MJCC Article p82 - 6

middle east journal of culture and
communication 7 (2014) 82-100 MEJCC

brill.com/mjcc
Anti-Islam Propaganda and Its Effects

Fitna, Fear-based Communication and the Moderating
Role of Public Debate
Floris Müller
University of Amsterdam, Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam
floris.muller.mail@gmail.com
Liesbet van Zoonen

Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU, E.A.
Van-Zoonen@lboro.ac.uk
Fadi Hirzalla
University of Utrecht, 3512 BR, Utrecht, The Netherlands
fadi.hirzalla@gmail.com
Abstract
In 2008, a short Dutch anti-Islam propaganda movie called Fitna caused global public
outrage and a brief media storm. Such attention is generally considered undesirable
‘mediahype’ that increases the number of people that will view the film and thus
potentially also its societal impact. In this article, however, we present a theoretical
model that suggests that extensive media coverage may, in some cases, actually serve
to diminish the impact of anti-Islam propaganda. We demonstrate the validity of this
model using an experimental study on the effects of the movie Fitna on non-Muslim
viewers. The results show that those viewers who had followed this debate closely were
less affected by Fitna. These effects were upheld even when we controlled for their
political preferences and educational levels; this suggests that exposure to extensive
debate about anti-Islam propaganda may serve to ‘inoculate’ non-Muslim viewers
against its fear-based appeal.
Keywords
fear appeal – prejudice – Elaboration Likelihood Model – Fitna
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Anti-islam Propaganda And Its Effects 83
Introduction
In 2008, a Dutch member of parliament Geert Wilders produced a short movie

called Fitna that caused global public outrage and, briefly, a media storm. The
film consists of a combination of allegedly hate-inspiring quotes from the
Qur’an and footage designed to arouse fear, such as clips of terror attacks such
as 9/11. The ‘preferred reading’ of this combination of text and image is that
Islam is a deadly threat to western societies (van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj 2010).
In the months preceding the release of the film, Dutch politicians, civic leaders
and concerned citizens publicly expressed many worries about the impact of
the film on the already tense relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in
the Netherlands. The question of whether Wilders should be allowed to voice
his extreme views was prominent, while some debated whether he should be
allowed to present his views in such a propagandistic manner. Commentators
called it ‘fear mongering’, and many references were made to Nazi-propaganda
and the infamous film Der Ewige Jude (Ruigrok, et al. 2009). Some expressed
concern that the movie would incite violence and rioting. To complicate mat-
ters further, the discussion about Fitna also began to take on a self-reflective
dimension: critics started to argue that all this discussion about the movie
would serve only to exacerbate its negative effects on Dutch society. More peo-
ple would be made aware of its existence, watch the film and then be provoked
by its content.
Only the first two of these predictions proved true. When the movie was
finally released, it was watched more than three million times in the first three
hours. However, no violence, rioting or increased ethnic tension was reported
after its release in the Netherlands. What happened? Were the worries about
the persuasive impact of Fitna ungrounded? And what was the role of the
intense media discussions about the movie before it was released? These ques-
tions are central to this article. The main question we answer is, What are the
effects of watching the anti-Islam propaganda film Fitna on the attitudes of indi-
vidual non-Muslim viewers and how can these effects be explained?
As a new generation of propaganda film that can reach a global audience
of millions in a matter of days, Fitna is indicative of the ways in which global
religious debate is changing. Communication is more instantaneous with
social media like YouTube and emotional appeals are increasingly common
(Hirzalla and Van Zoonen 2010; Stroud 2007); fear is the most commonly used
emotion to amass political support for anti-Islam statements (Zuquete 2008;
Kienpointer 2005; Rydgren 2005). Furthermore, the reach of these fear appeals
has increased markedly through the increasing penetration of the Internet
and new media technologies in people’s lives. In this context, it is crucial to
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84 Müller et al.
investigate whether and how fear-based propaganda affects support for anti-
Islam viewpoints.
In this article, we therefore investigate the effects of watching Fitna on indi-
vidual non-Muslim viewers. Using fear appeal theory (Cauberghe, et al. 2009)
and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (‘ELM’, Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty,
Brinol and Priester 2008), we propose a theoretical model that explains
the effects of fear-based propaganda using both cognitive and affective cues in
the movie. We also include the degree of prior exposure to the public debate
surrounding Fitna in our research design. By including this last variable, we
take issue with the widespread assumption that bringing attention to anti-
Islam propaganda such as Fitna only exacerbates its influence (cf. Scheufele
2002; Turner 1991). To date, such claims have not been substantiated. Moreover,
they assume a rather one-dimensional and dated ‘hypodermic needle’ model
of media influence, in which viewers are mere passive receivers of persuasive
communication. Our data suggest that the impact of contemporary fear-based
propaganda may follow a different path. We find that, in the case of anti-Islam
campaigns, media attention may actually provide viewers with the necessary
tools to ward off persuasive effects.
In the coming pages, we first discuss how Fitna can be approached as a form
of communication known in the field of advertising and health communica-
tion as a ‘fear appeal’. We then combine fear appeal theory with the ELM of
information processing. Together these theories lead to an experimental
design for the study of the effects of watching Fitna; this study is presented and
discussed in the remainder of the article.
The Fear Appeal of Fitna
As was argued above, the movie Fitna represents a trend in debates on

Islam that make explicit, frightening and dramatic appeals. The ‘fear appeal’
concept is derived from health communication literature, but is useful in
the analysis of the impact of fear-based propaganda. Fear appeals are those
forms of communication in which fear is aroused to produce the acceptance of
a particular message, norm or desired behavior (Cauberghe, et al. 2009). In a
fear appeal, persuasion is achieved through a combination of affective
and cognitive cues. The affective component consists of a fear-inducing
representation of the consequences of a particular behavior. In the case
of a safe sex campaign, for example, this might be achieved with pictures of
bodies disfigured by sexually transmitted diseases. To these affective cues, cog-
nitive cues are added that identify the source of the danger (e.g., unsafe sex)
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communication 7 (2014) 82-100
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and how to avoid these consequences (e.g., by using a condom) (Cauberghe

et al. 2009).
If we analyze the movie Fitna as a fear appeal, it is clear that the film con-
tains many strong affective cues. The viewer is confronted with a constant bar-
rage of fear-inducing (news) footage of terrorist attacks, violent Muslim
extremists and urban landscapes dominated by minarets. Moreover, these
images are accompanied by sounds of explosions, recordings from telephone
calls of 9/11 victims and a melodramatic classical music score. This kind of
footage has been shown to induce fear and thoughts of death in audiences in
earlier studies (Das, et al. 2009).
The cognitive cues in Fitna that identify the causes of these dangers are
provided by selected verses from the Qur’an that are consistently paired
with fear-inducing imagery. The presentation of these verses suggests that
Islamist violence and aggression is inspired by the holy book of the Qur’an.
By implication, all devout Muslims who live by its word are also framed as a
possible source of danger. The overt message of the film is that Islam is danger-
ous, not only in its extremist form but also in its everyday manifestations. While
the film itself does not give clear options to avert this danger, its maker and his
message shine through: Islam and the Qur’an should be banned from the
Netherlands and the only political party willing to take action on this is the
Freedom Party.
Fear appeal theory predicts that the persuasive appeal of Fitna depends on
its particular combination of these affective and cognitive cues. Both are nec-
essary ingredients to persuade an audience of its message about the alleged
dangers of Islam. If the cognitive cues based on showing the verses from the
Qur’an were absent, the film would mainly be images of terrorist violence. We
would then expect the movie to induce fear, but have less impact on attitudes
about Islam or Muslims, and it would not elicit sympathy for anti-immigration
and anti-Islam political policies. If only the cognitive cues were presented,
their persuasive effect would be much lower since no strong uncomfortable
emotions would be aroused.
Fear- and Danger Control
A meta-analysis of over 100 studies demonstrated that on average, there is

a positive correlation between the amount of induced fear and subsequent
cognitive or behavioral responses (Witte and Allen 2000); the more a message
arouses fear, the more, on average, a fear appeal message will lead to attitudi-
nal and behavioral changes. However, this average hides the fact that for

86 Müller et al.
different individuals or groups, fear appeals may have different and unpredict-
able effects (Hastings, Stead and Webb 2004). These differences can be
explained in part by the parallel response model which states that two
responses are possible once a member of the audience has been put into a
state of anxiety or fear (Leventhal 1970; Witte and Allen 2000; Cauberghe, et al.
2009). The first response is called the ‘danger control response’ and involves
changing behavior and attitudes to control the danger identified by cognitive
cues. For example, smokers who are made to expect and fear lung cancer will
become more negative about the behavior and (ideally) be motivated to stop
smoking. The second response involves the initiation of strategies to reduce
the unpleasant emotional state of fear, rather than taking action to remove the
danger that is causing it. This response is called the ‘fear control response’ and
may take a number of forms. For instance, audience members may deny that
they are at risk, avoid thinking about the issue completely in the future or
engage in what is called ‘reactance’—deconstructing the appeal itself, arguing
that it is unrealistic or manipulative. Fear control responses are not expected
to changes attitudes or behaviors in the direction intended by the producer of
the fear appeal (Witte and Allen 2000).
Studies using the parallel response model suggest that the appraisal of
cognitive cues in the message are crucial for its persuasive effect. The central
concept that is identified in the literature is whether viewers judge the ‘danger
control response’ suggested in the message to be effective (Cauberghe,
et al. 2009; Witte and Allen 2000). In the case of fear appeals in the domain
of health communication, this judgment depends on the extent to which
an audience member perceives a particular change in their behavior as a
realistic and viable option. In the case of smoking, he or she will privately
assess whether it would actually be possible to give up smoking for them
personally.
In the case of the anti-Islam propaganda movie Fitna, the cognitive cues are
aimed at changing people’s attitudes toward Islam by suggesting that violence
and the Qur’an are synonymous. To tolerate Islam, therefore, would be to toler-
ate the risk of terrorist violence. Compared to the long-term behavioral changes
necessary to control the dangers of unhealthy habits, the attitude change that
Fitna aspires to seems relatively easy to achieve. It does not require particular
skills or perseverance as quitting smoking would; danger control can be
achieved ‘simply’ by changing one’s attitude and supporting the only political
party that promises to fight Islam. Obviously, to assume that the film would
work like that is simplistic and refers to the long abandoned ‘hypodermic nee-
dle’ model of media influence. Other factors than the film itself will affect how
its cognitive cues are processed. One factor is of particular significance in the

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case of Fitna. As the film was published after a period of great controversy, many
people were exposed to considerable amounts of ‘intertextual’ information
contained in the debates about its content and purported effects on Dutch
society. The many perspectives offered on the movie may well have influenced
how people process the film when they finally watch it and may have a consid-
erable effect on its influence. We therefore need additional theory to account
for such influence. We used the Elaboration Likelihood Model to develop
the hypothesis that the impact of cognitive cues in Fitna is dependent on the
amount of argumentative resources a viewer has accumulated by following
the public debate.
Elaboration Likelihood in Fitna
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986;

Petty, Brinol and Priester 2008), cognitive cues may be processed in two alter-
native routes. The first route is called peripheral processing and means that
viewers rely on heuristic cues to assert whether a particular message is persua-
sive. These cues include trustworthiness of the source but also, for example,
the number or length of arguments that are presented (Petty and Cacioppo
1986; Petty, Brinol and Priester 2008). If a message with strong heuristic cues is
processed peripherally, attitudes will change in the intended direction.
Peripheral processing may occur especially in situations when a person
feels the matter at hand is not relevant to them personally (Petty, Brinol and
Priester 2008). In the case of fear-based political communication such as the
movie Fitna, this scenario is not likely. As the movie is highly provocative and
contains many affective cues to arouse emotions of fear, we may expect that
the movie is experienced at least in an emotional sense as personally relevant.
Research by Das, et al. (2007) shows that footage of terrorist attacks similar to
those used in Fitna increase death-related thoughts in viewers; this is a clear
indication that such images are perceived as personally relevant.
In those cases, the ELM predicts that messages will be ‘centrally processed’
and not processed peripherally. During such central processing, a person will
actively go over and evaluate the cognitive cues that the message contains. The
reasoning explicit or implicit in a message is critically evaluated and contrasted
with counterarguments or alternative perspectives that the viewer has at his or
her disposal. This last point is crucial for our argument: the viewer will attempt
to produce counterarguments during central processing and the degree of per-
suasion will depend on the number of counterarguments that he or she
can produce. The central processing route of the ELM therefore suggests that

88 Müller et al.
viewers who are able to produce counterarguments to Fitna’s anti-Islam mes-

sage will be less affected by the cognitive cues in the movie. In other words,
they will experience the fear appeal of the movie but dispute the connection to
Islam. As a result, they will not need to resort to ‘danger control’, but can reduce
their anxiety by engaging in different forms of ‘fear control’, such as decon-
structing the movie as a politically biased message. Those who do not possess
these resources, however, will have more difficulties in warding off the persua-
sive power of the cognitive cues, which are combined with arousal. As a conse-
quence, these people will engage in ‘danger control’ and we expect their atti-
tudes toward Islam to change.
Next to people’s political savviness and intrinsic argumentative powers,
the most likely source for counterarguments to the message of Fitna is
formed by exposure to the discussion about the movie in the media prior to
its release. Fitna received an impressive amount of public attention and
debate in the months prior to its release (Ruigrok, et al. 2009). People who
followed this discussion in the media thus witnessed a range of different
perspectives on the meaning of the movie, the intentions of its producer
and its propagandistic techniques. Other viewers that did not follow the dis-
cussion did not gather a similar stock of counterarguments and alternative
perspectives on the movie. Centrally processing the cognitive cues in Fitna
would therefore (all else being equal) not lead to the production of a similar
amount of counter argumentation. As a consequence, they may be more likely
to accept these cognitive cues as convincing and be persuaded of the movie’s
message.
Based on fear appeal theory, parallel processing and the Elaboration
Likelihood Model, we therefore expect that those people who followed the dis-
cussion about Fitna will be more likely to reject the cognitive cues in the movie
and demonstrate a ‘fear control’ response to it. Those people who did not fol-
low the discussion about Fitna will be more likely to accept the cognitive cues
and therefore engage in the intended ‘danger control’ responses. This effect is
assumed to hold irrespective of the possible differences in education and polit-
ical preferences that could potentially exist between the group that did follow
the discussion and the group that did not. These expectations can be summa-
rized in the following two hypotheses:
H1: Fitna increases Islamophobic attitudes of non-Muslim viewers through

the combination of affective and cognitive cues.
H2: Non-Muslim viewers who have not followed the discussion about Fitna
in the media will be affected more strongly than those that did, as they
engage more in danger control than fear control.

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Method
For this study, an experiment was conducted with 106 participants. Although
we recognize the inherent problems of experimental research on fear appeals,
especially with regard to measuring its social impact (see Hastings, Stead and
Webb 2004), our initial concern was to understand the process of persuasion
underlying fear appeals in anti-Islam propaganda. The participants for the
experiment were, on average, young and highly educated college students.
However, care was taken to include respondents of different ages and educa-
tional levels. Given the different kinds of reactions that were expected of
Muslims (anger) and non-Muslims (fear) in response to the film, we chose to
focus on the reactions of non-Muslims, as they were the target audience of
the film. In Amsterdam, about 14 percent of the population is Muslim, but in
the city center and the university campus, where this research was carried
out, this figure is much lower (i.e., less than 8 percent) (Municipal Statistics
Service 2013).
Sampling was done around the inner city of Amsterdam using flyers and
direct mailing, at two public schools, as well as through the personal network
of a team of five students that carried out the experiment. The mean age of the
total group thus contacted was 21 (SD = 5.5, with a minimum of 16 years old and
a maximum of 55 years old). Exactly 50 percent of the participants were female.
On the political spectrum, participants located themselves on the left (30 per-
cent), the center (55 percent) and the right (15 percent). Because of the wide-
spread media attention that had accompanied the release of Fitna, more than
half (59 percent) indicated that they had seen small fragments of Fitna prior to
participating in the study. Moreover, 63 percent indicated that they had seen
nothing or only very little of the debate in the months leading up to the release
of the movie; this enabled us to compare between those who did and did not
follow public debate.
Design of the Experiment

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which the
presence of cognitive and affective cues of the fear appeal of Fitna was manip-
ulated. In the first condition, participants watched Fitna as it was originally
made.1 This version contained, as we argued earlier, both cognitive and affec-
tive cues. In the second condition, participants watched a manipulated version
of Fitna. In this version, the verses from the Qur’an were left out. As a result, the
1 The Fitna video can de watched at the following URL: http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=kIKCgRlwQUA.

90 Müller et al.
stimulus in this condition did not present participants with the explicit asso-
ciation of the terror attacks with Islam. This manipulation effectively removed
the cognitive cues that suggest that the Qur’an is linked to the terrorist attacks,
and thus what remains is a fear arousing stimulus. The third condition func-
tioned as a control condition in which both cognitive and affective cues were
absent and participants were not shown the film.
For the variable mentioned in H2 (the extent to which participants had
followed the discussion about Fitna in the media) questions were designed
for this study that are described below. The resulting data can be described as a
3 (= Condition: 1. cognitive and affective cues/ 2. affective cues only/ 3. control)
x 2 (= did follow the discussion/ did not followed the discussion) factorial design.
With respect to H1, we expected participants in condition 1 (in which both
affective and cognitive cues form a coherent fear appeal) to score higher than
those in the other two conditions on measures of danger control responses;
respondents in condition 2 (in which cognitive cues were removed) were
expected to engage the most, relatively, in fear control responses.
H2 adds the expectation that the participants who followed the discussion
about Fitna in the media will be less susceptible to its influence. Hence we
expect that our predictions in H1 will only hold for those participants that did
not follow the discussion about Fitna in the media.
Measurements
For this study, existing measurements from health communication and other
literature, and from the European Social Survey were adjusted for the purpose
of analyzing the effects of the movie Fitna. In addition, new measurements
were developed to analyze support for the Freedom Party and exposure to pub-
lic debate.
Danger Control
For the measurement of danger control, it is necessary to make assumptions
about the ‘preferred reading’ of the cognitive cues contained in Fitna. As
was argued before, the cognitive cues in Fitna consist of selected verses from
the Qur’an systematically depicted alongside fear-inducing videos of terror
attacks. This presentation of the information suggests that Islam, the Qur’an,
and by implication, all devout Muslims are the cause of the dangers portrayed
in the movie. While Islam and the Qur’an are relatively abstract concepts to
be afraid of, we measured the effects of the fear appeal by looking at percep-
tions of threat coming from Muslims and by looking at explicit prejudice
against Muslims. An adapted version of the 6-item European Social
Survey scale for perceived ethnic threat was used (Coenders, Lubbers and

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Scheepers 2003). A sample question from this scale is: ‘there will be a time
when I will have to conform to the norms and values of Muslim minorities’.
Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from totally disagree
(1) to totally agree (5). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = .82 (M = 2.47,
SD = .85).
In addition, a 9 item scale called the Anti-Islam Prejudice Scale (Park, Felix
and Lee 2007) was used to measure prejudice against Muslims. A sample ques-
tion from this scale is, ‘Islam teaches compassion and love toward other peo-
ple’ (reverse-scored). Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (5). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was
α = .86 (M = 3.24, SD = .65).
A final indicator of danger control that was used in this study was support
for the party of Geert Wilders. Because this political party is highly controver-
sial, we expected that direct questions of support for the party would result in
socially desirable answers. Therefore, questions were asked about the person’s
reaction to other people’s sympathies for this party. Two items were used. The
first item read, ‘Suppose one of your friends decides to vote for the PVV in the
next elections. How would you react?’ The second item read, ‘Suppose a mem-
ber of your family decides to vote for the PVV in the next elections. How would
you react?’ Participants were asked to respond to both items using a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from very negative (1) to very positive (5). (M = 3.46, SD =
1.37 and M = 3.29, SD = 1.49, respectively).
Fear Control
Witte and Allen (2000) specify three different fear control responses that they
label ‘denial’, ‘avoidance’ and ‘reactance’. Denial is a strategy in which the threat
that is depicted in the fear appeal is downplayed. In this paper, we operational-
ized this form of fear control with three questions about the chance of a terror-
ist attack. The first question asked, ‘what is the chance that a terrorist attack
will occur on Dutch territory in the next two years?’ The second question
was, ‘what is the chance that one of your friends and family will be hurt in a
terrorist attack in the next two years?’ The third question was, ‘what is the
chance that you yourself will be hurt in a terrorist attack in the next two years?’
Each question could be answered on a ten-point scale ranging from 0 percent
to 100 percent.
The second form of fear response, avoidance, involves ignoring the whole
issue presented by the fear appeal after exposure has ceased. Because we only
measured directly after exposure in the current experiment, this factor could
not be measured in the current design and was left out. The third form of fear
control response was called reactance and involves deconstructing the fear

92 Müller et al.
appeal and questioning its credibility and reliability. We operationalized this

form of fear control by the perception of realism of the movie that had just
been watched. We used an adapted 5 item version of the Perceived Realism
Scale (Perse 1994) to measure the perceived realism of the movie. An example
of these questions is, ‘this movie demonstrates how Muslims are in real life’.
Answers were scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from totally disagree (1)
to totally agree (5) (M = 2.26; SD = .97, Cronbachs alpha = .88).
Other Measurements
Anxiety was measured with an expanded version of the Anxiety Scale (Pham
1996) that consists of 9 items with statements about internal emotional states
such as ‘I feel scared’ and ‘I feel nervous’. Participants responded on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from does not apply to me at all (1) to completely applies
to me (5). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = .77 in pre-test and .87 in post-
test (M = 1.281, SD = .57 and M = 2.36, SD = .83, respectively).
General mood (i.e., positive or negative emotional state) was measured
using the Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley and Lang 1994). Respondents
were shown 5 images with the same smiley character placed alongside each
other. The smiley that is farthest toward the left has the most negative expres-
sion on his face, and the smiley that is farthest toward the right has the most
positive. Underneath the smileys a row of buttons is presented from which
respondents are asked to choose the one that is closest to the smiley that rep-
resents their emotional state. The mean for this scale was M = 2.73, SD = 1.35 at
pre-test and M = 3.85, SD = 1.72 at post-test.
In order to measure the extent to which participants had followed the dis-
cussion about Fitna in the media, they were asked the following question at the
end of the experiment: ‘How much did you follow the discussion about Fitna
in the media?’ Possible answers were not at all (17 percent), a little bit (44 per-
cent), fairly well (36 percent) or very well (3 percent).
Results
Before our hypotheses were tested, we carried out checks to see if there were
any differences between the participants in the three conditions. There
were no differences in anxiety or general mood between the three conditions
at pre-test. There were also no differences in age, gender, political preference
for the left or right of the political spectrum or in terms of the amount of con-
tact participants had with Muslims in daily life. These analyses further showed
that there were no differences between the three experimental groups in terms

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of how much they had followed the discussion about Fitna or how often they
had seen the film prior to participating in the study. However, there was a small
difference in education level between the conditions (F(2,100)= 4.244; p =.017).
In all subsequent comparisons between the conditions, education was there-
fore included as covariate. An analysis was also done to check whether prior
exposure to Fitna would be an important variable to include as covariate. There
were no differences in exposure to Fitna prior to participation in the experi-
ment between the three conditions. Furthermore, prior exposure was not
correlated with any of the dependent variables used in the study. Wherever it
is relevant, this variable was included as covariate to control for possible
effects.
In order to assess whether the manipulations had been successful, an analy-
sis of variance was done comparing both experimental conditions (1 and 2)
with the control condition. As can be seen in table 1, participants from both
experimental conditions scored higher on anxiety than those in the control
condition (F(2,100)= 8.839; p <.05). Furthermore, their mood was significantly
more negative as well (F(2,100)= 31.102; p <.05). Post hoc LSD tests show that
differences between the two experimental conditions were not significant,
suggesting that the presence of cognitive cues did not alter the effects of the
affective cues.2
Based on the predictions described earlier in this paper, we expected the
effect of Fitna on anti-Islam attitudes to be particularly pronounced for partici-
pants who had not followed the discussion about it. Therefore, we now exam-
ine danger control responses and fear control responses separately for the
Table 1 Effects of the affective cues on mood and anxiety.
Condition
1. Cognitive cues & 2. Affective cues 3. Control

Affective cues only
Anxiety 2.66 (.11)* 2.43 (.17)* 1.94 (.13)

Negative mood 4.72 (.21)* 4.35 (.31)* 2.51 (.23)
*= significantly different from control at p <.05.
2 A ‘Post-hoc test’ is standard procedure after an analysis of variance turns up a significant

result. It is used to check which of the analyzed groups are responsible for the significant
result.

94 Müller et al.
group that did follow the discussion and the group that did not follow the
discussion.
Danger Control Reactions: Attitude Change

In order to assess the extent to which participants engaged in danger control
reactions (i.e., changing their attitudes to align with the cognitive cues in the
movie), an ANOVA analysis (of variance) was carried out. We tested the main
effects of the condition on perceptions of Islam as a threat and anti-Islam prej-
udice. No main effects were found for perceived threat (F(2,91)= 1.796; p =.112)
or anti-Islam prejudice (F(2,93)= 1.293; p =.243). In line with hypothesis 2, how-
ever, there was a significant interaction between the condition and the extent
to which the participants had followed the discussion about Fitna in the media.
This interaction was found both for perceptions of ethnic threat (F(4,83)= 2.753;
p =.033) and anti-Islam prejudice (F(4,85)= 1.369; p =.003). In both of these
ANOVAs we controlled for education level and political preference as these
could be considered confounds. The estimated means of the different groups
are shown in table 2.
The results in table 2 show a pattern that supports both H1 and H2. Consistent
with the first hypothesis, danger control responses only take place when cogni-
tive cues are presented alongside the affective cues. Consistent with the sec-
ond hypothesis, we also see that these effects only occurred among participants
who had not followed the discussion of Fitna. With regard to this last outcome,
it is important to stress that these results were obtained while controlling for
political preference and educational level. The relationship found between fol-
lowing the debate about Fitna and attitudes about Muslims is therefore at least
partially independent of political preference or educational level.
Since Fitna was conceptualized here as a form of fear-based propaganda, we
also analyzed the effects of the movie on support for the political party of
Geert Wilders, the Freedom Party. After controlling for political party prefer-
ence and educational level, neither condition (F(2,91)= 1,207; p =.304) nor the
extent to which participants had followed the discussion about Fitna
(F(2,92)= 1,975; p =.112) had a significant effect on support for the PVV.
Fear Control
Apart from danger control responses, however, it was also hypothesized that
those who had followed the discussions about Fitna in the media closely would
engage predominantly in fear control responses. In order to assess fear control
responses, first we investigated the correlation between fear control reactions
and the extent to which a participant had followed the discussion about Fitna.
A sizeable negative correlation was found with the first measure of fear

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Table 2 Danger control responses: increased perceived threat and prejudice.
Did not follow the discussion on Fitna Followed the discussion on Fitna somewhat Followed the discussion on Fitna closely
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3

Cognitive & Affective Control Cognitive Affective Control Cognitive & Affective Control
Affective cues only & Affective cues Affective cues
cues cues only cues only
Perceptions 3,76*(.46) 2.41(.17) 2.25(.20) 2.49 (.17) 3.23 (.28) 2.37 (.21) 2.36 (.28) 2.46 (.21) 2.34 (.21)
of ethnic
Anti-islam Propaganda And Its Effects
threat
Anti-Islam 4,43* (.32) 3.21(.12) 2.96(.21) 3.65 (.29) 3.37 (.21) 3.14 (.24) 3.03(.21) 3.30 (.16) 3.34 (.16)
Prejudice
middle east journal of culture and communication

*= significant at p <.05.
7 (2014) 82-100
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11:16:37AM
96 Müller et al.
Table 3 Fear control responses: Discounting the realism of Fitna and risk of terrorist attacks.
Did not follow the discussion about Did follow the discussion about
Fitna (n = 58) Fitna (n = 38)
1. Cognitive 2. Affective 3. Control 1. Cognitive 2. Affective 3. Control

& Affective cues only & Affective cues only
cues cues
Perceived 2.33 (.20) 2.63 (.28)* - 1.94 (.23) 2.04 (.39) -

realism
Risk 4.46 (.50) 6.83 (.71)* 4.59 (.53) 3.66 (.58)* 5.33 (1.00) 4.71 (.66)
perception
*= Notably higher or lower scores that explain the significant interaction

between following the discussion and condition (p <.05).
control, the perceived realism of the movie (r =-.418; p =.001), suggesting

that respondents who had followed the discussion about Fitna were more
likely to downplay its realism. A small but significant negative correlation was
also found between following the discussion and perceptions of the risk of a
terrorist attack on Dutch soil within the next 2 years (r =.-178; p <.05,
one-tailed).
An analysis of variance indicated that a significant interaction could be
observed between following the discussion and the experimental condition
(F(8,87)= 2.187; p <.05). The means and standard deviations of each group are
shown in table 3 below.
The means in table 3 suggest that this significant interaction was due to the
responses of two distinct groups of participants. On the one hand, heightened
risk perceptions could be observed for people who had not followed the dis-
cussion about Fitna and had been exposed only to the affective cues (M = 6.83;
SD =.71). These groups could not meaningfully engage in danger control
responses as there were no cognitive cues that explicated what this response
would need to be. On the other hand, lowered risk perceptions (but not
perceptions of realism) were found among people who had followed the dis-
cussion and had been exposed to cognitive and affective cues (M = 3.66;
SD =.58). Of this group we assumed that they had many counterarguments
available and that they would mobilize these when confronted with relevant
cognitive cues.

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Conclusion
This paper was set up to theoretically explain and test the effects of Fitna, a
prime example of fear-based anti-Islam propaganda. Based on a number of
theoretical considerations, we hypothesized that the effect of Fitna could be
conceptualized as a fear appeal in which affective cues are combined with cog-
nitive cues. In the movie Fitna, the presentation of verses from the Qur’an can
be viewed as cognitive cues that serve to connect frightening images of terror
attacks and murder to a particular enemy: Islam and its devout followers. Using
fear appeal theories and the ELM, it was hypothesized that the impact of the
frightening images would be less if these cognitive cues were absent.
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the effects of exposure to the movie
would be mediated by exposure to the public debate about Fitna. We hypoth-
esized that following the media discussion about Fitna would serve to inocu-
late viewers against its persuasive appeal because they would have criticism
and alternative perspectives at their disposal to resist the dominant interpreta-
tion of the cognitive cues in the movie.
The experiment described in this article lends support for both hypotheses.
First, it was shown that the effect of Fitna was dependent on the combination
of cognitive and affective cues. Although participants who saw only the affec-
tive cues experienced the same level of anxiety and mood changes as those
who saw affective and cognitive cues simultaneously, they failed to change
their attitudes toward Muslims or perceive increased levels of ethnic threat.
Second, and supporting the second hypothesis about the moderation of such
effects, Fitna failed to register an effect with people who had followed the dis-
cussion about the movie in the media. This effect was found after controlling
for political preference and educational level. This suggests that following the
discussion in the media is indeed the factor responsible, that is, underlying
variables such as ideological orientation or cultural capital are not
responsible.
The experimental research design of this study carries a number of limita-
tions that warrant a short discussion. First, the nature of the experimental
design precludes a comprehensive study of the impact of a movie like Fitna on
its entire global audience. This audience consisted of not only non-Muslim
Dutch viewers but also Muslims for whom the movie Fitna had a completely
different message. Moreover, audiences in other countries (notably in the
Middle East) will have experienced the movie in yet other ways, depending on
their local contexts and the role of Islam in public and private life. As a result,
caution is warranted in generalizing from the audience reactions found in this
study to the impact of Fitna on its worldwide audience. Moreover, the method

98 Müller et al.
is not suitable to address the impact the movie has had on (international)
political relations both in the Netherlands and worldwide, or on the ways in
which Islam is constituted in the discourse of politicians and the media.
Finally, the ways in which viewers responded in and outside of the media were
also beyond the scope of this investigation (for this dimension of the Fitna
phenomenon, see Van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj 2010, and Van Zoonen, Hirzalla
and Müller 2009).
Given these limitations, we can conclude that this study suggests that
anti-Islam propaganda like Fitna can be usefully conceptualized as a fear
appeal for non-Muslim viewers living in a liberal western country like
the Netherlands. In such a fear appeal, cognitive and affective cues are both
essential to form a persuasive media text. Furthermore, the data suggest that
following or having a discussion about a particular persuasive text may inocu-
late viewers from its persuasive effects. These results deserve more attention in
future studies.
The current study suggests a paradoxical conclusion in relation to the
widespread discussions and concern about Fitna and the attention it received
in the media prior to its release. On the one hand, our results suggest that the
political and public concern about the movie may have been unnecessary,
since the majority of the participants were generally not persuaded by expo-
sure to Fitna. On the other hand, however, it may also have been exactly this
widespread attention in the media that contributed to this lack of effect. These
discussions made many different perspectives on Fitna publicly accessible
and may have allowed people to counter the cognitive cues in the movie more
effectively. They may have, in other words, inoculated viewers from the persua-
sive impact of the movie.
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middle east journal of culture and

communication 7 (2014) 82-100 MEJCC

Anti-Islam Propaganda and Its Effects

Liesbet van Zoonen

fear appeal – prejudice – Elaboration Likelihood Model – Fitna

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/18739865-00701006

In 2008, a Dutch member of parliament Geert Wilders produced a short movie

middle east journal of culture and communication 7 (2014) 82-100

The Fear Appeal of Fitna

As was argued above, the movie Fitna represents a trend in debates on

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and how to avoid these consequences (e.g., by using a condom) (Cauberghe

Fear- and Danger Control

A meta-analysis of over 100 studies demonstrated that on average, there is

middle east journal of culture and communication 7 (2014) 82-100

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Elaboration Likelihood in Fitna

According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986;

middle east journal of culture and communication 7 (2014) 82-100

viewers who are able to produce counterarguments to Fitna’s anti-Islam mes-

H1: Fitna increases Islamophobic attitudes of non-Muslim viewers through

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Design of the Experiment

1 The Fitna video can de watched at the following URL: http://www.youtube.com/

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middle east journal of culture and communication 7 (2014) 82-100

appeal and questioning its credibility and reliability. We operationalized this

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Table 1 Effects of the affective cues on mood and anxiety.

1. Cognitive cues & 2. Affective cues 3. Control

Anxiety 2.66 (.11)* 2.43 (.17)* 1.94 (.13)

*= significantly different from control at p <.05.

2 A ‘Post-hoc test’ is standard procedure after an analysis of variance turns up a significant

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Danger Control Reactions: Attitude Change

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Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3

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via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

1. Cognitive 2. Affective 3. Control 1. Cognitive 2. Affective 3. Control

Perceived 2.33 (.20) 2.63 (.28)* - 1.94 (.23) 2.04 (.39) -

*= Notably higher or lower scores that explain the significant interaction

control, the perceived realism of the movie (r =-.418; p =.001), suggesting

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middle east journal of culture and communication 7 (2014) 82-100

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middle east journal of culture and communication 7 (2014) 82-100

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