N. M. Gelber, The Problem of The Rumanian Jews at The Bucharest Peace Conference 1918

The Problem of the Rumanian Jews at the Bucharest Peace Conference, 1918
Author(s): N. M. Gelber
Source: Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Jul., 1950), pp. 223-246
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4464884
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THE PROBLEM OF THE RUMANIAN JEWS
AT THE BUCHAREST PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918
By N. M. GELBER
On December 9, 1917 the government of Rumania, which joined

the Allied Powers against Germany and Austria-Hungary in World
War I, was forced to conclude an armistice with the Central Powers.
Negotiations for a separate peace were initiated in March 1918 and on
May 7 the final terms were set at Bucharest. This treaty was never rati-
fied by the Rumanian parliament because of the collapse of the Central
Powers, and Rumania repudiated this treaty on November 9, 1918. The
negotiations of the first treaty, however, involved the problem of the
Rumanian Jews and are of historical interest.
As soon as it became known that Rumania was negotiating a separate

peace with the Central Powers, the smaller Actions Committee of the
World Zionist Organization decided to press for the inclusion of a provi-
sion in the treaty to guarantee equal rights to the Jews in Rumania.
Despite the obligations towards the Jews assumed by Rumania in the
Treaty of Berlin of 1878, it had failed to live up to these obligations
and the Jews in Rumania had continued to live under various disabilities.
The Jewish population of Rumania in 1918 numbered 250,000 and
constituted 3 percent of the total population. The overwhelming majority
of them were Ashkenazim and only a small number were Sefardim.
A small group of several hundred Jews, chiefly bankers, industrialists
and big merchants, had been granted Rumanian citizenship in the
223
224 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
period between 1878-1912. The masses of the Jewish population made

their living from trade, handicrafts and manual labor. Most of the Jews
settled in Bucharest, Galatz, Jassy and in a number of smaller towns in
Moldavia. They were looked upon as aliens against whom discriminatory
policies were fully justified.
Immediately following the invasion of Rumania by the armies

of the Central Powers, influential leaders of Rumanian Jewry pointed
out to the German and Austro-Hungarian authorities that it would be
to their advantage to grant equal rights to the Jews. They would thereby
acquire the support of a large group of the population that could counter
the existing pro-Allied sentiment. The Jewish leaders also pointed out
that such action would win for the Central Powers many sympathizers
and supporters in the United States, Holland and the other neutral
countries.
The Zionist Actions Committee began its efforts with a long tele-
gram on March 5, 1918 to the central commission of the German Reichs-
tag, in which it called attention to the plight of the Rumanian Jews.
It noted the failure of Rumania to carry out Article 44 of the Treaty
of Berlin and pointed out that rectification of the situation could only
be achieved by the inclusion of a provision on this subject in the peace
treaty. "With the Jews of the entire world," declared the Zionist leaders,
"we share the conviction that only the energetic action of the German
government is necessary in order to rectify the violations of the terms
of the Treaty of Berlin against the Rumanian Jews. Germany, herself,
one of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, should be the first to make
an end to the martyrdom of Rumanian Jewry." I On March 5, the
Actions Committee also submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office
in which the attention of the German govrernment was called to the
Jewish question in Rumania. It asked the German government to pro-
vide guarantees in the pending treaty that would make it impossible
for the government of Rumania to disregard its obligations as it had
done in the past and to provide to the Jews of Rumania all civil and
political rights as well as the right to develop freely their own national
folk life.
In order to prevent the continuance of Jewish disabilities by a false
1 Zionist Central Archives, Jerusalem. Berliner Akten: A III. 6 I.
THE BUCHAREST PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918 225
interpretation of Articles 44 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Zionist Actions

Committee joined with Dr. James Simon and Oscar Kassel, acting in
behalf of the Union of Jewish Organizations of Germany (VIOD), to
dispatch a separate confidential communication to von Kiihlmann on
March 5. It made the following suggestions:
In view of the fact that Article 44 has given rise to interpretations

in Rumania which are not in keeping with the sense of the Treaty of
Berlin, it be decided:
The following are unconditionally citizens of the state of Rumania

and are to receive full and unrestricted benefits of the terms of Article
44 of the Treaty of Berlin and who, therefore, do not require special
naturalization either by law or by administrative action:
(1) All male and female inhabitants of Rumania who were not
listed as aliens in the census of December 12, 1912, and all their off-
spring. Excluded are those inhabitants of Rumania who indicate that
they have acquired foreign citizenship since then.
(2) All inhabitants of Rumania who served in the Rumanian army
or who can show that their grandfathers, fathers or brothers had served
in the Rumanian army or who had received orders to present them-
selves for examination for military service and who were then rejected
or excused from such military service.
(3) Wives, widows and children as well as sisters of Rumanian in-
habitants in category (2).
In case of doubt as to the military record of individual inhabitants
of Rumania and when it is not possible to submit official documents
regarding military service, equivalent proof can be submitted through
the affidavits of three witnesses, without regard to religion, who have
a clear record.
In order to receive the benefits of Article 44 of the Treat of Berlin,
it is sufficient to qualify under the terms of (1) or (2) or (3).
(4) In the event that any territories of another state be joined to
Rumania, the Jews of those areas are to receive full political or civil
equality as well as all the rights granted to the rest of the population.
This provision applies to all Jews who reside in these territories
at the time of the conclusion of peace or who left these territories dur-
ing the war and return to the same within the course of one year.
The Zionist Actions Committee also declared that, in addition

to these civil and political rights, the Jews of Rumania should be
guaranteed the right to organize their own communities, schools and
other associations, in accordance with their own wishes, in order co

further their religious, cultural and national interests.
In a simultaneous action the VIOD dispatched a telegram to the
Emperor's Headquarters asking the Emperor to support the demand
for Jewish rights in Rumania.2 On March 6, the Reichstag leader,
Erzberger, informed the Actions Committee that he had discussed the
matter with the Foreign Office and that they had promised, on their side,
to do all they could "to bring about the realization of these just desires."
At the same time, too, the Actions Committee and its Copenhagen office
gave wide circulation to a work by Dr. S. Bernstein on the Jewish policy
of the Rumanian government.
II
Steps were also taken to influence the government of Austria-

Hungary along the same lines. Several Jewish deputies, led by Dr. Strau-
cher and Kuranda, introduced an interpellation to the prime-minister
in the Austrian Cthamber regarding the emancipation of the Jews of
Rumania in which they inquired whether the government was ready
to take the necessary steps to guarantee equal rights to the Jews of Ru-
mania. Deputy Heinrich Reizes sent a telegram to the foreign minister,
Count Czernin, calling upon the Austro-Hungarian government, as a
signatory to the treaty of 1878, to use its influence in the pending peace
negotiations with Rumania to secure equal rights for the Jews. The
Executive Committee of the Austrian Zionist Organization, through its
representatives, Adolf Stand and Rudolf Taussig, transmitted to Count
Czernin on March 5, 1918 a memorandum on the Rumanian Jewish
problem. "In the name of the entire organized Jewish community of
Austria," it said, "we request of Your Excellency that full civil and
national equality for the Jews of Rumania be made secure with real
guarantees that will make evasion and circumvention impossible. To-
gether with the Jews of the entire world, we confidently place the fate
of our 300,000 fellow Jews in the hands of Your Excellency and we are
certain that we have not called in vain upon the proven statesmanlike
insight and sense of justice of Your Excellency."
The Bukovina Zionist Committee likewise dispatched a memo-
2 Idem. Berliner Akten: B 345 I.
randum to the Foreign Minister along the same lines. It was signed
by Dr. Mayer Ebner and Dr. Markus Kramer. Similarly, on March 10,
the Actions Committee of the World Zionist Organization sent a tele-
gram to Count Czernin.
Count Czernin gave favorable ear to these various requests. To his
Jewish confidant, Nathan Eidinger, he gave positive assurance that he
would work for the settlement of the Jewish question in Rumania. 3
Czernin also gave strict instructions to the Austro-Hungarian peace
delegation to incorporate a clause in the peace treaty that would provide
equal rights for the Rumanian Jews. Similar orders were sent to the
delegation by the Austrian and Hungarian prime-ministers.
In the preliminary peace terms, the solution of the Jewish question
was listed as one of the points of the peace treaty. Subsequently, this
point was removed at the instigation of the Germans. 5 The Under-
secretary of the German Foreign Office, Freiherr von dem Busche,
assumed a very evasive attitude towards this whole matter. It was be-
lieved at first that von dem Busche's reserve was merely an expression
of caution which he considered necessary in order not to interfere with
the negotiations being carried on by von Kiihlmann in Bucharest. It
seemed unbelievable that Germany would not take action to secure the
carrying out of Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin. The Berlin Jiidische
Rundschau, in its editorial of March 1, 1918, reminded the German
government of its responsibility in this matter and that "it could win
the gratitude of all Jewry by an energetic emancipation of the Rumanian
Jews." The Vossische Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt described the
sad plight of the Rumanian Jews and pointed out that it was not a question
of interference into the internal affairs of Rumania but rather of the
obligations of an international treaty which the German government
should see were carried out.
Despite all this agitation, the German delegation in Bucharest
adopted a position which only encouraged the Rumanian antisemites
in their agitation against the "Jewish provision" in the peace treaty.
Apart from Count Czernin, there was no one else who supported the
inclusion of the Jewish question in the peace negotiations.
3 Eidinger to Dr. Benno Straucher, March 9, 1918.

4 From personal communication by Dr. Franz Peter.
5 Letter of Eidinger of March 8 and 9, 1918.
III
Nathan Eidinger had effected in March 1918 in Bucharest a coni-

mon platform of Jewish demands accepted by Zionists, B'nai Brith
lodges and the Union of Jewish Academicians. A small committee had
been delegated to push these demands at the peace conference. The de-
mands were as follows:
(I) All Jews born in the country who are not citizens of a foreign
state are Rumanian citizens by law. Authentication of birth follows
according to the Rumanian legal code. Proof that one is not a citizen
of a foreign state may be attested by a certificate from the respective
Jewish community. Those covered by military law are not required to
furnish the above-mentioned proofs.
(II) The Jewish communities are juristic persons legally recognized

as such by the state. The existing educational and welfare institutions
of the Jewish communities are likewise juristic persons legally recognized
as such by the state.
(III) Autonomy is granted to the Jewish educational institutions. 6
This was the minimum program accepted by all Jewish parties.

Point I was designed to prevent the kind of circumvention which was
used to nullify Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin. It was considered im-
portant to provide for a certificate on citizenship by the Jewish communi-
ties for this was the only way to insure honest application of civic rights.
Otherwise the Jews would be subject once more to abuse of the principle.
The Jews based this demand on the precedents of dealing with Macedoni-
ans acquiring Rumanian citizenship and the case of the population of
Dobrudscha in 1909-1910. In both instances the necessary proofs were
submitted by the respective communities. Point II was based on Articles
96 and 817 of the Rumanian Civil Code and Article 66, section II of the
Rumanian Civil Court Rules. Point III was intended to secure for the
Jews the unlimited right to set up schools which would be autonomously
administered, and supported by the state and accredited on a basis of
equality with the other schools in the country.
The leaders of Rumanian Jewry considered these points to be a bet-
ter formulation of Jewish demands than the draft of the VIOD and they
6 From a letter of Rumanian Zionists in Zionist Central Archives, ZBB 345 I.
believed that the acceptance of these demands would secure for the Jews
of Rumania complete equality and civil and political emancipation. This
seemed even more plausible to them after the long conversation which
Eidinger had with the Prime-Minister designate, Marghiloman.
Eidinger came to see Marghiloman on March 8, 1918 and developed
for him, in a two-hour conference, all the ramifications of the Jewish
question. Marghiloman told him categorically: "I am absolutely in
favor of equal rights and emancipation of all the Jews in Rumania. I
have no fears of the 230,000 Jews who live among a population of
million. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that the Jews will show
their gratitude." He declared that he could not accept the view of the
leader of the Conservatives, Carp, who wanted to grant equal rights to
the Jews on the basis of special categories. He emphasized the fact that
he favored equal rights for all Jews without any differentiation among
them. 7 Marghiloman gave public expression to the same views after
he was officially named prime-minister. This raised the hopes of the Jew-
ish population.
The VIOD took steps at the same time in Berlin, Vienna and Buda-
pest to secure the support of the peace negotiators. Dr Paul Nathan, the
emissary of the VIOD, reported to the executive committee on March 20,
1918 that he had found a favorable attitude toward intervention in behalf
of the Rumanian Jews. 8 On March 15, a delegation from the VIOD
headed by Dr. Nathan, called on Chancellor Hertling and received assur-
ance from him that the German government was interested in the regula-
tion of the Jewish question in Rumania and that it had already made it
the subject of discussion within the framework of the peace negotiations
in Bucharest. Dr. Arthur Hantke and Dr. James Simon went to see Baron
Langwerth to discuss the various formulas suggested for dealing with the
Rumanian Jewish question.
The chief purpose of this intervention was to secure the incorpora-
tion of the provisions for Jewish emancipation into the peace treaty and
not leave it to Rumanian legislation alone. Dr. Nathan also visited vice-
chancellor von Payer and the Rumanian ambassador, Beldman. Beldman
took an optimistic view of the matter. Rumania would need the financial
7 Letter from Bucharest of Eidinger to Dr. Straucher, March 3, 1918.

8 Richard Lictheim's minutes of the session of March 20, 1918, in Zionist Archives,
ZBB 345 I.
230 TEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
help of foreign governments, especially the United States, and it would

have to realize that it could not carry on the same Jewish policy as it had
in the past.
At the end of March, Dr. Nathan transmitted to von Kuhlman a

memorandum on the Jewish question in Rumania and presented a pro-
posed formula for complementing and strengthening Article 44 of the
Treaty of Berlin. At the same time, Dr. Viktor Jacobson, who was in
close contact with the Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Rizoff, took
measures to secure the support of the Bulgarian government for the Jew-
ish demands. These efforts were all the easier because Bulgaria had been
the first state to carry out its obligations to the Jewish inhabitants under
the terms of the treaty of 1878. Rizoff and the Bulgarian prime-minister
Radoslavov, showed active interest in the matter and declared that
the Bulgarian government deemed it to be its moral obligation to give
vigorous support to the demands for equal rights for the Rumanian
Jews. On March 17, Radoslavov declared before the Bulgarian parlia-
ment: "The Bulgarian people always have maintained the best relations
with their Jewish fellow-citizens. Our Jews enjoy all rights. They have
provided a brilliant demonstration of courage and patriotism on the
battlefield, and in our negotiations with Rumania, we shall support the
demand that the Jews of neighboring Rumania be guaranteed all rights."
The Jews of Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland also transmitted to

the governments of the Central Powers, to the Rumainian prime-minister
and to the peace conference in Bucharest the demand that a positive solu-
tion of the Rumanian Jewish question be incorporated into the peace
treaty. 9 The Swiss Jews as well as the Bulgarian Jews also exerted pres-
sure on their governments to support the Jewish demands. The Stock-
holm office of the Poale Zion, at the instigation of the Zionist Actions
Committee, intervened with the two socialist groups in the German Reichs-
tag. Philipp Scheidemann, leader of the Majority Socialists in the Reichs-
tag answered on March 13th as follows: "I hasten to acknowledge the
receipt of your telegram and communications. Our party has always in
the past and will at all times support equal rights for the Jew in all coun-
tries in the same way as it stands for the rights of all minorities in all
countries. Our attitude is based upon our desire for equal rights for
9 Dr. Jacobson to Nathan Eidinger, March 20, 1918.
all." 10 The Poale Zion also requested the Soc

and Hungary to exert influence upon their respective governments. In
Sweden, Leon Chasanovich and Berl Locker 11 asked the Socialist leaders
to intervene in their behalf and Branting promised to solicit the aid of
the Swedish foreign-minister.
The Jewish press and the Jewish organizations in the United States
also stirred up public interest in the plight of Rumanian Jewry and called
upon the State Department to intervene in behalf of the Rumanian Jews
with the government of Bulgaria, with whom the United States was not
at war. 12 A delegation of the American Union of Rumanian Jews had
been received by President Wilson as far back as December 11, 1917 and
they had appealed to him to use to his good offices with the Rumanian
government to have the persecution of Jews in Rumania stopped and
equal rights granted to them. Wilson showed active interest in the report
of the committee; he asked them numerous questions regarding the con-
dition of the Jews in Rumania and whether their condition was worse
than that of the Jews under Tsarist Russia. The committe left with him
a number of documents dealing with this problem.
A delegation of the same organization, headed by Dr. Siegelstein,
called upon the Rumanian ambassador to the United States, Dr. Angeles-
cu. The ambassador promised to use the entire weight of his influence
to secure the emancipation of the Jews. He said he considered it incon-
ceivable for the Rumanian government to refuse such emancipation but
he pointed out that his country was in a critical condition at that time.
IV
Things did not move so easily at the negotiating table in Bucharest.

The Jewish question was not included in the preliminary negotiations.
The German delegates not only did not press the matter but also opposed
the demand of Count Czernin that the matter be brought up for discus-
sion. 13 After much wrangling, Czernin suceeded in having the solution
of the Jewish question listed among the conditions of peace but subse-
10 ZBB 345 I.
11 Berl Locker published an article, "The Peace and the Jewish Question in Rumania,"
in the Stockholm Sozialdemohraten of March 18, 1918.
12 ZBB 345 I.
13 Eidinger's Report from Bucharest to Dr. Hantke of March 8, 1918.
quently this point was eliminated from the preliminary draft of the treaty.
This gave heart to the Rumanian antisemites to agitate against the solu-
tion of the Jewish question. 14
Count Czernin was the only one to press for the regulation of the
Jewish question. For this reason, Eidinger called upon Dr. Hantke to
mobilize neutral public opinion to exercise pressure upon Berlin so that
the Germans would see that if the Jews do not secure civil equality the
blame will rest exclusively upon the German government. Appeals for
help kept coming in from the Jewish leaders in Bucharest calling for the
mobilization of public opinion in the neutral countries to warn the Cen-
tral Powers that the rights of the Jews in Rumania must be made secure
in the peace treaty. They asked especially that Berlin "press this matter
with the same energy as Count Czernin was doing, otherwise all would be
lost." The attitude of reserve displayed by the Germans was a portent of
great danger and the Jewish circles in Bucharest were depressed by this
situation. 15 Matters became all the more urgent when it was reported
that the peace treaty would be signed within 15 to 20 days.
Dr. Franz Peter, a young, well-educated and modern diplomat, was
the member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation entrusted by Count
Czernin to deal with the Jewish question. He worked in close contact
with Nathan Eidinger. Dr. Peter was convinced that even if the Rumani-
ans promise to emancipate the Jews, they will not keep their promise. 1"
That is why Eidinger impressed on Dr. Peter the necessity to prolong
the occupation of Walachia in order to carry out the provisions of emanci-
pation under the protection of the military occupation. Dr. Peter con-
tacted the German representative Krieger in order to work out together
the ways in which to incorporate the solution of the Jewish problem in
the peace treaty. Krieger declared that he had no intention to force the
matter and he put difficulties in Peter's way on this issue. Dr. Peter told
him, however, that he was instructed by his government to press this
matter and that he had no intention of dealing lightly with the emancipa-
tion of the Rumanian Jews. If the German representative will not give
proper attention to this matter, Dr. Peter declared, he would insert a
clause for equal rights for the Jews in a separate treaty between Austria-
14 Eidinger's letter from Bucharest of March 9, 1918 to S. Labin, ZBB 345 I.

15 Ibid.
16 Report of March 9, 1918 of Eidinger to Dr. Straucher.
Hungary and Rumania. This conversation took on a rather unpleasant

character and Dr. Peter, pounding his fist on the table, declared that he
would act independently in this matter irrespective of Germany. 17
Eidinger, informed by Dr. Peter on the state of the negotiations, pas-
sed the information on to the Jewish organizations. The leaders of the
VIOD had an interview with von Kiuhlman in the latter part of Marc
Von Kiihlmann stated to them that the peace treaty with Rumania "will
contain special provisions that will annul the previous treatment of Jews
in Rumania and secure for the Jews full legal and political equality with
all the other citizens of Rumania." 18
In the beginning of April, Count Czernin, in a speech to a delegation

of the Municipal Council of Vienna, made a statement which seemed to
preclude any doubt on the subject. "We will solve the Jewish question,"
said Czernin. "The Jews will become forthwith full-fledged citizens of
Rumania." This unusually decisive statement by the leading Austro-
Hungarian minister seemed to indicate that Count Czernin had been
able to overcome all opposition and that the peace treaty would contain
all the necessary guarantees for the free political, economic and national
development of the Rumanian Jews. 19 Czernin's declaration inspired
the Jewish National Union of Austria, headed by Robert Stricker, to
send a warm letter of appreciation to the foreign-minister on April 8,
1918.
By the middle of April, however, there was as yet no official text of
the provisions dealing with the Jewish question. The unofficral reports
emanating from Bucharest gave the Jewish leaders cause for alarm.
According to these reports, the treaty would repeat Article 44 of the
treaty of Berlin, which provided that religion be no bar to acquiring civil
rights, and then it would go on to say as follows:
The Rumanian government assumes the obligation, in order to

carry out the above provision, to promulgate a law, before ratification
of the treaty, whereby all stateless persons, including the native Jews,
who had previously been treated as aliens, would receive civil and politi-
cal equality.
The Jews who are to receive these equal rights immediately include
17 From personal communication by Dr. Peter to the author on December 10, 1927.
18 Confidential report of VIOD of April 2, 1918.
19 Cf. Jiidische Zeitung of Vienna, April 12, 1918.
(1) all those born and residing in the country, whose parents were born
in the country and (2) those who served in the war, either in active
military service or in the auxilliary services.
Women and minors likewise receive these equal rights.
On the basis of these reports, Dr. Paul Nathan and Dr. Fritz War-
burg, for the VIOD, and Professor Otto Warburg, for the Zionist Actions
Committee, transmitted a memorandum on April 17, 1918 to Krieger of
the German Foreign Office. They pointed out that if the above-cited
text was to be final one for the peace treaty, it would mean that the
Rumanian Jews would not really achieve equal rights. They insisted
that the treaty provide:
(1) That before the treaty is ratified, a law be passed granting equal
rights to all (a) who fulfilled their military obligations in the last war
in active service or in the auxilliary services and to their wives and
minor children, even if husband or father was killed in action; (b) who
reside in Rumania and are not citizens of another state, together with
their wives and minor children; (c) all Rumanian Jews who were born
in Rumania but who are now temporarily outside the country and who
have not acquired other citizenship, together with their wives and minor
children.
(2) That proof of military service, domicile or birth in the country
be possible also by affidavits and witnesses-either Christians or Jews-
and not through special documents that might be too difficult to secure.
(3) That in case Rumanian governmental commissions are created
to pass upon the credentials required for naturalization, Jewish repre-
sentatives also be appointed to the commissions and that a definite
period of time be set during which these commissions must make their
decisions.
When it became apparent that Bessarabia would be annexed to

Rumania, there was increased optimism in Jewish circles. It was believed
that Rumania would now be interested in demonstrating its friendly
attitude to the old-established Jewish population in order that they estab-
lish the necessary contacts with the Jews of Bessarabia. The fact that
300,0000 Bessarabian Jews were becoming Rumanian subjects, according
to this view, made it absolutely necessary for the Rumanian government
and parliament to grant full civil rights to its older Jewish population.
On the other hand, there was fear that this would provi
with the argument that the Jews were becoming too
as few as possible should be allowed to become natura
came clear that special action would be necessary to g
of the Bessarabian Jews.
The final treaty between Rumania and the Central Powers was made
public on May 7, 1918. It contained the following sections pertinent to
the Jewish problem.
Article XXVII. The Roman Catholic, Greek Uniat, Bulgarian

Orthodox, Protestant, Moslem and Jewish churches in Rumania are
granted the same freedom and the same legal and administrative protec-
tion as that enjoyed by the Rumanian Orthodox Church. They are to
enjoy the right to establish parishes or religious community organiza-
tions as well as schools. These are to be regarded as private schools and
there is to be no interference in their administration except in the case
of a breach of national security or of public order.
The pupils of all public and private schools may be required to
participate in religious instruction only if such instruction is admini-
stered by authorized teachers of their faith.
Article XXVIII. Differences in religious affiliation are to have no

influence on the legal status of the inhabitants of Rumania, in particu-
lar on their political and civil rights.
The principle stated in section 1 is also to apply to the naturalization
of the Rumanian population, including the Jews who had hitherto been
treated as aliens. For this purpose a law is to be promulgated before
this treaty is ratified according to which all stateless persons who had
participated in the war, either in active service or in the auxilliary ser-
vices, or who were born in the country and have domicile therein and
are descended of parents born there, should without further action be
considered as full-fledged Rumanian citizens and can register as such
with the courts. The acquisition of such citizenship extends also to
wives, widows and minor children of such persons.
Article 28 of the new treaty did not actually provide for more than
did Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin and, in some respects, it was even
worse. Above all, it did not take care of the rights of the Bessarabian
Jews. And the Rumanian administrative authorities retained the power
to question the rights of even those categories of Jews specifically men-
tioned in the treaty. The Jewish p

upon the Central Powers, who had
respect to all other matters contai
that the administering of the law
without evasion or circumvention.
birth, domicile or military service
testimony of witnesses or official
It was recalled that after the Balk
had also promised citizenship to the
the Jews applied to their regiments
refusal.
The Jewish and some of the non

provisions of the treaty. The Jued
torial of May 17, 1918, called upon the Central Powers to enforce an
equitable administration of the provisions of the treaty. The Neue Lem-
berger Zeitung was particularly severe in its criticism. It recalled the un-
equivocal declaration that Count Czernin had made a few days before his
resignation and contrasted it with the terms of the treaty which would help
no more than about twenty percent of the Jews of Rumania, granted that
the provisions are properly carried out. The terms of the treaty are such
that it will bring upon the governments of the Central Powers the criticism
of the antisemites from one side and the anger of the disillusioned Jews
of the entire world on the other. The Lemberg paper then went on to
point out that this policy would only give the Allied powers the chance
to play the role of liberators of the Jews.
The Stockholm Sozialdemokraten berated the Central Powers for
not keeping their solemn pledge to emancipate the Rumanian Jews. Ger-
many, in particular, declared the paper, did not display any serious desire
to rectify the injustice committed against Rumanian Jewry. Several Ger-
man newspapers also attacked the Jewish provisions of the treaty. Prof.
Strack published a critical article in the Berliner Neuesten Nachrichten
on May 22, 1918. The Berliner Tageblatt was especially sharp in its cen-
sure. "Rumanian trickery," it declared, "will know how to circumvent
the Treaty of Bucharest precisely the way it did the Treaty of Berlin.
Jewish groups in most countries protested against the inadequate
protection given to the Rumanian Jews by the terms of the new treaty.
They pointed to the various loopholes present and also to the complete
absence of any mention of national rights for the Jews. Local and nation-
al Zionist organizations called upon the Actions Committee of the World
Zionist Organization to resume energetic action in favor of the Rumani-
an Jews. 20
VI
The major problem now was to see to it that the law to be passed by
the Rumanian government, in accordance with the terms of Article 28
of the treaty, be as favorable as possible to the rights of the Jews. S. Labin,
leader of the Rumanian Jews living in Switzerland, called upon the leaders
of the larger Jewish organizations in Germany and Austria-Hungary to
proceed personally to Bucharest to negotiate with the Rumanian govern-
ment. 21
When the terms of the treaty were officially made public, the VIOD
in Germany expressed its thanks to the German government for its efforts
in behalf of the Rumanian Jews. It declared that, although the hoped-
for full and complete emancipation of the Rumanian Jews had not been
realized, yet there was no doubt that the condition of the Rumanian Jews
could be improved considerably as a result of Article 28 provided the
law to be passed by the Rumanian government for the carrying out of
the terms of the treaty will not allow for evasion or circumvention. The
experiences in interpreting Article 44 of the Berlin treaty, declared the
VIOD, indicate that there is such a possibility in view of the tendencies
present among the lower adminstrative officials in Rumania. The Ger-
20 Reaction in the Allied countries to the Jewish provisions in the Bucharest treaty
was also severely critical. Lord Robert Cecil, then Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
declared in the House of Commons on May 30, 1918 that "the enfranchisement obtained for
the Jews is of a most limited and conditional nature." His Majesty's Government, continued
Cecil, "have the fullest sympathy with the cause of Jewish enfranchisement in Rumania and
elsewhere; but it is to the full program of liberation which the Rumanian government
had themselves adopted prior to this treaty and not to this restricted scheme, that His
Majesty's Government will adhere." Lord Cecil's declaration was the occasion for further
exchange of view regarding the Rumanian Jews between Lucien Wolf and Nahum Sokolow
and Lord Balfour and David Lloyd George. The British leaders reiterated their concern
for securing "a just and permanent settlement of the Roumanian Jewish question." See
Sokolow, N., The History of Zionism, vol. ii; The Peace Conference Paris 1919; Report of
the Delegation of the Jews of the British Empire (London 1920) no. 8, p. 61. See also Zionist
Central Archives, fasc. H 32 I; ZBB 435 II.
21 Labin to Dr. Hantke, April 19, 1918; and Labin to Dr. Paul Nathan, April 18,
1918. ZBB 345 II.
man leaders suggested that the Rumanian law provide that a declaration
before a Rumanian court by the various categories of Jews listed in Article
28 be sufficient for naturalization. Penalties could be provided for false
declarations in order to prevent misuse of the new regulations. On the
other hand, the Jewish leaders maintained there is wide room for circum-
venting Article 28 if the Rumanian authorities require official documents
to prove birth, domicile or military service since such official documents
are in very many instances unavailable for a variety of reasons. They
might be deliberately withheld by Rumanian officials. More important,
the keeping of vital statistics in Rumania was not begun until 1866 and
was extended to the entire country only around 1878. Thus, birth cer-
tificates for the older generation of Jews were entirely lacking. Moreover,
official records in many communities had been destroyed or misplaced
as a result of the war. Equitable administration of the terms of Article
28, therefore, could only be carried out if Jews were to be allowed to
present affidavits or the sworn testimony of Jewish or non-Jewish witnes-
ses in lieu of official credentials.
The Jewish leaders then directed attention to the Rumanian acts

of violence committed against the Jews of Bessarabia. These incidents
only revealed the dangers to which the Jews of Bessarabia would be
subject upon the annexation of 'this area by Rumania. They therefore
called upon the Central Powers to take the necessary steps to protect
the Jewish minority there.
On May 15, Dr. Otto Warburg, in the name of the Zionist Actions
Committee, wrote to the German Foreign Office to exert pressure upon
the Rumanian government to promulgate a law which would compensate
for the defficiencies of Article 28 and which would protect the rights
of the Bessarabian Jews.
In Vienna, Count Czernin had been succeeded as foreign-minister

by Count Stefan Burian. On May 14, the Austrian Committee for the
Protection of the Rights of the Jewish Population in the Northern
Military Area submitted a memorandum on the Rumanian Jewishi
question to the new foreign-minister. It made the same points of criticism
mentioned above and called upon the governments of the Central Powers
to use their influence with the Rumanian government to promulgate
a law for the naturalization of the Jews which would make up for the
inadequacies of article 28. 22
On May 13, Labin, in Switzerland, once more urged the Jewish
leaders to send a delegation to Bucharest. He pointed out to them
that prime-minister Marghiloman "was a man you can talk to" and
who would, perhaps, allow himself to be convinced "if you explain to
him that the Jews of the entire world, a factor not to be lightly dis-
counted, are directly interested in the manner in which the Jewish
problem is solved in Rumania and that they will not rest until com-
plete solution is effected."
Early in June 1918, Professor Simonson in Copenhagen sent a tele-
gram to Marghiloman in the name of the Jewish communities of Den-
mark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, in which he called upon him
to secure a naturalization law that would be in keeping with full equality
for the Jews. Marghiloman replied on June 13 as follows:
You may rest assured that the law which will be presented to parlia-
ment will be conceived in a broad and equitable spirit and will satisfy
all legitimate aspirations. For me the settlement of the Jewish question
in Rumania is not a solution of the occasion, but the logical realization
of a political doctrine defined a long time ago.
VII
On June 18, 1918, the Rumanian parliament was convened. One

of its first tasks was the preparation of a law for the naturaliza-
tion of the Jews. The popular anti-Jewish sentiment in Rumania
was reflected in the parliamentary elections and, above all, in the elec-
tion of the antisemite Alexander Cuza from Jassy, despite the op-
position of the government. Jewish circles in Bucharest were fear-
ful that Cuza would receive considerable support in parliament in
opposing any modification of the peace treaty that would favor the Jews.
Prime-minister Marghiloman had told the delegation of the Union of
Rumanian Jews quite frankly on June 3 that the solution of the Jewish
question was not proceeding without difficulties and concessions even
though the Jews had had the warmest defenders in the Austro-Hungarian
delegation. He declared that there was a secret clause to the peace treaty
22 ZBB 345 I.
which eased and extended the terms of the treaty. He expressed his
conviction that nine-tenths of the Jews would be naturalized. But one
could not expect, said Marghiloman, that rights of citizenship also be
granted to those Jews who had been driven out from Galicia and Podo-
lia. These Jews, said the minister, were of a different type. He, him-
self, sensed the difference between the Jews in Moldavia and those raised
in Bucharest. 23
In his discussion with the Jewish leaders, Marghiloman carefully

avoided giving any precise information regarding the text of the na-
turalization law. In his general attitude toward the Jewish question,
he displayed some of the same prejudices as those of the antisemites.
The delegation left with the prime-minister a memorandum in which
the Jewish leaders expressed the hope that the government would pro-
ceed with energetic action to solve the Jewish problem and would receive
with favor the suggestions of the Union of Rumanian Jews. It went on
to say that the only solution in keeping with the obligations assumed by
Rumania would be one that would cover all native Jews and not attempt
to set up different categories of Jews. The memorandum also contained
a proposed draft for regulations to carry out the naturalization of the
Jews which was in keeping with the Jewish demands outlined above. The
same organization of Rumanian Jews also transmitted a memorandum
to the Rumanian parliament on June 21 in which they demanded com-
plete equality with all other citizens of their country.
About the same time, an article was published in the authoritative

newspaper, Jassy, which suggested that the Jewish question be left to the
Constituent Assembly that was to convene in the late fall of 1918. Any
change in the status of the Jews, declared the newspaper, could only be
by amending Article 7 of the Constitution, which dealt with the position
of "aliens" in Rumania. Amending the constitution could proceed
only according to prescribed regulations. Parliament must express its
approval of the plans to amend the constitution and must specifically
designate the articles of the constitution to be altered. Thereupon, par-
liament is to be dissolved and new elections ordered. The constituent
assembly thus elected would then be empowered to amend only those
articles designated by the previous parliament. Any law that the present
23 ZBB 345 II.
parliament would pass on this question, declared the Jassy, would be

"null and void" and "without practical value." All that the present
parliament could do was to decide that Article 7 should be ammended
and then the Jewish question would be dealt with by the Constituent
Assembly.
The government's constitutional scruples were made known just
at the time when the law for Jewish emancipation was to be presented.
All these constitutional aspects were of course just as well-known before
when the same government negotiated the peace treaty and Article 28,
which called for a law that would obviously require changes in the
Rumanian constitution. The Rumanian leaders, nevertheless, remained
silent until the peace treaty was voted and only then they discovered
that the present parliament was not authorized to deal with this matter.
All this indicated that the Rumanian government was not disposed
to fulfill its treaty obligation and carry out the provisions of Article 28.
According to the legislative plans of the Rumanian government,
only the following categories of Jews were to be granted full political
rights: (1) Those in service in the present war; (2) those having domicile
in Rumania and whose parents were born in Rumania and had domicile
there; (3) parents, widows and children of those killed in military action;
(4) those who were in the Rumanian army up to the time of the war;
(5) those mobilized in 1916 but not called to active service; (6) those re-
siding in the country for at least ten years before the outbreak of the
war and engaged in the following occupations: free professions with
diplomas from Rumanian universities or state-recognized colleges, heads
of factories with at least 100 employees, directors of commercial or finan-
cial companies with capital of at least 5 million ley; the ten year residence
period was to commence with the beginning of the exercise of these
professions; (7) those convicted of offensive violations and crimes were
to be excluded; (8) wives and legitimate and minor children were to
receive citizenship together with the head of the family; (9) the previous
article was to be retroactive for those naturalized before the war; (10)
young pathfinders who had just joined the army in Moldavia were to
receive citizenship after the attainment of their majority.
A Naturalization Commission was to sit from September 1 to the
end of the year to examine and pass upon all applications. Such a com-
mission was to be constituted in every political district and was to be
made up of the presiding judge of the district court and one representative
each for the ministry of the interior and the ministry of foreign affairs.
The commission was to make its decision within one month after sub-
mission of the application. The state's attorney could oppose any request
for naturalization and the commission would then have to make its
decision within ten days after it had heard both parties. Both parties
were to have the right to appeal to the Court of Cassation and its decision
was to be final. Proof to support a request for naturalization would be
by written documents and testimony of witnesses. Whoever had not
registered his claim by November 1 could make application to the district
court within five years after the promulgation of the law.
On July 14, 1918, Dr. Arthur Hantke and Dr. Paul Nathan came
to Bucharest as the representatives of the VIOD. They conferred with
the Jewish leaders of Rumania and with governmental and parliamentary
leaders. Austrian Jewry also sent two of its representatives to Bucharest.
They were Siegfried Fleischer and Dr. Armand Kaminker. They sub-
mitted a memorandum to Count Demblin, the diplomatic representative
of the Austro-Hungarian government. The Jewish leaders were not able
to effect such changes in the proposed law as to grant full rights to all
the Rumanian Jews but they received assurances from both Rumanian
and German circles that naturalization within the bounds of the law
could be carried out without evasion and in a broad spirit. Several minor
changes in the proposed legislation were also made at their suggestion.
Dr. Hantke and Dr. Nathan were of the opinion that once the majority
of Rumanian Jews received equal rights, it would not be very long before
the remaining Jews also received their due. 24
VIII
The government's law on the naturalization of Jews was introduced

into parliament and on July 25, the Senate passed it by a vote of 62 to 2.
Foreign-minister Arion, in presenting the proposed law, emphasized the
fact that the Jewish question would receive full solution later when
Article 7 of the Constitution would be revised. He further declared
that the granting of equal rights to the Jews of Rumania was not imposed
24 Hantke to Labin, August 8, 1918.
upon the government by the Central Powers but that the Rumanian
government had received with favor the wishes of the Quadruple Alliance.
In the lower house, Alexander Cuza delivered an attack on the

proposed Jewish law on July 31 which lasted several hours. He was
answered by prime-minister Marghiloman, who declared that the Ru-
manian population would have no reason for fear even if all the 300,000
Jews of Rumania were to receive these rights. But this law, declared the
prime-minister, would not grant citizenship to all the Jews. He pointed
to the various declarations by both conservative and liberal leaders, who
had pledged their parties to the solution of the Jewish question. He too
declared that this measure was not imposed by the Central Powers.
"I hereby declare," said Marghiloman, "that the Entente has made much
more onerous terms regarding this matter." The proposed law, he con-
tinued, "is not a law protecting the Jews against the Rumanians. In
passing this law, you will perform a great service for your country." The
law was passed by the lower house by a vote of 86 to 13, with one
abstention.
The law was promulgated by royal decree in the Monitorul Official

on August 27, 1918. The following is the text of the law:
Law for the Naturalization of Jews
What categories are to receive citizenship?

Art. I. Aliens in Rumania who are not subjects to another state and
irrespecttive of their religion are to be recognized as Rumanian citizens
if they belong to one of the following categories:
Parag. 1. Those who served during the last war in either active
military service or in the auxillary services.
Parag. 2. Those residing in Rumania who were born there and
parents likewise were born there.
Parag. 3. Parents, widows and children of those killed in battle
or of those in the auxilliary services who contracted disease and died
as a result of the carrying out of their duties; also the widows and chil-
dren of those specified in parag. 2 who died before they could acquire
citizenship.
Parag. 4. Those born in and residing in the country who were
mobilized in 1913 and who continuously maintained affiliation up to
the declaration of war in 1916 with one of the army's annual recruit
contingents even though they did not participate in any action because
the contingent to which they belonged was not called.
Parag. 5. Those born in and residing in the country who were
called to service in 1916 but who were excused for specific reasons stated
in their discharge papers.
Parag. 6 Those in the armed services who were granted citizen-
ship by royal decree subject to subsequent approval by parliamen
Excluded from Rights of Citizenship
The following are excduded from the above categories:
(a) Those who had been subjected to a dishonorable penalty be-

cause of criminal offence.
(b) Those who had received military sentence because of a serious
offence.
(c) Those guilty of dishonest bankruptcy and not rehabilitated.
(d) Those convicted of violations of the following articles of the
criminal code: 117-121, 126, 127, 138-146, 197 Abs. 1, 200-205 267,
268, 285 Abs. 2, 292, 293-308, 311, 316, 322, 325, 334.
(e) Those who can be proven to have born arms against the country.
Status of Wives and Minor Children
Parag. 7. Wives and children of those in the above categories are

to enjoy together with their husbands or parents the full right of Ru-
manian citizenship.
Parag. 8. The same is true of women and children whose husbands
and parents had been naturalized before the war but who were minors
at that time.
Parag. 9. Minors who had served as pathfinders during the war
and followed the Rumanian army in Moldavia will become full-fledged
Rumanian citizens upon application to the district court where they
reside one year after attainment of their majority. Citizenship will be
granted after the facts are presented in the presence of a state official.
Parents and guardians will have the right to request from either
the military or school authorities certification that their sons or wards
had been members of the pathfinder corps.
The pathfinders, themselves, shall have the same right.
For this purpose, the military and school authorities are to keep
regular registers in which a record of the certificates granted is to en-

tered.
This right may be exercized only during the period of 6 months
after the day of promulgation and publication of this law.
Articles II and III dealt with the powers of the naturalization com-
mission.
Articles IV-XI contained the provisions regarding the required
proofs.
Article XII dealt with the composition of the naturalization com-
mission.
Articles XIII-XLV prescribed the procedures of the naturalization
commissions.
Articles XLVI-LV dealt with appeals and procedures before the
Court of Cassation.
Articles LVI-LXI dealt with the formalities in drawing up the
naturalization papers.
Articles LXII-LXIII dealt with naturalization procedures accord-
ing to regular civil law.
Article LXIV dealt with the registers.
Articles LXV-LXVIII contained the final regulations for proce-
dure according to the ordinary law.
The law with all its 68 articles presented a labyrinth of such com-
plication that it was quite obvious that the administrtive authorities
would have ample opportunity to prevent it from being carried out
effectively. It was no surprise, therefore, that, after the promulgation
of the law, the authorities designated to administer it proceeded to in-
terpret it in quite a different way from that expected by the Jews. In
place of making it easier to secure the necessary credentials, the police
authorities issued an order that identification papers were to be issued
only to those who could prove that neither they nor their parents were
subjects of another state. Such proof was, of course, impossible. The
government made no effort to have the law carried out. It did not even
send out official notices to the courts and the district courts, therefore,
refused to draw up the necessary papers. All this gave the Jews cause
for grave concern and this was still further aggravated when the govern-
ment decreed that only such pupils may be excused from tuition fees
"who reveal special characteristics of national social life and solidarity
from an ethical standpoint." In addition, there were new legal regulat-

tions for the control of aliens which hit the Jews in particular, since they
were considered to be aliens. 25 It gradually became apparent that the
naturalization law was simply incapable of enforcement and could not
serve as a solution for the Jewish question in Rumania.
Ix
In view of the military and political condition of the Central

Powers by that time, however, it was clear that the Bucharest treaty
would have no permanent validity. Shortly after the armistice between
the Allies and the Central Powers, the Rumanian parliament was dis-
solved. All the laws passed by this parliament, including the naturaliza-
tion law for the Jews, were declared null and void. The Jewish problem
in Rumania was thus completely open once more to await solution. The
new government of Bratianu hastened to publish a decree whereby
Jews were to be granted political rights as individuals but subject to
all the well-known restrictive clauses. The Rumanian Jews, however,
tacitly adopted the policy of not accepting citizenship except if realized
through a general and comprehensive act of emancipation that would
cover all Jews. This they now hoped would result from the negotiations
at the peace conference in Paris.
25 Report from Bucharest by Adolf Salomon to Dr. Hantke, October 5, 1918. ZBB
345 III.

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N. M. Gelber, The Problem of The Rumanian Jews at The Bucharest Peace Conference 1918

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The Problem of the Rumanian Jews at the Bucharest Peace Conference, 1918

AT THE BUCHAREST PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918

On December 9, 1917 the government of Rumania, which joined

As soon as it became known that Rumania was negotiating a separate

period between 1878-1912. The masses of the Jewish population made

Immediately following the invasion of Rumania by the armies

1 Zionist Central Archives, Jerusalem. Berliner Akten: A III. 6 I.

interpretation of Articles 44 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Zionist Actions

In view of the fact that Article 44 has given rise to interpretations

The following are unconditionally citizens of the state of Rumania

The Zionist Actions Committee also declared that, in addition

other associations, in accordance with their own wishes, in order co

Steps were also taken to influence the government of Austria-

2 Idem. Berliner Akten: B 345 I.

3 Eidinger to Dr. Benno Straucher, March 9, 1918.

Nathan Eidinger had effected in March 1918 in Bucharest a coni-

(II) The Jewish communities are juristic persons legally recognized

(III) Autonomy is granted to the Jewish educational institutions. 6

This was the minimum program accepted by all Jewish parties.

6 From a letter of Rumanian Zionists in Zionist Central Archives, ZBB 345 I.

7 Letter from Bucharest of Eidinger to Dr. Straucher, March 3, 1918.

help of foreign governments, especially the United States, and it would

At the end of March, Dr. Nathan transmitted to von Kuhlman a

The Jews of Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland also transmitted to

9 Dr. Jacobson to Nathan Eidinger, March 20, 1918.

all." 10 The Poale Zion also requested the Soc

Things did not move so easily at the negotiating table in Bucharest.

14 Eidinger's letter from Bucharest of March 9, 1918 to S. Labin, ZBB 345 I.

16 Report of March 9, 1918 of Eidinger to Dr. Straucher.

Hungary and Rumania. This conversation took on a rather unpleasant

In the beginning of April, Count Czernin, in a speech to a delegation

The Rumanian government assumes the obligation, in order to

When it became apparent that Bessarabia would be annexed to

Article XXVII. The Roman Catholic, Greek Uniat, Bulgarian

Article XXVIII. Differences in religious affiliation are to have no

tioned in the treaty. The Jewish p

The Jewish and some of the non

The Jewish leaders then directed attention to the Rumanian acts

In Vienna, Count Czernin had been succeeded as foreign-minister

On June 18, 1918, the Rumanian parliament was convened. One

In his discussion with the Jewish leaders, Marghiloman carefully

About the same time, an article was published in the authoritative

23 ZBB 345 II.

parliament would pass on this question, declared the Jassy, would be

The government's law on the naturalization of Jews was introduced

24 Hantke to Labin, August 8, 1918.

In the lower house, Alexander Cuza delivered an attack on the

The law was promulgated by royal decree in the Monitorul Official

Law for the Naturalization of Jews

What categories are to receive citizenship?

Excluded from Rights of Citizenship

The following are excduded from the above categories:

(a) Those who had been subjected to a dishonorable penalty be-

Status of Wives and Minor Children

Parag. 7. Wives and children of those in the above categories are

regular registers in which a record of the certificates granted is to en-

from an ethical standpoint." In addition, there were new legal regulat-

In view of the military and political condition of the Central