Research Essay Final

Source 1

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1945)

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS-PTO-Summary.html#jstetw

Authors - Officers of the Survey

 Currency: Written during and after the war

 Relevance: A direct U.S. government related response to its own bombings
 Authority: Authored by a group of government experts

‘The big plants on the periphery of the city were almost completely undamaged and 94 percent of their
workers unhurt. These factories accounted for 74 percent of the 011901industrial production of the city. It
is estimated that they could have resumed substantially normal production within 30 days of the bombing,
had the war continued.’

 Bombing of Hiroshima did not severely impact heavy industry (94% workers unhurt, 74%
industrial output, normal production resuming within 30 days)

‘Early in May 1945, the Supreme War Direction Council began active discussion of ways and means to
end the war, and talks were initiated with Soviet Russia… [the] Potsdam Conference interfered with a plan
to send Prince Konoe [a prominent diplomat] to Moscow…with private instructions from the Emperor to
secure peace at any price.’

 Discussions about peace begin in May 1945

‘In the succeeding meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council, the differences of opinion previously
existing as to the Potsdam terms persisted exactly as before.’

 The atomic bombings did not change certain cabinet members’ opinion on the atomic bomb.
Only Suzuki’s determination for the Emperor’s direct involvement in policy decisions led to
unconditional surrender.

‘In all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had
not been dropped.’

Source 2

The Atomic Bombs And The Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan’s Decision To Surrender? (2007)

https://apjjf.org/tsuyoshi-hasegawa/2501/article

Relevance: A direct scholarly discussion of the atomic bombings

Authority: The author is a prominent Japanese-American scholar

Accuracy: The article cites over 50 sources, which are mostly reputable

Purpose: A journal article discussing the motive behind the atomic bombings.

‘Kantaro Suzuki, only upon the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, “was finally convinced that the moment had
at last arrived to end the war, since what we had been afraid of and tried to avoid at any cost had finally
come about.”’

- Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki did not fully decide to end the war until the Soviet invasion
(supported by source 7)
‘One might argue that the Hiroshima bomb did not have a greater effect than Soviet entry into the war,
since no one, including Hirohito, Kido, Suzuki, and Togo, took any concrete actions to respond to the
Hiroshima bomb.’

- None of the ruling elite in Japan ‘took concrete actions to respond to the Hiroshima bomb’.

Tsuyoshi also downplays the full impact of the atomic bombing, saying that ‘it is known that…the
conventional attacks by American air raids caused more devastation…But the number of sacrifices was not
the major issue for Japanese policymakers.’

Source 3

Telegrams from the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs (Togo) and v.v.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1228

Currency: These telegrams were posted during the war.

Relevance: Detail the thoughts and prevailing sentiment between the Japanese ruling elite, especially
Foreign Minister Togo.

No.1228 (July 20, 1945) from Sato to Togo

- Sato shares his view that Japan is soundly overpowered and defeated militarily, that Japan’s
foreign policy has been ‘completely [morally] bankrupt’, that peace is the only way forward

‘With the above thought [that the State of Japan cannot be saved due to the threat of U.S. invasion] in
mind, I have come to the conclusion that the individual’s position, the honour of the military, and the pride
of the people cannot take the place of the state, and that there is no other way for us than to hurry and make
up our minds to advocate peace.’

 Peace was already in the question by July, and the threat of invasion by the U.S. was enough
to convince Sato that Japan should surrender

Telegram 993 (August 7 [2 days after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, and a day before the Soviet
invasion) from Togo to Sato

‘The situation is becoming more and more pressing. We must know the Soviets’ attitude immediately.
Therefore, do your best once more to obtain their reply immediately.’

 Togo still clung to the hope of the Soviets mediating peace, as before; the Hiroshima
bombing did not change his opinion

Source 4

The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration (1998)

Author: Sadao Asada

https://doi.org/10.2307/3641184

Relevance: Another scholarly analysis of the necessity of the atomic bombings, in contrast to Tsuyoshi’s
article (which is almost a direct response to it)

Authority: Asada is also a respected historical scholar in America.

’From a political and diplomatic viewpoint the Soviet entry was indeed a serious blow to Japan; it dashed
the last hope of Soviet peace mediation. But it did not come as a total surprise, which the atomic bomb
assuredly was.’
‘From the viewpoint of the shock effect, then, it may be argued that the bomb had a greater impact on
Japanese leaders than did the Soviet entry into the war. After all, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria gave
them an indirect shock, whereas the use of the atomic bomb on their homeland gave them the direct threat
of the atomic extinction of the Japanese people.’

‘The shock of the bomb was all the greater because it came as a "surprise attack”,’

 Soviet invasion was not a total surprise, while the ‘atomic bomb assuredly was’
 The atomic bomb presented to the Japanese elite a more concrete threat to Japan than the
invasion of Manchuria

Source 5

Shiroku (The Historial Records of the End of the War), annotations by Jun Eto, volume 4., ed. Gamusho
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs) (1977-78)

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28492-document-67a-cabinet-meeting-and-togos-meeting-emperor-
august-7-8-1945

Relevance: Ministry for Foreign Affairs (government source) detailing sources and commentary from the
end of the war.

Authority: A direct Japanese government source, referencing many primary sources (although accuracy is
debatable due to bias)

 Togo asks the cabinet on August 7 to lodge a complaint with the Red Cross over the U.S.’s
use of the atomic bomb, saying it was a violation of international law
 Togo: ‘surrender be considered at once on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam
Declaration [Proclamation]’
 The Army (represented by Amami) argued that the bomb was not a atomic weapon and was
instead a powerful conventional bomb.
 Togo goes down without a fight and allows the army to send an investigative team instead.

(Source 6) under source 5/same document

Hokai no zenya (The night before the collapse) in Fujin Koron (1947)

Author: Seiji Hasegawa

Currency: Written during the war, in a diary.

Purpose: A record of Hasegawa’s thoughts in a private diary; as they weren’t meant for public consumption
they were likely less biased than other sources from the period.

The phone call [early August 7th] told me that…the United States attacked Hiroshima with an Atomic
bomb…but since I didn’t know how terrible the atomic bomb was, I felt I was shaken out of bed for a
trifling matter…[I] relayed the report to Foreign Minister Togo and…Sakomizu. But neither of them knew
anything about the atomic bomb. The military knew it, but believed the fact that it was an atomic bomb
should not reach the public.’

 Most Japanese (even someone as high up as Hasegawa, the director of a huge newsagency)
did not know about the full effects of the bomb till days after
 Even Togo and Sakomizu did not know about it; it was not immediately recognised as a
threat by the military and the ruling government.

Source 7

Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho (written 1945, published 2000)

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28493-document-67b-admiral-tagaki-diary-entry-wednesday-august-
8-1945

Relevance: A high-ranking official’s diary, with direct commentary on the war. Takagi was widely regarded
as an anti-war official.

Currency: Written during the final months of the war

Authority: Takagi was an admiral and political figure during the war, and his entries are candid and
detailed.

 In this entry (August 8th) the atomic bomb is barely mentioned with his discussion with Navy
Minister Yonai and other entries

‘Pessimistic mood prevailed because there is no response from the Soviet Union’.

Prime Minister Suzuki has ‘not heard about [the atomic bombing]…and no-one knows the [real situation].’

Takagi says the major problem is ‘not whether the enemy [the United States] will invade the mainland…
but rather the diminishing spirit of the people.’

(Source 8) Under Source 5/same document

Shusen ni saishite (At the time of the end of the war) (1945)

Author: Shidenori Togo

‘On August 6, the United States attacked the city of Hiroshima with an atomic bomb…[they] began a
massive propaganda campaign…saying that the atomic bomb not only changed the situation of the war
completely, but also brought a revolutionary change to the society.’

 The ‘Anglo-American’ camp used propaganda to convince the world that the atomic
bombing was the reason for Japan’s surrender, according to Togo.
 He also mentions that the army ‘tried to discount [the atomic bomb’s] effect as much as
possible.’ (not concerning enough for desperation yet)

Source 9

Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaiso-roku (Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir
of Zenshiro Hoshina) (1975)

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28431-document-75-hoshina-memorandum-emperors-sacred-
decision-go-seidan-9-10-august-1945#_edn63

Author: Zenshiro Hoshina

Relevance: A high-level meeting between all the major players in the final months of the war, providing
insight into direct decisions made by these officials and the Emperor.

Currency: A direct account of a meeting during the final months of the war

Accuracy: Debatable. The account in itself seems reputable, and matches up with the memoirs of those
others present (Sakomizu, Suzuki); but Hoshina would have grounds to portray the emperor as a saviour of
the Japanese nation.

In the meeting, Togo says ‘the military situation is now more favourable to the United States and Britain
given the current state of the enemy forces and because of Soviet participation in the war.’

 The invasion of the Soviet Union has driven Japan into a corner, leaving ‘no room for
compromise through negotiations’.
Anami rebuts that Japan ‘is going to lose its life as a moral nation if we accept the Cairo Declaration [i.e.
surrender]’ and argues that Japan was even prepared for an invasion by the United States.

 Both ministers do not even mention the atomic bomb, instead focusing on the Soviet
invasion.

Togo’s response to a question about the alleged rejection of the Potsdam Declaration, in which he replies
‘We didn’t take steps to reject it.’ If this was Togo’s (and by connection, Prime Minister Suzuki’s) opinion,
surely the U.S. must have known at least that prominent members of the Japanese cabinet were
taking steps towards accepting the declaration. (U.S. had already intercepted Source 2)

 Misinterpretation of mokukatsu (ignore/treat with silent contempt)

 Atomic bombing only mentioned in passing, in context of air-raids in a question by Privy
Council Minister Hiramura.
 Army Chief of Staff Umezu replies that ‘there is no reason Japan should surrender…as a
result of air raids’.

Hirohito replied that ‘I have the same opinion as the Foreign Minster…we will lose everything if we
continue a hopeless war…I decide this way in order to save the people from disaster.’

Source 10

The Atlantic: Was it right? (1995)

https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/archives/1995/07/276-1/132669313.pdf

Author: Thomas Powers

Relevance: A moral analysis of the atomic bombings, written by a prominent American scholar.

Accuracy: Cites many sources, published in The Atlantic magazine which is well-respected.

- Former President Hoover said to Truman that ‘500,000 to 1 million American lives’ would be
lost in the invasion – but General Douglas MacArthur said that there would be only 100,000.
- Hoover and other major players were right in saying that bombing and blockade would end
the war (source 1)
- American cryptanalysts knew that the government in Tokyo was looking for Soviet
mediation – ‘Truman knew this at the time’ (source 3)
- ‘It is very probable that the use of the atomic bomb only confirmed the emperor in a
decision he already reached (source 9)’ due to a result of bombings.
- Powers says that the bombings were already causing enough pain as is; and that the
bombings were equally destructive and morally decrepit as the atomic bombings
- ‘How could the killings of 100,000 civilians in a day for a political purpose ever be
considered anything but a crime?’ (in reference to firebombing of Tokyo)

Source 11

Rawls on Hiroshima: An Inquiry into the Morality of the Use of Atomic Weapons in August 1945 (2003)

Author: Charles Landesman

Relevance: An article, published in a philosophical journal, discussing the morality of the atomic
bombings.

Accuracy: Debatable; as a philosophical discussion, sources are more ambigiously referred to and a lot of
it comes down to personal opinion.

Laudesman has four main points, all of which can be easily countered:
 - If Hiroshima had not been bombed, the war would have gone on (countered by Sources 1, 3,
5, 9 etc; Japan was planning to surrender)
- If the war would have gone on, many people would have died as a result of Japanese actions
(i.e. war camps)
- If Hiroshima had not been bombed, Japan not have surrendered unless a home invasion
occurred (countered by all sources regarding the Soviet invasion; Japan most likely
surrendered as a result of Soviet invasion)
- If the Unites States Invaded Japan, hundreds of thousands of lives would have been lost.
(countered by source 10)

In a response to this article, Douglas Lackey counters with an extra point that ‘If Hiroshima had not been
bombed, 100,000 people at Hiroshima would not have died’.

Bibliography
Asada, S 1998, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A
Reconsideration’, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 67, University of California Press, no. 4, pp.
477–512, viewed 25 March 2024,
<https://online.ucpress.edu/phr/article-abstract/67/4/477/79560/The-Shock-of-the-Atomic-
Bomb-and-Japan-s-Decision?redirectedFrom=fulltext>.

Gaimusho (Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs) & Eto, J 1975, Shiroku (The Historical
Records of the End of the War), Shusen (ed.), trans. T Higuchi, vol. 4, Gamusho, Tokyo, pp.
57–60.

Hasegawa, S 1947, ‘Hokai no zenya (The night before the collapse)’, Fujin Koron.

Hasegawa, T 2007, The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: What Drove Japan’s
Decision to Surrender? - The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, The Asia-Pacific Journal:
Japan Focus, viewed 25 March 2024, <https://apjjf.org/tsuyoshi-hasegawa/2501/article>.

Hoshina, Z 1975, Daitoa senso hishi : Ushinawareta wahei kosaku : Hoshina Zenshiro
kaisoki [The Hidden History of the Greater East Asia War], Hara-Shobo, Tokyo, pp. 139–
149, viewed 25 March 2024, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28431-document-75-
hoshina-memorandum-emperors-sacred-decision-go-seidan-9-10-august-1945#_edn63>.
Lackey, D 2003, ‘Why Hiroshima Was Immoral: A Response to Landesman’, The
Philosophical Forum, vol. 34, Wiley-Blackwell, no. 1, pp. 39–42, viewed 24 March 2024,
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9191.00123>.

Landesman, C 2014, Rawls on hiroshima: An inquiry into the morality of the use of atomic
weapons in August 1945, Philpapers.org, viewed 24 March 2024,
<https://philpapers.org/rec/LANROH>.

Officers of the Survey 1947, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, Medical Division.

Powers, T 1995, Was the Atomic Bombing of Japan Morally Right?, The Atlantic, The
Atlantic, viewed 25 March 2024,
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/07/was-it-right/376364/>.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: summary report (European War) - Digital
Collections - National Library of Medicine 2024, Nih.gov, viewed 24 March 2024,
<https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/catalog/nlm:nlmuid-101634748-bk>.

Togo, S 1945, ‘Shushen ni saishite (At the time of the end of the war)’.