Table of Contents

RULE 21: SUBPOENA

1. Roco v Contreras, G.R. 158275, June. 28, 2005......................................................................................2
2. In Liebenow v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., G.R. No. 13463, Nov. 9, 1918.............................................6
3. In Re: Petition for cancellation and correction of entries in the record of birth, Lee v. CA G.R. No.
177861, July 13, 2010.............................................................................................................................10
4. Macaspac v. Flores, A.M. No. P-05-2072, August 13, 2008....................................................................13
5. Pagdilao, Jr. v. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467, Aug. 5, 1999...............................................................16
6. Nazareno v. Barnes, G.R. No. 59072, Apr. 25, 1984...............................................................................22

RULE 22: COMPUTATION OF TIME

1. Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc. v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 157020, Jun. 19, 2013...............29
2. PDIC v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139998 (Resolution), [October 29, 2002], 439 PHIL 980-989........31

RULE 23: DEPOSITION PENDING ACTION

3. Koh v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71388, September 23, 1986..........................................34
4. People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019]............................................................................37
5. People vs. Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999............................................................................49
6. Hyatt Industrial v. Ley Construction, G.R. No. 147143.March 10, 2006..................................................56
7. San Luis v. Roxas, G.R. No. 159127. March 3,2008...............................................................................63

RULE 25: INTERROGATORIES to PARTIES

1. Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145, 5 February 2014...............................................................70

1
Roco v Contreras, G.R. 158275, June. 28, 2005

G.R. No. 158275 June 28, 2005

DOMINGO ROCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDWARD B. CONTRERAS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAL'S POULTRY SUPPLY CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038, to wit:

1. Decision dated 20 August 2002,1 dismissing the appeal filed by herein petitioner Domingo Roco contra the 18 October
2000 resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Roxas City, denying due course to and dismissing his petition for certiorari
in SP Case No. 7489; and

2. Resolution dated 12 May 2003,2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The material facts are not at all disputed:

Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. Sometime in 1993, he purchased his
supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cal’s Poultry Supply Corporation (Cal’s Corporation, for short), a domestic
corporation controlled and managed by one Danilo Yap. As payment for his purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to Cal’s
Corporation against his account with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), which checks bear the following particulars:

Check No. Date Amount

004502 26 April 1993 ₱329,931.40
004503 4 May 1993 ₱319,314.40
004507 19 May 1993 ₱380,560.20
004511 26 May 1993 ₱258,660.20
004523 22 May 1993 ₱141,738.55.

Cal’s Corporation deposited the above checks in its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for having been drawn against a
closed account. Thereafter, Cal’s Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 (BP
22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

After preliminary investigation, five (5) informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Roxas City, thereat docketed as Crim. Cases No. 94-2172-12 to 94-2176-12, all of which were raffled to Branch 2 of
said court.

Meanwhile, and even before trial could commence, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) at Iloilo City a
denunciation letter against Cal’s Corporation for the latter’s alleged violation of Section 258 in relation to Section 263 of the National
Internal Revenue Code in that it failed to issue commercial invoices on its sales of merchandise. Upon BIR’s investigation, it was found
that Cal’s Corporation’s sales on account were unavoidable, hence, the corporation had to defer the issuance of "Sales Invoices" until
the purchases of its customers were paid in full. With respect to the sales invoices of petitioner, the investigation disclosed that the
same could not, as yet, be issued by the corporation precisely because the checks drawn and issued by him in payment of his
purchases were dishonored by PCIB for the reason that the checks were drawn against a closed account. Accordingly, the BIR found
no prima facia evidence of tax evasion against Cal’s Corporation.3

Thereupon, trial of the criminal cases proceeded. After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on
account of petitioner’s failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, the same court rendered a judgment of conviction against
petitioner.

Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his right to due process
when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording him of the right to present his evidence. Agreeing with the petitioner,
the RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the cases to it for the reception of petitioner’s evidence.

2
On 11 March 1999, during the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal’s Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19 May 1999 and to bring with them certain documents, records and books
of accounts for the years 1993-1999, to wit:

a) Sales Journal for the year 1993;

b) Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;

c) Sales Ledger for the year 1993;

d) Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in its absence, Accounts Receivable Ledger for the years 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998 or 1999);

e) Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statements as of February 1999;

f) Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999; and

g) Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.

The prosecution did not object to this request.

When the cases were called on 19 May 1999, the MTCC, then presided by Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting
petitioner’s aforementioned request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas.

During the trial of 14 July 1999, the private prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance of
the requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner countered by saying that Judge Delfin’s order of 19 May 1999 had become final and
hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioner’s
request for the issuance of subpoenas.

The prosecution did file its opposition, thereunder arguing that:

a) Vivian Deocampo, who previously testified for Lota Briones-Roco in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-2177-12 to 94-2182-12 before
Branch 1 of the MTC, had earlier attested to the fact that the following documents, records and books of accounts for 1993
sought by petitioner were already burned:

1. Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statement as of
February 1999;

2. Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999;
and

3. Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.

b) the Sales Ledger for the year 1993 cannot be produced because Cal’s Corporation did not maintain such ledger; and

c) the account Receivable Ledger for the periods from 1993, the Income Statement for 1993 and the Balance Sheet as of
February 1999, cannot also be produced because Cal’s Corporation recently computerized its accounting records and was still
in the process of completing the same.

For its part, the corporation itself maintained that the production of the above-mentioned documents was inappropriate because they
are immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted.

In a resolution dated 19 October 1999, the MTCC, this time thru its regular Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied
petitioner’s request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in
resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal
cases.

His motion for reconsideration of the denial resolution having been similarly denied by Judge Contreras, petitioner then went to the RTC
on a petition for certiorari with plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Contreras, which petition was docketed in the RTC as SP Case No. V-7489.
3
In a resolution dated 18 October 2000, the RTC denied due course to and dismissed the petition for petitioner’s failure to show that
Judge Contreras committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A motion for reconsideration was
thereafter filed by petitioner, but it, too, was likewise denied.

Undaunted, petitioner went on appeal via certiorari to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038.

As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 20 August 2002, 4 dismissed the petition and accordingly
affirmed the impugned resolutions of the RTC. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
resolution of 12 May 2003,5 petitioner is now with us via the present recourse on his submissions that -

I.

XXX THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND SUBPOENA DUCES
TECUM IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AS ENSHRINED IN ART. III, SEC. 14 (2) OF THE
CONSTITUTION; and

II.

XXX THERE MUST BE A BALANCING OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE RIGH [sic] OF AN ACCUSED TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE
AND THE RIGHT OF A COMPLAINANT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE.

As we see it, the pivotal issue is whether or not the three (3) courts below committed reversible error in denying petitioner’s request for
the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the five (5) criminal cases for violation of BP
22 filed against him and now pending trial before the MTCC.

We rule in the negative.

A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any
investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. 6

In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used
to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein
specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:7

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the
subpoena.

Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are
present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
(test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Again,
to quote from H.C. Liebenow:8

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is
proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and
secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial
examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value
may not show up, will not be enforced. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., 9 we held:

Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it must appear, by clear
and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue
before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or
described that it may be identified. (Emphasis supplied)

Going by established precedents, it thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and
the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it.

Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with
definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.

4
It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to
discharge his burden.

In the recent case of Aguirre vs. People of the Philippines,10 the Court reiterated the following discussions regarding violations of BP 22:

xxx what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 301). All
the elements, therefore, of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are all present in the instant criminal cases and for which the
accused is solely liable, to wit: [a] the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; [2] the knowledge of
the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment; and [3] subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).

We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.11 The offense is already consummated from the very moment a person issues a worthless
check, albeit payment of the value of the check, either by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of
dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense because the prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by
such payment.12

Here, petitioner would want it appear that the books and documents subject of his request for subpoena duces tecum are
indispensable, or, at least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court disagrees.

Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal’s Corporation with
temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the
corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to
prove his defense of payment. In the words of the appellate court:

The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the Regional Trial Court, that he had been issued temporary receipts in the form of yellow
pad slips of paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments which were all validated by the Private Respondent (Exhibits ‘8’ and ‘F’
and their submarkings). Even if the temporary receipts issued by the Private Respondent may not have been the official receipts for
Petitioner’s payments, the same are as efficacious and binding on the Private Respondent as official receipts issued by the latter.

We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this Court must have to disbelieve the factual findings of
the appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian
Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal’s Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.

Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on their very face thereof, what the fact that the requested
Audited Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax Returns, etc. pertained to the years 1994 to 1999 which could not
have reflected petitioner’s alleged payment because the subject transaction happened in 1993. Again, we quote from the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals:

The checks subject of the criminal indictments against the Petitioner were drawn and dated in 1993. The Petitioner has not
demonstrated the justification, for the production of the books/records for 1994, and onwards, up to 1999. Especially so, when
the "Informations" against the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed, with the Trial Court, as early as 1994.

We are inclined to believe, along with that court, that petitioner was just embarking on a "fishing expedition" to derail "the placid flow of
trial".

With the above, it becomes evident to this Court that petitioner’s request for the production of books and documents referred to in his
request are nakedly calculated to merely lengthen the proceedings in the subject criminal cases, if not to fish for evidence. The Court
deeply deplores petitioner’s tactics and will never allow the same.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED

5
In Liebenow v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., G.R. No. 13463, Nov. 9, 1918

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13463 November 9, 1918

H. C. LIEBENOW, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE VEGETABLE OIL COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

Kincaid & Perkins for appellant.

Hartigan & Welch for appellee.

6
STREET, J.:

This action was instituted by the plaintiff, H. C. Liebenow, on May 11, 1917, in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the defendant, the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil in the city of Manila. The
purpose of the proceeding is to recover a sum of money to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled by way of a bonus in addition to
the salary earned by him while in the employment of the defendant company as superintendent of its factory in the district of Nagtahan,
city of Manila. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance judgment was entered against the plaintiff, absolving the defendant from the
complaint, and the plaintiff has appealed.

The contract under which the plaintiff rendered the service to which reference has been made is expressed in a letter of March 17,
1914, written by the president of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company to Liebenow as follows:

We hereby confirm conversation had on yesterday by our Mr. Vorster and yourself to the effect that this company engages
your services as superintendent of its factory at Nagtahan for the period of one year from April 1st, 1914, at a monthly
compensation of P500 (five hundred pesos) and living quarters and such further amount in the way of bonus as the board of
directors may see fit to grant you.

In conformity with this agreement, the plaintiff entered upon the discharge of his duties as superintendent of the factory aforesaid on
April 1, 1914, and continued to render service in this capacity not only for the period of one year specified in the contract, but for an
additional period of four months, or until August 1, 1916, when his services terminated. At some time during the course of this
employment, the exact date of which does not appear, the monthly salary of P500 was raised to P750, but the contract was not
otherwise changed. After the employment ceased the defendant company continued to deliver to the plaintiff each month a check for
P750, the equivalent of the salary he had been receiving. These payments were continued until the total sum of P4,500 had been thus
paid.

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that by reason of his skill and ability the defendant's plant was made much more productive and its
profits thereby enormously increased. It is not denied that the service rendered was satisfactory to the company, and the court found
that during the time the plaintiff was employed as superintendent the output of the plant had increased and the cost of operation had
diminished, with consequent profit to the defendant company.

It is the plaintiff's contention that the stipulation contained in the letter of March 17, 1914, to the effect that the plaintiff should receive
such further amount in the way of bonus, over and above salary, as the board of directors might see fit to grant has not been satisfied.
The P4,500, which he received in the form of a monthly check of P750 for six successive months after the termination of his services,
seems to be considered by the plaintiff purely in the light of a free gift, and it is insisted that this money was not paid to him in
satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the stipulated bonus. We cannot concur in this suggestion. It is true that the directors did not by
anticipation declare that these payments should be considered in the light of a "bonus;" and a resolution to this effect was not adopted
by them until after the trial in the Court of First Instance had commenced. This circumstance we consider unimportant. The money thus
paid was in addition to salary; and it came from the same source and was paid by the same authority as any bonus that might have
been awarded to him. The fact that the money was not so labelled is immaterial.

The plaintiff, however, contends that he is entitled to a bonus to be fixed by the court as a reasonable participation in the increased
profits of the factory under his care, taking into consideration his technical skill and the greater output resulting therefrom. He believes
that the increased profits of the enterprise due directly to this efficiency amounted to at least P100,000; and he suggests, as the lowest
proper minimum that he should be awarded an amount sufficient to raise his salary for the whole period to the sum of P12,000 per
annum, the amount supposedly paid to his predecessor. This last suggestion is based on the circumstance that, upon a certain
occasion, he talked to the company's manager about the amount of the bonus which he would expect to receive and informed the
manager that he would not be satisfied with less than his predecessor had been accustomed to receive. The manager, so the plaintiff
says, expressed his conformity with this idea.

The solution of the case makes it necessary to consider the legal effect of the stipulation inserted in the contract in question to the effect
that the plaintiff should be entitled to such further amount in the way of bonus as the board of directors might see fit to grant.

We see no reason to doubt that a promise of this character creates a legal obligation binding upon the promisor, although in its actual
results it may not infrequently prove to be illusory. Such a promise is not, in our opinion, nugatory, under article 1115 of the Civil Code,
as embodying a condition dependent exclusively upon the will of the obligor. Nor can it be held invalid under article 1256 of the same
Code, which declares that the validity and performance of a contract cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties. The
uncertainty of the amount to be paid by way of bonus is also no obstacle to the validity of the contract (article 1273, Civil Code); since
the contract itself specifies the manner in which the amount payable is to be determined, namely, by the exercise of the judgment and
discretion of the employer.

7
The validity of the promise being conceded, the question which arises next is: What is necessary to satisfy it? Upon this point it must be
obvious that the obligation can only be satisfied when something has been paid as a bonus by or with the approval of the boar of
directors. In the case before us the promise to pay a bonus is absolute and unconditional. The payment is not conditioned upon
satisfactory service, nor upon the duration of the service, nor upon the profits which may accrue to the employer from the efficiency of
the employee. All these elements might and naturally would operate upon the minds and discretion of the directors in fixing the amount
of the bonus, but they are wholly unconnected with the legal right of the plaintiff to receive something as a bonus.itc@a1f

The amount of the bonus, it will be observed, is left by the contract to the discretion of the board of directors. Now, when that discretion
has once been exercised and a bonus has been pa by the directors or by the officers of the company, with the approval, express or
implied, of the directors, can that discretion be judicially reviewed? We are of the opinion that it cannot. The parties stipulate that the
discretion to be exercised was the discretion of the directors; and there would be a very manifest infringement of the contract, if we
were to substitute in place of the discretion of the directors the discretion of any other person or body whomsoever.

Practical considerations point to the same conclusion. An employer, in determining what amount to award as a bonus, naturally and
properly considers many things a court could not well take into account, as for instance, the personal peculiarities which make one man
more acceptable or more serviceable in the employment than another. In the complex enterprises of modern industry, especially, would
it be difficult for a court to undertake to say just what any particular employee might be entitled to. The best course, we think, in such a
case as this, is to recognize that the contracting parties have placed the discretion to determine the amount of the bonus in the hands
of the employer, and to hold them bound by than.

But it is suggested that where a contract of service provides for a salary in a fixed sum and an additional sum to be paid by way of
bonus, the whole contract is to be taken together, and it is to be considered as having about the same effect as if the parties,
recognizing the inadequacy of the amount fixed as salary, had agreed that a further bonus should be paid sufficient to raise the amount
to what should be considered adequate upon the basis of a quantum meruit. A more reasonable construction — and in our opinion one
which approximates more closely to the evident intention of the parties — is to hold that the fixed salary was adjusted with a view to
compensate the employee so far as those elements are concerned which could properly be taken into consideration in fixing a quantum
meruit and that the bonus was intended to be a mere gratuity the amount of which should be determined exclusively in the discretion of
the employer.

If, as supposed, the contracting parties are really bound by the stipulation which leaves the determination of the amount of the bonus to
the employer, two consequences necessarily follow. The first is that where something or other is paid by way of a bonus upon such a
contract, even though only a nominal amount, the obligation is satisfied. The other is that, if nothing at all is paid, the employee can
recover in a legal action only nominal damages. Such a contract contains nothing which could serve as the basis of a title to special
damages and affords no measure by which the amount of such damages could be ascertained.

It therefore becomes a matter of little or no practical importance whether the sum of P4,500, which was paid to the plaintiff after he quit
work for the defendant, was paid as a bonus or not; for even if it were not so paid, the plaintiff could in this action recover no more than
mere nominal damages.

A question which we consider of much importance is presented in an assignment of error directed to the action of the trial court with
reference to a subpoena duces tecum which the plaintiff caused to be issued a few days prior to the hearing in the Court of First
Instance. Said subpoena was directed to the managing director of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and commanded him to
produce in court upon the day set for the hearing of the cause the following documents. records, and papers relative to the company's
business, to wit:

(1) All Daily Mill reports showing daily output of oil and cake and consumption of copra of the P. V. O. Co., from April 1, 1913,
to March 31, 1915, both inclusive.

(2) All shipping reports of oil said company for the same period.

(3) All records showing cost of all shipments of oil made by said company, both in bulk and barrels for the same period.

(4) All records of all demurrage charges on said shipments for the same period.

(5) All records of receipts, expenses and profits from operation of the company's mill and all operating charges and costs of
said mill for the same period.

(6) All records and vouchers showing the salary and all other sums paid to Mr. Thompson, the company's mill superintendent,
or mill manager, during the entire period of his employment as well as all sums paid to him thereafter.lawphil.net

When the case was called for hearing the attorney for the defendant moved the court to vacate this subpoena on the ground that the
plaintiff was not entitled to require the production of the documents called for. The court reserved the matter for later determination and

8
in the end ruled that the evidence which the plaintiff sought to elicit was irrelevant. The witness was therefore excused from producing
the papers mentioned in the subpoena duces tecum and the plaintiff duly excepted.

According to the plaintiff's theory of the case, he was entitled to a bonus the amount of which should be determined by the court with a
view to the usefulness and efficiency which he had exhibited in the course of his employment; and he insists that the profits earned by
the defendant during the time he was employed as superintendent of the Nagtahan factory are relevant in determining the amount to be
thus awarded. For reasons already stated, this contention is untenable; and we are of the opinion that the court committed no error in
refusing to compel the production of the documents and records in question. The right to the bonus was wholly independent of the
profits, and the amount of the profits could not properly be taken into consideration by the court at all.

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum, with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the
subpoena. It is issued in the same manner as the ordinary subpoena, and is procurable from the clerk as of course without application
to the court. Section 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that the subpoena duces tecum may be used to compel the witness to
bring any book, document, or other thing under his control, which he is bound by law to produce in evidence. The words "which he is
bound by law to produce in evidence" indicate a limitation upon the exigency of the writ; and it is evident that there is this difference
between the ordinary subpoena to testify an the subpoena duces tecum, namely, that while the person to whom the subpoena to testify
is directed is bound absolutely and without qualification to appear in response to the subpoena, the person to whom the
subpoena duces tecum is directed is bound only in so far as he is required by law to produce the documents in evidence.

It results therefore that, if the case is such as to make it doubtful whether the documents to be produced are such that the witness is
bound by law to produce them, the witness is entitled to have the court pass upon this question; and where a subpoena duces tecum is
improperly issued to enforce the production of documents which the witness is not bound to produce, a proper remedy is by motion to
vacate or set aside the subpoena. Such was the procedure adopted in this case.

The power to require the production of books, documents, and papers by means of the subpoena duces tecum is one which is
undoubtedly capable of abuse and one which, if improperly used, causes great annoyance, not to say, expense to the person against
whom it is directed. If the use of the subpoena duces tecum were in practice confined to the office of compelling the production of
documents and papers which are directly related to the issues in a case, occasions for complaint would be infrequent. However, in
modern business it is sometimes necessary for litigants to have access to voluminous materials. Journals, ledgers, cashbooks, invoice
books, and account books pertaining to the business of large enterprises may have to be examined. To enforce the production of these
great piles of material unconditionally in court would in many cases operate with unreasonable hardship on the party against whom the
subpoena is issued and not infrequently the step would be barren of results to the person seeking to examine them. Such procedure is
not to be encouraged; and it is the duty of the court, in such a situation, to control the process so as to make it conformable to law and
justice. (Subsection 7, section 11, Code of Civil Procedure.) The motion to vacate or set aside the subpoena gives the court the
requisite opportunity to examine the issues raised by the pleadings in the cause and to consider not only the relevancy of the evidence
which is to be elicited but also to consider whether an order for the production of the document would constitute an unlawful invasion of
privacy.

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is
proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly,
whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will
not be enforced. (Street, Federal Equity Practice, vol. 2, sec. 1844.) No court, it is needless to say, would punish a witness for contempt
in refusing to obey a subpoena duces tecum the issuance of which has been procured with such end in view.

We observe in conclusion that where a party has any legitimate reason for inspecting the voluminous documents of an adversary, it is
usually more to the purpose to ask the court, before the hearing, for an order requiring such adversary to submit his books and records
for examination under such reasonable condition as the court may specify. If necessary, an expert can then be set to work; and the
result of his examination can be submitted to the court in a form at once intelligible and helpful. In the case before us if the documents
called for had been produced in the court room, both the court and the attorneys alike would have been helpless to discover from the
unsystematized mass the particular facts intended to be proved by them; and in the end it would have been necessary to adjourn the
hearing and call in an accountant to make the needed examination. While we do not wish to be understood as attempting to lay down
any hard and fast rule upon such a matter, we merely suggest that it is an abuse of legal process to use the subpoena duces tecum to
produce in court material which cannot be properly utilized by the court in determining the issues of the case; and in cases of this kind
the litigant should be required to resort to some other procedure in order properly to place before the court the evidence upon which the
case should be decided.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

9
In Re: Petition for cancellation and correction of entries in the record of birth, Lee v. CA G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-
VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right not to testify in a case against his
children.

The Facts and the Case

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had
11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-
Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh
children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed
that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably
TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the
status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the
father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG. 1

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the
12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lee’s
other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words,
by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave
birth to such other children, numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one
of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel
Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s
stepmother.3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu
was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother.

10
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, 4 setting aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005
Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not
render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, 5 she filed the present petition with this Court.

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
show that she is not Keh’s daughter.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it
was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh
children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against
invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event,
at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the
action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the
ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the
petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh
Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the
mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other children
were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot
deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age,
testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be
compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and
condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About
five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial
court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the
ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is
to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of
advanced age.8

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
11
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children
or other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who
revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to
them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.

SO ORDERED.

12
Macaspac v. Flores, A.M. No. P-05-2072, August 13, 2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. P-05-2072 August 13, 2008

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1989-P)

ROMMEL N. MACASPAC, complainant,

vs.
RICARDO C. FLORES, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case arose from the Complaint1 filed on August 20, 2004 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging
respondent, in his capacity as Process Server of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan, with Serious Neglect of
Duty relative to Criminal Case Nos. 9038 and 9039 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nova A. Catapang" for violation of Republic Act
No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").

Complainant, who introduced himself as a Police Officer (PO) I assigned at the District Civil Disturbance Management Group (DCDMG)
located at Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, alleged: that he was previously
assigned at PRO 3 Police Station in Orani, Bataan from August 30, 2002 to December 19, 2003; that on January 14, 2003, he
apprehended Nova Catapang for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165; that an Information was filed, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 9038 and 9039, and raffled to Balanga City RTC Br. 3; that knowing that he was bound to testify as the arresting
officer, he waited for the notice of hearing to be sent but none came until his actual reassignment on December 19, 2003; that on July
22, 2004, he was shocked and surprised when it came to his knowledge that the criminal cases were dismissed by the court per Order
dated June 30, 20042 stating, among others, that "the prosecution of these cases went caput (sic) simply because of the failure of the
purported arresting officer to appear at the scheduled hearings"; that upon inquiry with RTC Br. 3, he was informed by a court
personnel that respondent made a report on the return of the notice of hearing at the back page of the subpoena dated October 22,
2003 certifying that he has not served a copy of the subpoena to complainant on November 18, 2003 because "the said PO1 Rommel
Macaspac is now [assigned] at WPD Station 2[,] Tondo, Manila according to SPO3 Antonio Capuli of the PNP, Orani, Bataan"; that
respondent perjured in his report because complainant was at the time not assigned or transferred to another station, and in fact the
latter was the desk officer-on-duty from November 17 to 19, 2003, in that same station where the subpoena was allegedly served; that
the act of respondent, in making a report without further inquiry as to the truth thereof, is a grave neglect of his duties as a process
server because it is detrimental to the prosecution of the case and the government’s campaign against illegal drugs; and that the act of
respondent against complainant’s case is not an isolated incident as complainant found out through inquiries that most of the cases
handled by the municipal police officers of Orani, Bataan were dismissed because of respondent’s reports that a subpoena was served
to a particular police officer but in truth and in fact it was never served or that respondent never tried to serve it by coming to the police
station. Complainant prayed that a proper investigation of the matter be conducted before further damage would be caused by
respondent.

In its Indorsement dated September 9, 2004,3 the OCA directed respondent to file his Comment within ten days. On October 7, 2004,
respondent requested for an extension of fifteen days – reckoned from October 9, 2004 – within which to file his pleading, which was
granted.4 However, it was only on January 18, 2005 that respondent filed his Comment dated December 2, 2004. 5

Respondent countered that he should not be faulted for making a report that is candid and truthful. To him, he simply made a statement
of fact, no more and no less. He asserted that the situation would have been different had complainant questioned the existence of a
certain SPO3 Capuli, which he did not. Respondent stated that he could not have gone beyond the advice of SPO3 Capuli for the same
was accorded truth only after complainant was found unavailable; that it was complainant who was first sought by respondent and it
was only after he was nowhere to be found that respondent started to inquire from his colleagues. As to complainant’s allegation that
respondent was also negligent in other cases, respondent argued that such accusation deserves scant regard for want of specific
evidence that would link him to the supposed acts.

In his Reply filed on January 27, 2005,6 complainant reacted that respondent merely went through the process of serving a subpoena
without exerting much effort to locate him. He suspected that respondent’s service of the subpoena is tainted with irregularity, giving
doubts as to his integrity. Complainant reiterated his plea that a full-blown hearing be conducted to prove respondent’s negligence in
the performance of his duty.

13
On August 4, 2005, the OCA found in its Report7 that respondent is guilty for neglect of duty:

It is clear from the records of the instant complaint that there was indeed an unjustified failure to serve the subpoena dated 22
October 2003 on the complainant. Respondent, in his comment, expressly admitted that he failed to serve the subpoena on
complainant because the latter had been reassigned to the Tondo Police Station in Manila. This is not true for the fact is that
the complainant was reassigned to the NCRPO only on 11 December 2003. As of 18 November 2003 the complainant was still
the desk officer at the Orani Municipal Police Station, Bataan.

Respondent’s explanation that he was not able to serve the said subpoena as per advice of SPO3 Capuli is unmeritorious. As
a Process Server imbued with a sense of dedication to duty he should have ascertained the veracity of the information given to
him that complainant has been reassigned elsewhere. His alleged attempt to serve the subpoena was downright perfunctory.

By promptly acting the way he did without further verifying the false information given to him the respondent was guilty of
neglect of duty which caused the dismissal of Criminal [Cases] Nos. 9038 and 9039 of the RTC, Branch 3, Balanga City. 8

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent,
conformably with the ruling in Musni v. Morales,9 be fined in the amount of P3,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Per resolution dated September 12, 2005, this Court required respondent to manifest his agreement to submit the case for decision
based on the pleadings filed, as to which he assented.

After perusing over the records of the case, this Court agrees with the OCA findings, except as to its recommended penalty.

As opposed to the self-serving and uncorroborated declaration of respondent, documentary evidence substantiates the claim that on
November 18, 2003, the day respondent purportedly tried to serve a copy of the subpoena, complainant was actually still assigned as
the desk officer at the PRO 3 Police Station in Orani, Bataan. It can, therefore, be deduced that either respondent deliberately made a
false report as he, in fact, did not actually go to the police station or that he tried to serve the subpoena but no longer pursued it upon
relying on the representation of SPO3 Capuli. Since fraud or malice cannot be ascribed in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to prove the same, the Court is inclined to regard the latter scenario as logical especially since complainant himself failed to
disprove the identity of SPO3 Capuli or present his testimony to belie respondent’s allegation of having talked to him.

Nevertheless, respondent cannot escape administrative liability, considering that he did not diligently exert his best effort to ascertain
the true whereabouts of complainant. Evidently, he conveniently depended on just a lone informant, who later on was not even willing
to exculpate him from the present charges, instead of endeavoring to double check the data he obtained with the view in mind that
justice to the cause of the People would be served.

Notably, under Section 6, Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of Court, service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal
or substituted service of summons. Pertinent sections of Rule 14, in effect, state:

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Personal service and substituted service are the two modes of serving a subpoena. In this case, after respondent’s frustrated attempt to
personally serve complainant a copy of the subpoena he acted no further. This he cannot deny since the certification itself only
reflected: "I have this 18th day of November 2003 not served of (sic) witness subpoena upon PO1 Rommel Macaspac on the ground
that the said PO1 Rommel Macaspac is now [assigned] at WPD Station 2[,] Tondo, Manila according to SPO3 Antonio Capuli of the
PNP, Orani, Bataan."10 He did not attest in his report or aver in his Comment that, upon learning that personal service is not possible,
he served the subpoena by leaving a copy thereof to some responsible person at complainant’s dwelling place in Orani, Bataan or in
the police station. Respondent actually had ample time to properly serve it thereafter because complainant was only required to appear
as a witness on February 12, 2004, but respondent chose to be apathetic. The manner by which he served the court process clearly
does not suffice to comply with the requirements of the Rules.

Respondent’s lackadaisical deportment only shows his inefficiency and incompetence to perform the functions of his office. As public
servants, process servers like respondent must be constantly aware that they are bound by virtue of their office to exercise the
prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. 11 They should be fully cognizant
of the nature and responsibilities of their tasks and their impact in giving flesh to the constitutional rights of the litigants to due process
and speedy disposition of cases.12

14
In falling short of his mandate, respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which signifies the failure of an employee to give attention
to a task expected of him and a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. 13 The term does not necessarily include
willful neglect or intentional official wrongdoing.14 The OCA’s recommended penalty of a fine in the amount of P3,000, however, does
not correspond to the range of penalties provided for under Section 52 (B) (1), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,15 which took effect four days after the promulgation of the Musni case. Under the prevailing Rules, simple
neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense which carries the penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months
for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Considering the adverse effect of respondent’s negligence to the Republic’s
efforts to curb the proliferation of illegal drugs, he should be suspended for three months without pay.

WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and is SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personnel records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

15
Pagdilao, Jr. v. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467, Aug. 5, 1999

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467 August 5, 1999

ATTY. SAMUEL D. PAGDILAO, JR., Chief of Police, Caloocan City, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for grave abuse of discretion filed against respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City. Complainant is the Chief of Police of Caloocan City, Samuel D.
Pagdilao, Jr. The complaint stemmed from several orders of arrest issued by respondent against Caloocan City
policemen for their failure to attend hearings in criminal cases and testify as state witnesses, which respondent
wanted complainant to personally enforce. 1âwphi1.nêt

The record shows that on August 10, 1998, respondent issued an order of arrest which reads as follows: 1

In today's initial trial in Criminal Case Nos. C-53625 (98), 53626 (98), 53622 and 53623 (98), accused
Manuel Mendoza and Romeo Cendaño appeared and assisted by Atty. Ojer Pacis of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO). However, there was no appearance on the part of PO2 Alexander Buan. The records will
show however that he was duly notified of today's hearing but despite notice he did not appear thereby
delaying the early termination of these cases.

Consequently, and on motion of the public prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against PO2
ALEXANDER BUAN and the Chief of Police, Caloocan City, Police Superintendent Samuel Pagdilao is
hereby directed to effect the service of the warrant of arrest and to bring the body of the witness not later
then 8:30 o'clock in the morning tomorrow, August 11, 1998 for him to testify in these cases.

The accused is likewise directed to appear tomorrow, August 11, 1998.

WHEREFORE, let the scheduled hearing for today be cancelled and have it reset tomorrow, August 11,
1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

On August 11, 1998, respondent issued another order in another case (Criminal Case No. C-53081(97)), the
pertinent portion of which reads:2

After the pre-trial in this case has been waived by the accused through counsel, the Public Prosecutor failed
to present its evidence on the ground that his witnesses, mostly police officers, did not appear despite
notices.

Consequently, on motion of the Public Prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against SPO1 Edgardo
Fernandez and PO3 Eduardo S. Avila.

16
 Let the service of the warrant of arrest upon SPO1 Edgardo Fernandez and PO3 Eduardo S. Avila be
effected by no less than the Chief of Police of Caloocan City, Supt. Samuel Pagdilao and the latter is
directed to make a return on or before September 1, 1998.

On August 12, 1998, in Criminal Case No. C-53796(98), respondent issued an order reading: 3

A cursory examination of the records will readily show that on June 23, 1998 P/Insp. Emmanuel R. Bravo
appeared and signed for the scheduled hearing today, August 12, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, but
he did not appear despite notice thereby delaying the early termination of this case.

Let it be noted that the accused is a detention prisoner who is entitled to a speedy trial and the trial could not
proceed in view of the non-appearance of the aforesaid witness.

Consequently, and on motion of the public prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against P/Insp.
Emmanuel R. Bravo of the Caloocan City Police Force and let the warrant be served personally by the Chief
of Police of Caloocan City, Police Superintendent Samuel Pagdilao and the latter is directed to make a
return of the warrant not later than 8:30 o'clock in the morning tomorrow, August 13, 1998.

Apparently, resenting the tenor of the orders directed personally at him, complainant wrote respondent on August
14, 1998 asking for the reconsideration of the foregoing orders:4

14 August 1998

Honorable Adoracion G. Angeles

Acting Presiding Judge
RTC Branch 125, Caloocan City

Your Honor:

This is with regards to orders lately coming from that (sic) Honorable Court directing the undersigned
to personally serve and return subpoenas and warrants of arrests against PNP personnel assigned within and/or
outside the Caloocan City Police Station.

As Chief of Police of one of the three biggest Police Departments in the National Capital Region (next only to Manila
and Quezon City), I have to attend to many matters which would prevent my personally performing the task of
service on (sic) subpoena and warrants.

May I, therefore, respectfully request the Honorable Court to reconsider such orders and instead allow the
undersigned to delegate to subordinate officers particularly, the Chief, Warrant and Subpoena Section and Sub-
Station Commanders, the performance of this task. This will allow the undersigned to personally attend to the many
operational activities of law enforcement as well as the various administrative functions as Head of the City's Police
Department.

The order of the Honorable Judge to the undersigned Chief of Police disregards the time honored tradition and
system of Command and Control practiced in our organization and reduces the level of the Chief of Police into a
subpoena server and arresting officer. A job which can be readily accomplished by the Chief of Warrant and
Subpoena Section and by other officers whom the Commander may direct under this system.

Records show that service of warrants and subpoena to PNP personnel have all been duly accomplished by our
warrant and Subpoena Section.

I hope that this request will merit your favorable consideration.

Very respectfully yours,

17
 (signed)

ATTY. SAMUEL D. PAGDILAO JR.

Police Superintendent (DSC)
Chief of Police

Copy Furnished:

The Honorable Chief Justice, Supreme Court

The Honorable Court Administrator, Supreme Court
The Chief of the Philippine National Police

Respondent's reaction was just as acerbic. In an order, dated August 21, 1998, denying complainant's request for
reconsideration, she said:5

Before this court for consideration is a Letter-Request dated August 14, 1998 filed by P/Supt. Samuel D.
Pagdilao, Jr., Chief of Police of the Caloocan City Police Department.

He assails the orders coming from this court directing him to personally serve and return subpoenas and
warrants of arrest against PNP personnel assigned within and/or outside the Caloocan City Police Station.
He further contends that such orders disregard the time-honored tradition and system of Command and
Control practiced in their organization and reduces the level of the Chief of Police into a subpoena server
and arresting officer.

Apparently, P/Supt. Samuel D. Pagdilao, Jr. perceives the assailed orders as an affront to the eminence of
his position as Chief of Police above all else.

Nonetheless, this court has never entertained thoughts of debasing the Chief of Police or anybody else for
that matter. Nor was it ever enticed to employ dictatorial schemes to abbreviate its proceedings despite the
fact that the Presiding Judge is practically handling three (3) salas at the moment — the first as the duly
appointed judge, the second in an acting capacity and the third as the pairing judge for the presiding judge
thereat who has been on leave for quite some time already. 1âwphi1.nêt

Notwithstanding the incessant pressure inherent in the job, this court takes pride in the fact that it has never
lost its clear vision that it exists primarily for the proper and expeditious administration of justice.

Indeed, this court has always been very zealous in the discharge of its bounder duties. Nonetheless, its
earnest efforts to promote a speedy administration of justice has many times been unduly hampered by the
frequent non-appearances of police officers in court hearings despite sufficient notice. It has always been a
big disappointment to the court that its dedication to duty is sometimes not matched by some law-
enforcement officers.

Hence, in order to solve this dilemma, the Court directed the Chief of Police to personally ensure the
attendance of his men in court hearings so much so that (sic) their testimonies are very vital to the outcome
of the criminal cases herein. The Orders of the court were never meant to disregard the system of
Command and Control being employed in the Police Force. Its only concern was that such system of
Command and Control must be effectively used to address the lukewarm attitude of the Chief of Police's
subordinate relative to their duty to appear in court.

It is noteworthy to mention that since the issuance of the assailed Orders, the concerned law enforcement
officers have shown an impressive attendance in court hearings which confirms that it makes a lot of
difference when the Chief of Police himself acts to ensure the compliance of his subordinates to a lawful
court Order.

Needless to state, the court was able to solve a perennial problem with the renewed cooperation of the
City's police force.
18
 The court should not therefore be taken to task for its issuance of the questioned Orders because the same
was done in the interest of justice.

On the other hand, the Chief of Police must be reminded that this is not the time to be onion-skinned and
regard the said Orders as a personal insult to his dignity.

During this time when criminality is on the rise, would it not be more prudent for the Chief of Police to lay
aside his egotistical concerns and instead work with the courts of justice in addressing the more pressing
problems of criminally, violence and injustice?

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Letter-Request of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City is duly
noted but the court reiterates its stand that its foremost concern is the administration of justice and with this
consideration indelibly etched in its mind, it will issue such Orders which are geared towards the
achievement of its noble purpose.

Let copies of this Order be furnished upon the Honorable Chief Justice and Honorable Court Administrator
of the Supreme Court as well as to the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

SO ORDERED.

In his complaint, dated October 28, 1998, complainant avers that respondent's orders betray her ignorance of the
rulings of this Court in several cases that non-attendance at a trial does not constitute direct but indirect contempt
punishable only after written charge and hearing under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He states that the action of
respondent not only seriously affects the service records of the concerned policemen but also jeopardizes their
promotions.

Complainant likewise assails the orders of respondent requiring him personally to arrest the policemen concerned,
make a return of the orders, and in the case of PO2 Alexander Buan, to bring the latter to respondent's court not
later than 8:30 in the morning of August 11, 1998. Complainant claims that the order is capricious and whimsical
because the time given to him for serving the warrant was short and disregarded the "system of command and
control, and the doctrine of qualified political agency in the administration of public offices." According to
complainant, when he asked respondent to reconsider her order and allow his subordinates, particularly the Chief of
the Warrant and Subpoena Section and the Sub-Station Commanders, to serve the orders in question, respondent
"arrogantly dismissed [the principle complainant was raising] as nothing but a display of egotistical concerns."

In her comment on the complaint, respondent contended that the warrants of arrest against the Caloocan City
policemen were issued merely for the purpose of compelling the attendance of the policemen at the court hearings
as state witnesses as it had been her experience that the policemen ignored her orders. She stated that in issuing
the orders in question she was never motivated by ill will but that her concern was solely to expedite the
proceedings in two salas of the court over which she was presiding since justice delayed is justice denied. She
reiterated what she said in her order denying complainant's request to be relieved from serving the orders.
Respondent contends that a prior charge or hearing is not required before a warrant of arrest may be issued under
Rule 21, §8 of the Rules of Court. She argues that this provision only requires proof of service of subpoena on a
witness and the fact that the witness failed to attend the scheduled hearing before a court can exercise its power of
compulsion.

On the allegation that complainant was given a very short period of time for serving the warrant of arrest against
witness PO2 Buan, respondent points out that the policeman was right in the Caloocan City Police Station were
complainant held office. As for her statement that complainant's letter was "nothing but a display of egotistical
concerns," respondent said that obviously complainant took offense because of what he considered his "exalted
position as chief of police."

Replying to respondent's comment, complainant argues that Rule 21, §8 invoked by respondent to justify her orders
is not applicable. He points out that the orders were intended not only to compel the attendance of policemen in
court but also to punish them for contempt of court. He also alleges that, contrary to respondent's statement in her
order dated March 10, 1999, in Criminal Case Nos. C-55145(98) and 55146(98), that he did not make a return of the

19
warrant of arrest against PO3 Nestor Aquino, complainant says he made a return which, in fact, was received in
respondent's court on March 10, 1999 at 10:22 a.m.6

Respondent's order reads as follows:7

In an order of the court dated March 8, 1999, a warrant for the arrest of PO3 Nestor Aquino, prosecution's
witness in these cases were issued by the Court directing the Chief of Police of Caloocan City or the duly
authorized representative of the latter to produce the body of the aforesaid police officer not later than March
10, 1999 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

A cursory examination of the records will show that the order was received by the Chief of Police of
Caloocan City on the same date, March 8, 1999 but despite receipt thereof, the Chief of Police of Caloocan
City did not bother to make a return of the warrant of arrest thereby delaying the early disposition of these
cases.

Let it be stressed that this is a joint trial of Crim. Case No. 55145 (98) and Crim. Case No. C-55146 (98) for
the violation of the drugs law.

This indeed does not speak well of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City.

WHEREFORE, the Chief of Police of Caloocan City is hereby given a period of three (3) days from receipt of
a copy of this order to explain and to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of court for failure
to produce today, March 10, 1999, the body of the afore-said witness.

Let copies of this order be furnished upon the Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National
Capital Judicial Region (NCJR), Bicutan, Metro Manila as well as to the Director General of the PNP,
Roberto Lastimosa for them to know the actuation of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City in the discharged
of its official function.

Complainant's return, bearing the stamp "RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan, City, received, 3/10/99, 10:22 a.m.," reads: 8

Date 10 March 1999

Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court RTC BR 121 Cal City the attached Warrant/Order of Arrest in
Crim. Case No. 55145-55146 (98) against PO3 NESTER AQUINO with address at DDEU, NPDC, Tanigue
St., Kaunlaran Vill. Caloocan City for the crime of Non-appearance (at the scheduled hearing held on 8 March 1999.

REASONS: UNSERVED. Subject PNP personnel was already dismissed from the service effective 16
February 1999. Attached herewith is the xerox copy of Spl Order No. 366 relative to his dismissal.

Complainant adds that, in Caloocan City, only respondent issues orders to policemen to serve court processes on
short notice, and orders their arrest without hearing in case they fail to comply without taking into account that they
also have other work to do. He states that he filed the instant complaint against respondent not to cause her
dishonor but to promote respect for the law and to correct the misimpression that Caloocan City policemen are
"inefficient or defying court orders."

The Office of the Court Administration (OCA) recommends the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for
lack of merit. In its report, it states among other things:

A cursory reading of the records of this case shows the utter lack of merit of complainant's cause.

First, a perusal of the questioned orders issued by the respondent reveals that the subject policemen were
not punished for contempt of court hence the contempt provisions under the Revised Rules of Court is not
applicable. Prior written charge and hearing therefore is not necessary before Judge Angeles can issue
warrant of arrest to compel their attendance in court hearings;

20
 Second, a judge is not prohibited to issue orders directing heads of police stations to personally serve and
return processes from the court;

Third, it cannot be considered as unreasonable the period given to complainant within which to effect the
service of the warrants of arrest issued by the court considering that the police officers to be served by said
warrants are working right at the Station headed by the complainant himself; and

Lastly, on the charge that respondent arrogantly regarded the letter of complainant as "nothing but a display
of egotistical concerns" we are inclined to believe that the respondent's remarks were not tainted with malice
and that her only concern is for the "speedy and efficient administration of justice."

Rule 21, §8, pursuant to which respondent issued her orders, states that "in case of failure of a witness to attend,
the court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of the failure of the witness, may
issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or
officer where his attendance is required." Respondent is thus correct in contending that a judge may issue a warrant
of arrest against a witness simply upon proof that the subpoena had been served upon him but he failed to attend
the hearing. The purpose is to bring the witness before the court where his attendance is required, not to punish him for contempt which requires a previous
hearing.9 However, unnecessary tension and asperity could have been avoided had respondent simply called the attention of complainant to the failure of the
latter's men to comply with her orders instead of directing complainant to personally serve the orders and bring the policemen himself to her sala. Moreover, as is
clear from Rule 21, §8, the orders of arrest should have been addressed to the sheriff or the latter's deputy. Respondent could have done this while calling
complainant's attention to the alleged disregard by policemen of her orders so that appropriate disciplinary action could be taken if necessary.

It would appear that respondent's order of August 10, 1998 in Criminal Case Nos. C-53625(98), 53626(98), 53622,
and 53623(98), which provoked this incident and gave rise to the "word war" between the parties, was made
because respondent thought that in the other cases (Criminal Case Nos. 55145(98) and 55146(98)) heard that
morning, complainant ignored her order to produce a policeman whom she had ordered arrested. However, as
already noted, the policeman could no longer be presented in court as he had already been dismissed from the
service, and complainant did make a return informing the court of this fact, although his return did reach the court a
few hours after the hearing in which the policeman's testimony was required.

It was this unfortunate incident which provoked the exchanges between complainant and respondent: respondent
acting on the erroneous belief that complainant had ignored her order and, consequently, requiring complainant to
personally arrest his own men and take them to her court, and complainant taking umbrage at the orders. The
observance of restraint was never more demanded on the part of both parties.

Respondent acted a bit rashly while complainant reacted too strongly. The courts and the law enforcers are two of
the five pillars of the criminal justice system, the other three being the prosecution, the correctional subsystem, and
the community.10 Cooperation among, and coordination between, the five pillars are needed in order to make the
system work effectively. Indeed, complainant and respondent, both avow a common objective of dispensing justice.
More than that, the parties should observe mutual respect and forbearance.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City is
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial function with WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The instant complaint is DISMISSED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

21
Nazareno v. Barnes, G.R. No. 59072, Apr. 25, 1984

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59072 April 25, 1984

HIDULFO D. NAZARENO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ROQUE M. BARNES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Baganga, Davao Oriental, respondent.

Pedro S. Castillo for petitioner.

CUEVAS, J.:

This certiorari case arose from a contempt proceeding conducted by the Honorable respondent Judge against the
herein petitioner captioned "In Re: Contempt Proceedings vs. Hidulfo D. Nazareno, accused" criminal Case No. 436
for "Indirect Contempt of Court and Judge of the Court of First Instance," resulting in the issuance of the challenged
Order finding petitioner GUILTY of indirect contempt and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
and to pay a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos. 1

The aforesaid contempt case was brought about by a letter-complaint dated August 22, 1981, 2 addressed by the herein petitioner to His Excellency, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, which was subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Diosdado Llamas. Said letter reads as follows — têñ.£îhqwâ£

August
22,
1981

His Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacañang Palace
Manila

Your Excellency,

In line with your call to the general public to come up with charges and/or evidence against
incompetent and/or corrupt Judges in connection with the reorganization of the Judiciary, I am most
respectfully bringing to your attention specific charges against Judge Roque M. Barnes of the Court
of First Instance of Baganga, Davao Oriental, which I believe render him unfit to continue as a
member of the Judiciary. The following are specification of charges:

I— IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

(A) In Civil Case No. 174 entitled Baganga Consolidated Arastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs.
NLRC, et al., Judge Barnes issued an injunction against the National Labor Relations Commission
enjoining an execution issued by the latter. I believe since the NLRC is equal in rank if not higher
than the Court of First Instance and said commission has exclusive jurisdiction in Labor cases,
Judge Barnes displayed ignorance of the law in entertaining the suit for injunction. It might be

22
mentioned in passing that the NLRC filed a Motion to Dismiss the suit but up to now has not yet
been resolved.

(B). In the case of People of the Philippines versus Jeonardo Ty docketed as Criminal Case No. R-
1116-160, the accused therein was convicted by the Municipal Court of Cateel for Slight Physical
Injuries, after which the accused appealed to the Court of First Instance of Baganga. In a decision
dated January 19, 1976, Judge Barnes also found the accused guilty not of Slight Physical Injuries
but of Serious Physical Injuries, which decision was promulgated to the accused. However, after the
promulgation, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on an Affidavit of Desistance of
the complaining party. In an Order dated October 4, 1976, Judge Barnes vacated his previous
decision finding the accused innocent of the crime charge solely on the basis of the affidavit of
desistance. Considering that the affidavit of desistance was submitted after the promulgation of the
judgment, Judge Barnes committed grave error and/or displayed ignorance of the law in changing
his decision. Copies of the decision, motion for reconsideration and order are hereto attached as
Annexes "A", "B", and "C".

(C) In the case of Cresencio Maliño versus Ramon Ramirez vs. (sic) Vicente Estevas, Sr. in Civil
Case No. 122 for Reformation of Instrument, Judge Barnes while finding that the property in
question was in the possession of the defendant as mortgagee failed to apply the principle of
antichresis. Copy of the decision is hereto attached as Annex " D ".

II— ACTS OF HARASSMENT:

Sometime in October, 1980, Judge Barnes was on a private plane going to Baganga, Davao Oriental
from Davao City. The North Camarines Lumber Company which owns the airstrip in Baganga,
Davao Oriental advised all incoming planes that the airstrip was being repaired and therefore could
not be utilized for that trip. Failing to land in Baganga, Judge Barnes cited Mr. Ching Hai Cuan, the
Vice President for Operations of the North Camarines Lumber Company and Miss Norma Lo, the
company accountant for Contempt of Court and both were made to explain why the plane carrying
Judge Barnes was not allowed to land in the company's airstrip. Bth persons had nothing to do in
the landing field.

III— INCURRING INDEBTEDNESS IN THE COMMUNITY: It is of public knowledge in the

Municipality of Baganga that Judge Barnes has contracted many indebtedness in several stores and
from several persons without paying for the same.

IV— USING UNDUE INFLUENCE:

On enumerable occasions, Judge Barnes has requested for free rides in the planes of the North
Camarines Lumber Company in his trips to and from Baganga, Davao Oriental. Considering that the
company has its main offices at Baganga, Davao Oriental under the jurisdiction of Judge Barnes and
considering further that the company has cases pending before his sala, it was not proper to secure
favors from the company.

V— HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM:

It is also of public knowledge in Baganga, Davao Oriental that Judge Barnes holds sessions only
from two to three days a week.

Your Excellency, in due course I shall also submit other charges against Judge Barnes as soon as I
shall have verified certain reports reaching me. I hope that in the interest of attaining the objectives
of the Judicial reorganization, persons like Judge Barnes should not be extended a new
appointment. têñ.£îhqwâ£

Very truly yours,

23
 (S/T) HIDULFO D. NAZARENO
Baganga, Davao Oriental

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of October, 1981, in Baganga, Davao
Oriental; affiant having exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. 2261630 issued at Baganga,
Davao Oriental, on January 20, 1981. têñ.£îhqwâ£

(S/T) DIOSDADO YAMAS

Fiscal

Getting hold of a copy of the aforesaid letter, the Hon. respondent Judge instituted before his branch or sala a
charge of Indirect Contempt of Court which, as herein earlier stated, was denominated as Criminal Case No. 436,
for "Indirect Contempt of Court or Judge of the Court of First Instance." The charge reads as follows — têñ.£îhqwâ£

The undersigned Presiding Judge hereby charges the abovenamed accused of the crime of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT and Judge of the Court of First Instance, defined and penalized
under Sec. 3(d) and Sec. 6, Rule 71, Revised Rules of Court, committed as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1981, in a letter-complaint the accused addressed to the President of
the Philippines, true copy of which was furnished by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baganga,
Davao Oriental, and about which the accused have talked in restaurants and to several people in the
community of Baganga that he charged the undersigned with ignorance of the law in connection with
Civil Case No. 174, entitled "Baganga Consolidated Arastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Hon.
Alberto Veloso, et al"; and in Civil Case No. 122, entitled "Cresencio Maliño vs. Ramon Ramirez vs.
Vicente Estevas, Sr.", which cases are sub-judice or pending resolution before this Court in view of
the pleadings intervening, thus undermining the faith and confidence of the people in the Court, and
tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, unlawfully interfere with or influence the decision in
the controversy or degrade and embarrass the administration of justice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Baganga, Davao Oriental, Philippines, November 9,1981. têñ.£îhqwâ£

(SGD) ROQUE M.
BARNES Presiding
Judge

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of November, 1981, at Baganga, Davao
Oriental, Philippines. têñ.£îhqwâ£

(SGD) ADOLFO A.
CAUBANG
Municipal Mayor

On the basis of the aforesaid charge, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the petitioner who was actually arrested
at eight-thirty in the morning of November 11, 1981. Thereafter he was brought direct to the sala of the Hon.
respondent Judge where the charge of Indirect Contempt was read to him. As recorded, the proceeding that
transpired in said case runs thus— têñ.£îhqwâ£

COURT:

Now, the charge had been read to you and the basis of that charge is the law that is
there in the charge. Read the rule (Reading).

Now, you have been making comments criticisms against the presiding judge of this
court of ignorance of the law. That will undermine the faith, confidence and respect of
24
the people in the integrity of this Court and of the presiding judge, and thereby
maligning, embarrassing, impeding the administration of justice when you mentioned
in your criticism cases which are pending decision and/or resolution by the court. It is
there in your complaint under oath to the President of the Philippines.

Now, you wanted that this presiding judge decide the case as what you think when
you made this criticism? The court knows that you are not a lawyer. Does the
accused know the law?

DR. NAZARENO:

Not necessarily a lawyer.

COURT:

Are you a party to these cases you mentioned in your complaint?

DR. NAZARENO:

Your Honor, may I ask if this is part of the proceedings. Because if it is part of the
proceedings, then I would ask that the presiding judge inhibits himself.

COURT:

Are you a party to these cases you mentioned in your complaint to the President of
the Philippines?

DR. NAZARENO:

Not a party to the case, Your Honor, but I am doing it as a concerned citizen.

COURT:

You are not also a lawyer?

DR. NAZARENO:

I do not pretend to be a lawyer, Your Honor, but only as a concerned citizen.

COURT:

You should know the law because you are denouncing this presiding judge as
suffering from ignorance of the law?

DR. NAZARENO:

Your Honor, if this is part of the proceedings, then I move for the inhibition of the
presiding judge.

COURT:

You answer the question of the court.

DR. NAZARENO:

25
 If this is part of the proceedings, Your Honor, then I would petition the Honorable
Court that the presiding judge inhibits himself because he is a party-in-interest to this
proceedings. The contents of my letter to the President was only a narration on the
part of the call of the President on the people to denounce incompetent and corrupt
judges; and that letter is not addressed to anybody else but only to the President. So
it is the President who has to decide on that letter or complaint of mine.

COURT:

Your response to the court is good if it is correct. But your response is not correct
because you are violating the rule on contempt. You have heard the rule when it was
read to you. And in your complaint you mentioned cases which are still pending
resolution by the court and therefore sub-judice Moreover, you are not a party to the
case. By doing so, you are impeding the administration of justice. The lawyers know
the status of the proceedings. Do you have more answers to say?

DR. NAZARENO:

I am petitioning the Honorable Court that the Honorable Presiding Judge should
inhibit himself from hearing this case as he is a party-in-interest to this case, Your
Honor.

COURT:

Petition denied. it is within the power and authority of the court to charge and
investigate you and to put you under custody that is as provided for under the rules.

DR. NAZARENO:

May I Request that the ruling of the Honorable Court be placed on record the ruling
of the Honorable Court, Your Honor.

COURT:

Put it on record Mr. Stenographer. Do you have anything more to say?

DR. NAZARENO:

No more, Your Honor.

COURT:

Order. The accused stands charged of indirect contempt of court in a charge quoted
as follows: (quote the charge) The court after hearing the explanation and answer of
the accused, and finding the same to be unsatisfactory, the accused having admitted
the charge in open court, he is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and
accordingly, he is punished under the provisions of Sec. 6 of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, the accused is hereby sentenced and ordered to pay
a fine of P 1,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner now comes before Us through the instant petition for certiorari assailing not only the validity of his
conviction but likewise the legality of the proceedings conducted against him which resulted in his conviction ...
alleging that he was denied the opportunity to defend himself; to be assisted by counsel despite his insistence and
3

26
assertion of said right; and a reasonable time within which to prepare for his defense despite the penal nature of the
charge against him. Instead, respondent right then and there proceeded to investigate him on the basis of his letter-
complaint to the President which could not in anyway possibly interfere, impede nor obstruct the administration of
4

justice and could not therefore legally serve as a basis for a liability for indirect contempt.

In his COMMENT filed in compliance with our Resolution of March 8,1982, respondent Judge alleged that
petitioner's Letter-Complaint of August 2, 1982 to President Marcos, charging him of ignorance of the law
undermines the faith, respect, trust and confidence of the citizenry in the administration of justice considering that
the two cases therein dealt with and complained of are still pending consideration in his sala and therefore sub-
5

judice.

Respondent Judge also claims that he had been reliably informed that petitioner was not content in merely writing to
the President as he had done, but likewise had been talking to a lot of people in restaurants and other places on this
same subject-his (respondent's) alleged ignorance of the law. 6

Respondent Judge likewise contends that petitioner was merely seeking refuge under the guise of being a
concerned citizen answering the call of the President when in reality he was in truth and in fact really settling a score
against respondent who convicted him on appeal in a less serious physical injury case on December 14, 1971. He
denied having acted without jurisdiction nor in excess of jurisdiction, much less has he committed grave abuse of
discretion in adjudging petitioner guilty of indirect contempt and imposing upon him a fine of Pl,000.00 plus six ( 6)
months imprisonment which is in accordance with Rule 71, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The nature
thereof being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. The written charge may partake the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent (not accused) to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having committed the contemptuous acts imputed against
him; or (2) a petition for contempt by way of special civil action under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The first
procedure applies only where the indirect contempt is committed against a court or judge possessed and clothed
with contempt powers. The second, if the contemptuous act was committed not against a court nor a judicial officer
with authority to punish contemptuous acts.

Neither of the two modes of commencing an indirect contempt proceeding was resorted to nor availed of in the
instant case. What was filed against the herein petitioner was to all intents and legal purposes an information in a
criminal case.

Contempt, however, is not a criminal offense within the meaning of Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and need
not be instituted by means of an information. The institution of charges by the prosecuting official is not necessary
7

to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law
requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard
by himself or counsel. 8

But even disregarding said procedural infirmities, still we are not prepared to sustain petitioner's conviction. It can
not be denied that the letter-complaint authored and addressed by the petitioner to the President was in response to
His Excellency's appeal to the public to come up with charges and evidences against incompetent and corrupt
judges. Since that was the time when the proposed reorganization of the judiciary was being undertaken the
timeliness of the said letter may therefore be conceded. True, a mere causal perusal of the said letter will
immediately show that the statements contained therein are apparently degrading to the integrity and competence
of the respondent Judge. His Honor's remedy, however, if any exists, against such an onslaught or attack on his
character and reputation is a criminal action for defamations and not a citation for contempt since the power to
9

punish contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on vindictive principle. 10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a
citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. After
all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience
and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that
the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercise for purposes that are impersonal,
27
 because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise. (Emphasis supplied) 11

Anent respondent Judge's assertion that the two cases referred to and dealt with in petitioner's letter are still
pending consideration before His sala 12 hence, sub judice, suffice it to state that precisely one of the complaints insofar as Civil Case No. 174 is
concerned is the unresolved motion to dismiss which is still then pending despite the lapse of a substantial period of time since its filing. With respect to Civil Case
No. 122, the copy of the decision in said case attached to petitioner's letter as Annex D sufficiently negates respondent Judge's assertion that the case is still
pending. But be that as it may, it seems clear that petitioner's referral to the two aforementioned cases do not appear motivated by a desire to obstruct nor impede,
much less degrade the administration of justice but apparently to make his complaint a more authentic one, hence the said reference to definite cases by way of
specifications.

Another disturbing circumstance which strongly argues for the nullification of petitioner's conviction is the denial of
petitioner's right to due process and to counsel. We can not ride along with respondent Judge's feeble reliance upon
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in justifying the procedure adopted by His Honor in the questioned
contempt proceeding. He claimed that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard before being adjudged guilty
of the charge against him which was in full accord with Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.—After charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt;

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Our review of the records, however, convinces Us that petitioner was not afforded fun and real opportunity to be
heard. And this is so because he learned of the charge against him only on the very day he was arrested and hailed
to court to answer the said charge. Respondent should have granted petitioner ample opportunity to prepare for trial
and defend himself. While speedy trial should be encouraged, a person's right to due process should not be
sacrificed. In the case at bar, right at the very start and all throughout the proceedings, respondent Judge's burning
desire to send petitioner behind bars appeared clearly evident, thereby transforming his court into a despot's forum.
By reason thereof, he succeeded in having people, more especially the herein petitioner, lose confidence in courts
of justice thereby placing the administration of justice under a cloud of doubt, thus setting at naught his proclaimed
attempt to correct petitioner's alleged acts of undermining the faith, respect, trust, and confidence of the citizenry in
the court of justice. It should not be lost sight of that contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in
nature, the same being penal in character. The safeguards therefore provided for by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court in favor of the accused should be similarly accorded to the herein petitioner of which he was denied by the
respondent Judge.

Petitioner's proper and correct remedy against the questioned order of conviction, pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, is appeal. Instead, he has resorted to certiorari. Considering, however, that this case has been
pending for quite some time and more specifically the view we take thereon on its merits, to compel petitioner to
follow said mode of review, will be sanctifying technicality against substance with no different result in view.

WHEREFORE, the Order convicting petitioner of indirect contempt is hereby REVERSED, and he is hereby relieved
of any liability for indirect contempt.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

RULE 22 - COMPUTATION OF TIME

Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc. v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 157020, Jun. 19, 2013

28
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157020 June 19, 2013

REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS., PTE., LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B. GUEVARRA, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This petition for review concerns the reckoning of the extended period for the tiling of a pleading that ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday. May the pleading be filed on the following working day?

The Facts and the Case

On May 3, 2000 petitioner Reinier Pacitic International Shipping, Inc. (Reinier Shipping), as agent of Neptune Ship Management
Services, PTE, Limited, hired respondent Captain Francisco B. Guevarra to work as master of MY NOL SHEDAR. In the course of his
work on board, Reinier Shipping sent him Notice, relieving him of command of the vessel upon the insistence of its chatterers and
owners. As a result, Guevarra tiled a case for illegal dismissal and damages against Reinier Shipping and its principal.

Reinier Shipping countered that Guevarra had been negligent in the discharge of his duties as ship master. One of the vessel’s hatch
covers was damaged when it was discharging coal in Alabama, U.S.A. As a result, the charterers were forced to shoulder the repair
costs. Reinier had no choice but yield to the demands of the chatterers for Guevarra’s replacement.

The Labor Arbiter found Guevarra’s dismissal illegal and ordered Reinier Shipping and its principal to jointly and severally pay him the
US$11,316.00 that represent his salaries for the remaining balance of the contract plus attorney’s fees of US$1,131.60. The Labor
Arbiter found that Reinier Shipping denied Guevarra his right to due process since it did not give him the opportunity to be heard.
Guevarra claims that the damage to the vessel had been caused by cargo-handling stevedores. Reinier Shipping did not bother to
ascertain his guilt; it merely invoked the demand of the chatterers and vessel owners that he be replaced.

Reinier Shipping appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but on February 22, 2002 the latter affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.

The due date to file a petition for special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) fell on July 26, 2002, a Friday, but
Reinier Shipping succeeded in obtaining an extension of 15 days, which period counted from July 26 began to run on July 27, a
Saturday, and fell due on August 10, a Saturday. Reinier Shipping filed its petition on the following Monday, August 12, 2002.

On November 11, 2002 the CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. 1 The CA ruled that Reinier Shipping violated
Supreme Court’s A.M. 00-2-14-SC. Since August 10, 2002, the last day of the extended period, fell on a Saturday, automatic deferment
to the next working day did not apply and Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10, a Saturday, considering that
the court is closed on Saturdays.

Issue Presented

Reinier Shipping filed the present petition raising the issue of whether or not the CA erred in dismissing its petition for having been filed
out of time.

The Court’s Ruling

A.M. 00-2-14-SC clarifies the application of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court when the last day on which a pleading is due falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and the original period is extended. 2 The clarification states:

Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;

29
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the last
day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to
be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period;

NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of
"the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day
and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. (Emphasis supplied)

Reinier Shipping’s last day for filing its petition fell on July 26, a Friday.1âwphi1 It asked for a 15-day extension before the period lapsed
and this was granted. As it happened, 15 days from July 26 fell on August 10, a Saturday. The CA held that Reinier Shipping should
have filed its petition before August 10 (Saturday) or at the latest on August 9 (Friday) since, in an extended period, the fact that the
extended due date (August 10) falls on a Saturday is to be "disregarded." Reinier Shipping has no right to move the extended due date
to the next working day even if such due date fell on a Saturday. Since the courts were closed on August 10 (Saturday), Reinier
Shipping should have filed its petition, according to the CA, not later than Friday, August 9.

But this is obviously wrong since it would mean compelling Reinier Shipping to file its petition one day short of the 15-day extension
granted it. That would unjustly deprive it of the full benefit of that extension. Since its new due date fell on a Saturday when courts are
close, however, the clear language of Section 1, Rule 21, applies. This gives Reinier Shipping up to Monday (August 12), the next
working day, within which to file its petition.

The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday.
Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that "the period of extension" in such a case "is to be
reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the clarification, is
that "any extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact
that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday."

For example, if a pleading is due on July 10 and this happens to be a Saturday, the time for filing it shall not run, applying Section 1 of
Rule 21, on July 1 0 (Saturday) nor on July 11 (Sunday) but will resume to run on the next working day, which is July 12 (Monday). The
pleading will then be due on the latter date. If the period is extended by 10 days, such 10 days will be counted, not from July 12
(Monday) but from the original due date, July 10 (Saturday) "regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday." Consequently, the
new due date will be 10 days from July 10 or precisely on July 20. As stated above, the situation of Reinier Shipping is different.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals' Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP 71861 dated November 11,
2002 and January 23, 2003 and DIRECTS it to give due course to petitioner Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc.'s petition before
it.

SO ORDERED.

30
PDIC v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139998 (Resolution), [October 29, 2002], 439 PHIL 980-989

G.R. No. 139998 October 29, 2002

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), AS LIQUIDATOR OF CLOSED RURAL BANK OF MUNTINLUPA,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixth Division, HON. ALBERTO L. LERMA, Presiding Judge, RTC of MUNTINLUPA CITY,
Branch 256, and JOSE EMMANUEL JALANDONI, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner seeks to annul the resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18, 1999, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 53094, as well as its resolution2 dated August 4, 1999, denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts, as culled from records, are as follows:

On February 3, 1978, the Monetary Board (MB) of the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), through
Resolution No. 213,3 closed the Rural Bank of Muntinlupa, Inc. (RBMI) due to insolvency and placed it under receivership. Petitioner
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC) was duly appointed as receiver. The MB found that RBMI’s total assets of ₱4.4 million were
insufficient to meet its liabilities of ₱8.2 million.

On August 28, 1981, the MB, after confirming the insolvent status of RBMI, issued Resolution No. 1523, ordering the liquidation of said
bank.4

On April 6, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBMI, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9697, with the then Court
of First Instance of Pasig, Branch 25 (hereinafter Liquidation Court). This was pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, 5 (now Section
306 of R.A. No. 7653).7 Private respondent opposed the liquidation, alleging that the bank was not insolvent but capable of rehabilitation.

On June 6, 1983, the Liquidation Court dismissed Sp. Proc. No. 9697 on a finding that RBMI merely had liquidity problems, but was not
in a state of insolvency.

The Central Bank filed a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 03808, with the appellate court alleging that in
dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 9697, the Liquidation Court acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On November 22, 1984, the appellate court decided AC-G.R. SP No. 03808 in favor of Central Bank and remanded Sp. Proc. No. 9697
to the Liquidation Court for further proceedings. Dissatisfied with a mere order to remand, the Central Bank moved for reconsideration.
This caused the Court of Appeals, on January 4, 1985, to amend the decretal portion of its order. It granted the writ of certiorari, nullified
the challenged orders of the Liquidation Court, and ordered the latter to approve the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 9697 and assist in the
liquidation of RBMI.

Private respondent Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution, which the appellate
court denied on July 23, 1985.

Private respondent then elevated the matter to this Court in Apollo Salud, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. 8 docketed as
G.R. No. 71630. On August 19, 1986, we decided it as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-03808 dated January 4, 1985 and July 23, 1985
are set aside and the Decision dated November 22, 1984 is reinstated and affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Sp. Proc. No. 9697 was then remanded to the Liquidation Court to determine whether the continuation in business by RBMI would
cause probable losses to its clients and creditors and if Board Resolutions No. 213 and 1523 had been issued with bad faith and
arbitrariness.

On August 9, 1994, the Liquidation Court dismissed Sp. Proc. No. 9697 without prejudice, in view of the proposal by some stockholders
of the bank to rehabilitate it.

31
On October 26, 1995, petitioner filed anew a petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBMI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 95-076. Private respondent opposed on the ground that as controlling
stockholder of RBMI, he is the party with the preferential right to rehabilitate the bank. It is this action which gave rise to the instant
case.

On July 11, 1996, the RTC granted the petition. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but this was denied on January 8, 1997.

Private respondent then filed a motion to declare petitioner in contempt and to suspend the liquidation proceedings pending submission
of a rehabilitation plan. He likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner opposed it, relying on Section
30 of R.A. No. 7653, which explicitly declares insolvency proceedings as "final and executory," and thus may not be enjoined,
restrained, or set aside by the courts.

On December 15, 1998, the trial court granted private respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby granted. Let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against Petitioner or its representatives,
enjoining them to desist from disposing of the assets of the Rural Bank of Muntinlupa, Inc., until final Orders from the Court, upon
Movant's filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), to answer for any damages. Petitioner may
sustain by reason of the injunction, should the Court find that Movant is not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED.10

In enjoining the disposal of the bank’s assets, the trial court noted that a rehabilitation plan submitted by private respondent was still
being deliberated upon. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovecited order, but it was denied in an order of March 16, 1999.

On June 4, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53094,
challenging the trial court’s orders of December 15, 1998 and March 16, 1999. On June 18, 1999, the appellate court dismissed it for
having been filed outside of the reglementary period provided for in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, thus:

In this case, petitioner alleged that it received a copy of the Order dated December 15, 1998 on JANUARY 6, 1999. On February 5,
1999 ¾ or thirty (30) days thereafter ¾ it filed its Motion for Reconsideration thereof. It received the Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration on April 5, 1999.

Applying the foregoing rule, petitioner has a remaining period of thirty (30) days from April 5, 1999 or until May 5, 1999 within which to
file petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed its petition on June 4, 1999. Clearly, the same was filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on August 4, 1999.1âwphi1 Hence, the instant
petition.

The pertinent issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period.

At the outset, we note that on June 4, 1999, when CA-G.R. SP No. 53094 was filed, the prevailing rule, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court as amended by Circular No. 39-98, provided that:

SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed xxx.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the
period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioner allegedly received the order of the lower court granting the writ of preliminary injunction on January 6, 1999. On February 5,
1999, it moved for reconsideration, which interrupted the running of the 60-day period. At this point, 29 days of the reglementary period
to file a petition for certiorari had already lapsed. Hence, when petitioner received its copy of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration on April 5, 1999, it only had 31 days or until May 6, 1999 within which to institute its special civil action for

32
certiorari.12 But petitioner only instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 53094 only on June 4, 1999 or well after the 60-day reglementary period.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

33
 RULE 23: DEPOSITION PENDING ACTION

Koh v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71388, September 23, 1986

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 71388 September 23, 1986

MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JOB. B. MADAYAG in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, of
Branch CXLV, Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al., respondents.

Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for petitioner.

Fernandez, Oliva, Umali & Associates and Vicente C. Ramirez, Jr. for respondents.

FERIA, J.:

The Court affirms the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now renamed Court of Appeals) which dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner against respondent Judge Job B. Madayag of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and respondent First
Interstate Bank of California. Petitioner sought to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge denying her motion to dismiss the
complaint based on res adjudicata.

On June 15, 1983, respondent Bank filed a Complaint against petitioner to recover the sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency which, due to a computer error, it had overpaid to her on October 8, 1981. The Complaint alleged that on
September 30, 1981, petitioner's father sent her US-$500.00 through the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company which was the remitting
bank of respondent Bank. But due to computer mistake, respondent Bank's Los Angeles Office erroneously overstated the amount to
US-$8,500.00 instead of US-$500.00, and as a consequence respondent Bank issued and delivered to petitioner Cashier Check No.
1217681 amounting to US-$8,500.00 dated October 8, 1981 which petitioner deposited to her account and subsequently withdrew.

In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the above-stated allegations in the Complaint and alleged that immediately
after receipt of a formal demand letter to return the overpayment, she offered to pay respondent Bank through its lawyer in installments
of $100.00 a month but the offer was unreasonably rejected.

It is significant to note that no copy of said Answer was attached to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the Intermediate
Appellate Court, nor was any copy thereof attached to the petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. It was only in the
Comment of respondents' counsel filed with this Court that a copy of said Answer was attached thereto.

On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141, sent the following "NOTICE
OF CASE STATUS" to the parties through their respective lawyers.

G R E E T I N G S:

Please take notice that cases where issues have been joined will be scheduled for pre-trial conference only after
Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29-where applicable, necessary and or feasible have been resorted to by the parties.

If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not applicable, necessary or feasible with respect to him, he
shall file a manifestation to that effect.

The pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as the respective manifestations of having resorted to, or of
dispensing with, those modes of discovery have been filed by the parties.

The party, who has dispensed with those modes of discovery shall be deemed to have waived resort thereto, and,
unless for good cause shown, motion to resort thereto, after termination of the pre-trial, shall not be grantee. The
costs entailed the waiving party in presenting evidence during trial that could have been obtained through any of

34
 those modes of discovery which were waived, shall not be assessed against the adverse party nor awarded as part of
the litigation expenses.

If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed, the case shall be archived or
dismissed as the case may be.

Upon Order of the Court, this 19th day of August 1983.

Makati, Metro Manila.

(SGD.) E.R. BELEN

Officer-in-Charge

No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. On November 29, 1983, the presiding Judge (not respondent Judge), issued the
following order:

For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case Status) dated August 19, 1983, more particularly the last
paragraph thereof, this case is hereby dismissed.

This order was received by respondent Bank's counsel on December 28, 1983.

On July 4, 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint which was assigned to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati presided over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
adjudicata, as well as a supplement thereto, which was opposed by respondent Bank.

On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and on November 27, 1984, he denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, on the following grounds:

(1) The dismissal was too drastic and was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its day in court.

(2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case to comply with said notice of case status (above quoted), the court (Branch
141) should have set the case for pre-trial conference since the last pleading had been filed and there are no other conditions to be
complied with before any case is calendared for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20.

(3) It would be better for the defendant to have a definite and clear-cut decision as to her liability or non-liability, instead of winning a
case on a technicality.

On May 8, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court praying that the orders denying the motion
to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration be set aside as null and void and that the complaint be ordered dismissed. On May 21,
1985, the appellate court, finding no merit to the petition, resolved not to give it due course. In its decision, the appellate court ruled as
follows:

We concur with the above reasoning of respondent Judge. We should add to that our observation that the order of dismissal of Judge
Elbiñas in Civil Case No. 4272 (Annex F) was null and void for lack of legal basis. The 'notice of case status' (Annex D) was not an
order' of the court. I t was, as its title indicated, only a 'notice,' not an order. The warning in the last paragraph of the notice advising the
parties that-

'If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed, the case shall be archived or dismiss as the case may
be.'

was not an order of the court. It was a warning emanating from E.R. Belen, the officer-in-charge (of civil cases). The failure of the
parties to heed the warning was not tantamount to disobedience of a lawful order of the court, for the 'officer-in-charge' was not the
court or judge.

Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the force of a judgment. It did not constitute a bar to the
refiling of the bank's complaint. Respondent Judge did not err, or abuse his discretion, in denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss Civil Case No. 7765. (pp. 35-36, Record)

Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court. We are constrained to affirm Indeed, with the admission in petitioner's Answer of the
allegations in the Complaint that due to computer error there was an overpayment to her of the amount of US-$8,000.00, coupled with

35
her offer to pay respondent Bank the amount of the overpayment in installments of $100.00 a month, we cannot find any justification for
ruling that the order dismissing the first complaint operated as an adjudication on the merits or constituted a bar to the second
complaint. In fact, the trial court could have, on motion, rendered a judgment on the pleadings in the first case in favor of respondent
Bank.

True it is that respondent Bank's counsel should have taken the precaution of complying with the instructions contained in the "NOTICE
OF CASE STATUS" if only to avoid the consequent delay resulting from non-compliance; that respondent Bank's counsel was negligent
in not seeking a reconsideration or clarification of the order of dismissal or appealing therefrom. But, fortunately for respondent Bank,
the omissions of its counsel are not fatal to its cause in view of the defective procedure which culminated in the dismissal of the first
complaint.

The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised Rules of Court) are intended to enable a party to obtain
knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or of third parties through depositions to obtain knowledge of
material facts or admissions from the adverse party through written interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party
regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admission; to inspect relevant
documents or objects and lands or other property in the possession or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical or
mental condition of a party when such is in controversy. This mutual discovery enables a party to discover the evidence of the adverse
party and thus facilitates an amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on the
table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.

Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper utilization of the rules on discovery. However, recourse to discovery procedures is
not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set pursuant to the
mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.

Petitioner argues that respondent Judge was wrong in stating that a pre-trial order should have been issued since the last pleading had
been filed, because the "notice of case status" was issued on August 19, 1983, while the last pleading or the answer to petitioner's
counterclaim was filed much later. Although, ordinarily, the last pleading which has to be filed before the court shall set the case for pre-
trial under Section 1 of Rule 20 is the answer to the counterclaim (Itchon vs. Baligod, 17 SCRA 268; Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp.
vs. Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447), in the case at bar, petitioner's counterclaim for damages resulting from the filing of the complaint did
not require an answer (Navarro vs. Bello, 102 Phil. 1019; Gojo vs. Goyola, 35 SCRA 557). Since the counterclaim was the last
pleading, the court should have issued a pre-trial order after its submission and it was the duty of the clerk of court to place the case in
the pre-trial calendar under Section 5 of Rule 20.

Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 17 which reads as follows:

Failure to prosecute.-If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

This provision is not applicable to the case at bar. As the appellate court correctly held, the "notice of case status" was not an order of
the court. It was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge. Even the warning in the notice (that if no such manifestation has been filed
after 30 days from receipt the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case may be) was ambiguous. The failure of the parties to
heed the warning did not constitute disobedience of a lawful order of the court. Consequently, the order of dismissal could not have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits. Neither could respondent Bank be considered to have failed to prosecute its action for an
unreasonable length of time, inasmuch as petitioner's Answer was dated August 17, 1983 and the order of dismissal was dated
November 29, 1983.

Petitioner cites the case of Arellano vs. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (65 SCRA 45) in support of her stand. However, in said
case, the Court upheld the order of dismissal for failure of respondent Barreta to serve any answer to petitioner Arellano's
interrogatories. The dismissal was based on Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides that if a party fails to serve answers to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the Court on motion and notice may dismiss the action or render
judgment by default.

Petitioner further contends that if the ruling of the appellate court regarding the legality of the notice signed by the officer-in-charge were
sustained, then court processes such as summons, notices of pre-trial, writs of execution and the like can be merely disregarded by
lawyers. This contention is without merit. Section 1 of Rule 14 expressly provides that upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court
shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendant. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 20 authorize the clerk of court to issue the
notice of the date of the pre-trial and Section 2 of Rule 22 authorizes the clerk of court to issue the notice of the date of the trial. A writ
of execution may be issued by the clerk of court pursuant to an order of execution signed by the judge. There is no rule authorizing the
issuance of the "notice of case status" in question signed by an officer-in-charge.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed, with costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
36
People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019]

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 240053. October 09, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS LACANILAO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a novel question of law. May a prosecution witness, like
Mary Jane Veloso (Mary Jane), who was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian Government and who
is presently confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation
of a witness by the accused?

This petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the December 13, 2017 Decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 which granted respondent's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and reversed the August 16,2016
Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 88, of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, granting the motion of the prosecution to
take the deposition by written interrogatories of Mary Jane in Indonesia.

The Factual Antecedents

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia.
Believing that the job was a ray of hope, Mary Jane scraped whatever meager money she had and when the amount was not even
enough to pay Cristina and Julius as placement fee, she resorted to borrowing from relatives. Still, the amount gathered was insufficient
prompting Mary Jane's husband to sell even their precious motorcycle. On April 21, 2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually
left the Philippines for Malaysia. However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed by Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia that the
job intended for her was no longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-
day holiday with a promise that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a
luggage to bring on her trip.

Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers
for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. She was accordingly charged with drug trafficking before the District
Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Mary Jane sought comfort from her family in the Philippines and informed them that she was currently detained in Indonesia. Mary
Jane's family immediately confronted Cristina who instead of helping them even threatened them to keep the matter to themselves and
not to divulge the same especially to the media. She even told Mary Jane's family that she is part of an international drug syndicate who
would spend millions to get Mary Jane out of prison.

However, in October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, convicted Mary Jane of drug trafficking and sentenced
her to death by firing squad. After the affirmance of her conviction by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Indonesia, Mary Jane
and eight other felons who were similarly convicted of drug-related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of
Nusakambangan, off Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad, which was originally scheduled on April 9, 2015
but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015. Eventually, the eight companions of Mary Jane were executed by firing squad. Presently, Mary
Jane is detained at the Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with qualified trafficking in person in violation of Section 4(a) in relation to
Sections 3 (a) and 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise known as "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed as
Criminal Case No. SD (15)-3723.[4] Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two separate Informations with the crime of illegal
recruitment as penalized under Section 6, par. (k) and (1) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Workers Act of 1995," and estafa in violation of Section 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. SD (15)-3724,[5] and SD (15)3753,[6] respectively, filed before the trial court. Upon arraignment, Cristina and Julius entered a plea
of "not guilty" on all charges.

37
On March 31, 2015, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a document
known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso. "

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Mary Jane maintained her innocence and narrated how she was recruited by Cristina and Julius. She
alleged that while in Malaysia, she and Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in Malaysia. Cristina
has a boyfriend named Prince whom she conversed only by phone. Prince has a brother named "Ike. " On April 24, 2010, Mary Jane
and Cristina went to the hotel parking lot and met with "Ike " who was on board a white car. They then went inside the car wherein "Ike"
handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned to the hotel room, Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it
was unusually heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter
simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of
Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and
her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko
Widodo, granted her an indefinite reprieve. The Cabinet Secretary of the Indonesian Government informed the public that President
Widodo received reports about the on-going legal proceedings in the Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her
recruiters were already in police custody.

Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of Mary Jane to afford
her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and "Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her
to engage in drug trafficking.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:

(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. "[7] It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories
is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally
before the court due to her imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily in
criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon written interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules
of Court. Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed dispensation of direct testimony in open court under the Rules of
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that Cristina and Julius will still have an opportunity to
examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set of written interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking
the deposition; moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and answers.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and not during the trial. The depositions
under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use
thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the
witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the
prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the
affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its Resolution dated August 16, 2016, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion subject to the following conditions:

1. Considering that the Prosecution has already submitted their proposed questions in the written interrogatories, the accused,
through counsel, is given a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution to submit their comment to the proposed
questions on the deposition upon written interrogatories for the witness Mary Jane Veloso. Upon receipt of the Comment, the
Court shall promptly rule on the objections;

38
 2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned
trial judge. The final questions for the deposition (after ruling on the Defense objections), shall be propounded by the Consul of
the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written
interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of
Indonesia;

3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished the accused, through counsel, who shall thereafter
submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the Prosecution within ten (10) days from receipt;

4. The Prosecution is given the same period often (10) days from receipt of the proposed cross interrogatory questions of the
Defense stating the ground for the objections. Upon receipt of the comment, the Court shall promptly rule on the objections:

5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane Veloso in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the written cross
interrogatories (after ruling on the Prosecution's objections) shall be propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the
Republic of Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the written cross interrogatories shall
be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;

6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories, the testimony of Mary Jane Veloso by way of
deposition upon written interrogatories shall be deemed terminated. In case the Prosecution propounds re-direct written
interrogatories on the deponent, the above-mentioned procedure for the conduct of direct and cross interrogatories shall be
observed.[8]

Cristina and Julius immediately filed their "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to
Proposed Questions for Deposition of Mary Jane Veloso. "[9] However, the trial court denied their Omnibus Motion in its November 3,
2016 Resolution.[10]

Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction[11] before the Court of Appeals averring that the trial court judge gravely abused her discretion in the issuance of
the assailed Resolutions.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appellate court, in its assailed December 13, 2017 Decision, granted
the Petition for Certiorari and reversed the August 16, 2016 Resolution of the trial court. It held that, contrary to the RTC's. findings, the
conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
According to the appellate court, the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart from such rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies in civil cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or her
conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where the case is pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88, and that Cristina and Julius, being the accused in the criminal proceedings, should be notified
thereof so they can attend the examination.

The appellate court further reasoned that to allow the prosecution to take the deposition of Mary Jane through written interrogatories
will violate the right of Cristina and Julius as the accused to confront a witness or to meet the witness face to face.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought for reconsideration[12] but it was denied by the appellate court in its June 5, 2018
Resolution.[13]

Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court alleging
mainly that: (a) the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to Crisitina and Julius's petition for certiorari because there was another
plain, speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law; in addition, the OSG contended that the Petition
for Certiorari should not have been given due course considering the lack of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

39
on the part of the trial court; and; (b) Rule 23 of the Rules of Court with respect to deposition under written interrogatories can be
applied suppletorily in the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane given her extraordinary circumstances.

Meantime, spouses Cesar and Celia Veloso, parents of Mary Jane, filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Petition-In-Intervention."[14] They prayed to be allowed to intervene, on behalf of Mary Jane, in the instant proceeding for the purpose of
protecting and preserving their daughter's substantial and immediate interest. Attached to their motion was their Petition-in-Intervention.
[15]

The OSG, on the other hand, submitted its Manifestation and Motion. [16] It informed the Court that the trial court proceeded with the
hearing of the criminal cases in accordance with A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, or the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal
Cases. The prosecution has only Mary Jane to present as a witness. Hence, the OSG prays that the Court immediately resolve the
instant Petition for Review and to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

In this Court's March 27, 2019 Resolution,[17] it denied the motion for intervention of Mary Jane's parents for failure to establish legal
interest in the instant case that is actual and material as well as direct and immediate. The Court likewise denied the OSG's prayer to
suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal proceedings before the trial court for lack of basis.

Issues

(a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari, and;

(b) Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through deposition by written interrogatories.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

On Procedural Matters

The OSG avers that the appellate court erred in giving due course and granting the respondents' Petition for Certiorari there being other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. It further argues that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the State's motion to allow the taking of Mary Jane's testimony by deposition through written
interrogatories.

The Court agrees.

Impropriety of the writ of certiorari

before the Court of Appeals

A writ of certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In other words, certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of
procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. Thus, any alleged errors committed by the trial court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not by a petition for certiorari.[18]

The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cruz v. People,[19] citing Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company[20] is instructive
on the scope of certiorari:

We remind that the writ of certiorari - being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to
perform) - is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench,
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more
sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior
court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a
substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was
then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be
exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-
judicial acts.

40
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this
jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or
situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose[.]

xxxx

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two,
there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding. (Citations omitted)

It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina and Julius in their Petition for Certiorari pertained only
to its appreciation of the factual milieu, and the application of pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition for Certiorari did not
contain factual allegations that can support a finding of grave abuse of discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to
erroneous exercise of the lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, which does not justify Cristina's and
Julius's resort to a certiorari proceeding.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." [21] It arises when a lower court or tribunal violates and
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. [22] The Supreme Court explained in Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,[23] viz.:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse
of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of
the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show
that such act was patent and gross, x x x.

In the case at bench, respondents did not even attempt to show that the trial court abused its discretion, much less that the exercise
thereof was so patent and gross and to amount to lack of jurisdiction; in fact, even the appellate court simply stated in its assailed
Decision that the trial court merely erred, and not abuse its discretion, much more grave, in applying Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure instead of Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which particularly deals with the conditional examination of a
prosecution witness, like Mary Jane in this case, in criminal cases. Notably, the appellate court did not specify the circumstances in
support of its conclusion that the trial court arrived at its conclusion in an arbitrary and despotic manner. On the contrary, a close
examination of the trial court's judgment shows that it was anchored on the peculiar incidents surrounding the case, and applied
jurisprudence and rules which it believed were pertinent. It has in fact judiciously discussed the rationale for its decision to allow the
taking of Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories in this wise:

First, Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring prosecution witnesses who are either sick or infirm or has
left the Philippines without any date of return, to deliver their testimony in open court cannot be applied to the private complainant,
because her situation as a death row convict in a foreign country incapacitates her from making decisions, on her own, to take the
witness stand. Such decision to testify and the manner by which her testimony is to be given depends on the Indonesian authorities
before whom she was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death;

Second, considering the inapplicability of Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court found it appropriate
to apply in a suppletory manner, Sec. 23 of the Revised Rules of Court for the taking of the private complainant's deposition upon
written interrogatories. Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides that the deposition of a person confined in
prison may be taken only by leave of court upon such terms as the court prescribes;

Third, in the case of People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey Webb xxx, the Supreme Court categorically declared that "due process
is not a monopoly of the defense. The State is entitled to due process as much as the accused". To deny the motion of the Prosecution
would result in a highly inequitable situation where the sole witness relied upon by the Prosecution to establish their case would be
denied the opportunity to present her case due to procedural technicalities which are beyond her control;

Fourth, the deposition sought by the Prosecution is specifically aimed at perpetuating the testimony of the private complainant, thus
said deposition may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal pursuant to Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court
in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario Davide in the previously cited case of People vs. Webb, be affirmed that
depositions may be allowed in criminal cases and may be taken at any time after the commencement of the action whenever necessary
or convenient, x x x;

xxxx
41
Fifth, the offense involved in this case, i.e. qualified human trafficking, is a major transnational crime committed across continents.
Unlike the previously cited cases of Cuenco and Go where the offenses involved are non-index crimes (i.e., estafa and other deceits),
the subject suit involves a major transnational crime that cuts across borders and is a principal policy concern among nations. Thus, the
Court believes that the Prosecution should not be denied the opportunity to prove its case, thus assuring the global community that the
Philippines is committed to fight such modern day menace[.][24]

Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of deposition through written interrogatories by the trial court
was made in an arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious manner. There was no patent abuse of discretion which was so gross in nature
thereby amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[25] What was only apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly considered the extraordinary
circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to applicable rules and jurisprudence. Suffice it to state that the Decision
of the trial court was not without rhyme or reason. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part of the trial court to support its
ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law.

As already adverted, the case at hand is unprecedented. It involves novel issues and poses difficult questions of law. It is settled
jurisprudence that "[a] doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always
accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties, xxx Any person who seeks to
establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive." [26] As such, no abuse of discretion, much more grave abuse of
discretion, may be successfully imputed against the trial court.

In fine, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and in holding
that respondents' resort to a Petition for Certiorari was proper.

This now brings our discussion to the substantive issues.

On Substantive Matters

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's conviction by final judgment and her detention in a
prison facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of an indefinite
reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the
reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any question propounded to her must only be in
writing, are more than enough grounds to have allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the
relaxation of the Rules and the suppletory application of Rule 23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional
rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to protect
and preserve their rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that the deposition of Mary Jane's testimony through written interrogatories in
Indonesia is not sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the pronouncements of
the Court in Go v. People[27] and Cuenco vda. De Manguerra v. Risos[28] that Section 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should not be
given any suppletory application. It held that "just like a witness who is sick or infirm, Mary Jane's imprisonment in Indonesia presents a
limitation on her mobility."[29] According to the Court of Appeals, Section 15, Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary Jane's deposition must be taken before the court where the case is pending. In other
words, the appellate court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the cases of respondents are
being heard, and not in Indonesia.

The Court begs to differ.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning,
he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (Emphasis Ours.)

42
Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being
heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of
the court, or; (b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither too sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave
the Philippines indefinitely. To recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted by final judgment of the
crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense in the said state. In fact, she was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her
execution by firing squad. Her situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility is by reason of ill-health or feeble age, the
grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119. In fact, Mary Jane's predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from one
place to another but a deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with little or no hope of being saved from the extreme
penalty of death by firing squad.

It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenco vda. De Manguera v. Risos are not on all fours with the present
case. The circumstances of the prosecution witnesses in the cases of Go and Cuenco demanded and justified the strict adherence to
Rule 119. The witnesses in both cases anchored their allowance to testify by way of deposition on their claims that they were too sick or
infirm to testify before the court. In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned to Cambodia claimed that he was undergoing treatment
for lung infection and could not travel back to the Philippines due to his illness.

Similarly, in the case of Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra averred that she would not be able to testify before the trial
court due to weak physical condition and age. Note, however, that despite the limitation in the mobility of Li Luen Pen and Concepcion,
they can still undoubted voluntarily take the witness stand and testify before the trial court should they get better or so decide.

This is not the same in the case of Mary Jane. She cannot even take a single step out of the prison facility of her own volition without
facing severe consequences. Her imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her of any opportunity
to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the trial court in Nueva Ecija where the cases of the respondents were
pending.

Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written interrogatories and effectively requiring the presence of Mary
Jane before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly applied and interpreted
Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into consideration the concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the
prejudice that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement. Considering the circumstances of Mary Jane, the
Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to happen and thus impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was
akin to a denial of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to establish its case against the respondents. The
peculiar circumstances obtaining in the present case made it impossible for Mary Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. Just like when Mary Jane was recruited by the respondents and taken advantage of because of her poor condition, the
same scenario is being repeated because the respondents are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire circumstances which they
themselves put her in, by depriving her the opportunity to speak and obtain justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not take into
account the fact that the case of the prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected through the testimony of Mary Jane
herself.

Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary
Jane and denied her and the People of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused. By its belief that it
was rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. By not
allowing Mary Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to prove her
innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the
grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.

It is well to remind the Court of Appeals at this point that as held in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[30] "[t]he due process clauses in the
American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed,
the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future.
The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law
the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause 'gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the
course of the decisions of cases as they arise' (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to 'the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play' (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates
to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366)." Thus, it
behooved upon the Court of Appeals to have provided some leeway in its interpretation of the subject provision.

At this juncture, we find the discussion on the matter by Justice Florenz D. Regalado instructive and relevant, viz.[31]:

1. Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action, viz

43
 a. Depositions pending action (Rule 23);

b. Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24);

c. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);

d. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26);

e. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27); and

f. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28);

Rule 29 provides for the legal consequences for the refusal of a party to comply with such modes of discovery lawfully resorted to by
the adverse party.

2. In criminal cases, the taking of the deposition of witnesses for the prosecution was formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for
the purpose of perpetuating the evidence to be presented at the trial, without a similar provision for defense witnesses.
However, in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, only the conditional examination, and not a deposition, of prosecution
witnesses was permitted (Sec. 7, Rule 119) and this was followed in the latest revision (Sec. 15, Rule 119).

3. Depositions are classified into:

a. Depositions on oral examination and depositions upon written interrogatories; or

b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions in perpetuam rei memoriam.

Depositions de bene esse are those taken for purposes of a pending action and are regulated by Rule 23, while depositions in
perpetuam rei memoriam are those taken to perpetuate evidence for purposes of an anticipated action or further proceedings in a case
on appeal and are now regulated by Rule 24.

4. The court may determine whether the deposition should be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories to prevent
abuse or harassment (De los Reyes vs. CA, et al, L-27263, Mar. 17, 1975).

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [32] Simply put, rules of procedure should facilitate
an orderly administration of justice. They should not be strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case. This
precept has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan[33] to wit:

[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the
Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as
to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not
without additional basis, x x x

There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial justice because of any of the following
reasons: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the
case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (t) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [34]

Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic phrase

44
that will automatically oblige the Court to suspend procedural rules. To stress, "[procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed." [35]

The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, also known as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, was
entered into by the Southeast Asian countries namely: Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of
Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Treaty aims to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities of the
state parties in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of offenses through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters.

Article 1, paragraph 2(a) of the Treaty states that mutual legal assistance can be rendered by the state parties in case of taking
evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons, among others. The legal assistance sought by the Requesting Party
from the Requested Party is not without limitations. In fact, Article 3 of the ASEAN ML AT has laid down guidelines on limitations on
assistance. In particular, paragraph 7 of the said Article states that the Requested Party can render legal assistance subject to certain
conditions which the Requested Party must observe.

To recall, the Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in taking the testimony of Mary Jane:

a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

b) No cameras shall be allowed;

c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;

d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the
same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open
court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as
there is compelling reason.

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by applying suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on
Civil Procedure in criminal proceedings.

For one, in Caños v. Peralta[36] the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion when it ordered the
consolidation and joint trial of the criminal cases that were filed against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned, among others, that
consolidation of cases is authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.

The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court[37] and Cojuangco. Jr. v. Court of Appeals[38] wherein the Supreme
Court upheld the consolidation of the criminal case and civil case that were respectively filed against the petitioners therein.

On that score, the Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of
substantial justice.

The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the
allowance of written interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person,
whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.

Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. — In a foreign state or country, depositions may be
taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of

45
the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the person
referred to in section 14 hereof.

Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of
any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the
person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken.
Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within
three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to
take the deposition.

A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary
Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina
and Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve
precisely to afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings obtaining in the Philippines.

Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the aim of ASEAN MLAT, that is to render mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters among signatory states including the Philippines. The ASEAN MLAT is enforced precisely to be applied
in circumstances like in the case of Mary Jane. It recognizes the significance of cooperation and coordination among the states to
prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single state just like in the case of drug and
human trafficking, and illegal recruitment, the very charges that were filed against respondents.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the
provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of
Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with
the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an
accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be
given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a charge. [39]

Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking of Mary Jane's deposition by written interrogatories. The grant
of the written interrogatories by the Indonesian Government perceives the State's opportunity to present all its desired witnesses in the
prosecution of its cases against Cristina and Julius. It is afforded fair opportunity to present witnesses and evidence it deem vital to
ensure that the injury sustained by the People in the commission of the criminal acts will be well compensated and, most of all, that
justice be achieved. Hence, the right of the State to prosecute and prove its case have been fully upheld and protected.

Further, the right of the State to prove the criminal liability of Cristina and Julius should not be derailed and prevented by the stringent
application of the procedural rules. Otherwise, it will constitute a violation of the basic constitutional rights of the State and of Mary Jane
to due process which this Court cannot disregard.

The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally upheld and protected so that justice can prevail in the truest
sense of the word. To do justice to accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be dispensed to all the parties
alike.[40] As aptly held in Dimatulac v. Villon[41]:

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to
promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious
crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge
must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. Although the determination of a
criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be
exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of
the State and offended party to due process of law.

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of
society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
necessarily a denial of justice, and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party
wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State
and offended party, on the other. (Emphasis Supplied.)

46
No violation of the constitutional right
to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and
Julius.

The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an accused. It is ingrained in our justice system and
guaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution as stated under its Article III, Section 14(2), to wit:

Section 14. (1) x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings
in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers.[42] It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to
test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness.
[43]

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the
terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of
written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and
Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories
submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be
asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded
questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in
turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raised any objection thereto, the
trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be
conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be
given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for
the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her
ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial court
judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to her both by
the prosecution and the defense.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are
sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still
subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the
trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility.

Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized exceptions to the right to confrontation. [44] In the case at
bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary Jane's deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration. There is no
doubt that Mary Jane will be answering the written interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death - or execution by a
firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final judgment and sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane
has already availed of all available legal remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the Indonesian
authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary Jane to assist the prosecution in erecting its case against her
recruiters and traffickers. There was nary any mention that the outcome of the legal proceedings here in the Philippines will have a
concomitant effect in Mary Jane's conviction by the Indonesian authorities. That Mary Jane is facing impending death is undisputed
considering the nature of her reprieve which is merely temporary. It is therefore not a stretch of imagination to state that Mary Jane's
declarations in her deposition "are made in extremity, [she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this world is gone; when
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth," [45] to vindicate
oneself, and to secure justice to her detractors.

All told, the Court finds reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. It erred when it gave due course to the Petition
for Certiorari of Cristina and Julius considering that the errors ascribed therein were mere errors of judgment which do not lie in
a certiorari proceeding. More importantly, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it granted the taking of testimony of Mary Jane by way of deposition through written interrogatories in light of the conditions of
Mary Jane's reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia. These are compelling reasons to liberally construe the procedural rules and

47
apply suppletorily the Rules on Civil Procedure. Yet still, the fundamental rights, not only of the State, but also of the accused Cristina
and Julius have been fully and equally protected and preserved in the pursuit of justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December 13, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
149002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the deposition will be taken before our Consular Office and
officials in Indonesia pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.

The recommendation by the Office of the Solicitor General for this Court to promulgate a set of rules for the guidance of the Bench and
the Bar in transnational cases that may arise in the future, where a prosecution's vital witness in a criminal proceeding is unavailable for
reasons other than those listed in Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis the enforcement of the accused's
constitutional right to confront witnesses face-to- face is NOTED and REFERRED to this Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules
for its appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

48
People vs. Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 entitled "Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita Tolentino, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque,
People of the Philippines and Lauro Vizconde" which set aside the order of respondent judge therein denying herein respondent Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb's request to take the depositions of five (5) citizens and residents of the United States before the proper consular
officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be.1âwphi1.nêt

The factual and procedural antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al." presently pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, presided
by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.

During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral
Deposition1 praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the following:

1.] Steven Bucher

Acting Chief, Records Services Branch

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

425 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington D.C. 20536

U.S.A.

2.] Debora Farmer

Records Operations, Office of Records

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Washington D.C.

U.S.A.

3.] Jaci Alston

49
 Department of Motor Vehicles

Sacramento, California

U.S.A.

4.] Ami Smalley

Department of Motor Vehicles

Sacramento, California

U.S.A.

5.] John Pavlisin

210 South Glasell, City of Orange

California, 92666

U.S.A.

before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court
alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since
the court had no jurisdiction over them.

Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly
"material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that:

Sec. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented
at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may by used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the
deponent as a witness;

(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an
adverse party for any purpose;

(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1)
that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the province and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the
party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness
by subpoena or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in
the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used;

(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it
which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may introduce any other parts. (emphasis supplied).

The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to
the representation of respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not
during trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.2

In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section
4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. 3

50
A motion for reconsideration4 thereto on the grounds that: 1.] The 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions, and
2.] Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions in foreign countries before a consul
general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, was likewise denied by the trial court in an order dated
July 25, 1997.5

Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari6 naming as respondents therein
the Presiding Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, the People and private complainant Lauro Vizconde. In the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 45399, respondent Webb argued that: 1.] The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.]
Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States;
and, 3.] He has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will violate his
constitutional right to due process.

Commenting7 on the petition, the People contended that the questioned orders of the Presiding Judge are well within the sphere of her
judicial discretion and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that if at all, they may
be considered merely as errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal in due time because: a.] The motion failed to comply
with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; b.] The conditional examination must be conducted before an
inferior court; and c.] The examination of the witnesses must be done in open court.

In his Comment,8 private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition contending that:

1.] The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner [now herein respondent] Webb's
motion to take testimony by oral deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated 23
June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

a.] The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure finds no
application in criminal actions such as the case at bar.

b.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure only provides for
conditional examination of witnesses before trial but not during trial.

c.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the
conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside of Philippine jurisdiction.

2.] The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Webb's motion to take testimony
by oral deposition considering that the proposed deposition tends only to further establish the admissibility of documentary
exhibits already admitted in evidence by the public respondent.

On February 6, 1998, the Fourth Division9 of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,10 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated 11 June 1997 (Annex "A" of the Petition) and
25 July 1997 (Annex "B" of the Petition) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. It is hereby ordered that the deposition of
the following witnesses be TAKEN before the proper consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and
California, as the case maybe:

(a) Mr. Steven Bucher;

(b) Ms. Deborah Farmer;

(c) Mr. Jaci Alston;

(d) Ms. Ami Smalley; and

(e) Mr. John Pavlisin.

SO ORDERED.

From the foregoing, the People forthwith elevated its cause to this Court by way of the instant petition dispensing with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration for the following reasons: 1.] The rule that the petitioner should first file a motion for reconsideration applies
to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and there is no similar requirement in taking
an appeal from a final judgment or order11 such as the present appeal by certiorari; 2.] Section 4, Rule 45 in requiring a petition for
review on certiorari which indicates that "when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed" implies that petitioner need not
file a motion for reconsideration; 3.] The questions being raised before the Court are the same as those which were squarely raised
51
before the Court of Appeals;12 4.] The issues being raised here are purely legal;13 5.] There is an urgent need to resolve the issues
considering that the trial of the accused in the criminal case is about to end; and, 6.] The nature of this case requires a speedy and
prompt disposition of the issues involved.14

What are challenged before this Court are interlocutory orders and not a final Judgment. The respondent has filed his Comment 15 which
We treat as an Answer. The petitioner, in turn, filed a Reply. 16 The petition is ripe for decision.

In urging this Tribunal to exercise its power of review over the assailed decision of the Appellate Court, petitioner asserts that the Court
of Appeals committed serious and reversible error —

IN RULING THAT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

II

IN RULING THAT THE DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN BEFORE A CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINES WHERE THE
PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES RESIDE OR ARE OFFICIALLY STATIONED.

III

IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT.

which can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to
take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court.

In setting aside the order of the trial judge, the Appellate Court's Fourth Division reasoned, inter alia, thus:

Settled is the rule that the whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice. Thus, as the Supreme Court has ruled in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General and reiterated in
subsequent cases:

. . . The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which give the opportunity for the most complete and
perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other
words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of
justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most
salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers
by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable
portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which the courts are always striving to secure the
litigants. It is designed as the as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of
the one and takes on the other [,] the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave criticism.17

In the light of the foregoing judicial precedent, this Court finds that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in
denying the motion to take the deposition of the witnesses for petitioner. While petitioner had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of the
Rule of Court, which is found under the general classification of the Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its application to the
other proceedings, provided the same is not contrary to the specific rules provided therein. Indeed, the Rules of Court is to be
viewed and construed as a whole, and if the Supreme Court had compartmentalized the same into four divisions, it was, as
petitioner had claimed, for the purpose of organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.

To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure, specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis-à-vis Section 1, Rule 23 would
reveal no inconsistency so as to exclude the application of the latter rule in criminal proceedings. Section 4, Rule 119 refers to
the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial, while Section 1, Rule 23 refers to the taking of deposition
witnesses during trial. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

52
 While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we find no
reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the same in the manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23 under
the circumstances of the case. To disallow petitioner to avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny
him the opportunity to adequately defend himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now pending before the
public respondent and, further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure which is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Even granting arguendo that Rule 23 is to be exclusively applied to civil actions, the taking of the deposition of petitioner's US-
based witnesses should be still allowed considering that the civil action has been impliedly instituted in the criminal action for
rape with homicide. Since public respondent has jurisdiction over the civil case to recover damages, she exercised full
authority to employ all auxiliary writs, processes and other means to carry out the jurisdiction conferred and [to] adopt any
suitable process or mode of proceeding which includes the application of the rule on depositions pending action under Rule 23
in the case pending before her.

Second. Depositions obtained during trial in a foreign state or country may be taken before a consular office of the Republic of
the Philippines where the deponent resides or is officially stationed. 18 Section 5, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is thus clearly
inapplicable in the instant case since the same relates to the examination of witnesses under Section 4 thereof and not
Section 1 of Rule 23. Consistent with the procedure provided [for] under Rule 23, the deposition of the petitioner's witnesses,
which include four (4) officials of the United States government, will be taken before a consular officer of the Philippines where
these witnesses reside or are officially stationed, as the case may be.

The denial of petitioner's right to present his witnesses, who are residing abroad, based on a very Shaky technical ground, is
tantamount to depriving him of his constitutional right to due process. This Court recognizes the impossibility of enforcing the
right of petitioner to secure the attendance of the proposed witnesses through compulsory process considering that they are
beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts. Petitioner, however, is not without any remedy and he correctly sought to secure
the testimonies of his witness through the process of taking their depositions pending the trial of Criminal Case No. 95-404 in
the court below under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In any event the prosecution would have the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses for accused Hubert Webb (petitioner herein) since they will be given the opportunity to cross-examine
the deponents as in accordance with Section 3 to 18 of Rule 132. 19

Furthermore, no prejudice would be suffered in the taking of the depositions of petitioner's US-based witness(es). On the other
hand, a denial of the same would be prejudicial to petitioner-accused since he would be denied an opportunity to completely
present his evidence, which strikes at the very core of the due process guarantee of the Constitution. To reiterate, it is not the
function of this Court to second-guess the trial court on its ruling on the admissibility of the pieces of documentary evidence as
well as the latter's witnesses,20 but it is definitely within this court's inherent power to scrutinize, as it does in the case at bench,
the acts of respondent judge and declare that she indeed committed grave abuse discretion in issuing the questioned Orders.

In the final analysis, this Court rules that the denial of the deposition-taking amount to the denial of the constitutional right to
present his evidence and for the production of evidence in his behalf. The denial is not justified by the flimsy reason that Sec. 1
of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to the criminal proceedings. To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony
of these witnesses by deposition it to put [a] premium on technicality at the expense of the constitutional rights of the accused,
which this court is not inclined to do. Particularly where the issue of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner is bound to hinge
heavily upon the testimonies of his US-based witnesses, it behooves upon public respondent not only to guarantee that
accused is given a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence, but also to allow him a certain latitude in the presentation
of his evidence, lest he may be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated.
Finally, even if respondent's contention is correct, it cannot be denied that the case at bar includes the recovery of the civil
liability of the accused, which normally is done through a civil case.

We disagree.

As defined, a deposition is —

The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a
commission to take testimony issued by court, or under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and
duly authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. A pretrial
discovery device by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the
other party. The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the court
room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A transcript — word for word account — is made of the deposition. Testimony of
[a] witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions or
interrogatories . . .21

53
and the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and
preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make available
in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the
parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5.] Expedite litigation; 6.]
Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and
trial.22 As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before
and not during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice — particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the
criminal proceedings against him in the court below — states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must
move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion. 23

It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is "to foreclose any
objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long
been rendered moot and academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial court in its order dated
July 10, 1998.24

In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be
superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of Exhibits "218" and "219" readily shows that these are of the same species
of documents which have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court in its order dated July 18, 1997 which
We noted in Webb, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al.25 wherein We pointed out, among others, "[t]hat respondent judge reversed
this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility have been
cured though the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the merits"." 26

Indeed, a comparison of Exhibit "218-A" which is a U.S. Department of State Certification issued by Joan C. Hampton, Assistant
Authenticating Officer of the said agency, for and in the name of Madeleine K. Albright, stating that the documents annexed thereto
were issued by the U.S. Department of Justice as shown by seal embossed thereon, 27 with other exhibits previously offered as
evidence reveals that they are of the same nature as Exhibits "42-H" 28 and "42-M".29 The only difference in the documents lies in the
fact that Exhibit "218-A" was signed by Joan C. Hampton for and in behalf of the incumbent Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright
whereas, Exhibits "42-H" and "42-M" were signed by Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for and in behalf of former Secretary of
State Warren Christopher.30

A comparison of Exhibit "218-B"31 with the other documentary exhibits offered by respondent, likewise discloses that its contents are the
same as Exhibits "42-I"32 and "42-N."33 The only difference in the three exhibits, which are actually standard issue certification forms
issued by the U.S. Department of Justice with blanks to be filled up, is that Exhibit "218-B" is dated February 5, 1997 and signed by one
of the U.S. Attorney General's several Deputy Assistant Attorneys for Administration for and in her behalf, while Exhibits "42-I" and "42-
N" are both dated September 21, 1995 with another of the said deputies signing both documents. 34

Still comparing respondent's Exhibit "218-F,"35 which is likewise a standard issue U.S. Department of Justice Certification Form, with
other documents previously introduced as evidence reveals that it is the same as Exhibits "39-D" 36 and "42-C."37 The only differences in
these documents are that Exhibit "218-F" is dated October 13, 1995 and is signed by Debora A. Farmer while Exhibits "39-D" and "42-
C" are both dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Cecil G. Christian, Jr., Assistant Commissioner, Officer of Records, INS. 38

Still further scrutinizing and comparing respondent's Exhibit "218-G" 39 which was also introduced and admitted into evidence as
Defense Exhibit "207-B"40 shows that the document has been earlier introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court an
astounding seven (7) times, particularly as Exhibits "34-A", "35-F", "39-E", "42-D", "42-P", "50" and "50-F." 41 The only difference in these
document is that they were printed on different dates. Specifically, Exhibits "218-G" as with Exhibits "34-A", "35-F", "50", and "52-F"
were printed out on October 26, 199542 whereas Exhibit "207-B" as with Exhibits "39-E", "42-D" and "42-F" were printed out on August
31, 1995.43

In fact, the records show that respondent's: a.] application for Non-Commercial Driver's License; b.] Documentary records based on
Clet's Database Response; c.] Computer-generated thumb-print; d.] Documentary records based on still another Clet's Database
Response, and e.] The Certification issued by one Frank Zolin, Director of the State of California's Department of Motor Vehicles, were
already introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibits "66-J", "66-K", "66-H", "66-I" and "66-L", respectively. 44

It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only; serves to underscore the immutable fact that the
depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in
denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous
exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. In
this regard, it bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably
expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. (emphasis and italics supplied.)

54
Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under the
prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can not
feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to present his side. 45 It must be borne in mind in this regard that due process
is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused. 46 Furthermore, while a litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.47

The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 48 The deposition taking can not be based nor can
it be denied on flimsy reasons.49 Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.
There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary,
capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion ". . . implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of Law." 50

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.51

To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the
public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil
action for certiorari.52

Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not a further
prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge. If there has
been no grave abuse of discretion, only after conviction may this Court examine such matters further. It is pointed out that the defense
has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the
exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, we sustain the
proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decide that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved
in the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation
that the American public officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the
public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they
can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the United States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 6,
1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City is ordered to
proceed posthaste in the trial of the main case and to render judgment therein accordingly.

55
Hyatt Industrial v. Ley Construction, G.R. No. 147143.March 10, 2006

G.R. No. 147143 March 10, 2006

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., and YU HE CHING, Petitioners,

vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the nullification of the Decision dated May 4, 2000 of the Court of Appeals’
(CA) then Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119, which remanded Civil Case No. 94-1429 to the trial court and directed the latter
to allow the deposition-taking without delay;1 and the CA Resolution dated February 13, 2001 which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.2

The facts are as follows:

On April 8, 1994, respondent Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1429, against petitioner Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a
real property in Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price of P2,634,000.00; and that Hyatt failed to
develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC’s payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. 3 On April 12, 1994, LCDC
filed an amended complaint impleading Princeton Development Corporation (Princeton) as additional defendant claiming that Hyatt sold
the subject property to Princeton on March 30, 1994 in fraud of LCDC. 4 On September 21, 1994, LCDC filed a second amended
complaint adding as defendant, Yu He Ching (Yu), President of Hyatt, alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price of P2,634,000.00 to
Hyatt through Yu.5

Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer of Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel
Ley, President of LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and Janet Ley. 6

On July 17, 1996, the RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed. 7

At the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy on September 17, 1996, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded
and pre-trial be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case. The RTC agreed and on the
same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place on November 14, 1996. 8

LCDC moved for reconsideration9 which the RTC denied in its October 14, 1996 Order, portion of which reads:

This Court has to deny the motion, because: 1) as already pointed out by this Court in the questioned Order said depositions will only
delay the early termination of this case; 2) had this Court set this case for pre-trial conference and trial thereafter, this case would have
been terminated by this time; 3) after all, what the parties would like to elicit from their deponents would probably be elicited at the pre-
trial conference; 4) no substantial rights of the parties would be prejudiced, if pre-trial conference is held, instead of deposition. 10

On November 14, 1996, the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Pendency of
Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.11 The petition, which sought to annul the Orders of the RTC dated September 17, 1996
and October 14, 1996, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 4251212 and assigned to the then Twelfth Division of the CA.

Meanwhile, pre-trial proceeded at the RTC as scheduled13 and with the refusal of LCDC to enter into pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton
moved to declare LCDC non-suited which the RTC granted in its Order dated December 3, 1996, thus:

On September 17, 1996, this Court noticing that this case was filed as early (as) April 4, 1994 14 and has not reached the pre-trial stage
because of several depositions applied for by the parties, not to mention that the records of this case has reached two (2) volumes, to
avoid delay, upon motion, ordered the cancellation of the depositions.

On September 24, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking to reconsider and set aside the order dated September 17,
1996, which motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October 14, 1996, ruling among others that "after all, what the
parties would like to elicit from these deponents would probably be elicited at the pre-trial conference", and, reiterated the order setting
this case for pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996.
56
On the scheduled pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals, seeking to
annul the Order of this Court dated September 17, 1996 and October 14, 1996, furnishing this Court with a copy on the same date.

At the scheduled pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996, plaintiff orally moved the Court to suspend pre-trial conference alleging
pendency of a petition with the Court of Appeals and made it plain that it cannot proceed with the pre-trial because the issue on
whether or not plaintiff may apply for depositions before the pre-trial conference is a prejudicial question. Defendants objected, alleging
that even if the petition is granted, pre-trial should proceed and that plaintiff could take deposition after the pre-trial conference, insisting
that defendants are ready to enter into a pre-trial conference.

This Court denied plaintiff’s motion to suspend proceedings and ordered plaintiff to enter into pre-trial conference. Plaintiff refused.
Before this Court denied plaintiff’s motion to suspend, this Court gave Plaintiff two (2) options: enter into a pre-trial conference, advising
plaintiff that what it would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference, thus expediting early termination
of this case; and, terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on. Plaintiff insisted on suspension of the pre-trial
conference alleging that it is not ready to enter into pre-trial conference in view of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Defendants insisted that pre-trial conference proceed as scheduled, manifesting their readiness to enter into a pre-trial conference.

When plaintiff made it clear that it is not entering into the pre-trial conference, defendants prayed that plaintiff be declared non-suited. x
xx

xxxx

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, this Court is compelled to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

WHEREFORE, for failure of plaintiff to enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reason, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
Defendants’ counterclaims are likewise dismissed.

SO ORDERED.15

LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration16 which was denied however by the trial court in its Order dated April 21, 1997. 17 LCDC went to
the CA on appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 and assigned to the then Seventh Division of the CA. 18

On July 24, 1997, the CA’s then Twelfth Division,19 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 denied LCDC’s petition for certiorari declaring that the
granting of the petition and setting aside of the September 17, 1996 and October 14, 1996 Orders are manifestly pointless considering
that the complaint itself had already been dismissed and subject of the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57119; that the reversal of
the said Orders would have practical effect only if the dismissal were also set aside and the complaint reinstated; and that the dismissal
of the complaint rendered the petition for certiorari devoid of any practical value.20 LCDC’s motion for reconsideration of the CA-G.R.
SP No. 42512 decision was denied on March 4, 1998.21 LCDC then filed with this Court, a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
133145 which this Court dismissed on August 29, 2000.22

On May 4, 2000, the CA’s then Seventh Division issued in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 the herein assailed decision, the fallo of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal meritorious, this case is remanded to the court a quo for further hearing and
directing the latter to allow the deposition taking without delay.

SO ORDERED.23

The CA reasoned that: LCDC complied with Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which expressly sanctions
depositions as a mode of discovery without leave of court after the answer has been served; to unduly restrict the modes of discovery
during trial would defeat the very purpose for which it is intended which is a pre-trial device, and at the time of the trial, the issues would
already be confined to matters defined during pre-trial; the alleged intention of expediting the resolution of the case is not sufficient
justification to recall the order to take deposition as records show that the delay was brought about by postponement interposed by both
parties and other legal antecedents that are in no way imputable to LCDC alone; deposition-taking, together with the other modes of
discovery are devised by the rules as a means to attain the objective of having all the facts presented to the court; the trial court also
erred in dismissing the complaint as LCDC appeared during the pre-trial conference and notified it of the filing of a petition before the
CA; such is a legitimate justification to stall the pre-trial conference, as the filing of the petition was made in good faith in their belief that
the court a quo erred in canceling the deposition scheduled for no apparent purpose. 24

Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which the CA denied on February 13, 2001. 25

Hyatt and Yu now come before the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, on the following grounds:

57
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH DIVISION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, ACTUALLY AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN HOLDING IN EFFECT INVALID THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 17,
1996 AND OCTOBER 14, 1996 WHICH ARE NOT RAISED OR PENDING BEFORE IT, BUT IN ANOTHER CASE (CA-G.R. SP. No.
42512) PENDING BEFORE ANOTHER DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION, AND WHICH CASE WAS
DISMISSED BY THE SAID DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FINALLY BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN
G.R. NO. 133145.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH DIVISION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF
LAW IN REVERSING THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER DATED DECEMBER 3, 1996 AND APRIL 21, 1997 HOLDING RESPONDENT
NON-SUITED FOR FAILURE TO ENTER INTO PRE-TRIAL.26

Anent the first issue, petitioners claim that: the validity of the RTC Order dated September 17, 1996 which set the case for pre-trial, as
well as its Order dated October 14, 1996 denying LCDC’s motion for partial reconsideration are not involved in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119
but were the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 42512, assigned to the then Twelfth Division, which dismissed the same on July 24, 1997 and
which dismissal was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 133145; in passing upon the validity of the Orders dated September 17, 1996
and October 14, 1996, the CA’s then Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 exceeded its authority and encroached on issues
taken cognizance of by another Division.27

On the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA’s then Seventh Division should have outrightly dismissed the appeal of LCDC as the
same did not involve any error of fact or law but pertains to a matter of discretion which is properly a subject of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court; conducting discovery thru deposition is not a condition sine qua non to the holding of a pre-trial and the
fact that LCDC wanted to take the deposition of certain persons is not a valid ground to suspend the holding of pre-trial and
subsequently the trial on the merits; the persons whose depositions were to be taken were listed as witnesses during the trial; to take
their depositions before the lower court and to present them as witnesses during the trial on the merits would result in unnecessary
duplicity; the fact that LCDC has a pending petition for certiorari with the CA’s then Twelfth Division docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
42512 is not a ground to cancel or suspend the scheduled pre-trial on November 14, 1996 as there was no restraining order issued;
LCDC’s availment of the discovery procedure is causing the undue delay of the case; it is only after LCDC has filed its complaint that it
started looking for evidence to support its allegations thru modes of discovery and more than two years has already passed after the
filing of the complaint yet LCDC still has no documentary evidence to present before the lower court to prove its allegations in the
complaint.28

Petitioners then pray that the Decision dated May 4, 2000 and the Resolution dated February 13, 2001 of the CA’s then Seventh
Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 be annulled and set aside and the validity of the Orders dated December 3, 1996 and April 21, 1997
of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62 in Civil Case No. 94-1429 be sustained. 29

In its Comment, LCDC argues that the petitioners erred in claiming that the CA’s then Seventh Division overstepped its authority as this
Court has ruled in G.R. No. 133145 that the issue of whether LCDC has been denied its right to discovery is more appropriately
addressed in the appeal before the then Seventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 below rather than by the then Twelfth Division in
the certiorari proceeding in CA-G.R. SP No. 42512; and while the appeal of the final Order of the RTC dated December 3, 1996 also
questioned the Orders dated September 17, 1996 and October 14, 1996, it does not render the appeal improper as this Court in G.R.
No. 133145 held that the subsequent appeal constitutes an appropriate remedy because it assails not only the Order dated December
3, 1996, but also the two earlier orders.30

On the second issue, LCDC contends that: the mere fact that a deponent will be called to the witness stand during trial is not a ground
to deny LCDC the right to discovery and does not cause "unnecessary duplicity", otherwise no deposition can ever be taken; a
deposition is for the purpose of "discovering" evidence while trial is for the purpose of "presenting" evidence to the court; if petitioners’
concern was the delay in the disposition of the case, the remedy is to expedite the taking of the depositions, not terminate them
altogether; petitioners have nothing to fear from discovery unless they have in their possession damaging evidence; the parties should
be allowed to utilize the discovery process prior to conducting pre-trial since every bit of relevant information unearthed through the
discovery process will hasten settlement, simplify the issues and determine the necessity of amending the pleadings; the trial court
erred in not suspending the pre-trial conference pending the petition for certiorari before the then Twelfth Division of the CA since
considerations of orderly administration of justice demanded that the trial court accord due deference to the CA; not only was LCDC’s
petition for certiorari filed in good faith, the CA found it meritorious, vindicating LCDC’s insistence that the pre-trial be suspended; the
undue delay in the disposition of the case was not attributable to LCDC’s deposition-taking but to the flurry of pleadings filed by
defendants below to block LCDC’s depositions and prevent it from gaining access to critical evidence; the critical evidence that LCDC
needs to obtain through discovery is evidence that is totally within the knowledge and possession of petitioners and defendant
Princeton and is not available elsewhere.31

On September 17, 2001, the Court required the parties to file their respective memoranda. 32 Hyatt and Yu on the one hand and LCDC
on the other filed their respective memoranda reiterating their positions. 33

58
On January 2, 2002, Princeton filed a "Comment" which this Court considered as its Memorandum in the Resolution dated January 30,
2002.34

In said memorandum, Princeton averred that: it is not true that Princeton failed to comply with any discovery orders as all information
requested of Princeton was duly furnished LCDC and there are no pending discovery orders insofar as Princeton is concerned; LCDC
is seeking to dictate its procedural strategies on the RTC and the opposing parties; LCDC was not deprived due process as it was given
all the opportunity to prepare for its case and to face its opponents before the court; LCDC admits to the probability of forum shopping
as it filed a petition for certiorari with the then Twelfth Division of the CA and later an appeal with the then Seventh Division of the CA;
the RTC did not bar LCDC from presenting witnesses or discovering any evidence, as all it did was to transfer the venue of the
testimony and discovery to the courtroom and get on with the case which LCDC did not want to do; that discovery proceedings need
not take place before pre-trial conference; trial court judges are given discretion over the right of parties in the taking of depositions and
may deny the same for good reasons in order to prevent abuse; the trial court did not err in not granting LCDC’s motion to suspend
proceedings due to the pendency of a petition for certiorari with the CA since there was no order from said court and there was no merit
in the petition for certiorari as shown by the dismissal thereof by the then Twelfth Division; there was proper and legal ground for the
trial court to declare LCDC non-suited; appearance at the pre-trial is not enough; there is no evidence to support LCDC’s claim that
Hyatt surreptitiously transferred title to Princeton.35

The Court is in a quandary why Hyatt and Yu included Princeton as respondent in the present petition when Princeton was their co-
defendant below and the arguments they raised herein pertain only to LCDC. With the failure of petitioners to raise any ground against
Princeton in any of its pleadings before this Court, we shall treat Princeton’s inclusion as respondent in the present petition as mere
inadvertence on the part of petitioners.

Now to the merits. The issues that need to be resolved in this case may be simplified as follows: (1) Whether the CA’s then Seventh
Division exceeded its authority in ruling upon the validity of the Orders dated September 17, 1996 and November 14, 1996; and (2)
Whether the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and order the deposition-taking to proceed.

We answer both questions in the negative.

Petitioners assert that the CA’s then Twelfth Division in CA-GR SP No. 42512 and this Court in G.R. No. 133145 already ruled upon the
validity of the Orders dated September 17, 1996 and November 14, 1996, thus the CA’s then Seventh Division in CA G.R. CV No.
57119 erred in ruling upon the same.

A cursory reading of the decisions in CA-GR SP No. 42512 and G.R. No. 133145, however, reveals otherwise. The CA’s then Twelfth
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 was explicit in stating thus:

x x x Any decision of ours will not produce any practical legal effect. According to the petitioner, if we annul the questioned Orders, the
dismissal of its Complaint by the trial [court] will have to be set aside in its pending appeal. That assumes that the division handling the
appeal will agree with Our decision. On the other hand, it may not. Also other issues may be involved therein than the validity of the
herein questioned orders.

We cannot pre-empt the decision that might be rendered in such appeal. The division to [which] it has been assigned should be left free
to resolve the same. On the other hand, it is better that this Court speak with one voice. 36

This Court in G.R. No. 133145 also clearly stated that:

x x x First, it should be stressed that the said Petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 42512) sought to set aside only the two interlocutory RTC
Orders, not the December 3, 1996 Resolution dismissing the Complaint. Verily, the Petition could not have assailed the Resolution,
which was issued after the filing of the former.

Under the circumstances, granting the Petition for Certiorari and setting aside the two Orders are manifestly pointless, considering that
the Complaint itself had already been dismissed. Indeed, the reversal of the assailed Orders would have practical effect only if the
dismissal were also set aside and the Complaint reinstated. In other words, the dismissal of the Complaint rendered the Petition
for Certiorari devoid of any practical value.

Second, the Petition for Certiorari was superseded by the filing, before the Court of Appeals, of a subsequent appeal docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 57119, questioning the Resolution and the two Orders. In this light, there was no more reason for the CA to resolve the
Petition for Certiorari.

xxxx

In this case, the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact, it is the appropriate remedy, because it assails not only
the Resolution but also the two Orders.

59
xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. x x x. 37

With the pronouncements of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 42512 and by this Court in G.R. No. 133145 that the subsequent
appeal via CA-G.R. CV No. 57119 constitutes as the adequate remedy to resolve the validity of the RTC Orders dated September 17,
1996 and November 14, 1996, the arguments of petitioners on this point clearly have no leg to stand on and must therefore fail.

On the second issue, the Court finds that the CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to
proceed.

A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. 38 It is accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. 39 It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with
the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; 40 and provided it is taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if
an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of
Court).41 The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in
ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. 42

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004
which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of
deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of
depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise
required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their
having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. 43

Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity of said issuance, however, the depositions sought by LCDC
shall be evaluated based on the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.--- By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in
Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take depositions after the
answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the rules then prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the
previously scheduled depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege,44 such circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.

The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling the scheduled depositions. While speedy disposition of cases is important,
such consideration however should not outweigh a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of cases, for the ends of justice are
reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases but more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of
the merits of the case.45 Records also show that the delay of the case is not attributable to the depositions sought by LCDC but was
caused by the many pleadings filed by all the parties including petitioners herein.

The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the intended deponents shall also be called as
witnesses during trial, is also without merit.

The case of Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals46 which already settled the matter, explained that:

The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court’s order that his
deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may
be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

60
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking
depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by
both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva
voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the facts to the
parties before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.

x x x [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery - with use on
trial not necessarily contemplated - and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege
have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral
testimony wherever practicable.47

Petitioner also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims and that it was only after the filing of its Complaint that it started
looking for evidence through the modes of discovery.

On this point, it is well to reiterate the Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan48:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential
to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-
discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding
it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.49

It also does not escape this Court’s attention that the trial court, before dismissing LCDC’s complaint, gave LCDC two options: (a) enter
into a pre-trial conference, advising LCDC that what it would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference,
thus expediting early termination of the case; and (b) terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on. The trial court
erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from these options and in dismissing its complaint upon LCDC’s refusal to choose either of the
two.

The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance Officer of Hyatt and Pacita Tan Go, an Account
Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.

As also pointed out by the CA:

x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the very purpose for which it is intended, as a pre-trial device.
By then, the issues would have been confined only on matters defined during pre-trial. The importance of the modes of discovery
cannot be gainsaid in this case in view of the nature of the controversy involved and the conflicting interest claimed by the parties. 50

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the
real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. 51

Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan52 the Court explained that:

The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and
policy of the law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves
of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in
other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal
possible through the deposition- discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been the
ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary ends of modern procedure; it not only
eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards
on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the
pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The
evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 53 (emphasis supplied)

61
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in
determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its
case in the dark --- the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less
a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent. 54

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA was correct in remanding the case to the trial court and ordering the depositions
to proceed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

62
San Luis v. Roxas, G.R. No. 159127. March 3,2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 159127 March 3, 2008

RAMON GERARDO B. SAN LUIS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC. Br. 70, Pasig City and BERDEX INTERNATIONAL
INC., respondents*.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Ramon Gerardo B. San Luis (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Resolutions dated September 11, 20021 and May 20, 20032 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R. SP No. 72596.

The factual background of herein petition is as follows:

On July 12, 2001, Berdex International, Inc. (private respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) a complaint 3 for
a sum of money against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 68530 alleging that: it is a foreign corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the United States of America with principal office in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.; it is maintaining the present
action only to enforce its rights by virtue of an isolated transaction with petitioner; in June 1997, petitioner received from it certain
amounts of money which were meant partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in both Seanet and
Seabest Corporations, however, not a single share in those corporations was transferred to private respondent by petitioner and the
shares were retained by the latter; the parties then agreed to treat all the payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner
as the latter's loan; petitioner proposed the payment of the loan within a period of three years, which proposal was accepted by private
respondent with the agreement that in case of non-payment of any installment on their due dates, the entire amount shall become due
and demandable; petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of loan; petitioner confirmed such loan to private respondent's
auditors on August 8, 2000; and he had only paid US$20,000.00 and no further payment was made despite repeated demands. Private
respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of US$150,335.75 plus interest until fully paid and attorney's fees.

Petitioner filed his Answer4 contending that: he is a businessman engaged in the trading of seafoods; he received from private
respondent the total amount of US$141,944.71 with instructions that petitioner first deduct therefrom the amount of US$23,748.00
representing the latter's commission from private respondent in their other transaction; the money was intended to be used to buy 70%
of the outstanding shares of Seanet Corporation on behalf of private respondent and the balance as private respondent's advances as
Seanet's stockholder, which he complied with; in view, however, of subsequent substantial losses incurred by Seanet and petitioner's
desire to maintain good business with private respondent, petitioner offered that the amounts he received from private respondent be
paid by Fuegomar Traders, Inc. (Fuegomar), a company which he subsequently put up and which he substantially owned and engaged
in the same line of business as Seanet; Fuegomar will purchase at cost the stock investment of private respondent in Seanet; while the
documentation of such agreement was being finalized, petitioner then gave US$20,000.00 to private respondent on behalf of
Fuegomar; however, private respondent then claimed that its investment in Seanet was petitioner's personal loan and the amount of
US$20,000.00 paid on behalf of Fuegomar was maliciously interpreted as petitioner' admission of personal liability.

The pre-trial conference was terminated on January 11, 2002 and the case was subsequently set for trial.

On April 4, 2002, private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) 5 alleging that
initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, 2002; that however, all of its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the
USA; that one of the witnesses is already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous; and
there is a perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002; 6 that written interrogatories are
ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such mode of deposition-taking will save precious judicial and
government time and will prevent needless delays in the case.

In his Opposition and Comment,7 petitioner contends: If indeed there was an oral contract and petitioner was liable to private
respondent for the amount he received from the latter, the documents attached to private respondent's complaint did not support its
claim, but rather supported his position. There is a very strict standard in proving an oral contract. Taking the deposition through written
interrogatories would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor of witnesses. Petitioner's right
63
to cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to cross-interrogatories which will severely limit not only the
scope but the spontaneity of his cross-examination. It is doubtful whether the witnesses will give their deposition under sanction of the
penalties prescribed by Philippine law for perjury. It will not necessarily save precious judicial and government time but may in fact
lengthen the trial, as both parties will have the right to review and to object to interrogatories submitted by the other party. The claim
that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who are all Americans is frivolous, since respondent has not
presented evidence that the US government has prohibited its citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there was such
prohibition, it was not binding on our own legal system. Old age was not a valid reason.

In an Order8 dated May 9, 2002, the RTC granted private respondent's Motion, as it found the same appropriate and sanctioned by the
rules on deposition-taking.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order 9 dated July 3, 2002.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.

In a Resolution dated September 11, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition, thus:

A perusal of the petition and its annexes indicates that:

1. no affidavit of service is attached;

2. the following Annexes are blurred:

- Annex H

- Annex J

3. the pleadings filed before the respondent court are not attached.

According to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1994 Rules of Civil Procedure,
non-compliance with the requirements is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED. 10

In a Resolution dated May 20, 2003, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. In denying the motion, the CA found that
non-compliance with the requirements as a result of misapprehension and unfamiliarity with the rules is not excusable; that in any case,
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-96 dated June 1, 1996 states that subsequent compliance with the requirement shall not warrant a
reconsideration.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISMISSED ON MERE TECHNICALITY THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF THE PETITIONER EVEN IF THERE WAS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE UNIQUENESS OF THE LEGAL
ISSUE RAISED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE GRAVE INJUSTICE THAT WILL BE VISITED UPON THE PETITIONER IF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, A NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN CORPORATION, WILL BE ALLOWED TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT THROUGH DEPOSITION BY WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES OF ALL ITS
WITNESSES TAKEN OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES.11

Petitioner argues that the CA focused on technicality rather than substantial justice, notwithstanding that he subsequently complied with
all the requirements and attached them to his Motion for Reconsideration; that his failure to attach an affidavit of service was due to his
belief that the affidavit can be dispensed with in case of personal service of the petition to the parties who received the same; that
Annex "H," a letter dated July 12, 2000 sent by private respondent to Fuegomar and R.G. San Luis (herein petitioner) asking for
confirmation of the note held by the former regarding the latter's outstanding obligation to it, 12 which was attached to the complaint filed
with the RTC, was also blurred; that the blurred copy of Annex "J," the Seanet Corporation Loan Amortization Schedule, 13 was due to

64
inadvertence during the reproduction of the numerous annexes; and that he only attached pleadings to the petition filed in the CA which
he believed to be important and relevant to the issue submitted in his petition.

Petitioner further alleges that the CA failed to appreciate that grave injustice would be done to him if private respondent, a non-resident
foreign corporation, would have all its witnesses who are foreigners give their testimonies through deposition upon written
interrogatories which would be taken outside of the Philippines and would seek to establish an oral contract not supported by any
documentary evidence; that to allow such deposition will prevent the RTC from testing the credibility of the witnesses, and petitioner's
right to cross-examine the witnesses would be curtailed if not denied, as he would be limited to cross-interrogatories and re-cross
interrogatories based on written interrogatories.

Private respondent counters that petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a
petition for review under Rule 45; that petitioner can no longer question the CA Resolutions, as certiorari under Rule 65 is not a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available; that the CA's dismissal of the petition was proper; that Circular 19-91 is
quite clear that any petition under Rule 65 may be denied outright if there is no proof of service on the lower court; that no grave abuse
of discretion was committed by the RTC in allowing deposition-taking as the same was consistent with the rules.

The Court's Ruling

Preliminarily, we find petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 proper considering that petitioner is assailing the
Resolutions of the CA dismissing their petition outright.14

In Donato v. Court of Appeals15, we held:

The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated
by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw
a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws
involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.16

Anent petitioner's failure to attach the affidavit of service, we find the same not fatal to the petition since it showed that copies of the
petition were personally served on the RTC and private respondent's counsel on September 3, 2002 as evidenced by the parties'
official receiving stamps appearing opposite their names. By analogy, we have held 17 that the non-attachment of the affidavit of service
is not fatal to the petition when the registry receipts attached to the petition clearly show that respondents were served copies of the
petition; that the demands of substantial justice were satisfied by the actual receipt of the petition. 18

We likewise find satisfactory the explanation advanced by petitioner with respect to the blurred copies of the annexes attached to the
petition. Moreover, we find that Annexes "H" and "J" are not necessary for the resolution of the issue brought before the
CA, i.e., whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondent's MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-
Taking Through Written Interrogatories).

As to the non-attachment to the petition of the pleadings filed in the RTC, we find that the documents attached to the petition -- to wit:
private respondent's MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories), petitioner's opposition, petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent's opposition -- show that they contained the relevant facts of the case and the
respective arguments of the parties on which the CA could have based its resolution on the merits of the issue brought before it. Thus,
there was no need to attach all other pleadings filed in the RTC. Nonetheless, petitioner had submitted all the pleadings when he filed
his motion for reconsideration.

The CA's reliance on Administrative Circular No. 3-96 dated June 1, 1996 in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration is
misplaced. Although the Circular provides that subsequent compliance with the requirement shall not warrant a reconsideration, it does
not apply to the petition filed by petitioner before the CA. The subject of the said Circular deals with copies of the judgment or resolution
sought to be reviewed and not to other pleadings filed in the RTC. The Circular clarified the meaning of "duplicate original copy" and
"certified true copy" of decisions, judgments, resolutions or orders and not other documents to be attached.

65
As to the non-submission of the affidavit of service and other pleadings jurisprudence dictates that the subsequent and substantial
compliance of a petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. 19

While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, they nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. 20 Time and again, this Court
has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate
it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.21 Thus, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in hastily dismissing the petition on procedural flaws.

While herein petitioner prays that the CA be ordered to give due course to the petition for certiorari filed before it and to remand the
case to the CA for proper disposition, the Court opts to resolve the sole issue raised in the present petition which is a pure question of
law, i.e., whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of having all
its witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the
Philippines to prove an oral contract, in order to avoid further delay.

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, which substantially reproduced Section 1, Rule 24 of the old Rules, provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by depositions upon oral
examination or written interrogatories.

Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that private respondent is
a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts
relative to the issues of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark. 22

In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes23, where we upheld the right of plaintiff during the trial stage of the case to present its evidence
by deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral examination in court, we said:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the
knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes
of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or
things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts,
not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the
object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever
may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation,
and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts;
they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The
deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the
rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally."

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay: the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-
examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the
trial or hearing.

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent,
under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4,
Rule 2424 of the Rules of Court.

66
 SEC 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented
at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of
deponent as a witness;

(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an
adverse party for any purpose;

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than
fifty25 (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;

(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it
which is relevant to the party introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.

The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be
given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him."

It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the
party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule
24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person
or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).

Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already
been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or
outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that
"reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . (stating) the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs . . . "(Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court
intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice
and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not
be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel,"
etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or
in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24). 26 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's MOTION (To Allow Deposition-
Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering private respondent's allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans
residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
that the witness resides at a distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.

Petitioner insists that Dasmariñas does not constitute a precedent in the instant case as the facts are substantially different; to wit: (1)
in Dasmariñas, plaintiff filed a motion to take deposition through written interrogatories of two witnesses abroad after it had already
presented its first witness, while in the present case, private respondent will not present a single witness to testify in court but only the
witnesses' depositions; (2) in Dasmariñas, the existence of the contract involved was not in issue at all, while in the present case,
petitioner denied the existence of the alleged contract of loan and private respondent has not presented any documentary evidence to
support its claim.

We do not agree.
67
The situation in Dasmariñas is the same as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during the trial stage that the
deposition through written interrogatories was sought to be taken. It does not matter whether one witness for the plaintiff had already
testified since the Dasmariñas ruling did not make such testimony in court a condition to grant the deposition of the two other
witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas, the plaintiff sued defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was the same as in the instant
case as private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum of money.

Petitioner claims that the right to take depositions upon written interrogatories in lieu of oral testimony in open court would result in
grave injustice to him, as private respondent is seeking to establish the existence of an oral contract which requires stricter standard in
proving the same.

We find such argument untenable.

While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial
intervention,27 such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith; 28 or in such a
manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry; 29 or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.30

It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment 31 and should not be unduly
restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of
litigation would be defeated.32 In fact, we find nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as alleged by
petitioner.

In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time. The
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. 33

Petitioner argues that to allow such deposition-taking will prevent the RTC from observing the witnesses' demeanor and credibility; and
that petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses would be curtailed if not denied as he is limited to cross-interrogatories and re-
cross interrogatories based on written interrogatories.

We are not persuaded.

Depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court, where
their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge; and the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition,
thereby taken, inadmissible.34 It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being subject to the prying eyes
and probing questions of the Judge.35 Depositions are consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding.36 Depositions are allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Court; that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has
been submitted; and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists. 37

We also find no merit in petitioner's claim that his right to cross-examine private respondent's witnesses will be curtailed since petitioner
is fully accorded the opportunity for cross-examination under Section 25, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 25. Depositions upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. - A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name
and address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who
has served cross interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve re-
cross interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

Thus, petitioner may submit cross-interrogatories upon private respondent with sufficient fullness and freedom.

Finally, petitioner contends that since private respondent will have the testimonies of its witnesses in another jurisdiction, the sanction of
penalty for perjury under our laws would not apply to them; and petitioner may not be able to enforce its own claim against private
respondent, since it is domiciled in a foreign country and does not appear to have any assets in the Philippines. We will not venture to
make any determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. We must only deal with an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 38

68
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 11, 2002 and May 20, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 72596 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, the Orders dated May 9, 2002 and July 3, 2002 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68530 stand.

SO ORDERED.

69
 RULE 25: INTERROGATORIES to PARTIES

Afulugencia v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 185145, 5 February 2014

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff,
Province of Bulacan, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Section 6,1 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by
the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks to prevent fishing
expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 are the April 15, 2008 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
99535 which dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and its October 2, 2008 Resolution 4 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint 6 for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and Emmanuel
L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 336-M-2004 and
assigned to Branch 7.

Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
the Malolos RTC.

After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Testificandum7 to require Metrobank’s officers8 to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31,
2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as
those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20411 (M). The Motion contained a notice of hearing written as follows:

NOTICE

The Branch Clerk of Court

Regional Trial Court
Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan

Greetings:

Please submit the foregoing motion for the consideration and approval of the Hon. Court immediately upon receipt hereof.

(signed)
Vicente C. Angeles9

70
Metrobank filed an Opposition10 arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated
motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that pursuant to
Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to
appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories; that petitioners have not
shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for
evidence.

Petitioners submitted a Reply12 to Metrobank’s Opposition, stating that the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of
Metrobank’s Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored; that leave of court is not necessary for the
taking of Metrobank’s officers’ depositions; that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive, but
instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the same during the presentation of its own
evidence; that the documents sought to be produced are relevant and will prove whether petitioners have paid their obligations to
Metrobank in full, and will settle the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; and that the Rules do not
prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 19, 2006, the trial court issued an Order13 denying petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum, thus:

The motion lacks merit.

As pointed out by the defendant bank in its opposition, the motion under consideration is a mere scrap of paper by reason of its failure
to comply with the requirements for a valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, the defendant bank and its officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories are
first served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, and for lack of merit, the motion under consideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.14

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 pleading for leniency in the application of the Rules and claiming that the defective
notice was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They further argued that Metrobank’s
officers – who are the subject of the subpoena – are not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise the adverse party; they are
individuals separate and distinct from Metrobank, the defendant corporation being sued in the case.

In an Opposition16 to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted on the procedural defect of improper notice of hearing, arguing
that the rule relative to motions and the requirement of a valid notice of hearing are mandatory and must be strictly observed. It added
that the same rigid treatment must be accorded to Rule 25, in that none of its officers may be summoned to testify for petitioners unless
written interrogatories are first served upon them. Finally, it said that since a corporation may act only through its officers and
employees, they are to be considered as adverse parties in a case against the corporation itself.

In another Order17 dated April 17, 2007, the trial court denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court held, thus:

Even if the motion is given consideration by relaxing Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, no such laxity could be accorded
to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court which require prior service of written interrogatories to adverse parties
before any material and relevant facts may be elicited from them more so if the party is a private corporation who could be represented
by its officers as in this case. In other words, as the persons sought to be subpoenaed by the plaintiffs-movants are officers of the
defendant bank, they are in effect the very persons who represent the interest of the latter and necessarily fall within the coverage of
Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.18

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari19 with the CA asserting this time that their Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it does not seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. For these reasons, the
Motion need not be heard. They likewise insisted on liberality, and the disposition of the case on its merits and not on mere
technicalities.20 They added that Rule 2121 of the Rules requires prior notice and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions;
since their Motion sought to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify in court and not to obtain their depositions, the

71
requirement of notice and hearing may be dispensed with. Finally, petitioners claimed that the Rules – particularly Section 10, 22 Rule
132 – do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

On April 15, 2008, the CA issued the questioned Decision, which contained the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders dated October 19, 2006 and April 17, 2007 in Civil
Case No. 336-M-2004 issued by the RTC, Branch 7, Malolos City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.23

The CA held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders; petitioners’ Motion is a litigated
motion, especially as it seeks to require the adverse party, Metrobank’s officers, to appear and testify in court as petitioners’ witnesses.
It held that a proper notice of hearing, addressed to the parties and specifying the date and time of the hearing, was required,
consistent with Sections 4 and 5,24 Rule 15 of the Rules.

The CA held further that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners’ Motion to secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum,
ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in providing that the consequence of a party’s failure to serve written interrogatories upon the
opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled by the former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal. By
failing to serve written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to present the bank’s officers as their witnesses.

The CA declared that the justification for the rule laid down in Section 6 is that by failing to seize the opportunity to inquire upon the
facts through means available under the Rules, petitioners should not be allowed to later on burden Metrobank with court hearings or
other processes. Thus, it held:

x x x Where a party unjustifiedly refuses to elicit facts material and relevant to his case by addressing written interrogatories to the
adverse party to elicit those facts, the latter may not thereafter be compelled to testify thereon in court or give a deposition pending
appeal. The justification for this is that the party in need of said facts having foregone the opportunity to inquire into the same from the
other party through means available to him, he should not thereafter be permitted to unduly burden the latter with courtroom
appearances or other cumbersome processes. The sanction adopted by the Rules is not one of compulsion in the sense that the party
is being directly compelled to avail of the discovery mechanics, but one of negation by depriving him of evidentiary sources which would
otherwise have been accessible to him.25

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,26 which the CA denied in its assailed October 2, 2008 Resolution. Hence, the present
Petition.

Issues

Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE
15, RULES OF COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS WHEN SUCH
REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO DEPOSITION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (REVERSIBLE) ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MUST FIRST SERVE
WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS BEFORE THEY CAN BE SUBPOENAED. 27

Petitioners’ Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the Court allow the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum, petitioners assert that the questioned Motion is not a litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the issuance of
process. They insist that a motion which is subject to notice and hearing under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an application for relief
other than a pleading; since no relief is sought but just the process of subpoena, the hearing and notice requirements may be done
away with. They cite the case of Adorio v. Hon. Bersamin,28 which held that –

Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties to the action.1âwphi1 No violation of due
process results by such lack of notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses and documents
subpoenaed once they are presented in court.29

72
Petitioners add that the Rules should have been liberally construed in their favor, and that Metrobank’s filing of its Opposition be
considered to have cured whatever defect the Motion suffered from.

Petitioners likewise persist in the view that Metrobank’s officers – the subject of the Motion – do not comprise the adverse party covered
by the rule; they insist that these bank officers are mere employees of the bank who may be called to testify for them.

Respondents’ Arguments

Metrobank essentially argues in its Comment30 that the subject Motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum is
a litigated motion, especially as it is directed toward its officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence would affect it as the
adverse party in the civil case. Thus, the lack of a proper notice of hearing renders it useless and a mere scrap of paper. It adds that
being its officers, the persons sought to be called to the stand are themselves adverse parties who may not be compelled to testify in
the absence of prior written interrogatories; they are not ordinary witnesses whose presence in court may be required by petitioners at
any time and for any reason.

Finally, Metrobank insists on the correctness of the CA Decision, adding that since petitioners failed up to this time to pay the
witnesses’ fees and kilometrage as required by the Rules,31 the issuance of a subpoena should be denied.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the filing of
the Opposition.32

Nonetheless, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the case of Adorio cannot apply squarely to this case. In Adorio, the request for
subpoena duces tecum was sought against bank officials who were not parties to the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. The situation is different here, as officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling party’s
main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is
not without significant consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are
first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate
the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will
most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead,
the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a
prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, 33 compelling the adverse party to take the witness
stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its
case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand
could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only
be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus
prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from
conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving
a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or
altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if
not pointless entertainment.

73
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present
documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be
allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are
considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized
agents34 – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of
making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and
evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party
Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in
court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of
justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the
start. This they may not be allowed to do.

Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of their causes of action
in their Complaint, petitioners claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan agreement with
Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with these
documents even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were never furnished the same, any inferences
generated from this would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by providing petitioners with these documents,
Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement,
and while the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.

With the view taken of the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address the other issues raised by the parties, which are
irrelevant and would not materially alter the conclusions arrived at.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 15, 2008 Decision and October 2, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99535 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

74