent
defect.
The facts of this case were briefly as follows. SM sold W a motorcar for
R1 250. The purchase price consisted of R400 in cash, and W traded
in his old motorcar for the balance. When the contract of purchase
and sale had been concluded, SM discovered that the motorcar which
had been traded in had a
latent defect. It would cost R120 to repair the defect. SM claimed the
R120 under the actio quanti minoris on the ground that a latent
defect was present at the time of conclusion of the contract of sale.
The court held that, where a part of the purchase price consists in
something other than money, the same principle that applies to the
thing sold, applies to the non- monetary part of the price. The reason
is that, in contracts of exchange, both contracting parties are
protected by the aedilitian actions against latent defects in the things
which are the subject matter of these contracts, and that it would be
unfair and illogical not to afford similar protection to the seller in
respect of the thing traded in. Thus the judge held that the seller
could also invoke the actio quanti minoris if the non-monetary part of
the price contained a latent defect.
The purchaser who is entitled to use the actio empti because of the
presence of a misrepresentation or the absence of guaranteed
commendable characteristics, may, if she prefers, use the aedilitian
actions if a latent defect is present in the thing sold.
2. Where the purchaser has waived his rights. This waiver may be
tacit or express, at the time the agreement was entered into or
thereafter.
Courts have held that the actio empti is the action used against the
manufacturer.
Liability is founded on either breach of a warranty implied by law or
on misrep taking the form of failure to disclose the presence of a
defect because knowledge of the defect is imputed to the manufacturer
(Holmdene Brickworks: court said that there was a likelihood that the
basis of liability would lead to different results, the court therefore,
merely approached the question as on of breach of contract.
Jaffe: the court said that the liability of the dealer is based on non-
fulfillment of a tacit warranty – but in such a case its better to work
with misrepresentation or a warranty implied by law against latent
defects.
The seller isn’t required to be the owner of the thing for the sale to be
valid. The aim of the contract is the buyer should become the owner of
the thing sold in place of the seller.
The seller has an obligation to transfer every right and benefit arising
from the thing sold to the buyer.
If the seller isn’t the owner of the thing, the contract is valid but the
seller must guarantee that no one with a better title will evict the
buyer.
Transfer of ownership:
If the seller is the owner he is obliged to transfer ownership to the
buyer. The action for the transfer = actio empti.
Abstract system of transfer of ownership
A real agreement is required – ownership is transferred if there is a
valid, real agreement: mutual intention that ownership should pass
coupled with delivery or registration.
The abstract system is followed: the invalidity of the contract doesn’t
affect the validity of the transfer of ownership. Only a valid real
agreement is required
Delivery must be made to the buyer himself or his representative
(carrier).
Its not a requirements for the validity of the sale contract that the
seller be the owner of the thing sold – if he isn’t the owner, the law
implies a warranty into the contract that no-one with a better title will
deprive the buyer of his right to possession = naturalia of the contract.
The fact that the seller is liable for eviction doesn’t imply that he may
sell an article belonging to another, with full knowledge that he isn’t
the owner, since he would be guilty of misrepresentation.
Wessels Trustee: the claim would then be based on eviction and the
buyer would have to await eviction.
tried to recover these amounts from the seller as damages resulting from
breach of warranty against eviction.
Decided: against him.
The eviction in regard to which the warranty exists must be one in
respect of a flaw in the title of the seller, which existed at the time of the
sale or is due to some act on the part of the seller – the threats, which
occurred to the buyer, didn’t arise out of a flaw in title.
2. Notice:
The buyer must give the seller notice of the 3rd party’s claim of
possession of the thing – must be given in good time so that the seller
has an opportunity to fulfill his general obligation to protect the
purchaser in his possession. The seller may enter into negotiations
with the true owner or may participate in an action instituted against
the buyer.
If the buyer fails to give the seller notice he has no right of recourse
against the seller – unless he can prove that the 3rd parties claim is
unassailable or it’s the seller’s fault that the notice didn’t reach him in
time.
In ABSA Bank Ltd v Eksteen court held that where the seller receives
a notice of the threatened eviction from the buyer and does not
respond, the seller cannot later argue that the buyer should have
resisted the third party’s claim more energetically or skilfully.
Where the seller decides not to get involved after getting notice and
the buyer is evicted after conducting a proper defence = the seller cant
question the 3rd parties right to the thing sold as this is sufficient
proof.
Q: if a buyer today has to conduct a virilis defensio as a prerequisite
for his claim against the seller = 2 situations:
a) The 3rd parties claim is legally unassailable and notice has been
given to the seller – to conduct the defense here would be a
waste of time (Lammers)
b) The 3rd parties claim isn’t unassailable – notice must be given
before the buyer can sue the seller – don’t need to defend = after
the seller is given notice, he has only himself to blame if the
buyer is evicted
This decision leaves open the possibility that where the thing is sold is
a depreciating asset; the buyer who has had an uninterrupted period
of use and possession may not be able to recover the full purchased
price on eviction.
The court can free the seller from repayment of part of the purchase
price.
Apart from the purchase price the buyer can then claim from the
seller any further damages he may have sustained because of the
eviction – i.e. reasonably foreseeable damages.
The court also refused in Katzeff to regard a car as a fast depreciating
asset.
As part of his damages for eviction the buyer can also claim that the
seller reimburse him for improvements which he effected to the thing
Lammers: the buyer to the knowledge of the seller made improvements
to a car, which increased in value from R50 to R250.
When threatened by the true owner he handed the car over after
notifying the seller. The seller did nothing about the matter, but when
sued by the buyer, alleged that he was only responsible for the amount
of R50. As far as the improvements were concerned the buyer had a
claim of enrichment as well as a lien against the true owner.
Consequently he should never have surrendered the car and the seller
wasn’t liable since the buyer hadn’t put up a virilis defensio.
On appeal majority of the court found that the buyer wasn’t obliged to
put up the defence after notice to the seller = seller liable on the ground
of breach of warranty for all foreseeable damage.
Partial eviction: buyer will be able to retain what he ahs left after
eviction and will be able to claim compensation, calculated according
to his positive interest for that part of the thing of which he’s been
dispossessed.
___________________________________________________________
Duty of custody means that the seller must take all necessary steps
which a reasonable person would have taken to guard against the
destruction of or damage to the thing.
But expenses incurred by the seller in terms of this obligation must be
defrayed by the buyer – seller even has a lien with which to enforce
the payment of such expenses.
The buyer carries this risk even though the thing hasn’t yet been
delivered and there is no possibility that he has already become the
owner. Ownership doesn’t pass when the contract is perfecta; it only
passes on delivery or registration.
The seller must undertake custody of the thing before delivery takes
place, like a reasonable person. If he doesn’t comply with this
obligation he is liable in full for loss.
Land:
Any contract of sale, exchange or donation in terms of which a piece of
land, the right to claim transfer of land, an undivided share in land or
a real right to land is alienated must be contained in the deed of
alienation.
Deed of alienation
Contents of the deed of alienation:
S2 requires every alienation of land to be contained in the deed of
alienation, which must be signed by the parties or their agents – the
following must appear:
a) The identity of the parties
b) The essentialia of the contract in question (sale, donation or
exchange)
c) Other material terms on which the parties agreed
d) The signature of every party to the contract
The document may make it clear that the offer is intended for
someone other than the person to whom it’s addressed and that the
latter’s only function is to transmit the offer to the person for who it’s
intended.
One may address a written offer to buy property to an estate agent but
indicate that its ones intention that she should submit the offer to the
owner of the land for acceptance = the owner can validly accept the
offer which was in fact intended for her.
Wide approach: regards all terms on which the parties have agreed to
as material terms of their contract and includes every term in the
following:
a) The content and properties of every performance which must be
rendered
b) When, where and how the performance is to be rendered
c) The cooperation which each party requires regarding the
performance by the other
d) The remedies which a party will have if the other party commits
a breach
A non material term is one which contains information only and which
isn’t intended to bind the parties.
Restrictive approach:
Not all terms the parties agree to be material.
Court in Trustees v Mitchells Plain Trust: all the material terms of the
contract be reduced to writing only if the characteristics of materiality
is amenable to objective determination = examples are terms going to
date of transfer or possession, the contractual duty to renovate the
premises or render them in a certain condition before transfer and
terms fixing liability for certain costs, such as transfer or survey costs.
The court regarded a term determining which of the parties had the
power to appoint the conveyancer as not being material.
Rectification
A deed of alienation can be rectified if it doesn’t correctly reflect the
intention of the parties. – Before it can be rectified it must be prima
facie valid – it must at least:
a) Contain the essentialia of the contract in question
b) Disclose the identity of the parties
c) Be signed by the parties/agents
The following people aren’t agents in terms of S2 (1) and don’t need
the written authority of the person they represent:
a) A father as natural guardian of a child
b) Guardian of a minor
c) Husband/wife married in community of property
d) Partner who acts on behalf of his co-partners
e) Curator of a person whose unfit to manage his own affairs
f) The executor of a deceased estate
g) Trustee of an insolvent estate
h) Liquidator of a company
S28 was drafted with a contract of sale in mind – but the provisions
apply to all alienations and to exchange and donation.
One or both parties may render partial or full performance before they
become aware that there is no reference to the cooling off right in the
contract – the legislature failed to make S28 applicable to such
situations.
The normal position would be that any person who renders a
performance in terms of a void contract could reclaim her
performance.
The effect of these rules was that a contract, which was wholly void
and could in principle have no effect, could be enforced if one or both
parties rendered full or partial performance
This was so much in conflict with the general principle of the law of
contract that the decisions in question were severely criticized and
when the matter came before the Cape Provincial Division it refused to
follow the Transvaal approach.
Someone who signs an offer to buy land or a deed, within 5 days after
having signed the offer or deed and before he has exercised his
cooling-off right in respect of the transaction, will on signature of the
transaction be deemed to have exercised his cooling-off right to revoke
or terminate.
Such a purchaser must notify the seller in the earlier transaction of
the revocation or termination in writing- failure to do so is a criminal
offence.
Lease:
Essentialia of a contract:
These classify a contract as one of a specific type – e.g. contract of sale
For a contract of sale you look at:
a) An undertaking by the seller to deliver the thing to the buyer
b) An undertaking by the buyer to pay a sum of money in
exchange for the thing
Naturalia:
These are included in the contract by operation of law – they don’t
need to be expressly negotiated by the parties (they are based on
notions that are fair and reasonable). The operation of these natural
terms can be excluded by agreement between the parties – i.e. the
operation of the naturalia depends on the will of the parties.
When the parties intend to enter into a type of contract = they agree
on the essentialia of the contract concerned.
The essentialia and the naturalia which is part of the contract by
operation of law amount to the contract, which are enough particulars
to ensure there is no doubt what they intend.
Parties are also free to insert other terms in their contract which the
essentialia and naturalia don’t provide for, in order to meet specific
requirements = incidental terms.
1. The lessor deliver and the lessee receive a thing or property for
the temporary use and enjoyment
2. It must be a thing or property which is being let
3. An amount of rent must be paid for the use and enjoyment
An agreement, which doesn’t comply with these 3 requirements, isn’t
a contract of lease.
The letting and hiring of the leased thing must be temporary and not
perpetuity:
The lease can’t be forever – only a contract in which temporary use
and enjoyment of the thing is granted = lease.
This doesn’t mean that a contract in which the use and enjoyment of
a thing is granted to a party in perpetuity is for that reason invalid – it
means that such a contract isn’t one of letting an hiring.
A thing which hasn’t yet come into existence can be let – the fact that
the undertaking is to deliver such a thing doesn’t automatically mean
that there can’t be a lease – locatio conductio rei spertae: if the thing
doesn’t come into being the lessor's performance becomes impossible.
Lease: the parties limit the power, which the lessee may exercise over
a thing. Only the use and fruits of the thing are granted to the tenant
The conclusion of the contract, its performance and its objective must
be lawful – it’s unlawful when its reason or conclusion is forbidden by
statute, common law or is contrary to public interest/ good morals.
Consequences of illegality:
the contract is void and unenforceable – the court won’t enforce the
illegal lease irrespective of whether the parties to the contract raise
the question of illegality.
If illegality is alleged, the party alleging it must prove it.
Ex Turpi Causa:
the 1st consequence of nullity of an illegal contract is that neither
party may institute an action on the contract – ex turpi causa: from
an immoral cause no action arises.
This is an absolute rule of contract = no exceptions.
The fact that one of the parties has performed her undertaking makes
no difference because performance doesn’t render the contract lawful.
The courts will refuse to enforce such a contract.
The argument raised to relax the application of this rule is that the
par delictum rule is founded on public interest which demand that
justice be done = it cant be in the public interest to enforce the rule
where its unjust to the plaintiff.
The par delictum rule should be applied as a general rule to which an
exception must be made whenever simple justice between man and
man demands it.
The lessor must deliver the thing at the agreed time and place – he
must make it available to the lessee.
Delivery must be such that the lessee gets vacuo possession.
The lessor must ensure that subject to an agreement to the contrary
no one will, lawfully or unlawfully, interfere with the lessee’s exercise
of the full and undisturbed use and enjoyment of the thing. The lessor
must deliver everything without which the thing can’t be used
properly.
Problem: where the lessor lets the same object to 2 different parties
but established neither in possession of the object:
A enters into a contract of lease with B, in terms of which B rents A’s
thing, before he takes possession A leases the same thing to C.
If C isn’t in possession and at the time of the contact was aware of the
contract between A and B, B’s right prevails. B can prevent A from
delivering the object to C by means of an interdict.
Where C contracted bona fide with A = problem:
Some jurists apply the prior in tempore rule – B can prevent A from
putting C in possession.
Other holds that C should be given possession.
Our courts follow the prior in tempore rule.
Lessee’s remedies:
if there is a major breach of contract – where the debtor fails to deliver
the thing = cancellation, this includes the case where the condition of
the property is such that it’s unfit for the purposes for which it was let
= can cancel and possibly to get an action for specific performance.
The appellant raised the argument that the contract had an implied
term that the respondent wouldn’t take any steps to interfere with the
access to the hotel and prevent the flow of custom to the hotel.
The judge: Commodus usus could include the idea of profit where the
lessee runs a business from the leased premises.
The judge found that because the lessee conducted business to make
a profit, closing or diverting the road indirectly infringed with his use.
(Sishen Hotel, the court found that in that case commodus usus
included the idea of profit where the lessee ran a business from
the leased premises. However, this seems to amount to a tacit
term implied within the circumstances of that case as opposed
to a term, which would apply in all cases of a similar nature.
This is thus an exception and not a general rule.)
Remedies
Since the lessor’s obligation is negative, the lessees’ normal remedies
are an interdict, cancellation and damages.
Remission of rent isn’t claimable.
So where the thing has been let for a specific purpose it must be
delivered in such a condition so it’s fit for that purpose.
Where there’s an express agreement about the condition of a thing –
lessor must comply.
A lease creates continuous obligations – the lessor must ensure that
the thing is in a fit and proper state.
Q: Sarkin: the lessee had undertaken to repair the thatched roof on the
premises. In an action for forfeiture of the lease on the ground that the
lessee neglected repairs – plaintiff proved that at the commencement of
the lease that the roof was in a proper state of repair and in a condition,
which fulfilled the requirements of tenancy until its termination.
I.e. if the lessee hadn’t neglected ordinary repairs the roof would have
lasted the whole course of the lease.
The reason for the distinction is that fault is normally required for
liability by reason of breach. Fault isn’t required for liability by virtue
of breach of warranty.
With an ex lege warranty in a lease contract = the fact that he was
unaware of the reputed defect and that it wasn’t possible for him to
have been reasonable aware of it, or he had taken all precautions
won’t avail the lessor.
Remedies:
1. Cancellation
2. Specific performance:
Marais: obligation to repair is vague so the court can’t
supervise an order of specific performance. This view is said to
be a generalization.
The rule that a court can’t grant specific performance where the
order would be difficult to enforce is open to doubt. It’s the duty
of the party in whose favour the order is given to repair and the
court may then take necessary steps.
The extension of this rule is questionable.
3. Remission of rent:
If the lessor fails to comply with his requirement for repairs, the
lessee may continue to suffer the inconvenience and may then
claim remission of rent in accordance with the degree of
inconvenience suffered (damages).
4. Damages:
Claimed of loss suffered as a result of a defect
a) Tenant’s knowledge: where the lessee knows of the defect
at the time he enters into the contract, he loses his claim
for damages against the lessor for loss caused by the
Huur Gaat Voor Koop: allowed the lessee too turns off of the land the
landowner himself. It was C who must make good any losses, which
were incurred.
Lessor may validly let something belonging to another, lessor doesn’t
guarantee his title – the only obligation resting on the lessor is to
place the lessee in undisturbed possession and to maintain him in
undisturbed possession.
As with a contract of sale = law presumed the existence of an ex lege
warranty against eviction in a contract of lease.
The eviction of a lessee is usually governed by the same rules as the
eviction of a purchaser.
E.g. the lessor doesn’t guarantee against unlawful hindrances and the
mere threat of eviction doesn’t yet constitute breach of contract by the
lessor. The lessee would have no claim against the lessor if she leaves
as soon as the 3rd party threatens to evict her. She must go on paying
the rent – if she fails to do so = breach. Warranty doesn’t apply if the
disturbance is because of an act of God (including expropriation).
Remedies:
1. Cancellation
2. Damages: lessee who entered into the lease knows or ought to
know that the lessor’s title is limited, has no right to damages if
he is required to leave as a result of the termination of the
lessor’s title.
The lessee will, irrespective of his knowledge have a right to
damages if the lessor terminates his right of his own volition (by
surrendering it).
Tenant’s duties:
1. Tenant must pay the rent
2. Must use the property in the proper manner
3. Must restore the property to the lessor on the termination of the
lease
4. Must carry out any special obligation imposed on him by the
agreement of lease.
Place of payment:
where does payment take place if the contract doesn’t provide a place
Q: Must the creditor seek out the debtor for payment?
There is usually a trade usage: while the interests of the parties can
be deduced from the surrounding circumstances.
Where there is no stipulation and no trade usage = it’s thought in SA
that creditors must seek out the debtor.
De Wet and Van Wyk: where there is no other indication, the debtor
must pay at the place where the contract was concluded but they
don’t deal exhaustively with the matter: e.g. A and B (PTA) while in
JHB enter into a contract of lease of a house in PTA- no stipulation or
trade usage on where the rent must be paid = stupid to hold the rent
must be paid in JHB.
Venter: the lease between 2 parties had a forfeiture clause in the event
of non-payment of the rent (fixed date). The lessee sent the rent on the
due date to a certain bank and told the lessor. The bank credited the
account of another Venter – when the lessor called the bank he was
told that there was no money – he cancelled the lease.
The mistake was discovered and the bank paid but the lessor refused
to accept.
NOW: if the creditor must seek out the debtor then the lessor would
have to apply to the lessee for payment and the mistake would have
immediately been discovered.
Q: was it the lessor’s duty to ask the lessee for payment, since there
was originally no money at the bank.
AD: unanimous – where the contract fixes a date for payment = the
debtor must seek out the creditor to pay (i.e. must tender payment to
avoid breach of contract.
OUR LAW: where a date for payment has been fixed the debtor must
seek out the creditor unless usage indicates otherwise.
Time of payment
If the parties agree that rent must be paid on a specific date and at a
specific place – no uncertainty.
If they stipulated a specific day – the lessee has until midnight to pay
– this doesn’t mean that he must keep trying to pay until midnight = if
he has tried unsuccessfully to pay during the afternoon he doesn’t
need to try present payment during the evening as well.
BUT if the lessor can’t be found during the morning, the lessee is
expected to try again later on in the day.
After that mora creditoris will arise.
Where the contract has no specific day for payment, the rent becomes
due only after the expiry of the lease. It’s not certain whether it’s
necessary for the lessor to place the lessee in mora after the lease has
expired.
If there’s a term in the contract that the landlord may resile if the
tenant fails to pay the rent – lessor automatically has a right of
rescission.
There’s uncertainty about the circumstances in which the landlord is
entitled to resile on the ground of the tenants failure to pay the rent if
there is no term in the contract covering this contingency.
At common law: the landlord couldn’t resile before the rent has been
in arrears for 2 years.
BUT: in Goldburg: AD decided that the 2 year rule had become
superfluous and that a lessor could get a right to rescind by giving the
lessee notice of rescission.
Even if the lessor is entitled to rescind the contract on the ground of
the lessee’s failure to pay the rent, he forfeits this right if he waives it
expressly or by implication.
Waiver takes place if the lessor claims the rent or takes receipt of the
rent for a certain period of the lease – after this he can no longer resile
on the ground of failure to pay the rent for that particular period – but
isn’t barred from resiling on the ground of subsequent failure.
Waiver can also take place if the lessor doesn’t resile within a
reasonable time after he becomes entitled to do so.
If despite prior acceptance of late payment of rent, the lessor gives the
lessee due notice insisting of future payment of rent being timeous
and thereafter the lessee fails to pay timeously, the lessor will be
entitled to cancel the lease on this ground.
Eviction procedure:
Before: SA courts held that in a claim for eviction it was sufficient to
allege that the plaintiff is the owner of the property and the defendant
was in possession thereof.
It was unnecessary for the owner to allege that the defendant was in
wrongful unlawful occupation = because ownership entitles
possession.
The plaintiff can establish ownership by bringing the title deed or get
admission of the plaintiff’s ownership by the defendant – onus then
moves to the defendant to prove his right of occupation.
Ndlovu and Becker: Q: whether PIE applied to people who once had
lawful possession but whose possession becomes unlawful
The tenant’s lease in Ndlovu appeal was terminated lawfully but he
refused to vacate.
In Bekker - appeal a mortgage bond had been called up and the
property was sold in execution and transferred to the applicant. The
owner refused to vacate the property.
In neither case did the applicant for eviction comply with the
procedural requirements for PIE.
In cases where the defaulting tenant and mortgagors fail to vacate the
property they are said to be holding over.
PIE applies to an unlawful occupier which = someone who occupies
land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or the person in
charge or without any other right in law to occupy such land.
Q: whether an unlawful occupier includes holding over?
The court held that the significance of this question is that should PIE
not apply to cases of holding over, then a landlord or a bank may evict
the defaulting tenant or mortgagee from an urban residence by
satisfying the common law pleading requirements.
Eviction procedure:
Occupation for less than 6 months: if an unlawful occupier has
occupied premises for less than 6 months at the time that proceedings
are instituted, a court may grant an order for eviction if its of the
opinion that its just and equitable to do so after considering all the
relevant circumstances: look at the needs and rights of the elderly,
children, disabled and households headed by woman.
Rubin v Botha: AD accepted that there was a lease despite the fact
that the lessee performance didn’t consist in the payment of money.
Otherwise than in Roman law where agreements had to be fitted into
specific categories to be enforceable, in our law distinctions are drawn
between contracts with a view of specific naturalia or to special
requirements which the law deems desirable in the light of the
characteristics of the modern contract.
Q: whether a contract, which doesn’t require the lessee to render a
performance in money, can and should be regarded in the same light
as a contract in terms of which the lessee’s performance sounds in
money.
Look at 2 situations:
1. Its possible to agree that each party will make available the
thing which he must deliver only for a limited time, as where 2
farmers, each of whom have one ox, agree to plough with both
oxen in turn – if this contract is a lease its impossible to
distinguish between the lessor and lessee.
2. Its possible that one party undertakes to make the thing he has
delivered available to the other on a permanent basis, just as
the lessee permanently surrenders the rent to the lessor – if
services are rendered in exchange for the use of a thing =
possession is the same- can distinguish between lessor and
lessee – PROBLEM: naturalia of a lease don’t make provision for
a case where the lessees performance = delivery of a thing =
need an adjustment of the naturalia of a lease before a contract
without rent can be regarded as a lease.
Q: legal policy – rent must consist in money – if the rent doesn’t sound
in money, the contact isn’t a lease with the result that if its valid
contract it will be governed by the general principles of the law of
contract.
Y, however, has the right to decide whether he will allow the squatter
to continue with his services, in return for the right to occupy his
land. In spite of various attempts made by Y to prove to the squatter
that he (Y) is truly the new owner of the land, the squatter still refuses
to recognise Y as the owner. Y therefore had the right to have the
squatter removed from his land. It is therefore a question of legal
policy. Except in the case of the bywoner’s contract, the rent can
consist only in money.
The lessee must use the property for the purpose of which it was let
and he must exercise care of a bonus paterfamilias in looking after the
property (i.e. look to whether he is changing the nature of the
property).
Trees: the lessee may plant trees unless the nature of the property
forbids it (mimosas on arable land) – he is then liable to maintain the
trees if he has undertaken to do so.
Cutting trees:
a) Silva caedua: the lessee may cut down trees that grow after
being cut down (Gum) and sell the wood for his own benefit =
the lessee doesn’t appropriate a portion of the property (such
trees reproduce themselves). But he may not cut them down if
they have been planted for ornamental purposes
b) Fruit trees: may not be cut down
c) Other trees: can only be cut down for domestic and agricultural
purposes, but cant be cut down if they have been planted for a
special purpose (shade).
Lessor’s remedies:
where the tenant misuses the property, the lessor may:
a) claim damages
b) get an interdict
c) cancel the contract where the misuse is serious
Abandonment of property:
Where the lessee abandons the property the lessor may abide by the
contract and sue for rent when due or he may accept the lessee’s
repudiation and sue for damages for breach.
Burns: the court held that B was interfering materially with the
ordinary comfort and convenience of the other tenants in the building.
The court held that B’s conduct = breach of the lease and was serious
enough to entitle D and G to cancel the lease and eject B.
S2 of the Act: provided that no long term lease would apply against
the successors of the lessor unless it was registered against the title
deed of the leased property – it was decided that in future this would
only be the case where the lease would apply against successors of the
lessor = imply an amendment to common law.
Essop: stated that the common law wasn’t amended by S2 (this case
also disagreed with the court in the Alternators case).
S1(2) of Act replaced S2: it apples to leases entered into for at least 10
years, the natural life of the lessee or another or a lease which is
renewable.
It determines that no such lease is valid against a creditor or
successor onerosi for longer than 10 years unless:
- it’s registered
- They knew of the lease
Short leases:
the lessee’s real rights vest on him getting possession.
Where the buyer had actual or constructive notice of the lease, the
lessees title is good even though he doesn’t have possession: A leases
a house from B for 5 years but cant take possession for at least 6
months = he is afraid that B may sell the property to a 3rd party in which
case the innocent party will get the property free from the lease = A may
register the lease and such registration is constructive notice to any
would be purchaser.
A short term lessee who isn’t in possession gets only personal rights –
he can enforce this right against the lessor but not against any
holders of real rights – he can’t maintain his lease against a purchaser
in good faith.
Lessee gets real rights over the leased thing = HGVK = applies to the
right of everyone who has established a right over a thing after the
lessees right has been established.
The tenants real right enjoys preference if it conflicts with any other
subsequent vested right – if the right of a holder of a mortgage or
servitude is vested after that of the lessee, his right must be given
pride of place to the lessees = the right of the lessee is proffered to
purely personal rights irrespective of the time they were vested.
Thus non-preferent creditors of the lessor are always bound by the
lessee’s real right.
Effect of the real right of the lessee is that no one can disturb him in
the exercise of his right during the currency of the lease.
Our court take a different view: its said that as soon as the new owner
has taken transfer, he is as owner entitled to the rent and that the
seller by alienating the property, releases himself from his obligations
in terms of the contract of lease, so that his obligation will now rest on
the buyer.
The buyer is bound by all the terms of the lease. If the actual terms of
the lease differ from the terms – the buyer is bound by the actual
terms.
However, this will not be the case with an option to purchase
contained in a lease agreement (Spearhead Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd
v E&D Motors)
Greenblatt: held that the HGVK doesn’t apply where the ownership of
the thing let passes by operation of law and not by virtue of the
contract. The lessee has no rights against the local authority in the
case where the leased property vests in the local body in terms of an
ordinance.
All movable (invecta et illata) brought onto the property may be held
as security by the lessor.
3rd parties: in Roman Dutch law: movables of a 3rd party are subject to
the hypothec provided the goods were brought onto the property with
the permission of the owner and with the intention that they remain
on the property for an unspecified time.
4 factors are taken into account when considering if the goods of a 3rd
party are subject to the hypothec:
1. Provided the lessor is aware the goods on the property belong to
a 3rd party, those goods aren’t subject to the hypothec
2. If the 3rd party is aware that the goods are being held on leased
property and he was given permission that they remain there =
subject to the hypothec = the 3rd party creates the impression
that the lessee is the owner of those goods – if the 3rd party
wants to prevent the lessor from being misled by the impression
created, he must ensure that the lessor gets notice that the
goods don’t belong to the lessee – if he fails to do so = must
accept the fact that the goods are subject to the hypothec
3. If the goods of the 3rd party are merely temporarily on the leased
property but are brought there for the indefinite use of the
lessee, they are subject to the hypothec
4. Goods of a 3rd party will only be subject to the hypothec if they
are brought on the property for the use of the lessee.
Preference in insolvency:
S85 (1) of the Insolvency Act: the lessor’s legal hypothec: preference
with regard to any article subject to that hypothec for any rent
calculated in respect of any period before and up to the date of
sequestration but not exceeding:
- 3 months, if rent is payable monthly or shorter than a month
- 6 months, rent payable at intervals exceeding 1 month but not
exceeding 3 months
Interdict or attachment
The lessor may give effect to the hypothec by asking for an interdict
restraining the lessee from removing goods from the premises.
If the amount of rent in arrears doesn’t exceed the Magistrate court
jurisdiction – the Magistrate Court Act provides for an automatic rent
interdict: notice is inserted in the summons prohibiting anyone from
removing the goods from the premises pending the decision of the
action
The tacit hypothec doesn't give the lessor real rights to the goods =
should the lessee remove them and store them in another place, the
lessor can’t seize them.
Also the lessor can’t pursue the goods once they are in the possession
of a 3rd party.
The lessor’s real right only exists once he has confiscated the goods,
which are on the leased property, or if the goods have been removed,
before they reach their new destination.
The hypothec is applicable only if the lessee owes the lessor rent, if no
rent is owing no hypothec can exist over the goods of the lessee.
Quick pursuit
This doctrine applies when attachment will be granted.
Once the goods have been removed from the premises, the lessor loses
his hypothec and attachment may no longer be granted = problem:
lessor may not forcibly restrain the lessee from removing the goods to
defeat the hypothec before an attachment can be obtained.
So the lessor is in a position to lose his hypothec = the law allows the
lessor to carry out a quick pursuit = can apply to the court for an
attachment order while the goods are in the process of being removed
or are in transit, he can apply for an interdict to prohibit the lessee
from removing the goods from the leased property.
BUT this case shows us that the courts will grant an attachment order
where approached before the goods have reached their destination – if
they haven’t yet reached their destination at the time the attachment
is requested, they may be taken back to the leased property where the
hypothec is revived.
Remission of rent:
Lessee is released from his obligation to pay the rent if he is prevented
(by vis major) from having the full use and enjoyment of the thing
Where circumstances beyond the control of the parties make it
impossible for the lessee to have the full use and enjoyment of the
thing = lessor’s performance has become impossible.
The lessee will be released wholly or in part from his own performance
= payment of rent.
Only if, where there is nothing wrong with the property (locusts
destroyed crops) it’s the lessor’s duty not only to deliver and maintain
the property in a specific condition but also to ensure the lessee can
use the property in a profitable way = supervening impossibility.
The lessee need not pay the full rent or pays no rent at all where
circumstances beyond the control of the parties lead to his being
unable to have full or partial use of the thing for the purposes
intended by the lease.
Abandonment of property:
Where loss is caused by a vis major the lessee can claim remission or
abandon the property (becomes useless).
Abandonment is justifiable even though the loss is only imminent.
Where the tenant abandons the property he is only liable for the rent
for his period of occupation.
Whether release is granted depends on whether the thing has become
unfit for the purpose for which it was let.
Amount of remission
This is within the courts discretion – some think the profits of 1 year
should be set off against the meager crops of another year – if the
lessee has a good year, she can’t complain if he isn’t so fortunate the
next year.
Where the lessee has paid in advance, he may recover this from the
lessor.
Agricultural leases:
Differentiate between annexure, improvements that aren’t annexure,
trees and crops.
The lessee can’t claim any compensation for improvements, which
aren’t annexure – can’t claim compensation for soil erosion work.
Annexures:
these include fences, dams, bridges and aqueducts.
Where the improvement doesn’t amount to an annexure no then
compensation is payable.
shall be found thereon after the prescribed time shall come to and
remain for the benefit of the owner.
The lessor obtains such an annexure without payment of
compensation but he lessee may remove them.
Necessary improvements:
these are necessary to preserve the property – the placaats are silent
on necessary improvements = raises a presumption that no distinction
should be made between necessary and useful improvements
De Beer: placaats shouldn’t be applied in the case of necessary
improvements and that in such a case the lessee is entitled to
compensation as if he were a negotiorum gestor – this was followed in
Bailey.
Other leases:
placaats don’t apply and common law does – here the lessee has
certain rights to remove her property.
If the lessee doesn’t remove his property, the lessor must pay
compensation for necessary and useful improvements but not for
luxurious improvements.
The scale of compensation is measured by the value of the property
enhanced unless the improvement actually cost less, in which case
the lessor must pay the lesser amount.
In civil law: the accession has the same character as the thing
to which it’s acceded. Permanent annexures made by the lessee
become part of the property and fall under the ownership of the
lessor.
So the lessee can’t remove the annexure, either during or after
the expiration of the lease.
But in the case of annexures other than buildings – it becomes
difficult if a movable is annexed to an immovable with the
intention that it should remain there permanently = the
movable becomes immovable.
BUT this doesn’t happen where the movable wasn’t
intended to remain there for a permanent purpose and
since the lessee’s title is only temporary = presumption
that where a lessee fixes a movable to the property he has
no intention of fixing it permanently.
The lessee may even sublet to another where the landlord himself
desires to obtain tenancy.
Consequences of cession:
the contract doesn’t affect the position of the lessee as debtor in terms
of the lease. The effect of cession by a lessee is that the cessionary
becomes the lessor’s creditor but the lessee remains the lessor’s
debtor.
Sublease: there is no legal tie between the sub lessee and the lessor –
the legal tie is only between the lessee and sub-lessee. The lessee lets
the thing to the sub-lessee so that the lessee becomes the lessor in
relation to the sub-lessee.
Delegation:
The lessee is replaced by another as debtor and it takes place by
means of a novation agreement entered into by all 3 parties
concerned.
Assignment:
the lessee in his capacity as creditor and debtor is replaced by another
– he affects the transfer of his rights by means of a cession thereof to
the other person and the transfer of his obligations is naturally a
delegation governed by the normal principles of delegation.
A sub-lessee may also cede his rights to another.
Prohibition on transfer
The lessee must comply with any contractual prohibitions on cession,
waiver or subletting by the lessee without the lessor’s permission.
If he does what has been prohibited, he commits a breach of contract.
1. Mutual agreement
Such an agreement can be concluded orally even if the contract of
lease was required to be reduced to writing – unless otherwise agreed
on such an agreement has no effect on already existing obligations –
lessor will be entitled to payment of rent in arrears.
2. Effluxion of time
Terminates the lease automatically – if the lease was for a specified
period.
It often happens that the parties renew the contract expressly or
tacitly.
Express renewal:
The lease may give the lessee the option to renew – he may then
convert the lease into a long lease = requires registration.
Where no date is fixed for notice by the tenant of his exercise of the
option of renewal he may give notice within a reasonable time before
the expiry of the lease, but not after.
Tacit renewal:
This happens: If on the leases expiration the lessee continues to hire
the same property from the same lessor (the parties and subject
matter must be the same) – there can be variation in the agreement.
Renewal of the lease brings a new lease into existence.
The party claiming tacit renewal must prove this.
Tacit renewal isn’t renewal of the old lease, but the creation of a new
lease. The creation of the new lease will depend on the intention of the
parties.
Until the contrary is proved, it’s presumed that the conditions of the
new lease are the same as those of the original lease.
3. Notice:
A lease for an unspecified period may be terminated by either party
after reasonable notice has been given.
Notice is reasonable if the lease will expire at the end of the rental
period and if it offers the other party a reasonable opportunity to
make alternative arrangements = tenant must give a months notice on
or before the 1st day of the month if the rent is payable monthly.
4. Merger (confusion)
If the lessee buys the leased property = merger of titles.
The lessees failure to pay rent on time = common law rule was that
the lessor could cancel the lease when the rent was 2 years in arrears.
Goldburg: AD decided that the 2-year rule wasn’t useful and the
lessor could get a right to rescind by giving the lessee notice of
rescission.
8. Insolvency
Landlord: this doesn’t terminate the lease BUT in some circumstances
the lessor’s insolvency does terminate the lease = where the trustee
may sell the property free from the lease – in terms of the Insolvency
Act, a stipulation in a lease that the lease shall terminate or be varied
on the insolvency of the lessor is null and void.
9. Death
Definite period: general rule – death doesn’t terminate the lease where
the lease was for a definite period
to who must the lessor give notice = lease stays in force until the 31
May.
The lease terminates because there is no exercise of will – it’s also
argued, pending the appointment of an executor, the Master may
continue the lease – notice must be given to and by the master until
an executor is appointed, then he gives and receives notice = practice.
10. Legislation:
S6 Immorality Act: the lease of a house or a place which becomes a
brothel after the conclusion of the contract is terminated and
becomes void as from the date of this event.
The case where the inhabitant of a hotel room lives an immoral life
doesn’t fall under this section – Lomax: proprietor of a hotel sued an
occupant of one of its rooms claiming cancellation of the agreement
and ejectment – the conduct complained about being that the
defendant used the room for an immoral purpose – an exception to
the declaration was upheld.
A landlord doesn’t have the right to eject his tenant of a house, flat or
room for privately living an immoral life, while disturbing no one and
creating no nuisance nor causing anyone patrimonial loss.
If there is a clause in the contract that the lessee may not sublet, a
lessee who disregards this will of course be committing breach of
contract if he or she sublets the property.
However, breach of contract will arise only if he or she sublets and not
if he or she merely allows another to have the use and enjoyment of
the thing.
Whether the original lessor can resile from the contract on the ground
placaats and we agree with him that they do not forbid a sublease of
rural premises.)
The placaats of 1515, 1580 and 1658 remain undoubtedly in force in
the Republic except as regards the penal provisions of the ninth
article. In De Vries, it was held that in terms of the placaat of 1658, a
lessee of rural property cannot sublet without consent. This case was
followed by the Orange Free State court in Visser case.
However, in Eckhard, the Transvaal court held that the relevant
placaats were not in force in South Africa and that a rural lessee
could therefore sublet. But this view was overruled by the Appellate
Division in Rubin.
Neither of the above-mentioned two opinions is correct. The placaat of
1658 is doubtlessly part of our law, but section 9 does not apply to
subletting. The correct point of view seems to be that the lessee of
rural property is free to sublet.
Brief summary:
o When the lease is terminated, the lessor may use the deposit
and interest towards the payment of unpaid rental or any other
amounts due and payable by the tenant under the lease,
including the reasonable cost of repairing damage to the
dwelling during the lease period and the cost of replacing lost
keys.
o Where the lessee does not promptly pay the rent or charges,
does not vacate the premises on proper termination of the lease
by the lessor, does not return the dwelling in a good state of
repair and does not pay compensation for damage caused by
himself or herself, the household or visitors, will be guilty of an
offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two
years or to both (s 4(5) together with s 16(a)).
Scope
The Consumer Protection Act applies to most transactions between
suppliers and consumers and the promotion of goods and services
that could result in such agreements, as well as the goods and
services themselves upon conclusion of the relevant transaction
(section 5). The following are some important definitions in terms of
section 1 of the Act:
A supplier is any person (including a juristic person, trust or organ of
state) who markets (promotes or supplies) goods or services.
A consumer is any person to whom particular goods or services are
marketed in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business; a person
who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary
course of the supplier’s business (unless the transaction is exempt
from the application of this Act); a user of those particular goods or a
recipient or beneficiary of those particular services, irrespective of
whether that user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a
Part E of the Act deals with the consumer’s right to fair and
responsible marketing by suppliers. Amongst other things it contains
provisions regarding general standards for the marketing of goods or
services (section 29); the regulation of bait marketing (section 30); the
prohibition of negative option marketing (section 31); the regulation of
direct marketing to consumers (section 32); and the regulation of
catalogue marketing (section 33).
Remedies
Section 52(3) provides the following remedies if a supplier
transgresses section 40 or 41:
If the court determines that a transaction or agreement was, in whole
or in part, unconscionable, unjust, unreasonable or unfair, the court
may-
(a) make a declaration to that effect; and
(b) make any further order the court considers just and reasonable
in the circumstances, including, but not limited to, an order-
(i) to restore money or property to the consumer;
(ii) to compensate the consumer for losses or expenses
relating to-
(aa) the transaction or agreement; or
(bb) the proceedings of the court; and
Other remedies
There are various remedies available to consumers in terms of the Act.
We mention but a few here:
Section 16: Right to “cooling-off” period after direct marketing
One remedy is a consumer’s right to a “cooling-off” period after direct
marketing (meaning to approach a person, either in person or by mail
or electronic communication, for the direct or indirect purpose of
promoting or offering to supply, in the ordinary course of business,
any goods or services to the person; or requesting the person to make
a donation of any kind for any reason – section 1). Section 16 provides
that (subject to an exception where section 44 of the Electronic
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 applies) a
consumer may rescind a transaction resulting from any direct
marketing without reason or penalty, by notice to the supplier in
writing, or another recorded manner and form, within five business
days after the later of the date on which the transaction or agreement
was concluded; or the goods were delivered to the consumer. A
supplier must return any payment received from the consumer within
15 business days after receiving notice of the rescission (if no goods
had been delivered to the consumer in terms of the transaction), or
receiving from the consumer any goods supplied in terms of the
transaction; and not attempt to collect any payment in terms of a
rescinded transaction (except as permitted in terms of section 20(6).
services – section 1) paid for those goods, if the supplier has delivered
(a) goods to the consumer in terms of an agreement arising out of
direct marketing, and the consumer has rescinded that agreement
during the cooling-off period, in accordance with section 16; (b) goods
that the consumer did not have an opportunity to examine before
delivery, and the consumer has rejected delivery of those goods for
any of the reasons contemplated in section 19(5); (c) a mixture of
goods, and the consumer has refused delivery of any of those goods,
as contemplated in section 19(8); or (d) goods intended to satisfy a
particular purpose communicated to the supplier as contemplated in
section 55(3), and within 10 business days after delivery to the
consumer, the goods have been found to be unsuitable for that
particular purpose. There are, however, circumstances in which goods
cannot be returned (eg for reasons of public health).
E Formalities
Section 50: Written consumer agreements
Certain prescribed categories of consumer agreements have to be in
writing may be (s 50(1)). Signature of the consumer is not required (s
50(2)(a)). Record must be kept of all other transactions (s 50(3)). It also
has to be in plain language (s 22).
F Terms of consumer agreements
Section 56(1) read with section 55(3) also provides that there is a
second implied warranty that the goods are reasonably suitable either
for the specific purpose for which the consumer wishes to acquire the
goods or for the use to which the consumer intends to apply those
goods and which the consumer has specifically informed the supplier
of, and the supplier either ordinarily offers to supply such goods or
acts in a manner consistent with being knowledgeable about the use
of those goods.
mark, any instructions for, or warnings with respect to the use of the
goods;
(b) the range of things that might reasonably be anticipated to be done
with or in relation to the goods; and (c) the time when the goods were
produced and supplied.
CONTRACT SUMMARY:
Recap of contract:
MISREPRESENTATION:
Legality:
Jajhbay:
An illegal contract cannot be enforced as its illegal and thus void. If a
party to an illegal contract wants to claim the OTHER PARTY’S
PEROFRMANCE i.t.o the contract, he may NEVER do so due to the ex
turpi causa rule – from an illegal act, no action arises. This rule is
never relaxed and is an absolute rule. Thus one may never claim the
performance of the other party to the illegal contract.
BUT one may try to claim one’s own performance BACK using undue
enrichment = the rule that applies to undue enrichment is par
delictum = where the parties are of equal guilt, the possessor is in the
stronger position. This rule may, however, be relaxed, for SIMPLE
JUSTICE BETWEEN MAN AND MAN – Jajhbay.
SEE MEMO OF THE JAJHBAY QUESTION IN THE QUESTION PACK!!!
BREACH:
This is where there was a valid contract, and due to one party’s
fault, there is a breach.
5 types:
1. mora debitoris
2. mora creditoris
3. repudiation
4. positive malperformance
5. prevention of performance.
his delay the goods, for instance fresh fruit are spoilt so as to render
later performance impossible.
2 forms of prevention of performance
(1) Absolute or objective prevention of performance, where
performance is prevented permanently and as regards everyone.
(2) Relative or subjective prevention of performance, where it is
only performance by the debtor which is rendered impossible.
Remedies
The innocent party has the usual choice between rescinding/canceling
and upholding the contract. However, he cannot claim specific
performance as the performance is rendered impossible.
DAMAGES
Whether the innocent party claims performance or cancellation of the
contract, he can still sue for damages.
The innocent party must suffer patrimonial loss: The plaintiff must
prove actual patrimonial loss. Such a loss is loss suffered by the
estate of the person concerned, THUS one compares the present
value of the innocent party’s estate with the value it would have had,
had the contract been carried out properly and on time. The debtor
must place the creditor in the same patrimonial position as he would
have been in had proper and timeous performance taken place. This is
the formula applied for damages and is referred to as positive
interest.