Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Provision:

Section 16, Article III of the Constitution: All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

The Trial must be free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against [them] was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over [them] for an indefinite time, and to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

The inquiry as to whether an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by
precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.

Question: When is the right to a speedy disposition deemed to have been violated?

Answer: This right is violated when:

· The proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays

· When unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured.
· When without just cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
Question: What are the factors that may be considered and balanced in determining
the violation of such right?

Answer:

· The length of the delay

· The reason for such delay
· The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
· The prejudice caused by the delay
Thus, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefor, would not
be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.

Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy
disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies."
This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the
periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section
14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.

As a "radical relief," courts may order the dismissal of cases against the
accused if there is a proven violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases

“DELAYS MAY BE ALLOWED”

Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time
within which trial must commence.

Those exclusions should reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept
of “speedy trial” is a relative term and must be necessarily be a flexible concept.

The courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due
process and the strictures of speedy trial and the right of the state to prosecute crimes
and rid society of criminals

Rationale: Judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the
realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider
several factors, rather that a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have
elapsed.

Case: Mendoza Ong v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

The case at hand revolves around a complaint initiated by the petitioner, which was
lodged with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on December 13,
1994. Petitioner laments that although the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas as early as December 13, 1994, the informations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on August 1, 1997, and the amended
informations, on October 27, 1998. According to her, the delay of nearly three years to
finish the preliminary investigation violated her constitutional rights to due process and
speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling:

The Graft Investigation Officer issued a resolution finding probable cause against the
petitioner within six months of her submission of counter-affidavits. Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto subsequently approved the resolution just two and a half months later.
Despite the petitioner's claim of delay, the entire process, from the filing of the
complaint to the approval of the resolution, spanned only ten months, which is by no
means oppressive. This timeframe aligns with the concept of "speedy disposition of
cases," and is consistent with reasonable delays.
Supreme Court: The informations were filed only on August 1, 1997, also did not
violate petitioner’s constitutional rights

Rationale: The delay was not without valid reasons. The Special Prosecutor in charge
of preparing the informations felt a genuine need to specify in the informations

(1) the value of the five drums of fuel petitioner received as gift in violation of the anti-
graft law

(2) the amount of the subsistence allowance of heavy-equipment operators that the
municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, paid for when petitioner used heavy
equipment rented by the municipality to develop her private property.

The recommendation to specify these two amounts then had to undergo levels of
review and was approved by Ombudsman Desierto only on January 29, 1996.
Unfortunately, the needed information was not in the records, so the Deputy Special
Prosecutor sought it from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. As that
office also did not possess the needed information, it issued an Order on June 10, 1996,
directing petitioner to supply the needed information.

Upon receiving the Order, the petitioner requested additional time to comply but
ultimately waited two months before submitting a verified statement on August 23,
1996. However, this statement failed to provide the required information. The petitioner
claimed that the five drums of fuel were donations and that she was unaware of their
value. Additionally, she asserted that she and her husband, not the government,
covered the subsistence allowance for a heavy-equipment operator during the
development of their private property. Notably, the petitioner did not object to the
delay in terminating the proceedings against her nor did she attempt to expedite their
resolution at that time.

Other Reasons for delay:

· Petitioner’s refusal to supply the information prompted the handling investigator

at the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas to recommend on August
28, 1996, that the price of the five drums of fuel be estimated instead.
· The Office of the Special Prosecutor could have filed the informations then, but
petitioner had filed with the said office a motion for reassessment of evidence on
June 25, 1996, and a supplemental motion on August 20, 1996.
· The case had to be reassigned to another Special Prosecutor because the original
handling prosecutor was appointed Resident Ombudsman for the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Petitioner’s motion for reassessment was resolved only on
June 27, 1997.
SC Conclusion:

Considering the number of times that the case had to be reviewed, the levels of review
that the case had to undergo, and petitioner’s own motions for additional time, the
period that lapsed roughly two years and five months to terminate the proceedings
against petitioner could not be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.
They were necessitated by exigency of the actions taken on the case. The period to
terminate the proceedings, in our view, had not violated petitioner’s constitutionally
guaranteed rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.

Neither could the delay be said to have been prejudicial to her considering that she
herself is guilty of delay. The Court has held that if the long delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation was not solely the prosecution’s fault, but was also due to
incidents attributable to the accused and his counsel, the right of the accused to speedy
disposition of cases is not violated. Petitioner cannot now seek the protection of the law
to benefit from what she now considers the adverse effects of her own conduct in this
case.

CERVANTES V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

In March 1986, Pedro Almendras filed a sworn complaint with the Office of the
Tanodbayan against Alejandro Tapang, accusing Tapang of falsifying a
statement by inducing Almendras to sign a blank paper, later inscribed with
false information regarding a payment. Almendras implicated Elpidio C. Cervantes,
who worked as an analyst for labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz. Tapang responded with a
counter-affidavit on October 2, 1986, disputing Almendras' claims of falsehood and
vagueness in his complaint. Cervantes, on October 16, 1986, filed an affidavit with the
Tanodbayan, asserting his innocence and denying involvement in the blank paper
incident.

Over six years later, on May 18, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer II Luz L.
Quinones-Marcos filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan charging
Cervantes, Ruiz, and Tapang with violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019.
The charge alleged a conspiracy to induce Almendras into signing the blank paper,
causing undue injury by falsely stating that a monetary claim had been settled.
Cervantes filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28, 1992, reiterating his innocence.

Subsequently, on October 2, 1992, Cervantes filed a motion with the

Sandiganbayan to defer arraignment, citing pending reinvestigation,
prescription of the case due to delay, and arguing that the acts charged did
not constitute an offense. Despite Cervantes' motions, on the same day, the
Ombudsman denied his motion for reconsideration and filed an amended information
with the Sandiganbayan, specifying the total amount involved in the alleged offense.

The Sandiganbayan, through a resolution dated December 24, 1992, denied Cervantes'
motion, finding no unwarranted postponement or denial of steps to accelerate the case
by the Tanodbayan or the Ombudsman. Thus, the legal proceedings continued, with
Cervantes contesting the allegations against him.
ISSUE: whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to quash for violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case.

RULING: We find petitioner's contention meritorious. He was deprived of his right to a

speedy disposition of the case, a right guaranteed by the Constitution.

RAIONALE: It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six

(6) years from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an
information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the complaint by stating that "no political motivation appears to have
tainted the prosecution of the case" in apparent reference to the case of Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan.

Where the Court ruled that the "long delay (three years") in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan" was violate of the Constitutional right of
"speedy disposition" of cases because "political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case.

SC: We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor's ratiocination. It is the duty of the
prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him.

REMULLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

In August 2005, Remulla filed a criminal complaint against Maliksi with the Office of the
Ombudsman, accusing him of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Remulla alleged
that Maliksi, while serving as governor of Cavite, facilitated the purchase of medical
supplies from Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation in November 2002 without
conducting any public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to the
company. In response, Maliksi submitted his counter-affidavit on December 15, 2005.

Ombudsman Ruling:

After nearly nine (9) years, the Ombudsman, in a resolution dated August 27, 2014,
found probable cause against Maliksi for violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, disputing the existence of probable cause and
alleging a violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. The Ombudsman, in
an order dated October 22, 2014, denied the motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, in November 2014, the Ombudsman filed an information for violation of

Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Maliksi before the Sandiganbayan. Maliksi
responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss on November 20, 2014, asserting that the
finding of probable cause was null and void, and claiming that his constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of the case was infringed upon due to the 9-year delay in the
proceedings, which he argued caused him undue prejudice.

The Sandiganbayan Ruling:

The Sandiganbayan found that Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case was
violated. Thus, it dismissed the case against him. It stated that the explanation
provided by the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was
insufficient to justify its 9-year delay in the resolution of Maliksi's case. The
Sandiganbayan noted that the interval was caused by the delay in the routing or
transmission of the records of the case, which was unacceptable.

Citing Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, it wrote that it was inconsequential to determine

whether an accused had followed up on his case because it was not his duty to do so.
The Sandiganbayan opined that it was the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the
resolution of the case within a reasonable time.

The OSP filed a motion for partial reconsideration

Answer: The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for partial reconsideration. It

reiterated that the fact-finding of the case, which lasted for three (3) years, and the
preliminary investigation, which lasted for six (6) years, were due to mechanical routing
and avoidable delay. The Sandiganbayan found that such delays were unnecessary and
unacceptable. It also echoed Coscolluela that it was not the duty of the respondent in a
preliminary investigation to follow up on the prosecution of his case.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT.

RULING:

Contention:
Remulla argues that the Sandiganbayan should not have dismissed the case as there
was a finding of probable cause; that there was no violation of Maliksi's right to a
speedy disposition of his case because he did not promptly assert his right; that mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient to invoke inordinate delay

SC: The petition is bereft of merit.

Rationale:

the "balancing test" to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of cases has been violated. As this test necessarily compels the
courts to approach such cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct of both the prosecution
and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold factors, to wit:

(1) length of the delay;

(2) reason for the delay;

(3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and

(4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however,
is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered
together with other relevant circumstances.

Argument of Remulla:

Remulla argues that the cases of Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello dictate that
it is mandatory for a respondent or accused to actively assert his right to a
speedy disposition of his case before it may be dismissed on the said ground.
He insists that Maliksi failed to follow up on his case during the preliminary
investigation, hence, he cannot invoke his right to a speedy disposition of his case.

That the doctrine in Coscolluela, where the Court held that there was no need for
the respondent to follow up his case, is not controlling and it is only applicable
when the respondent is completely unaware of the preliminary investigation
against him.

SC: The first set of cases shows that the criminal cases were not dismissed because of
the non-assertion of the accused of their right to a speedy disposition of cases or
speedy trial. Other factors in the balancing test were also considered by the Court,
particularly, the reason for the delay in the proceedings and the prejudice caused by
the delay
(1st set of cases reason why their contentions are denied)

The length of delay in these cases were properly justified by the prosecution and the
accused therein failed to take steps to accelerate their cases, the Court found that the
there was no prejudice caused, which would warrant the assertion of their right to a
speedy disposition of cases.

The Court did not solely rely on the failure of the accused to assert his right; rather, the
proper explanation on the delay and the lack of prejudice to the accused were also
considered therein

(2nd set of cases reason why speedy disposition was violated)

In the second set of cases, the lengthy delay in the proceedings against the accused
therein was not satisfactorily explained.

The court considered several factors in sustaining the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases, such as the length of delay, the failure of the prosecution to justify
the period of delay, and the prejudice caused to the accused. The utter failure of the
prosecution to explain the delay of the proceedings outweighed the lack of follow ups
from the accused.

Harmonizing the 2 sets of cases:

Essentially, the Court found in those cases that the State miserably failed to give an
acceptable reason for the extensive delay. Due to the manifest prejudice caused to the
accused therein, the Court no longer gave weighty consideration to their lack of
objection during the period of delay.

Accordingly, both sets of cases only show that balancing test of applying societal
interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis." To reiterate, none of the factors in the
balancing test is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related
and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances.

How the Balancing test should be weighed:

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that
the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-
trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial;
and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system.
For the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
two things:

(a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay;

(b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of

proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Argument: Remulla argues that the assertion or non-assertion of the right to a speedy
disposition of cases determines whether the court must dismiss the case for inordinate
delay or continue the proceedings. Such argument, however, fails to persuade.

SC: Such argument, however, fails to persuade.

Rationale:
There is no constitutional or legal provision which states that it is mandatory for the
accused to follow up his case before his right to its speedy disposition can be
recognized. To rule otherwise would promote judicial, legislation where the Court would
provide a compulsory requisite .not specified by the constitutional provision. It simply
cannot be done, thus, the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test must be upheld.

CONCULSION of the SC:

The Ombudsman failed to justify the delay in the proceedings

Rationale:

The delay was traced back to the fact-finding investigation initiated by the
Ombudsman, spanning from December 15, 2005, to October 24, 2008, totaling three
years. Subsequently, the preliminary investigation endured for six years, until its
termination on August 27, 2014, followed by the filing of the information in November
2014, resulting in a total delay of nine years.

The prosecution attributed the delay to various factors, including the consolidation of
multiple cases and external events like the 2010 hostage-taking incident and the
impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Gutierrez. However, the court found the
explanations provided insufficient to justify the prolonged delay. It criticized the
Ombudsman's inaction on the proposed resolution and decision, delays in routing
memoranda for consolidation, and the unexplained four-year lull in the proceedings.
Despite Maliksi's lack of objection to the delay, the court emphasized the
prosecution's duty to expedite proceedings, irrespective of the accused's
stance. It underscored the prosecution's failure to justify the delay, thus
outweighing Maliksi's inaction. The court also dismissed Remulla's argument
regarding the length of delay, stating that the Sandiganbayan properly weighed all
relevant factors in its decision.

In conclusion, the court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the case against
Maliksi, upholding his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. It
reiterated the importance of adhering to procedural due process and emphasized the
detrimental effects of undue delay on the accused's rights. The decision serves as a
reminder of the judiciary's commitment to upholding fundamental rights and ensuring
fair and timely legal proceedings for all parties involved.

HERMIS CARLOS PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE

OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On April 27, 2016, a complaint was filed against Hermis C. Perez, the Mayor of Biñan,
Laguna, and Victor G. Rojo, a private individual connected with Etsaw Consultancy and
Construction of Environmental Technologies International Corporation of the Philippines
(ECCE). The complaint alleged malversation of public funds, violation of Sections 3(e)
and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and violation of Sections 37 and 48 of R.A. No.
9003.

The complaint arose from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed on

November 12, 2001, between the Municipality of Biñan, represented by Perez,
and ECCE, represented by Rojo. The MOA outlined the Municipality's agreement to
utilize ECCE's Hydromex Technology for its solid waste management program. An
amended MOA was purportedly executed on March 25, 2002, with adjusted price and
payment terms.

Despite the 14-year gap since the MOA's execution, the complaint alleged that
no competitive bidding occurred for ECCE's services. It further contended that
ECCE lacked the financial capability to fulfill its contractual obligations, citing
discrepancies between its investment and subscribed capital stock. Additionally, harm
and injury to residents near ECCE's dumpsite operations were reported.

The OMB Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer found probable cause to charge
Perez with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
The information filed against Perez:

On July 19, 2018, an Information was prepared against Hermis Carlo Perez, accusing
him of committing various offenses related to his position as the Municipal Mayor of
Biñan, Laguna. The Information alleged that from November 12, 2001, to March 25,
2002, Perez, while in the performance of his official functions, willfully and
unlawfully gave unwarranted benefits to Etsaw Consultancy and Construction
of Environmental Technologies International Corporation of the Philippines
(ECCE) and/or Victor G. Rojo, President of ECCE. These benefits were in the form
of contracts for the municipality's solid waste management program and related
services, totaling PHP 71,000,000.00.

The Information outlined several irregularities in the awarding of these contracts,

including the absence of a public bidding, lack of recommendation and approval
from the bids and awards committee, and failure to conduct due diligence on
ECCE's financial and technical capabilities. Despite these irregularities, Perez
allegedly facilitated payments to ECCE, causing damage and prejudice to the
government.

Perez Motion to Quash:

Perez argued that the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 occurred
between November 12, 2001, and March 25, 2002. According to Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, offenses punishable under this law prescribe after 15 years. Since the
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 5, 2018, more than 16 years
after the commission of the offense.

Perez contended that the criminal charges should be dismissed due to prescription.
Additionally, Perez invoked his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:

Sandiganbayan found Perez's motion bereft of merit.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the 15-year prescriptive period under R.A. No. 3019
applied to Perez's case since the amendatory law, R.A. No. 10910, took effect only on
July 21, 2016. It determined that the prescriptive period began from the discovery of
the offense, which occurred when problems with the MOA became evident. Even if
reckoned from the Sangguniang Bayan's resolution on October 1, 2001, approving the
MOA, the filing of the complaint with the OMB interrupted the prescriptive period.

Regarding Perez's right to speedy disposition of cases, the Sandiganbayan found no

violation. It deemed the OMB's resolution of the preliminary investigation within a
reasonable period, considering the complaint filed on April 27, 2016, and the
Information submitted on October 5, 2018. Moreover, Perez's failure to file a motion for
the early resolution implied acquiescence.

Perez filed a motion for reconsideration on February 13, 2019, arguing that the offense
was discoverable as early as October 1, 2001, or as late as March 25, 2002. He
contended that the complaint's filing with the OMB did not interrupt the prescriptive
period.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether the offense charged against Perez has prescribed; and

(b) Whether Perez's right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.

PEREZ Contention:

Perez insists that prescription of the offense had been set in his favor. Since
October 1, 2001, or the date of approval of the Sangguniang Bayan resolution,
the MOA was known to the public and irregularities in its execution may
already be discovered.

Perez also argues that prescription may be reckoned on November 12, 2001, the date
of the notarization of the MOA, or at most, on March 25, 2002, when the MOA was
amended. Insofar as the interruption of the prescriptive period is concerned, Perez
disputes the Sandiganbayan ruling that the filing of the complaint with the OMB tolled
the prescription of the offense. Finally, Perez again invokes his right to the speedy
disposition of cases, positing that the OMB took more than two (2) years to
resolve the complaint.

RULING:

SC: The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Rationale:

Ruling on the Prescription:

In resolving issues regarding the prescription of offenses, the Court must address three
key points:

1. the prescriptive period of the offense

2. when the period began to run
3. when the period was interrupted.

Given that Perez was charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prescriptive period of the offense is determined by Section 11 of the same law,
which sets it at 15 years. Although R.A. No. 10910 later extended this period to 20
years, this amendment cannot be retroactively applied to crimes predating its
enactment.

As for when the period commenced, Act No. 3326 governs the prescription of offenses
punished by special penal laws. Under this law, prescription generally begins on
the day of the offense's commission or its discovery if unknown at the time.
The "blameless ignorance" principle allows for prescription to start from the
discovery of the offense, but this is an exception and applies only when the plaintiff is
unable to know or has no reasonable means of knowing of the offense.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan erred in applying the "blameless ignorance"

principle to justify that the offense had not yet prescribed. The posting
requirements under the LGC provide sufficient notice of the local government unit's
contractual obligations. Thus, any irregularities in the execution of the MOA with
ECCE could have been discovered without substantial delay, rendering the
"blameless ignorance" principle inapplicable.

Prescription began upon the execution of the MOA between the Municipality of
Biñan and ECCE on November 12, 2001, or when the alleged violation of R.A.
No. 3019 occurred. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan's misapplication of the discovery
rule constituted a grave abuse of discretion. There was no evidence to suggest that
Perez deliberately concealed the MOA from the public, thus making it possible for the
State to discover any anomalies in the contract.

As a result, the Court rules that prescription began upon the execution of the
MOA, and the offense charged against Perez has indeed prescribed.
Interruption on the Prescriptive period (Ruling):

In the matter of whether the offense charged against Perez has prescribed, it is
essential to clarify the interpretation of Act No. 3326 regarding the interruption of the
prescriptive period. Perez contends that the offense has prescribed because the
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan beyond the 15-year period
stipulated in R.A. No. 3019. However, Perez's argument overlooks the fact that Act
No. 3326, which governs the prescription of offenses, does not limit the suspension of
prescription to judicial proceedings alone.

The Court emphasizes that the commencement of preliminary investigation proceedings

effectively interrupts the prescriptive period of an offense.

RATIONALE:

The rationale behind this interpretation lies in the nature of preliminary investigation as
the initial step in the prosecution of criminal offenses. The filing of a complaint
triggers the investigative process, marking the beginning of proceedings
aimed at determining the presence of probable cause and ultimately pursuing
criminal charges.

Consequently, the filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016, effectively
initiated the preliminary investigation against Perez, thereby interrupting the
prescriptive period of the offense.

SC: THERE WAS INORDINATE DELAY IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE PI

RATIONALE:

The constitutional guarantee on due process requires the State not only to observe
the substantive requirements on preliminary investigation, but to conform
with the prescribed periods under the applicable rules. "[s]ubstantial adherence
to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law."

GUIDELINES IN RESOLVING QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY

DISPOSITION OF CASES:

1. Distinction between right to speedy disposition of cases and right to speedy trial:
The right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before any tribunal,
whereas the right to speedy trial is specific to criminal prosecutions in courts of
law. The key consideration is whether the accused may be prejudiced by the
proceeding.
2. Initiation of case and periods for preliminary investigation: A case is initiated
upon filing of a formal complaint prior to a preliminary investigation. The Office
of the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigations,
with delays beyond this period viewed unfavorably. Time for fact-finding
investigations prior to the formal complaint is excluded from determining delay.
 3. Burden of proof: The burden of proof depends on timing of invocation of the
right and adherence to prescribed time periods. If invoked within set time
frames, defense must justify; if invoked after, prosecution must justify. Defense
must prove lack of malice and non-contribution to delay; prosecution must prove
adherence to procedure, complexity of issues, and absence of prejudice to
accused.
4. Contextual determination of delay: Length of delay is not mechanical and must
consider case complexity and evidence. Exceptions exist for malicious
prosecution or accused waiver of right.
5. Timely invocation of right: Right to speedy disposition must be raised through
appropriate motion upon lapse of statutory or procedural periods to avoid
waiver.

These guidelines emphasize the importance of adherence to procedural time frames,

fair burden allocation, and timely invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.

APPLICATION IN THE CASE:

In assessing whether the right of Perez to the speedy disposition of cases was violated,
it is crucial to examine whether the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) adhered to the
specified time periods in conducting the preliminary investigation. While the Rules of
Procedure of the OMB do not prescribe a specific period for concluding the
preliminary investigation, they require adherence to Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.

Under Section 3(f) of Rule 112, the investigating officer must determine the
existence of sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial within 10 days
after the investigation. Additionally, Section 4 of Rule 112 mandates the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor within five days, with the case forwarded to the
appropriate authority for review. This authority must act on the resolution within 10
days.

In this case, Perez filed his counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016.

Subsequently, the resolution of the complaint against him remained stagnant
for almost two years until the OMB issued a resolution on February 22, 2018, finding
probable cause to charge him. The delay extended beyond the 10-day period
prescribed under the Rules.

Given the delay, the burden of proof shifted to the prosecution to establish that
such delay was not inordinate.

Therefore, based on the prolonged duration of the preliminary investigation beyond the
prescribed period, the prosecution must justify the delay by proving compliance with
procedural rules, the complexity of the case, and absence of prejudice to the accused.
SC CONCLUSION:

Upon the submission of Perez's counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016, there was a
lull in the proceedings for preliminary investigation. Significantly, the OMB did not set
the case for further clarificatory hearing. The OMB justified its inaction for more
than a year by citing its heavy workload, and by invoking the judicial notice
taken by courts of the steady stream of cases filed before it.

Indeed, the Court has recognized that there are constraints in the OMB's resources,
which hampers its capacity to timely carry out its mandates and increasing caseload

However, this does not, by itself, suffice to explain the belated resolution of the
preliminary investigation against an accused.

Aside from the mounting workload of the OMB, the prosecution must also establish
that the issues are so complex and the evidence so voluminous, which render
the delay inevitable. In this case, the prosecution neither alleged nor proved any of
these circumstances.

Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind the "steady stream of cases that reach their
office" despite the Court's recognition of such reality.

"steady stream of cases" and "clogged dockets" are not talismanic phrases
that may be invoked at whim to magically justify each and every case of long
delays in the disposition of cases. Like all other facts that courts take into
consideration in each case, the "steady stream of cases" should still be subject to proof
as to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to
speedy disposition of cases as a fundamental right

CONTENTION:

The Sandiganbayan, however, held that Perez waived his right to the speedy
disposition of cases because he did not "take any step whatsoever to accelerate the
disposition of the matter."

SC:

The Court cannot emphasize enough that Perez's supposed inaction - or, to be more
accurate, his failure to prod the OMB to perform a positive duty - should not be
deemed as nonchalance or acquiescence to an unjustified delay. The OMB is
mandated to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers
and employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, in order to promote efficient service."
In conjunction with the accused's constitutionally guaranteed right to the speedy
disposition of cases, it was incumbent upon the OMB to adhere to the specified
time periods under the Rules of Court. Mere inaction on the part of the
accused, without more, does not qualify as an intelligent waiver of this
constitutional right.

Sandiganbayan neglected to see that Perez moved for the quashal of the Information
against him at the earliest opportunity The filing of this motion clearly contradicts any
implied intention on the part of Perez to waive his constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of cases. petition is hereby GRANTED

Chingkoe vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 232029-40, 12 Oct 2022

FACTS:

The Special Presidential Task Force 156 filed a Complaint against the officials and
employees of the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of
the Department of Finance, as well as private individuals, in connection with the
irregularities in the issuance of tax credit certificates. Among those accused were
Chingkoe and Andutan.

Andutan, then the deputy executive director of the center, is accused of favoring certain
companies, including Filstar Textile Industrial Corporation (Filstar), Petron Corporation
(Petron), and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), by recommending the
approval of tax credit applications and the subsequent transfer of tax credit certificates
to these companies.

Chingkoe, the corporate secretary of Filstar, is accused of submitting falsified

documents related to the issuance and transfer of tax credit certificates in conspiracy
with government officials and employees.

On March 26, 2009, several Informations 13 for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic. Act
No. 3019 and estafa through falsification of public Documents were filed by the Office of
the Ombudsman against Chingkoe, Andutan, and other respondents before the
Sandiganbayan.
Chingkoe filed a Motion to Quash citing a significant six-year delay in concluding the
preliminary investigation, contending that this delay breached her constitutional rights
to due process and a speedy disposition of cases. Andutan, along with other
respondents, supported Chingkoe's motion. However, the prosecution opposed it,
arguing that Chingkoe's failure to raise objections before her arraignment waived her
right to challenge the Information's validity. The Sandiganbayan eventually denied the
motion for lack of merit. This decision led Chingkoe and Andutan to separately file
Petitions for Certiorari before the Court, contesting the violation of their right to a
speedy disposition of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Grace T. Chingkoe and Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.'s
right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated.

RULING:

In the case at hand, petitioners Grace T. Chingkoe and Uldarico P. Andutan Jr. invoked
their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. They argued that the
prolonged delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation and subsequent
proceedings violated their fundamental rights.

However, upon careful examination of the facts and applicable legal principles, this
Court finds that their arguments lack merit.

In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-
called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors
and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that [they have] been
deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case.

As a "radical relief," courts may order the dismissal of cases against the
accused if there is a proven violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases.

It is therefore unnecessary to anchor the quashal of the Informations in

this case on Rule 117, Sections 3(b) and 3(d) of the Rules of Court, as
petitioners Chingkoe and Andutan contend.

For an information to be quashed, "the lack of authority [of the officer who filed the
information] must be evident on the face of the information."

Court’s standing on the Petitioner’s contention:

The court acknowledges that the preliminary investigation in the cases involving the
petitioners took longer than the prescribed period. However, such a delay alone
should not lead to an outright abandonment by the court of its duty to
adjudicate cases and reach a final resolution after evidence has been
presented. As articulated in Francisco Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the court
must balance the right to speedy disposition with the broader imperative of ensuring
public justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is not absolute and should not
impede the government's mandate to prosecute criminal cases or ensure
fairness in the administration of justice. While the protection of individual rights is
crucial, it should not come at the expense of the people's right to seek redress through
the legal system.

It is essential to recognize that determining whether there has been a violation of

the right to speedy disposition requires more than a mere mathematical
calculation of time. Not all delays are unreasonable, and the court must assess
whether the delay is attended by vexatious, capricious, or oppressive circumstances.
The right is violated when there is an inordinate delay that unjustly deprives parties of
a fair opportunity to present their case or when postponements are sought without
justification.

In essence, while acknowledging the importance of expeditious proceedings, the court

must also ensure that all parties are afforded a fair and just opportunity to have their
cases heard and adjudicated. Therefore, in evaluating claims of violation of the right to
speedy disposition, the court must consider the totality of circumstances and the
interests of all parties involved.

Reasonable periods regarding PI:

Section 8. Period for the conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Unless otherwise

provided for in a separate issuance, such as an Office Order creating a special panel of
investigators/prosecutors and prescribing the period for completion of the preliminary
investigation, the proceedings therein shall not exceed twelve months for simple cases
or twenty-four months (24) months for complex cases, subject to the following
considerations:

(a) The complexity of the case shall be determined on the basis of factors
such as, but not limited to, the number of respondents, the number of
offenses charged, the volume of documents, the geographical coverage,
and the amount of public funds involved.

(b) Any delay incurred in the proceedings, whenever attributable to the

respondent, shall suspend the running of the period for purposes of
completing the preliminary investigation.
 (c) The period herein prescribed may be extended by written authority of the
Ombudsman, or the Overall Deputy Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman concerned for justifiable reasons, which
extension shall not exceed one (1) year.

Notes (Guide for Recitation):

Rule 112, Sections 3 and 4 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 3. Procedure.— The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the

following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits
shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, before a notary
public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he
is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer
shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If
the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he
intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit
and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense.
The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant.
The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-
affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit

counter-affidavits within the ten (10)-day period, the investigating officer shall resolve
the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
 (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be
clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but
without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-
affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their
submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Section 4. Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor and its Review. — If the

investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare
the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or
as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend
the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their
receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. 1âшphi1

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating

prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but
his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause
exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct
another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another
preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice
may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the
resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct
the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without
conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
 (SORRY MAHABA HAHAHA guide lang just in case Technical yung tanong)

BACK TO THE RULING:

Applying either the shorter 15-day period to conclude the bearing and 10-day
period to determine probable cause under the Rules of Court, or the longer 12
to 24-month periods under Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2020, the
Office of the Ombudsman evidently exceeded the specified period to conduct
preliminary investigation. Here, the Complaint was filed on March 18, 2003, and
petitioner Chingkoe submitted her Counter-Affidavit on August 20, 2003. Based on the
records, it took the Office of the Ombudsman more than five years from the
filing of the Counter-Affidavit to issue the Resolution finding probable cause against
petitioners, among other accused.

COURT’S STANDING REGARDING THE ORDINATE DELAY:

The Court acknowledges the respondent's contention that the delay in the disposition of
the criminal cases is not inordinate and may be attributed to the ordinary processes of
justice. However, the prosecution failed to provide adequate justification for
the delay. It did not demonstrate that the complexity of the issues or the
volume of evidence necessitated the delay, nor did it follow prescribed
procedures in prosecuting the case. Moreover, the prosecution did not establish
that the accused did not suffer prejudice due to the delay.

In previous cases such as Cagang and Mamansual v. Sandiganbayan, this

Court recognized institutional delays within the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, it also emphasized that individuals must positively and timely assert
their right to a speedy disposition of cases. Failure to do so, as seen in Dela
Peña v. Sandiganbayan, may imply acquiescence to the delay and result in a
waiver of such right.

Therefore, considering the failure of the accused to seasonably assert their right to a
speedy disposition of cases and the absence of demonstrated prejudice, vexation, or
oppression caused by the delay, the Court rules that there has been no violation of the
right to a speedy disposition of cases in this instance.

CONCLUSION OF THE COURT:

JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE SC:

In Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, The petitioner in this case has persistently and
assertively invoked their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the
case. The petitioner's diligent pursuit of justice is evidenced by the filing of numerous
motions seeking early resolution before the Sandiganbayan. This proactive approach
underscores the petitioner's unwavering commitment to conclude the legal
proceedings in a timely manner.

Moreover, the unjustified delay of over ten years since the case was deemed
submitted for decision cannot be attributed to the petitioner. The petitioner
neither engaged in dilatory tactics nor prolonged the proceedings through procedural
maneuvers. Instead, the petitioner consistently pushed for the resolution of the
case, demonstrating a clear intent to expedite the legal process.

The prolonged delay has undeniably caused prejudice, distress, and anxiety to
the petitioner. As a senior executive in the banking sector, the unresolved
criminal prosecution has tarnished the petitioner's reputation and hindered
professional opportunities. Furthermore, the petitioner's status as an accessory after
the fact adds another layer of complexity to the situation, highlighting the need for a
timely resolution.

In Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, this Court emphasized that the right to a speedy

disposition of cases is of paramount importance and must be positively and
timely asserted. The petitioner's consistent efforts to seek justice, coupled with the
undue prejudice caused by the delay, warrant the dismissal of the case.

Additionally, Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan serves as a contrasting example where the

delay was not deemed oppressive, and valid reasons were provided for the
delay.

Legal Basis:

Established legal principles as outlined in Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, which recognized

the right to a speedy disposition of cases and emphasized the need for timely
assertion of this right. The Court also considered Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, where
valid reasons for delay were deemed acceptable, highlighting the importance of
balancing the interests of all parties involved. Additionally, the ruling is consistent with
the broader legal framework governing the protection of constitutional rights and
ensuring fair and expeditious legal proceedings.

IN COMPARISON AND APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR:

In the matter before the Court, the petitioners have filed a Motion to Quash
after an elapsed period of nearly six years from their arraignment, and only
subsequent to the issuance of resolutions by the public respondent. Such timing
gives rise to the inference that the motion was an afterthought rather than a response
to vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays encountered during the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The determination of whether there has been a violation of the right to speedy
disposition of cases necessitates a thorough examination of the specific facts and
circumstances pertinent to each case. While the accused's arraignment is a
relevant consideration, it cannot be deemed the sole determinant in assessing
the timely invocation of this right.

Furthermore, the petitioner Chingkoe's assertion of inordinate delay in the

preliminary investigation, as raised in her memorandum before the Office of
the Ombudsman, lacks legal footing. Her memorandum, filed as a motion for
reconsideration of a prior resolution, contravened the procedural rules stipulated by the
Office of the Ombudsman. As per the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, a motion for reconsideration must be filed within five days from
notice with the corresponding leave of the court where the information was filed. By
filing her motion beyond the prescribed period and without the requisite leave
of court, petitioner Chingkoe failed to adhere to the procedural requirements
mandated by law.

Given the petitioners' failure to comply with procedural rules and their delayed
assertion of their right to speedy disposition of cases, they are deemed to
have acquiesced to the delay. By waiting until after their arraignment and the
dismissal of cases against other accused individuals, petitioners have effectively waived
their right to timely assert their claim of violation of their right to speedy disposition of
cases.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing considerations and the petitioners' failure

to adhere to procedural requirements, the Court finds no merit in the petition
and hereby denies the Motion to Quash.