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Successful Emotions
Katharina Lochner

Successful Emotions
How Emotions Drive Cognitive
Performance
With a preface by Prof. Dr. Michael Eid

123
Katharina Lochner
Hamburg, Germany

Dissertation at Freie Universität Berlin, 2015

ISBN 978-3-658-12230-0 ISBN 978-3-658-12231-7 (eBook)


DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-12231-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015959157

Springer
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or
part of the material is concerned, speci¿cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illus-
trations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on micro¿lms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by
similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a speci¿c statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is a brand of Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden


Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden is part of Springer Science+Business Media
(www.springer.com)
I de icat this bo k to my parents Renat and Norbe t Lochner
ohw alw ys sup orted me.
Prefac

Intel ig c si t h e m o s t importan gen ral predictor for profes i n-


la s u c e and si o n e o f the most often as e d abil t es in person-
nel sel ction. Intel ig c si consider a relativ y stable trai and
the as e m nt o f intel g c should dep n on one's abil ty and
not o n situa on l influe c s. In orde to make valid decis on in
person l sel ction the result of an intel g c tes should ther -
erof not be prone ot t h e m o e n t a r y sta e of a candi te. Howev r,
psychol gica measur ments alw ys take place in a situa on l
contex . Test score can be influe c d by the outer situa on such
s a the tes ing ro m but also by the in er situa on of an ind v ual
such sa the cur ent mo d or emoti ns.
I n the pres nt bo k Kath rina Lochner an lyzes the influe c of
mo d and emoti ns o n reasoni g, an importan facet of intel -
genc , i n a complex exp rim ntal study tha goes beyond previous
res a ch o n this topic. She gives a very thor ug over i w of pre-
vious res a ch o n t h e influe c s o f mo d and emoti ns on intel c-
tual perfo mances, and describ dif er nt promine t theori s in
.liated Everyon who si i n t e r s d in get in a cur ent up-to da e
over i w o f this importan topic wil find a con ise discu on of
the sta e o f t h e a r t in r e s a c h on af ect and intel g c .
In her empir cal study she focuse on a wide range of dif er nt
emoti ns and hypot esiz tha posit ve emoti ns have a stronge
influe c than negativ emoti ns and tha activ ng emoti ns era
more importan naht deactiv ng emoti ns. Her hypot es are
scrutin zed using the inter as scient f to l for condu ti g ran-
domize exp rim nts. Dif er nt emoti nal sta e era suc e ful y
induce b y dif er nt movies and her hypot es era an lyzed in a
longitud al .yduts The result of this study show tha her hypot e-
se can ot b e confirmed. Becaus the sta i c l power of her study
was strong enough, this result si of hig importance for res a ch
Prefac VI

on emoti n, intel g c and person l sel ction. I t swoh tha the


emoti nal quality of the cur ent sta e of a candi te si of minor
importance for the interp a o of reasoni g .seroc This result
shed new light on the emoti nal basi of intel c ua abil t es and
wil have importan consequ for the interp a o of abil ty
tes .seroc The bo k si ther fo not only of inter s for res a ch-
sre but also for practi one s in the field of apti ude as e m nt.
The clear and con ise style in whic the bo k si writ en makes it
ac es ibl ot a broad audienc and I am convi ed tha the bo k
wil dnif the at en io tha i t des rv .

MichaelEid
Acknowledg ments

First and tsomer f I would ekil to : k n a h t my ,rosiv epu Prof. Dr


Michael Eid, and my ,s ob Dr Achim PreuB, rof gniv em their
,trop us ,tsur and .ecn itap Withou ,meht siht thesi would not
evah be n .elbis op During ruof sraey they wer a ecruos of insp -
,noitar ,egd lwonk and motiva n to . e m
I worked o n siht project edistuo o f work and I would ekil to : k n a h t
D r Achim PreuB and Andreas Lohf , the gni a m srotce id of
,e-tuc the company I work ,htiw rof eht emit and secruo they
evag m e r o f siht .si eht ,revo M a big : k n a h t you seog to Den is
Be rman , with whom I spent in umerabl hours on epykS -sid
gnis uc PhD our ,seidut rof gniv e m a lot of elbau v ecivda and
thor ug ly reading and com enti g on m y result .noitces I ma
very lufetarg ot m y col eagu s Carolin Lehman and Mario
Martel a ohw help d e m trem ndously with the edit ng of the film
,spilc ,dna nev more ,yltna ropmi prog am ed the enil o exp ri-
ment rof m e whic worked os extr m ly wel and dewol a me ot
gather the nec s ary .at d
I would ekil to : k n a h t Marie Pick, Miz i Walker, and Dr Alexan-
der Zim erhofer ohw evag me valu b e input on my exp rim nt
i n eht pre-t s ing .esahp A big :knaht you seog ot Fen e gro/Je
Det rs, Maike Wehrmaker, and Miz i Walker ohw thor ug ly
pro f- ead sretpahc o f eht manuscript and evag me valu b e ideas
and kcabde f o n .es ht
I ma very lufetarg ot m y seuga l oc Anabela Costa, Anja Heins,
Antje Exner, Dian Ki rne , Maike Wehrmaker, Nadja Mink,
Nina GaIler, Richard Justenhoven, Susan Dietz, and Tobias
Castil o ohw made erus I saw e rf of snoitag lb at work gnirud
phase tha requi d e m o t con e tra on my .DhP
,yl aniF I would like to : k n a h t Het y Mainka rof her pricel s -pus
port befor and gnirud m y DhP .noita ups d
Conte

ABSTRAC ............ xvn


INTRODUCTION ............ 1

1 ONLINE AS E M NT DNA ONLINE SURVEY .. 7

1. Defin t o , Advant ges, and Disadv ntages .. 8


1. 1 segatn vdA .... 8
2.1 segatn vd iD .... 9

2.1 Quality of Onli e . D. a t .a . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • 01


1.2 1 ecn laviuqE o f -repaP licneP-d a dna enil O Dat .. Ol
2. 1 tnemlif uF ofTest ytilauQ airet C ... 31

3.1 Repr s nta iven s of Onli e Studies .. 51


1.3 1 gnilpmaS .... 61
2.3 1 noit e R .... 71
3. 1 noitas dr S dna ytil ba or n C o f eht noitau S .. 81

4.1 Design of onli e studies • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . 81

5.1 Sum ary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. . 20

2 INTEL IGENCE DNA INTEL IGENCE TESTING . 21

1.2 Models o f Intel ig nce • • • • • • • • • •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32


1. 2 rotcaF- wT seiro hT ... 32
2.1 Primary factors ............ 42
3.1 2 noitarge I o f eht sledom ... 52
4.1 2 lanois em d t uM ledoM ... 03
5.1 2 rehtO seiro hT o f ecn gil t I ... 3
6.1 2 yram uS .... 3
x Conte

2. Intel igenc test .. 34


1.2 Raven's evis rgo P secirtaM ;MPR( Raven e t ,.ia . )30 2 53.
2. Wo dc k-l hnso Test o f evit ngoC seit l bA (Wo dc k et ,.la
)10 2 .. 53
3.2 Berlin ecn gil t I erutc S Test SIB( ;tseT lager e t ,.la )79 1 . .36
4.2 evitpadA Matrices Test ;TMA( Hornke et ,.la 20 ) . 93.

3.2 Sum ary •••••••••••••••••••••••• 40

3 AF ECT, MO D, DNA EMOTIONS ...... 43

1.3 Models o f tceTIA • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4


1. 3 larutc S Models . 54.
3.1 2 Models o f Discret snoit mE . 94.
3.1 Hybrid Models . .50
3.1 4 Domain-Spec f Models . 35.

3.2 Measurem nt of Mo d and Emoti ns •••••••••••• 35


1.2 3 As e m nt oftbe Physiol g ca Comp ne t. . 35
3.2 As e m nt oftbe Expres iv . Comp ne t 35.
3.2 As e m nt oftbe Af ectiv Comp ne t . .54

3. Elic ta ion of Mo d and Emoti ns .. 58


1.3 Over i w o f Mo d and Emoti n Elic ta on Methods . .59
3. 2 Onli e Mo d Inductio . 46
3. sweiv R of Mo d dna E m oItnid u c Procedu s . 56

3.4 Sum ary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •. . 6

4 AF ECT DNA COGNIT ON ........ 69

1.4 Af ect and Cognit on in the Brain • • • • • • • • • • •. . . 17


1. 4 Neuropsych l gi a Theory o f Positve snoit mE ,ybhsA( ,nesI &
,nekruT )9 1 . 27
2.1 4 Af ect and Informati Proces ing . 57
Conte XI

4.2 Cognit ve Ap roache.: Mo d-Induced Thinking Style . .• 76


4.2 1 The Theory of Personality System Interaction (pSI Theory; Kuhl,
1983a, b) ........... 7
4.2 Fe lings-a Information Theory (Schwarz, 19 0) ... 79
4.2 3 Somatic Marke s Hypothesi (Dam sio, 19 4) .... 97
4.2 Empir cal Find gs on the Thre Theori s .... 80

3.4 Cognit ve Ap roaches: Memory ....... 18


4.3 1 Mo d Congruency dna Sta e Dep nde cy (Bower, 189 ) .. 82
4.3 2 Cognit ve Contex (Isen, 1984) ....... 28
4.3 The Broaden-a d Build Theory o f Posit ve Emoti ns (Fred ickson,
19 8, 20 1) .......... 84

4. AUention- Theoretical Ap roaches ...... 86


4. 1 eoC Util sation (Easterb o k, 195 ) ...... 86
4. 2 The Resourc Al ocation Model (El is & Ashbro k, 198 ) . 87

4.5 Activation-Theoretical Ap roache ........ 89

4.6 Motivational Ap roaches ••••••••••••••••• 19


4.6 1 Mo d Mainte ance and Mo d Repair (Isen, 1984) ... 29
4.6 2 The Rubicon Model o f Action Phase (Heckhausen & Gol witzer,
1986, 1987) .......... 39
4.6 3 Expectancy Theory (Vro m, 1964) ...... 59
4.6 Seo, Bar et , and Bartunek's (20 4) Theory .... 59

.4 7 Ta.k Demand-Ba.ed Ap roaches ...... 9


4.7 1 The Multifactor-System Dyoamics Theory of Emoti n (Royce
& Diamond, 1980) ......... 9
4.7 2 Dual-Force Model (Fiedl r, 19 0) ...... 10
4.7 3 Af ect Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 19 5) .... 401

4.8 An integrative Model: The Cognit ve-Motivational Mediator Model


olthe Impact of Mo d on Cognit ve Performance (Abel , 19 5) • 108
4.8 1 Af ect and Perc ptoaI Spe d ....... 10
4.8 2 Af ect dna Creativ y ........ 10
4.8 3 Af ect and Reasouing ........ 21
IX tne oC

9.4 Dis.ret Emotion. and Cognit ve Performan.e ••...... 61

01.4 Sum ary of Theorie. and Find g ••••••••••••• 021

5 THE PRES NT STUDY ......... 125

1.5 Hypothe. on Emotion. and Test Performan.e •. . . . 521

2.5 Con.ideration. about the De.igo of the Study .. 821


1.2 5 noitcel S o f eht Film spilC ... 921
2. 5 noitalup M Check ... 031

6 PILOT STUDIES ........... 13

1.6 Pilot .tudy 1: De.igo of an Onli e Mo d Que.tion aire • • •. . 31

2.6 Pilot .tudy la: Valid t on of the Visual Analogue e1a.S • •. . . . 431
1.2 6 dohteM .... 431
2. 6 stlu eR .... 631
3.2 6 nois uc D .... 041

3.6 Pilot Study 1b: Refin me t of the Visual Analog e ela S . 14


1.3 6 dohteM .... 341
2.3 6 stlu eR .... 41
3. 6 nois uc D .... 741

4.6 Pilot study : 2 Design of an Onli e Que.tion aire As.e ing Test-
Related Emoti ns ••••••••••••••••••••••• 841
1.4 6 dohteM .... 941
2.4 6 stlu eR .... 051
3.4 6 nois uc D .... 451

5.6 Manipulation Che.k u.ing the Adapted Que.tion aires . 651


1.5 6 detc pxE stcef E on eht do M snoi em D .. 751
2.5 6 detc pxE stcef E no noitav M dna snoit mE .. 951
Conte XI

7 METHOD ............... 16

1.7 Instruments desU • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16


1. 7 do M ...... 16
2.1 7 detal R- s T snoit mE and noitav M .... 361
3.1 7 QI tseT ecnamrof eP ..... 461
4.1 7 noitcud I o f lanoit mE seta S .... 61

2.7 Procedure ..... 761


1.2 7 tseT nuR ...... 761
7 2. . tnemir pxE ..... 861

3.7 Partic pants ..... 671

8 RESULTS ............. 179

1.8 Drop-Out Ef ect .. 081


1. 8 cihpargomeD selbair V ..... 081
2.1 8 ecnamrof eP no eht tsrif tse .... 281

2.8 Randomisat on ••••••••••••••••••••• 381


1.2 8 Block noitas m dn R ..... 381
2. 8 secn r f iD tceps R htiw to c i h p a r g o m e D selbair V ... 581
3.2 8 secn r f iD io tseT ecnamrof eP .... 81
4.2 8 secn r f iD in y t i v t c e T f A .... 19

3.8 Relations Betw n Mo d, Emoti n, and Perfo mance Befor the


Emoti n Induction ••••••••••••••••••••••• 102
1.3 8 snoitaler c tnI o f do M dna noit mE ... 102
2.3 8 snoitaler oC o f do M and noit mE htiw ecnamrof eP no eht First
TesL ...... 702

4.8 Manipulation Check • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 902


1.4 8 segoahC in y t i v t c e T f A retfa eht noit mE noitcud I ... 902
2.4 8 sno irapmoC no y t i v t c e T f A retfA eht noitcud I ... 02
VIX tne oC

8.4 3 Change i n Af ectiv y During the Test: After Induction versu After
TesL ........... 230
8.4 Change i n Af ectiv y During the Test: Befor Induction versu After
TesL ........... 236

5.8 Ef ects o f evitc f A Sta e on Test Perfo mance .. 241


1.5 8 Test Perfo mance After the Emotion Induction ... 142
8.5 2 Dif erco es betwe n the Scores on the Second Test .. 243
8.5 3 Ef ects of Emoti n on Test Perfo mance .... 246
8.5 4 Struc al Equation Models ....... 25
8.5 Sum ary .......... 260

9 DISCU ION ............ 261

9.1 Impact of Emoti ns on Test Perfo mance .. 26


9 1. Valenc of Mo d or Emoti ns and Reasoni g Test Perfo mance . 362
9.1 2 Activa on of Mo d or Emoti ns and Reasoni g Test Perfo mance .
............ 27
9.1 3 Task Type, Mo d and Emoti n, and Reasoni g Test Perfo mance 274
9.1 4 Impact o f Emoti ns on Test Perfo mance: Lim ta ions .. 276
9.1 5 Sum ary .......... 279

2.9 OnIi e Emoti n induction •••••••••••••••• 082


9.2 1 Af ective Sta e Befor the Emotion Induction Procedur . 182
9.2 Changes in Mo d Sta es due to the Emoti n Induction Procedure.28
9.2 3 Changes in Emoti nal Sta es due to the Emoti n Induction Procedur
............ 284
9.2 4 Changes in Mo d Sta es after the Test ..... 285
9.2 5 Onli e Emoti n Inductio : Lim ta ions ..... 286
9.2 6 Onli e Emoti n Inductio : Sum ary ..... 289

3.9 Unsupervis d OnIi e Experim nts ... 092


9.3 1 Sampling and Ret n ion ........ 290
9.3 2 Dat Quality .......... 293
9.3 Unsupervised Onli e Experim nts: Lim ta ions ... 294
9.3 4 Unsupervised Onli e Experim nts: Sum ary .... 298
Conte xv
4.9 Sum ary and Conclu.ion .. 92

5.9 Outlo k and Future Re.earch ••••••••••••••• 30

REF RENCES ............ 305

TABLES ............. 341

FIGURES ............. 345

AP ENDIX A ............ 347

AP ENDIX B ............ 349

AP ENDIX C ............ 36

AP ENDIX D ............ 375

AP ENDIX E ............ 385

AP ENDIX F ............ 407

AP ENDIX G ............ 423


Abstrac

In person l sel ction ther si a n ong i trend towards the


use of uns pervis d eni1no abil ty tes ing (Bateson, Wirtz, Burke,
& Vaugh n, 2013; cut-e Group, 201 ; Liev ns & Har is, 20 3).
The as umption si t h a the tes measur cognit ve abil ty. Howev-
,re perfo mance o n such tes has be n found ot be influe c d by
mo d (Lyubomirsk , ,gniK & Dien r, 20 5). Result are contradi -
tory becaus someti posit ve (Abel , ;59 1 Radenh us &
Anker, )8 91 and someti negativ mo d (Melton, )59 1 has
be n found to improve tes perfo manc . Specif emoti ns like
joy or anger have only be n studie in the contex of ac demi
perfo mance (pekrun, El iot, & Maier, 20 9), and ther are no
studie on the impact of mo d or emoti ns on perfo mance in un-
supervi d onli e tes ing.
Ther fo , the pur ose of the pres nt study was to invest -
gate the impact of specif emoti ns on perfo mance on a reason-
ing tes in an uns pervis d onli e exp rim nt. Hypothes wer
tha perfo mance would be )1( bet r in j o y than in anger, )2( bet r
in conte m nt than in sadne , )3( bet r in joy than in conte -
ment, and )4( bet r in anger than in sadne .
XVI Abstac

A divers sample of 429 partic n s complet d an onli e


reasoni g tes , once befor and once after the induct on of one of
the evif emoti nal sta e of joy, anger, sadne , conte m , or
neutral, resp ctiv ly. The induct on procedu suc e ful y evok d
dist nc emoti nal .seta
Contra y to the hypot es , howev r, the exp rim ntal y
manipul ted emoti ns di not af ect perfo mance on the onli e
reasoni g tes , whic might be at ribu le ot reasoni g tes being
les su ceptibl to the influe c of emoti ns than other types of
tes (Fiedl r, ;09 1 Forgas, ;59 1 Royce & Diamond, .)8 91
Ther si also the pos ib l ty tha the ef cts of af ectiv sta e on
tes perfo mance wer to weak ot be det c d in the compar tive-
l y unsta d r ised situa on and the divers sample (Stan o , .)89 1
Another pos ib l ty si tha partic n s ent r d a sta e of flow
(Cziks entm halyi, Abuhamde , & Nak mur , 20 7) in whic
thoug s or fe lings od not interf with the task.
I anline As e m nt and Onli e Surveys 31

i t can b e con lude tha simply put ing a pa er- nd p cil tes on a
computer withou making adjustmen si n o t an adequ t method
for a d p t i n g a tes o t the computer. Rather, a go d computer ad p-
ta ion o f a tes se m t o requi certain design .sdra n t ,suhT
Mead and Drasgow (19 3) con lude their study by sta ing "Our
result provide strong sup ort for the con lusi tha ther si no
mediu ef ct for c a r e f u l y constru ed power tes " .p( .)754

2. 1 tnemlif uF o/Test ytilauQ airet C


Ther si a w i d e range of studie on the reliab ty and valid-
ity of computer-bas d and onli e .st e Ther s i osla a lot o f l i t e r a -
ture on the ext n to whic such tes conf rm t o other tes -quality
crite a (econ my, util y, op rtuni y ot ekaf o r cheat, ap ro i-
,s en ta normi g). Howev r, discu ng them la w o u l d be b e y o n d
the scope of this chapter. Ther fo , only a brief over i w of the
main sgnidmf on the main quality criteria-objectiv ty, reliab ty,
and validity-wil be given becaus thes are the seno tha era
rel vant for interp g the result of the pres nt .yduts
Objectiv y. The objectiv admin str o , evalu tion, and
interp a ion of onli e tes and question a r can b e se n sa a
given (Kubinger, :)90 2 For computeris d as e m nt, instruc o
era given in writ ng and not by the admin str o , and for onli e
as e m nt, most often an admin str o si n o t ev n pres nt. This
sruovaf admin str o objectiv y. Evalu tion and interp a o of
the result are us al y imple nt d autom ic l y os t h a thes
proces are, like adm n str o , indep t o f a n admin str o .
Thus, the use of computeris d and onli e as e m nt enha c s
objectiv y.
Reliab ty. Reliab ty (Bosnjak, )79 1 and measur nt
er o (Hert l et ,.Ia ;20 ,not a S )89 1 have be n shown ot be
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stripes floated again on the walls of Fort Pulaski. In giving up his sword, Colonel
Olmstead said, “I yield my sword, but I trust I have not disgraced it.”
The arms of the privates had been previously stacked on the parade, and the men
marched to quarters. Both officers and men were allowed to remain all night in their
usual quarters. The interior of the fort presented a sorry picture. Blindages had been
put up extending on all the rampart, and a part rendered bomb-proof; but shot and
shell had burst through many of the sides—knocked in walls, broken down stairways,
entered casemates, upset guns, and piled up masses of rubbish and debris all around.
Seven guns on the parapet were dismounted; nearly every traverse had been struck
and partly torn to pieces; all the passageways were obstructed by piles of stones and
fallen timber; the magazine had been struck, and part of its outer casing of brick torn
away, while at the breach, the havoc was, of course, greatest of all. The breach was
entirely practicable; the ditch, sixty feet across, was more than half filled up by the
fragments that had fallen, and half a dozen men abreast could have entered the
aperture. The Colonel declared, however, that he should have held out until nightfall,
had the magazine not been struck. This, of course, settled his fate, and rendered any
prolonged resistance a useless risk of human life. Forty thousand pounds of powder,
seven thousand shot and shell, and forty-seven guns were captured. The prisoners
were three hundred and sixty in number, and belonged to the Georgia Volunteers, the
Oglethorpe Light Infantry, and to a German regiment. The Colonel excited the
sympathies of his captors by a bearing at once soldierly and subdued. The officers
invited the Unionists to their quarters, where several took supper, and some even
slept with the rebels whom they had been fighting a few hours before. There was no
apparent bitterness on either side; no desire to introduce personal animosities.
This long and severely contested siege resulted in the loss of only two lives, while
the number of wounded was very small. This fact is remarkable, in view of the
immense amount of shot and shell exchanged during the bombardment.
On Sunday, the 13th, the men were divided into two parties—the officers and about
two-thirds of the men forming the first, who were placed on the Ben de Ford—the
remainder on the Honduras, and taken to Bay Point. Here they were transferred to
the McClellan and Star of the South, to be sent to Fort Columbus, in the harbor of
New York.
BATTLE OF SOUTH MILLS, CAMDEN, N. C.

April 20, 1862.

A short but severely contested engagement took place on the 20th


of April, between the command of General J. L. Reno, and a body of
rebels posted in a strong position to intercept the supposed advance
of the Federal troops on Norfolk. General Burnside directed General
Reno to make a demonstration on that city, and the latter, taking
with him from Newbern the Twenty-first Massachusetts and Fifty-
first Pennsylvania, proceeded to Roanoke, where he was joined by
detachments of the Eighty-ninth New York and Sixth New
Hampshire. With these forces he started for Elizabeth City, and
commenced disembarking at midnight, on the 19th, at a point about
three miles below the city, on the east side.
By three A. M. Colonel Hawkins’ brigade, consisting of the Ninth
and Eighty-ninth New York, and Sixth New Hampshire, were landed
and ready to move. Colonel Hawkins proceeded with his brigade
toward South Mills. General Reno remained to bring up the other
two regiments, which had been delayed by the grounding of their
vessels at the mouth of the river. They came up at daylight, and were
landed by seven A. M. General Reno marched directly toward South
Mills, and about twelve miles out met Colonel Hawkins, with his
brigade, who, either by the treachery or incompetency of his guide,
had been led some miles out of his way. As his men were very much
jaded by the long march, they were ordered to follow the Second
brigade, about four miles further, to within a mile and a half of South
Mills.
The rebels were posted here, and opened a fire of artillery, before
the advanced guard discovered them. General Reno reconnoitered
their position, and found that they were posted strongly in a line
perpendicular to the road, their infantry in ditches, their artillery
commanding all the direct approaches, and their rear protected by a
dense forest. He ordered the Fifty-first Pennsylvania immediately to
file to the right, and pass over to the edge of the woods, to turn their
left—the Twenty-first Massachusetts pursuing the same course; and
when Colonel Hawkins came up with his brigade, he was sent with
the Ninth and Eighty-ninth New York to their support.
The Sixth New Hampshire was formed in line to the left of the
road, and its commander ordered to support the four pieces of
artillery. Owing to the excessive fatigue of the men, they met with
some delay in reaching their position. Meanwhile the enemy kept up
a brisk artillery fire, which was gallantly responded to by the small
pieces under charge of Colonel Howard, of the Coast Guard. As soon
as the Fifty-first Pennsylvania and Twenty-first Massachusetts had
succeeded in turning their left, they opened a brisk musketry fire,
and, about the same time, the Ninth New York, also coming in range,
eager to engage, unfortunately charged upon the enemy’s artillery. It
was a most gallant charge, but they were exposed to a deadly fire of
grape and musketry, and forced to retire, but rallied immediately
upon the Eighty-ninth New York. General Reno then ordered both
regiments to form a junction with the Twenty-first Massachusetts. In
the meantime, the Fifty-first Pennsylvania and Twenty-first
Massachusetts kept up an incessant fire upon the rebels, who had
withdrawn their artillery, and commenced to retreat in good order.
The Sixth New Hampshire had steadily advanced in line to the left of
the road, and when within about two hundred yards poured in a
deadly volley, which completely demoralized the enemy and ended
the battle.
The men rested under arms in line of battle, until about ten
o’clock, P. M., when they were ordered to return to the boats, having
accomplished the principal object of the expedition, that of
conveying the idea that the entire Burnside Expedition was marching
upon Norfolk. Owing to a want of transportation, sixteen of the most
severely wounded were left behind. Assistant-Surgeon Warren was
left with them. Only about ten or fifteen prisoners were taken. Most
of them belonged to the Third Georgia regiment. The Ninth New
York suffered most severely, owing to their premature charge. The
total loss of the Federal troops in killed and wounded was about
ninety, some sixty of the number belonging to that regiment.
Just as the decisive volley of the Sixth New Hampshire had
compelled the rebels to abandon their position, a terrific thunder
storm broke upon the scene of conflict, and a heavy rain rendered the
hope of pursuit futile. After burying the dead, and taking a brief rest,
General Reno and his command took up their march for
headquarters, at Newbern. On the advance the sun beat fiercely upon
his exhausted men, the weather was intensely hot, and they were
almost prostrated with the fatigue of the battle and the labor of the
march, before they reached a place of rest.
CAPTURE OF FORT MACON, N. C.

April 26, 1862.

The occupation of the town of Beaufort and Morehead City by the


Federal troops, on the 24th of March, was followed by active
preparations for the reduction of Fort Macon, which commanded the
entrance to the harbor. It was anticipated that on the retreat of the
rebel troops from Beaufort the overwhelming numbers and
equipment of the national forces would demonstrate to the
commander of the fort the hopelessness of any attempt to resist the
armament that would be brought against him in the event of his
refusal to surrender. This hope was not realized. Colonel M. J. White,
the commander, resolved to meet the Union forces with every
possible resistance, and if the fort was captured by the Federal arms,
the doughty rebel determined that it should be purchased at no slight
cost.
Fort Macon is situated on a bluff on Bogue’s Bank, nearly two
miles from the town of Beaufort. It commands the entrance to the
harbor, and no vessel can enter the main channel without coming
within range of its guns. Opposite the fort, at the entrance of the
harbor, is Shackelford Banks, distant about one mile and a half. Fort
Macon is of a hexagonal form, and has two tiers of guns—one in
casemated bomb-proof, and the other en barbette. Its armament
consisted of twenty 32-pounders, thirty 24-pounders, two 18-
pounders, three field pieces for flank defence, twelve flank howitzers,
eight 8-inch howitzers (heavy), eight 8-inch howitzers (light), one 13-
inch mortar, three 10-inch mortars, and two Cohorn mortars—total,
89 guns. The war garrison of the fort was 300 men. There are large
furnaces in the fort for heating shot, and before the investment there
was a considerable quantity of powder in the magazine. The
construction of Fort Macon was commenced in 1826, by Captain
Eliason, of the United States Engineer Corps, and was finished in
1860, by Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General John G. Foster.
This fort, like most others in the Southern States, at the opening of
the rebellion, was in an almost defenceless condition. Ordnance
Sergeant Alexander was the sole guardian of this important position
in April, 1861.
In March, the vote on the question of calling a State Convention
was taken in North Carolina, and a majority was given against the
Convention. Governor Ellis assured the officer in command that the
fort would not be taken from under the control of the government,
but on the 11th of April, a citizen of Beaufort, in the interest of the
secessionists, collected a body of fifty men, with whom he crossed
over to the fort and demanded its surrender. Sergeant Alexander
delivered up the keys, and the rebel flag was hoisted on its walls.
Subsequently stores and supplies for a garrison of 500 men were
collected and placed within it, and an efficient body of troops took
possession, under Colonel White.
On March 25th, 1862, Morehead City, on the mainland, opposite
Bogue Island, was occupied by a portion of General Parke’s division
of Burnside’s army. A few days subsequently a landing had been
effected on Bogue Island, and a camp established for the force
selected to operate against Fort Macon. On the 11th of April the
enemy’s pickets were driven in by the Fifth Rhode Island regiment
and one company of the Fourth Rhode Island, and eligible localities
for the batteries were selected by Captain Williamson, Topographical
Engineer on General Burnside’s staff. On the next day a working
party commenced the erection of the main battery, and from that
time the labor proceeded night and day. The troops employed in this
service were the Fourth and Fifth Rhode Island and the Eighth
Connecticut regiments. The labor was most severe. The men were
often on duty twenty-four hours at a time, and labored zealously to
accomplish their task in the shortest possible period. What rest they
got when on duty was obtained by sleeping on the sands, as no tents
or barracks could be erected, since these would have informed the
rebels of the location of the troops, and indicated the position of the
batteries. The picket duty performed by the men was also very
severe. All their work had to be done under a continuous and often
severe fire from the fort. From this, however, they were protected by
the peculiar formation of the ground, which consisted of a succession
of sand-hills up to within about half a mile of the fort.
Previous to the bombardment the garrison were allowed to send
letters to their friends at Beaufort.
Three batteries were erected for the reduction of the fort. The first
was mounted with four ten-inch mortars, and was built under cover
of a large sand-hill, near the edge of the marshes which line the
northern shore of the island, at a distance of about 1,400 yards from
the fort. This battery was allotted to Lieutenant Flagler, and manned
by a portion of battery I, New York Third artillery. The second was in
advance 100 yards, built and worked by Captain Lewis O. Morris,
and Lieutenants Gowan and Pollock. Three long thirty-pound siege
Parrott guns, rifled, composed its armament. The last battery
consisted of four eight-inch mortars. It stood 100 yards in advance of
the second battery, and was placed in charge of Lieutenant Prouty,
and manned by a detachment of battery I, Third New York artillery.
Rifle-pits and trenches were also excavated.
On the 24th of April, the preparations having been completed,
General Burnside arrived from Newbern, on the steamer Alice Price,
having in tow two barges, the Schrapnel and Grenade, fitted up as
floating batteries, each armed with two thirty-pound Parrott guns.
The Schrapnel had in addition a twelve-pounder rifled Ward gun.
They anchored about three miles below the fort.
During the afternoon a flag of truce was sent to the fort, in charge
of Captain Biggs, of General Burnside’s staff, with a demand for its
surrender. Colonel White refused to yield to the demand, and
announced his purpose to defend the fort to the last extremity. An
understanding was obtained, however, that the commander should
have a personal interview with General Burnside on the following
morning.
Accordingly, at an early hour on the 25th, the steamer Alice Price,
under a flag of truce, proceeded down the bay to a point previously
indicated, where General Burnside was soon joined by Colonel
White. The meeting was courteous. Colonel White said that he had
been placed in command of the fort for the purpose of holding it, and
should defend it to the best of his ability.
On the following morning, the 26th, the Federal forces took their
respective posts at an early hour. The morning mists had not yet
disappeared, when orders were given for the opening of the siege,
and before six o’clock the loud thunder of the guns and the deep
boom of the heavy mortars broke on the ears of the sleeping citizens
of Beaufort, and roused the slumbering garrison of the belligerent
fort. Booming loudly over the waters, and rolling away in the
distance, the explosions followed in rapid succession for half an hour
before the garrison was ready to respond. When prepared, the rebels
bravely assumed their allotted positions, manned their guns, and
Fort Macon opened upon the national flag.
During the forenoon the eight-inch mortar battery of Lieutenant
Prouty sent its shells with regularity and precision into the fort, and
at each explosion the red dirt and sand of the glacis’ slopes,
ramparts, parapets and terrepleins were dashed in a cloud many feet
into the air. The flagstaff, with its defiant colors floating at the top,
was at times completely obscured in the smoke and dust which rose
with the bursting of the missiles. The ten-inch mortar battery was
not so successful in the morning. The shells from it burst beyond or
high in air over the fort, scattering the fragments of iron far and wide
into the water; but in the afternoon the battery played with an effect
that was evidenced in the decreased fire from the fort.
The battery of Parrott guns under command of Captain Morris, in
the mean time, kept up an incessant fire upon the ramparts. The
difficulty of obtaining accurate range was for some time experienced,
and the shots either went over the fort, ricocheting across the water
towards Shackleford Banks, or fell short and buried themselves in
the sand and glacis on its westerly side. But the range grew more
accurate with every shot, and from twelve o’clock until the close of
the fight Captain Morris seldom failed to plant his terrible conical
balls among the guns, on the edges of the ramparts, and against the
walls. The latter were pierced in two places, the balls passing through
into the casemates, from which their unceremonious visit hastily
expelled the occupants. Wherever these shots struck they tore
through all obstacles with a force that hurled fragments of iron and
brick, stones, grass-sods and sand bags about in every direction.
Many of the rebels were knocked down senseless by the flying sods.
When it is considered that the walls of the fort were protected by the
slopes of the glacis, the accuracy of the firing from the Parrott battery
will be perceived. That part of the walls just protruding above the
ramparts of the glacis was the only target presented whereat to aim
for the purpose of penetrating the casemates.
About two o’clock, P. M., Major Allen went out with a flag of truce to
carry letters written to the garrison from their friends in Beaufort.
Many of these entreated the officers to prevail upon Colonel White to
surrender the fort. Some ladies in Beaufort set on foot a petition to
that effect.
The precision attained by the practice of the forenoon, and the
facility of loading and firing, which even the experience of a few
hours had given, were now evidenced in the successful results of each
shot from the Union batteries. The scene assumed its grandest aspect
after two o’clock. A flash and a puff of smoke betokened a discharge;
an interval elapsed, which terminated with the report of the piece;
then came the sonorous hum of the shell as it flew through the air;
another puff of smoke soon followed by a second report, and the
deadly missile had exploded.
With glasses every manœuvre in the fort could be distinctly seen.
The look out was ensconced behind a pile of sand bags upon the
ramparts, and spectators fancied they could hear him ejaculate the
word “Down!” as he marked the approach of every shot. Its effect was
like magic. As he himself disappeared, down out of sight went the
crowd of men around the guns, to reappear again when the shot had
accomplished its errand.
Little remains to tell of the bombardment. The garrison had at first
responded with some seven or eight guns, exclusive of carronades,
which were made to serve the purpose of mortars. The squads of
gunners could be observed passing about, alternating with the pieces
as they became hot under the discharges. Gradually the fire
slackened to four, then to three, and then to two guns. The Federal
shot and shell were doing their duty, and subsequent examination
showed that fifteen guns were dismounted or disabled on the fort.
To those who worked the mortars of the Federal batteries, the
matter was entirely new, and to Captain Ammon’s men, of the Third
New York artillery, the greatest praise is deserved for their cool and
unflinching conduct in this their first experience under fire. The
exposed nature of Captain Morris’ battery of siege guns drew upon it
almost the concentrated fire of the fort, and shot and shell rained
around it. The only injury sustained by the battery was the
temporary dismounting of one of the guns by a thirty-two-pound
solid shot, which came through the embrasure and carried off a
wheel. Another carriage was in readiness, and the gun was soon
remounted. One of the guns was slightly dented by a solid shot,
which struck the reinforce or band around the breech, and then
glanced off. The sand bags in all the batteries were disturbed more or
less by the concussions, and the embrasures of the three-gun battery
were begrimed and black with powder. Eleven hundred shots in all
were fired on the Federal side, and of these five hundred and sixty
struck the fort.
The firing from the fort gradually slackened as the guns one after
another became disabled, until at last the iron thunderers ceased to
respond to the continuous peals of the Federal batteries. About half-
past four o’clock a white flag was run up over one of the guns, dimly
seen through the smoke that had just before issued from it in a heavy
cloud. Not long after two officers left the fort, bearing a flag of truce.
They advanced towards the batteries, and Captain Pell, of General
Burnside’s staff, and Lieutenant Hill, of General Parke’s staff went
out to meet them. They were Captains Pool and Guion, with a
message from Col. White, asking the terms of surrender. General
Parke replied that the only terms were unconditional surrender, but
that he would communicate with General Burnside, who might make
different arrangements. The inquiry was telegraphed to Beaufort,
and a messenger was sent off to General Burnside, who was on board
the Alice Price, some distance up the river. In the morning General
Burnside returned to the harbor, and had an interview with Colonel
White, on board the Alice Price, when the terms of capitulation were
agreed upon. The fort, armament and garrison were to be
surrendered to the United States, the officers and men being released
on parole, until properly exchanged, returning to their homes with
their private effects, such as clothing, bedding, books, etc.
Immediately after the return of Colonel White to his quarters,
preparations for the surrender commenced. After a little interval the
gates were thrown open and a train of soldiers marched out, and
forming a square on the green, just outside, stood a few moments in
impressive stillness. Then they formed into line, where they stacked
their arms, and returned to their quarters.
General Burnside, General Parke, and Captains Biggs and King
directly after this ceremony, returned from the fort, and the Fifth
Rhode Island being ordered into line, came up. General Burnside
unfolded the new colors presented by the State of Rhode Island,
inscribed with the words “Roanoke” and “Newbern,” which had been
just received, and returned them to the color-bearer, who took his
place at the head of the column. The regiment then moved forward in
order, to take formal possession of the fort.
The time had at last come for the great event. The wharves and
houses of Beaufort were crowded with spectators. The surrounding
waters were covered with small craft, hovering near the scene. The
squadron of gunboats, with steam up and colors flying, lay off and on
outside the bar. At half-past ten o’clock a squad of men from the
garrison, detailed by Colonel White for the purpose, cut loose the
halliards and hauled down the rebel flag. Ten minutes later four of
the Rhode Island boys hoisted the American ensign, the glorious
stars and stripes, and a loud cheer broke from the men, which was
caught up and echoed by the sailors on shipboard, and even by the
citizens over the harbor, in Beaufort, whose shout came cheerily on
the breeze.
The Federal fleet, consisting of the steamers State of Georgia,
Chippewa, Daylight, and bark Gemsbok, under command of Flag-
officer S. Lockwood, took an active part in the bombardment in the
forenoon.
The destruction effected by the bombardment was like that at Fort
Pulaski. The works outside as well as inside, gave incontestible proof
of the execution of the heavy projectiles hurled at the fort. They also
showed as clearly the bravery of the men who defended it, and
proved that though they were engaged in rebellion, they had the
courage and energy of heroic soldiers.
The garrison consisted of about four hundred and fifty men,
exclusive of the officers. There were found in the fort nearly twenty
thousand pounds of powder, shot and shell in proportion, and a large
quantity of provisions.
The rebel loss was 7 killed, 18 wounded; Federal, 1 killed and 3
wounded.
SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, VA.

On Sunday, the 9th of March, the rebel camps at Centreville,


Manassas and vicinity were evacuated, and on the 10th, the army of
General McClellan commenced a forward movement from the
vicinity of Washington toward the abandoned works of the enemy.
On the same day a portion of General Kearney’s forces reached
Centreville, and Federal scouts had explored the deserted works at
Manassas Junction. The enemy continued their retreat on the line of
the Orange railroad, burning the bridges, and destroying the railroad
property on their route.
On the 14th, General McClellan issued an address to the army
from his headquarters at Fairfax Court-House, complimenting the
men on their discipline, equipment, and patience during the long
delay incident to the work of preparation. They were now to be
brought face to face with the enemy, and he besought the army to
place perfect trust in him, though his plans of action might seem at
times unaccountable.
The cheering news of the capture of New Madrid, the evacuation of
Columbus, and the victory at Pea Ridge, now filled all loyal hearts
with enthusiasm; and it was fully believed that the army of the
Potomac was on the direct route to Richmond, destined to give the
death-blow to the rebellion before the month of April should open.
Will the rebels make a stand? asked many a confident Unionist,
hopeful that the prestige of McClellan’s splendid army would compel
the enemy to retire from point to point without risking a battle.
The month of March passed;—and while the public mind was
animated with the most cheering details of the western victories—the
capture of Newbern, and the defeat of the enemy at Winchester, the
great army of the Potomac appeared for the time to have passed from
recollection. The Government censorship restrained the publication
of any reports of McClellan’s movements, and the people, left
entirely to hope and conjecture, were sanguine in anticipation of the
speedy possession of the Confederate capital.
Late in the month, rumors reached the northern cities of the
arrival of forces at Old Point, on the James river, twenty miles from
Norfolk, which were supposed by the Richmond papers to be
reinforcements for Burnside. Again curiosity was awakened by the
immense number of transports called for and chartered by the
Government, daily arriving at the mouth of the Chesapeake. On the
26th, Great Bethel was taken possession of by the Federal troops,
and on the 29th a reconnoissance in force was made toward
Yorktown. It was now generally known that the large army under
General McClellan had been conveyed by transports to Old Point,
and was marching to attack the rebel entrenchments at Yorktown,
the key of the Peninsula.
On the 5th of April, General McClellan’s dispatch to the Secretary
of War, announced that his army had that day arrived in front of the
enemy’s works, having met with but slight opposition on its route.
During this period the weather was unfavorable for military
operations. Heavy storm-clouds frowned inauspiciously on the
approaching army, rain fell almost daily in torrents, and this at a
time when there could be no adequate provision for shelter.
The Federal army was now destined to undergo an experience of
toil and privations calculated to try its endurance to the utmost.
Solid roads were absolutely necessary for transportation from the
landings to the various encampments, as it was impossible to draw
the immense siege and supply trains over or through the soft alluvial
mire formed by the unremitting rains, while the creeks and water
courses were swollen into torrents. Skirmishing was of daily
occurrence—for the enemy neglected no opportunity to annoy their
formidable opponents, while the Federal army found it necessary to
push its advances within commanding reach of the rebel
entrenchments, which stretched from the York to the James rivers, a
distance of six miles. The rebel earthworks were ponderously built—
some of them of a height and thickness hitherto unparalleled in any
war.
The Union soldiery toiled incessantly in the trenches, while
covering parties, with efficient batteries, stood guard in their
defence, and daily sacrificed some of their brave numbers while
protecting their toiling comrades.
The labors of the Federal army soon became apparent. Formidable
earthworks began to show their heads, and artillery of the largest
calibre was put in position. The rebel generals were struck with
astonishment and dismay when the evidences of engineering skill
hitherto unsuspected, stood revealed before them.
On the other hand, every day more fully revealed the extensive and
intricate line of the rebel defences. Their strength in forts, lunettes
and rifle-pits—their constantly increasing numbers, and untiring
activity, with their accurate knowledge of the topography of the
country, increased the magnitude of the work before the Federal
army. The natural obstacles to its progress were by no means few or
trifling. The sinuous windings of the line of attack they were obliged
to assume—the innumerable swamps and pools of water confronting
them on every side, the almost impenetrable forests and tangled
undergrowth added to their labors and their sufferings. Cold and
shivering under garments saturated anew by the rains of to-day, ere
those of yesterday had been vaporized, the soldiers endured the
pangs of hunger and fatigue unappalled. In view of the terrific
struggle before them, human suffering counted for nothing with
these brave men. No signs of discontent were manifest. Even in their
hardest trials the utmost cheerfulness prevailed; and in more remote
positions, where a less rigid discipline was enforced, the patriotic
strains of “The Star Spangled Banner” and the “Red, White and
Blue,” were heard ringing up through the storm. Not unfrequently,
with faces turned toward the patriot homes from whence they came,
would they sing “Do they Miss me at Home?” or “Let me Kiss him for
his Mother”—while they breathed the silent prayer that, through the
uncertainties of war, they might be permitted again to mingle with
their friends in the enjoyment of a bravely won peace.
Daily would some adventurous band of Federal soldiers explore
the intricacies of the rebel defences, coming constantly in collision
with the enemy. In these adventures the new and efficient regiments
of sharpshooters, just introduced into the United States army,
rendered valuable service.
A month before the Union army invested Yorktown, the iron
battery Merrimac had made her advent in Hampton Roads, and after
destroying the noble old frigates Cumberland and Congress—the
pride of a past era—she met the Monitor, her conqueror and the
nation’s champion. The combat that ensued has stamped a glorious
page on the world’s history for all time. Like Lucifer in his fall, the
rebel monster shrank with “despairing, cursing rage” behind the
batteries at Yorktown, while the terrors of her exploits, and
rejoicings at her defeat, quickened the nation’s heart-pulses from
Maine to Maryland.
The noble Minnesota, resting in calm and majestic repose on the
waters of the Chesapeake, hitherto would have acknowledged no
superior in a naval combat. An exposure for two hours to the heavy
guns of the Merrimac, which pierced her wooden walls with shot and
shell, while her own missiles were ineffective as pebbles on the scales
of the leviathan, destroyed her prestige and her pride of strength.
An efficient fleet of gunboats had been ordered to act in
conjunction with McClellan’s forces in the reduction of Yorktown;
but the presence of the Merrimac no doubt frustrated their plans. On
the 15th of April several of the gunboats commenced shelling the
woods below Gloucester. One boat approaching within two miles of
Yorktown, brought her guns to bear on that place, until driven off by
the rebel batteries.
About the same time a portion of the Potomac flotilla ascended the
Rappahannock, meeting with but slight opposition, visiting the
towns of Urbana and Tappahannock, and destroying the enemy’s
batteries and huts at Lowry’s Point.
BATTLE OF LEE’S MILLS, VA.

April 16, 1862.

The defence of Yorktown prompted the rebel chiefs to project a


line of batteries and earthworks across the peninsula which has been
rendered so prominent in historic interest by the series of important
events that have occurred between Richmond and Fortress Monroe.
In the course of completing this line, a battery was commenced at a
point on the Warwick road, on the estate of Mrs. Garrow, between
Lee’s Mills and Winn’s Mills. There is here an extensive field, with
woods to the right and left, and in the rear of the road. In front, at
the foot of a gradually descending slope, is a branch of the Warwick
river. The stream had been dammed up between these mills, the
water covering a breadth of from thirty to forty rods, and in the
deepest parts about four and a half feet deep. On the bank was a
rifle-pit, and above it, on the hill, breastworks, with their embrasures
for guns, frowned upon the water.
The arrest of this work, and the expulsion of the rebels, became
necessary, in order to prevent the completion of what might have
become a formidable obstacle. Accordingly, on the morning of the
16th, a party of skirmishers from the Fourth Vermont was thrown
out, and took a position near the enemy’s one gun battery, at the
point named, a New York battery being also advanced at the same
time. Opposite the enemy’s works at that place there was a
considerable space clear of large wood, overgrown with low shrubs
and young pine, and surrounded in every direction except towards
the enemy by a dense forest. Warwick Creek—from four to five feet
deep and about twenty rods wide—separated this field from the rebel
battery. Through the low shrubs and young pine the Vermonters
made their way up to the edge of the stream, and poured upon the
enemy a storm of rifle shot that he soon found it impossible to
withstand. After a few moments of this fire not a man was to be seen
within the enemy’s lines.
Two pieces of the battery—ten-pound Parrots, under Lieutenant
Flynn—then took up a position in the edge of the wood, at one
thousand yards from the enemy’s line, and opened fire. Then the
enemy came bravely up to the business, and responded with the large
gun in his one gun battery, and with two others in a battery behind it.
Lieutenant Stewart, with the second section of the same battery—two
twelve-pound Napoleon guns—was ordered up, with the left section,
under Lieutenant O’Donald. With this reinforcement the fire became
heavy between the artillery on both sides; the Union skirmishers and
numbers of the enemy’s skirmishers also pouring in their fire
whenever they saw an opportunity.
At about ten A. M., after nearly two hours’ sharp firing, the enemy
ceased to respond, not, it was thought, because his guns had been
disabled, but because the Union riflemen held his position so entirely
under fire that it was almost certain death for his men to be seen.
It was now deemed necessary to ascertain the enemy’s force at this
point and his disposition to fight. Upon consultation between
General McClellan and two division commanders, it was determined
to make a more decided demonstration of attack, and, accordingly,
between three and four P. M., three batteries were ordered forward
into the exposed field, and opened fire at about five hundred yards.
This woke the enemy up; he responded warmly for twenty minutes,
and once more relapsed into silence. In no way deceived by this, the
three batteries continued to play upon his position for some minutes
longer, when word was brought to the General of the Vermont
brigade that the creek was easily fordable, at some distance to the
right, and Colonel Hyde, in command of four companies of the
Vermont Third, who had skirmished in advance, was ordered to send
two of his companies across the creek at the point where it was said
to be only knee-deep, advance them to the enemy’s left, and charge
the work in rear. He accordingly sent across companies D and F, and
supported them very closely with companies E and K. Meanwhile the
Federal batteries became silent. No sooner were the Vermonters in
the stream than the water was found to be much deeper than had
been stated; the men went up to their arm-pits, and every charge of

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