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Democratic Counterinsurgents: How Democracies Can Prevail in Irregular Warfare 1st Edition William Patterson (Auth.)
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RETHINKING
POLITICAL
VIOLENCE
Democratic
Counterinsurgents
How Democracies Can Prevail in Irregular Warfare
William Patterson
Rethinking Political Violence
Series Editor
Roger Mac Ginty
Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Manchester, UK
This series provides a new space in which to interrogate and challenge
much of the conventional wisdom of political violence. International
and multidisciplinary in scope, this series explores the causes, types and
effects of contemporary violence connecting key debates on terrorism,
insurgency, civil war and peace-making. The timely Rethinking Political
Violence offers a sustained and refreshing analysis reappraising some of the
fundamental questions facing societies in conflict today and understanding
attempts to ameliorate the effects of political violence.
Democratic
Counterinsurgents
How Democracies Can Prevail in Irregular Warfare
William Patterson
US Department of State
Washington DC, USA
This book would not have been written without the guidance of three
academic mentors. Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz was especially influential.
Through conversation and questioning he was instrumental in helping me
identify the topic and then narrow its scope. Through numerous meetings
he kept me, and the project, on track. His encouragement and confidence
in my ability to complete the task kept me motivated and moving forward.
Finally, his suggested revisions improved the quality of the final iteration
of this work.
I owe thanks to Dr. William Brenner for his guidance in working
through some of the key philosophical issues involved in this effort. The
concept of legitimacy is an especially difficult one to come to grips with
and the substantial analysis of it in this work is based upon discussions
with him and readings that he suggested. Since my undergraduate years
Dr. Brenner has been a mentor in my study of philosophy and has guided
my struggle with complex and abstract philosophical concepts. He has
improved not only my knowledge of these and similar issues but my ability
to think about them. He is also a scrupulous editor and his close reading
of early drafts helped immensely in improving their readability.
Dr. David Earnest pushed this book further than I had ever intended
by urging me to explore not only how democracies can be successful
at counterinsurgencies but how they may be even more successful than
other regime types. He pointed out that democracies may have several key
advantages that may translate into higher levels of success in population-
centric counterinsurgencies such as tolerance of other cultures and the
institution of legitimate governance. These suggestions led me to go one
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
1 Introduction 1
The Puzzle 1
Organization 5
2 The Arguments 11
Lack of Resolve 12
Strategic Limitations 22
What Counts as Winning? 24
Legitimacy 30
4 Malaya 61
History 61
Direct Action Against the Insurgent 65
Indirect Action Against the Insurgent 71
Interaction with the Population 74
Conclusion 80
ix
x CONTENTS
5 Vietnam 85
History 86
Direct Action Against the Insurgent 89
Indirect Action Against the Insurgent 104
Interaction with the Population 108
Conclusion 114
6 Iraq 121
History 122
Direct Action Against the Insurgent 124
Indirect Action Against the Insurgent 132
Interaction with the Population 137
Conclusion 143
7 Conclusions 149
Bibliography 159
Index 165
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
xi
xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Introduction
THE PUZZLE
We are in a critical part of history when it comes to counterinsurgency war-
fare. One war, Iraq, is over for the United States and another, Afghanistan,
is winding down. Some major goals were accomplished in each country.
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was overthrown, tried and executed and his
brutal Baathist regime was dismantled. Furthermore, elections were held
which led to the establishment of a government that represents a major-
ity of the Iraqi people. Similarly, in Afghanistan the Taliban were overrun
and removed from power and the current government was established by
democratic means. Progress has been made on establishing and training
Afghan security forces and police and some progress has been made in
regard to economic development.
Neither of these conflicts, however, can be considered an untarnished
victory for the United States. Violence has been on the rise in Iraq since
the American withdrawal and sectarian tensions continue to prevent polit-
ical reconciliation and stability. In Afghanistan the Taliban continue to
threaten the stability and security of the country and al-Qaeda remains
a threat. After more than a decade of effort, more than a trillion dollars
spent, thousands of lives lost and tens of thousands of severe injuries, the
costs of these conflicts have been great. In the wake of such costs many
have come to the conclusion that succeeding at counterinsurgency is not
possible, especially for democracies that must be responsive to the will of
the people. Such conflicts are said to be too lengthy to maintain public
approval and they are simply too costly in terms of financial investment
and lives lost. Some have concluded from this that no such efforts should
ever be attempted again and that democracies, especially the US, should
focus their military efforts on conventional threats.
It is not at all clear, however, that this is the correct conclusion to draw.
It is too hasty to claim that counterinsurgency is impossible without a close
look at the totality of the theoretical and empirical evidence. Furthermore,
democracies may not have the convenience of simply proclaiming a dis-
dain for counterinsurgencies and pledging to avoid them. It is rare that
such conflicts are desired. They are entered into because they are seen as
vital to national security. Failing to prepare for counterinsurgency will only
make victory less likely the next time one is unavoidable. It is therefore
imperative to draw valid conclusions about the viability of success in coun-
terinsurgency from the vantage point of democratic regimes. The analysis
presented here is intended to further clarify the issues at stake and bring us
to more firmly grounded considerations upon which democratic govern-
ments can base important defense and military decisions.
The fact that large powerful countries have frequently lost in counterin-
surgency warfare against much weaker opponents during the past century
is puzzling from the perspective of realist international relations theory.
Since power is the predominant factor in realist theory, the larger power
should almost always win. While other factors may be significant at the
margins and result in an occasional upset, the vast majority of wars will,
according to realism, be settled by power differentials. As Ivan Arreguin-
Toft explains, ‘As far back as Thucydides’ description of the wars between
Athens and Sparta, the link between power and conflict outcomes has
been the root principle of realist international relations theory. More
power means winning wars, and less power means losing them.’1 The facts
suggest, however, that within the past 50 years strong states, even when
vastly more powerful than their opponents, have been losing small wars at
a much greater rate than previously. Calculations by Arreguin-Toft indi-
cate that from 1950 to 1999 the more powerful actor won such wars only
48.8 percent of the time; less than half! The rate of success by powerful
actors in earlier 50 year increments was much higher (1800–1849, 88.2
percent; 1850–1899, 79.5 percent; 1900–1949, 65.1 percent).2
Democratic states are considered especially ineffective at counterin-
surgency warfare. Jason Lyall, for example, notes that ‘To date, a near
consensus exists among scholars, policymakers, and journalists around the
INTRODUCTION 3
Despite the strong case that has been made by a variety of scholars
using an array of arguments to demonstrate that democracies are particu-
larly unsuited to counterinsurgency, there is an opposing literature which
is consolidated around an effective counterinsurgency strategy applicable
by democratic governments. It has long been a tenet of counterinsur-
gency doctrine that the local population is the key to winning such con-
flicts. In his 1964 masterpiece, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and
Practice, for example, David Galula argued that the First Law of counter-
insurgency is that: ‘The Support of the Population is as Necessary for the
Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent.’5 In fact, he argues that support
from the population is the key determinant of power in counterinsurgency
conflicts. ‘In conventional warfare’, he argues,
success in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Daniel Byman and Matthew
Waxman, however, point out that
Contrary to the predictions of those who saw Desert Storm as putting the
Vietnam experience to rest, the relatively low U.S. death total in Desert
Storm only raised public expectations of bloodless foreign policy and fed
perceptions among policy makers that the public had softened in this regard.
The further erosion of already fragile U.S. public support that followed the
October 1993 deaths of 18 servicemen in Mogadishu evinced the strong
pull that U.S. casualties can exert on policy.12
ties and a war can remain popular despite them.15 This may also bode ill
for democratic counterinsurgents since it is precisely in such conflicts that
military progress may be most difficult to measure. Counterinsurgencies
may be able to overcome initial public skepticism if they are perceptibly
successful, but may suffer even further erosion if not.
Another important factor in determining public opinion was multilat-
eral support. Though this variable was weaker than either policy objectives
or the cost–benefit analysis produced by perceptions of success or failure,
multilateral cooperation did increase public support for conflict. Eisenberg
surmises that this is due to the perception of burden sharing.16 Moral soli-
darity may also be an important element. How this factor affects public
opinion about counterinsurgencies will of course be case-dependent, as
some counterinsurgencies are highly multilateral while others are less so.
Research conducted by Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver and Jason
Reifler concerning casualties in Iraq corroborates Eisenberg’s first two
findings.17 It demonstrates that two key variables directing US public
opinion in this case were perceptions of the war’s rightness or wrongness
(consistent with Eisenberg’s findings on war aims) and the likelihood of
success. It also found that these two factors are interrelated and affect each
other but that success is the stronger of the two variables.
Success is such an important variable, they argue, that it trumps the raw
number of combat deaths. In contradistinction to Mueller, they contend
that public support for the war did not vary with casualty numbers but
instead was determined by the public’s moral view of the war along with
perceived levels of success during the war’s various phases. This research
leads them to conclude that ‘the public does not measure success in terms
of body bags. On the contrary, the public claimed to focus on whether the
coalition was in fact winning over the hearts and minds of the Iraqi peo-
ple, as measured by Iraqi willingness to cooperate with coalition forces.’18
These findings have important implications for counterinsurgency cam-
paigns in that they demonstrate the public’s understanding of the key
importance of gaining the support of the population. Achieving such sup-
port is a major plank of the counterinsurgency strategy outlined below, as
being the most likely to lead to success for democratic regimes.
Scott Sigmund Gartner remains unconvinced by the argument pre-
sented by Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler. He agrees that public opinion is the
result of engaging in cost–benefit analyses of war, but rejects their con-
clusion that casualties don’t matter. The results of his statistical analysis
indicate that they definitely do matter, though casualty aversion is context
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Language: Finnish
Kokoelma kertoelmia
Kirj.
Fredrik Nycander
Ari Aalto
SISÄLLYS:
Esipuhe.
Nuorta väkeä.
Matka Lysekiliin.
Ei maksa vaivaa.
Pohjakalaa.
Kaksi kruunua.
Kosinta.
Vappuyö.
Keulapuolella.
Lumen alla.
Tupa.
Vahinkolaukaus.
Kun pappi kuoli.
Vanha laivuri.
Kajavia.
Vanhat neidit.
Esipuhe.
Olen nuori.
Tekijä
Nuorta väkeä.
Hän toivoi Ollille jotakin pahaa, mutta Katrinalle — ei toki, hän olisi
voinut laskea hänet puuvillapatjalle. Kun hän vain ajatteli, kuinka ne
nyt siellä seisoivat uskollisuuden lupauksia tekemässä —
varmaankin olivat he juuri lasketelleet sanat papin jälestä — kävivät
hänen kasvonsa tuskan rypistämiksi ja harmin kyynelet pakkautuivat
hänen silmiinsä.
Kummallista, että ihminen voi pitää niin paljon toisesta ja se, että
tämä ei voi välittää takasin. Sen asian laita on hullusti maailmassa!
Eikö hän, Gert, ollut sanonut Katrinalle niin monta kertaa, että hän oli
kiusallisuuteen asti rakastunut häneen, niin kerrassaan rakastunut,
että tuskin tiesi mitä tehdä — ja kuitenkin oli hänen kerrassaan
mahdotonta saada tyttö omakseen. Voiko kukaan käsittää, että hän
tahtoisi omakseen Ollin? Hänen, joka oli niin sairas pitkät ajat, niin
raihnas mies, että tuskin kykeni kyntämään, mutta ajoi mieluummin
lääkäriin. Rahoja hänellä oli tiettävästi — ajatteles, jos tyttö rahojen
takia olisi hänet ottanut. Ei, sitä hän ei voinut koskaan uskoa. Se oli
kehno ajatus, jonka paholainen oli hänessä herättänyt!
Gert puristi nyrkkiään yksinäisyydessään, ja otsasuonet hänen
lakkinsa alla paisuivat.
— Hyvää päivää!
— Hyviä ystäviä olemme me aina olleet, ja nyt voit sinä hyvin istua
alas ja saada osasi hääruoasta.
Katrina sanoi sen niin sävyisästi ja siivosti, ja Gert katsoi häneen
lempeämmin kuin koskaan ennen.
— Kaunis hän on aina ollut, sen minä kyllä tiedän — vastasi Gert
painolla.
— Gert, Gert!…
— Gert!
— Elä tee mitään hullutuksia, Gert. Minä oli pakoitettu, minä olin
pakoitettu!
— Siitä minä viis, mutta minä pidin sinusta, ja sinun olisi pitänyt
tulla minulle, kuuletkos.
— En, en.
— Kyllä, kyllä.
Mutta Olli oli hintelo eikä hänen jaloissaan ollut mitään jäntevyyttä.
Gert rupesi nauramaan niin, että koko hänen ruumiinsa vapisi.
Hän nauroi ei niin paljo tuon aviomiehen tanssille kuin sille
ajatukselle, kuinka hän tulisi peijaamaan Ollia. Ja kun Olli oli
lopettanut tanssin, meni Gert hänen luokseen ja löi hänelle kättä
oikein reilusti, niin että Ollin polvet aivan horjahtivat, ja sitten sanoi
hän, kasvot hyvää tuulta hehkuvina ja äänessä mitä toverillisin
sointu:
— Minä olen aina ollut vihainen sinulle, Olli, Mutta ei maksa olla
häijynä ja pahaa tahtovana, kuules, jos tahdot kuten minä, niin
juomme lasin yhdessä ja tulemme hyviksi ystäviksi.
Matka Lysekiliin.
— Ei, jei, älkäähän lähtekö nyt. Nuppinne eivät ole selvät — arveli
Abrahamsson.
Hän oli nähnyt unta, että joukko poikasia raapi hänen laatikkoaan.
Nyt alkoi hän ymmärtää tulleensa väärää tietä. Ja nyt tahtoi hän
herättää toisetkin.
Siinä se seisoi.
— Suusi kiinni!
Ei maksa vaivaa.