Jake Brancatella

Master’s in Philosophy and Theology

The God of Aristotle is Not the God of Abraham

Abstract
There has been extensive debate in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions

concerning the relationship between the God of Aristotle and the God of Abraham. Are they

the same God? This paper seeks to address this question from an Islamic perspective. After

providing the necessary details for the theology of Aristotle, the focus will turn towards

detailing the legendary Sunni scholar of hadith Muhammad al-Bukhari’s understanding of divine

action. The author will support the interpretation being argued for by utilizing the

interpretations of al-Bukhari’s view on divine action from Asharis and Maturidis. Commentary

from Muhammad Anwar Shah al-Kashmiri will serve to vindicate the controversial theologian

Ibn Taymiyyah, demonstrating his compatibility with the theology of al-Bukhari and ahl al-

hadith (People of Hadith). A parallel will be drawn between the Mutakallimun (practitioners of

kalam) and Aristotle’s notion of divine immutability and its relation to divine perfection,

followed by a brief rejoinder. Finally, a response will be provided to another common objection

to the theology of al-Bukhari and Ibn Taymiyyah based on the well-known Qur’anic reference of

ْ َ ‫س َك ِم ْث ِل ِه‬
‫شء‬ َ ‫( َل ْي‬There is nothing like Unto Him).
‫ي‬

As understood by al-Bukhari, the Qur’an portrays God (Allah) as a dynamic Creator

capable of acting in succession. On the other hand, the God of Aristotle is a static, simple God

incapable of thinking of anything except Himself. Despite protestations by some of the “Islamic

Philosophers” and Mutakallimun (practitioners of kalaam), the God of Aristotle is not the God

of Abraham.
 The God of Aristotle

The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, born nearly four hundred years before Christ,

has undoubtedly influenced philosophy and theology. Some representatives of the “Abrahamic

faiths,” i.e., those that trace their religious claims back to Abraham, would view Aristotle as an

authority and others as an enemy. Perhaps the most influential Catholic theologian, Thomas

Aquinas, commonly referred to Aristotle as “The Philosopher.” Aristotle’s impact on Aquinas’

metaphysics and theology is uncontroversial. Still, other theologians within these traditions

viewed Aristotle with great suspicion.1

Aristotle’s conception of God is perhaps better understood when contrasted with the

theology of his teacher, Plato. Like his student Aristotle, Plato grew up in ancient Greece

attempting to answer similar questions but sometimes concluding with different answers. For

example, Plato famously held that universals existed in a distinct world of forms. 2 At the same

time, Aristotle denied the world of forms and instead located universals in particular objects. 3

Similarly, Aristotle differed from his teacher regarding the nature of God. There is an

interpretive dispute about whether Plato held that The One (God) was identical to Being or

beyond Being. In Plato’s famous work The Republic, he states, And say that as for the objects of

1
Pasnau, Robert, "Thomas Aquinas", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023
Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/aquinas/>.

2Rogers, A. K. (1935). Plato’s Theory of Forms. The Philosophical Review, 44(6), 515–533.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2179922

3
Orilia, Francesco and Michele Paolini Paoletti, "Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/properties/>.
knowledge, not only is their being known due to the Good, but also their being, though the

Good is not being but superior to and beyond being in dignity and power (οὐκ οὐσίας ὀντος τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας).4 This text gives the impression that Plato viewed God as

beyond Being itself.

Proclus, considering himself a faithful interpreter of Plato, interpreted Plato along the

same lines, saying,

They [viz., Plato and Speusippus] held that the One is better than Being and is the source

of Being (melius ente [...] a quo le ens), and they separated it from the usual

understanding of what a Principle is. Maintaining that if the One itself is taken by itself

and considered alone without other things, nothing else being added to it would not be

able to produce any other thing, they introduced the principle of the Indefinite Dyad as

principle of beings.5

Aristotle does not interpret Plato in the same manner as Proclus. In the following

passage, Aristotle represents Plato as holding the view that God is identical to Being itself,

The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most necessary for knowledge of the

truth is whether being and one are the substances of beings (οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων) and

whether each of them, without being anything else, is being or one respectively, or we

must inquire what being, and one are, with the implication that they have some other

4
Plato, Republic 6, 509b in Reale, Toward a New Interpretation of Plato, 148

5 Proclus, In Plat. Parmenidem, 38ff., ed Klibansky-Labowsky, in Reale, Toward a New

Interpretation of Plato, 148, slightly modified
 underlying nature. Some people think they are of the former, while others believe they

are of the latter character. Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being (τὸ ὂν) and one

(τὸ ἓν) were nothing else (οὐχ ἕτερόν), but this was their nature, their essence being

just one and being.6

Whether one interprets Plato as thinking of the One as beyond Being or Being itself,

Aristotle does not hold to either view substantively. Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s view is that it

inevitably leads to Parmenides’ Monism or at least fails to avoid its unwelcomed conclusions. 7

The God of Aristotle is neither beyond being nor an impersonal universal concept seemingly

existing in the mind alone. However, the personal nature of Aristotle’s conception of God may

be questioned. Aristotle describes God as an unchanging activity whose activity is thinking, and

the object of His thought is Himself alone. Aristotle expresses this notion in the following

passage,

And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself and that which is thinking in

the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself

because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of

thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object

of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought,

i.e., the essence, is thought.8

6 Aristotle, Metaphysics B 4, 1001a4- 1001a12, trans. Ross, slightly modified

7 Aristotle, Metaphysics B 4, 1001a29-1001b6, trans. Ross, slightly modified

8 Aristotle, Metaphysics B 4, Part 8, trans. Ross

 One may assume that Aristotle’s God is “personal” because it has or is an intellectual

activity. However, it is impersonal in a more relevant sense in that it only has itself as the object

of its thought and is not related to anything outside itself. Aristotle’s God does not “change” in

any way either, as he states, “Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and

precious, and it does not change (lat. non trasmutatur); for change would be change for the

worse, and this would be already a movement (lat. motus).”9 The assumption by Aristotle is

that since God is perfect, if He were to do or think of anything other than Himself, He would no

longer be perfect. According to Aristotle, “Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought

thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking

(νοήσεως νόησις, lat. intelligentiae intelligentia).”10 Although Aristotle maintains that God is an

activity, he believes God is a static, unchanging activity that only thinks of Himself. This idea of

God certainly cannot be the dynamic God of the Qur’an who has knowledge of and power over

everything. They are not the same God in that they are described and understood radically

differently, leaving aside technical disputes surrounding Frege’s sense/reference distinction and

synthetic identity.11

The God of the Qur’an

The legacy and influence of Plato and Aristotle on subsequent philosophers and

theologians in the Abrahamic tradition is undeniable. As previously noted, some theologians

9 Aristotle, Metaphysics B 7, Part 9, trans. Ross

10
Aristotle, Metaphysics B 7, Part 9, trans. Ross

11 See: Moore, A. W. (1993). Meaning and reference (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.
fully embraced much of the thought of ancient Greece, while others sought to avoid outside

influence upon revealed truth. Of those who attempted to marry Greek thought with religion,

competing narratives emerged regarding the purpose and status of divine revelation. Some

suggested that the masses could not attain metaphysical truths through sophisticated

discursive reasoning.12 Considering this, God revealed through scripture that the laity was His

target audience. These philosophers offered other speculations as the gap between religious

language in scripture, and the technical jargon of philosophy was apparent. If the theology of

Aristotle is true, then why is the God of revelation described, at least on the surface, as

something radically different? This is a question philosophers such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn

Rushd (Averroes), and others attempted to answer.

On the other hand, many within the Islamic tradition deemed their attempts futile. They

identified the appropriation of Aristotle and the Greeks as a failed project and even a rejection

of revelation.13 The Mutakallimun (practitioners of kalaam), represented by the Asharis and

Maturidis, rejected divine simplicity but largely affirmed divine immutability and timelessness.

Their doctrine of divine immutability affected how the Mutakallimun interpreted the Islamic

texts regarding divine action. The apparent meaning of the Qur’an presents Allah as genuinely

acting in succession, but this presents a problem for the Mutakallimun as it contradicts their

conception of God.

The Legendary Sunni Scholar of Hadith--Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari

12
Averroës. (2002). Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory (C. E. Butterworth, Trans.).

13Ghazzālī. (2000). Al-Ghazālī’s Path to Sufism and His Deliverance from Error: An Annotated
Translation of Al-Munqidh Min Al Dalal (R. J. McCarthy, Trans.).
 Those with the slightest degree of familiarity with the Islamic tradition will immediately

recognize the name al-Bukhari. Al-Bukhari was born in the city of Bukhara in present-day

Uzbekistan in 810 CE, less than two hundred years after the demise of the prophet Muhammad

‫ﷺ‬. Imam al-Bukhari is most well-known for his scholarly contribution to the science of hadith,

culminating in his magnum opus, Sahih al-Bukhari, a Sunni collection of ahadith, sayings, and

traditions attributed to the prophet Muhammad. Many Muslims consider Sahih al-Bukhari as

the most authentic collection of traditions of the prophet Muhammad and even the most

valued text in the Islamic tradition, second only to the Qur’an.14

During al-Bukhari’s time, a controversy arose regarding the status of the Qur’an. The

Mu’tazila were an early sect of Islam that obtained political power and sought to enforce their

theology upon the public. The Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun began persecuting Muslims in 833 CE

over a theological controversy that became known as the Mihna.15 The Mihna controversy

centered around whether the Qur’an was created or not. Al-Ma’mun and the Mu’tazila

maintained that the Qur’an was created and persecuted those who believed the Qur’an was

uncreated (ghayr makhluq). Although al-Bukhari is best known for his collection of ahadith, he,

too, found himself in the middle of this controversy. Al-Bukhari asserted that the Qur’an was

the Word of Allah ‫ ﷻ‬and uncreated, whereas God creates the recitations or actions of human

14al-Nawawi, Abu Zakariyya Yahya ibn Sharaf (1972). Al Minhaj, Sharh Sahih Muslim ibn al-
Hajjaj (in Arabic) (2nd ed.). Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi. p. 14.

15Patton, W. (1897). Ahmed Ibn Hanbal And the Mihna: A Biography of the Imam Including an
Account of The Mohammedan Inquisition Called the Mihna.
beings.16 Much more can be said about the Mihna, but it is mentioned here merely to establish

the relevance of al-Bukhari in this discussion. It is safe to say that al-Bukhari is viewed as

orthodox in his theology by all groups that claim to be Sunni. For this reason, as well as the

availability of his texts in the relevant field, al-Bukhari’s theology has been selected for analysis.

Following the rest of ahl al-hadith (people of hadith), al-Bukhari rejected divine

simplicity. That is if one means by divine simplicity the notion that God is an undifferentiated

reality, devoid of any real distinctions within Himself. Accepting God possesses real attributes is

wholly opposed to the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and their likes, who viewed God as a simple,

undifferentiated reality. The basic premise of their doctrine was that distinction entailed

composition, and composition, in turn, entailed causation. Anything possessing real distinctions

within itself requires a cause outside of itself. God is, by definition, uncaused. Therefore, God

cannot contain any real distinctions within Himself, including between His attributes or

between His attributes and His essence. Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, and those who followed the

principles of the Greeks maintained that God was a simple reality either devoid of any

attributes or understood God’s attributes as being identical to each other and identical to His

essence.17 Al-Bukhari, ahl al-hadith, the Asharis, and the Maturidis rejected this reasoning. They

understood the Qur’an and ahadith as requiring Muslims to affirm that God has real attributes

16 Brown, Jonathan (2007). "Three: The Genesis of al-Bukhārī and Muslim". The Canonization of
al-Bukhari and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni Hadith Canon. Koninklijke Brill
NV, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. p. 80.

17Khodadadi, Hossein (2023). Ibn Sina: Divine Simplicity and the Problem of Ineffability.
International Journal of Indonesian Philosophy and Theology 4 (1):29-40.
that are not identical to each other.18 For example, God’s attribute (sifa) of power is not

identical to His attribute (sifa) of knowledge. Indeed, there are differences between ahl al-

hadith and the Ashari and Maturidi schools of kalaam on other important topics, but they agree

on rejecting this notion of divine simplicity. Sunni scholars typically gave three lines of evidence

in support of the affirmation that God possesses real attributes. They provided textual and

rational arguments while appealing to authorities within the tradition at the same time.

However, a different topic will be discussed in more detail instead of focusing on debates about

divine simplicity in the Islamic tradition.

One of the most significant differences between the God of Aristotle and the God of the

Qur’an is Aristotle’s belief in a static, mute conception of God. On the other hand, the God of

the Qur’an is a dynamic being who speaks whenever He wills. Allah constantly creates new

things, speaks to His creation, and can perform different actions at different times. Throughout

the Qur’an, we witness Allah acting successively. Here are some examples,

Qur’an 10:34 “Say, ‘Allah begins creation and then repeats it’.”19
ُ ُ ْ َ ْ ُ۟ َ ُ‫ه‬ ُ ُ
‫ٱَّلل َي ْبدؤا ٱلخل َق ث َّم ُي ِعيد ُهۥ‬ ‫ُي ِعيد ُهۥ ۚ ق ِل‬

Qur’an 55:29: “...every day He is bringing about a matter.”20

ْ َ ُ ُ
‫ك َّل َي ْو ٍم ه َو ف شأن‬

18Turner, Jamie B. & Doko, Enis (2023). A Metaphysical Inquiry into Islamic Theism. In Robert C.
Koons & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), Classical Theism: New Essays on the Metaphysics of God.
Routledge. pp. 149-166.

19
Qur’an 10:34 (Translated by Sahih International)

20 Qur’an 55:29 (Translated by Sahih International)

Qur’an 65:1 “...perhaps Allah will originate after that a [different] matter.”21
َ َ َ َ ُ َ ‫َل َع َّل ه‬
‫ٱَّلل ُي ْح ِدث َب ْعد ذ َٰ ِلك أ ْم ًۭرا‬

Qur’an 2:29: “It is He who created for you all that which is on the earth. Then He directed
Himself to the heaven, [His being above all creation,] and made them seven heavens.”22
َ ٓ َّ َ ٰٓ َ ُ َْ ُ َ ََ ‫ُ ه‬
‫ٱلس َما ِء ف َس َّو َٰى ُه َّن َس ْب َع َس َم َٰـ َ َٰو ت‬ ‫يعا ث َّم ْٱست َو َٰى ِإَل‬ َ ‫ٱْل ْر‬
ًۭ ‫ض ج ِم‬
ِ ‫هو ٱل ِذى خل َق لكم َّما ِف‬

Qur’an 7:11: “And We have certainly created you [O Humankind] and given you [human] form.
Then We said to the angels, ‘Prostrate to Adam’.”23
َ ۟ ُ َ ٰٓ َ ْ َ ْ ُ ُ ُ َ ُ ُ َََْ ْ ََ
‫ََولقد خلقن َٰـك ْم ث َّم َص َّو ْرن َٰـك ْم ث َّم قلنا ِلل َمل َٰـ ِئك ِة ْٱس ُجدوا ِل َٔـادم‬

Qur’an 15:26-27: “And We did certainly create man out of clay from an altered black mud. And
the jinn We created before from scorching fire.24
ُ ٍۢ ْ َ ‫َو َل َق ْد َخ َل ْق َنا ْٱْل‬
‫نس َٰـ َن ِمن َصل َص َٰـ ٍ ٍۢل ِّم ْن َح َم ٍإ َّم ْسنون‬ ِ
َّ ‫َِو ْٱل َج ٓا َّن َخ َل ْق َن َٰـ ُه من َق ْب ُل من َّنار‬
‫ٱلس ُموم‬ ِ ِ ِ

These passages do not scratch the surface concerning the evidence supporting the claim

that the God of the Qur’an is a being that acts in succession, performing different actions at

different times. Even the so-called philosophers opposed to this doctrine readily admit this is the

apparent meaning of these texts. However, as mentioned earlier, the God of Aristotle is incapable

of doing anything other than thinking of Himself. For the philosophers and some of the

Mutakallimun, these passages must be reinterpreted in favor of their Aristotelian assumption of

divine immutability.

21 Qur’an 65:1 (Translated by Sahih International)

22 Qur’an 2:29 (Translated by Sahih International)

23 Qur’an 7:11 (Translated by Sahih International)

24 Qur’an 15:26-27 (Translated by Sahih International)

 Why would God reveal scripture in such a way that presents Him as performing temporal

actions when, according to Aristotle and those who followed him, God is incapable of doing so?

Remember that common folk, devoid of philosophical training, read the Qur’an as suggested. Is

God going to judge and punish people for affirming this view of God when the apparent meaning

of His revealed text states this? This is doubtful. Those opposed to understanding God as He

describes Himself in these plain texts offer different answers to these questions, but none are

convincing.

The Actions of Allah According to al-Bukhari

The following text from al-Bukhari lays the foundation for his view on God’s actions,
َْ ْ َ ْ ْ َ َ َ َ
‫ َوال َمفعول غ ْْيه ِم َن الخل ِق‬،‫اّلل‬
ِ ‫اّلل ِصفة‬ ِ ‫ف ِف ْعل‬
َ ْ َّ ْ ْ َْ َ َ َ ُْ َ ُ َ َ ْ ْ ْ ْ َ َ
ِ ‫ التخليق ِف ْعل‬:‫ال أهل ال ِعل ِم‬
25‫اّلل‬ ‫ وق‬،‫ ل ِك ْن َمخلوق‬:‫ لذلك قالوا‬،‫ ال ِف ْعل َوال َمفعول َو ِاحد‬:‫الت ال َج ْه ِم َّية‬
ِ ‫وق‬

So, Allah’s action is His attribute, and that which is acted upon is distinct from Him,

being part of His creation…And the Jahmiyyah said: ‘The act (of Allah) is the same as that

which is acted upon.’ This is why they said to ‘Be!’ - “[It is] created.” And the people of

knowledge said: ‘Al-Takhliq (bringing into existence) is the act of Allah.’ [Translated by

Jake Brancatella]

Here, al-Bukhari explicitly states that the actions of God are attributes (sifat) of His. Al-

Bukhari also notes that the acts of God are distinct from the effects of His actions. Opposing al-

Bukhari’s view is a group known as the Jahmiyyah, named after Jahm ibn Safwan, deemed

heretical by Sunni authorities. They held that God’s “actions” are identical to His effects or His

25
ْ ‫ عبد الرحمن‬.‫د‬, Vol. 1, pg 113).
al-Bukhari, M. (1977). (Khalq Af’aal Al-’Ibaad)‫عمية( خلق أفعال العباد‬
‫دار المعارف السعودية‬.
creation. This idea is perplexing but was much more common than one may assume. Part of the

motivation for holding the view of the Jahmiyyah was to avoid attributing temporality to God in

any way. They reasoned that if God performs new actions and His acts are genuinely distinct

from their effects, God would be ascribed with “accidents.”

The Asharis and Maturidis shared this concern with the Jahmiyyah and denied that God

acts in succession. The Maturidis held that God’s actions are subsumed under His eternal

attribute of takwin (acts of creating).26 Still, the Maturidis had difficulty explaining the

relationship between God’s eternal acts and His temporal effects. Al-Bukhari did not directly

engage with Asharis or Maturidis, as these groups formed after his time. However, the Ashari

view, which developed later, is akin to the position of the Jahmiyyah, both groups affirming that

Allah’s “actions” refer to His effects or the temporal events witnessed in creation and are not

attributes of His essence.

On the other hand, al-Bukhari understands that there is a doer of the action (Allah), the

act of the agent, and the created effect, which is the result of the action. The view of the

Jaymiyyah and, by extension, the view later adopted by the Asharis is sharply contrasted with

the view of the “people of knowledge” by Imam al-Bukhari.

Al-Bukhari not only affirmed that God’s actions are attributes of His, but he also

affirmed the temporal notion of God’s actions in the following passage,

27‫َب ْع َد‬ َ َ ََ َْ َ
َ ‫﴿ل َع َّل‬ َ ْ ْ َ َ ْ َ ُ َ َ َ
‫هللا ي ْح ِدث‬ ‫﴿ما َيأ ِت ِيه ْم ِم ْن ِذك ٍر ِم ْن َرِّب ِه ْم م ْحد ٍث﴾ وقو ِل ِه تعاَل‬ ‫هللا ت َعاَل ﴿ك َّل َي ْو ٍم ه َو ِ يف شأ ٍن﴾ و‬ َ
ِ ‫باب ق ْو ِل‬
ْ ْ َ ‫س َك ِم ْث ِل ِه‬
َّ ‫شء َوه َو‬ َ َ ََ ْ َ َ ُْ َْ َ َ َ
َ ‫﴿ل ْي‬ ْ َ َ َ َ َّ َ َ ً ْ َ َ َ
‫الس ِميع ال َب ِص ْي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫وق ْي ِلقو ِل ِه تعاَل‬
ِ ‫ل‬‫خ‬ ‫م‬‫ال‬ ‫ث‬ ‫د‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ب‬
ِ ‫ش‬‫﴾ذ ِلك أمرا﴾ وأن حدثه َل ي‬

26 The Differences Between the Ash’aris & Maturidis (Abd Al-Aziz Suraqah, Trans.). (2018).

27 al-Bukhari, M. (2001). (Sahih al-Bukhari) ‫السلطانية( صحيح البخاري‬, Vol. 9, pg 152). ‫دار طوق النجاة‬.
 Chapter: on Allah’s saying: ‘Every day He is engaged in some affair’ [Quran 55:29], and

His statement: ‘[Quran 21:2], and Allah saying: ‘Perhaps Allah will ordain (yuhdithu) a

matter after that’ [Quran 65:1], and that His occurrences (hadathahu), exalted be He,

are not similar to the occurrences (hadath) of creatures. According to the saying of

Allah, Most-High: There is nothing like Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing. [Qur’an

42:11] [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

One may have noticed that Imam al-Bukhari quotes some of the same verses of the

Qur’an that were cited earlier to support the claim that the God of the Qur’an acts in

succession. After citing these verses, al-Bukhari mentions that God’s hawadith (new

occurrences) are unlike the temporal events of creatures. Al-Bukhari makes clear the distinction

between the temporal actions of God and the temporal events in creation in the following

passage,
َ َْ ْ َ ْ ُ ‫َ َ ْ ُ ُ َ ْ َ َ َ ْ َ َّ َ ه‬ َ ‫اَّلل َر ُّب ْال َع َالم‬ َ ْ َ ُ ْ َ ْ ُ َ ََ
ُ ‫اْل ْم ُر َت َب َار َك ه‬
:‫اَّلل الخل َق ِم َن اْل ْم ِر ِبق ْو ِل ِه‬ ‫ "قد بي‬:‫] " قال ابن عيينة‬٥٤ :‫ي} [اْلعراف‬ ِ ‫أَل له الخلق و‬
ََ َ َْ ‫ه‬ َ َ َ ُ َْ ْ َ َ ْ َ ُ ْ َ ْ ُ َ ََ
:‫ َوكق ْو ِل ِه‬، ]٤ :‫{َّلل اْل ْم ُر ِم ْن ق ْب ُل َو ِم ْن َب ْع ُد} [الروم‬
ِ ِ :‫ فالخلق ِبأ ْم ِر ِه كق ْو ِل ِه‬، ]٥٤ :‫{أَل له الخلق واْل ْم ُر} [اْلعراف‬
َ ُ ْ َ ْ َ ُ َ َّ َ ُ َ ْ َ َ ْ َ ََ ُ ُ َ ُ ُ َ َ ُ َ ْ َ ً ْ َ َ َ َ َ ُ ُ ْ َ َ َّ
}‫ض ِبأ ْم ِر ِه‬‫ {و ِمن آي ِات ِه أن تقوم السماء واْلر‬:‫ َوكق ْو ِل ِه‬، ]٨٢ :‫ول له ك ْن ف َيكون} [يس‬ ‫ِ{إنما أمره ِإذا أراد شيئا أن يق‬
َْ ُ َ
‫ َول ْم َيق ْل ِبخل ِقه‬، ]٢٥ :‫"ِ[الروم‬28

[In his discussion of the verse] {Indeed, to Him belongs the creation and the command.

Blessed is Allah, Lord of the worlds.} [Al-A’raf: 54] Ibn Uyaynah said: “Allah has

distinguished the creation from the command by saying: {Indeed, to Him belongs the

creation and the command} [Al-A’raf: 54], so the creation is by His command, as He

28
ْ ‫ عبد الرحمن‬.‫د‬, Vol. 1, pg 45).
al-Bukhari, M. (1977). (Khalq Af’aal Al-’Ibaad)‫عمية( خلق أفعال العباد‬
‫دار المعارف السعودية‬.
 stated elsewhere, such as: {To Allah belongs the command before and after} [Ar-Rum:

4], and as He stated: {His command is that only when He intends a thing that He says to

it, “Be,” and it is} [Ya-Sin: 82], and as He stated: {And of His signs is that the heaven and

earth remain by His command} [Ar-Rum: 25], and He did not say by His creation.

[Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Notice that al-Bukhari uses the above verses of the Qur’an to establish that God’s

commands are not only temporal but are uncreated. One may be wondering how this is

possible. If something has a beginning in time, then does that not mean that it is created?

According to al-Bukhari, that is not the case, as God’s actions can have a beginning in time and

yet are uncreated. Eastern Orthodox Christians hold a similar view following Gregory Palamas.29

This position deserves further elaboration and defense, but space does not allow this.

Interpretations of al-Bukhari by the Mutakallimun

Some may assume the interpretation provided above by Imam al-Bukhari is novel due to

unstated biases on the author’s part. This concern is natural. This section will produce

references confirming the interpretation of al-Bukhari’s statements in the previous section from

Ashari and Maturidi scholars. The Maliki scholar Ibn Battal comments on al-Bukhari’s

statements saying, ‫ فأحال‬،‫غرض البخاري الفرق بي وصف كالم هللا تعاَل بأنه مخلوق وبي وصفه بأنه محدث‬

30‫الظاهر وهو خطأ‬ ‫ وهذا قول بعض المعتلة وأهل‬،‫وصفه بالخلق وأجاز وصفه بالحدث اعتمادا عىل اآلية‬

29 Palamas, S. G. (1983). The Triads. Paulist Press. Pg. 77

30 al-Maliki, I. B. (2003). (Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari) ‫( شح صحيح البخارى‬2nd ed., Vol. 10, pg 525).
‫مكتبة الرشد‬.
 Al-Bukhari aimed to distinguish between the attributions of createdness and

temporality to Allah’s speech. He prohibited describing it as created and permitted

describing it as temporal based on the verse, and this is the position of some of the

Mu’tazila and the people of literalism, and it is wrong. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

As one can see, Ibn Battal understands Imam al-Bukhari as claiming that God’s speech is

temporal and uncreated. Ibn Battal attributes this view to the “literalists” and claims that al-

Bukhari was wrong in his opinion. However, it is important to note that Ibn Battal did not

condemn al-Bukhari for his view. Ibn Battal did not label al-Bukhari a deviant or disbeliever, as

some holding similar views to al-Bukhari would later be charged with by the Mutakallimun. Ibn

Battal was an Ashari who did not affirm that God’s actions were attributes. Regardless of this

disagreement with al-Bukhari, Ibn Battal accurately interprets al-Bukhari’s statements instead

of reinterpreting them as some later scholars did.31

The Maturidi scholar Badr al-Din al-‘Ayni commented on al-Bukhari’s view regarding
ِّ ُ ْ َ َ َ َ َ َ َْ َ
َ ‫ َو َل ْم َي َز ْل ُس ْب َح َان ُه َو َت َع َاَل ب‬،‫ َو ُه َو م ْن ص َفاته‬،‫ت َأ َّن ُه ُم َح ِّد ٌث‬
Allah’s actions, saying, :‫ي‬
ِ ‫ وقال ابن الت‬،‫يع ِصف ِات ِه‬
ِ ‫م‬
ِ ‫ج‬ ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ ‫فأثب‬
َ ُّ ُ ُ ْ ْ َ ٌ َ ُ ْ
‫اس ِتدالله ُي َرد َعل ْي ِه؛ ْلنه إذا كان لم يزل بجميع صفاته وهو قديم فكيف تكون صفته محدثة وهو لم يزل‬‫ و‬،‫هذا ِمنه ع ِظيم‬

‫ وأن حدثه ال‬:‫ حيث قال‬،‫ وهو ظاهر كالم البخاري‬،‫ كما يقوله البلخ ومن تبعه‬،‫بها؟! إال أن يريد أن المحدث غت المخلوق‬
ّ
‫ (ولشأن أحقر من أن يتكلم‬:‫ ثم قال الداودي نحو ما ذكره ف رشح قول عائشة‬.‫ فأثبت أنه محدث‬،‫يشبه حدث المخلوقي‬
ّ ّ ‫هللا‬
.‫ بخالف بعض قول الناس أنه لم يتكلم‬،‫ فيه أن هللا تعاَل تكلم ربتاءة عائشة حي أنزل فيها‬:‫ قال الداودي‬،)‫ف بأمر يتىل‬

ّ ّ
32‫الحوادث‬ ‫فتحل فيه‬ ،‫ هذا من الداودي عظيم؛ ْلنه يلزم منه أن يكون هللا متكلما بكالم حادث‬:‫وقال ابن التي أيضا‬

31 Al-Kashmiri mentions this referring to Ibn Hajar. See: al-Kashmiri, M. (2004). (Sharh Sunan al-
‫( العرف الشذي شح سي ر‬1st ed., Vol. 1, pg 417). ‫الياث العرب‬
Tirmidhi) ‫اليمذي‬ ‫دار ر‬.
‫ي‬

32 al-Din al-Ayni, B. (n.d.). ('Umdat Al-Qaari Sharh Sahih Al-Bukhari) ‫عمدة القاري شح صحيح‬
‫( البخاري‬Vol. 12, pg 179). ‫المنيية‬
ْ ‫إدارة الطباعة‬.
 So, he affirmed that it is temporal. It is also among His attributes, and He - may He be

praised and exalted - has always had His attributes. Ibn Al-Tin said: This is outrageous

from him, and his own evidence refutes him because if He has always had His attributes

and He is eternal, then how can His attribute be temporal while He has always had it?

Unless he means that the temporal is not created, as Al-Balkhi and those who followed

him say, and this is the apparent meaning of al-Bukhari’s words, as he said: ‘And his

occurrence does not resemble the occurrence of the creatures,’ so he affirmed that they

[the actions] are temporal. Furthermore, Al-Dawoodi said something similar in his

commentary on Aisha’s saying: ‘My matter is surely far too insignificant for Allah to

speak about me in a form to be recited,’ Al-Dawoodi said: ‘This indicates that Allah

spoke [the words] of Aisha’s innocence when He revealed [His words] about her,

contrary to some people’s saying that He did not speak. Ibn Al-Tin also said: This is

outrageous from Al-Dawoodi because it implies that Allah speaks with a temporal

speech, which implies that He is subject to temporal events. [Translated by Jake

Brancatella]

Al-‘Ayni says the apparent meaning of al-Bukhari’s words is that Allah’s speech is

temporal and uncreated. In the same passage, al-‘Ayni mentions that others seem to have held

this view, but he cannot understand why. Al-‘Ayni is clear about his underlying assumption in

the final sentence, where he states that al-Bukhari’s view implies Allah is ascribed with

temporal speech but mentions that this is impossible for Allah. Back to the common

assumption that God cannot act in succession as this would imply “change,” which is impossible
for God. Again, this assumption is not found anywhere in the religious texts and directly

opposes the apparent meaning of much of the Qur’an and prophetic tradition.

The Vindication of Ibn Taymiyyah

The great thirteenth-century scholar Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah was attacked and

imprisoned for his beliefs during his lifetime and continues to be the subject of condemnation

by those who oppose his teachings. The following section is meant to exonerate Ibn Taymiyyah

from some of these attacks by his detractors, demonstrating that much of what he said

regarding the actions of Allah was previously stated by the likes of al-Bukhari. This paper is not

a complete defense of the theology of Ibn Taymiyyah, as space does not allow for this.

However, suppose one can accept that Ibn Taymiyyah merely represented the view of al-

Bukhari. Even if one thinks the view is erroneous, it may remove some animosity directed

towards Ibn Taymiyyah today.

Maturidi scholar Muhammad Anwar Shah al-Kashmiri describes the Ashari view as
َّ ‫وأما اْلشاعرة فيقولون بأن الباري‬
follows, 33‫عز اسمه ليس بمحل للحوادث وقالوا ال فرق بي الحادث والمخلوق‬

“And as for the Asharis, they say that the Maker, lofty be His name, is not subject to hawaadith

(events), and they said that there is no difference between the haadith (that which has a

beginning) and the makhluq (that which is created).” [Translated by Jake Brancatella] Ibn

Taymiyyah, following al-Bukhari, held that distinct actions of Allah had a beginning in time but

were not created. Al-Kashmiri goes on to say that the Arabic language supports the view of Ibn
ً
Taymiyyah in the following passage, ‫ إن‬:‫ إن اللغة تساعد الحافظ ابن تيمية فإنه إذا كان زيد قائما يقال‬:‫وأقول‬

‫العرف الشذي شح سي ر‬st ed., Vol. 1,

33 al-Kashmiri, M. (2004). (Sharh Sunan al-Tirmidhi) 1) ‫اليمذي‬
pg 417). ‫العرب‬ ‫ر‬
‫دار الياث‬.
‫ي‬
 ً ً
‫ إنه خالق القيام فكذلك لما كان هللا موصوفا بالتول فال بد من قيام‬:‫ وال يقال‬،‫ وإن زيدا متصف بالقيام‬،‫القيام متعلق بزيد‬
ً
‫ وكون الباري عز برهانه متصفا بالتول ال خالقا‬،‫ًالتول‬34

And I say: The (Arabic) language is in support of al-Hafidh Ibn Taymiyyah, for when Zayd

(for example) is standing, it is said that the qiyaam (act of standing) is connected to Zayd

and that Zayd is described with qiyaam. It is not said that he (Zayd) is the creator of

qiyaam. Likewise, when Allah is described with nuzul, then there must be [an act of]

nuzul established [within Allah], and that the Maker, lofty be His manifest evidence, is

described with al-nuzul, not that He is a “creator” of it. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Al-Kashmiri also acknowledges that Ibn Taymiyyah is merely following the opinion of al-

Bukhari when he states, ‫ إال أن الشارحي‬،‫له وبعي ما قال ابن تيمية قال البخاري بأن هللا متصف بصفات حادثة‬

35‫تأولوا ف كالمه‬

And the very same thing that Ibn Taymiyyah said, al-Bukhari [also] said; [he said] that Allah is

described with attributes [of action] that are temporal (sifat haadithah), but the commentaries

reinterpreted his words. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Al-Kashmiri mentions that not only was this the view of al-Bukhari, but also an entire
َ َْ ِّ
group of scholars of hadith, ‫ ومنهم‬،‫ منهم من أنك َر قيام الحوادث بالباري تعاَل‬:‫ فهم فيه عىل فرقتي‬،‫َّأما المحدثون‬

ُ ُ ُ َ َّ ‫ه‬ َّ ‫من‬36
‫اْلسلم واْلحكم‬ ‫المذهب‬ ‫ وهو‬،‫ فاتفقوا عىل إنكاره‬،‫ بق المتكلمون‬.‫أقره‬

34 ‫العرف الشذي شح سي ر‬st ed., Vol. 1, pg

al-Kashmiri, M. (2004). (Sharh Sunan al-Tirmidhi) 1) ‫اليمذي‬
417). ‫العرب‬ ‫ر‬
‫دار الياث‬.
‫ي‬
35 ‫العرف الشذي شح سي ر‬st ed., Vol. 1, pg
al-Kashmiri, M. (2004). (Sharh Sunan al-Tirmidhi) 1) ‫اليمذي‬
417). ‫العرب‬ ‫ر‬
‫دار الياث‬.
‫ي‬

36 al-Kashmiri, M. (2008). (Fayd al-Baari ’Ala Sahih al-Bukhari) 1) ‫فيض الباري عىل صحيح البخاري‬st
ed., Vol. 6, pg 590). ‫دار الكتب العلمية‬.
 As for the Muhaddithun (scholars of hadith), they are of two groups regarding [this

matter]. Some of them denied that the Creator, exalted is He, is subject to temporal

events, and some affirmed it. There remain the Mutakallimun and they agreed upon

denying it, which is the more safe and correct position. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Although al-Kashmiri rejects the view of al-Bukhari and Ibn Taymiyyah, he recognizes

that an entire group of scholars held their view and argues that the Arabic language supports

their position.

Divine Immutability According to Aristotle and the Mutakallimun

Attributing hawadith (new occurrences) to God is deeply problematic, according to the

Mutakallimun. Attributing temporal notions to God contradicts their famous “rational

argument” that attempts to prove the existence of God via the impossibility of an infinite

regress of past events. This argument is known as huduth al-hawaadith fil-ajsaam or huduth al-

ajsaam for short, which argues that things that can be described by new events, new

occurrences, or a temporal notion of any kind must themselves be originated, i.e., created.

From this argument, we get the well-known kalaami principle: ‫ما ال يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث‬

“Whatever is not free of hawaadith (new events) is itself haadith (originated).” [Translated by

Jake Brancatella]37 Therefore, in the mind of the Mutakallim (practitioner of kalaam),

attributing to God new events would disqualify Him from being God.

Unlike al-Bukhari and ahl al-hadith, the Asharis and Maturidis share Aristotle’s

conception of divine timelessness and immutability. “Change” for the Mutakallimun includes

37 al-Ghazali, M. (1985). (Qawaʻid Al-ʻAqaʼid)‫( قواعد العقائد‬2nd ed, pg 155.). ‫عالم الكتب‬.
God merely acting in succession. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi makes an argument similar to what was

quoted earlier by Aristotle regarding the impossibility of God “changing”,

ّ ّ
‫ فال بد وأن يكون من‬،‫ أن كل ما كان من صفات اَّلل تعاَل‬:‫ الحجة اْلوَل‬:‫والذي يدل عىل فساد قول «الكرامية» وجوه‬

‫ لكان ذاته قبل حدوث تلك الصفة خاليا عن صفة‬،‫ فلو كانت صفة من صفاته محدثة‬،‫صفات الكمال و نعوت الجالل‬

‫ أن‬:‫ فثبت‬.‫ و ذلك محال‬.‫ فيلزم أن ذاته كانت ناقصة قبل حدوث تلك الصفة فيها‬،‫ والخاَل عن صفة الكمال ناقص‬.‫الكمال‬

38.‫محال‬ ّ
‫حدوث الصفة ف ذات اَّلل تعاَل‬

The fallacy of the position of the Karramiyyah is indicated through numerous aspects.

The first argument is [to say]: Anything that [qualifies as] an attribute of the exalted God

must be an attribute of perfection and a majestic description. Therefore, if an attribute

of His is [said to be temporally] originated (muhdathah), His essence (dhatuhu) must

have been devoid of an attribute of perfection prior to the origination of that attribute.

But that which is devoid of an attribute of perfection is imperfect. Therefore, it follows

that His essence was imperfect prior to the origination of that attribute within it.

However, that is impossible. Thus, it is demonstrated that the origination of the

attribute within God’s essence is impossible. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

The above argument from al-Razi leveled against the Karramiyyah, a group who

affirmed the temporality of God’s actions, asserts that God cannot be ascribed with temporal

acts, for if He had been, this would entail imperfection. The idea is that since all of God’s

attributes are perfect, He must possess them eternally. If God acquired an attribute of

38 al-Dīn al-Rāzī, F. (n.d.). (Kitāb al-Arba’īn Fī Uṣūl al-Dīn) ‫األربعي يف أصول الدين‬
ْ : Vol. 1 (pgs 170-
171) (1st ed.). ‫دار التضامن‬.
perfection at a particular point in time, this would entail God lacking perfection before attaining

said attribute.

Al-Razi’s argument is similar to Aristotle’s assumption mentioned earlier, “Evidently,

then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change (lat. non

trasmutatur); for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a

movement (lat. motus).”39 Aristotle states the problem as he sees it in reverse, asserting that

since God is eternally perfect if He were to “change,” it would necessarily be a “change” for the

worse, a movement from perfection to imperfection.

The arguments by al-Razi and Aristotle can be challenged by providing an alternative

characterization. God is eternally perfect, and for any action He performs at a particular

moment, said action is perfect concerning the specified time. God is not imperfect before

performing said action, as al-Razi assumes. Instead, God is perfect prior and maintains His

perfection while acting at such time. Thus, God is not imperfect before any act, nor does He

lose His perfection upon acting. Indeed, He is eternally perfect and maintains His perfection

while acting. God did not become a Mutakallim (one who speaks) by virtue of speaking the

Qu’ran. Allah ‫ ﷻ‬did not gain the attribute of kalaam as He was always capable of speaking and

had been speaking by His will and power before the revelation of the Qur’an. God does not gain

particular attributes while acting successively. The Creator in all of His Majesty possesses these

attributes eternally, but individual speech acts occur in time. There is not anything incoherent

about this narrative, and it allows us to affirm the apparent successive acts of God in the Qur’an

39 Aristotle, Metaphysics B 7, Part 9, trans. Ross

instead of being forced to reinterpret the sacred texts in the manner of the Mutakallimun in

favor of unfounded Aristotelian assumptions about the divine.

There is Nothing Like Unto Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing
Some may argue that the theology of al-Bukhari and Ibn Taymiyyah, as described above,

likens God to creation. This view violates the Qur’an when it states, “There is nothing like unto

ْ َ ‫س َك ِم ْث ِل ِهۦ‬
Him, ‫شء‬ َ ‫ َل ْي‬.” [Qur’an 42:11] These theologians are guilty of tashbih (likening God to

creation) because they deny divine immutability and simplicity. This type of objection is

widespread in Islamic theology. Everyone who claims to be a Muslim, likewise, claims to affirm

this verse of the Qur’an. However, they differ in how it should be interpreted. A vast spectrum

of theologies ranging from the divine simplicity of the Ismaili Shia on one extreme to those who

affirmed a body (jism) for God on the other and everything in between charged each other with

violating the Qur’an’s divinely intended meaning in the verse just mentioned.

Muhammad al-Shahrastani, as modern research demonstrates, was an Ismaili who

outwardly proclaimed to be an Ashari.40 The following passage not only eliminates the

possibility of him being an Ashari, but it also captures the accusation of tashbih mentioned

earlier,

“The Anthropomorphists (mushabbiha) held there was an essence and a face for God;

and their proof was [the tradition] which says: And He created Adam in the image of

God. The Karramis maintained there is a physical locus and a direction for God or

[considered Him] subsisting in an essence or primordial attribute (jismi oujihati). Their

proof was: ‘He is Omnipotent over His servants (6:18). The Asharis, an essence and eight

40 Shahrastānī, M. I. ʻ. A. (2001). (Struggling With The Philosopher) ‫كتاب المصارعة‬. (pgs 9-10) I. B.
Tauris.
 pre-eternal attributes. Their proof: ‘Nor shall they compass aught of His knowledge

except as He willeth’ (2:255). The Mu’tazills, an essence [for God] and attributional

characteristics (ahkam-i sifatl). Their proof: ‘The Living, the Self-subsisting (2:255). The

philosophers, an essence, and negative and relative attributes. Their proof: intellect.

And at the root of each denomination an anthropomorphism is implied, and a negation

is necessitated.”41

After describing key features of several theological groups, including the Asharis, al-

Shahrastani charges them with tashbih, which necessitates their rejection. Al-Shahrastani’s

ordering of the groups mentioned begins with the most objectionable position in his eyes,

culminating in the least problematic theological camp. However, even the Mutazila and

“philosophers” such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, who proclaimed divine simplicity, could not

escape the criticism of tashbih leveled by al-Shahrastani. The Mutazila likewise accused the

Asharis of tashbih for affirming real attributes (sifat) distinct from God’s essence. Ibn

Taymiyyah, too, was charged with tashbih by his Ashari opponents.

Space does not permit details regarding the disputes between these groups, but a brief

defense of al-Bukhari’s theology will be offered against the charge of tashbih. We all are guilty if

merely attributing the same name to God and something in creation renders one guilty of

tashbih. God has an essence, as do things in creation, including humans. Since we attribute the

same name to God and creation, we have failed to avoid likening God to creation. This

understanding of tashbih does not sound convincing. So, the standard cannot be merely

41 Poor, D. M. (2021). Command and Creation: A Shi‘i Cosmological Treatise: A Persian edition
and English translation of Muhammad al-Shahrastani’s Majlis-i maktub (pg 102). I.B. Tauris.
attributing the same name to God and creation unless one assumes doing so entails the same

ontology for God and creation. This principle is falsified if one affirms God and humans can

possess an essence without being similar ontologically. The same bears true for every other

predicate given to God.

Looming behind the charge of tashbih is an assumed realism regarding universals. For

example, God and humans both have knowledge. This universal “knowledge” must be partially

identical in God and man. However, if we reject the realist notion this argument assumes, we

cannot affirm the conclusion of tashbih. There is no “ontological sharing” between God and

creation because “ontological sharing” does not exist. Every object, including its essence and

attributes, is particular and not universal. Universals merely exist as concepts in the mind. A

complete defense of the nominalism suggested is not possible at present, but it suffices to

avoid the initial charge of tashbih.

Those who seek to avoid tashbih with creation by refraining from attributing anything to

God, only do so at the expense of likening God to nothingness as explained by Ibn al-Qayyim,

ّ
‫ وهذا يستلزم وصفه‬،‫سم له وال كفؤ له‬ ‫ أنه سبحانه وصف نفسه بأنه ليس كمثله رشء وأنه ال‬:‫الوجه الحادي والسبعون‬

ْ َ‫س َك ِم ْث ِل ِه ر‬
‫ش ٌء‬ َ ‫ وهكذا كونه ليس له سم {بصفات الكمال الت فات بها َش َب َه المخلوقي واستحق بقيامها به أن يكون َ{ل ْي‬،

،‫أي مثيل يساميه ف صفاته وأفعاله وال من يكافيه فيها‬

‫ولو كان مسلوب الصفات واْلفعال والكالم واالستواء والوجه واليدين ومنفيا عنه مباينة العالم ومحايثته واتصاله به‬

‫ فيكون قد نق عن نفسه‬،‫وانفصاله عنه وعلوه عليه وكونه يمنته أو يرسته وأمامه أو وراءه لكان كل عدم ِمثال له ف ذلك‬

42‫المحض‬ ‫ فهذا النق واقع عىل أكمل الموجودات وعىل العدم‬،‫مشابهة الموجودات وأثبت لها مماثلة المعدومات‬

42 al-Jawziyya, I. al-Qayyim. (n.d.). (Al-Sawaiq Al-Mursalah) ‫الصواعق المرسلة يف الرد عىل الجهمية‬
‫( والمعطلة‬1st ed., Vol. 3, pgs 1019-1020). ‫دار العاصمة‬.
 The seventy-first aspect [is] that He – may He be exalted – has described Himself by

[saying] that there is nothing equal to Him (kamithlihi), that there is none that can be

named together with Him (samiyya lahu), and that none is equivalent to Him (kuf’a

lahu). This necessitates that He is to be described with [all] the attributes of perfection

by which He transcends similarity to His creations and by carrying which He deserves to

be ((without any equal)). Likewise, His being without samiyy – i.e., an equal who

measures up to Him (yusamihi) or parallels Him (yukafihi) in His attributes and agency –

[necessitates the same.]

If He were stripped of His attributes, agency, speech, His istiwa, His face, and His two

hands, or if He were denied [both] His being distinct from the world and His entering in

it, or [both] His being connected to it and disconnected from it, or His being over it, to

the right of it, to the left of it, in front of it, and behind it, then it would follow that every

non-existent is equal to Him in that [regard]. He would be negating from Himself

similarity to the existents and ascribing to Himself an equivalence with the non-

existents. For this negation [of equals and parallels] would be applicable to the most

perfect of existents as well as sheer nonexistence. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Ibn al-Qayyim’s point is that some people may, with good intentions, deny attributing

specific characteristics to God in fear of tashbih. However genuine their intentions may be, they

fail to achieve what they have in mind. Instead of likening God to created realities, these

individuals make God similar to non-existents or even contradictions. Nothingness and the

conception of God criticized by Ibn al-Qayyim have in common a denial of all the attributes
mentioned in the passage above. This illustration by Ibn al-Qayyim is meant to draw attention

to the reader’s problematic methodology in how we speak of and think about God.

Conclusion

The God of Aristotle is a simple, isolated, static activity who cannot think of anything

other than Himself. It sounds narcissistic and arguably psychopathic. 43 Conversely, the God of

the Qur’an possesses multiple distinct attributes, is related to His creation, and is dynamic in

His creative activity. These two conceptions of God could not be much further apart. Al-Bukhari

ascribes temporal, uncreated actions to God. Several commentators on al-Bukhari’s texts

disagreed with his position, but this did not affect their ability to interpret him accurately. Al-

Kashmiri noted the similarity between Ibn Taymiyyah’s position and a group of hadith scholars,

including al-Bukhari. Imam al-Bukhari, having the same position on divine action as Ibn

Taymiyyah, should caution those who attack and seek to condemn Ibn Taymiyyah for affirming

that God acts in succession. The same ruling applied to Imam al-Bukhari should likewise be

applied to Ibn Taymiyyah and those who followed them in their position on the divine action of

the Creator if one wishes to remain consistent. If Imam al-Bukhari is not deemed a deviant or

detractor of the faith, then those who followed him should not be considered as such either.

Some may be concerned with tashbih (likening Allah to creation), but as noted earlier,

this assumes a realist position regarding universals, which one is free to reject. Allah ‫ ﷻ‬is

eternally perfect and remains perfect despite acting in succession, contrary to what Aristotle

and those who followed him believe. While attempting to avoid likening God to creation, such

43Mullins, R 2022, 'Closeness with God: A Problem for Divine Impassibility', The journal of
analytic theology, vol. 10, pp. 233-245. https://doi.org/10.12978/jat.2022-10.17-51-65122018
individuals have run the risk of likening God to nothingness. The Mutakallimun may reflect

upon why they have adopted principles that seemingly contradict the apparent meaning of the

Qur’an. A final quote from the Ashari scholar Sayf al-Din al-Amidi seems like a fitting ending:

‫وقد احتج أهل الحق عىل امتناع قيام الحوادث به بحجج ضعيفة‬: The adherents of the “truth” [The

Mutakallimun] have argued for the impossibility of there being temporality within God with

weak arguments. [Translation by Jake Brancatella]44

44 al-Numayri al-Harrani, I. T. (1991). (Darʾ Taʿaruḍ Al-ʿAql Wal-Naql) 2) ‫درء تعارض العقل والنقل‬nd
ed., Vol. 4, pg 27). ‫جامعة اإلمام محمد بن سعود اإلسالمية‬.