XDR Design Clinic

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XDR Design Clinic

Things you should know


Aaron Woland
Rob Gresham
Matt Robertson
October 17, 2023
‣ Understand the value proposition of
Cisco XDR
Learning ‣ How to design a Cisco XDR
Objectives deployment with you customer

‣ What does XDR do?

‣ What does XDR detect?

‣ How does XDR respond?


Changing how we look at detection & response

The XDR Promise


• Collection of telemetry from key D&R
tools + high-value sources
• Analytics to the collected &
homogenized data to arrive at a
detection of maliciousness
• Response & remediation of that
maliciousness

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Cisco’s XDR

• Only XDR in market that doesn’t require use of


our own EDR
• You could start with Crowdstrike’s EDR
• Add NVM
• Add NetFlow / IPFIX
• BAM!

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Cisco XDR is a SOC Productivity Tool

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SoC / CSIRT Productivity Tool
Sam Remi
(Security Analyst) (Incident Responder)

My job is to prioritize risks, When a security incident occurs I


remediate vulnerabilities, and focus on finding the proper security
proactively avoid attacks. I’m data and determining the “why,
constantlyTier 1 / Tier 2 and
multitasking what, and when” of what
reordering myAnalyst
priorities. happened. Tier
Then3 IAnalyst
come up with
(Expert)
recommendations for future
(Junior or Jack of all Trades) prevention.
“Did a security event happen, and “How did the security incident happen,
should I be taking action?” and what more do I need to know?”

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


XDR is focused on the attacks that got
past the protection products

Not a Single Pane of Glass / not a MoM


/ not a dashboard to see all the things
that have already been blocked.

Not a tool for PCI Compliance or


Reporting
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Investigation Timeline – what happened & when?
SOC / Admin

Responder typically
builds out a timeline
when investigation
Lateral
Movement
Initial Data
Probing Initial
Exfiltration
Compromise
Timeline
Pre-Exploitation Exploitation Post-Exploitation
?
IP Address
Mac Address
Failed Privilege
GUID(s) Activity
Exploit Escalation
Attempts

Starting Here, look forward & backwards for


correlation to build the timeline / attack graph
of “what happened”
© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l
So… if you have an EDR, how much of
the timeline can you build?
Very sophisticated types of attacks that can
ONLY be detected & understood by combining
data from Network, Endpoint & more.
It takes multiple intelligent tools to put
together the entire timeline. Especially when
not every endpoint has the EDR agent
installed.
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Aren’t SIEM & SOAR all we need?
• SOCs make big investments in SIEM to store raw logs & allow query
• Organizations will have extensive custom queries to hunt
• Invest $$$ into performing asset resolution between disparate systems
• Data must be in data-store; how do you determine when enough is enough?
• SOCs make big investments in SOAR for custom playbooks
• These are per-playbook & per-integration; which make them very complex
• If the investment in asset resolution wasn’t made, responses fail
• It’s all custom.
• Must be tuned & re-tuned & tailored per environment

• Very few tier-3 investigators skilled enough to run & keep them up.
• Requires big investment in training of the custom playbooks
• Personnel turnover is very costly

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“The need for XDR is driven by the
market not meeting the needs of
the SOC”

- Large Financial Customer

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Detection and Response and the SOC XDR
Correlated/Prioritised Events
• Not enough creativity
Sam • Not enough time
• Too much work
Remi

SOC Staff SIEM SOAR


• Not enough people • Too expensive • This never actually worked
• Not enough talent • Too much data
• Not enough time

NGFW/IPS/IDS/WSA EDR
• Encryption NDR Email IaaS
• Limited
• Too noisy • Too many alerts • Phishing • Not enough
coverage
• Not actionable • Not actionable • BEC visibility
• Too many alerts
• Remote workers
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Timeline from multiple sources

XDR Should Build out the Timeline

XDRs need other high-


value sources

EDR

EVENT

Credential Theft
IP Address
Mac Address - AD Find
GUID(s) Activity - Rubeus
Vic01

Random mac-address
DHCP Assigned IP
EDR Installed

1. EDR event, detects Kerberos attack to harvest credentials.


Is this enough information to act?
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The XDR should be automagically
looking for how the event
happened.. Stitching together other
key events that might not be as
critical to generate an Alert!

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Integration Sources

Integration Sources for Success


XDR

EDR NDR ITDR CNDR

BYO EDR Native to Cisco XDR Included w/ XDR Native to Cisco XDR

Secure Endpoint { NVM + Netflow }* Devices** Azure

Crowdstrike SNA Users AWS

MS Defender ExtraHop ISE GCP

Sentinel1 Darktrace

CyberReason

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l *put NVM everywhere!


**integrate the MDMs
EDR as an XDR Source

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Integration Sources

An EDR is key for XDR Success


• EDR is the original detection & The session activity is
response tool for visibility and
actions against the attacks that visible on the endpoint –
get past our perimeter who, application,
• This tool is VERY focused on the PowerShell commands,
Endpoint’s view. what spawned the
• Some have network telemetry process, etc...
from the endpoint’s perspective
• Only helps with attacks involving
the endpoints managed by the
EDR
© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l
Timeline from multiple sources

XDR Should Build out the Timeline


Vic01

AD3
Discovery commands AD2
- systeminfo.exe AD
- netstat.exe
- net.exe EVENT
- ipconfig.exe
- nltest.exe
Impact: Crypto
- whoami.exe
- ryuk.exe
starts encrypting
Executes
Bazar
EDR
EDR EDR EDR

EVENT

Credential Theft
Vic01
- AD Find
Activity - Rubeus
Vic01

Random mac-address
DHCP Assigned IP
EDR Installed

4. EDR: First System (AD) was Ransomed! How did this happen?
5. EDR: Endpoint Vic01 was sending out discovery commands previously, what else was seen for Vic01?
12. Bazar executable XYZ was downloaded by Kevin Smith
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NVM & NetFlow as Sources

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Integration Sources

Think of NVM as the “XDR Agent”


• The flows are NOT used like • Couple it with NetFlow to get the
NetFlow NDR signatures in XDR Analytics
fire
• NVM is a cross between NDR &
EDR – and acts as the glue • NVM is the glue that stitches many
binding detections together telemetry sources together
• NVM has its very-own detections
engine in XDR

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Integration Sources

Network is key for XDR Success


• XDR provides some NDR • XDR is not an enterprise-grade
capabilities natively NDR
• Not all EDRs include network • Most enterprise’s have more
telemetry requirements for their NDR than
can be met with native XDR
• Not all devices run the EDR agent
network analytics:
• NDR is critical to detect TTPs
• Ex. policy monitoring, traffic monitoring
commonly used by attackers like
BlackTech, Volt Typhoon, & Jaguar or more advanced customization
Tooth. • Position SNA for these scenarios
• Ex. Lateral movement, Living off the land, (Breach Advantage!)
etc. • Integrate XDR with (lesser) third-party
NDRs (ex. Extrahop, Darktrace)

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Timeline from multiple sources

XDR Should Build out the Timeline


Vic01
AD
AD3
Discovery commands Network Conn: AD2
- systeminfo.exe ldap://ad:389 AD
- netstat.exe AD AD2 AD2
smb tcp/445
- net.exe EVENT
Downloads - ipconfig.exe Lateral Movement
xyz.exe - rdp tcp/3389 Lateral Movement
- nltest.exe
- smb tcp/445 Impact: Crypto
- whoami.exe
- ryuk.exe
Vic01 Roams Open C2 starts encrypting
Executes AD
Bazar & gets new IP Channel
EDR
NDR EDR NDR EDR NDR NDR EDR
NVM

Opens email EVENT


Follows Link to Open C2 Network Conn:
a-p-p-i-e.com Channel Credential Theft Lateral Movement
Vic01 ftp of harvested
- AD Find creds to C2 - smb tcp/445
Activity - Rubeus
Vic01 Vic01

Random mac-address
AD AD3
DHCP Assigned IP
EDR Installed

7. NDR / DNS / Proxy: XYZ on Vic01 was communicating encrypted TLS w/ a potentially risky site before the commands
8. NDR: Vic01 does first lateral move to AD via RDP
9. NDR: AD Establishes C2 channel
10. NDR: AD moves laterally to other AD servers via SMB
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11. Vic01 had roamed & gotten a new IP Address (so much more important than you know)
DNS (Umbrella) as a Source

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Integration Sources

Umbrella adds context to EDR & NDR


• Much like NDR, adds a layer of • NVM includes all DNS lookups in
visibility to the timeline that adds the flow data sent to XDR & can
great value be leveraged for correlation
• What other machines have tried to
resolve the same domain
• Verdicts, Judgements from Umbrella

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Email as an XDR Source

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Integration Sources

Email is also a key telemetry source


• #1 Attack Vector (Still) • ETD included in Breach & User
• Really important for response actions to Suites
remove the email from any mailboxes
that contain a copy • SMA for the ”other email” solution
• Timeline would be incomplete without • If you can’t use ETD (you should)
the email telemetry then
• MSFT 365 (Q2FY24)
• Proofpoint (roadmap)

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Timeline from multiple sources

XDR Should Build out the Timeline


Vic01

AD
Email to Kevin Smith AD3
Contains Link to appIe.com/xyz.exe Discovery commands Network Conn: AD2
a-p-p-i-e.com (looks alike) - systeminfo.exe ldap://ad:389 AD
- netstat.exe smb tcp/445
AD AD2 AD2
- net.exe EVENT
Downloads - ipconfig.exe Lateral Movement
xyz.exe - rdp tcp/3389 Lateral Movement
- nltest.exe
- smb tcp/445 Impact: Crypto
- whoami.exe
- ryuk.exe
Vic01 Roams starts encrypting
Executes
Bazar & gets new IP
EDR
ETD NDR EDR NDR EDR NDR NDR EDR
NVM

Opens email EVENT Open C2


Follows Link to Open C2 Network Conn: Channel
a-p-p-i-e.com Channel Credential Theft Lateral Movement
Vic01 ftp of harvested
- AD Find AD - smb tcp/445
creds to C2
Activity - Rubeus
Vic01 Vic01

Random mac-address
AD AD3
DHCP Assigned IP
EDR Installed

13. Kevin Smith received an email w/ a look-alike domain in the URL & he clicked it to download that executable

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Demo – the Timeline in Cisco XDR

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XDR is incomplete without Identity

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Integration Sources

Identity is also a key telemetry source


• Can use ISE integration today w/ • Coming Soon: Identity Detection &
XDR analytics (NDR capabilities) Response with Oort
• ONA required for pxGrid to ISE (today) • Part of the Breach & User Suites
• Included with Duo Advantage & XDR
• User Insights
Essentials*
• Provides user context
• That context will be in the incidents &
investigations soon

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Coming Soon**: User context in an Investigation / Incident Management

Details for User “Assets”


Becomes the User Object,
instead of generic data

Progressive Disclosure
Clicking the user in the graph
would display the User Details
”drawer” within the window

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l

** this is wireframe to describe an intended result, not a delivered feature


Coming Soon: Identity Threat Detection & Response

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Don’t forget that XDR has built-in Cloud
Native Detection & Response

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Integration Sources

Cloud Native Detection & Response (CNDR)


• XDR has native integrations with:
• Azure
• AWS
• Google Cloud

• Full set of detections specific to


cloud native environments
• Note: CNDR is not the same as
CSPM

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RX for Success

• Power the native NDR capabilities w/


Flow Logs
• Highly recommend EDR

• Install NVM where possible


• Highly recommend ETD or SMA
(email)
• DNS is very good

• Power the native CNDR


• Integrate Device Managers & CMDB
where possible
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Follow-up

• Rob Gresham’s session on building


Workflows
• Watch out for the ATT&CK! with Matt
and Mike
• Threat Hunting Workshops
• See session: Enhanced Identity
Security Posture Management with
Duo

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Incident Creation:
Data, Analytics and Detection

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XDR Outcome: Analytics to the collected & homogenized data
to arrive at a detection of maliciousness

How do we
get incidents?

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l

Cisco Confidential
Methods of Incident Creation: Current Status

XDR Analytics
Individual and/or correlated alerts

API
For workflows and custom integrations

Cisco Secure
Endpoint
- Critical and High Events automatically promoted Once an Incident is created it
- this will evolve in the next quarter
is enriched with data from
supported integrations
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Correlation Enrichment
Pre-Incident Creation Post-Incident Creation
Data from multiple security tools is A detection of maliciousness is further
analysed to arrive at a detection of enhanced with data from integrated
maliciousness security tools.

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Recall: Data Analytics Pipeline
Data Acquisition Analytics Stack

P(A|B) Alert(s)
Acquisition Observation(s)
Data Incident
Source and We believe this is
Normalisation Warehouse We saw something(s) Created
important

Attack Chain

These alerts correlate

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New Incident Generation
Telemetry is ingested into the data warehouse, analyzed and correlated with other data in the
data model, where it serves as an input to a net new incident candidates for Cisco XDR

Current – 6 Sources Q1 FY24 2H FY24


Cisco 3rd Party Cisco 3rd Party
• Identity Service Engine • CrowdStrike • Meraki** • Checkpoint
• Network Telemetry • Oort • Cybereason
• NGFW via SAL Logging • Secure Access • Darktrace
• Public Cloud Infrastructure • ExtraHop
• Secure Client NVM
Q2 FY24 • Fortinet
• Secure Endpoint* Cisco • Microsoft Defender
• Secure Email • Microsoft O365
• Secure Endpoint*
Important! • Secure Network Analytics
• Palo Alto Cortex
• Palo Alto NGFW
At least one of • SentinelOne
3rd Party:
these is required • Proofpoint
• Trend Micro Vision One

to get an
incident today! *Cisco Secure Endpoint auto-promotes incidents
**Meraki NetFlow today is ingested into
Cisco XDR; a significantly enhanced
today. Q2 plan is to move through new data and
integration between XDR and Meraki is
© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l logic path for correlation with other data sets
underway
Observations to Alert
Data
Model P(A|B)

Observation(s)
Alert
We saw something(s)
We believe this is important

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l

44
A note about data science
There is a complex AI/ML data
model behind the alerting engine

What moves a set of observations to an


alert can be situational dependent for
certain alert types

For some alerts predicting their


future appearance in the UI is not
always deterministic

Practical terms:
• Small labs are not ideal proof of concept scenarios
• Single test scenarios are also not cool
• You might not get alerts (incidents) for some data sources
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Alerts Require (Specific) Data Plan
Accordingly

Familiarise yourself with the observations, data and history for specific alerts
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Reconstructing the attack timeline

Alert Correlation (AKA Attack Chains)


Alert0

Alert1 Device1 Device2 Device3

Alert3 Alert2 Alert4

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Don’t publish all the alerts
and the attack chains. It
could be too noisy.

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Endpoint Data Analytics Pipeline (ex. Crowdstrike)
Data Acquisition Analytics Stack
P(A|B) Alert(s)
Acquisition Observation(s)
Data Incident
Source and We believe this is
Normalisation Warehouse We saw something(s) Created
important

Attack Chain

These alerts correlate

• Observation created for Endpoint sightings


• Call API every 1 minute
• Suspicious Endpoint Security Finding
• Ingest Critical and High detections
• 12 New Endpoint Alerts
• Normalise and store data in Data
• Aligned to MITRE ATT&CK Tactics
Warehouse • Correlated into Attack Chains
• Promoted as Incident into XDR UI

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Detection Engine Demo

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Detection without response is
insufficient!

Automation is essential.

5
© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l
Response is more than isolate,
block or quarantine

• Response includes:
• Triage / Investigation / Identification
• Containment
• Eradication
• Recovery
• Lessons Learned

Responses must be modular,


repeatable and eventually
automatable.

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l

5
Response has its own processes…

Investigate +
Triage Respond Manage Incidents
• Reviews events, initial correlations • Reviewing triage data for • Manages Major incidents /
• Close / Ignore false-positives false positives Breaches

• Gather required data as requested • Investigate and validate scope of • Ensures proper threat hunting and
Informational, Functional and scoping
• Validate enrichment or conduct Recovery Impact
manual enrichment • Creates Detections
• Deep knowledge of tools and data • Deep forensics, threat intelligence,
• Assess against runbook processes
• Understands adversary actions malware understanding
• Swivel chair correlates • Creates Playbooks and Runbooks

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Mapping the Process to Legacy Roles

Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3


Triage Investigate + Respond Manage Incidents

• Reviews events, initial correlations • Reviewing triage data for false • Manages Major incidents /
• Close / Ignore false-positives
positives Breaches

• Gather required data as requested


• Investigate and validate scope of • Ensures proper threat hunting and
Informational, Functional and scoping
• Validate enrichment or conduct Recovery Impact
manual enrichment • Creates Detections
• Deep knowledge of tools and data • Deep forensics, threat intelligence,
• Assess against runbook processes
• Understands adversary actions malware understanding
• Swivel chair correlates • Creates Playbooks and Runbooks

Events Incident Breach

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


Without XDR…

Sam Remi Talos CTIR


Triage Investigate + Respond Manage Incidents

• Reviews events, initial correlations • Reviewing triage data for • Manages Major incidents /
• Close / Ignore false-positives
false positives Breaches

• Gather required data as requested


• Investigate and validate scope of • Ensures proper threat hunting and
Informational, Functional and scoping
• Validate enrichment or conduct Recovery Impact
manual enrichment • Creates Detections
• Deep knowledge of tools and data • Deep forensics, threat intelligence,
• Assess against runbook processes
• Understands adversary actions malware understanding
• Swivel chair correlates • Creates Playbooks and Runbooks

Events Incident Breach

© 2 0 2 3 C is c o a n d / o r its a ffilia te s . A ll r ig h ts r e s e r v e d . C is c o C o n fid e n tia l


…With XDR

Sam Sam / Remi Remi / Talos CTIR


Triage Investigate + Respond Manage Incidents

• Reviews events, initial correlations • Reviewing triage data for • Manages Major incidents /
• Close / Ignore false-positives
false positives Breaches

• Gather required data as requested


• Assess against runbook processes • Ensures proper threat hunting and
• Investigate and validate scope of scoping
• Validate enrichment or conduct
manual enrichment Informational, Functional and • Creates Detections
Recovery Impact • Deep forensics, threat intelligence,
• Assess against runbook processes
• Explains adversary actions malware understanding
• Deep knowledge of tools and data • Creates Playbooks and Runbooks
• Swivel chair correlates.

Incident Breach
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XDR Response Value

• Decreases Time to complete investigation


• Provides contextual breadcrumbs for investigation
• Reduces swivel chair correlation

• Guided Response Actions as a “playbook”


• Standardizes SOC tasks and methods
• Focuses on SOC outcomes not Integrations, but uses integrations

Learn how to take use cases and turn them into playbooks by attending my
tech talk: “How to develop playbooks from a use case” this afternoon.

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Investigate and Respond Demo

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Cisco Confidential
Review: the "should's" of any XDR

• Should work with your existing tools & not require a lift & shift to a single
vendor.
• Should be able to extend the detections without having to store all
telemetry & events in its own Data store
• Should enable the junior analyst to perform a much more senior level
• Should be able to respond quickly without additional configuration
• Should be able to create gap integrations with XDR Automate

• Integrate & work with your SIEM investments without having to replace
them.

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5
Follow-up

• Rob Gresham’s session on building


Workflows
• Watch out for the ATT&CK! with Matt
and Mike
• Threat Hunting Workshops
• See session: Enhanced Identity
Security Posture Management with
Duo

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