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Edition 137 Jul-Sep 2019 (/editions/edition-137-drugs)

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Drugs and the death penalty

Rebranding for revival

Written by: WAHYUDI AKMALIAH & CAHYO PAMUNGKAS Published: Nov 15,
2023

Category: Wahyudi Akmaliah & Cahyo Pamungkas

Edition 153 Jul-Sep
2023 (/editions) On 2 December 2022 we entered the Mosque At-Tin in East
Jakarta in time for the dawn prayer (subuh). Our intention was
to observe the reunion of the ‘212 Movement’ after several
Published:
attempts to hold such an event had been sti ed in recent
Nov 15, 2023
years. The reunion was commemorating the mass
demonstrations rst held on 2 December 2016, in the
Tagged under surrounds of Monas (National Monument) in central Jakarta, in
Urban Indonesia which Muslims from diverse Islamic groups and backgrounds
came together for what is considered Indonesia’s largest ever

(/component/tags/
 tag/urban- protest. The reunion is an effort to reinvigorate the spirit of
indonesia)
this and subsequent mass mobilisations around what became
Islam
(/component/tags/
known as the 212 Movement.
tag/islam)

A focus of protest

At the time, police estimated the crowd assembled on 2

December 2016 as around 200,000
(https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20161205091436-
20-177377/menghitung-jumlah-peserta-aksi212-di-jantung-
jakarta) people, although the organisers put the number far
higher, in the millions. The focus of their protest was a call for
the imprisonment of the then governor of Jakarta, Basuki
Tjahaya Pernama, known as Ahok, on the grounds that he had
performed an act of religious blasphemy. These events took
place in the lead-up to gubernatorial elections, with Ahok
running for a second term. Ultimately, the 212 Movement was
considered a success with Ahok’s prosecution and sentencing
to two years in prison the following May.

Prior to the 212 Movement, Ahok seemed poised to win the

gubernatorial election that was to be held in February 2017.
The turning point in his political career occurred in September
2016, when he was convicted in the Thousand Island district
(Kepulauan Seribu) for remarks related to the Qur'anic verse,
Surah Al-Ma'idah 51. Whilst campaigning in his home province,
Ahok had referenced the verse to claim that his opponents
used it to argue that Muslims should not be led by non-
Muslims. As a ‘double minority’, both ethnic Chinese and
Christian, he felt he was unfairly targeted and the verse mis-
used. The controversy was exacerbated when a 30-second
video was uploaded to Facebook a few weeks later by Buni
Yani, a former lecturer at the London School of Public
Relations in Jakarta.

Buni Yani asked if the video might constitute religious

defamation and shared an edited transcript of Ahok's
statement, omitting the word ‘use’ (pakai). The edited video
altered the context of Ahok's words, making it appear as if he
were stating that the Qur'an itself should not mislead Muslims.
Subsequently, many Islamic organisations, including the
Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and the FPI (Islamic Defender
Front), led by Rizieq Shihab its the founder and leader and 
ultimately, one of the gureheads of the 212 Movement,
demanded that Ahok be brought to trial. The legal proceedings
against Ahok did indeed commence, accompanied by a series
of Islamic mobilisations aimed at ensuring his prosecution.
Human rights defenders (https://www.dw.com/id/pemerhati-
ham-ahok-dihukum-karena-kuatnya-tekanan-elit-dan-
massa/a-38763787) and others argue that Ahok’s conviction
and imprisonment were a consequence of these interventions,
orchestrated by both religious elites and the masses.

Many of those attending the reunion at the At-Tin mosque six

years later, had made long journeys to attend. Around ve
thousand people, including whole families, congregated
around the mosque with large numbers sleeping inside or
nearby. Virtually everyone was dressed in white. In Islamic
teaching this colour is seen to represent kindness,
preciousness, and cleanliness
(https://lifestyle.okezone.com/read/2019/02/21/194/202110
6/pakai-pakaian-putih-di-aksi-munajat-212-apa-maknanya).
For the organisers of this reunion wearing white was also
intended as a symbol to demonstrate political neutrality
(https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1151259/pa-212-massa-
hanya-boleh-bawa-bendera-tauhid-di-reuni-akbar-
212#:~:text=%22Kami%20sengaja%20memakai%20warna%20b
aju,reuni%20212%20dilandasi%20kepentingan%20politik.).

A movement without a cause?

It immediately struck us that this event differed from the

previous reunions of the 212 Movement. Firstly, there was no
overtly political oratory. Instead, speeches were focused on
messages about Islamic solidarity. There were performances of
Islamic rituals such as zikir (a form of meditation or recitation
of the names of Allah), reciting salawat (giving praise to the
Prophet), practicing the night (shalat malam) and earlier
morning praying (salat subuh) and, lastly, tausiyah (Islamic
teachings which concerned on the moral appealing).

Followers of Reunion 212 gather in Jakarta (2/12/2021).

ANTARA/Akbar Nugroho Gumay


Most obviously, unlike earlier reunions, the 2022 event was not
held at Monas or the Istiqlal mosque, but at the Suharto
family-owned At Tin Mosque. Why the police refused to issue a
permit for the 212 Reunion at either of those locations remains
unclear. The reasons are most likely to be strongly related to
the government’s policy to control this movement and its
associated ban on the FPI, issued on 30 December 2020. Such
a reunion was seen to have the potential to generate
momentum and provide a platform to a broader public, for
FPI’s political orientation once again, and in turn threaten the
government’s power.

The connection between the 212 Reunion and the Suharto

family was established several years earlier and is one of
mutual bene t. On the one hand, the 212 Reunion committee
required a venue for their gathering, especially after facing
rejection when attempting to secure government-owned
locations. On the other hand, the Suharto family, through their
new political party, Berkarya, sought to leverage the enduring
popularity of Rizieq Shihab and gain the support of FPI
members ahead of the 2024 election. This symbiotic
relationship was initiated as early as 10 April 2019, when Siti
Hardianti Rukmana, known as Tutut, and her party delegation
visited Pesantren Agrokultur Markaz Syariah, which is
af liated with Rizieq. Despite being in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, at
the time, Rizieq warmly welcomed Tutut and her team through
teleconference. During this encounter
(https://politik.rmol.id/read/2019/04/11/385545/habib-
rizieq-doakan-partai-berkarya-lolos-ke-senayan), both Tutut
and Rizieq expressed admiration for each other's contributions
to the nation and the ummah. For Tutut, FPI had contributed
to enhancing security and fostering a peaceful environment in 
Indonesia. From Rizieq's perspective, despite Berkarya's
limited track record, this party was seen as a faithful guardian
of the ulama's congregation.

A temporary silencing

Four years later at the At-Tin Mosque reunion, Rizieq Shihab,

newly free on parole following his prosecution and sentencing
for violating Indonesia's quarantine law and spreading fake
news during the pandemic, was one of the attendees. Whilst
his attendance was a signi cant boost for the organisers he
was not permitted to give a speech owing to his parole
conditions, which apply to the end of July 2024.

The changing nature and context for these reunions

demonstrates how since its heyday in 2016-2017, the
Indonesian government under President Widodo has, at least
for now, curtailed this movement. As mentioned, in December
2020, as part of a range of measures to clamp down on radical
Islamic groups, FPI was banned. Up until then Rizieq Shihab
had used his position as leader of the FPI to criticise what he
deemed the ‘un-Islamic’ politics of the Widodo presidency.
Prior to the 212 Movement, Shihab’s criticisms of the
government were primarily delivered in Islamic sermons in the
mosques, at events of Islamic teaching, or through the
platform given at demonstrations. For many lower class
Jakartans the messages he relayed in his speeches resonated
with their daily struggle to make a living amid increasing
precarity. His alliances with predatory political actors with
strong interests in the outcomes of the Jakarta gubernatorial
election in 2017 and the presidential election in 2019
transformed him from a local religious leader who was not
supported by most Indonesian Muslims, to becoming a
recognised religious gure leading a major Islamic
mobilisation.

A new generation of preachers

With the forced demise of the FPI, a new organisation, Front

Persaudaraan Islam (Islamic Brotherhood Front, FPI), simply
assumed its mantle and Rizieq Shahab’s son-in-law
Muhammad bin Husein Alatas was appointed as its leader. It
remains to be seen if the rebranded FPI under Husein Alatas’

leadership can articulate the particular voice of Islam in the
same way Rizieq once did. Although he is the nominated
successor to his father-in-law, Husein Alatas’s personality and
leadership style is vastly different to Rizieq's and arguably
lacks the same appeal for FPI followers.

We would argue that there is another candidate for the

leadership of the 212 Movement who appears to have more in
common with FPI’s founder and is a possible successor to him.

Bahar bin Smith was born in Manado,

(https://voi.id/en/bernas/115771) North Sulawesi, on 23 July
1985. He pursued his education at the Darullughah Wadda'wah
Islamic Boarding School in Bangil, Pasuruan, East Java. In 2007,
he established the Prophet's Defender Council (Majelis
Pembela Ulama) in Pondok Aren, South Tangerang City, with
close ties to the FPI. He then later founded the Tajul Alawiyyin
Islamic Boarding School in Kemang, Bogor. Bahar holds the
distinguished title of Sayyid,
(https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/meet-the-
habibs-the-yemen-connection-in-jakarta-politics/) as he is a
direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. His ancestral
lineage (https://www.newmandala.org/habib-bahars- fteen-
minutes-of-infamy/)can be traced to his great-grandfather,
Habib Alwi bin Abdurrahman bin Smith, the rst member of his
father's family to be born in Indonesia after relocating from
the Hadhramaut region, in present day Yemen.

Bahar bin Smith faces charges in court in Bandung, Jawa

Barat, (28/2/2019) /ANTARA-M Agung Rajasa


Rizieq and Bahar have similar characteristics, including a track
record of outing the law leading to prosecutions and time
served in prison. Although Bahar was not one of FPI’s inner
circle, on many occasions, Rizieq has supported him as he
faced criminal charges and prosecutions. For both Bahar and
Rizieq, their criminal records serve to only enhance their
appeal for their loyal followers.

Bahar’s criminal record includes charges relating to disobeying

COVID-19 lockdown regulations and hate speech. For instance,
in 2010 he led an attack on Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia in
South Jakarta; in 2012 he mobilised approximately 150 of his
followers for a sweeping action at De Most Cafe in South
Jakarta; and in November 2018, he was reported to the police
for insulting
(https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2018/12/04/337/198675
7/5-fakta-habib-bahar-hina-jokowi-banci-tolak-minta-maaf-
siap-membusuk-di-penjara) Indonesian President Joko
Widodo. On 9 July 2019, Bahar was sentenced to three years in
prison for molesting two children in 2018, at an Islamic
boarding school in Kampung Kemang, Bogor. He was released
on 16 May 2020.

Rather than diminishing their religious authority, these

prosecutions are seen by their followers as testament to their
commitment to defend Islam against a government they
believe is intent on eroding religious freedoms. Arguably,
Bahar’s prosecutions and court appearances transformed him
from an unknown religious gure into a religious authority,
who in Rizieq’s absence could be in a position to take over
where the FPI rebrand left off.

A new look

Indeed, such is his pro le that many attendees at the

December 2022 reunion were eagerly awaiting Bahar’s arrival.
He was greeted with warm applause and many young people
waved ags adorned with his image. Although the audience
may have hoped he would speak about political issues the
committee had instructed him to only cite salawat, or a offer
blessing. Compared to other Islamic preachers attending the
reunion, after Rizieq, Bahar was clearly the most popular gure
there. 
In his detailed observations about Bahar’s rising popularity Yen
Tzu-Chen notes (about:blank) the importance of his
involvement in the 212 mobilisation in 2016. It was there that
his reputation was established as he made provocative
speeches and engaged with police to defend their right to
demonstrate. Where exactly Bahar sits among his fellow
young hadrami preachers
(https://www.gramedia.com/products/habaib-dan-
kontestasi-islam-di-indonesia-antara-menjaga-tradisi)
remains to be fully understood. This is a generation seeking to
balance preaching to a traditional Islamic audience, with the
rise of new religious preachers from Islamic revivalist groups
including Jamaat Tabligh, the Tarbiyah movement, and Sala ,
who are increasingly digitally savvy and pose an existential
threat to hadrami preachers.

In this context, there are a number of reasons why many

young urban Muslims are increasingly attracted to Bahar. The
rst of these is his unorthodox appearance compared to
other hadrami preachers. Whilst most adopt an Arab-style way
of dressing, such as donning a white hat (peci putih), white
shirt (baju kurung putih) and shawl (sal), and short haircuts,
Bahar’s appearance is more like that of a preman (thug) or rock
star; he has shoulder-length blonde hair and cap and he often
sports sunglasses. He wears colourful and contrasting
clothing, in lieu of white robes.

He is active on various social media platforms and his YouTube

videos present strong images of masculinity, such as those
which represent him as a brave lion capable of defeating his
enemy in a battle. Through his social media accounts he has
built an intimate relationship with his fans. This relation
structure can be seen in his short videos on YouTube where he
shares his current activities and responses to current social-
political issues with his followers and engages with them
directly via comments.

Precarity and Islamic populist representation

Whilst it is dif cult to imagine that Bahar could become an

Islamic populist on the scale Rizieq achieved in relation to of
the Ahok blasphemy case, conditions in urban Indonesian
continue to harbour the potential for such a gure to emerge 
again. In 2023, data from Badan Pusat Statistik (Bureau of
Statistics, BPS) indicated that the number of poor
(https://jakarta.bps.go.id/indicator/23/645/1/garis-
kemiskinan-jumlah-dan-persentase-penduduk-miskin-di-
daerah-menurut-kabupaten-kota-di-provinsi-dki-
jakarta.html) people living in Jakarta and surrounds is
increasing, reaching 477.830 or 4.44 percent, which is slightly
higher than 2015 of 398,920 or 3.72 per cent. The forthcoming
2024 election in which three candidates are running for the
presidency - Ganjar Pranowo, Prabowo Subiyanto, and Anies
Baswedan - is also a potential trigger, as identity politics is
likely to feature in campaigning once again. By taking the
lessons learned from the Jakarta election in 2017 and the
Presidential election in 2019, it might be seen as advantageous
to use similar tactics in the 2024 elections.

The three presidential candidates are yet to differentiate

themselves from each other with each presenting a similar
vision to establish Indonesia as more progressive and
prosperous. As the campaign progresses and the race becomes
tighter, the votes of urban Indonesians - most of whom are
Muslim and many of whom are also living somewhat
precarious lives - will be increasingly in play. As it was in the
Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017, ethnicity and religion
could be levers pulled in pursuit of votes. If such a situation
were to arise again, with Rizieq muzzled and his generation of
preachers arguably less relevant to young Muslims, gures like
Bahar may see and seize an opportunity. Bahar has the
potential to be an Islamic populist capable of driving the
marginalised narrative of the next generation of
disenfranchised urban Muslims.

Wahyudi Akmaliah is a doctoral candidate in the Malay Studies

Department, National University of Singapore (NUS) and
Researcher at Research Centre for Society and Culture,
National Research and Innovation Agency (PMB-BRIN). Cahyo
Pamungkas is a research professor in Sociology, Center for
Areas Studies, the National Research and Innovation Agency
(BRIN).

Inside Indonesia 153 Jul-Sep 2023