The Socioeconomic Impact of Hezekiahs PR

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles
The Socioeconomic Impact of Hezekiah’s Preparations for Rebellion
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures
by
Kyle Henry Keimer
2011
© Copyright by
Kyle Henry Keimer
2011
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The dissertation of Kyle Henry Keimer is approved.
____________________________________
Charles Stanish
____________________________________
William M. Schniedewind
____________________________________
Elizabeth Carter
____________________________________
Aaron A. Burke, Committee Chair
University of California, Los Angeles
2011
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS................................................................................................ VI

ABBREVIATIONS ..........................................................................................................................................VII
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................................................ IX
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................1
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...........................................................................................................................2
2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................................................3
3. HISTORY OF SCHOLARSHIP ............................................................................................................................6
A. Defensive Networks, Fortifications, and Warfare.................................................................................6
B. lmlk Impressions/Jars ............................................................................................................................10
i. Classification/Characteristics ............................................................................................................11
ii. Date....................................................................................................................................................14
iii. Function............................................................................................................................................14
iv. Distribution.......................................................................................................................................17
C. Districts and Boundaries .......................................................................................................................19
D. Socioeconomics and Warfare ...............................................................................................................23
4. METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................................................................................24
5. OVERVIEW OF STUDY ..................................................................................................................................26
CHAPTER 2. DEFENDING JUDAH: HEZEKIAH’S FORTIFICATIONS...........................................28
1. ESTABLISHING THE PRESENCE OF A DEFENSIVE NETWORK ......................................................................28
A. Theories of Defense/Defensive Strategies...........................................................................................29
B. Attributing Sites to Hezekiah ...............................................................................................................34
i. Lachish III parallels/Dates of the Lachish III Assemblage .............................................................36
ii. Presence of lmlk impressions...........................................................................................................42
iii. Presence of Destruction Layers Attributed to Sennacherib ..........................................................43
iv. Textual Resources............................................................................................................................45
v. Other Possible 8th Century Markers.................................................................................................48
B. Forms of Defensive Networks..............................................................................................................50
i. Middle Bronze II Levant ...................................................................................................................51
ii. Late Bronze Age Ugarit....................................................................................................................53
iii. Neo-Assyrian Empire ......................................................................................................................54
iv. Mycenaean and Classical Greece....................................................................................................57
2. HEZEKIAH’ S DEFENSIVE NETWORK............................................................................................................63
A. Site Hierarchy and Classification.........................................................................................................65
i. Settlement Types................................................................................................................................66
CHAPTER 3. GEOGRAPHICAL ASSESSMENT OF HEZEKIAH’S DEFENSIVE NETWORK....74
1. THE W EST: THE SHEPHELAH AND A PPROACHES TO JERUSALEM ..............................................................77
A. Cities ......................................................................................................................................................82
B. Villages ..................................................................................................................................................96
C. Fortresses ...............................................................................................................................................99
D. Watchtowers ........................................................................................................................................104
E. Unassignable ........................................................................................................................................107
F. Regional Defense Assessment ............................................................................................................118
2. THE SOUTH: THE NEGEV ...........................................................................................................................121
A. Cities ....................................................................................................................................................123
B. Villages ................................................................................................................................................126
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C. Fortresses .............................................................................................................................................127
D. Watchtowers ........................................................................................................................................128
E. Unassignable ........................................................................................................................................129
3. THE NORTH: THE CENTRAL BENJAMIN PLATEAU ....................................................................................131
A. Cities ....................................................................................................................................................132
B. Villages ................................................................................................................................................134
C. Fortresses .............................................................................................................................................135
D. Watchtowers ........................................................................................................................................135
E. Unassignable ........................................................................................................................................135
4. THE EAST: THE WILDERNESS ....................................................................................................................138
A. Cities ....................................................................................................................................................144
B. Villages ................................................................................................................................................144
C. Fortresses .............................................................................................................................................144
D. Watchtowers ........................................................................................................................................145
E. Unassignable ........................................................................................................................................148
5. THE CENTER: THE W ATERSHED ROUTE ...................................................................................................155
A. Cities ....................................................................................................................................................157
B. Villages ................................................................................................................................................160
C. Fortresses .............................................................................................................................................161
D. Watchtowers ........................................................................................................................................162
E. Unassignable ........................................................................................................................................163
6. GEOPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF HEZEKIAH’ S ENTIRE DEFENSIVE NETWORK .......................................169
CHAPTER 4. THE OPERATION OF HEZEKIAH’S DEFENSIVE NETWORK ..............................174
1. WHO IS BEING EMPLOYED?........................................................................................................................177
A. Northern Refugees ..............................................................................................................................177
B. Mercenaries..........................................................................................................................................191
C. Judeans .................................................................................................................................................197
2. SOCIOECONOMIC A SSESSMENT OF OPERATING HEZEKIAH’ S DEFENSIVE N ETWORK ............................205
3. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................213
CHAPTER 5. THE ADMINISTRATION OF HEZEKIAH’S DEFENSIVE NETWORK .................215
1. THE ISSUE OF JUDEAN DISTRICTS .............................................................................................................216
A. Economic versus Political Administration ........................................................................................220
B. The Economic System in Operation ..................................................................................................230
2. JUDEAN ECONOMY IN THE D AYS OF H EZEKIAH—ADMINISTRATION AND EXPLOITATION ....................231
3. SOCIOECONOMIC A SSESSMENT OF ADMINISTERING HEZEKIAH’S DEFENSIVE NETWORK .....................241
CHAPTER 6—CONCLUSIONS...................................................................................................................244
APPENDIX–LIST OF SITES WITH LMLK IMPRESSIONS .................................................................252
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................253
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LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS
TABLE 1. LEMAIRE’S CLASSIFICATORY SCHEME FOR THE LMLK IMPRESSIONS. .................................................13
TABLE 2. JUDEAN SITES WITH DESTRUCTIONS A TTRIBUTED TO SENNACHERIB ...............................................44
TABLE 3. SITES MENTIONED IN TEXTS AS TAKEN BY SENNACHERIB. .................................................................46
TABLE 4. ANCIENT SETTLEMENT TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................52
FIGURE 1. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE VARIOUS JUDEAN SITE TYPES.................................................70
FIGURE 2. COMPARATIVE SCALE OF IMPORTANT JUDEAN CITIES.......................................................................72
MAP 1. THE REGIONS OF JUDAH...........................................................................................................................75
MAP 2. THE NORTHERN SHEPHELAH AND WESTERN JUDEAN ASCENTS ALONG WITH THE ROADS AND
LINES OF SIGHT ............................................................................................................................................81
MAP 3. THE SOUTHERN SHEPHELAH AND WESTERN JUDEAN ASCENTS ALONG WITH THE ROADS AND
LINES OF SIGHT ............................................................................................................................................92
MAP 4. THE NEGEV WITH LINES OF SIGHT.........................................................................................................123
MAP 5. BENJAMIN AND THE CENTRAL BENJAMIN PLATEAU WITH LINES OF SIGHT. .......................................134
MAP 6. THE NORTHERN JUDEAN WILDERNESS WITH IMPORTANT LINES OF SIGHT.........................................140
MAP 7. SITES AND ROUTES IN THE SOUTHERN JUDEAN WILDERNESS. ............................................................142
MAP 8. THE CENTRAL H ILL COUNTRY WITH SOME IMPORTANT LINES OF SIGHT............................................157
TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE AND REGION OF JUDEAN DEFENSIVE SITES IN THE EIGHTH CENTURY. ......170
TABLE 6. DEFENSIVE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE KINGS OF JUDAH ACCORDING TO THE BIBLICAL TEXTS. ........176
TABLE 7. NUMBER OF SETTLEMENTS AND HECTARAGE DURING THE IRON AGE II IN THE JUDEAN HILL
COUNTRY AND SHEPHELAH......................................................................................................................198
TABLE 8. ESTIMATED POPULATION BY CENTURY IN THE JUDEAN HILL COUNTRY AND SHEPHELAH. THE
DENSITY COEFFICIENT IS TAKEN AS 200 PEOPLE PER HA .........................................................................199
MAP 9. MAP SHOWING THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS OF JUDAH IN THE DAYS OF H EZEKIAH. ..................217
TABLE 9. SITES IDENTIFIED IN JOSH 15 AND 18 WITH FIRM EIGHTH CENTURY DATES. ...................................218
MAP 10. JUDAH’S KEY AGRICULTURAL REGIONS (MARKED IN GREEN). ..........................................................224
TABLE 10. QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CERAMICS BY TYPE AND STRATUM AT TEL BATASH. ..............237
TABLE 11. QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF STONE OBJECTS BY TYPE AND STRATUM AT TEL BATASH.......239
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Abbreviations
A Map of Amazya (109/1-2), 2 Vols. Y. Dagan. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities
Authority, 2006
AHw Akkadische Handwörterbuch (3 Vols.). W. von Soden. Wiesbaden: Otto

Harrassowitz, 1965-1981
ANET Ancient Near Eastern Texts, 3rd ed. J. Pritchard (ed.). Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969
ARAB II Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Vol. II. D. D. Luckenbill.

Chicago: University of Chicago, 1927
ARMT Archives royales de Mari, traductions. Paris, 1950ff.
B Archaeological Survey of the Hill Country of Benjamin. I. Finkelstein and

Y. Magen (eds.). Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 1993
BA “The Judaean Desert and Plain of Jericho.” P. Bar-Adon. In Judaea,

Samaria, and the Golan: Archaeological Survey 1967–1968, edited by M.
Kochavi, pp. 92–149. Carta, Jerusalem, 1972
CAD Chicago Assyrian Dictionary. Chicago: The Oriental Institute, 1954-2011.
COS 2 The Context of Scripture, Vol. 2. Monumental Inscriptions from the

Biblical World. W. W. Halo and K. L. Younger (eds.). Leiden: Brill, 2003.
D Map of Lachish (98). Y. Dagan. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority,

1992
FIR Roman Roads in Judaea II: The Jaffa-Jerusalem Roads. M. Fischer, B.

Isaac, and I. Roll. BAR International Series. Tempus Reparatum, Oxford,
1996
GP “The Land of Ephraim and Manasseh.” R. Gophna and Y. Porat. In

Judaea, Samaria, and the Golan: Archaeological Survey 1967–1968,
edited by M. Kochavi, pp. 196–241. Carta, Jerusalem, 1972
H Map of Herodium (108/2). Y. Hirschfeld. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

Authority, 1985
vii
J.W. Jewish War, Josephus
K Survey of Jerusalem, 3 Vols. A. Kloner. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

Authority, 2000-2003
Ka “The Land of Benjamin and Mt. Ephraim.” Z. Kallai. In Judaea, Samaria,

and the Golan: Archaeological Survey 1967–1968, edited by M. Kochavi,
pp. 153–193. Carta, Jerusalem, 1972
KB The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament. L. Koehler and
W. Baumgartner. Leiden: Brill, 1994-2000
LXX Septuagint
MT Masoretic Text
NALK Neo-Assyrian Legal Documents in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British

Museum (StPohl SM 14). T. Kwasman. Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto
Biblico, 1988
NY Map of Nahal Yattir (139). Y. Govrin. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

Authority, 1991
P Map of Deir Mar Saba (109/7). J. Patrich. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

Authority, 1994
TAVO Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert
Verlag, 1977-1993.
Y “The Land of Judah.” M. Kochavi. In Judaea, Samaria, and the Golan:

Archaeological Survey 1967–1968, edited by M. Kochavi, pp. 19–89.
Carta, Jerusalem, 1972
viii
Acknowledgments
The writing of this dissertation was a long process that benefited from contact
with numerous colleagues. I want to thank first the members of my committee. Their
guidance over the years has been of great help in seeing this dissertation through to
completion; I have learned from all of them. I would also like to thank my fellow
students during my time at UCLA. For those who were ahead of me in the program—
Matthew Suriano, Jeremy Smoak, Roger Nam. Robert Cargill, and Peter Lanfer—I
learned as much from you guys as I did in any class. The willingness you each had to
discuss archaeology, Jerusalem, the Bible, or to visit site after site with me in Israel are
greatly appreciated. I also want to thank George Pierce to whom I have turned time and
again to discuss archaeology at all hours of the day. Ryan Roberts also deserves thanks
for always giving me feedback on various projects. Even more, he deserves thanks for
filing all of my paperwork while I finished my dissertation in Jerusalem. Both George
and Ryan have been good friends, and for that I am thankful. Last, but certainly not least,
I want to thank Sara Brumfield for her enthusiastic translating of multiple Italian articles.
Numerous other scholars have taken time to discuss aspects of my research, in
particular I would like to thank Ami Mazar and John Monson for discussing Judean
fortresses and historical geography. John also provided helpful comments on early drafts
of my dissertation and was the first person to really introduce me to the land of Israel.
Special thanks, however, go to James Monson. I would not be where I am today without
his help, knowledge, kindness, and patience. And I would not be who I am today without
the perspective that he has given me; he is a true mentor.
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During my time at UCLA I received generous financial support from the
university in the form of summer research mentorships, a research year fellowship, and a
Dissertation year fellowship. Also, from the Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, I received
funding that enabled me to travel to Israel multiple times. My dissertation was completed
in Jerusalem while I was the George A. Barton fellow at the W.F. Albright Institute of
Archaeological Research. I am thankful to the director of the Albright, Seymour Gitin,
for welcoming me and for discussing multiple facets of my research. The opportunity to
study at the Albright, a place so filled with history, was truly exciting. I also want to
thank Biblical Backgrounds, Inc. for allowing me to use their maps.
Most importantly I would like to thank my parents. Their love and support is
unending. Words cannot describe how blessed I am.
x
VITA
June 3, 1979 Born, Sandusky, Ohio
2001 B. A., Anthropology

The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio
2002 M. A., Biblical Archaeology

Wheaton College
Wheaton, Illinois
2006-07 Graduate Student Researcher

Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures
2008-09 Teaching Associate

2009-10 Teaching Fellow

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
Keimer, Kyle H. “Tel Dothan as Grain Producer and its Relation to Samaria and the
Samaria Ostraca.” Presented at The Middle West Branch of the American
Oriental Society. Grand Rapids, Michigan. 2003.
––––––. “Stone Objects” in Dothan I, eds. Daniel Master, E.H.E. Lass, John Monson,
and George Pierce. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns; pp. 161-166. 2005.
––––––. “The Iron Age Fortifications of Jaffa.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Schools of Oriental Research. Boston, Massachusetts. 2008.
––––––. “An Assessment of Hezekiah’s Military Preparations for Rebellion.” Presented
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at the Annual Meeting of the American Schools of Oriental Research. Atlanta,
Georgia. 2010.
––––––. “Stone Vessels from Idalion” in Excavations on the Eastern Acropolis of

Idalion, ed. Pamela Gaber. Boston: ASOR. In press.
––––––. “Area B: A Test Case for the Publication of the Kaplans’ Excavations in Jaffa”
in Studies on the History and Archaeology of Jaffa 1, eds. Martin Peilstöcker and
Aaron A. Burke. Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology. In press.
xii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Socioeconomic Impact of Hezekiah’s Preparations for Rebellion
by
Kyle Henry Keimer
Doctor of Philosophy in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures
University of California, Los Angeles, 2011
Professor Aaron A. Burke, Chair
This research seeks to determine the socioeconomic impact that Hezekiah’s
preparations for rebellion had on Judah in the late eighth century B.C. In 705 B.C.
Hezekiah rebelled against the Assyrian Empire. While the biblical texts focus on
Hezekiah’s preparations in Jerusalem, the archaeological record suggests that his
preparations encompassed the entirety of his kingdom; an encompassing defensive
infrastructure was established. This infrastructure is evident in the increased number of
fortified sites in Judah, the lmlk jars, and an increased number of officials attested to by
seals/impressions.
Specific concerns faced by Hezekiah in preparing for rebellion direct the course
of this research and include: 1) the establishment of a defensive network—what sites
xiii
needed to be fortified or refortified; 2) the operation of a defensive network—what
personnel and supplies were required at these fortified sites; 3) the administration of a
defensive network—from where did the necessary supplies come, and how were those
supplies distributed or managed? By addressing these issues it is argued that the
socioeconomic impact of Hezekiah’s rebellion may be articulated, and a better
understanding of the interaction between warfare and socioeconomics may be
established.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Methodology
In 705 B.C. Hezekiah rebelled against the Assyrian Empire. The reason(s) for this
rebellion can be reduced to two related ideas: he thought he could win because of Judah’s
infrastructure and/or their alliance with Egypt, and he thought YHWH was on his side.
Though the biblical texts portray the latter reason, faith in YHWH, as the more important
reason, the archaeological record suggests that Hezekiah was also pragmatic and
considered infrastructure equally important. This infrastructure is evident in the increased
number of fortified sites, the lmlk jars–evidence of the distribution of supplies–which are
found throughout the country, the increased bureaucracy of Hezekiah’s kingdom known
from epigraphic sources, and the apparent standardization in ceramic forms and
production. When viewed together each of these elements suggests that Hezekiah’s
preparations for his rebellion against the Assyrian Empire had an impact on the
socioeconomics of Judah in the late eighth century B.C. It is the decisions of Hezekiah
and their concomitant results as manifested in the archaeological record, with which this
study is concerned.
Hezekiah’s preparations cross three realms: geography, society, and economy.
These topics form the organizational framework of this study. Geography dictates where
warfare can be conducted, where supplies can be prepared, and where defenses need to be
established if Judah hoped to be successful. Before the geography could be utilized,
however, a social order that allowed for extensive military preparations without crippling
the economy had to exist; if a viable social order did not exist then it needed to be
1
fabricated or incentivised. Such a social order, however, was also related closely to
economic needs; the greater the call for production the more workers were needed to
enable that production to be met. At the same time, the more individuals there were, the
more extensive the agricultural-based economy had to become. In Hezekiah’s case,
military preparations necessitated a change in the social order and economy and, at the
same time, military actions during and just preceding Hezekiah’s rule led to social and
economic developments. Any understanding of change or effect is derived only from
considering each of these variables and the cyclical nature of how they interact. Through
addressing these variables it is argued that the socioeconomic impact of Hezekiah’s
rebellion may be articulated, and a better understanding of the interaction between
warfare and socioeconomics may be established.
1. Historical Background
Beginning with Tiglath-Pileser III the Assyrians exerted an ever-increasing
pressure on the peoples of the southern Levant. The numerous military campaigns
conducted by Tiglath-Pileser, Shalmaneser V, and Sargon II both individually and
collectively denuded the southern Levant of its wealth over the last third of the eighth
century B.C. Ultimately, the Assyrian goal was to control the main trade route to Egypt
and any route branching off of this route; whenever the trade routes were poached by
local rulers, or whenever local rulers did not pay tribute, the Assyrians responded with
harsh military action.
The kingdoms of the northern Levant were the fist to submit to Assyrian power,
then the kingdoms of Damascus and Israel in the southern Levant. An initial razzia by
2
Tiglath-Pileser III in 734 B.C. even reached the Philistine Coastal Plain and ended with
Assyria extracting tribute from the key Philistine cities (ANET, 283). In the following
years the Philistines would mount resistance that was never able to expel the Assyrian
presence. Sargon II reacted to this Philistine obstinance in 720 and 712 B.C., put down
revolts, and established a permanent Assyrian presence in the southern Coastal Plain
(ANET, 285–291). By this time the small kingdom of Judah, which before 712 B.C. had
been relatively unaffected by Assyrian interests because it was removed from the main
trade routes in the secluded mountains of the southern Levant, gained the interest of the
Assyrians because of their association with the rebellious Philistines. The inevitability of
further Assyrian action was palpable and it was at this time that Hezekiah began
preparing for rebellion in earnest. Once preparations were made Hezekiah only needed to
wait for the appropriate moment to withhold tribute, thereby initiating his revolt. That
moment came in 705 B.C. with the death of Sargon II.
2. Purpose of the Study

More scholarship has been conducted on the reign of Hezekiah (726-698 B.C.)
than any other Judean monarch. This is no surprise as the period of Hezekiah is one of the
most archaeologically visible periods in Israel and it provides the
archaeologist/historian/biblical scholar with data sets that are either unavailable or
restricted for every other Judean king. Many studies fall within two broad categories of
discussion concerning the period of Hezekiah: text critical or historiographical studies of
the biblical and Assyrian texts (Childs 1967; Gallagher 1999; Na’aman 1979, 1986b,
3
1986c; Stade 1886), and military studies (Hunger 1911; Manitius 1910).1 The military
studies have been conducted largely from an Assyrian perspective, with a focus on
determining how the Assyrians affected Judah (Dubovský 2006; Mayer 2003). Studies
that focus on military aspects of Judah, however, are largely lacking. Certainly this is
because of the available data, yet, an assessment of the martial capabilities of Judah is not
impossible. When Judean preparations or reactions to Assyria are treated, they focus
largely on the lmlk jars, many arguing that these jars were use to stockpile supplies for
Judah. Yet, studies that utilize the archaeology of Judah, aside from mentioning the
presence of lmlk jars or destruction levels, have not used the archaeology to its potential.
This study not only seeks to move away from Assyrian-centric perspectives and
text-driven analyses, but it also seeks to offer a more substantial investigation of the
entire preparatory process for rebellion that Judah appears to have made based on the
archaeology. Rather than focus on the Assyrians and their military prowess, this study
focuses on the small kingdom of Judah, the decisions of its king in dealing with the
Assyrians, and the impact those decisions had on the average Judean. In other words,
Judean military concerns in the days of Hezekiah led to economic buildup and
exploitation and social restructuring. This social restructuring is evidenced in the
increased bureaucracy attested to during Hezekiah’s reign, and the standardization of
many classes of products/consumables (e.g., ceramics, weights, and figurines).
Not only are many studies written from an Assyrian perspective, but when they
deal with warfare they also tend to focus on the destruction and end result of warfare. If
1
Notable exceptions are Faust (1999) and Defonzo (2005).
4
any preparations are detailed, they are Assyrian preparations and not those of the peoples
against whom Assyria is campaigning. The factors leading up to confrontation and the
reason(s) why confrontation manifests itself in a certain manner are largely unaddressed.
In order to remedy this lacuna, a discussion of warfare must begin by articulating the
lifestyle of those fighting. In the ancient Near East life was centered on farming (and
fighting). In the case of Iron IIB (ca. 840-701 B.C.) Judah and Assyria, the social
structure of each society affected who farmed and how it was done. This in turn affected
who could be used for the military and even how the military was organized. Differences
did arise, as is clear when one considers the well-organized juggernaut that was the
Assyrian army versus the more modest army of Judah. Social organization, which was
adapted to the lifestyle and resources of each country, in addition to political and
religious ideology contributed to the divergent developmental paths that the two nations
took.
Hanson (1998: 4) notes that in dealing with warfare and farming, the latter of
which equates to ‘economy’ in both his study and the current one:
“We must think first not of tactics or strategy, or even of economic loss or gain,
but rather—as the ancient authors who wrote such histories surely took for
granted—of the physical environment in which such work took place, the dirt and
the danger that faced such men, the impediments of time and space to cutting,
burning, and trampling, and the mentality of the farmers and the fighters, who had
no doubts why such growing or destroying was so important to their survival.”
While this quote deals with offensive military action, its maxims can be applied easily to
defensive planning; time and space must be considered not only when assessing offensive
military actions, but defensive preparations. Some studies do consider the effort and time
5
put into destroying and causing destruction through warfare (Eph‘al 1984), though they
are not humanistic in the sense that Hanson calls for. Further, there are no comprehensive
studies that consider the time, labor, and space required for the preparations meant to
provide for or fortify against military action.
Yet, such preparations were, and still are an integral part of warfare. “As long as
people need to eat, and wars extend beyond the battlefield itself, generals and military
planners will worry over how to protect and attack cropland” (Hanson 1998: 5). It is this
fundamental concept that lies at the heart of the current study. It will be argued that, not
only did Hezekiah make large-scale preparations to ensure the safety of agricultural lands
and their surplus, because of a war he knew was coming, but also that those preparations
had a dramatic impact upon the economy and society of Judah; an impact that can be seen
in the archaeological record.
3. History of Scholarship
The juxtaposition of the issues with which this study deals—defensive
networks/fortifications, royal administration, and socioeconomics—has not been
attempted for Iron Age Judah. Each of these topics, however, has been discussed
singularly, with occasional studies that integrate two of the three issues. A brief history of
the scholarship dealing with each main issue that this study seeks to integrate is presented
below.
A. Defensive Networks, Fortifications, and Warfare

One of the earliest and most comprehensive works on warfare and fortifications in
the southern Levant is that of Yadin (1963). In essence, this work is largely a description
6
of warfare as illustrated through both the archaeology and biblical texts. While it is very
successful in its presentation of the reality of ancient warfare it offers little in the way of
synthesis; it does not attempt to relate warfare to social, economic, geographic, or (to a
lesser degree) political concerns.2 Much has been discovered since Yadin wrote his
treatise, however, and only now is there enough quantitative data that makes it possible to
offer more holistic syntheses. It is surprising then, that there has not been a systematic or
quantitative study of fortified sites, especially from the end of the eighth century, though
blanket statements abound, such as, “the series of fortresses and towers both in the desert
regions and in Judah itself point to a highly developed system of defense and to a well-
defended road network” (Mazar 1984: 55).
Yadin’s discussion of Iron Age warfare in the southern Levant is driven largely
by the Assyrian records; artistic and textual sources illuminate the Assyrian army’s
offensive capabilities (1963: 313–328). At the same time, Yadin discusses the form of the
fortifications found in the Levant, because, as he correctly notes,
“The development of the art of warfare of one nation can only be fully evaluated
in light of the art of warfare of its enemies in attack and defense, because war
always involves two sides. Innovations of one side lead to innovations on the
other side. City fortifications need to be looked at in relation to attack method”
(1963: 1–2).
While Yadin offers a broad chronological-typological scheme for the development of
fortifications over the course of the entire Iron Age (ca. 1200-500 BC), he does not
attempt to differentiate specific fortification features occurring in the Iron IIB-C (ca. 840-
2
Yadin’s work is a more popular treatment meant for a broad public audience, though much of the book
derives from his more scholarly articles on warfare.
7
586 BC). Wall and gate types are discussed without an articulation of how these features
differ from site to site within the same period, nor are reasons offered as to why they
might differ.
The lack of nuance in Yadin’s work has been criticized in more recent works,
such as Herzog’s 1992 discussion, which critiques Yadin’s schematic approach and
delves into the issue of how fortifications functioned in relation to the geography and
political structure. Herzog writes:
“Instead of a rigid scheme based on a single functional factor, the variety of

fortification methods which existed side by side at various times during this
period, chosen as a result of various functional considerations, should be
emphasized. One such consideration was the function of the city within the
monarchical administration, its location and strategic importance, and the
adaptation of the fortifications to the expected form of attack upon the city”
(1992: 267, 269).
Herzog proceeds to set out an adjusted chronological and typological developmental
scheme of different fortification features specifically in the Iron II (1992: 265–274, esp.
Table 5 p.270). Emphasis is placed on the type of wall (e.g., casemate or solid), and style
of gate (e.g., 6-chambered, 4-chambered, or 2-chambered), though short mention of other
features such as glacis and towers is included. As novel and important as Herzog’s article
is, it is only an introduction to fortifications and is not meant to be a comprehensive
geopolitical treatise.
A study that does attempt to be comprehensive is that of Vaughn (1999). His
study utilizes archaeological material to show that under Hezekiah, Judah experienced an
economic buildup and had a more cogent civil power than what existed during the reigns
of previous Judean kings and the later king Josiah. The point of his study is to use the
8
archaeology—including stratigraphic analysis and the lmlk jars—to show that the book of
Chronicles is a historically valid source. Through his study he collates much of the
archaeological material from major Judean sites and offers useful discussions of the lmlk
impressions and Hezekiah’s officials. From a political perspective, Vaughn’s work is
quite comprehensive, however, from a defensive perspective, most smaller sites such as
fortresses and towers are left unaddressed. While Vaughn’s work is a great resource,
numerous final reports and additional surveys have appeared since its publication,
making an update of his archaeological assessment necessary.3
In addition to the more synthetic works of Herzog and Vaughn, Mazar (1981,
1982) has written two almost identical articles on Iron Age fortresses (one in Hebrew and
one in English) in which he discusses a limited number of fortresses in the Shephelah. He
details the communication abilities of the fortresses at Kh. Abu et-Twein, Deir Baghl,
Kh. el-‘Abhar, Kh. el-Tibneh, and H. Eres, and is one of the first to use the archaeology
3
Reports on the fortifications of individual sites have appeared, providing a large corpus of data with
which to work. The nature of these reports, however, means that they are largely descriptive and at most
only offer a regional assessment of any defensive network. Sites whose Iron IIB (840-701 BC)
fortifications have been published and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 include: Cities: Aroer
(Biran 1993, Biran and Cohen 1977, 1981), Tel Batash (Timnah) (A. Mazar 1997, A. Mazar and Panitz-
Cohen 2001), Beersheba (Aharoni 1973, Herzog 2008), Gezer (Dever 1974, 1985, 1986, Dever, Lance, and
Wright 1970), Gibeon (Pritchard 1962, 1964, 1993), Tel Halif (Jacobs 2008, Seger and Borowski 1993),
Tel Harassim (Givon 1995), Hebron (Chadwick 1992), Tel ‘Ira (Beit-Arieh 1999), Jerusalem (de Groot and
Ariel 1992, Franken and Steiner 1990, Geva 2000, 2003, E. Mazar and B. Mazar 1989, Shiloh 1984,
Steiner 1986, 2001), Lachish (Ussishkin 2004), Tel Malhata (Beit-Arieh 2008, Kochavi 1993), Khirbet
Rabud (Kochavi 1974), and Tell Beit Mirsim (Albright 1943). Fortresses: Arad (Amiran, Ilan, and Aharoni
1993, Herzog 1997b, Herzog 2002), Azekah (Bliss and Macalister 1902, Stern 1993), and the Buqe’ah
Valley Sites (Stager 1975, Vaughn 1999b). Towers: Khirbet Abu et-Twein (A. Mazar 1982; 1993) and
numerous additional towers and fortified compounds that have been identified in surveys conducted in
Judah (Avni 1992, Bar-Adon et al. 1972, Baumgarten 2004, Beit-Arieh 2003, Berman and Barda 2005,
Berman, Barda, and Stark 2004, Cohen 1981, 1985, Cohen and Cohen-Amin 2004, Dagan 1992a, 1992b,
2006a, 2006b, Finkelstein, Lederman, and Bunimovitz 1997, Finkelstein and Magen 1993, Gazit 1996,
Gophna and Beit-Arieh 1997, Govrin 1991, Haiman 1986, 1991, 1993, 1999, Hirschfeld 1985, Kloner
2000, 2001, 2003, Kochavi and Beit-Arieh 1994, Lender 1990, Patrich 1994, Rosen 1994, Stark, Barda,
and Berman 2005, Weiss, Zissu, and Solimany 2004).
9
of non-tell sites to support the idea of a coherent defensive system. The current study
seeks to apply the approach of Mazar to the entire Kingdom of Judah in the days of
Hezekiah.
The small amount of scholarship dedicated to addressing what fortifications relate
about geopolitical and socioeconomic concerns means that there are many issues
remaining to be addressed and many questions remaining to be asked.4 In particular, this
research asks where are the fortified sites in Judah, both in relation to the topography of
the country and in relation to each other? Why are they were they are? Is there a coherent
network of fortifications? If so, then it will be possible to move past mere descriptions of
fortifications and look at what they relate about the society, government, economy, and
worldview of those who built them.
B. lmlk Impressions/Jars
The lmlk jars are those storage jars whose handles are impressed with a stamp
reading “lmlk,” which means “to/belonging to the king” or “royal.” These stamps also
include one of two emblems and one of four place names. Scholarship done on the lmlk
impressions/jars is quite voluminous and can be divided into different categories of
research: classification or characteristics of the impressions, their date, the function of the
impressions and the jars on which the impressions are made, and their distribution.
4
Allen (1994: 13) notes a similar trend in the archaeology of New Zealand. He writes, “there is an
unprofitable tendency in New Zealand archaeology to consider pa as solely fortifications in isolation of
their social and environmental context. Pa had a variety of functions besides forts…Pa also undoubtedly
had social, ideological, and political functions…though these have seldom been the focus of archaeological
research.”
10
i. Classification/Characteristics
Some of the earliest attempts at classifying the lmlk impressions based on their
characteristics are those of Diringer (1941, 1949) and Albright (1943: 74–75), who
created a three class typology based on iconographic, stylistic, paleographic, and
orthographic distinctions.
The first class has “naturalistic” four-winged scarab emblems. The second class
has “conventionalized” four-winged scarabs, and the third class has two-winged flying
scroll emblems.5 According to Diringer and Albright, the four-wing emblem precedes the
two-wing emblem and only changes in the days of Josiah due to his religious reforms.
The change was to eliminate pagan symbols. Diringer also uses supposed paleographic
differences to support his three-class system, with each class introduced subsequently by
Hezekiah, Manasseh, and Josiah. This classificatory scheme was adopted and slightly
refined by Welten (1969: 104), who dates the seals with the four-wing emblem to the
period of Hezekiah and those with the two-wing emblem to the reign of Josiah.
Tushingham (1970, 1971) took the discussion of the characteristic emblems a step
farther and tried to identify the meaning behind the emblems. The two different
emblems—the four winged scarab and two winged solar disc—seen in the lmlk
impressions led him to conclude that the former is the royal insignia of Israel and that the
latter is the royal emblem of Judah.6 His contention is that the use of two royal emblems
reflects Josiah’s assertion that he was the ruler of a reunited kingdom encompassing the
5
The identification of this emblem is problematic and has garnered multiple interpretations: a bird, a flying
scroll, and a winged sun disk.
6
This view is contra Yadin (1961a: 14), who attributes the winged scarab emblem to Judah.
11
territories of both Israel and Judah (Tushingham 1971: 33–35). Later, after four- and two-
winged lmlk impressions were found in the same context at Lachish and definitively
dated to the eighth century, Tushingham adjusted his theory stating that it was Hezekiah
who used both emblems; the scarab to symbolize reunification, and the solar disc as the
official Judean emblem. Both emblems—the solar disc specifically—then continued to be
used until the reign of Josiah (1992: 64).
The difference in emblems does pose an interesting problem, as they are the key
identifying elements of lmlk seal impressions.7 Despite previous interpretations, the two
different emblems likely serve to differentiate something, as correctly noted by Fox
(2000: 222). While this differentiation is likely more for the products contained within
the lmlk jars, Fox agrees that Tushingham’s idea about a northern and southern insignia
may be applicable for the time of Hezekiah:
“Adopting the royal insignia of the North as one of Judah’s state symbols may
have served to unify the populace of Judah, a percentage of which by his time was
probably of northern origin. The designation lmlk as a superscription on most of
the royal seals would certify that both the scarab and the winged sun disc
qualified as state symbols” (2000: 222).
A more recent classificatory scheme has been proposed by Lemaire (1981), who
created 22 categories of impressions based on some of the same features originally used
by Diringer: orthography and iconography. Lemaire’s classification, however, resulted
because of critiques not only of Diringer’s scheme, but also of Welten’s. The latter’s
scheme, according to Lemaire, is sometimes the result of a poorly applied impression,
7
Consider Welten (1969: 171), who compares them to coats of arms.
12
and the number of categories should be reduced (1981: 57*). Lemaire also rebuffs the
chronological scheme of Diringer, who based his analysis on the paleography,8 and says
some forms represent experimentation and not chronological differences, a fact that is
further bolstered thanks to the more recent excavations at Lachish, which show that all
the stamps should be dated to the second half of the eighth century as argued by Lemaire
(1981: 58*).
Lemaire’s scheme groups the lmlk seals into seven different types based on the
number of wings, presence of the word lmlk, the geographic name, and how that name is
written (see Table 1). It is the scheme that today is followed almost exclusively, and that
is adopted by the current study.
Type (class) Number of Lmlk GN GN Above/Below Split GN

Wings Emblem (A/B)
Ia 4 Y Y B
Ib 4 Y Y B
IIa 2 Y Y B
IIb 2 Y B Y
IIc 2 Y A
XII Y
OII 2
Table 1. Lemaire’s classificatory scheme for the lmlk impressions.9
Class I: flying scarab
Class II: winged sun disk
Subgroups—GN: H(ebron), Z(iph), S(ocoh), M(mst), X (no place name), and O (no inscription)
Sub-subgroups: I: a: less standardized writing (sloppy writing) (Diringer’s class I)
b: better executed inscriptions (Diringer’s class II)
II: a: lmlk is written split in the middle (lm-lk) (zyph written with matres lectionis)
b: lmlk and the place name are split
c: only the place name (above the emblem)
XII: ‘lmlk’ not split
8
In a separate article, Lemaire (1975) shows that the letter heh when made with four horizontal strokes
appears as early as the beginning of the eighth century B.C., contrasting Diringer, who considers such a
form to be seventh century in date.
9
Only three of these classes are unattested yet in the archaeological record: SIa, ZIIb, and SIIc.
13
ii. Date
Following Ussishkin’s excavations at Lachish, the consensus over the past thirty
years on the lmlk impressed jars is that they were initiated by Hezekiah, were only
produced during his reign, and represent efforts by him to provision his kingdom in light
of his rebellion against Assyria (Ussishkin 2004a; Vaughn 1999).10 Prior to Ussishkin’s
work and the clear association of Level III instead of Level II with the destruction
wrought by Sennacherib there was a tendency to associate the lmlk impressions with
Josiah (Albright 1943, 1958; Cross 1969; Diringer 1941, 1949). Many articles were
written on this debate, a debate that is only mentioned briefly here. For further reading on
this old debate one is directed to the summary offered by Vaughn (1999: 81–87) and the
bibliography cited therein.
iii. Function
In addition to the issue of their date, there has been a debate surrounding the
function of the lmlk jars/impressions. Albright (1943: 75) believed the four sites
mentioned in the impressions were store-cities, while Diringer (1949: 82) believed that
the names referred to royal potteries. Lapp (1960: 22), followed by Rainey (1982), argued
that the jars were related to the production of wine from royal wineries, and Cross (1969:
10
This statement only applies to jars impressed with the seal ‘lmlk’ and not to the form of the store jars on
which these inscriptions occur. Recent studies have shown that the form of store jar, now termed “oval-
shaped store jar” has antecedents dating back into the 9th century (Gitin 2006; Shai and Maeir 2003;
Zimhoni 1997: 137).
A recent study (Lipschits, et al. 2010: 28) has attempted to differentiate the lmlk impressions
chronologically within the reign of Hezekiah. In their opinion, the type Ia, Ib, and IIa impressions were the
only ones produced prior to 701 BC, while the type IIb, IIc, and XII were each developed in sequence after
701. The later impressions would have been produced, presumably, during the reign of Manasseh. The
difficulty with accepting this new chronological classification is that it is based on both the presence of
impressions at sites that were not destroyed by Sennacherib and the absence of impressions at sites that
were. Neither scenario offers the tight chronological control argued for by Lipschits, Sergi, and Koch as the
first offers no absolute dates and the second could be the result of sampling/excavation.
14
22) claimed that the jars represented a standardized system of measures. Diringer’s
hypotheses is no longer accepted, nor is Cross’s, which was obviated when Ussishkin’s
excavations and restoration of numerous lmlk jars showed that they were not of a
standard size (Ussishkin 1978: 77, 80, 1983: 162–163).
Further interpretations of the lmlk jars suggest that they are: 1) evidence of
taxation; 2) a designation of rations for fortress sites on Judah’s borders (Halpern 1991);
3) a part of the buildup program in the months prior to an expected Assyrian invasion of
Judah to prepare for siege conditions (Na’aman 1979, 1986b; Ussishkin 2004a: 2142);
and 4) a general program of reform designed to bolster the economy of the nation and
increase the influence of the monarchy over the entire country that was begun years
before the threat of Assyrian reprisals (Finkelstein and Silberman 2006; Vaughn 1999:
169–172).
Zimhoni (2004a: 1795) combines these various interpretations in her detailed
discussion of the ceramics of Lachish III. She classifies the jars upon which the lmlk
impressions occur as Group III: SJ-1 and notes that this type of jar is the largest of the
closed storage vessel types but could still be easily transported:
“Therefore, they were apparently selected by the administrative authorities as the

ideal storage vessel for food supplies on the eve of the revolt against Assyria. This
explains the royal seal impressions they bear. Apparently these storage jars were
not specifically made in preparation for the revolt, but rather production was
simply continued, and those jars intended for official use were stamped” (2004a:
1795).
An added feature of the lmlk jars that has been discussed in regards to their function is the
presence of private seal impressions on the jars. Ussishkin points out that private seals
15
only occur on lmlk jars and that they appear only on jars that are stamped with two-wing
lmlk impressions (a statement further supported by the study of Mommsen, et al. 1984:
106). There are no jars with four-wing symbols that also have private stamps (Ussishkin
2004a: 2142–2143). It would appear that the private stamps marked individuals to whom
the contents of the lmlk jars were shipped. However, Ussishkin (2004a: 2145) later writes
that, “the stamps were not necessarily meant to be legible, but rather that the principle
objective was to furnish the vessels with a mark of official sanction” (Contra this see
Barkay and Vaughn 1996: 42–44, 2004: 2170). As such, the seal impressions “had little
to do with the distribution of the storage jars throughout Judah” (Ussishkin 2004a: 2145).
According to Ussishkin, the owners of the private seal impressions cannot be officials in
Hezekiah’s government for in such a case Lachish would have more than fifteen officials
(Ussishkin 2004a: 2146). Without offering much of a conclusion or interpretation of the
private names, Ussishkin is consigned to saying that, “the seals bearing private names
were kept and employed according to the discretion of those responsible for the
production of the storage jars” (2004: 2146, cf. similar statements in Kelm and Mazar
1995: 133).
Barkay and Vaughn express a similar pessimism for identifying any function for
the lmlk jars themselves. Their conclusions are limited to saying that the lmlk jars were
store jars and that there is not enough quantitative data to say anything more (2004:
2170f). At the same time, however, they do claim that, “Hezekiah set up storehouses or
distribution centres throughout the kingdom from which royal commodities were shipped
out on a kingdom-wide basis” (2004: 2168 [citing Vaughn’s 1999 work, pp. 81-167]).
16
It will be argued in detail in Chapter 5 that a combination of the previous
interpretations is preferable. The lmlk jars did contain commodities being distributed by
the government for officials and military personnel. These jars were produced in the
Shephelah (see next section) and shipped empty to their respective regions (i.e., one of
the four regions/cities mentioned in the impressions) where they were then filled with
supplies from either the royal storehouses or from Judean citizens as taxes in kind. Once
they were filled the jars were shipped a second time to officials/personnel throughout the
kingdom. When and if these personnel were re-stationed they took their supplies in the
lmlk jars with them. Such a scenario, it will be argued, offers an explanation for the
distribution of the lmlk jars and the fact that the place names of the impressions do not
always correspond to the region in which the jars are actually found.
iv. Distribution
The distribution of the lmlk impressions is a bit of an enigma; impressions bearing
one place name are not limited to that region, but rather appear to be randomly situated.
Further, the lmlk jars are not distributed equally throughout Judah. Impressions/jars are
most abundant at sites in the Shephelah and in the Central Benjamin Plateau, including
down to Ramat Rahel. Such a distribution is not surprising as the west and north were the
most likely directions from which any enemy force would attack. On the other hand, only
a handful of lmlk impressions come from either the Wilderness or the Negev.11
11
It should be noted that, with the exception of the Negev, the highest quantities of lmlk impressions come
from sites that have been excavated. If and when more sites in the Central Hill Country of Judah are
excavated statements concerning the distribution of lmlk impressions may need to be reassessed.
17
The dearth of lmlk impressions from sites in the Negev has given rise to
arguments that claim the Negev had a different logistical arrangement than the rest of the
country. Rainey (1994: 335–336) writes,
“The strong points in the Shephelah and in the hill country were supplied with
wine from the royal vineyards located at the four hill country sites of Hebron,
Ziph, Socoh, and Mmšt. Cities like Arad and Beer-sheba were receiving wine
shipments from other places nearby, as witnessed, for example, by a small
inscribed sherd found in the storehouse at Tel Beer-sheba that recorded shipments
of wine from Tolad and Beth-amam…The four place names on the lmlk seal
impressions have nothing to do with administrative divisions of the kingdom…”
As for the dearth of lmlk impressions from Judean Wilderness sites, it has been
assumed that there were few if any settlements in this region during the days of Hezekiah.
Even if there were sites, the likelihood of an attack coming from that direction was very
minimal. However, Vaughn (1999) has made a good case that some of the sites in the
Wilderness at which lmlk impressions have been found were occupied in the eighth
century and could have served as a more spartan line of defense.
Related to the issue of the distribution of the lmlk jars, is the issue of where they
were being produced. A petrographic study was conducted that showed the jars were all
being produced in the eastern Shephelah (Mommsen, et al. 1984). This fact is further
supported by a study done on the ceramic fabric of the lmlk jars found at Tel Batash.
Mazar and Panitz-Cohen (2001: 19) note that the lmlk jars found at Batash were made
with terra rossa soil, a soil type that is found around Beth Shemesh but not Tel Batash
further to the west.
A meaningful distribution of the lmlk impressions has yet to appear. That is, no
distribution that may better inform the function of the jars and the purpose of the four
18
place names has been articulated. It is no surprise as there are over 1700 lmlk impressions
found at almost 70 Judean sites. Various facets related to the distribution of lmlk
impressions/jars will be addressed further in Chapter 5.
C. Districts and Boundaries

Delineating the boundaries of Judah, the possible districts, and the boundaries of
those districts during Hezekiah’s reign has proven to be notoriously difficult. The town-
and boundary-lists in the books of Joshua (15:21-62; 18:25-28), and 1 Chronicles (4:39-
44) are commonly cited sources for reconstructing the various divisions within Judah, but
debate has raged over the date and meaning of these lists. Alt (1953) was the first to
recognize that the town lists and border descriptions of Josh 15 recorded a system of
provinces established by the Kingdom of Judah for administrative purposes; a system that
dated to the days of Josiah (640-609 B.C.) in his opinion, based largely on the inclusion
of Benjaminite territory in Judah. Of the various biblical texts, Josh 15 offers the most
detailed list of the districts of Judah along with the villages and cities included in each.
There are three districts in the Shephelah, seven in the central hill country, one in the
Judean Wilderness, and one in the Negev; the latter being the largest in both area and
number of cities (Josh 15:21-32).
Alt’s dating of the list, however, was critiqued by Cross and Wright (1956) who,
drawing upon archaeological evidence unavailable to Alt, date the province lists to the
time of Jehoshaphat (873-849 B.C.). Cross and Wright (1956: 224-226) suggest that the
provinces actually were established even earlier, possibly in the days of David or
Solomon, but that the form of the lists in Joshua reflects only the days of Jehoshaphat.
19
Cross and Wright’s assessment of the historical setting and archaeology was, in
turn, quickly criticized by Kallai-Kleinmann (1958),12 who states that the various town
lists did not derive from the same time period but reflect the individual tribal territories at
different times. Further, he dates the current form of Judah’s town list to the days of
Hezekiah, though acknowledges that it could have been composed earlier as suggested by
Cross and Wright (1958: 139). In addition, Kallai addresses the issue of gaps between
boundaries. He states, “we must bear in mind, however, that a town mentioned in the
boundary-description stands for its whole territory, which may be small or extensive, and
it is our duty to find out where the limits of this territory are” (1958: 144).13
The problem with identifying a specific date for the boundary- and town-lists in
the biblical sources is partly due to a long and complex process of redaction of the texts.
Over time the town lists were likely updated to reflect the current political situation.
Further, the inclusion or omission of specific detailed lists like those in Joshua and
Chronicles was often determined by the theological or political motivations of the biblical
author.14
Discussions of the boundary- and town-lists provide the foundation for
discussions of the administrative districts within Judah. The presence of districts and the
number of those districts is necessary to establish for the current study because some
12
All future references will list his name as “Kallai” as this was how he authored subsequent and re-
published versions of articles.
13
Kallai (1958: 157-8) also draws a distinction between what is represented in the boundary lists versus the
town lists. The former represented the divisions of the kingdom according to a given political situation,
while the latter represented the “holdings of the particular tribes in a given political situation.”
14
Consider the inclusion of the list of fortified cities built by Rehoboam in 2 Chr 11:5-12.
20
scholars correlate the lmlk institution15 with political administration. Aharoni (1958,
1979) and Yadin (1961b) were some of the first scholars to do so. Aharoni suggests that
the four place names on the lmlk seals represent four districts within the kingdom of
Judah in Hezekiah’s day. These four districts, he contends, are a simplification of the
twelve districts that proceeded from Jehoshaphat’s day, which ultimately reflect the
division of the kingdom in Solomon’s day (1 Kgs 4). Solomon’s districts, in turn, are
based upon the tribal allotments for Israel mentioned in Joshua (eleven allotments for
twelve tribes).16
In a more focused study, Rainey (1980) elucidates the subdivisions within the
Shephelah district. He notes that the distribution of sites along the major east-west valleys
(i.e., the Aijalon, Sorek, Elah, Lachish, and Adoraim) and along the north-south trough
that separates the Shephelah from the Hill Country of Judah determined the
administrative divisions of the Shephelah (1980: 195). Rainey posits that the inclusion of
Philistia in the Shephelah district as presented in Josh 15:45-47 is something that could
only have happened in the days of Uzziah (2 Chr 26:5-7) or Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18:8; 1 Chr
4:42-43). Territorial expansion under both of these kings is generally accepted among
archaeologists today based on the excavations at Timnah/Tel Batash and Tell es-
Safi/Gath.
15
The term “institution” is used here as an all-encompassing term concerning any and all aspects of the
lmlk jars/impressions: distribution, recipients, senders, administration, etc.
16
Wright (1967: 59*) argues that the provinces of Solomon were “fixed as administrative entities of
approximately equal economic capacity.” Support for such a statement may be found in the fact that the
administrative districts of Solomon cross the tribal boundaries as laid out in the book of Joshua. See further
articles by Aharoni (1959, 1961, 1976).
21
Hooker (1993: 356), also focusing on the Shephelah district, offers an even more
refined date for both the list of Josh 15 and the events depicted therein: the period of time
between 720-712 B.C. This specific dating arises from Hooker’s equation of the Wadi el-
Arish as the “Brook of Egypt” mentioned in the reports of Sargon II. According to
Hooker, the Brook of Egypt in Josh 15:1-12, 21-26, 45-47 can only refer to the Wadi el-
Arish after the campaign of Sargon II in 720. Prior to that date the term “Brook of Egypt”
likely referred to the Nahal Besor further to the north. Since the Philistine district in Josh
15:45-47 would only make sense, according to Hooker, if the Brook of Egypt were the
Wadi el-Arish, a precise date for Josh 15 can be reached. Hooker also makes the case that
Sargon appointed Hezekiah to guard the coastal highway between the Nahal Besor and
Wadi el-Arish between the years 720-712 (1993: 230-233).
When 2 Kgs 18:8 and 1 Chr 4:39-44 are considered in addition to Josh 15, the
biblical texts are unanimous that Hezekiah expanded Judah’s territory. It may be at this
time that Hezekiah also expanded Judah’s borders to incorporate the territory of
Benjamin in the north. Following 712 B.C., however, when Judah participated in the
Yamani revolt Judah lost its mandate to guard the coastal highway and it forfeited any
holdings it had in Philistia (Hooker 1993: 358).
The boundary- and city-lists in Josh 15 and 18:25-28 reflect the period of
Hezekiah. While the administrative boundaries no doubt were created earlier, the city
lists represent specific historical settings and were periodically updated for administrative
purposes. In addition, the mention of the “Brook of Egypt” in Josh 15:2-4 suggests that
Philistia was under Judean control, a scenario that is further corroborated by 1 Chr 4, and
22
the archaeology. As for the relation between political administrative districts and the lmlk
institution during Hezekiah’s reign, that topic will be addressed in Chapter Five.
D. Socioeconomics and Warfare

The interaction between socioeconomics and warfare is not a topic that has been
emphasized in the scholarship dealing with the archaeology or anthropology of the
southern Levant. Yet, such discussions are found for the Neo-Assyrian Empire (Fales
2000; Parker 1997) and pre-state societies outside of the ancient Near East (see
following). Further, there are numerous theoretical treatises on the relationship of
socioeconomics and warfare (see Coulomb 2004: and the bibliography therein).
War affects economies. This is a simple maxim that has been illustrated
throughout history. The desire to survive unites people, leads to the creation of jobs for
the production of supplies necessary for that survival, and results in an exploitation of
resources so production can proceed. In a specific example, Ferguson (1999: 401, citing
Ferguson 1983) notes that, “On the Pacific Northwest coast, lineage chiefs had to spur
production, and commoners accept a rather centralized economy, because of the need to
amass food and wealth to potlatch military allies.”
There is also an intimate connection between warfare and taxation. Military
developments often led to tax changes, which are known from Republican, Imperial, and
Holy Rome (Rosenstein 1999: 202; Campbell 1999:235; Bachrach 1999: 290) in
particular. Further, Ferguson (1999: 401) points out that, “beyond even taxation, imperial
centers transformed the entire system of production and commerce around them to
provide both material support for armies and a continuing supply of troops” as seen in
23
early China, Medieval Europe, the Byzantine Empire, the Roman Empire, and the Aztec
world. A similar picture is evident even in ancient Israel during the time of Solomon who
built numerous fortifications, restructured the administrative districts, initiated corvée
labor, and imposed taxes on the population; all actions that derived initially from
Solomon’s desire to protect his kingdom from future attacks. Such basic economic
restructuring, Ferguson continues, “well illustrates the power of war” (1999: 401).
The socioeconomic-warfare relationship in the ancient Near East, however, is not
always fully developed despite the available comparative studies mentioned above. Some
aspects of socioeconomics and warfare have not even been broached yet. In fact,
Ferguson (1999: 400) writes,
“anthropology has had little to say on the relationship of war to the circulation and
distribution of goods and services. Still, the patterning of who provides and who
receives what will necessarily shape the way that any scarcity is experienced by
different categories of people in a society.”
The lmlk jar phenomenon, if it can be meaningfully articulated in space and time
can allow a discussion on the relationship of the distribution of goods and services,
military concerns, and government aegis.
4. Methodology
The methodology adopted in this study, put in anthropological terms, is
functionalist. The parts of the culture system of Israel—economy, society, politics, and
military—must be understood in relation to one another and to the structure of the
24
Israelite “system” as a whole in an effort to better understand the motivating reasons for
the socioeconomic situation in Judah at the end of the eighth century BC.17
Though functionalism is rather static in its approach it is felt that the concise and
delineated time period that is being dealt with can best be served by this approach as it
allows an articulation of the interaction between the different aspects of society. Further,
functionalism is the obvious choice because a more diachronic investigation must be
downplayed largely because of a lack of available data. Only in the reign of Hezekiah is
there sufficient archaeological data that can be used to even attempt an understanding of
the relationship between military concerns/actions and socioeconomics. Future
excavations may provide data and/or inscriptional data that can help illuminate the other
periods of Judahite history, however, until that time, the reign of Hezekiah is the most
viable for study. Military features are not readily identifiable in the archaeological record
for some of the other Judean kings; even in the case of Hezekiah, the data must be
carefully weighed so that untenable claims are not made.
A word must also be said concerning the different capabilities of the
archaeological and textual records. The archaeological record, though being used in the
present study because it clarifies a discrete chronological period, rarely is so precise. If
there were no lmlk impressions then even a specific attribution of archaeological remains
to the period of Hezekiah would not be as apparent; the Lachish III ceramic repertoire
17
McNutt (1999: 22) points out that, “the period of the divided monarchy is not well represented among the
recent studies with social-scientific orientations, perhaps because the texts that deal with this period are
generally believed to contain more accurate historical information, and thus have not drawn the same
amount of attention as the transitional periods at the beginning and end of Iron Age I. This relative lack of
representation may also have to do with the fact that there is little theory available that is appropriate for
analyzing small, village-based states like Israel and Judah.”
25
taken by itself leaves roughly 80-100 years within which a particular event can be dated
(see more on this in Chapter Two). On the other hand, textual sources can be far more
chronologically specific but run into the case of ideological manipulation and/or
telescoping. It is through a combination of both text and archaeology that the most useful
parameters for assessing ancient history are established. Chapter Two offers a further
discussion of the various archaeological materials and textual sources that are appropriate
for establishing such parameters for the present study.
5. Overview of Study
The first step in determining any socioeconomic impact that Hezekiah’s military
preparations had on Judah is to establish the presence of a coherent defensive network.
This is done in Chapter Two. First, theories and strategies of defense are detailed before
the discussion articulates the various corpora used to attribute sites and archaeological
strata to the period of Hezekiah. Then, numerous case studies on defensive networks are
presented that include discussions of the networks’ form and their linguistic
manifestation—that is, both the ancient and modern terms used to identify specific types
of defenses are defined. Third, foundations for discussing Hezekiah’s defensive network
are laid, including the site hierarchy and term definitions.
Chapter Three presents Hezekiah’s defensive network, providing a detailed
geopolitical picture for eighth century Judah. To facilitate discussion of the numerous
defensive sites, Judah is divided into five geographic regions. The discussion of each
region details the geology, roads, geographic features, and the fortified sites in order to
explicate how each site operated within a given region and how all the regions operated
26
together. The chapter concludes with an assessment of Hezekiah’s defensive strategy in
light of the Assyrian threat.
Once the presence of an actual defensive network has been established and that
network has been detailed, Chapter Four addresses the operation of that network.
Specifically, the chapter focuses on who is being used to man the fortifications. An
integral part of the discussion concentrates on the changes in the social order that were
necessary to operate the network, along with changes that allowed for the initial creation
of the network.
Chapter Five deals with the administration of the defensive network, including the
relationship of the lmlk institution to the political administration of Hezekiah’s Judah.
Next, it discusses the interaction between administrative and economic change in light of
both archaeology and texts.
Chapter Six summarizes the overall socioeconomic impact of Hezekiah’s
preparations for rebellion against the Assyrian empire. It recapitulates that Hezekiah
established an infrastructure that was well organized and exploited the limited resources
of the small kingdom of Judah. This infrastructure as seen through the fortified sites of
Judah and the system of distribution evident in the lmlk seals/jars was understood by
Hezekiah as a cogent defense against any Assyrian reaction.18 Further, the preparations
for this infrastructure affected all levels of Judean society and had an extensive economic
impact on Hezekiah’s kingdom.
18
Once the Assyrians arrived, however, the level of decimation they wrought led Hezekiah to beseech
Egypt for help.
27
Chapter 2. Defending Judah: Hezekiah’s Fortifications
“War pits strength against weakness. Each side chooses how best to bring its own
strength to bear upon the perceived weak points of the enemy. It is in the nature of
war, between rival states at least, that each side anticipates it and takes measures
accordingly, either to precipitate hostilities at a favorable moment or to defer and
forestall them. But each, in the process, is continually reckoning the balance of
strengths against vulnerabilities. This reckoning, before hostilities begin, is in
itself a formidable and fearful task…for the process depends upon estimations not
only of numbers of men, strategic positions, and quantifiable resources, but also
of collective intent, mood, and morale. These last three are the factors that bring
on war, and only when they are fundamentally altered does it end” (Munn 1993:
129).
1. Establishing the Presence of a Defensive Network

By addressing a network of fortifications it is possible to move past the
typologization of fortifications and examine their wider social impact. Yet, in order to
consider the socioeconomic affect that a defensive network had on Judah in the days of
Hezekiah, the defensive strategy and the existence of a defensive network must be
established first. This will be done in three steps. First, various defensive strategies along
with the one most likely adopted by Judah are discussed. Judah’s adopted strategy is only
possible to determine, however, once the specific sites attributable to Hezekiah are
identified. The second step, therefore, details the methodology for attributing specific
sites to the late eighth century and Hezekiah’s reign. When it is clear why specific sites
are included in this study, the third step will establish the cultural context of Judah’s
defenses and the way in which archaeologists interpret and classify such defenses. It will
be shown that defensive strategies are largely related to settlement patterns and that any
28
articulation of a defensive network requires the articulation of a society’s settlement
pattern, which in turn requires the definition of specific site types along with their ancient
and modern terminology. As such, the defensive networks of neighboring peoples from
the Bronze and Iron Ages will serve as case studies to see how fortification networks
have been interpreted and articulated. Following these three steps, the specific site
hierarchy and terminology to be used in this study for Hezekiah’s defensive network is
defined, which will allow for the detailed discussion of that network in Chapter Three.
A. Theories of Defense/Defensive Strategies

While individual defensive strategies rely upon specific historical considerations
in addition to topographical, socioeconomic, and political factors, commonalities exist
that allow the classification of five basic strategies: 1) deterring the enemy from ever
attempting an attack; 2) stopping the attacking enemy before he reaches the frontiers of
the state; 3) meeting the enemy at the frontiers; 4) resisting the enemy within the
frontiers; and, 5) abandoning the state territory and meeting the enemy behind the walls
of the capital city. It appears that Judean strategy in the late eighth century falls
somewhere between numbers four and five, as argued in detail by Halpern in 1991. That
is, they turn to a “hedgehog” defense, as he calls it, abandoning the countryside to the
Assyrians, and moving into urban centers throughout the kingdom, rather than just to the
capital as suggested in strategy five.
Such a strategy, however, would have been viable only after a prolonged period
of preparation. A period in which fortifications could be constructed or rebuilt, when
supplies could be grown and gathered in bulk, and when defenders and officials could be
29
trained and organized so that the defense of Judah was as viable if not more viable an
option against the Assyrian juggernaut as was paying tribute.19
Considering that most revolts in the ancient world began when rulers of larger,
more powerful states or empires died, the question becomes whether vassals or subjects
were in a state of readiness for such an occasion (i.e., a revolt was predetermined), or
whether they merely responded to the circumstances without any preparation. The
cessation of tribute as was done by so many entities in the ancient Near East is suggestive
of a quick response to the circumstances when a monarch died, while more extensive
preparations such as stockpiling of goods and even land grabs followed by the
construction of fortifications suggest a predetermined revolt. Without a heightened level
of readiness, the potential to stockpile goods or make land grabs would have been slight,
and when the state/empire returned under their new ruler, the vassal/subject’s only
recourse would be to pay heavy tribute and/or relinquish the territory gained. The facts
that Hezekiah does not appear to have paid his tribute quickly, that the Assyrians had to
destroy the newly Judahized sites in the western Shephelah, and that Sennacherib
attempted to attack Jerusalem even after receiving tribute, suggest that Judah’s state of
readiness was high and that revolt was planned in order to eliminate Assyrian presence
from the southern Levant.
19
Betts (1995: 28–29) notes that, “a state’s first task is to ensure that it has enough potential capability—
either from its own internal resources, or from collaboration with allies—to be a match for its enemy
[emphasis original]. Unless that potential exists, readiness to exploit it is beside the point. A government
that does not arrange its alliances or its economy so as to have sufficient military potential for defense
should not plan to try to defend itself militarily and has no business worrying about readiness because war
cannot serve its interests better than surrender.”
Similarly, Ober (1985: 15) adroitly states that, “among the most important factors influencing defensive
policy making is the economic base of the state: the resources available for building a defense
establishment and the resources the defense establishment will be expected to protect.”
30
Because readiness determines to a large degree defensive strategy it is appropriate
to define what is meant by “readiness.” Betts (1995: 27ff.) offers a three-part definition
for readiness that addresses a nation’s military strength according to both size and
efficiency.20 1) Military readiness pertains to the relation between available [mobilization
and alerting] time and needed [deployable] capability. 2) A country is militarily ready as
long as the time needed to convert potential capability into the actual capability needed is
not longer than the time between the decision to convert and the onset of war. 3) A
country proves not to be ready when a gap between the actual and potential capability
causes a gap between the supply of capability and the demand for it (Betts 1995: 27–28).
Essentially, a state/government is in a state of readiness when the military capability it
could have, the military capability it needs to succeed in combat, and the capability it
does have when suddenly called upon all match. On the other hand, “unreadiness” results
when decisions are not made soon enough to convert military potential into available and
effective forces (Betts 1995: 28).
The readiness of Judah as both size and efficiency will be shown through the
remainder of this study. While the former is difficult to recreate based on the
archaeological and textual records it can be recreated when demographic and
ethnographic studies are considered. The latter, readiness as efficiency, however, is more
easily articulated from the archaeology. When the readiness of Judah is considered as
20
The notion of readiness according to size is tantamount to “operational readiness” and focuses on “how
ready the military is to win a war [emphasis original]; this notion focuses attention on the time it will take
to amass a force large enough to defeat an enemy of some given strength” (Betts 1995: 27). This is in
contrast to the idea of readiness as efficiency, which focuses on “the time needed to gear up training,
maintenance, stocks of spare parts, and other consumables for existing units, leaving aside the question of
whether even peak performance of that number of units will be enough to win” (Betts 1995: 27).
31
both size and efficiency, it becomes possible to ask questions concerning how that
readiness affected the socioeconomics of the kingdom.
What then, does readiness look like in the archaeological record? In one sense,
readiness as size is nearly impossible to determine from the archaeological record
because there are no detailed ancient accounts that record the size of any ancient army.
Some such texts are found among the Greco-Roman sources and there are some Hittite,
Egyptian, and Neo-Assyrian texts that give some details about the training and
marshalling of military forces, but these are all problematic as comparisons for Judah.
The military situation in Greco-Roman times is too far removed from that in the Iron Age
Near East. Further, each of the latter three sources record details of readiness for empires,
which had far more resources to draw upon than did Judah. Even a careful comparison in
an effort to delineate Judah’s readiness as size would be fraught with difficulties because
the scale of readiness is too disparate.
One possible way to quantify Judah’s readiness as size, however, is by merely
counting the number of fortified sites. In order for the number of fortified sites to have
meaning, though, the quantity of fortified sites from both before and after the period of
investigation (i.e., the late eighth century) would need to be known. While no study has
precisely compiled such data, there is survey data indicating that Judah in the eighth
century B.C. was more densely settled than it was in any other pre-Byzantine (fourth
century A.D.) period. Though it cannot always be assumed that a greater number of sites
equates to more fortified sites, the fact that so many of the eighth century sites are one-
period sites located in locations most suitable for a military purpose suggests that at that
32
time, Judah was more “ready” than at any other time. The higher number of fortified sites
infers that there was also a higher number of individuals capable of defending such
sites.21
Despite the difficulties of quantifying readiness as size, readiness as efficiency
can appear in many different forms in the archaeological record: as the standardization of
ceramics, the distribution of supplies in state-produced ceramic vessels, the presence of
weapon caches, the presence of monumental storehouses and the combination of any or
all of these at strategically located fortified sites. If such “efficient” sites can be identified
in the archaeological record, it could be argued that those sites created a “rationally
planned system” of defense as Ober (1985: 195-197) refers to it. The identification of
such a coherent or “rational” system would likely share additional similar, observable
characteristics: 1) fortified sites should guard and/or observe all major routes to the
capital; 2) the forts should have visual communication capabilities that link the border
regions of the system to the capital city; 3) the fortified sites should be linked to a road
network to facilitate communication; and, 4) there should be smaller fortified supply
centers or regrouping stations between the larger fortified sites along the roads (Ober
1985: 196–198).22 Each of these characteristics, as will be shown in the next chapter, is
21
The nature of the sites in Judah is different from those in Greece and Cyprus of the Late Bronze/Cypriot
and early Iron Age where secluded sites were used more as retreats for civilians (see the essays in
Karageorghis and Morris 2001). There is no indication in the archaeology or texts that the secluded and
defensible sites in Judah served such a purpose; instead, people fled to the larger cities in times of attack.
22
Ober (1985: 199), who articulates the fourth century BC Athenian defensive network using these
characteristics, states, “The watch posts required receiving stations and the fortresses needed watch posts
for advance warning. The signal relay stations linked the forts with Athens. The road system and supply
stations allowed messengers to travel quickly from the borders to Athens and allowed troops to operate
between and behind the line of forts. Thus each element was dependent on the others and one is justified in
assuming that the fortifications and roads were in fact parts of an overall defensive system.” Cf. Defonzo
33
present in Hezekiah’s Judah. However, before that discussion is possible, the
methodology for attributing sites to the period of Hezekiah must be clarified.
B. Attributing Sites to Hezekiah

The defensive network presented here is based on the archaeological remains
from excavated and surveyed sites. It is acknowledged that the use of survey data can be
problematic, nevertheless, historical reconstructions must be attempted based on the
available data.23 Multiple variables or corpora of data have been assessed in order to
determine which sites should be included in any discussion of a Hezekian defensive
network. While each or any one of these variables may be enough to determine whether a
site is included in the present discussion, it is also recognized that there are debates and
problems that surround each.
The attribution of sites and specific strata to the period and defenses of Hezekiah
relies largely on ceramic evidence: 1) the presence of lmlk impressions in quantity and in
stratified contexts, and 2) ceramic parallels to Lachish Stratum III, which serves as the
chronological lynchpin for the late eighth century. This study assumes that those sites that
show ceramic affinities with Lachish III will generally have been in existence during the
rule of Hezekiah. It does not assume, however, that such ceramic parallels can indicate
(2005: 62) who, in discussing the settlement pattern of 8th century Judah, notes that sites are located along
transportation routes and were not randomly spaced, indicating that there was planning “on more than a
local scale.”
23
Banning (2002: 60–62) discusses some of the problems with using survey data, including: the type and
intensity of survey, the survey design, visibility, site preservation, artifact collection, and publication.
Falconer and Savage also caution the use of survey data and emphasize assessing the environmental setting
as well (1995: 38, 55). Further, many of the surveys conducted in Israel do not (and often, cannot)
differentiate eighth century pottery, but rather refer to “Iron II,” “Iron IIB,” “Iron IIC,” “Late Iron Age,”
and/or “Iron III”; there is no standard terminology.
34
whether Hezekiah himself built/fortified a given site, if he merely stockpiled it, or if it
was just a site that was inhabited during his rule. In fact, this study is not interested in
differentiating these issues, but rather is more interested in how the maintenance and
administration of a defensive network affected the socioeconomics of Judah. For the
purpose of this study, it is understood that Hezekiah’s preparations for rebellion can be
identified in the archaeological record through ceramics, small finds, and epigraphic
remains.
As important as ceramics are for determining whether or not a site or stratum
should be dated to the days of Hezekiah, there are other more limited variables that must
be considered: the presence of destruction layers attributed to Sennacherib, textual
references to specific sites either in the biblical or Assyrian sources, and the distribution
of small finds that may be culturally or ethnically specific, suggesting at least a Judean
occupation at a specific site. Further, the geographical location of individual sites often
dictates their function and whether or not they should be considered as defensive in
nature. If a site is situated in a location that has a strategic value—i.e., if it has a
commanding view of the surrounding terrain, has visual communication capabilities with
surrounding sites, and/or guards a road or economic resource—then it is included as part
of the defensive network detailed in Chapter Three, even if corroborating chronological
data may be indeterminate. Though such an approach will undoubtedly bloat the number
of settlements included in Hezekiah’s defensive network, a methodology that
overestimates the number of sites is considered more favorable than one that
underestimates the number of sites so that the most extensive potential defensive network
35
may be articulated. Through a combination of some or all of these data sets, it is possible
to articulate Hezekiah’s defensive network.
i. Lachish III parallels/Dates of the Lachish III Assemblage

The destruction of Lachish Stratum III is attributed to Sennacherib in 701 BC and
is attested in the archaeological, textual, and iconographic records. Because this
destruction—which has become one of a limited number of chronological anchors for the
Iron Age II—can be so precisely dated, the Lachish III ceramic assemblage has become
synonymous with the late eighth century BC and is the assemblage to which the
assemblages of other Judean sites are compared. To say that the Lachish III assemblage
existed in 701 BC is enough for the purposes of this study. However, it is instructive to
consider when the repertoire began and ended because there are debates surrounding
those dates. Further, depending on the length of time that the Lachish III assemblage was
in use the rate of socioeconomic change indicated by the characteristics of the
assemblage (e.g., the standardization of vessel forms, the presence of state-sponsored
ceramics) will vary. A shorter chronological life for the Lachish III assemblage implies a
more dynamic socioeconomic shift than does a longer lifespan.
Many scholars argue that the ceramics of Lachish III do not appear to predate the
760s/750s BC (Finkelstein 2008; Finkelstein and Silberman 2006: 261; Singer-Avitz
2002: 114–116, 162; Ussishkin 2004b; Zimhoni 1997: 172–173, 2004b). This date
corresponds roughly with the great earthquake mentioned in Amos 1:1 and Zech 14:5 that
happened in the days of the Judean king Uzziah. Herzog (2002: 97), in his discussion of
36
the site of Arad explicitly details how the earthquake and the shift in ceramic
assemblages relate:
“major cultural permutations on the geo-political or economic level are likely to

cause chain reactions that find expression in changes in style of the artefacts that
constitute the archaeological finds. The destruction of systems forces the creation
of new structures and these result in stylistic changes.”
Though such stylistic changes in the ceramics are observed at Arad between Strata XI and
X, and at Lachish between Strata IV and III the correlation between such changes and the
760/750 BC earthquake is ambiguous at best.24 Not all, or even most sites with possible
evidence of damage from this earthquake display stylistic changes in ceramics (e.g. Tell
es-Safi, Gezer, and Deir ‘Alla).
Zimhoni offers a slightly more detailed discussion of the transition between
Lachish IV-III, which, according to her, takes place over the period of 785-748 BC.25
24
Herzog suggests that Arad Str. X was established following the earthquake around 750 BC and lasted for
an indeterminate amount of time. The ceramic assemblages of Arad X-VIII—though they have not
appeared yet in a final publication—are very similar and reflect, according to Herzog, a relatively short
period of time (though consider that Judean ceramics are notoriously consistent and change quite slowly).
Although no date for the transition between Str. X and IX is offered, Herzog does suggest that Arad IX
ended around 715 BC based on the fact that the temple in the northeast corner of the site ceased to exist.
The cessation of the temple’s operation is equated with the religious reforms of Hezekiah and is dated
roughly to 715 BC—a date that assumes Hezekiah’s rule was from 727-698 and that his religious reforms
happened around the middle of his career. Such an interpretation would account for the various lengths
given for Hezekiah’s rule in the biblical texts and would suggest that the religious reforms marked a turning
point after which he was granted another 14 years to rule. Whether or not these reforms happened around
715 is unclear, though they may find a better context in the year 713/12 and be related to the campaign of
Sargon II. Regardless, either date would mean that the fortress of Str. VIII stood for only roughly a decade
before it was destroyed, presumably also in 701 (Herzog 2002: 97–98).
25
Determining when this transition between Lachish IV-III took place is important because it can articulate
how quickly Judah’s population increased. There are few surveyed sites that have ceramic parallels with
Lachish IV, but hundreds with Lachish III ceramics. This issue of Judah’s population increase is debated by
Na’aman (Na'aman 2007) and Finkelstein (Finkelstein 2008), the former believes Judah, and Jerusalem in
particular began expanding in the ninth century, while the latter believes the expansion was limited to the
second half of the eighth century and was a much more dramatic process.
37
Specifically, Zimhoni dates the end of Lachish IV to the second quarter of the eighth
century, with the beginning of Level III somewhere in the second half of the eighth
century (2004b: 1707). Mazar and Panitz-Cohen (2001: 274-5), however, argue that
Zimhoni’s transition dates are too low based on comparisons with the single period site at
Kuntillet ‘Ajrud.
The Kuntillet ‘Ajrud ceramic assemblage has been dated to ca. 800 BC by C14
dating and appears to mark the transition between Lachish IV and III. This has led Mazar
and Panitz-Cohen to date the end of Lachish IV to the second half of the 9th century,
transitional Locus 4421 (at Lachish) to the beginning of the 8th century, and the beginning
of stratum III to the first half of the eighth century (2001: 275). In addition, Mazar and
Panitz-Cohen argue that the three strata at Arad (X-VIII) and also two possible strata at
Beersheba (III-II) needed more time than what would be allowed if the transition between
Lachish IV-III happened in the mid 8th century as suggested by Herzog and Zimhoni.26
At the same time, Bunimovitz and Lederman (2006: 419, n.6) are quick to point out
that while the transition between Lachish IV and III is attributed more and more to the
earthquake mentioned in the books of Amos and Zechariah, the “seismologists involved
have relied on the subjective and ambiguous observations of the archaeologists rather
26
Actually, Zimhoni offers seemingly contradictory dates for this transition. If Lachish IV ends in the
second quarter of the eighth century (775-750) and Lachish III begins in the second half of that century
(750), then transitional Locus 4421 at Lachish would represent a very short period of time (in fact, Zimhoni
notes that the period represented by L.4421 is unknown). Zimhoni shows that the ceramics of L.4421 are
more similar to Lachish III than they are to Lachish IV, which would suggest a date close to 750 for
L.4421. She then notes that the ceramics of this transitional locus have parallels with the ceramics at Tel
‘Eton, the latter of which shows an even more advanced stage of the transition (Zimhoni 1985: 88; 1997:
208) and is dated between 850-750 BC according to Zimhoni herself, Ussishkin (1974: 18), and Tzaferis
(1982: 10). At the same time, the ‘Eton corpus has parallels to Tel Batash III, which in turn has parallels to
Gezer VII-VI, Beth Shemesh 3, and Kuntillet ‘Ajrud, all dated to the end of the 9th-beginning of the 8th
century. A date around 750 BC for the transition between Lachish IV-III is then difficult to justify.
38
than on hard scientific data (citing (Austin, et al. 2000).” They note that at their own site
of Beth Shemesh the destruction layer for Level 3 contains pottery with affinities to
Lachish IV and transitional forms between Lachish IV and III, Arad XI-X, and Beersheba
IV-III (Bunimovitz and Lederman 2006: 419). Beth Shemesh 3 presumably ended in the
first half of the eighth century27 in their opinion, bringing the view of Bunimovitz and
Lederman into accord with that of Mazar and Panitz-Cohen. Based on the archaeological
evidence (i.e. comparative ceramic assemblages and radiocarbon dates), a date in the first
half of the eighth century for the beginning of the Lachish III assemblage appears to be
more plausible than a date in the mid- to second half of the eighth century. This would
mean that the transition between Arad XI-X should also be dated earlier than that
proposed by Herzog.28 Regardless of the date accepted, there is no correlation between
the ascension of Hezekiah and the transition of Lachish IV ceramics to Lachish III
ceramics.
27
See Grant and Wright (1939: 14) for a partial list of possible events that caused the destruction of Level 3
(his IIb). Bunimovitz and Lederman (2009: 136) relate the destruction of Level 3 to the actions of Jehoash,
king of Israel, against Amaziah, king of Judah, recorded in 2 Kgs 14.
28
It is also useful at this point to consider specifically the presence of the closed cooking pot because, as
Zimhoni (2004: 1703) notes, “cooking-pots are the most reliable typological tool for classifying vessel
assemblages and establishing relative chronologies of ceramic assemblages from different sites.” The
closed cooking pot appears only in Level III at Lachish (see Zimhoni 2004a: Fig.26.24:21-27; Zimhoni
2004b: 1702). At Gezer, this ceramic form only appears after Str. VIA, the end of which is dated to 733
B.C. (Gitin 1990: 223–224). Though the closed cooking pot is absent from Gezer VIA and the mid-eighth
century assemblage, it does appear slightly earlier at Arad in Strata X-VIII. If the beginning of Arad X and
the transition between Lachish IV-III occur in the second half of the eighth century as argued by Zimhoni
and Herzog, then the appearance of this cooking pot would mark a rather sudden change in form, possibly
lending credence to Herzog’s theory of an earthquake-initiated change, and would corroborate better with
its late eighth-century appearance at Gezer. If, on the other hand, the strata at Arad and Lachish are dated to
the first half of the eighth century per Mazar and Panitz-Cohen, then the appearance of the closed cooking
pot would occur at least 35 years earlier. The latter scenario may suggest that the closed cooking pot
developed over a longer period of time and spread from the south to the north. Further, it may be that the
closed cooking pot developed from earlier narrow-necked cooking jugs found at Arad (Str. XII and XI) and
Beersheba (Str. VI) (cf. Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2001: 183, n. 18).
39
While the transition in ceramic forms from one corpus to the other is not related to
Hezekiah’s actions, the increased level of standardization in ceramic forms within the
Lachish III corpus does appear to relate to changes brought about by Hezekiah’s
government. The ceramic forms attested by the Lachish III corpus (from Lachish and
other sites) represent the situation at the time of Sennacherib’s campaign and not
necessarily the earliest phase of the corpus’ lifespan (cf. Na’aman 2007: 26f.). Whether
the standardization of forms was something that started at the beginning of the lifespan of
the Lachish III corpus, or whether such standardization represents a later development
within that corpus is difficult to determine, however, standardization is suggestive more
of efficiency due to government involvement during a period of possible conflict than it is
of a period of economic prosperity resulting from international cooperation as
characterizes most of Uzziah’s reign (and perhaps part of Jotham’s reign). In fact,
standardization within the Lachish III assemblage makes sense during the reign of Ahaz,
who was under constant pressure from surrounding nations; though, the textual
representation of Ahaz as weak and incompetent (2 Kgs 16; 2 Chr 28; Isa 7) undermines
any confidence in associating such change with him. Rather, the standardization seen in
the Lachish III assemblage is most likely to have arisen during Hezekiah’s reign.
Establishing the end of the Lachish III ceramic assemblage is even more difficult
than determining when it began. It is generally argued that Lachish III ceramic forms were
largely replaced by Lachish II forms sometime in the first half of the seventh century, but
40
there are no concrete chronological anchors for the first three quarters of the seventh
century; only with Nebuchadnezzar’s campaign in 604 B.C.—and even more so in 586
B.C.—is there another relatively secure chronological anchor.
The destruction wrought by Sennacherib’s campaign may have been impetus
enough for stylistic change in the ceramics between Lachish III-II. Once people
reestablished themselves or readjusted to life with a smaller population due to
Sennacherib’s deportations, there may have been a need for stylistic changes in certain
ceramic forms.29 Because Lachish lay abandoned for an indeterminate period of time
following Sennacherib’s campaign, and because other seventh century Judean sites are
often dated by comparison to Lachish II ceramics, the establishment of a date for the
transition between Lachish III and II ceramics cannot be determined with specificity.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the beginning and ending dates for the Lachish
III ceramic assemblage, this assemblage serves as the baseline for comparing the
ceramics of other Judean sites. Even though multiple phases within the assemblage are
possible, as is suggested by fragmentary remains at some sites (e.g., Timnah/Tel Batash),
the articulation of these phases is only possible when one phase has lmlk impressions and
the other does not (see below for more on this). In these rare instances it is clear that the
remains from the phase with the lmlk impressions was constructed or rebuilt in the days
of Hezekiah. At the same time, a lack of lmlk impressions does not necessarily indicate
29
Compare Halpern’s argument that stylistic changes in ceramics occurred preceding Sennacherib’s
campaign because of changes in the social order (see Chapter Four below for more on this). A similar shift
in the social order may have happened following Sennacherib’s campaign. However, note the article by
Zevit (2006) that claims Sennacherib did not actually deport anyone, but merely “counted” them as booty;
no changes would be expected in such a case.
41
an earlier phase of the Lachish III corpus or preclude a specific attribution of a phase to
the period of Hezekiah, but instead may be a result of the depositional process and
preservation. Aside from the presence or absence of lmlk impressions, there are not
enough nuances within the Lachish III corpus to define specific phases. Ceramics similar
to those of Lachish III are, therefore, understood as representative of the end of the eighth
century even though it is admitted that the lifespan of that corpus is much longer than the
reign of Hezekiah.
ii. Presence of lmlk impressions

In his study on ancient landscapes, Wilkinson (2003) questions whether the study
of such landscapes can clue the modern researcher into changes? That is, will change of a
political nature be evident in the landscapes? His answer is in the affirmative, but only if
a new ruler implements a new system. In the case of Hezekiah, just such a system is
implemented: the lmlk impressions.30
The generally accepted attribution of the lmlk impressions solely to the reign of
Hezekiah makes them a useful category of artifact for dating archaeological strata.31
Further, the presence of lmlk- impressed jars can establish whether a site was part of
Hezekiah’s Judah or not. Granted, the impressions must occur in well-stratified contexts
to be of the best use, but even impressions found upon the surface at sites are useful. In
30
The novelty of the impressions should not be confused with the jars upon which the impressions are
made; the jars themselves have a longer history. See n. 10 in Ch. 1.
31
There is, however, a new study being done that suggests the lmlk impressions began in the days of
Uzziah (Hudon, personal communication, 2009). While such an early date for the beginning of this
phenomenon cannot be ruled out, there is no concrete archaeological evidence that supports it either.
Possible evidence that an economic buildup as represented by the lmlk impressions occurred in the days of
Uzziah can be found in the biblical texts though (2 Kgs 14:22; 2 Chr 26: 1-15).
42
the latter instance other factors such as geographical location, other ceramics found at a
site, and the number of impressions must be factored in.32 Sites with only one impression
found on the surface may still be useful for articulating Hezekiah’s defensive network,
but more caution will be used in assessing the possible role such a site played.
Regardless of the dates one attributes to Hezekiah’s rule, the fact that the lmlk
impressions only appear to be related to this king mean that there is a roughly thirty year
window for their production.33 Sites and specific strata that contain lmlk impressions can
be dated essentially to the last quarter of the eighth century. However, Mazar et al (1996)
have shown that some lmlk impressions continued to be used—but not produced—in the
seventh century, particularly at sites that were not destroyed by Sennacherib (e.g.
Jerusalem, Kh. Beit Silhah).34
iii. Presence of Destruction Layers Attributed to Sennacherib

The presence of a destruction layer dated to the end of the eighth century by
ceramic means once was considered to be clearly associated with Sennacherib’s
campaign in 701 B.C. Recent work, however, has started to question the simple
attribution of late eighth century destruction layers solely to Sennacherib. Some
destructions have been attributed by a few scholars to his predecessors Tiglath-Pileser III
32
All of these factors are important considering some lmlk impressions have been found in the northern
Kingdom of Israel at locations clearly outside of any Judean realm of control (Vaughn 1999: 248–249).
33
The two most common alternatives are 726-698 (based on 2 Kgs 18:9-10) and 715-687 (based on 2 Kgs
18:13). The former is adopted by Cogan and Tadmor (1988) while the latter is used by Bright (1981). There
are additional alternatives based on whether or not an accession year or a co-regency is assumed (cf. Thiele
1983; Hayes and Hooker 1988; see Vaughn 1999:9-14 for a good summary on the issue of the dates of
Hezekiah’s reign).
34
Consider, however, the rare (isolated?) appearance and apparent use of lmlk impressions and jars at
seventh century Tel Batash (Str. II), a site that was earlier destroyed by Sennacherib.
43
and/or Sargon II, to the Edomites, or to other nomadic peoples (Blakely and Hardin
2002). Despite this growing avoidance of attributing destructions to Sennacherib, Table 2
lists the Judean sites that have destruction layers traditionally attributed to Sennacherib.
Further discussion of individual destruction layers and alternate causes will be discussed,
when necessary, in the section below on Hezekiah’s defensive network.
Site Stratum Reference

Lachish III Ussishkin 2004b
Tell Beit Mirsim* A2 Greenberg 1987; Aharoni and Aharoni 1976
Beer-Sheba II Aharoni 1973
Rabud, Kh. B-II Kochavi 1974: 18; 1993: 1252
Halif, Tel VIB Seger and Borowski 1993
Arad VIII Herzog 2002
Safi, Tel es- Temporary Str. 3 Maier 2008
Batash, Tel III Mazar 1997:150; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2001
Beth-Shemesh IIc (Level 2) Bunimovitz and Lederman 1993
‘Erani, Tel VI Brandl 1997:257
Hebron* Eisenberg and Nagorski 2002: 92*
Malhata, Tel IV Kochavi 1998: 35
‘Eton, Tel Faust 2008: 169
Judeideh, Tel Bliss and Macalister 1902:50; Gibson 1994:201
Ramat Rahel* VB Aharoni 1993; Barkay 2006
Maresha* Kloner and Eshel 1999:150
Miqne, Tel II Dothan and Gitin 1993: 1056
Table 2. Judean Sites with Destructions Attributed to Sennacherib
*The nature of a destruction layer is unclear.
-Destruction levels attributed to Sennacherib were also excavated at Tell el-Hesi (VIIIa) and Tel Sera (VI)
in the Philistine Coastal Plain.
Complicating the picture even more are some sites in Judah (including the Coastal
Plain) that have multiple destruction layers in the last third of the eighth century: Tell
Beit Mirsim A(2)1-A(2)2, Tell el-Hesi VIIIa-VII, Ashdod VIII-VII, Arad X-VIII,
Beersheba III-II, and Tel ‘Erani VIII-VI. Traditionally, the former destruction at most of
these sites was associated with Sennacherib, while the latter was associated with the
44
Babylonians a century later. The recent re-analysis by Blakely and Hardin (2002),
however, suggests that due to the similarity in ceramic forms at each site over all the
strata, the former destructions should be attributed to either Tiglath-Pileser III or Sargon
II while the latter should be associated with Sennacherib.35 An additional site that can be
added to Blakely and Hardin’s list is the site of Tell es-Safi.36 In every instance lmlk
impressions are found only in the last destruction, giving credence to a strictly Hezekian
date. In the end, it may not be entirely possible using only the archaeology to establish
which destruction layer at any given site should be attributed to a specific Assyrian
monarch or even some other group or localized event. Fortunately, there are some texts
that attribute the destructions at certain sites to specific individuals or groups. While these
textual sources must be weighed critically, they offer an additional source of information
that cannot be ignored.
iv. Textual Resources

Both biblical and Assyrian sources refer to Hezekiah’s rebellion and
Sennacherib’s subsequent campaign. While many of the details of the events surrounding
Hezekiah and Sennacherib are similar in both the Assyrian and biblical sources, there are
clear differences. These differences lie in large part in the different purposes of each
35
Consider, however, the article by Finkelstein and Na’aman (2004), which dismisses most of Blakely and
Hardin’s arguments.
36
Recent excavations at this site show a tight sequence of three destructions all dating to the mid- to late-
eighth century. The first destruction layer is attributed to an earthquake in the middle of the eighth
century—the one mentioned in the book of Amos. This destruction appears in Area F in the form of a large
mudbrick wall that suddenly and completely shifted off its foundations and collapsed to the north. Directly
above this destruction layer are two more destruction layers that produced Judean-style ceramics typical of
the Lachish III repertoire. The excavators posit that Sargon II caused the earlier destruction while
Sennacherib wrought the latter.
45
nation’s literature. Before addressing the textual record of each nation, a list of sites
besieged or destroyed by Sennacherib is presented in Table 3; this list is compiled from
both the Assyrian and biblical sources.
Site 2 Kgs 18 2Chr Isa Mic Assyrian◊ Identified/Excavated/

32 36* 1† Destruction Layer?
Beth-Dagon X (SC) Beth Dagan/Y/N
Jaffa X (SC) Tel Yafo/Y/N
Bene-berak X (SC) Tell Abu Zeitun?/Y/?
Azor X (SC) Yazur/N
Ekron X Tel Miqne/Y/Y
Eltekeh X (BC) Tell esh-Shallaf?/N
Timnah X (BC) Tel Batash/Y/Y
Lachish X X X X X (TR) Tel ed-Duweir/Y/Y
Azekah X (LG) Tel Azekah/Y/Y
Libnah X X Tel Bornat?/Y/N
Gath X Tell es-Safi/Y/Y
Beth-le-aphrah X Tell ‘Erani?/Y/Y
Shaphir X N
Zaanan X N
Beth-ezel X N
Maroth X N
Moresheth-Gath X Tell ej-Judeideh/Y/Y
Achzib (Shephelah) X X (O) Tell Beidah?/N
Mareshah X Tell Sandahannah/Y/Y
Adullam X Kh. esh-Sheikh Madkur/N
Table 3. Sites mentioned in texts as taken by Sennacherib.
◊ Unless otherwise noted the Assyrian source in which a given site is mentioned is (at least one version of)
Sennacherib’s annals. Additional abbreviations relate to the term of destruction used in the annals for the
specific sites, and/or indicate a different Assyrian source. These include: O= “overwhelmed”; SC=
“surrounded and conquered”; BC= “besieged and conquered”; LG= Sennacherib’s Letter to God; TR=
Throne Room of Nineveh relief.
*The sites mentioned in Isa 10:28-32 could perhaps be included in this list, although the reality that the
Assyrians attacked these sites is debated. If these verses indicate an actual Assyrian advance from the
north, through the Central Benjamin Plateau, then the sites of Aiath, Migron, Michmash, Geba, Gibeah,
Gallim, Laishah, Anathoth, Gebim, and Nob should be added to the above list.
†The sites mentioned in Micah are generally assumed to have been destroyed by Sennacherib, and were
likely some of the 46 walled cities he mentions in his annals.
46
a. Biblical Sources
The pertinent biblical texts are: 2 Kgs 17-21; Isa 21, 36-39, and possibly chapter
10:28-34;37 and 2 Chr 29-32. These texts describe the reign of Hezekiah and/or mention
Sennacherib and the Assyrian response. Unfortunately, only a handful of sites are
mentioned in relation to Hezekiah, and there are only a few verses from the Bible that
actually illuminate his military actions; most of the aforementioned chapters discuss his
religious reforms. The most useful verses come from 2 Kgs 19:8 and the parallel
reference in Isa 37:8. The Chronicler attributes additional preparations to Hezekiah (2
Chr 32:3-6, 27-30); though, many scholars question the historical veracity of
Chronicles.38 Other texts that offer indirect commentary on the social, economic,
political, and military setting of the late eighth century include: Amos, Hosea, and Micah
1:8-16.39 Of interest are also chapters 13-19 of the book of Joshua, particularly Josh
15:21-62, which includes the town and boundary lists of Judah. These lists most likely
reflect the period of Hezekiah’s rule and may explicitly articulate the settlements within
Hezekiah’s defensive network (cf. Defonzo 2005: 23).
37
These verses make better sense geographically within the context of the Syro-Ephraimite war. First, there
is no inscriptional or textual evidence that suggests the Assyrians ever approached Judah from the east.
Sennacherib conducted his campaign along the coast because his main concern was subduing Judah enough
to keep trade with Egypt open. Second, the route recorded in Isaiah would be the more difficult route to
follow if a contingent of Assyrians came from Samaria. Third, such an easterly approach would only be the
most logical approach for a force arriving from Damascus that was to meet up with an Israelite contingent.
38
One of the most recent and useful studies on the historicity of Chronicles is that of Vaughn (1999), in
which he concludes that Chronicles does reflect an historical reality despite the theological purpose of the
book and its later composition.
39
The problem with using the biblical texts to illuminate ancient Israelite society, however, is articulated
nicely by Defonzo (2005: 21), who says this difficulty arises because of, “the lacunae concerning matters
of common knowledge, author bias, and the ambiguities concerning the determination of source material,
dates of authorship and redaction.”
47
b. Assyrian Sources
The Assyrian sources include Sennacherib’s annals—which are presented in the
Rassam cylinder, Chicago/Taylor Prism, and the Bull Inscription—and his “Letter to
God”.40 Further, there are the numerous wall reliefs from his palace at Nineveh that
depict the Judean countryside, its cities, their fortifications, and the Judean inhabitants
(Russell 1991).
The annals mention multiple Judean and Philistine cities along with an additional
46 unnamed “walled cities” and smaller towns “without number.” While the possibility
of identifying these specific 46 cities and/or the smaller towns is beyond the capability of
archaeology, such a number does not appear to be made up or symbolic (cf. De Odorico
1995 on numbers in the Assyrian annals). Archaeology does show that there were at least
twenty walled Judean cities with late eighth century strata, though these stretch across the
entire country and are not limited to just the Shephelah.41
v. Other Possible 8th Century Markers

In addition to the corpora above, it appears that there may be other classes of
material culture that can be used, though less successfully, to date strata to at least the
eighth century, if not the late eighth century. One of these classes is inscribed weights.
Kletter (1991, 1998) has shown that there is a shift in the inscribed weights used between
the eighth century and the seventh-sixth centuries. Weights common to the eighth century
40
There is some debate as to which Assyrian king this letter should be attributed. Na’aman (1974)
attributes it to Sennacherib while Frahm (1997) suggests Sargon II; Na’aman is most likely correct.
41
Walled Judean cities include: Gezer V, Gibeon, Tell en-Nasbeh, Jerusalem 12, Timnah III, Tel es-Safi
Temporary Str. 3, Socoh, Adullam, Mareshah, Lachish III, Tel ‘Eton, Kh. el-Qom, Tel Rabud, Hebron,
Adoraim, Tel Halif VIB, Beersheba II, Tel ‘Ira VIII, Tel Malhata IV, and Aroer III.
48
(and likely earlier into the ninth and perhaps tenth century) include the nesef, pym, and
beka‘ weights, while weighs inscribed with various shekel amounts are common in the
seventh-sixth centuries. This shift in weight types is supported by the finds at sites such
as En-Gedi, where in Stratum V only shekel weights are found (Stern 2007: 151). Strata
with nesef, pym, and/or beka‘ weights may be considered to be pre-seventh century and
may at least suggest a Judean presence at a given site (though not always).
Kletter (1996: 41) has also conducted a study on the Judean pillar figurines, which
appear beginning in the eighth century and last through the seventh century, though in
lesser quantities. Certain styles of the figurines can be definitely attributed to the eighth
century while others can only be dated to the 8th-7th centuries. According to Kletter
(1996: 42) there are 127 pillar figurines that can be securely dated to the eighth century.
With their specific style it may be possible to use their presence at sites lacking
diagnostic ceramics to determine whether or not the site should be dated to the eighth
century, though such a specific dating is very complex as articulated by Kletter (1996:41-
42).
Based upon the archaeological remains, there are almost 500 sites in Judah that
have Lachish III-style ceramics.42 Of these sites, only 86 have lmlk jars/impressions,43
and of these 86 sites only 16 have destruction layers attributed to Sennacherib.44 The next
step is to determine how many sites, either in addition to or less than the 86 sites with
42
Based off totals taken from the numerous maps of the Archaeological Survey of Israel (see Table 7
below). Dagan (2004: 2681 Table 38.5) lists 731 Iron IIb sites, of which 289 were settlements (based on a
survey of ca. 63% of the Shephelah (2004: 2673)).
43
See the Appendix.
44
This number is taken from Table 2.
49
lmlk impressions, served a defensive role. This will be done by assessing the
geographical location of the almost 500 Iron IIB/C sites in Judah. As will be shown in
Chapter Three, only 152 of the sites were located in geographically significant locations
that warranted their inclusion in the current research (not all of the sites with lmlk
impressions were strategically located; the non-strategic sites are dealt with in Chapter
Five). Within these 152 sites there are multiple classes of settlement. How these classes
were defined in antiquity, and how they are defined today by archaeologists is necessary
to clarify, and is helpful for articulating the Judean settlement hierarchy and defensive
network, which is done next.
B. Forms of Defensive Networks

Any discussion of defensive networks must begin by defining site hierarchies and
settlement patterns. Most studies that articulate site hierarchies and/or settlement patterns
using the archaeological record do so based on site size or estimated population. Once
one of these factors is established, a given site is assigned a descriptive term such as
“city,” village,” “fortress,” etc. These terms are then related to ancient Hebrew,
Akkadian, Ugaritic, and/or Northwest Semitic terms with the proviso that the modern and
ancient terms are largely comparable. Such equations, when all the terms are properly
defined, are useful, yet still lack some explanatory power. Terms that describe sites are
often attributed to a given site based on a trait list. For instance, “cities” have
monumental architecture, religious architecture, water systems, and walls, while villages
lack these traits (cf. Herzog 1992). What such trait lists do not account for, however, is
social organization and other more functional considerations. In particular, the defensive
50
function of sites from a holistic or nation-wide perspective is not generally a determining
factor in the assignation of specific terms to, and hence, classification of sites. At the
same time, social organization is underutilized as a determining factor for establishing
site hierarchies. Even once a set of terms is defined, relating those terms to actual sites as
attested in the archaeological record is difficult. In what follows, studies that articulate, to
a certain degree, site hierarchies/settlement patterns and assign ancient classificatory
terms to archaeological sites as a precursor for discussing ancient defensive networks
serve as case studies. The benefits and downfalls of each approach will be drawn upon to
illuminate how a Judean defensive network should be defined and what should be looked
for in the archaeological record.
i. Middle Bronze II Levant

Middle Bronze Age defensive networks have recently been addressed in detail by
Burke (2008). In his tour de force, Burke articulates a six-tiered settlement hierarchy for
kingdoms throughout Mesopotamia and the Levant (see Table 4), stating that,
“defensive networks can be identified in the Levant by employing the

terminology for Bronze Age settlement types…and settlement pattern data that
allow for the identification of administrative or quasi-military districts” (2008:
122).45
The various tiers of the hierarchy include distinct settlement types—e.g., towers, cities—
whose distribution within the given kingdoms is fairly standard. For instance, in the
northern Levant and Syria, kingdoms were surrounded by satellite sites in a fairly circular
45
This six-tiered hierarchy is drawn from Late Bronze Ugaritic sources and retrojected into the Middle
Bronze Age. Other attempts at determining Middle (and even Early) Bronze settlement hierarchies
typically have four tiers based variously on settlement sizes, the presence of fortifications, and, to a lesser
degree, textual sources (see Burke 2008: 103–122 and the bibliography therein). The greater number of
hierarchical levels given by Burke is a result of his isolation of “watchtowers” and “agricultural estates” as
distinct settlement types.
51
pattern with sites becoming smaller the further one traveled from the capital city. In the
southern Levant, however, geography plays a much larger role than it does in the north,
and sites are not as uniformly distributed around capital cities. The one exception, if one
accepts Burke’s arguments, is the kingdom of Ashkelon, which appears to have satellite
sites distributed much the same way they are around capital cities in the northern Levant.
Settlement Type Akkadian (Sumerian) Ugaritic Hebrew

Large Fortified Towns ālu(m) (URU) qrt ‘ir
Secondary Fortified Towns ālu(m) (URU) ‘r ‘ir
Unfortified Villages kapru(m) (URU.ŠE) kpr kepher
Fortresses dūr-PN/DN (BAD3) ḥl*, ‘mq, ḍmr* mibtzar, beroniah
Military Watchtowers birtu(m)? mgdl migdal
Rural Agricultural Estates dimtu(m) (AN.ZA.GAR3) gt gat
Table 4. Ancient settlement terminology
While Burke attempts the difficult association between archaeological sites and
textually attested site-types for Middle Bronze Ashkelon’s settlement hierarchy, he more
importantly disassociates, to a certain degree, the identification of specific site types from
their estimated size. Instead, defensive considerations (or, functions), in conjunction with
textual references are used to dictate how a site is classified (Burke 2008: 122–124; cf.
also Burke 2007: 43). “Large fortified sites” are the capitals of kingdoms attested in the
inscriptional record and often referred to as ālu. “Secondary fortified towns,” which are
also referred to as ālu in the Old Babylonian texts, are not capitals of kingdoms, and in
some instances where extensive surveys and excavations have been conducted, appear to
be smaller than the capital cities. “Unfortified villages” are differentiated by their lack of
free-standing walls, though they could have an enclosing wall that likely functioned to
keep animals in. “Fortresses” and “watchtowers” are both identified based on their
52
strategic positions, with the latter occurring “on ridges along major routes” (Burke 2008:
124). The last category of site, the “agricultural estate,” is similar to the unfortified
village, just on a smaller scale; in this instance, size does factor in.
In the case of Ashkelon, secondary sites were located along the kingdom’s
borders while smaller sites filled in the spaces between. Towers were situated at locations
that allowed for visual communication back to Ashkelon and for control of the trade
routes running through the kingdom. From a defensive and communication perspective,
Ashkelon’s defensive network utilized the natural topography very efficiently.
ii. Late Bronze Age Ugarit

Located in the northern Levant, Ugarit sits on a plain bound on the west by the
Mediterranean and on the east, south, and north by mountains. Passes over these
mountains were guarded by multiple watchtowers, as was the eastern part of the plain
once one descended from the mountains (Burke 2007: 41). Throughout the kingdom, sites
were located along main trade/access routes that led to the city of Ugarit itself. Aside
from such general observations, however, little has been done to fully articulate Ugarit’s
defenses. Rather, the focus has been on attempts to articulate the administrative districts
and the settlement hierarchy of the kingdom because the texts provide a relatively robust
lexicon by which to attempt such an assessment (van Soldt 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2005).46
These studies often attempt to relate ancient locations listed in the texts with
modern settlements, but because most of the sites listed in the Ugaritic texts are smaller
46
In the end, however, van Soldt concludes that no system of administrative districts within the Ugaritic
bureaucracy is to be found (2005: 135–145, 191).
53
settlements, such associations are fraught with difficulty. Few ancient sites have been
definitively equated with modern locations and even fewer have actually been excavated.
The issue of identifying specific types of sites (with modern terminology) with lexical
terms listed in the Ugaritic texts is similarly difficult, however, Burke (2007) has made a
strong case for associating sites whose modern Arabic names include the element,
“majadil/majdal” with the ancient term migdal/magdalu, “tower.” When the distribution
of these majadil is considered for Ugarit, and throughout the Levant, their strategic role
becomes clear and Burke’s proposed association becomes stronger.47 Aside from Burke’s
discussion of magdaluma, the most definitive treatment of the settlement within the
kingdom of Ugarit is Van Soldt, who summarizes the settlement pattern as, small villages
in the north and northeast, bigger towns in the hilly center of the state, and really large
towns in the fertile plains to the south and southeast of Ugarit (1999: 760). No detailed
discussion of defensive or communication potential, however, is given.
iii. Neo-Assyrian Empire

The non-linear development of Assyrian power in the Near East meant that
although there was a fairly standard approach to defense from the ninth to seventh
centuries, this approach was nuanced depending on the period and specific location.
Defenses were constructed along the Empire’s borders or beyond those borders as
precursors to expansion. As a result, there is an interesting interplay between indigenous
settlement patterns/hierarchies and Assyrian settlement patterns/hierarchies. Three (Fales
47
Burke (2007: 41f.) also proposes associations between the numerous Middle and Late Bronze
magdaluma and the various political entities in the Levant, noting the geographically distinct positions of
the magdaluma and the defensive/communication function they could have provided to their political
overseer.
54
1990), four (Liverani 1992: 131–132), or five (Kühne 1994: 66; Liverani 1992: 131–132)
hierarchical levels of settlements have been proposed, depending on the criteria used for
classification.
Fales (1990) establishes what is essentially a three tier settlement pattern based on
the linguistic terms in the Neo-Assyrian texts.48 The different types of settlements are
listed under their Akkadian terms, which are defined to a large extent by social
organization and not size, contra more archaeologically-driven discussions of settlement
patterns (e.g., Kühne 1994).49 For instance, the term ālu, generally translated as “city” is
generic and can refer to sites ranging from very large to very small (Fales 1990: 99–101).
It is not, therefore, size that dictates whether a site is a “city”, but rather it appears that
the term ālu infers the presence of a non-familial level of organization, i.e., one in which
kinship ties are not present. Sites where kinship ties are predominant or exclusive appear
to fall under the term kapru (URU.ŠE), “village” (Fales 1990: 105).50 Sites referred to as
kapru in the Neo-Assyrian texts also fluctuate greatly in size, from many homes to a
single home.
48
Liverani (1992: 125–130) argues that, according to textual attestations in Ashurnasirpal II’s annals, three-
tier settlement hierarchies were common among the peoples conquered by the Assyrians at that time. Once
Assyria conquered a region, however, a fourth hierarchical level consisting of the Assyrian capital city
(whether it be Nimrud or Nineveh later) was added. In some cases a fifth level was added for administrative
purposes.
49
Kühne (1994: 63) states that over the course of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, there was a shift from a three-
tiered hierarchy to a four-tiered one, at least in the Habur region: 1. Regional centers (>40 ha); 2. provincial
centers (10-40 ha); 3. big villages (6-10 ha); 4. villages (1-6 ha) and Hamlets and castles (<1 ha)). By the
late Neo-Assyrian Empire (after ca. 750 B.C.), this hierarchy appears to have grown and included capitals
(provincial and empire) (Kühne 1994: 66).
50
Halpern (1991: 52) cites 1 Chr 2:24, 42-55 as an implicit biblical reference to the kin-based nature of
villages.
55
Whether or not the terms ālu or kapru infer the presence of defenses is not
apparent. However, there is no doubt about the last category: fortified towns.
Unfortunately, little else is known about this type of site, though Fales does make the
differentiation between fortified towns (URU.BAD3) and isit(t)u, the latter of which is
likely equivalent to the earlier Middle Assyrian dimtu, “tower, fortified farm-house”
(Fales 1990: 106, following NALK, p.39; cf. AHw, p.74a-b). If the isit(t)u is considered
its own category of site based on function, then there would be a four-tier settlement
hierarchy according to the Neo-Assyrian texts.
Part of the Assyrian settlement hierarchy involved a four-step process for
establishing sites, out of which the hierarchical levels were established. This settlement
process began with Ashur-dan II (935-912 B.C.) and was done to “restore military
strength and agricultural prosperity to the country” (Postgate 1974: 237). Step one
included: the building of administrative and military centers, i.e., “palaces,” in strategic
positions, 2) the provisions of ploughs, 3) the storage of grain reserves, and 4) the
acquisition of draught-horses.
“This reflects a deliberate policy of first winning back and defending the deserted
lands from their Aramaean invaders, and then cultivating them so as to permit the
growth of population and improve agricultural prosperity” (Postgate 1974: 237).
This process, as articulated by Postgate, is equivalent to the idea of “strong points”
discussed by Liverani (1979). “Strong points” are fortresses established outside of
consolidated Assyrian territory as a first wave of expansion; Postgate’s step one.
Individual fortresses serve as islands of Assyrian influence and control in an otherwise
56
non-Assyrian countryside. According to Liverani, only with subsequent campaigns does
Assyrian influence and control fill in the regions between these islands.
There are Assyrian texts that discuss various aspects of the construction, manning,
stockpiling, and maintenance of these “island” fortresses (see Parker 1997: and the texts
cited in nn.8-9, 15-16). These texts, in conjunction with archaeological work at sites such
as Ziyaret Tepe (ancient Tushan) and Üçtepe (Tidu), which were along Assyria’s
northern border, allow a glimpse of what the Assyrian defensive network looked like
(Algaze 1989; Matney 1998; Matney and Summers 1999; Parker 1998, 2001a, 2001b).51
Massive fortifications and monumental buildings were constructed for both protection
and for propagandistic reasons of establishing Assyrian supremacy.
iv. Mycenaean and Classical Greece

Greek terms for defensive settlements were as robust as in the Near East, and
often have an equal abstractness in definition. Lawrence (1979: 159) notes that in Greek,
“any permanent stronghold in a locality of actual or potential danger was called a ‘fort’
(phrourion) if it were intended, even in part or only on occasion, to hold a garrison
(phroura).”52 A “tower” was a pyrgos whether it stood alone or had a small enceinte
(Lawrence 1979: 159). A charax (‘stockade’) referred generally to a position protected
by an embankment of earth or stones with stakes set in it, and so took different forms
(Lawrence 1979: 162). Teichos literally meant ‘wall’ but could be applied to a stronghold
“that was politically not a city” (Lawrence 1979: 173). It appears to be slightly more
51
Outside of this region there are not archaeologically driven syntheses of the Assyrian defensive network.
52
This is different from a ‘camp’ (stratopedon), which is any expanse of ground occupied by an entire
army on campaign, regardless of whether or not it was fortified (Lawrence 1979: 159).
57
robust than a phrourion. Towers (pyrgos), or guard-posts (phylakteria; possibly to be
equated with ‘patrol-houses’ (peripolia)) were located most often on hilltops (Lawrence
1979: 188-189). The studies presented below, unfortunately, offer no substantive attempt
to integrate these terms with the archaeological finds.
From the Mycenaean period (ca. 1500-1200 B.C.) to the Classical period (ca. 500-
200 B.C.), ancient Greece was organized into regional kingdoms or city-states. The
natural topography of Greece was not conducive for any large-scale unification, and as a
result, each of the city-states developed their own settlement patterns and defensive
networks. Each of these defensive networks utilized the natural geography and was
comprised of various types of fortifications. While defensive networks have not been
articulated for every Greek city-state, many networks have been discussed, particularly
those of Mycenaean Boiotia (Fossey 1990) Classical Phokis (Fossey 1986), Aetolia
(Bommeljé 1987), and Athens (Munn 1993; Ober 1985).
In the Kopaïs region of Boiotia, Fossey identified a Mycenaean period defensive
network established by the site of Orkhomenos to protect their drainage works (1990:
87). The articulation of this network, however, is rather underdeveloped. Fossey refers to
“fortified settlements,” which are closest in definition to what the present study terms
“cities” (see below). In one instance, Fossey mentions a “military fortress”—the site of
Glá—a type of site set apart from the other fortified settlements by the fact that they had
civilian populations while Glá housed only military personnel. Fossey’s “posts” equate to
“towers” (see below) though no further explanation of what classifies a “post” is offered.
58
Lastly, Fossey mentions one “relay station” that could relay signals between Orkhomenos
and Glá, though if and how this station differed from a “post” is not detailed.53
The defensive nature of the network of sites discussed by Fossey is based largely
on their geographical location. If the network represented an offensive expansion of
Boiotian power, more settlements to the west and southwest would be expected, however,
the greatest concentration of sites was in the northeast (1990: 86).54 In fact, the northeast
bay of the Kopaïs was the most vulnerable region and the one from which attacks
traditionally came (cf. Pausanias Description of Greece IX.38.7); the attacks were to
sabotage the Mycenaean drainage works.
In an earlier study, Fossey (1986: 135–141) discussed the Classical period
defensive network in eastern Phokis. Through survey work, a comparative analysis of the
masonry styles, and an establishment of inter-settlement visibility, Fossey was able to
postulate what the Phokian defensive network looked like and how it may have
operated.55 He concludes that this fortification network not only guarded the north-south
route between the Gulf of Corinth and the Kephissos Valley in the north, but also allowed
the Phokians to expand and protect their eastern borders. In fact, the network appears to
53
Ober (1985: 102) similarly divides the defenses of Attica into multiple site-types without specifically
articulating the nature/characteristics of his divisions: towers, fortresses, and fortified positions of rubble
construction.
54
Similarly, most of the sites were in geographically inaccessible locations and would have been
impractical for any civilian function.
55
The inclusion of specific sites in this network was based on numerous occasions on a given site’s
masonry style. Fossey does note the difficulty in attributing a specific type of masonry to a certain time
period, though a general development of styles is offered (1986: 121–132). This difficulty in dating specific
types of masonry in Greece is debated with some scholars claiming to be able to limit the dates for a certain
style to less than a century, while others are much more reserved (cf. Bommeljé 1987: 23). Regional
variation and preferences of style further complicate the dating by masonry style of Greek fortifications.
59
have been defensive at first, but was possibly later used offensively to coordinate a two-
pronged attack against Boiotia around Mt. Helikon during the Third Sacred War in the
mid-fourth century B.C. (Fossey 1986: 141).
Just west of Phokis, in the territory of Aetolia, a similar self-contained defensive
network has been cautiously posited for the Hellenistic period. Bommeljé (1987: 23–26)
states that,
“it is known from the written sources that communication within a territorial
organization, such as the ethnos of the Aetolians, was often realized by means of
optical signals (also by means of ‘long-distance-runners’). Warnings against
invading armies, or calls for general mobilizations were messages which were
communicated by a system of visual signaling.”
The towers and forts along the western boundary of Aetolia appear to be nodes of inter-
visibility. Messages/warnings could be conveyed amongst these key border sites, with
some of the sites allowing a more dendritic passing of messages further east into Aetolia.
That is, because of the rugged terrain, the key western forts were responsible for
conveying signals to specific sites further east, sites that could not communicate with
each other because they were in different dendritic networks.
In yet another region of Greece, Munn (1993) focuses on the rural defenses of
Attica. Most importantly, his study asks probing questions about the function of different
types of fortifications. He asks specifically, “how, in military terms, did fortifications
work? Where in the constellation of military, economic, and social considerations were
rural fortifications placed by their builders, and in response to what circumstances (Munn
1993: xviii)?” Though asking these questions, Munn acknowledges the difficulty in
answering them.
60
In the end, Munn’s understanding of the Attic fortresses is that they were more for
refuge and stockpiling than they were for stopping any enemy force or serving as a
unified border defense that guarded the main routes, as argued by Ober (1985: 191–207).
He continues by saying that fortresses are “shown to be fundamental to the defensive
institutions and concerns of a state yet, under the threat of invasion, to be primarily
passive centers of resistance” (Munn 1993: 32). Inferred in his discussion is that pitched
battle was the norm in Greece.56 People could run to the fortresses (or more specifically,
to Athens itself) for protection while the army arrived to battle the invaders. While the
situation in Judah is likely very similar to this scenario, the one key difference is that
Judah does not appear willing or able to meet Assyria in pitched battle.57
Ober (1985: 3) sees the fortresses as a much more active component in defense.
He argues that post-Peloponnesian War Athens created a network of defenses,
“based on a line of fortresses designed to defend the passes into Attica from the
Megarid and Boeotia, a complex network of signal stations by means of which
fire signals could be sent between the fortresses and Athens, and military
highways leading from Athens to the border posts. The new system required
major changes in the way Athenian soldiers were trained and recruited and in the
responsibilities of various officials.”
Ober, as with Fossey, also notes throughout his study that the identification and precise
dating of the specific elements of this defense network via the archaeological remains is
very complex. Yet, both conclude that geography and settlement patterns suggest both the
function of certain structures and their date.
56
In fact, based on textual evidence, Munn (1993: 31) argues that the troops stationed at the fortresses
served as a police force and conducted raids against enemies in their territory, or against enemy lands.
57
The Egyptians, however, do meet the Assyrians in pitched battle at Eltekeh.
61
Many of the concerns faced by Athens in the first half of the fourth century
closely parallel Judah’s concerns, and if Halpern’s (1991) interpretation of the defensive
strategy is correct, then many of the changes witnessed in the Athenian military
establishment may appear in Judah as well. Ober (1985: 99) notes specifically that,
A specialized generalship “of the chora” was created; the ephebes were trained in
peltast and garrison defense tactics; the recruitment system was changed to allow
the younger age groups to be sent out on short notice; military highways were
built; and fortresses were erected in the countryside…the various reforms should
be seen as elements of a coherent and ongoing program of defensive preparations.
The new program required major efforts on the par of the Athenians and was
undoubtedly quite expensive. Exactly how the land defense program was financed
is not clear. However, the property tax system (eisphora), the proceeds of which
were used for military purposes, was reorganized in 378/7 and at about the same
time, probably in 378, a new military chest, the stratiotic fund, was established
under the direction of a competent official.”
Unfortunately, written records that could detail many of these changes in Judah are
lacking; no such secular treatises have been found. However, as Ober correctly notes,
how the defensive strategy was meant to operate relies on an assessment of the
topography and archaeological remains of the fortifications. This kind of assessment is
possible in Judah.
What is clear from each of these case studies is that while there was a similar
lexicon of terms for defensive structures and site types throughout the ancient
Mediterranean and Near East, the way in which those terms are translated into English
varies. Further, the classification of an archaeological site with a specific term (both
ancient and modern) by archaeologists is rarely standardized, nor is the criteria by which
those terms are applied always made explicit.
62
As the goal of this research is to identify how Hezekiah’s defensive preparations
affected Judah’s socioeconomics, the classificatory scheme for the site types that is
adopted in this research (and the reasoning behind its adoption) is now articulated. This
articulation will facilitate the discussion of the overall socioeconomic impact that the
operation and administration of individual site types had due to Hezekiah’s military
preparations.
2. Hezekiah’s Defensive Network

A defensive network in the days of Hezekiah existed and it needed to be
maintained. This research is not interested in how the system came to be, notably because
it was the byproduct of earlier kings as well as Hezekiah, but rather in the impact on
Judah of maintaining such a system. In actuality, a specific date for the construction of
most of the individual features of such a defensive network cannot be articulated with the
archaeological remains.58 The cost/impact of maintaining such a system, however, can be
articulated based on the number of fortified sites and the presence of lmlk impressions;
only for the days of Hezekiah is such a cost assessment possible because no similar
defensive system/network appears in the same manner or on the same scale for other
Judean kings.59 Granted, many of the fortifications could have been constructed by
Hezekiah’s father, Ahaz, or even Uzziah but there is no archaeological or textual
evidence that these fortifications were supplied with a ration system similar to the lmlk
58
Munn (1993: 33) correctly notes that fortifications represent “generic responses to perennial conditions”
and that they “only rarely…occur in a form that allows a direct and demonstrable correspondence with
historical episodes.”
59
A rationing system similar to that attested by the lmlk impressions does appear in the days of Josiah and
is represented by the presence of rosette-stamped store jars. The distribution of these jars, however, is over
a smaller area and they occur in fewer numbers than the lmlk jars (see Cahill 1995).
63
jars. Similarly, following Hezekiah, the lmlk institution ceases and the number of manned
fortified sites appears to decrease. The reign of Hezekiah then is set apart both by the
quantity of archaeological evidence and the magnitude of available evidence—a larger
theoretical corpus of material results in a larger amount of actual data recovered.
Some explanation of the motivating reasons behind the marked increase in and
location of sites in eighth century Judah is necessary, and enlightening (Dagan 1992a, b,
2006a, b). In a study aimed at discerning these motivating factors, Holladay (1998:
389ff.) presents a short discussion of a regression analysis that tests whether or not the
number of new or expanded Iron II sites was proportionally related to any given factor, in
this case, horticultural lands (drawn from land use patterns recorded in a 1945 census of
British Palestine). What Holladay’s study shows is that in Judah, “the demography of this
topographical unit is dictated by political/military considerations, and not by land use
considerations (1998: 390).”60
While Holladay’s conclusions tacitly attest to the presence of a coherent defensive
network in Judah during the reign of Hezekiah, A. Mazar has explicitly articulated some
of this defensive network based on the archaeological remains. He writes, “The series of
fortresses and towers both in the desert regions and in Judah itself point to a highly
developed system of defense and to a well-defended road network” (Mazar 1984: 55).”
Despite such statements, however, no detailed discussion of the settlement pattern or the
underlying military advantages of given sites within such a network have appeared. Such
60
Holladay notes a similar pattern in the Northern Central Range of Samaria, where the location of sites
may have been influenced more by the location of trade routes than the availability of agricultural lands
(1998: 390).
64
a discussion appears in Chapter Three, but in order to articulate Hezekiah’s defensive
network it is necessary to first establish a hierarchy of sites and to define the terminology
to be used.
A. Site Hierarchy and Classification

Traditional site hierarchies are established based on the size (and sometimes
population density) of the sites included within the hierarchy, and size is often equated
with economic potential. While economic potential is an important consideration for this
study, a non-traditional hierarchy that classifies sites based on their military function is
used. The main reason for establishing a functional hierarchy is that the size of most sites
in Judah is not known. Estimates can be made, but for sites that have only been surveyed,
it is becoming clear that sherd scatters are not always (if usually) a good indicator of the
actual size of a site. Further, the use of space within a site, that is, how much is dedicated
to monumental buildings and/or public works versus domestic architecture, is difficult to
establish even when a portion of a site has been excavated. The resulting obfuscation
makes establishing the population density of a given site problematic. While estimates for
population density can be made, and actually will be employed later in this study, the
determining factor for classifying sites in the present study is their role within the
defensive network of Judah in the eighth century.
A complete representation of the settlement/defensive network of Judah cannot be
achieved, however, due to the preservation of the archaeological record; not every ancient
site is preserved. Yet, the large number of sites that have been excavated and/or surveyed
in Judah do allow for a meaningful assessment of settlement patterns and the nature or
65
appearance of any defensive network. The nature of such a network comes into focus
even more when the geographical setting is considered, as the geography of Judah has
remained largely unchanged since the days of Hezekiah.
i. Settlement Types
This study identifies five different types of settlements: the city, village, fortress,
tower, and unassignable site. The attribution of specific sites to one of these categories is
often difficult, especially for sites that have only been surveyed. E. Hunt (1974: 63) notes
that, “unless one knows beforehand at what level of territorial integration a site belongs, a
frontal attack using different non-archaeological kinds of evidence may be what is
needed.” For many of the sites included in this study, their geographical location serves
as this non-archaeological evidence. Most of the aforementioned categories encompass a
variety of subtypes and are now defined.
a. Cities
The identification of cities is made difficult because the attribution of a site as a
“city” can be done according to different criteria. This study adopts Frick’s (1977: 30)
definition for a city, that is: any settlement with a defensive wall encircling it. In addition,
this study would add, the population must be predominantly civilian from multiple
familial lines (cf. Fales’ assessment above). This minimalist definition for a city seems to
be reflected in the Hebrew term ‘ir. Further, such a definition can avoid the debate about
an urban-rural dichotomy that rests on the level of agricultural and/or non-agricultural
pursuits in order to define a “city” (cf. the models of Diakonoff 1975, 1982; Liverani
1984; Marx 1965; Zaccagnini 1989). Schloen’s 2001 work on patrimonialism and social
66
organization in the Late Bronze Age argues that such a dichotomy is false and that even
urban inhabitants were largely concerned with agricultural pursuits. Though drawing
upon LB Ugarit as a test case, Schloen’s analysis is still appropriate for much of the Iron
II in the southern Levant. While his work is one of the more recent and most fully
explicated works on the assumed urban-rural dichotomy, it draws upon the earlier works
of Weber and even Frick (1977: 95-97), who note the falsity of this dichotomy.
Many studies identify different types of cities. For example, Herzog (1997: 276)
delineates four different levels of cities in ancient Israel/Judah: capitals (e.g., Jerusalem,
Samaria), regional centers (Lachish, Dan, Hazor, Megiddo), secondary regional centers
(Beersheba, Arad, Kadesh Barnea), and provincial towns or “artisan cities” (Tell Beit
Mirsim, Gibeon, Tell en Nasbeh). These different levels of cities as presented by Herzog,
however, are not adopted in this study for multiple reasons. First, the attribution of one
site as a certain type of city is dependent on an understanding of the geographical setting
of the site and the factors that determined whether or not a site was “central.” Since
different variables determined whether or not a given site was “central” it is hard to
identify regional or secondary regional centers.61 Second, and related to the first reason,
some of the sites listed by Herzog do not fit in the categories as he himself defines them.
For instance, he classifies Beersheba as a secondary regional center, a site type that is left
undefined, even though it possesses all but one of the features of a regional center: a large
area of non-residential buildings, storehouses, well-engineered water-system, a palace,

61
I also do not adhere to the differentiation of “Large” and “Secondary” fortified towns as detailed by
Burke (see above p. 52) as the only substantive difference is that “large” towns serve as the capitals of
given kingdoms. From a defensive perspective, large and secondary fortified towns are the same. In the
case of Hezekiah’s Judah, even though Jerusalem is the capital, its defenses are on par with other
“secondary” sites in the kingdom; it does not offer any additional or unique defensive features.
67
and often many open spaces where passing military units or commercial caravans could
encamp.62 Is it to be assumed that a secondary regional center is smaller in area than a
regional center, or is there some other variable that separates the site types?
The simplified definition of a city as adopted here allows for an avoidance of
determining what “type” of city a site is. With this said, however, specific cities may
have had specialized functions within Judah, e.g., the production of ceramic forms,
production of olive oil, etc.
b. Villages
A village (Heb. kepher) is a settlement that does not have an encircling defensive
wall and whose population is largely, if not exclusively of the same lineage.63 Other
characteristics generally cited for villages—a lack of monumental buildings, cult centers,
and town planning (i.e., no orthogonal plan)—will be considered on a case-by-case basis,
however, all are secondary to the lack of a city wall. Few examples of villages have been
excavated in Judah in the Iron IIB, though the prominent site of Beth Shemesh Level 2
(Str. IIc) is one exception.
According to Borowski (2003: 15) there are three general types of villages: ring-
shaped, agglomerated, and farmsteads. This study follows Borowski in classifying the
Negev settlements of the Iron IIA and Buqe’ah settlements (including settlements of
62
Beersheba Str. II appears to lack a palace, however, both the “governor’s house” and “house 32” would
have served the same function as a palace. As a further critique of Herzog, it is unclear what size of area
constitutes an “open space.” Megiddo IV and Lachish III have the largest amounts of open space and could
be in their own class, while the other regional centers at Dan and Hazor do not appear to have any open
spaces of similar dimensions. In fact, the amount of open space that is found inside the gate of Beersheba
Str. II is on par with that found at Dan and Hazor, and even Lachish and Megiddo if one does not include
the palace courtyards.
63
This includes both real and fictitious lineages. The difference between villages and cities is that fictitious
lineages can apply to an entire village while they rarely, if ever include the entire population of a city.
68
comparable design) of the Iron IIB-C as farmsteads. It is the assignation of farmsteads as
villages, however, that this study does not follow. While farmsteads do function as small
settlements for a limited number of families, if not only a single family, they are quite
often built in strategic locations and thus serve a dual, if not greater purpose: that of
observation posts. The consistency with which farmsteads are built overlooking trade
routes throughout the Iron II period is remarkable and suggests that these settlements
were strategically placed, presumably at the behest of a centralized government. It is for
this reason that the current study classifies farmsteads as “watchtowers” instead of
“villages.”64
c. Fortresses
What differentiates a fortress (Heb. mibtzar, beroniah) from a city is the design of
the site, its geopolitical setting, the size of the site, and the presumed population of the
site. The design that is common, though not universal, to Judean fortresses in the Iron
IIB-C is a rectangular, walled structure with six to eight protruding towers and an
apparent lack of a gate. Sites conforming to this design are generally located in strategic
positions that overlook key routes. Some sites that are traditionally considered
“fortresses” in the literature are here classified as watchtowers (e.g., Kh. Abu et-Tuwein).
The reasoning behind such a classification is that fortresses were constructed to house a
considerable military contingent that could stop the further advance of the enemy into the
Judean heartland and/or stop the flow of traffic along a trade route (cf., Azekah, Arad,
64
It is presumed that someone was always present at such farmsteads insofar as they were nearby and could
quickly relay fire signals or other visual communications. They were not, so to speak, “on duty” wherein
they were confined to the structure at all times.
69
Kadesh Barnea). Watchtowers, on the other hand, functioned as observation points and/or
relay stations and were not meant to stop any enemy advance. They could be inhabited by
numerous people or families, but generally had a smaller population than fortresses.
It is understood that military personnel were the predominant inhabitants of
fortresses, while cities were inhabited largely with civilians. Further, fortresses were
situated strategically (often despite the unavailability of many supplies), something that is
not always the case for a city.
Figure 1. Representative examples of the various Judean site types.

1) Beersheba (Str. II)-city (after Herzog 1992: Fig. 19); 2) Azekah-fortress (after Bliss and Macalister
1902: Pl.3); 3) Arad (Str. X)-fortress (after Herzog, et al. 1984: Fig.10); 4) Giloh-watchtower (after
Mazar 1990b: Fig.10); 5) el-Khirbe (Phases 2-3)-watchtower (after Hizmi 2004: Fig.6).
70
d. Watchtowers
This category includes farmsteads such as the Buqe’ah sites and other sites
previously labeled as “fortresses” (e.g., Kh. Abu et-Twein, and other sites overlooking
the western approaches to Jerusalem) as well as individual towers (e.g., Giloh).
Numerous archaeological structures either excavated or identified in surveys of Judah fall
under this classification. What is clear from those that have been excavated is that there is
no standard design. Giloh is rectangular with a central wall that divides the interior into
two chambers. Kh. Abu et-Twein is rectangular with casemate walls. El-Khirbe is a four-
room house with an adjoining courtyard. This latter design is the most common among
sites classified as towers in the present study.
As mentioned above, watchtowers (Heb. migdalim) served as observation points,
a fact that is implied by the Hebrew term, which is derived from the Akkadian madgaltu,
itself a term derived from the verb dagālu, “to look, see.”65 Some were constructed on or
near trade routes while others were more isolated.66 In times of need, watchtowers may
have served as rallying points for troops, but in general, they housed a limited number of
soldiers and/or one to two families. Towers were used largely as an early warning system
and served a far more strategic role than they did a functional role in the defense of
Judah.
65
See Burke 2008: 115 for a more detailed discussion on the derivation of the term migdal, including
alternative etymologies.
66
This is a difference not articulated in the literature. Previous studies focus on watchtowers that guard
roads, though in the geographic discussion below it will become apparent that many towers are not located
near any routes. Rather, they are located based on observational capabilities.
71
Figure 2. Comparative scale of important Judean cities.
1) Beersheba (after Herzog 1992: Fig.19); 2) Tell en Nasbeh (after Herzog 1992: Fig.20); 3) Jerusalem
(after Geva 2000: Fig.1.4).
72
e. Unassignable
The attribution of the various sites to one of the previous categories depends
largely upon whether or not the site has been excavated, though the nature of some sites
remains unclear even after they are partially excavated. Those sites whose nature is
unclear but which can be attributed to the late eighth century due to excavated or
surveyed remains and/or stray lmlk impressions will be dealt with in a fifth category:
unassignable. Just because their nature cannot be determined at present does not mean
that these sites should be excluded from a discussion of Hezekiah’s defensive network.
The fact that such sites have the appropriate ceramics and/or lmlk impressions is enough
to include them in the discussion.
Further, sites that are situated at geographically strategic positions but which lack
chronologically significant markers (e.g., lmlk impressions, Lachish III ceramics) or
datable finds in general will also fall under the category of “unassignable”. With the
settlement types defined, it is now possible to turn to a geographical examination of
Hezekiah’s defensive network.
73
Chapter 3. Geographical Assessment of Hezekiah’s Defensive
Network
From the discussion of site and settlement types that contributes to an articulation
of Hezekiah’s strategic defenses, attention must be turned to a geographical assessment
of these defenses. This assessment investigates all of the identified late eighth century
Judean sites that served a potential military function region by region in order to
understand how each site functioned within a specific region and how each region
functioned within the whole of Judah. The following discussion is divided into five
distinct regions: the Shephelah, the Central Benjamin Plateau, the Central Hill Country,
the Judean Wilderness, and the Negev (see Map 1 for the boundaries of each region).
Each of these regions is geographically distinct and offers a unique landscape that could
be exploited differently within the kingdom of Judah. These geographical divisions,
however, do not necessarily reflect the political districts that were imposed upon the
kingdom (see Chapter Five).
Within each region, sites of every hierarchical level will be assessed in order to
determine, 1) if each region had the same site types, and 2) how the different site types
functioned within each region. Since the geography of Judah forms the foundation upon
which this study is based, it regulates the discussion. It is possible to use the geography as
a foundation because it has changed little from the days of Hezekiah, and it was the key
factor that dictated where sites were located. At the end of each regional discussion there
74
is an assessment of that region’s defenses, and at the end of the chapter there is a
geopolitical assessment of Hezekiah’s entire defensive network.
Map 1. The regions of Judah.
In his classic book on historical geography, Aharoni (1979: 106–107) states that
there are four contributing factors that determined the location of sites: 1) strategic
considerations involving the defensibility of the site, 2) an adequate water supply, 3)
situation on thoroughfares or interurban arteries, and 4) nearness and ease of access to
agricultural lands. Though these factors contributed to the location of larger settlements
in Judah, there are very few smaller settlements (i.e., towers or fortresses) whose
locations were dependent upon these factors. In fact, the locations of these smaller sites
75
appear to be influenced almost exclusively by the first factor, strategic considerations.
The needs of people, be they defensive, political, or agricultural, therefore, were
constantly weighed against the geographic reality and the difficulty in overcoming that
reality.
This study takes a maximalist approach to including sites for discussion. Despite
the difficulty of decisively assigning specific sites to the reign of Hezekiah, sites with
Lachish III ceramics and/or lmlk impressions are considered as belonging to the defensive
network of the late eighth century (see the discussion in Chapter Two). In the discussion
below, if the majority or all of the information concerning a site comes from survey data
then the site’s name is followed in parentheses by the abbreviation(s) for the survey(s) in
which it appears and the site number it was given in that survey (e.g., Y25, A774).
Further, if the modern name of a site is the same as its ancient name then only one site
name occurs. If the modern name is different than the ancient name but the identification
is certain or almost certain the two names appear separated by a dash. Sites whose ancient
name is uncertain or unknown will appear under the modern name of the site with any
proposed ancient name given in parentheses after it. The data is presented in gazetteer-
like form with discussions of individual sites. These individual discussions then inform
the more synthetic regional defense assessments. On Maps 2-8 lines of sight have been
added to illustrate the communication potential of a given site. These lines are based on
ground-level observations by either the author himself or the excavators/surveyors of a
given site. Those lines of sight that have not been corroborated or which are possible only
from an elevated stance (e.g., the top of a tower) are marked in green.
76
Some of the questionable sites have been included in the discussion below
because of their geographical location. If a site is situated in a location that has a strategic
value (see p. 35 above) then it is included as part of the defensive network, even if
corroborating chronological data may be lacking or indeterminate. Though such an
approach will undoubtedly bloat the number of settlements included in Hezekiah’s
defensive network, a methodology that overestimates the number of sites is considered
more favorable than one that underestimates the number of sites so that the most
extensive potential defensive network may be articulated.67 Such an approach also will
allow the geography to dictate the explication of a defensive network—all the sites that
geographically serve a strategic purpose are included—while at the same time, will allow
the archaeology to inform a nuanced reconstruction of the historical situation.
1. The West: the Shephelah and Approaches to Jerusalem

The discussion of this first region includes not only the Shephelah, which was the
most populous region in Judah, but also the western approaches to Jerusalem through the
Judean Hills. The data suggests that the Shephelah served as a buffer zone between the
Coastal Plain and highlands of Judah that was regularly in flux during the Iron Age.
Furthermore, the approaches through the Judean Hills provided a secondary buffer zone
that limited access to the heartland of Judah. Discussion of the sites moves from north to
south and from west to east.
67
While many site totals derive from the emergency survey of Judah (Kochavi 1972a), more recent re-
surveying of some of the regions (e.g. Finkelstein and Magen 1993; Ofer 1994) has shown that there are far
more late eighth-seventh century sites than originally estimated. This number continues to increase as more
intensive surveys are done.
77
The Shephelah is a geologically distinct area composed largely of chalky Eocene
limestone that erodes to the semi-productive Mediterranean Brown Forest soil. This area
of low, rolling hills stretches roughly from the Aijalon Valley in the north to the region of
Tel Halif in the south, and from the higher Judean Hills in the east to the Coastal Plain in
the west. A north-south Senonian limestone trough (Wadi en-Najil/Wadi eṣ-Ṣur)
separates the Shephelah from the hills of Judah, while on the west, the Shephelah
dissipates into the Coastal Plain.68 Further, there is a north-south ridge that roughly
separates the Shephelah into eastern and western halves. Multiple east-west valleys bisect
the Shephelah and allow access into the heartland of Judah. From north to south they are:
the Aijalon Valley (Wadi Selman), Sorek Valley (Wadi eṣ-Ṣarar), Elah Valley (Wadi es-
Sant), Valley of Zephathah (Wadi el-Afranj), Nahal Lachish (Wadi Qubeibeh), and Nahal
Adoraim (Wadi el-Hesi) (see Map 2, Map 3). In addition to serving as thoroughfares,
these wadis contain the much more productive combination of alluvial and terra rossa
soils that wash down from the Judean Hills. The northern three valleys are wider than the
southern three, but all contribute to the Shephelah being one of the most agriculturally
productive areas in Judah (Orni and Efrat 1971).
Because of the nature of its low, rolling hills, the Shephelah, particularly in the
north and west, was crossed by numerous roads and was one of the more difficult regions
to defend. The cities of the Shephelah were strategically located to guard approaches to
the interior of Judah from the west; most sat within one of the east-west valleys that
68
George Adam Smith eloquently describes the contrasting landscapes on either side of this wadi, “all
down the east…runs that close and lofty barrier of the Central Range, penetrated only by difficult defiles,
its edge turreted here and there by a town, giving proof of a table-land behind; but all down the west the
low scattered ranges and clusters of the Shephelah, with their shallow dales and softer brows, much open
ground and wide passes to the sea” (1966: 147).
78
divide the Shephelah or along the north-south trough. As one progresses eastward into the
Hills of Judah, however, the elevated and deeply eroded slopes of this Cenomanian
limestone uplift restrict the number of roads and accessibility to the heartland of Judah.
Particularly formidable is the entire Sorek drainage system which makes approaching
Jerusalem from the west impossible.
From the Shephelah, one can ascend one of eleven main roads into Judah.69 Some
of these roads, however, coalesce at key sites (e.g., Gibeon, Kiriath-Jearim, and Kh. el-
Abhar) and limit access. Historically, the main route to Jerusalem was the Ascent of
Beth-Horon (Josh 10:10–11; 1 Sam 13:18). This route runs from the north side of the
Aijalon Valley up to Gibeon on the Central Benjamin Plateau, before turning south to
Jerusalem; it was the easiest ascent into Judah (Smith 1966: 149; Aharoni 1979: 59).
South of, and parallel to the Beth-Horon road was the more difficult road that ran from
the region of Gimzo to the region of Biddu before rejoining the Beth-Horon road at
Gibeon.70 A similarly difficult road connected Gezer and Jerusalem via Deir el-Azhar
(Kiriath-Jearim).71 This route would have been taken only if necessary because before
69
See Baly (1974) and Dorsey (1991) for discussions of the methods of road construction, types of roads,
and types of traffic in antiquity. Baly’s work does a far better job of including topographical considerations
when discussing the routes of roads than does Dorsey’s work, which largely omits such consideration (as
Fischer, Isaac, and Roll 1996: 324 point out, “its main weakness lies in the small regard paid by the author
to the topography of each specific road. Thus, many of the suggested roads which seem to be logical due to
a series of sites, could hardly exist, if at all, because of the difficult nature of the terrain.”).
70
The parallel road just south of the Beth-Horon road was a secondary road whose existence is only first
mentioned in the Roman period (Fischer, et al. 1996: 101ff.) It is unlikely that any army would have used
this road even if it were a local road in the Iron Age. Dorsey (1991: 185–186; Road J4) does not even
record this road, but suggests a route further south that connected Yalu (Aijalon) with Kh. Kefirah
(Chephirah). This alternate route proposed by Dorsey also would have been avoided by armies as it
proceeded along a valley instead of a ridge, making ambush much easier. Even the ascent of Beth Horon
could be perilous as illustrated by the Jewish ambushing of the fleeing Romans under the command of
Cestius Gallus in A.D. 66 (J.W. 2.19.8-9).
79
reaching Jerusalem the steep and difficult Sorek Valley would need to be crossed near the
site of Mozah. Even though this route is largely followed by the modern Highway 1 and
is the most direct route to Jerusalem from the west, its difficult ascents and descents made
it impractical for ancient armies to use. Recognition of this topographical reality is likely
the reason that no cities were constructed along this route. From Deir el-Azhar (Kiriath-
Jearim), the road splits with the northern branch meeting up with the two previously
discussed routes at Gibeon, and the southern route heading almost due east to Mozah and
Jerusalem.
Further south, roads from both the Sorek and Elah Valleys ascended into Judah
south of the Sorek system and met at the fortress of Kh. el-Abhar before continuing
eastward through the Rephaim Valley to Jerusalem (see 2 Sam 5:17-25). Roads further to
the south that led to the region of Hebron included roads: from Gath to Beth-zur via Tel
Beida and which passed just north of Keilah; from the region of Mareshah to the region
just north of Hebron via et-Taiyiba; from Idna to Hebron via Beth-tappuah; from Tel
‘Eton to Adoraim; and, from Tell Beit Mirsim to Kh. Rabud/Debir. Not every one of
these routes was likely to be used by an invading army, though there is no way of
knowing with any certainty which were and which were not.
The Shephelah as a region had many resources to offer and was constantly fought
over by the Judeans and Philistines (1 Sam 17; 23; 2 Sam 5:17-25; 2 Chr 26:6-7; 2 Chr
28:18; 2 Kgs 18:8). The biblical texts mention specifically that the region was known for
71
The identification of Deir el-Azhar as Kiriath-Jearim is generally accepted though the nature and size of
the biblical site is not clear. Iron Age pottery and a possible Iron Age tomb have been found at the site, but
most of the remains are later (de Vaux and Steve 1950; Fischer, et al. 1996: 118f.).
80
its olives and sycamore trees (1 Chr 27:28; 1 Kgs 10:27), though the low rolling hills and
wide valleys that characterized the region were also conducive to grain production.
Protection of these resources was vital to the survival of Judah (cf. Chapter Five below).
The rugged nature of the ascents into the Hill Country, on the other hand, meant that
there was a limited amount of productive cereal growing land there. Though these ascents
could have been terraced, it is difficult to determine in the archaeological record to what
degree such terracing appeared in the Iron Age.
Map 2. The northern Shephelah and western Judean ascents along with the roads and lines of sight
81
A. Cities
A combination of the fertility and topography made the Shephelah the most
populous region in Judah. No other region had as many cities as did the Shephelah, a fact
that is corroborated both by excavations and surveys and by Sennacherib’s claim to have
taken 46 walled cities, fortresses, and small cities in the region (COS II: 219B, 303). The
cities of the Shephelah were strategically located in or overlooking the key east-west
valleys and the north-south chalk moat that bisected the region. The locations of the cities
mirror quite closely the topographical differences within the Shephelah, which can
actually be divided into an eastern and western half largely demarcated by the north-
south ridge upon which Azekah sits. Typically Judah controlled only the eastern
Shephelah, while the western Shephelah was in the realm of the Philistines. Both
archaeology and the biblical texts indicate that during the reign of Hezekiah, however,
Judah expanded into the western Shephelah. Such an expansion created a double, and
sometimes triple, defensive line through the main valleys.
i. Gezer. Beginning with the Aijalon Valley in the north, Judah appears to have
taken Gezer from the Assyrians as suggested by the presence of at least 37 lmlk
impressions at the site.72 The nature of the settlement at Gezer following its destruction—
presumably by Tiglath-Pileser III in 733 B.C. according to his mention of a site called
Gazru (Ga-az-ru)—is difficult to determine for the late eighth century. Stratum V is
72
The exact number of lmlk impressions from Gezer is unclear as Macalister did not record an accurate
number. Gitin (1990: 17, n.16) notes that there could have been upwards of 50 impressions. Further, an
additional lmlk jar handle was discovered about 1 km north of the tell in an installation that likely served an
agricultural purpose. This installation was circular (c.7-11m dia), preserved two courses high (0.5m), one
stone wide (0.35-0.45m), and had a fieldstone pavement (Hardin 1995: 143).
82
dated from the late eighth to the early sixth century and does not appear to have been
destroyed by Sennacherib (Dever and Cole 1974: 75). The site, however, still can be
considered a city as evidenced by the continued use of Casemate Wall 1001, though in a
later phase of Str. V this wall appears to have gone out of use as there was “a massive
spill of broken 7th cent. B.C. pottery over Casemate Wall 1001 and down the slope”
(Dever and Cole 1974: 75). In addition to Casemate Wall 1001, the city gate in Field III
was rebuilt in Str. V as a two-chambered gate.
Gezer’s location on an elevated point at the western extent of the Aijalon Valley
allowed it a commanding view over the northern Coastal Plain and the north-south
international highway. From its location it could guard approaches from the sea and from
the north. Yet, Gezer would have been a difficult site for Judah to control because it was
on the very fringes of the Shephelah and was largely unprotected by any notable
geographic features. When the nature of the site’s fortifications at the end of the eighth
century are considered (the outer wall of a casemate wall), it appears that Gezer was a
small city likely garrisoned with Judean troops meant to serve as a lookout or even as a
relay station to sites further east in Judah.73 The lack of a destruction layer following Str.
VI could suggest that the Judeans who were at the site fled before Sennacherib’s army
after realizing the futility of trying to protect the site.74
73
Note the comments of Mazar and Panitz-Cohen (2001: 280–281), who come to a similar conclusion and
compare Gezer to the site of Timnah just to the south.
74
Alternately, Mazar (1994: 259–260) suggests that the destruction of Str. VI should be attributed to
Sennacherib and not Tiglath-Pileser III as argued by the excavators. The combined evidence of the
archaeology and texts, however problematic as they both may be, is stronger for the excavator’s
interpretation than it is for Mazar’s. See Vaughn 1999 pp.147–150 for a short summary of the differing
opinions and the evidence used for both.
83
ii-iii. Upper and Lower Beth Horon. If Gezer were taken, the Beth-Horon ascent
still had additional cities to defend it—Lower Beth-Horon (LBH) and Upper Beth-Horon
(UBH)—located directly on the road that could also attempt to stop an invading force.
Thus, the defense of the northernmost route into Judah from the Shephelah is of a
different nature than the routes further south. None of the other routes into Judah offered
such a level of protection (see below for more). The identification of either Lower or
Upper Beth-Horon as cities, however, is admittedly reliant upon the biblical texts that
mention Solomon fortifying one or both sites (2 Chr 8:5; 1 Kgs 9:17).75 The sites
identified with these two cities—Beit ‘Ur et-Tahta (B22) with LBH and Beit ‘Ur el-
Fauqa (B28+143) with UBH—are located beneath modern settlements and have only
been surveyed. However, it stands to reason that because of their location on the main
road to Jerusalem from the west they both were still fortified in the days of Hezekiah.
While no mention is made of a noticeable city wall for either site in the survey, the scatter
of Iron IIB-C sherds at both Beit ‘Ur el-Fauqa (UBH) and Beit ‘Ur et-Tahta (LBH)
suggests that the sites were quite sizeable at roughly 3.3 ha and 3.0 ha, respectively.76
Also, one lmlk impression was found at Beit ‘Ur et-Tahta (LBH).
iv. Khirbet el-Kefirah (Chephirah). Kh. Kefirah is not located on any of the main
routes but no doubt served an important strategic role. The site is located about 4 km west
of Biddu on the western end of a prominent ridge and was ca.1.5 ha in size. A detailed
75
It should be noted that the Chronicler’s account mentions specifically that UBH and LBH were “cities of
fortified walls, doors, and bars” (‫ )ערי מצור חומות דלתים ובריח‬while the parallel passage in 1 Kgs 9:17 is more
ambiguous, stating only that LBH was “built” (‫)בנה‬.
76
The 3.3 ha spread of sherds at UBH consists of two surveyed sites on opposite sides of the modern road;
Site 28 is 1.5(?) ha and Site 143 is 1.8 ha.
84
survey of the site was conducted and Iron II pottery, along with two lmlk impressions
were recovered (Vriezen 1975: see also Finkelstein and Magen 1993: 209–211; Site
No.263). This site has a clear view all the way to Aijalon and Gezer in the west and the
fortress at Horvat Eres two ridges to the south. Kefirah likely served as a signal relay
station between Gezer or Aijalon and towers further to the east. In this regard, though
Kefira is classified as a city because of its massive defensive wall, it is more similar to
many of the towers in the western approaches to Jerusalem (see below under Towers)
than it is to any city.
v. Tel Miqne/Ekron. The Str. IIA settlement at Ekron was confined to the
northeast acropolis. Though much smaller than the occupations both preceding and post-
dating it, the settlement of this stratum was well defended with a mudbrick wall and a
tower on top of the acropolis (Dothan and Gitin 1993: 1056, 2005, 2008: 1955). How
much control Judah actually asserted over this site is difficult to assess. The ceramic
record attests to both coastal and Judean vessel forms, though such a mixture is likely
more reflective of the site’s location on the boundary between Judah and the Coastal
Plain than it is of political control. Yet, the presence of three lmlk impressions does
suggest some kind of Judean contingent at the site. Further, Sennacherib’s annals record
that the inhabitants of Ekron turned their king, Padi, over to Hezekiah. Perhaps Ekron
made a deal with Hezekiah whereby the latter would offer military protection in return
for allowing him to occupy the site, which was in the transitional realm between the
Shephelah and Coastal Plain. From Ekron, trade along the north-south coastal highway
could be controlled, as could a route heading southeast from the site to the Elah Valley.
85
vi. Timnah/Tel Batash. Timnah/Tel Batash was strengthened with a large city wall
(up to 4 m wide) and massive bent-axis gate in the 8th century (Str. III). While a specific
date for the construction of these defenses is unclear, they were most likely constructed
before Hezekiah began to rule. The excavation of building 737 (the possible “barracks”)
produced 18 restorable lmlk jars—with an additional 15 jars posited on sherd counts—
making it clear that there was a Judean presence at the site in the days of Hezekiah
(Mazar 1997: 190, 192). In fact, the settlement histories of Tel Batash and the nearby site
of Beth Shemesh attest to Judean expansion in the eighth century (a longer discussion of
this relationship is presented below under Beth Shemesh).
Judean control of Tel Batash created a larger buffer zone between Jerusalem and
Judah’s borders and brought the broad fertile segment of the Sorek Valley under Judah’s
aegis. Strategically, Tel Batash was important because it was located in the western half
of the Sorek Valley where the hills of the Shephelah dissipate into the Coastal Plain. Any
enemy seeking to enter Judah from the Sorek would pass Tel Batash. The magnitude of
the city’s defenses, the presence of a substantial number of lmlk jars (not all of which had
impressions) in a single [administrative?] building, and Sennacherib’s explicit mention of
the site in his annals attest to the site’s importance.
vii. Tell es-Safi/Gath. The attribution of Tell es-Safi/Gath as a city in the days of
Hezekiah is based on the strategic nature of the site and the recovery of some
archaeological material from the end of the eighth century. It should be noted, however,
that the extent of the site and the nature of its defenses in the late 8th century is not clear.
Recent research has focused on the largely domestic structures in Areas A and F. In the
86
latter, two distinct destruction layers that are attributed to the second half of the eighth
century have been found; the excavators posit that these destructions could be associated
with those of Sargon II and Sennacherib respectively (Chadwick 2009).
Though Maeir’s statement that, “the sparse occupation of the site after the mid-
eighth century BCE corresponds well with the nonappearance of Gath in biblical and
extra-biblical sources of the eighth-sixth centuries BCE (2008: 2081),” should be
accepted, it appears that there is a short-lived settlement there in the days of Hezekiah.
The destruction of the site attributed to Sennacherib, the presence of lmlk impressed jars
discovered by Maeir and Bliss and Macalister (1902: 106ff.), and the reference to Gath in
Micah 1:10 all point to a Judean reoccupation of Safi for strategic purposes. Despite the
site’s “sparse” occupation in comparison to its population in the ninth century, it is most
likely that it was still (or, re-) walled in the days of Hezekiah. Safi is strategic in that it is
located on the Nahal Elah, has a commanding view of the surrounding terrain, and
guarded the approach to Azekah via the Elah Valley.
viii. Tel ‘Erani (Beth Leaphrah?). This ca. 2.4 ha site “holds a position of
considerable strategic importance, since it commands the junctions of the Wadis el-Hābûr
and Ghafr, and is accessible, through the valley of a tributary, to traffic using the Wadi
eṣ-Ṣafi” (Tufnell 1953: 35). Earlier identified with both Libnah and Gath of the
Philistines, Tel ‘Erani has more recently been identified with Beth Leaphrah (Suriano
2010). The Iron Age settlement at ‘Erani appears to be limited mostly to the acropolis,
but is difficult to articulate as only preliminary results have ever been published. Yeivin
(Yeivin and Kempinski 1993: 418–419) dated Str. VIII-VII to the eighth century and Str.
87
VI-V to the seventh century, however, the presence of lmlk impressions from Areas A (8
or more) and F (2), in both Str. VI and V suggest that at least Str. VI should be raised to
the end of the eighth century—whether the lmlk impressions in Str. V come from fills or
habitation layers is nowhere stated (cf. Brandl 1997; Blakely and Hardin 2002: 35).
‘Erani appears to have been a small city during at least part of the eighth century
as a stone wall surrounds the acropolis in Str. V and is related to a stone glacis (Yeivin
1961: 5–6). Also, the partially eroded foundations of a large tower from Str. V were
uncovered in the northwest part of Area A (Yeivin 1961: 5).
ix. Tel Burna (Libnah?). A casemate wall surrounds the summit of this site,
though the sherd scatter from the Iron IIB suggests a much larger settlement (Uziel and
Shai 2010: 240). Whether or not the area outside of the summit was fortified, however, is
currently unknown, making the assignation of Burna as a city somewhat conjectural. On
the one hand, the casemate defenses may suggest a fortress, while on the other, if Tel
Burna is in fact ancient Libnah, then it’s classification as a city is supported by 2 Kgs
19:8 which states Sennacherib was besieging Libnah.
Burna’s location allowed for communication between Azekah and Mareshah, and
it also marked Judean expansion from the eastern Shephelah into the western Shephelah.
Though only small-scale excavations have been conducted so far, ridged-rim store jars
typical of Judean sites and a lmlk impression have been discovered at Burna (personal
communication, Joe Uziel). Burna and Tell Judeidah allowed for signals to be passed
from Azekah to Mareshah and Lachish, respectively, and from those latter two sites
further signals could be passed throughout the southern Shephelah.
88
x. Mareshah. Only small portions of the pre-Hellenistic city at Mareshah have
been excavated, but it appears that it was quite substantially fortified. In Area 100 in the
northwest corner of the tell, two walls (W205 and W30) mark the upper (possibly) and
lower defensive lines of the city walls (Kloner, et al. 1998: 154). W205 was largely
disturbed by the later Hellenistic tower constructed over it so it is not possible to
determine its width though a thickening of stones was discovered to the south of the wall
and dated to the 8th century. W30 (ca. 3.5 m thick) was uncovered further down the slope
than W205 and exposed for about 30 m. It was constructed “partly on a fill of large
stones sealed by a stepped wall, [and] served as an outer defensive line of the city”
(Kloner, et al. 1998: 154). It was preserved up to almost 2 m just west of the Hellenistic
tower.
Mareshah is a key site for communication in the Shephelah. It has lines of sight
with Lachish, Tel Burna, Kh. Abu et-Twein, and Beit ‘Elem [1], and it is located just
south of an important crossroads.
xi. Lachish. Lachish is understood to be the second most important site in Judah
behind Jerusalem. It was well fortified and earned a special place in Sennacherib’s artistic
depictions of his campaign against Hezekiah. Further, it was a communication and trade
hub with good visibility to sites in almost every direction, access to multiple trade routes,
and acceptable agricultural land for olives and grapes. While none of these features is
89
unique to Lachish, the abundance of lmlk impressions—over 400—and personal seals
discovered at the site attest to its importance.77
How Lachish functioned within the Judean administration is unclear, though the
presence of the podium structure/palace likely indicates a leading role. The fact that
Lachish is not mentioned as one of the sites in the lmlk impressions is then more
intriguing. If Lachish is the most important site in the Shephelah, then why is Socoh
listed in the impressions? It could be related to the availability of productive soils around
each site. The amount of cultivable land around Socoh is greater than that around
Lachish, as is the amount of productive terrain for terracing and growing olives or grapes.
Just south of Lachish is an outcrop of Eocene limestone that, although good for seasonal
agriculture (Dagan 1992a: 13*), is not the most conducive for growing olive trees or
vines. This outcrop is quite substantive and greatly limits the production capability of the
region of Lachish. The immediate vicinity of Socoh has no such limitations. It would
seem that Lachish was not the best site for administration from a socioeconomic
perspective, however it was from a geopolitical perspective (this issue will be addressed
further in Chapter Five).
xii. Idna (Ashnah?; A220). A modern Arab village covers most of site, though it
is estimated to be about 5.5 ha in size. Multiple segments of what is likely the city wall,
up to 5-6 m wide, were recorded along the west, south, and east sides of the tell. Dagan
also identifies a possible city gate along the NW of the tell where the wall turns at 90
77
In L.4014 alone, inside the city gate, eighteen storage jars were found. Three of them were stamped with
lmlk impressions and a fourth was likely stamped with a private stamp (Zimhoni 2004a: 1794–1795). Such
an accumulation of lmlk jars is similar to building 737 at Timnah/Tel Batash and indicative of royal
administration.
90
degrees (Dagan 2006a: 173*). Sherds dated to the “Iron Age” were found scattered over a
larger area than the tell, covering ca. 7.5 ha and suggest that a substantial ancient
settlement was located here.
Idna’s location in the eastern Shephelah along the main north-south road that
separated the Shephelah from the Judean mountains made it an important site. Not only
could it guard the north-south road, but it could also relay signals from the sites of Beit-
Elem [1] and Beit-Elem [3] to et-Taiyiba along the ascent to Hebron.
xiii. Kh. al Ras (A210.1). This site is a ca. 5.0 ha tell with a view west to Kh. Bet
Loya and Bet ‘Elem [3]. A large building (10 x 12? m) with a 2.1 m wide wall and ashlar
constructed corners crowned the site, and a portion of the presumed city wall was
surveyed along the northern side of the tell (ca. 3m wide, built of large field stones [0.7 x
1.0 m] preserved to four to eight courses (Dagan 2006a: 165*)). Another wall, of
different construction technique was discovered along the western side of the tell and is
suggested as a fortification. It is likely that one of the walls was the Iron Age city wall.
Iron Age tombs were also discovered along the eastern side of the tell. This site appears
to have been a major site throughout most phases of history (beginning with the MB and
running up to the Ottoman period). An ancient road runs right past the site towards Idna.
xiv. Kh. el-Qom/Kum (Shaphir?; Y135; A398). Kh. el-Qom78 sits at the eastern
extent of the Shephelah, just west of where the higher Judean Hills begin. The region is
known even today for its winter wheat, which grows well due to the mild winters and
fertile terra rossa soil throughout the region (Dever 1969-1970: 140). The site also serves
78
The identification of Khirbet el-Qom as Shaphir (Josh 15:8; Mic 1:11) is suggested by Abel (Abel 1938:
447–448) and followed by Dever (Dever 1969–1970: 189).
91
as an important connecting point between Migdal-Gad and Adoraim. Dagan lists Kh. el-
Qom as 2.5 ha in size and notes that there may be a fosse on the east side of the tell
(though it was filled in at the end of the Ottoman period according to current residents).
Dagan also mentions the Iron II casemate wall, gate flanked by two pillars, and the
remains of a structure and associated silo (2006b: 35*). The gate was excavated by
Holladay and revealed to be of the typical four-chambered style (Defonzo 2005: 16). A
majority of the recovered ceramics dated to the eighth and seventh centuries.
Map 3. The Southern Shephelah and western Judean ascents along with the roads and lines of sight
92
Kh. el-Qom sits just over 1 km south of the main road that ran from Lachish up to
Hebron. Further, el-Qom is located just off a key north-south route that ran from Tell Beit
Mirsim north past Keilah and Adullam all the way to Aijalon. Dever comments that Kh.
el-Qom sits in an area that is suited for the “inner defense” of the Shephelah and is a
counterpart site to Lachish, which sat further west at the mouth of the Nahal Lachish
(1969-1970: 140). The only site between Lachish and Kh. el-Qom would have been
Migdal-Gad, which is associated with modern Amazya (see below). Though this site has
only been surveyed it stands to reason that its initial settlement—in the Iron I according
to the ceramics recovered—was a tower that sat at the half-way point between Lachish
and Kh. el-Qom.
xv. Tel ‘Eton (Eglon?). Tel ‘Eton was surrounded by a substantial wall in the
eighth century, before being destroyed apparently at the hands of the Assyrians in the
“late eighth century” (Faust 2009: 115). Whether this destruction can or should be
attributed to Sennacherib is difficult to ascertain as the ceramic repertoire suggests a date
slightly earlier in the eighth century. Zimhoni (1985: 88) dates the ceramic assemblage
from Ayalon’s (1985) Str. I-II to 850-750 BC. She makes comparisons with Lachish III,
though says that the “Eton assemblage represents what the Lachish III assemblage would
have looked like in the beginning of it’s lifespan as opposed to how it appears in the
archaeological record (i.e., at the end)” (Zimhoni 1985: 88). She makes further parallels
between ‘Eton and Tell Beit Mirsim A1 (and into A2), and Arad X-VIII, which she dates
entirely to the eighth century (1985: 86).
93
Though the ceramic evidence may suggest a date preceding Sennacherib, the
destruction level discovered by Faust in his Area A is most likely to have occurred during
Sennacherib’s campaign as no other Assyrian monarch likely visited the eastern
Shephelah.79
Prior to its destruction, ‘Eton contained a large building (over 20 m in width) that
may have been an administrative building. Ayalon (1985: 61) compared it to the West
Tower at Tell Beit Mirsim, buildings 411 and 148 at Tell el-Far‘ah (N), and perhaps the
“basement house” at Beersheba, all of which have also been proposed as administrative
in some function. It would make sense for some kind of administrative building to be at
Tel ‘Eton, whose ancient name is unknown, as it sits at an intersection between a north-
south road running along the chalk moat and an east-west road leading up the Nahal
Adoraim from Lachish toward Hebron. Some signals could have been passed to ‘Eton
from Migdal-Gad via Kh. Raia and then from ‘Eton onto A784 along the ascent to
Adoraim, although ‘Eton’s sunken location in relation to most of its surroundings limits
its communicative potential.
xvi. Tell Beit Mirsim. Despite Albright’s original dating of Str. A at Tell Beit
Mirsim to the beginning of the sixth century, more recent analyses of the archaeological
material have attributed that stratum and its destruction to the late eighth century (Blakely
and Hardin 2002: 14–24; Greenberg 1987; Vaughn 1999: 27–29). At the same time, the
attribution of Str. A2 as a city (as defined in the current study) has been critiqued by
79
Of course, this assumes that the destruction level should be attributed to a military conflict even though
such an assumption cannot be proven. It should be noted, however, that many arrowheads were discovered
in the destruction layer, suggesting either preparation for a battle or defense of the site during a battle (see
Faust 2009: 115). In the limited excavations, ‘Eton has yet to turn up any lmlk impressions, though lmlk-
style jars have been found (Zimhoni 1985: Fig. 7:16).
94
Blakely and Hardin, who argue that the walled city of A2 was destroyed before
Sennacherib’s campaign and that only the “buildings of public character” (to borrow
Albright’s term (1932: 48–49)) in the southeastern quadrant of the city and the Western
Tower were left to destroy in 701. The continued use of the city wall, according to them,
was an assumption made by Albright that cannot be proven. At the same time, Blakely
and Hardin admit that their interpretation of an un-walled citadel and tower is also an
assumption (2002: 19) because the material published by Albright cannot prove one way
or the other whether the city wall was still functioning in the last phase of the city’s
occupation.
Despite the ambiguity of the city wall’s operation, a city with such strategic
importance as Tell Beit Mirsim, which sat near a crossroads and whose Western Tower
allowed visual communication with Tel Halif to the southwest, would no doubt have
remained fortified until its final destruction. Otherwise, an enemy would have been able
to advance unhindered as far as Kh. Rabud/Debir in the Judean Hill Country.
xvii. Tel Halif (Rimmon?). Tel Halif is located at the juncture of the Shephelah
and Negev making its assignation to one region or the other immaterial. Traditionally,
however, it has been assigned to the Negev following its identification with Rimmon in
Josh 15:32 and 19:7. The site’s location on the route connecting the Negev and
Shephelah allows for communication between the two regions. Signals could be passed
95
from Kh. Sansanna to Tel Halif then north to the western tower at Tell Beit Mirsim.80
Further, Seger (1983: 1) notes that,
“its [Halif’s] importance derives from its strategic position commanding the route
from Egypt and the sea coast into the Judean hills toward Hebron and Jerusalem.
From its vantage point Tell Halif guards the agricultural lands and water resources
in the southeastern Shephelah.”
Halif Str. VIB, dated from the ninth to the end of the eighth century, was
defended with a casemate wall and glacis made of both crushed chalk and paving stones
depending on the area; it was destroyed at the end of the eighth century, most likely by
Sennacherib as is suggested by the presence of numerous arrowheads and sling stones
found in contemporary destruction levels in areas A3 and B3 in Field III and areas C8
and D8 in Field V (Seger 1983: 14; Borowski 2009: 121). Judean preparations for the
arrival of the Assyrians is attested to by the lmlk-type jars found in many of the houses
(Borowski 2009: 120; Hardin 2010; Jacobs 2008: 1761).
B. Villages
i. Beth-Shemesh. The settlement of Level 2 at Beth Shemesh, which was
destroyed by Sennacherib according to Bunimovitz and Lederman (2009: 139), does not
appear to be walled. That Beth Shemesh appears to be un-walled is odd considering its
strategic position and that over 60 lmlk impressions and fifteen private or official’s seals
have been found at the site. Also strange is the fact that the administrative buildings from
Level 3 (Iron IIA) go out of use in Level 2. Instead, domestic architecture with olive
pressing installations dominates the settlement. The resulting picture suggests that the site
80
This tower was constructed likely for relaying signals, as visual communication between Tell Beit
Mirsim and Tel Halif is possible only from its location.
96
remains important, though this importance is now related to agricultural production and
not necessarily administrative capability.81
At the same time, however, the more westerly Tel Batash is reoccupied (Str. III)
and heavily fortified (Mazar 1997). Both the excavators at Tel Batash and Beth Shemesh
are in agreement that this represents the “expansionist trends” of the kings of Judah in the
second half of the eighth century (Bunimovitz and Lederman 2006: 424, 2008: 1648,
2009: 137, 139). Beth Shemesh was no longer the border town leading into Judah, but
rather Tel Batash took over that function. Despite the increased buffer zone between the
Coastal Plain and the Hill Country, however, the relative protection of the route into the
Hill Country was unchanged; one city merely replaced the other.
Once Timnah was taken, only one fortress (Beit Itab) stood between an invading
army and Jerusalem. Perhaps the site of Zorah, overlooking the Sorek from the north,
could have rallied some opposition to an army passing through the valley. If not, it is
most unlikely that the once powerful city of Beth-Shemesh, which was now an
agriculturally productive village, would have offered must resistance. Instead, its role was
likely relegated to communicating warnings to Zorah, which could then pass signals to
Zanoah and up into the Hill Country.
ii. Tell ej-Judeideh (Moresheth-Gath?). Bliss spent considerable time attempting
to ascertain the date of the city wall that was visible on the surface at Judeideh during his
original excavations at the site. He concluded that the wall was constructed “perhaps in
81
The private or official’s seals are understood to represent the individuals to whom the goods contained
within the jars are being shipped. The question is whether the jars indicate that the officials were at Beth
Shemesh, whether the jars were collected there in order to be shipped to the officials elsewhere, or whether
the jars were brought by officials who were re-stationed in Beth Shemesh after Sennacherib’s invasion had
begun. Chapter Five will discuss this issue further.
97
Roman times” (1902: 51) after opening multiple probes along the exterior of the wall.
Two more probes were opened, “to ascertain whether an earlier wall was to be found
underlying the surface wall, or whether such a wall existed in a line outside or inside that
of the surface wall, but in each case the negative was proved” (1902: 47). Despite the
lack of defenses accorded the site by Bliss, more recent analyses of the site have
questioned such an interpretation, largely because of the early archaeological
methodology used by Bliss—only fills inside a city wall, not outside, can provide its date.
Gibson (1994: 213) concludes that, “for the moment, it remains an open question whether
the Early Bronze Age and Iron Age settlements at the site were fortified” while Vaughn
(1999: 142) notes that, “it is possible that some Iron Age walls might have been missed
by Bliss and Macalister, and it is difficult (but not impossible) to imagine the many Iron
Age finds and buildings they discovered without any defensive walls.” Nevertheless,
until renewed excavations uncover an Iron Age city wall, the site must be classified as a
village.
Vaughn’s statement is derived from the fact that at least 39 lmlk impressions and
fifteen official seal impressions were recovered from Judeideh.82 However, as seen with
Beth Shemesh above, major sites that apparently played a key role in the administrative
system did not necessarily have to be walled. It is possible that Judeideh was unwalled
because it was no longer directly on the Judean border in the days of Hezekiah, and
because of the site’s difficult natural topography. At the same time, Judeideh is located in
82
Vaughn (1999: 142, n.214) also notes the uncertainty surrounding the number of lmlk impressions
recovered by Bliss and Macalister as it was clear from Gezer that Macalister did not have a penchant for
keeping an accurate count of the lmlk impressions recovered.
98
a very strategic location on the summit of the north-south ridge that separates the eastern
half of the Shephelah from the western half. The site would have aided in the passing of
signals from north to south as it has visual communication capabilities with Tel es-
Safi/Gath in the north and Lachish in the south. An unfortified site of such strategic
importance would have been a major oversight in Hezekiah’s defensive planning (more
so than leaving Beth Shemesh unfortified because Judeideh’s communicative potential
was far greater).
Regardless of whether or not future excavations prove the site to have been
walled in the Iron Age, Bliss’ excavations indicate that at least a portion of the site was
destroyed at the end of the eighth century. A substantial destruction layer was found in
Pit 4 in a layer that Gibson (1994: 201) refers to as the “upper phase” of the Iron IIB
(Bliss’ “Jewish Period”). Multiple lmlk impressions were found in this “upper” phase
while none were found in the “lower” phase of the Iron IIB. At the same, however, no
destruction was recorded in the similar “upper” Iron IIB phase in Pit 5; thus, the extent of
the site’s destruction is unclear.
C. Fortresses
i. Azekah. While interpretation of this site is difficult due to the fact that it was
excavated before modern methodological standards had been established, it does appear
that the Iron IIB-C site was, at its center, a rectangular fortress with six towers. Fortresses
of similar design are also known from Kadesh Barnea83, Kuntillet ‘Ajrud, and Rasm ed-
Daba (see below) though exact dates for the construction and habitation at all but
83
The pertinent fortress at Kadesh Barnea—Str. 3—actually has eight towers instead of six.
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Kuntillet ‘Ajrud is difficult to delineate; radiocarbon dates and ceramic analysis date
Kuntillet ‘Ajrud to the beginning/first half of the eighth century. Ceramics from Azekah
and Rasm ed-Daba are more difficult to date due to the early excavation methods and the
lack of excavations, respectively. The fortress of Str. 3 at Kadesh Barnea, though
formally similar to the other fortresses, is dated to the second half of the eighth century.
As such, it would be the latest of the fortresses, however, Cohen and Bernick-Greenberg
(2007: 12) note that, “neither its beginning nor its end can be dated with better precision”
and the attribution to the second-half of the eighth century is based on an “impression”
that the excavators have; the ceramics of Str. 3 have similarities to Lachish III, Beersheba
II, and Arad X-VIII, but they also share similarities with the ceramics of the earlier Str. 4
fortress at Kadesh Barnea that is dated to the tenth century. A date earlier in the eighth
century, therefore, is possible and even likely when the historical events of the eighth
century are considered. Judean presence in the southern wilderness is more feasible
before Assyria arrived in the 730s and is most likely during the reign of Uzziah when
relations with the northern kingdom of Israel were amicable (as suggested at the least by
the evidence from Kuntillet ‘Ajrud and also 2 Chr 26:10).84
Even though the fortress at Azekah was likely constructed early in the eighth
century, it appears to have undergone multiple stages of reparation. The pertinent data for
the present study comes from what Bliss referred to as the “Jewish Period,” which was
84
Recent excavations at the site of Tell el-Kheliefeh, near the Red Sea, show that Edom controlled the area
through the help of the Assyrians in the days of Sargon II (Avner 2008: 1707–1708). Additionally, sites
south of Tel Aroer in the southern wilderness (Kuntillet ‘Ajrud, Kadesh Barnea) or in the Arabah (En
Hazeva, Tell el-Kheleifeh) appear to have been outside of Judean control during the time of Hezekiah. The
use and provisioning of such sites would have put too much of an economic burden on the state due to their
distance from Judah, and the control of these sites would have offered no strategic advantage against the
Assyrians.
100
dated from c. 800-300 BC, and was further divided into four phases, labeled Periods A
through D. Lmlk impressions were uncovered in remains from both Periods B and C
which has led Stern (1993: 124) in his reassessment of Bliss’ work to date the
construction of the fortress at Azekah to the end of the eighth century. What exactly is
meant by “the end of the eighth century” is unclear; it is better to speak of a date in the
mid- to second-half of the eighth century, particularly if similarities in form to the other
fortresses mentioned above suggest contemporaneity. While occupation levels can be
attributed to Hezekiah’s period based on the presence of lmlk impressions, the date of the
fortress’s construction can only be confirmed with further excavations.
The fortress sits atop the northern extent of the north-south ridge that divides the
Shephelah. From its location it guards access to the Elah Valley and can relay signals
from the Coastal Plain (from Tell es-Safi/Gath) into the Judean Mountains at either Kh.
Abu et-Twein or Kh. Judur/Gedor on a clear day. It also has visible communication with
closer sites such as Tell esh-Shuweikah, Tel Beida, and Rasm ed-Daba. Further, it may
have been possible to see Tell ej-Judeideh from Azekah depending on the height of the
structures at the sites.85
Azekah’s strategic potential and the imposing topography upon which it was
located made it a formidable defensive site. One Assyrian monarch, likely Sennacherib,
refers to Azekah stating,
“in the city of Azaqa his stronghold, which is situated in the mid[st of the
mountains…] located on a mountain ridge like a pointed dagger […] [it was made
85
From the vantage point of the surface, the two cannot see each other as Rahmani (1964: 213) points out.
However, Begin (2000: 136–137, Ill. 62) shows that visual communication is possible with a structure that
is roughly 10 m in height at one of the sites.
101
like an eagle’s] nest and rivaled the highest mountains and was inac[cessible…]
[…even for siege ra]mps and for approaching with battering rams, it was [too]
strong…” (COS 2.119D).86
Additionally, Lachish Letter 4 and Jer 34:7 attest to Azekah’s strategic importance, as
Azekah is one of the last two sites (the other being Lachish) holding out against the
Babylonians.
ii. Kh. el-Abhar. Very little is known about the nature of the site, though its
importance cannot be overestimated. Abhar’s attribution as a fortress is based on the
description given by Mazar (1982: 107) and the site’s strategic location at the confluence
of three routes ascending into the Central Hill Country. No other location in the western
ascents to the Central Hill Country was so important; the northernmost and southernmost
of the three convergent routes were likely to be used by militaries as they progressed
from the broad Sorek and Elah Valleys, respectively.
Based on surveys conducted by Mazar in the 1980s and Bahat and Shiloh in the
1960s, the latter of which is unpublished, the site includes, “a large group of ruined stone
buildings; one of which is larger than the others and thus might have been a fortress”
(Mazar 1982: 107). Iron age ceramics were abundant and an illegible two-winged lmlk
impression was found.
iii. H. Tivnah (NH185). Tivnah sits about midway up the southernmost ascent
from the Elah Valley to Kh. el-Abhar. Such a location is similar to that of the proposed
fortress at Beit ‘Itab (see below), which is along the route from the Sorek Valley to Kh.
86
Na‘aman (1974), whose interpretation is the more widely accepted, argues that this “letter to god” should
be attributed to Sennacherib while Tadmor (1958) attributes it to Sargon II in 712 BC.
102
el-Abhar. Though Tivnah’s location does not allow for direct communication with Kh. el-
Abhar, it is likely situated where it is because the ascent into the Hill Country becomes
wider at that point. The design of this fortress is unlike that of the others in that it is
roughly square with one tower along the middle of the southern wall and one
reconstructed tower along the eastern wall (Weiss, et al. 2004: 93, Ill. 185). The location
of the southern tower may not appear important at first glance, as it is possible to see Kh.
Abu et-Twein to the southeast, Kh. Darbon in the north, and Tell el-Beida to the
southwest (on a clear day) from anywhere in the fortress. However, the location of the
southern tower—if, as was likely, it was built to around 10 m in height (see Begin 2000:
132)—allows an important visual communication line to be established between Tivnah
and Tell esh-Shuweiqah (Socoh); a line that is not possible in the rest of the fortress
because of the northward up-slope of the terrain just west of the site.
iv. Rasm ed-Daba. As with Azekah, precise dates for Rasm ed-Daba are difficult
to establish as the site was only surveyed. Rahmani (1964: 212, 214) dates this structure
from the ninth century to 701 BC based on ceramics and suggests that it was constructed
as early as king Asa or perhaps by Uzziah. This fortress has visual contact with Tell ej-
Judeideh, Azekah, and H. el-Beida, and likely served as a fortified signal station capable
of relaying signals between Judeideh and Azekah as noted by Rahmani (1964: 213). It
also overlooked the important north-south route that linked Azekah with Mareshah and
Lachish.
The sunken location of this fortress in comparison to the terrain to both the west
and east precluded any viable communication potential in those directions. It is situated,
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however, in a perfect location for north-south communication as there is a natural fault
just east of the Azekah-Tell ej-Judeideh ridge and Rasm ed-Daba is located just east of
and overlooking that fault about midway between Azekah and Judeideh.
D. Watchtowers
Though it is difficult to determine if the architectural remains at each of these
sites date to the Iron IIB/C period, their location on the tops of hills that were otherwise
uninhabited suggests that they served as lookout towers. When it is considered that each
also sat overlooking a key route, their identification as towers becomes even more solid.
i. Tell el-Kokah (GP242). This site is a likely tower just to the southeast of
Yalu/Aijalon at a higher elevation. It was closely related to Aijalon and served as a
lookout tower with good views to the west down the Aijalon Valley and to Shaalbim, and
to the east to H. Eres.
ii. Deir Baghl (Y28). Kochavi surveyed this one-building site labeling it as a
“fortress,” a term adopted by Mazar (1982: 105) as well. However, the site is not on any
main road and is at the end of a remote ridge. These factors suggest that the site was
important more for communication reasons than active defense. Its communication
function, however, appears to be rather limited and precise. While the site has a good
view towards the Shephelah, it does not have the same range of sight as Kh. Abu et-
Twein just to the south or as Kh. el-Abhar to the north. Its presence would seem
redundant if it was meant to receive signals from the Shephelah. However, its location
approximately midway between Kh. el-Abhar and Kh. Abu et-Twein allowed for signals
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to be passed between those two sites at times of inclement weather when the normally
clear line of sight they shared would not have been possible.
iii. Kh. Abu et-Twein. This site, which is composed of a large building (31 x 29.5
m) and a small associated village near the foot of the site, is approximately 4 km south of
Deir Baghl on an even more secluded hilltop. This site is also referred to as a “fortress”
by Mazar (1982), though as with Deir Baghl, from a defensive-functional perspective, it
is classified here as a tower. Kh. Abut et-Twein was doubtless the most strategic tower in
the western ascents into the Central Hill Country as attested to by the length of its
occupation (ninth/eighth to fifth centuries) and its communication potential. The western
view from Kh. Abu et-Twein is unhindered like the views of the other towers and
fortresses in the western ascents. This fact, combined with the great difference in
elevation between et-Twein’s location and the sites in the Shephelah allowed for views as
far west as Lachish and Azekah. And in the north, the fortress at Tivnah and Kh. el-
Abhar are visible, which meant that Kh. Abu et-Twein was instrumental for passing
signals from the southern Shephelah further north.
iv. Nahal Guvrin (A56).87 A square structure located on a hilltop overlooked the
route coming up the Nahal Guvrin. This site has a good view to the east and south to
Idna, and was near a crossroads between the east-west road running up the Nahal Guvrin
to Hebron and the north-south route from Keilah down to Tell Beit Mirsim (the route ran
87
Israel Antiquities Authority policy concerning unnamed sites is to name the site after the nearest major
geographic feature. If multiple remains are near the same feature a number in brackets is listed after the
feature name (e.g., “Nahal Guvrin [8]” is the eighth unnamed site near the Nahal Guvrin).
105
along the western edge of the Judean mountains, separating them from the eastern
Shephelah). Ceramics similar to Lachish III were recovered.
v. Rujm el Qas‘a (A664.1). Iron IIB sherds were collected over ca. 0.2 ha, though
later periods appear to be more extensive at this site. There is a ca. 10 x 10 m “fortress”
(Dagan 2006b: 136*) with an adjacent courtyard (ca. 20 x 35 m) on a hill that overlooks
the north-south road from Kh. Beit Maqdum/Makkedah to Tel ‘Eton; subsequently, both
sites are also visible from Rujm el Qas‘a. The location of Rujm el Qas‘a suggests that the
site was equally suited for communication and defensive purposes as it could
communicate, in addition to Tel ‘Eton in the southwest, at least as far north as Idna and
east up to Fuqeiqis, which was on the road running up into the Hill Country from ‘Eton to
Adoraim.
The surviving 10 x 10 m structure at Rujm el Qas‘a is likely Roman in date, as
that is the most abundantly represented period from survey. Just down the slope to the
northwest, however (Site A671), there are remains of three buildings with Iron II
ceramics, so it is likely that a tower stood at Rujm el Qas‘a in the Iron II.
Similarly, the site on Jebel Duweimar (A761), approximately one kilometer to the
southwest of Rujm el Qas‘a, was used during the Iron II and Roman periods and may
have functioned in relation to the rujm. 88 Both sites were situated at locations that
overlooked the same crossroads and both shared similar strategic value. Though the
structure at Jebel Duweimar was slightly larger (1.2 m wide walls; ca. 22 x 22 m) than
the central structure at Rujm el Qas‘a, the latter had a greater range of visibility.
88
One four-winged lmlk impression was found just southwest of the structure on Jebel Duweimar (at site
A763).
106
Based on survey results, the density of settlement in the southeastern Shephelah
was so dense that inter-site communication would not have been a problem; however,
determining which site(s), if any served as towers in the defense of Judah becomes far
more difficult to determine because so many of the sites share similar strategic potential.
vi. Wadi Umm Hadwa (A784). There are remains of a square structure (ca. 10 x
10 m) on an exposed hilltop with a commanding view to the west. Rough-hewn stones
are preserved up to four courses (1 m) high. Clear views to Tel ‘Eton and Amazya are
possible as is an overview of the north-south road from Idna to Tell Beit Mirsim. Further,
the structure is located just north of the east-west road that connects Tel ‘Eton and
Adoraim. Iron IIB sherds (and Roman sherds) were collected from this site and a few
additional buildings and a winepress were surveyed nearby.
E. Unassignable
The lack of excavations at most of the following sites precludes any clear
classification even in instances where the sites are mentioned in ancient texts as one type
of site or the other. It was thought that caution should be used in their classification as,
again, the equation between ancient terms and modern archaeological sites is not always
clear.
i. Shaalbim (FIR Site 117). Iron II ceramics have been picked up at this site, but
no specific dates or details about the settlement are presented. A later synagogue was
excavated.
ii. Musa Tali’a. This is a small site south-southeast of Gezer that likely served as
an outpost for Gezer (Dever, et al. 1970: 1; Macalister 1912: 365–367). Though
107
Macalister only found Byzantine or later remains, Dever suggests that the strategic
location likely supported some outpost in the Bronze and Iron ages because from Musa
Tali’a’s vantage point it was possible to see to the south and southwest, something not
possible from Gezer itself.
iii. Yalu/Aijalon (GP241). It is unclear what the nature of the site was in the Iron
IIB/C as it is below a more recent Arab village. According to 2 Chr 11:5-12, however, it
was one of the fortified cities of Rehoboam. However, if that list is to be dated to the
reign of Hezekiah as suggested by Na‘aman (1979), then Aijalon would appear to be a
city at that time. Excavations of the later, Medieval remains were conducted (Fischer, et
al. 1996: 253), but the only evidence of earlier Iron Age remains are the descriptions
given by Abel (1938: ii., p.240f.) and the survey results of Gophna and Porat (1972: 236).
Aijalon was important because it overlooked the entire Aijalon Valley, was located near
abundant springs, and guarded the roads to Jerusalem via the Beth-Horons and Kiriath-
Jearim.
iv. Deir el-Azhar (Kiriath-Jearim). Iron Age pottery and a possible Iron Age tomb
have been found at the site, but most of the remains are later (de Vaux and Steve 1950;
Fischer, et al. 1996: 118f.). The size and nature of the Iron Age settlement is unclear.
v. Qastal (FIR104). Unfortunately, the dates for this site are unknown due its
destruction during the Israeli War of Independence in 1948-1949 (Fischer, et al. 1996:
235). Its location on a prominent mount overlooking the road from Kiriath-Jearim to
Jerusalem, however, would provide a strategic observation and defensive point.
108
vi. Zorah. The ceramics found during a survey of the site date predominantly to
the Iron IIC (eighth-sixth centuries), though some earlier Iron IIA-B sherds were
recovered. A very overgrown city wall, whose date is unknown, is also visible on the
surface (Lehmann, et al. 1996: 363ff.). This wall, in conjunction with Zorah’s inclusion
as one of Rehoboam’s fortified cities in 2 Chr 11:10 lend strong support to the
identification of this site as a city. The amount of overgrowth, however, has greatly
hindered further exploration of this site.
Zorah served an important role in Judah’s communication system as it allowed for
signals from Beth Shemesh to be passed further into the Hill Country via Zanoah and
Beit ‘Itab; without Zorah, communications from Beth Shemesh into Judah would have
been far more difficult, if possible at all due to the higher hills just east of Beth Shemesh.
Further, if the city wall is to be dated to the Iron Age, Zorah would have been a
substantial defensive site with a strong topographical advantage at that time.
vii. Ishwa‘ (Eshtaol). Surveys of this site have recovered few Iron Age ceramics,
though a two-winged lmlk handle was found (Kuschke 1971: 300); most of the ceramics
are more recent in date (Lehmann, et al. 1996: 354). Much of the site is built over by the
modern moshav but some earlier wall foundations are visible under the present
Synagogue (Lehmann, et al. 1996: 353). Eshtaol was situated just west of the main north-
south road that ran along the chalk moat delineating the Shephelah from the Central Hill
Country.
viii. Har Etan A. This site, located on a hilltop north of the Sorek Valley,
“consists of three watchtowers, a quarry, cisterns and cultivation terraces, dated to the
109
MB IIB and the Iron Age” (Solimany and Weiss 1995: 104). Whether one or more of the
watchtowers is/are, in fact, Iron Age and not MB is unclear. From this site, a clear view
south to Kh. el-Abhar is possible as is a view to the site at Qiryat Ha-Yovel (K[101]162)
to the east.
ix. Qiryat Ha-Yovel (K[101]162). Because the ridge upon which Qiryat Ha-Yovel
sits is at a greater elevation than the Jerusalem area, any communications from the west
would either need to be diverted around the ridge or go over it. Since this is the only site
in its vicinity that would allow for communications over the ridge, it is suggested that
Qiryat Ha-Yovel functioned as a tower in the Iron Age. Though no datable finds were
recovered at this site, which is comprised of ruined walls and cairns, its location provides
a useful link for relaying signals from Har Etan A and Qastal to Ramat Rahel.
x. Beit ‘Itab (NH67). A later Crusader or Ottoman building covers much of the
site, but Iron II ceramics were recovered. The site is located on the ancient road from
Beth-Shemesh to the Kh. el-Abhar crossroads and served as an important communication
point and likely defensive tower. There is a commanding view of the Elah Valley from
Beit ‘Itab, and although Beth Shemesh itself cannot be seen from Beit ‘Itab, signals from
Beth Shemesh could be relayed to Zorah, then to Zanoah, to Beit ‘Itab, and on to Kh. el-
Abhar.
xi. H. Zanoah (NH86). This is a site on a hilltop with good views in every
direction except the south and southwest. To the north, Zorah can be seen; to the
northeast, Beit ‘Itab; to the southeast, Har Hanot (see below). The site covers ca. 10.0 ha,
though the period in which it reached such a size is not clear from the survey. It was
110
likely a village and allowed for communications to be passed from the Sorek Valley to
sites in the western ascents to Judah.
xii. Kh. esh Sheikh Sad (S) northeast (NH148). Remains of a building (ca. 20 x 30
m) are located on the northern part of the summit of a prominent hill (444 m asl). No
pottery was recovered from the survey, but from its location, the site has visual contact
with Zorah in the north, an overview of much of the chalk trough that runs north-south,
and views of the eastern half of the Elah Valley even unto Adullam in the south. The
location of this site suggests it served a major role in north-south Judean communications
in the eastern Shephelah.
xiii. Har Hanot (NH131). Wall segments, remains of watch-booths, and stone
fences were surveyed on a summit (650 m). No pottery was recovered, but this location
would make a good location for a tower and would fit the pattern observed along the
other roads that ascend from the Shephelah to Kh. el-Abhar where towers/fortresses (Beit
‘Itab and H. Tivnah) were constructed midway between the beginning of the ascents and
Kh. el-Abhar. Of the three towers/fortresses, Har Hanot has the most expansive view of
the Shephelah, from Keilah in the south to Zorah in the north (including Adullam, Socoh,
and Azekah).
xiv. Har Sansan (NH170). This site is possibly a farmhouse that functioned as a
relay tower. It is ca. 12 x 12 m with two main rooms, a smaller room in the northeast
corner (4 x 4 m), and a protruding room on the northwest. Nearby, remains of a watch-
booth, terraces, and a winepress were found. The importance of this site on Har Sansan is
that it has visual communication with the tower at Har Hanot and the fortress at Kh. el-
111
Abhar and would provide yet another possible communication line between the
Shephelah and the Central Hill Country.
xv. Tell esh-Shuweiqah (Socoh). Within eyesight of Azekah and located to the
east was the impressive site of Tell esh-Shuweiqah, accepted by most scholars to be
ancient Socoh. Unfortunately, this site has not been excavated, though the remains of
monumental walls and buildings are visible on the surface. If this site is in fact ancient
Socoh and is the Socoh of the lmlk impressions then it becomes clear why this site was so
important. It is well protected by surrounding sites, has a defensible position, and is
located in the center of the fertile Elah Valley. It is a much more economically strategic
site than Lachish and this may be why the lmlk impressions mention swkh and not
Lachish (see Chapter Five for more on this).
xvi. Kh. esh-Sheik Madkur (Adullam). Adullam was likely an important city
throughout the Iron Age, however, no excavations have been conducted at the site. Many
large walls are visible on the surface and at least one lmlk impression has been recovered
from the site (Vaughn 1999: 196), which is located on a ridge just west of the chalk moat
route. The site is mentioned in 2 Chr 11:7 as one of Rehoboam’s fortified cities and is
one of the sites denounced by Micah (1:15).
xvii. Tel Beida. No exploration has been conducted at this notable site either. It is
a small but prominent tell situated just south of the ancient road that ran from Gath to
Beth-zur. It has visual communication with Azekah and a clear view to the east, though it
112
is unclear with which sites it would have communicated in that direction as neither
Adullam nor Keilah are visible.89
xviii. H. Qeyleh (Keilah; Y70). A large site (ca. 5.0 ha) was surveyed by Kochavi,
who recorded walls, but little else is known about the nature and precise dating of this
site. The pottery is “Iron Age” but no phases are given; it is likely that the site was
inhabited throughout the Iron Age. H. Qeyleh sits on the north-south road that follows the
chalk trough. This route runs from Aijalon to Keilah before fragmenting into multiple
branches, one of which proceeds to Tell Beit Mirsim and on to Beersheba. About mid-
way between Keilah and Adullam is a crossroad that runs from Tel el-Beida to Beth-zur.
Kochavi noted remains of a possible gate and [city?] walls (Kochavi 1972b: 48).
xix. Kh. er Resm (D25). A likely tower on a spur that offered a view of the ancient
road coming from Tel ‘Erani. Signals could be passed from Kh. er Resm south to Lachish
as the latter site could not see the road itself and would have had no early warning if
‘Erani did not send a signal.
xx. Horvat Bet ‘Elem [1] (Achzib?; A26). This site is a possible village that has a
view west to Maresha and southeast to Idna. Iron II ceramics were recovered over an area
of ca. 6.0 ha, but most of the Iron Age structures have been dismantled and used in more
recent construction work (Dagan 2006a: 82*).
xxi. Horvat Bet ‘Elem [3] (A29). Another possible village or tower. There were at
least four structures, most of which were robbed for the later agricultural terrace walls on
the hill. One building (ca. 6 x 8 m) was well built with a double row of ashlars at its
89
With high towers at both Beida and Adullam visual communication might have been possible.
113
corners. Wine presses and collecting vats were nearby, as was an oil press and a cistern
(Dagan 2006:86*). Lachish III-II ceramics were recovered from the buildings, over an
area of ca. 1.0 ha. This site allows for good north-south visibility, from Bet ‘Elem [1] to
Amazya in the south, and to Idna in the east.
xxii. Horvat Bet Loya (A103). The nature of the settlement is unclear because it is
mostly covered with medieval buildings, though Iron II pottery was recovered over an
area of ca. 1.0 ha. The site sits on a hill with an almost 360 degree view. Maresha can be
seen in the northwest and Amaziah/Migdal-Gad in the south. Iron II tomb inscriptions
were found at the nearby site A195.
xxiii. Amazya (Migdal-Gad?; A318.1). This very strategic site was probably a
village or tower during the Iron II. Only scanty eighth century remains were recovered
due to the continued occupation of this site, though. Abel proposed equating the site with
Bozkath mentioned in Josh 15:39, however, Dagan has more recently identified Amazya
with Migdal-Gad, a more likely association. The site’s location near a crossroads in the
upper Nahal Lachish, which provides visual contact with Lachish, H. Bet Loya, and as far
east as Kh. el Qom, Kh. Beit Maqdum, and the tower overlooking the Wadi Umm Hadwa
(A784) lends credence to Dagan’s identification as such strategic potential is typical of
migdal sites.
xxiv. Kh. Beit Maqdum (Makkedah?; A405; Y136). Much of this site is either
built over or used as agricultural land now, though Iron Age ceramics were recovered
during both surveys of the site (Dagan 2006b: 38*–39*; Kochavi 1972b: 60). Based on
the modern toponym and geographical setting, the equation with biblical Makkedah
114
seems solid (Dorsey 1980). Note also the nearby site A356.1, which may be the remains
of a farmhouse set on a hill of higher elevation than the rest of the settlement, allowing
visual contact with Idna.
xxv. Kh. Firjas (A396.1). A 1.2 m thick wall surrounds this 3.5 ha site. While
Firjas may have been a city, the fact that the wall is only 1.2 m wide is more suggestive
of a retaining wall, in which case the nature of Firjas is ambiguous. Further, it is unclear
whether this wall even dates to the Iron II even though many Lachish IV-II ceramic
parallels were found. The site is just west of Kh. el-Qom and has a good view over much
of the Shephelah (Firjas is not labeled on Map 3).
xxvi. Tel Haraqim (D280). This site is a small settlement with a square structure
(15 x 15 m) of unclear date. Lachish style ceramics of levels V-II were recovered from
the site, which could communicate with both D291 and D348 to the east. This site was
located on the western extent of the Nahal Adorayim just south of the junction of roads
from Amazya (Migdal-Gad) and Lachish. From there the roads continued on to the region
of Tel Najila.
xxvii. Nahal Adorayim (D291). Presumably this site was a tower with a good view
over the western Shephelah. The site could communicate with Lachish, Tel Haraqim, and
D348, and it overlooked the secondary road between Amazya (Migdal-Gad) and Tel
Haraqim.
xxviii. Kh. Umm el-Baqar (D249). This site is a possible tower in the western
Shephelah, though whether it is Iron Age or should even be attributed to Judah is unclear.
115
The location of this structure so far west90 made it very vulnerable though it could
communicate with D348 (see below) if that structure were, in fact, Iron Age in date.
xxix. Nahal Adorayim (D348). A likely tower in the Shephelah just south of the
Nahal Adorayim and on the summit of a prominent hill. From this location
communication to the north, west, and east was possible, with visual communication
possible with Umm el-Baqar, Tel Haraqim, D291, and Kh. Raia.
xxx. Kh. et-Taiyiba (Y115). Though much modern agricultural work has damaged
this site there are still multiple building remains, and much “Israelite” pottery was
gathered during a survey of the site (Kochavi 1972b: 57). This site is located on one of
the secondary routes through the western approaches of the Judean Hills and has been
identified with Beth-leaphrah, though see recently Suriano (2010), who identifies that site
with Tel ‘Erani. Kh. et-Taiyiba has a commanding view to the north (to Keilah), west (in
particular to Idna), and south.
xxxi. Tafuh (Beth-Tappuah; Y133). A modern Arab village is built over and
reuses the ancient remains of this site. Tafuh is located on the main route between Idna
and Hebron and could have received signals from the former site before passing them on
to the site of Adoraim to the southwest.91
xxxii. Kh. Beit ‘Awwa (A572). This settlement of ca. 4.0 ha is largely destroyed by
modern agricultural work. Some buildings, however, are preserved up to four courses and
a 3 m wide wall that may have been a city wall surrounds the hill, though it is unclear to
90
It is not depicted on Map 3.
91
The benefit or importance of such a route, however, is not apparent.
116
which period it dates. While there were “numerous” Lachish III-II ceramics recovered
from the survey, there were also numerous EBIV and Rom/Byz sherds collected (Dagan
2006b: 101*–102*). This site likely had visual contact with Adoraim and can see north to
Idna and west to Amazya (Migdal-Gad).
xxxiii. Kh. er Raia (A630). This is a ca. 3.5 ha site that has visual contact with
Amazya in the north and Tel ‘Eton in the southeast. There are many remains, some likely
from later periods at this extensive site.
xxxiv. Kh. Fuqeiqis (Y166). The NE corner of a possible tower (“fortress” in
Kochavi 1972b: 65) remains. This structure was largely destroyed by a modern building
but is recorded as 80 x 60 m and was preserved up to five courses in the NE corner. This
site is located on the main ascent to Adoraim and has a commanding view over the
eastern Shephelah, including a clear line of sight to Tel ‘Eton and Amazya/Migdal-Gad.
Its eastern view, however, is very limited. A second structure, also largely destroyed, is
located about 50 m west of the fortress. It covered a smaller area—22 x 17 m—and had
1.20 m thick walls. While Iron II pottery was the most common at Fuqeiqis, some
Ottoman pottery was recovered so the identification of the larger of the two buildings as
Iron Age is questionable.
In addition to the listed sites, a survey—which is unavailable—of the Beth
Shemesh area was conducted, stretching from Beth Shemesh south along the chalk moat
(passing T. Zanoah) to the Elah Valley and extending west until the Elah turns north. In
the west, the area was bound by the modern road between Zechariyah and Beth Shemesh.
117
There are 38 more Iron II (mostly 9th-8th c) settlements, 20 of which are farmsteads
according to Dagan (1995: 95).92
F. Regional Defense Assessment

The various western ascents into Judah were defended each according to the
difficulty of the terrain. Only a couple of the ascents were likely to be used by an
invading army; those of Beth-Horon and Kh. el-Abhar. And it is these routes that were
the best protected. The Beth-Horon ascent was the shortest into the Central Hill Country
as the wide Aijalon Valley penetrates further east than do the valleys further south. This
ascent was protected by Gezer on the west, Gibeon in the east, and the two Beth-Horons
along the ascent itself. Communication concerning an enemy advancing along this path
could be passed from Gezer to UBH and from there a signal could be relayed to Kh. Badd
Abu Mu’ammar (see below), then Nebi Samwil, “French Hill” or “U.N. Hill,” and finally
Jerusalem.
Even though there was a route linking Gezer to Jerusalem via Kiriath-Jearim and
Mozah, this route would not have been used by any invading force. The initial ascent to
Kiriath-Jearim would have been fairly easy for an army, however, between Kiriath-
Jearim and Jerusalem the route made multiple steep ascents and crossed the deeply
eroded Sorek Valley. This rugged terrain served as a natural border and is also likely the
reason that there are no cities along this route. In fact, the entire area west of Jerusalem
was so formidable from a geographic perspective because of the Sorek and Chesalon
92
The first volume of the Beth Shemesh Survey appeared as I was preparing to file the dissertation (Dagan
2011). While there was not time to fully integrate the findings from that survey, sites 171 (H. Zanoah), 205
(Kh. el‘Alya), 326 (Kh. Umm edh-Dhiyab), 349 (Nahal ha-Ela [32]), and four farmsteads with lmlk
impressions stood out as eighth century sites.
118
canyons, that there are neither cities nor highways there. It may be that the ruggedness of
the terrain was part of the reason that Sennacherib proceeded to attack cities further to the
south in the Shephelah instead of moving towards Jerusalem.
South of the Nahal Sorek, Kh. el-Abhar sat at the confluence of multiple routes
from the Sorek and Elah Valleys. Before an enemy could even reach these ascents, they
needed to pass through the multiple waves of defense in the Shephelah. If successful, the
enemy would face fortresses midway up the ascents to Kh. el-Abhar. The site of Beit Itab
offered additional protection against invasion from the region of Beth Shemesh, and the
fortress at Kh. et-Tibnah guarded the approach from Azekah and Socoh. From Kh. el-
Abhar the routes split again with one proceeding up the Emeq Rephaim, and the other
around the south side of the Beit Jala Ridge. Ramat Rahel would have been the last line
of defense before Jerusalem was reached.
Communication between the Shephelah and Jerusalem along these routes appears
to be more circuitous than that along the Beth Horon Ascent. From Beth Shemesh a
signal would proceed to Zorah, Zanoah, Beit Itab, Kh. el-Abhar, and Rujm el-Barish.
From Rujm el-Barish a signal could be relayed to Ramat Rahel or the Mt. of Olives. For
the route from the Elah Valley, signals could be sent from either Azekah or Socoh to Kh.
Abu et-Twein, then to Kh. el-Abhar. The more rugged ascents that meet the Central Hill
Country at Mozah, Beth-Zur, Hebron, and Adoraim appear to be less well-defended no
doubt due to the topographical difficulties of those ascents.
While the natural topographic difficulty of the ascents into the Central Judean Hill
Country were deterrent enough for most enemies, Hezekiah realized the military might of
119
the Assyrians and took added precautions while preparing for his rebellion. It appears that
under Hezekiah, Judah was able to expand its western border into the Philistine Coastal
Plain and establish strong points at the heads of many of the larger wadi systems. The
line of sites, Gezer—Tel Batash/Tel Miqne—Tell es-Safi—Tel el-Areini, show evidence
of Judean presence if not overt control based on the number of lmlk impressions found at
each site and the presence of Judean-style ceramics. This archaeological picture is
corroborated by multiple textual references as well. 2 Kgs 18:8 states that Hezekiah
“struck down the Philistines as far as Gaza and its territory, from watchtower to fortified
city.” 1 Chr 4:39-43 records the westward expansion of the Simeonites to Gerar (T.
Haror) suggesting that Judah controlled the entire western Negev.93 Sennacherib’s annals
add that the residents of Ekron had, “thrown Padi, their king…into iron fetters and
handed him over in a hostile manner to Hezekiah” (COS 2.119B).
Control of these sites on the very western extent of the Shephelah and Negev is
very difficult for a highland entity and rarely occurs throughout Judean history. The
typical line of Judean control appears to be in the central Shephelah along the line, Beth-
Shemesh—Azekah—Tel ej-Judeideh—Maresha—Lachish. However, with the expansion
came an increase in the amount of productive agricultural land under Judah’s control, and
it also created a double, and sometimes triple, defensive line through the main valleys.
Further, such a westward expansion suggests that Hezekiah was, 1) quite powerful and
influential, and/or 2) that he had alliances with the Philistines and was allowed to station
troops in their cities in preparation for Sennacherib’s campaign (e.g., Ekron). On a site-
93
Following the LXX reading of “Gerar” instead of the MT reading “Gedor”.
120
by-site analysis one or the other of these options seems favorable, however, when a
regional assessment is made in conjunction with the historical setting of the day, it
becomes much more likely that both statements about Hezekiah reflect the actual reality.
Concerning communications, the low rolling hills of the Shephelah offered an
extensive visual communication network. However, specific sites such as Gezer, Azekah,
Kh. Abu et-Twein, and Amazya (Migdal-Gad), were main hubs within this network.
These sites were strategic not only because they were strong points located on key routes
(except Kh. Abu et-Twein) through the Shephelah, but also because they could relay
signals into the Judean Hill Country in the event of an attack.
2. The South: the Negev

The Negev94 is the largest district in Judah in regards to area (highlighted on Map
4). It extends from east of Arad to Tell Abu Hureira/Haror in the west, and from the
southern end of the Judean Hill Country to the modern Negev Highlands in the south.
The Negev is a basin surrounded by Eocene and Senonian limestones, which when
weathered, do not make the most productive soils. Only a narrow finger of the harder
Cenomanian limestone intrudes into the Negev from the north, splitting the basin in half.
It is upon the southern tip of this finger that the key site of Tel ‘Ira is located.
Despite its overall area and the fact that the main east-west trade route in the
southern Levant ran through it, there were few major settlements in the Negev. This east-
west route ran from Gaza in the Philistine Coastal Plain to Beersheba. From Beersheba
two routes continued east, one north of the Nahal Beersheba, and the other south of it.
94
The term “Negev” refers to the biblical region of the Negev and not the modern region, which includes a
much larger area stretching to the south.
121
The northern route continued east to Tel Malhata before splitting again, with one route
descending towards the southern end of the Dead Sea via either the later site of Horvat
‘Uza or the site at Zohar (see Wilderness map) and the other ascending north towards the
fortress at Arad.
The southern route from Beersheba proceeded east to Aroer where it then turned
south and weaved through the rugged, faulted territory of the Southern Highlands,
including the Maqteshim and the Wilderness of Zin. The route traveled the Ma’aleh
Aqrabbim (the “Ascent of the Scorpions”) before exiting into the Arabah south of the
Dead Sea at the site of Mezad Hazeva. These routes facilitated the lucrative spice trade
between Arabia and the Philistine Coastal Plain and beyond, out into the Mediterranean
Sea.
From the Negev two main routes also ascended northward into the Hill Country
of Judah, one at the west end of the basin and one at the east end. The western route
ascended the Nahal Yattir past Tel Shoqet and Kh. Tatrit towards the site of Khirbet
Rabud/Debir and Hebron, while the eastern route proceeded past the fortress at Arad
before reaching Kerioth and climbing to Metzudat Yehuda, and ultimately Hebron. It
appears that the protection of these and the east-west routes, and not the exploitation of
natural resources was the motivating factor for the location of sites in the Negev.95
95
The Negev was on the fringe between the fertile hill country and the arid wilderness further south; it had
no major resources to be exploited. Mixed pastoralism and cultivated agriculture were practiced there.
122
Map 4. The Negev with lines of sight.
A. Cities
i. Beersheba (Tell es Saba). Beersheba sits at the confluence of the Nahalot
Beersheba and Yattir. It had a casemate wall, four-chambered gate, monumental water
system, three storehouses, and two mansion-sized houses (the “Governor’s Palace” and
the “Cellar House”); the pre-planned layout of Stratum II at Beersheba indicates that the
site clearly served an administrative purpose (Herzog 1992: 258ff.).96 Further, the
presence of imported cedar wood throughout the city suggests that construction of the site
96
The dearth of lmlk impressions, representative of governmental bureaucracy, is, therefore, odd. Only one
has been recovered from the site and it was on a pithos unlike the typical oval-shaped store jars. Vaughn
(1999: 194) records two lmlk impressions at Beersheba, citing Na’aman (1979: 75, n.37); however,
Na’aman never gives a number, but himself cites Aharoni (1973b: 76–77), who mentions only one lmlk
impression.
123
was under the aegis of the government, as common people would not have had access to
cedar wood for construction (see Liphschitz and Waisel 1973: 99, Fig. 91). The site is
located near a crossroads in the western Negev and has visual contact with Kh.
Sansannah to the north and Tel ‘Ira to the east (if towers ca. 10 m in height were
constructed at both sites, which is likely).
Beersheba’s location was no doubt selected not only for its accessibility to water,
but also for its ability to administer and/or tax the lucrative trade running between Arabia
and the coastal plain. Yet, Beersheba’s location did not provide it with great defensibility
nor did it mark the greatest strategic position in the Negev from a military perspective;
that position was at Tel ‘Ira.
ii. Tel ‘Ira (Ramoth-negev?). ‘Ira is located on a hill that is part of the
southernmost extension of the Hebron Hills. From its location it has visual contact with
the eastern Negev basin and could have communicated with Arad via Tel Malhata to the
southeast, and with Beersheba in the western Negev. Further, it has clear visibility to the
site of Aroer, which sits on the southern border of the Negev basin, and it can
communicate with the tower at Horvat Hur to the northwest and on a clear day can see to
the modern town of adh-Dhahiriye (Aharoni 1958: 37). Tel ‘Ira is another example of a
site whose location was determined apparently because of its communication potential
and not its potential for control of trade routes.
Tel ‘Ira is also a difficult site with which to deal because it is unclear which
stratum should be attributed to the time of Hezekiah. Str. VIII appears to be a smaller
unfortified settlement that was confined to the eastern half of the tel, while the Str. VII
124
settlement encompasses the entirety of the tel and is surrounded by a formidable
defensive system. The ceramics recovered from Str. VIII are identified as tenth-eighth
century forms while those from Str. VII appear to be intermediate between Lachish III
and II. Concerning the Str. VII ceramics, Beit-Arieh (1999: 176) writes,
“comparison of vessels from Stratum VII with those from Level III at Lachish and
Stratum II at Tel Beersheba, both destroyed by Sennaherib [sic] in 701 B.C.E,
further reveals that while several types of bowls, jars and cooking-pots occur at all
three sites, other types are found at Lachish and Beersheba but not at Tel ‘Ira.
However, several types of cooking-pots and jars which are more common at the
very end of the Iron Age at Lachish occur already in Stratum VII at Tel ‘Ira.”
Beit-Arieh then dates Stratum VII at ‘Ira to the very end of the eighth century or very
beginning of the seventh (1999: 176). That the beginning of Stratum VII should be dated
to the reign of Hezekiah is supported when both the site’s geographical location and the
presence of certain ceramic forms is considered.97
iii. Tel Malhata (Baalath-beer? Telaim?). This city sat directly on the northern
east-west trade route through the Negev. Not only could it guard this route, but also
ground water is easily accessible in the vicinity of Tel Malhata. Further, a tripartite
pillared building was uncovered that was in operation from the ninth-sixth centuries
(Kochavi 1993a: 935). The combination of location, available resources, and architecture
suggests that the site had more of an economic role than it did a military role. While the
Str. IV site was heavily protected with a 3.5m wide mudbrick wall and multiple towers,
these features were likely a result of the exposed location of the site.
97
There is a clear shift in ceramic forms between Stratum VII and VI at Tel ‘Ira. Forms from Stratum VI
include sack-shaped jars, rosette seal-impressed jars, cooking pots with flat everted rims and cooking pots
with a single ridged neck (Beit-Arieh 1999: 177; Freud 1999 for the more detailed discussion). These are
all forms that occur at Lachish II but not Lachish III.
125
iv. ‘Aroer. The lone city on the southern side of the Negev is at the site of ‘Aroer.
This well fortified site sat on the southern route through the Beersheba Basin, as it exited
the basin and headed toward the Arabah. This site had visual contact with Tel ‘Ira and
Tel Malhata and was the southernmost city in Hezekiah’s kingdom.
B. Villages
i. Bir es-Saba‘. Numerous soundings have been conducted under the modern city
of Beersheba, identified with Roman-Byzantine Berosaba and known in Arabic as Bir es-
Saba‘. Below the Roman-Byzantine remains scattered Iron Age remains between the
eleventh and eighth centuries have been found over an area of almost 10.0 ha (Gophna
and Yisraeli 1973: 115; Panitz-Cohen 2005). There is as of yet no evidence of any
fortifications for this settlement.
ii. Tel Shoqet (Beth-pelet?). The tell is unfortunately covered by a modern
Bedouin cemetery and cannot be excavated. During the survey of the site, however,
remains of walls were noted along the north side of the low tell, but no enclosing wall
was ascertained in the survey. It is suggested that Shoqet was a village in the eighth-
seventh century based on the architectural and ceramic remains identified at the site. To
the southeast, Shoqet has a line of sight to Horvat Hur, which itself can see further
southeast to Tel ‘Ira. Shoqet was apparently a small village that sat on the road from
Beersheba to Hebron. Further, from Shoqet the east-west route coming through the
Negev could head northwest towards Tel Halif.
iii. H. Yittan (Moladah?; NY162). South of Tel Shoqet the site of Horvat Yittan
sits exposed in the middle of the western Negev. Some architectural remains were noted,
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and numerous eighth century ceramics with good parallels to Tel ‘Ira VII, and some
forms in VI were recovered. Bowls, kraters, and holemouth jars were the dominant forms
(Govrin 1991: 107). The site’s location between the Nahalot Yattir and Moladah is
probably because water from the nahalot could be collected.
iv. Kh. Tatrit (Madmannah?; Y249). Kh. Tatrit is a substantial site that is located
just west of the Nahal Hebron on the border between the Negev and Judean Hill
Country.98 The site was originally surveyed by Kochavi and estimated at 7.0 ha, however,
a more recent survey by Lehmann (1995: 125) gives an estimate of over double that size
at 16.0 ha. Kochavi mentions that many foundations were visible but no definite outlines
of walls could be traced, and no city wall was identified. Tatrit is located on the road
from Beersheba to Hebron and has visual contact with H. Sansannah to the northwest and
the region of Socoh (Y229) in the NE (though it is doubtful that visual communication
was possible between the sites themselves).
C. Fortresses
i. Arad. The large fortress of Arad guarded the eastern approach from the Negev
into the Judean Hills and could relay signals from Tel Malhata to Metzudat Yehuda. The
issues surrounding the stratigraphy and dates of the Str. X-VIII fortresses at Arad were
discussed in Chapter Two above (especially note 24) and so will only be briefly
summarized here. Herzog (2002) dates all three levels of the fortress to the second half of
the eighth century based on the similarity of the ceramic forms from each stratum. While
no date for the beginning of Str. IX is offered, the elimination of the fortress’ temple at
98
The soils at this site are more similar to those of the Negev than they are to the Hill Country (Kochavi
1972b: 81).
127
the end of that stratum can be related to Hezekiah’s religious reforms mentioned in 2 Kgs
18:4.
The subsequent fortress of Str. VIII saw an increase in the amount of space for
storage of goods (Herzog 2002: 78–79). In addition to the tripartite building in the
northeast corner a second building of five rooms was constructed that likely served for
storing supplies. Consider also, that the space once occupied by the sanctuary of Str. X-
IX was now used for domestic structures and/or storage. It would appear that the fortress
of Str. VIII was stockpiling many supplies; supplies on a level that were not necessary in
the previous period. The increase in the amount of storage area even increased in Str. VII,
which suggests that following Sennacherib’s campaign the Edomites or others were an
even more present force, and defense of the southern border of Judah was more important
than ever.
D. Watchtowers
i. Horvat Hur (NY63). H. Hur sits on an elevated ridge that has a view over the
western Beersheba basin, and which has visual contact with the important site of Tel ‘Ira
to the southeast and Beersheba to the southwest. The survey of this site showed that most
of the remains on the surface were Byzantine, but some Iron II (eighth-seventh century)
bowl fragments were found. Govrin refers to two 6 x 6 m towers, one on each side of the
ancient road that traverses the site. Each was built of large stones, dry-built, and
preserved to a height of four courses (2 m). However, it is not possible to determine
whether these structures were Byzantine or of a greater antiquity.
128
Strategically, H. Hur could provide advanced warning to sites further north in the
Hebron Hills in case of invasion from the south. It has a better view to the Hebron Hills
than does Tel ‘Ira, and it would have served as an intermediary between Tel ‘Ira and Tel
Shoqet, the two of which did not have visual contact due to the ridge upon which Horvat
Hur sits.
ii. Sansannah. The main structure at Sansannah, which measures roughly 25 x 25
m, is reminiscent of el Khirbe and the Buqe‘ah Valley sites (see below). Eighth century
pottery abounded at this strategically placed site, which also contained pressing
installations (Batz 2006: 61–67). Sansanna’s location on a prominent ridge at the
southern end of the Judean mountain range made it ideal for an observation tower and
allowed for visual communication between Tel Halif and sites in the Negev.
iii. Metzudat Yehuda. Batz (2003: 84, 2006) uncovered the remains of a cave
dwelling and tower (Tower 2, measuring 3.7 x 2.5 m). The location of this site on the
summit of the Anim Ridge overlooking the road from Arad suggests that it was a key
tower in the Judean defensive network.
E. Unassignable
i. Hazar Betarim. The site of Hazar Betarim was excavated and produced a
substantial settlement estimated at ca. 5.5 ha (Dagan 1996: 104; Gophna 1963). The
earlier settlement contained ninth-eighth century ceramics and fragmentary buildings but
appears to be smaller than the later seventh-sixth century settlement, which Dagan
identifies as the Beer-sheba mentioned in Josh 15. He suggests that after Tel Beersheba
was destroyed in 701 BC, that the settlement moved north with the name Beersheba. No
129
reference is made of a city wall so the identification of Hazar Betarim as a village is
possible.

The similarities in the fortifications and site plans at Beersheba, Tel ‘Ira, Tel
Malhata, and ‘Aroer have been noted, as has the fact that these similarities suggest the
work of a centralized authority (Thareani-Sussely 2007: 71). When considered from a
strategic and geographic perspective the initiative of the Judean state becomes even more
apparent. These cities, in conjunction with the fortress at Arad, allowed for surveillance
and control over the entire Negev and guarded against incursions into the Hill Country
from the south.
From an economic point of view Beersheba is clearly the central place in the
Negev because its location allows it to dominate the trade routes that run through the
Negev. From a military perspective, however, Beersheba is rather weak both in
defensibility and strategic capability. Tel ‘Ira is much more central, and, in fact, is the
most important site for Judah’s military concerns as it is situated in the center of the
Negev Basin and has visual contact with sites in all directions—no other site in the
Negev has this. Aharoni already attributed great strategic value to Tel ‘Ira when he
explored the site in 1956 (1958: 36f.). ‘Ira no doubt served as a relay station and garrison
point within Hezekiah’s defensive network.
In the eastern basin, communication between the Negev and the Central Hill
Country was accomplished via the site at Metzudat Yehuda, located along the top of the
Anim Ridge. Not only was this site strategic from a communication perspective, but it
130
also sat on the route from Arad to the gently rolling and very agriculturally productive
region of Carmel. In the western part of the Negev, the site at Kh. Sansannah served a
similar strategic role for communications. It could relay signals from Tel ‘Ira, Kh. Tatrit,
or Tel Shoqet to Tel Halif, which could then pass them on north to Tell Beit Mirsim.
3. The North: the Central Benjamin Plateau

The term “Central Benjamin Plateau” (CBP) refers to the section of the tribal
allotment of Benjamin that is roughly delineated by Gibeon in the southwest, Mizpah in
the north, and Ramah in the southeast. Included in the discussion of this region, however,
are sites to the east as far as Kh. el-Qubbe and to the south as far as Kh. Tililiyye even
though they are not directly on the plateau.
The CBP functions in the north in much the same manner as the Shephelah does
in the west: as a buffer zone. Not only is it a buffer zone, but it is also a very strategic
region because it is a crossroads. Travel either north-south or east-west is much more
restricted outside of this plateau due to the rugged nature of the hills of Samaria and
Judah. Because of its gentler nature and its communication and taxation potential, many
battles have been fought over control of the CBP, from biblical times (1 Kgs 15:16-22) to
modern times; whoever controls the CBP controls not only the Hill Country, but also the
communication between the Coastal Plain and the Jordan Valley.
Multiple roads cross through the CBP. Two roads reach the plateau from the west,
via the Beth-horon ascent and via the modern site of Biddu. The road from Beth-horon
then splits into two branches once on the plateau. The northern branch heads east towards
Mizpah before turning north and ascending into southern Samaria, and the southern
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branch runs southeast towards Gibeon. Once at Gibeon, the road continues east past the
later site of Adassa, avoiding the upper reaches of the deep Sorek drainage basin before
again splitting. One road turns south and joins the Central Ridge Route that runs all the
way from Beth-shean to Beer-sheba. The other road continues east to Ramah before
turning slightly northeast and then descending to Jericho.
A. Cities
i. Tell en-Nasbeh (Mizpah). The city of Str. 3b-a at Tell en-Nasbeh (TeN) is
fortified with a massive solid wall (4-6 m thick) and double gate (Zorn 1993: 151), and
appears to be the northernmost site controlled by Judah at the end of the eighth century
(or at any other period). 88 lmlk impressions were recovered during the excavations
attesting to the site’s importance, which was related not only to its geographical location
but to the fact that TeN was located on the central ridge route meaning almost all traffic
coming from the north had to pass the city.99
TeN’s view to the north is surprisingly limited, however, the importance in
controlling this site for Judah is that it was north of the CBP. If TeN was controlled, the
entirety of the CBP was accessible to Judah, including the agricultural potential and
access to trade routes. That is why TeN/Mizpah is mentioned as one of the cities built by
the Judean king Asa after the northern Kingdom of Israel withdrew from the CBP in
order to address Aramean attacks further north (1 Kgs 15:16-22). From TeN, however,
signals could be relayed south to Nebi Samwil, Ramah, and/or Tel el-Ful/Gibeah.
99
There is a secondary road further to the east that allows some north-south travel, however, it is far more
difficult to traverse as it crosses the upper reaches of the rugged Wadi Suweinit. A portion of this route is
referred to in Isa 10:28-32.
Despite the abundance of lmlk impressions, there is no evidence of large public buildings at TeN in Str.
3a (Zorn 1993: 91).
132
ii. Gibeon. Gibeon sits in the western extent of the CBP where two of the main
ancient routes into the Central Hill Country debouched. From a communication
perspective, Gibeon was not very strategic as it is situated in one of the lowest points of
the CBP, though it could relay signals to Nebi Samwil just to the south. It’s real
importance lay in defending the routes that passed nearby. The site itself was defended by
a solid wall 3.0-4.4 m in width (the “Later City Wall”) and which seems to have been in
use throughout most of the Iron II, though precise dates for the construction and
destruction of this wall are based on circumstantial evidence (Pritchard 1964: 39).
In addition to its formidable fortifications, Gibeon also had a rock-cut pool for
accessing the ground water from within the city. At some point, probably at the end of the
eighth or beginning of the seventh century, an additional stepped tunnel was cut from
inside the city wall to Gibeon’s main spring, which was located outside of the defenses.
Pritchard posited that this tunnel was cut due to the increased population of Gibeon at the
end of the Iron Age, when the water of the pool was no longer sufficient (Pritchard 1993:
512).
While the massive defenses and water systems at Gibeon attest to its strategic
importance, the 63 excavated wine cellars attest to the site’s economic function. Pritchard
(1964: 25) calculated that, conservatively, these cellars could have stored at least 95,000
L of wine. Juxtapose the numerous inscribed store jars mentioning gb‘n gdr PN “Gibeon,
plot of PN”, a ceramic funnel for filling the store jars, numerous clay stoppers for the
jars, and 95 lmlk impressions, and Gibeon’s role as a wine production center that is
133
integrated into if not administered by the government, becomes apparent (cf. Pritchard
1959: 15–16).
Map 5. Benjamin and the Central Benjamin Plateau with lines of sight.
B. Villages
Villages in Benjamin were located largely to the east of the Ramah-Gibeah line or
south of Nebi Samwil. As neither of these two subregions offers any great strategic
possibility, those sites in the CBP that can be classified as villages are not discussed here.
However, mention will be made of a few of the sites in the socioeconomic discussions of
chapters four and five.
134
C. Fortresses
i. Tel el-Ful/Gibeah. The Period IIIA settlement at Tel el-Ful consists of the
fragmentary remains of a fortress with a revetted tower and attached casemate walls
surrounding a village (Gibson 1996: 17*). While Albright (1924, 1933) and Lapp (1993a,
1993b) suggest that this settlement is seventh/sixth century in date, the presence of 14 or
16 lmlk impressions suggests that the tower and wall were constructed at least by the end
of the eighth century. The site’s strategic location along the central ridge route, and the
fact that commanding views of the surrounding territory are possible attest to the site’s
importance; it would be strange if such a strategic site were not occupied in Hezekiah’s
days. Views to Mizpah, Kh. el-Qubbe, French Hill, and Nebi Samwil are all possible
from Tel el-Ful.
D. Watchtowers
No clearly defined towers are present in the CBP. The most probable candidate,
Nebi Samwil, has been so disturbed by later construction that identifying the nature of the
Iron Age site is impossible (see below). The presence of towers in Benjamin, however,
need not be expected since the region is so small and the highest, most strategic locations
in the region are dotted with larger settlements (either cities or fortresses).
E. Unassignable
i. Mukhmas and Kh. el-Hara el-Fauqa/Michmash (F223; K108). It appears that
Michmash was an extensive settlement in most periods, though it is now below an Arab
village. Also, it is unclear if this settlement ever fell under Judean control. If it did,
135
control of the site and its surrounding area would have offered more territory for terracing
and some agriculture, and it could have relayed signals to Tel el-Ful/Gibeah.
ii. Tel Maryam (Beth-Aven?; Ka115). It is unclear if this 26 x 26 m “fortress”
should be attributed to the Iron II or just to the Roman period (Kallai 1972: 182). The
site’s location would have allowed control over the road from Ramah to Jericho but little
in the way of communication potential.
iii. Kh. el-Qubbe (Ka118). This site is a 5 x 5 m tower on the top of a hill that has
visual communication with Tel el-Ful/Gibeah. This tower could have provided warning
of any enemy approach from Jericho, though its view to the east was not particularly
great. However, it is the only location in the northeast of Benjamin that could
communicate visually with sites further to the south.
iv. er-Ram/Ramah (F188). A modern Arab village covers this site, which was
likely a city during part of the Iron II. Ancient (?) walls were seen incorporated into
modern terrace walls during survey work done at the site and Iron II ceramics were
recovered from this area. The site sits on a hill with visibility to Tell en-Nasbeh, Nebi
Samwil, and likely to Kh. Tililiyye and Gibeah (T. el-Ful) to the south. It also has a
commanding view to the southeast. The site is located just east of the main ridge route
that runs the entire length of the Hill Country and just north of the road connecting the
Jordan Valley and the Coastal Plain. Control of this site was integral to controlling not
only the CBP, but access to Judah. 1 Kgs 15:17 illustrates this point when it says that the
Israelite king Baasha fortified Ramah, “to prevent anyone from going out or coming in to
Asa, king of Judah.”
136
The mention of Ramah as being “fortified” (bnh) by Baasha in 1 Kgs 15:17, 21; 2
Chr 16:1, 5 strengthens the assignation of the site as a city. Yet, the duration of these
specific fortifications was not long according to 1 Kgs 15:22/2 Chr 16:6 because when
Asa defeated Baasha he took the stones from Ramah and built Mizpah and Geba—
whereby claiming the CBP for Judah. Whether Ramah was ever refortified is unclear and
will only be answerable through excavation.
v. Kh. Badd Abu-Mu‘ammar (F150; Ka121). Some Iron Age sherds were
collected at this location, though few remains were seen. This site, however, would allow
communication between Nebi Samwil and Upper Beth Horon.
vi. Nebi Samwil. This site was likely a tower during the Iron Age as it provides
one of the most extensive views in Cisjordan. Any Iron Age remains were eradicated by
the extensive Medieval settlement, though numerous lmlk impressions have been
recovered in fills from the site.
vii. Kh. Tililiyye (Ka156; K[101]36). This site is a rectangular fortress. It appears
that there are two fortresses built in the location, one most definitely Rom/Byz, though
the other may be earlier. From this location, on the top of a hill, Gibeah and Ramah can
be seen. The site likely guarded a secondary route from the region of Biddu past el-Burj
(Beeroth) on to Jerusalem.

The region of Benjamin was extraordinarily important because it contained the
lone route that connected the Coastal Plain and the Jordan Valley via the Central Hill
Country. Further, control of the Central Benjamin Plateau provided Judah with additional
137
productive agricultural land. Not only were the major cities fortified under Hezekiah’s
control, such as Gibeon, Tell en-Nasbeh, and likely Ramah, but secondary sites such as
Kh. el-Qubbe and Kh. Badd Abu Mu‘ammar, allowed for a coherent regional
communication network. The CBP also boasted one of the highest points in Judah, Nebi
Samwil. This sentinel offered views from the Mediterranean to the Highlands of Moab
and south to Gedor.
4. The East: the Wilderness

The Judean Wilderness is the most rugged and inhospitable region within the
kingdom and is referred to in part in the biblical texts as the “wilderness of Tekoa” (2 Chr
20:20; 1 Macc 9:33). It is divided by many faults and deep wadis and has a minimal
amount of arable land. Even the land that is cultivable is quickly exploited because the
Wilderness is composed largely of infertile Senonian limestone. In fact, the only region
within the Wilderness that offers the potential for settlement of any size is the gently
rolling Buqe‘ah Valley; though the remainder of the region has been and still is exploited
for seasonal pasturage (Hirschfeld 1985: 6*). The settlements located in this valley were
no more than fortresses and towers that relied upon irrigation to try and maximize the
production potential of the soil; only a couple possible cities or villages were located in
the Wilderness.
Despite this dearth of cities or villages, the Wilderness and approaches to
Jerusalem from the east were guarded by fortresses and towers, as any threat from the
east/southeast would enter Judah via this region (cf. 2 Chr 20:2 when the Edomites
crossed the Dead Sea and entered Judah via the Wilderness). Little emphasis has been
138
placed on this region in previous studies concerning the days of Hezekiah, and the
consensus has been that the Wilderness was largely unprotected.
To leave any region unprotected, even if it is unlikely that attack will come
through that region, however, is unwise. Some level of defensive measure must be taken.
In fact, archaeological remains suggest that the Wilderness was in fact defended, albeit
much less so than the other regions of Judah. Part of the problem with identifying the
nature of defenses in the Wilderness lies in the fact that only a portion of the region has
been surveyed, and an even smaller portion of sites has been excavated. Further, the sites
that have been surveyed often lack meaningful materials by which to date them, if they
contain archaeological materials at all. A clear delineation must be made, therefore,
between sites that can with reason be assigned to the days of Hezekiah, and those sites
that, due to geographical setting, would fit with an overall defensive network yet lack
chronological markers. Before addressing the sites in the Wilderness it is necessary to
consider the routes that run through this remote region.
The Wilderness can be divided into two topographically different regions
separated by the Nahal Arugot. North of this canyon the terrain is very rugged due to the
extensive faulting, while south of the canyon the faults are less pronounced and the
terrain is more rolling. After making the ascent from the Dead Sea, the southern
139
Map 6. The Northern Judean Wilderness with important lines of sight.
Wilderness would have been much easier to cross than the north, though it appears less
likely that this territory was frequently transgressed in the eighth and early seventh
centuries. Part of the reason for this lies in the fact that the southwestern shore of the
Dead Sea (south of the Lisan) was too rugged to allow anything more than a north-south
pathway; no clear road appears to cross this territory between Metzudat Zohar and the
140
region of the Lisan. North of the Lisan, however, the alluvium that has washed down the
Nahalot Hever, Mishmar, and Zeelim has created a broad alluvial fan that allows travel
north to En-Gedi. From there, the main road ascended to Tekoa. Further west, however,
north-south travel through the Wilderness is very limited, being possible north of the
Arugot only in the Buqe’ah Valley. South of the Arugot, such travel is greatly hampered
by the upper reaches of the Zeelim Canyon, though it is possible (as attested by the
multiple footpaths used by the Bedouin today).
East-west travel through the wilderness, though also limited, is more practical.
There are four primary routes that lead into the Judean Hill Country from the Wilderness
in the east (Map 6). Two of these routes begin in the vicinity of Jericho, with one heading
towards the northern extent of the Benjamin Plateau and the other passing just north of
Jerusalem. The third route begins just south of where the Wadi Mukallik debouches into
the Jordan Valley. It proceeds up the Mukallik until it turns to the southwest and passes
through the Buqe’ah Valley. After crossing this gently rolling plateau the route quickly
ascends to the west and reaches Bethlehem. The last route from the east begins at En-
Gedi, quickly climbs the Ascent of Ziz and proceeds northwest until it reaches Tekoa.100
This last route is mentioned multiple times in the biblical sources as “the Way” (1 Sam
24:4; 2 Chr 20:2).101
100
From the Ascent of Ziz a secondary route splits from the road to Tekoa. This secondary route runs
further to the east and passes the later site of Herodium before reaching Bethlehem (Hirschfeld 1985: 9*;
two segments of this road were discovered at sites 12 and 121 of Hirschfeld’s survey. Conder and
Kitchener (1883: 318) discuss this road, as does G. A. Smith (1966: 185)). Hadas (1996: 132) identified
portions of the road and many forts that lined it in a survey of the En-Gedi area.
141
Additional secondary east-west routes branched off the route running through the
Buqe’ah Valley. One that followed the course of the Nahal Qumran to the Ma’aleh
Qumran, one along the Nahal Secacah to the Ma’aleh Qumran, and one that proceeded
from the Kidron to the Wadi es-Samra, then on to Rosh Zuqim and ‘Enot Zuqim (‘Ein
Feshka) (Patrich 1994: 12*). It was at the junctures of these secondary routes with the
northeast-southwest route running through the Buqe’ah that three Iron Age fortresses
were established.
Map 7. Sites and routes in the Southern Judean Wilderness.
101
There is also “the way through the wilderness of Edom” or “the way of Edom” (2 Kgs 3:8, 20; cf. 2 Sam
8:13), which Aharoni (1958: 35) associates with the route further to the south that runs east past the later
fortress of Horvat Uza.
142
In the southern part of the Wilderness there were secondary east-west routes as
well. Access into the Judean Hills can be reached by the modern ascents of Mor, Yair,
and En-Boqeq, all three of which filter traffic northwest to the Zeelim Pass, which is the
easternmost point at which the Nahal Zeelim can be crossed. Once reaching this pass the
paths converge and continue northwest until the single path reaches the site of Carmel.
Turning now to the sites in the Wilderness, Patrich (1994) surveyed a portion of
the Wilderness and was able to identify only eighteen Iron II sites. Similarly, Bar-Adon
(1972) identified 27 Iron Age sites (six of which are duplicated in Patrich’s survey). With
the rare exception of a few sites whose date could be limited to the Iron IIB-C, most of
the sites identified by Patrich and Bar-Adon are labeled generically as “Iron II.” While
most scholars would date these sites to the seventh century, it cannot be precluded that
they were established in the eighth century as Bar-Adon’s generic dating suggests (cf.
also Finkelstein 1994: 175 and Vaughn 1999: 72-74).102
A similar dating has been adopted for the Buqe‘ah Valley sites, though Vaughn
(1999) argues that they likely were founded in the eighth century.103 The settlements in
the Buqe‘ah Valley that date to the Iron Age are all situated along an almost straight line
that runs from northeast to southwest, mirroring the eastern edge of the valley itself. The
Iron Age structures are fairly evenly spaced and are situated at locations where wadis
break through the higher eastern rocks bordering the valley.
102
Consider also Faust (2008: 175), who, in discussing the Judean Wilderness, states that, “although the
peak was indeed in the seventh century (sic), the settlement wave had started already in the eighth century.”
103
The general consensus is that the Judean desert had few, if any, settlements in the eighth century (Stern
2001: 137; Faust 2008: 173f.).
143
The few towers identified in the southern Wilderness are difficult to assess
because they have only been presented in Marcus (1984), which is a survey of hiking
trails and geological features published by the Israel Nature Preserves Authority. Though
Marcus lists multiple fortresses and mentions surface pottery at some of the sites, his
references are too generic (e.g., “pottery from the Iron Age”, “Roman pottery”) to allow
for a precise dating of any of the sites.
A. Cities
There are no sites clearly classifiable as cities and datable to the eighth century in
the Judean Wilderness.
B. Villages
Neither are there identifiable villages that have been found in the Wilderness. The
inhospitable nature of the terrain limited any such settlements.
C. Fortresses
Three sites have been classified as fortresses and are dealt with together due to
their proximity and similarity in design. The fortresses at Kh. Abu Tabaq, Kh. es-Samra,
and Kh. el-Maqari were all originally dated to the seventh century (Cross and Milik 1956;
Stager 1975). While such a date is correct for these sites’ main period of occupation,
Vaughn’s (1999: 75–78) more recent assessment of the excavations at each of these
settlements makes a good case that they were established already in the eighth century.104
He has correctly reanalyzed Stager’s argument and pointed out that some of the ceramics
referred to by Stager as seventh century are similar to the ceramics of Lachish III. At the
104
In fact, Cross (1993: 269) adjusted his original dating and acknowledged that these sites could have been
established in the eighth century.
144
time Stager was writing, however, he held to the interpretation that Lachish III was
associated with the destruction of Nebuchadnezzar instead of that by Sennacherib. When
such an interpretation is corrected based on the more recent dating of Lachish III, the
earliest phase at Kh. Abu Tabaq (Area 3, Phase 1) can similarly be dated to the late
eighth century. Further, the discovery of two lmlk impressions at Kh. es-Samra indicates
a similar settlement history.105
These three rectangular, casemate sites are all located just east of the road that
runs from the Jordan Valley to the Buqe‘ah, where it splits with one route heading to
Bethlehem and the other to Jerusalem. While these sites no doubt served a defensive
purpose, as suggested by their location along the north-south road as well as their
communication capabilities with smaller sites to the east (see below), the presence of
fourteen long, narrow rooms at Kh. es-Samra identified as storage magazines attest to the
economic function of these sites as well (Stager 1975: 147). Stager (1975: 227–228)
states that the settlements were likely used in the distribution of wine from the southern
Hill Country near Hebron to Jericho.
D. Watchtowers
i. Zanaba (F490). This site is a likely tower that overlooked the road from
Jerusalem to Jericho. It sits atop a ridge above the road and has a clear view to the Mt. of
Olives to the SW. Unfortunately, the site is comprised of only a poorly preserved
rectangular structure 40 m long with 70 cm wide walls preserved up to 1-2 courses. This
105
Though the lmlk impression found on Floor 004 in Room 9 (Phases 1-2) had concentric circles carved
on it, suggesting a cancellation of use and hence possibly a post-Hezekian period, the associated ceramics
were similar to Lachish III. As a result, the belief that concentric circles may indicate a later re-usage of the
lmlk jars is not certain.
145
structure may be similar to the one at El-Khirbe (see above) based on satellite imagery;
no plan is offered in the published survey, likely because of the fragmentary nature of the
remains.
ii. El-Khirbe. This settlement is a tower on the Ma’aleh Adummim. This site was
on a secondary route from Jericho to Jerusalem and did not have the most extensive view.
Yet, it did have visual contact with the Mt. of Olives and could see the Jordan Valley, but
its view directly to the east was largely obscured by the hill upon which the modern city
of Ma’aleh Adummim is built.
The main structure at El-Khirbe is a walled rectangular structure that has a four-
room house in its southeastern corner. This plan is common during the Iron II and
suggests the dual nature of such a settlement. The enclosed courtyard and four-room
house suggest the social organization and economic lifestyle of the inhabitants, while the
strategic location and sturdiness of the structure’s construction suggest a military
function.106 Whether such structures were inhabited by Judean soldiers (with or without
their families) or civilians that provided an early warning system and could relay signals
to Jerusalem, is unclear. However, the geographical location, number (five of them),107
and relative uniformity in structures such as the one at El-Khirbe support not only their
interpretation as watchtowers, but as settlements utilized in Judah’s defensive network.
iii. Wadi Abu Hindi Tower (ESI 2:58). This tower is briefly mentioned in ESI 2
and is dated to the eighth-seventh centuries based on the sherds collected during survey.
106
23 objects identified as sling stones further support a military purpose for the site (Hizmi 2004: 168–
169).
107
The sites are: El-Khirbe, Wadi Abu Hindi, Sansannah, Zanaba, and ‘Ein el-Ghuweir.
146
The site, including the courtyard is 28 x 20 m and had a small structure in the
southwestern corner. Though no plan is given for the site, it may be suggested that it is
similar to the tower seen at El-Khirbe. The Wadi Abu Hindi Tower is located on a spur
south of said wadi and overlooked a secondary route from the Buqe‘ah Valley to
Jerusalem.
iv. Hirschfeld Site 34 (H34). This site offers a view to the southeast down the
Nahal Tekoa and it overlooks the secondary route to En-Gedi from Bethlehem. Further,
H34 has visual contact with Tekoa, though the road that H34 overlooks is not visible
from the latter site. The benefit of site H34 is the capability to see Tekoa and the
primarily used Tekoa-En-Gedi road from it. Because of a small rise southeast of Tekoa,
that site cannot see the road coming from En-Gedi; H34 allows signals from BA147 on
that road to be passed to Tekoa.
v. Bar-Adon Site 147 (BA147). There are two round structures about 200 m apart,
either of which may have served as a tower along the road from Tekoa to En-Gedi. Bar-
Adon recovered Iron Age ceramics from both, however, Hirschfeld does not record any
ceramics (his Sites 91-92). There is no direct line of sight between BA147 and Tekoa, but
rather signals must pass through H34.
vi. Zahrat el Miqtach (BA172c). This site is comprised of a rectangular structure
on the road between Tekoa and En-Gedi. The structure has visual contact with BA147 to
the northwest and can view the road toward En-Gedi almost to the ascent from the Dead
Sea Basin.
147
E. Unassignable
i. Jericho. Kenyon (1993: 680) stated that there was not likely an eighth century
settlement at Jericho, but rather that the Iron Age ceramics excavated suggested a
considerable settlement in the seventh century. However, two phases (lxviii, lxix) of
architecture along with many eighth century ceramic forms (including a lmlk impression)
were recovered in her Trench I (Kenyon 1981: 111–112; Kenyon and Holland 1983: 58–
84). At the same time, Iron Age remains were uncovered in Kenyon’s Trench II, though
they were more fragmentary with fewer ceramics than in Trench I. What ceramics were
recovered are largely typical of the eighth-sixth centuries, however, some distinct types
suggest a date towards the end of this period (Kenyon 1981: 171–173; Kenyon and
Holland 1983: 176–181).
The small exposure of the Iron Age remains at Jericho makes it difficult to
determine the nature of the site. In both Trenches I and II parallel walls reminiscent of
casemates were excavated, however, these should be dated to the seventh century as they
overlay the earlier Iron II remains and, as Kenyon notes, they are rather flimsy for
casemate walls (1981: 112); they more likely served to keep animals in. Neither does the
biblical reference in 1 Kgs 16:34 to Hiel the Bethelite rebuilding Jericho prove useful as
his actions supposedly happened during the reign of the Israelite king Ahab in the ninth
century.
ii. Kh. Abu Sa‘ad (F486). This site is a ruin that is located just west of and at a
higher elevation than El-Khirbe. Abu Sa‘ad has a better view down the Wadi Adummim
though the nature of the settlement here is unclear. It appears that one or two buildings
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were located at this site even though ceramics were found scattered over a larger area (4.0
ha).
iii. Bar-Adon Site 80 (BA80). This site is located in the Jordan Valley where the
Judean Wilderness ends and is of considerable size (88 x 40 m; roughly circular, with 70
cm wide walls). It sits just north of the modern road linking Jerusalem and Amman,
though it is unclear whether any ancient east-west road passed this site. It is built of large
stones and had a tower divided into two rooms in the southeast corner. Bar-Adon only
records that this site was “Israelite”, but his description of the tower is reminiscent of the
tower at Tell Goren, which was built in the seventh century.
iv. Qumran (City of Salt? Secacah?). The Iron IIB/C settlement at Qumran is
unclear. De Vaux (de Vaux 1993: 1236) believed that it consisted of a rectangular
structure with an adjoining round cistern (L.110), however more recent excavations by
Magen and Peleg (2008: 379–380) have refuted this interpretation saying that the cistern
was not Iron Age in date and that some of the Iron Age walls identified by de Vaux are
actually part of the foundations of the Hellenistic settlement. At the same time, Magen
and Peleg believe that the Iron Age settlement expanded further to the south and east than
de Vaux realized, yet they suggest that it may have been only a seasonal site (2008: 380).
The classification of the Iron Age settlement, therefore, would shift from a possible tower
to a small village.108
108
While Magen and Peleg present a more minimal view of the Iron Age settlement at Qumran than de
Vaux, they also hedge their argument and admit that a central tower may have existed (2008: 380). It
should also be noted that there is a very fragmentary building (the “Bâtiment Israélite”) less than 1 km
south of Qumran that is of considerable size (ca. 50 x 63 m) and dated to the eighth century based on the
recovered ceramics (Humbert and Chambon 1994: 268, 367).
149
Whether Qumran was some sort of fortress or tower during the Iron Age is
unclear, but its location near the northwestern shore of the Dead Sea would have allowed
for observation and protection of the road running along the Dead Sea from the Lisan to
Jericho and the path that ascended to the Buqe‘ah Valley. Possible indicators of a
governmental presence—contra Magen and Peleg (2008: 376, 378), who see all the
settlements in the Jordan Valley and along the Dead Sea as private endeavors—are two
lmlk impressions found among the numerous sherds typical of the eighth-sixth
centuries.109
v. Buqe’ah watchtowers. There are seven small structures (Sites P21+18/BA89,
P56/BA95c, P73/BA100c, P75, P112/BA106c, P121/BA108a, P122/BA106g) identified
in Patrich’s survey of the Mar Saba region (most were also identified in Bar-Adon’s
earlier survey of the region) that may have served as small watchtowers. Each is so
poorly preserved or lacking chronological indicators that they cannot with certainty be
categorized elsewhere. The reason for including them, however, is that each offers an
eastward view down one of the nahals/wadis—Qumran, Secacah, el Maqari, or Kidron—
that bisects the Buqe‘ah. As such, they may have served to warn the larger fortresses (Kh.
Abu Tabaq, Maqari, and Kh. es-Samra), which were stationed along the main northeast-
southwest road that ran through the Buqe‘ah and had poorer views to the east.
vi. Wilderness watchtowers. These sites were identified by Bar-Adon (1972) and
are located along the edge of the cliffs overlooking the Rift Valley. One site is located
above Qumran (BA93) and produced a few Iron Age sherds. BA93 may have had visual
109
One was found by de Vaux (1973: 2; under L-68) and the other by Magen and Peleg (2008: 379, Fig.
31).
150
communication with P75 to the southwest, though the exact location and original height
of the structures at both sites would determine such a possibility. Similar sites such as
BA109 (which was above BA114, a possible small Iron Age village on the north banks of
the Wadi en-Nar), BA149, and Rujm Qedimah (BA158) also sat overlooking the Rift
Valley near wadis that allowed for paths to descend to the Dead Sea, though they did not
produce any pottery.
vii. Bar-Adon sites. Bar-Adon published multiple sites that he referred to as
“fortresses” and dated to the days of Uzziah, though more recent analysis has tended to
place the sites in the seventh-sixth centuries. Determining the period(s) to which these
sites belonged, however, is difficult because of the dearth of Iron II ceramics. Many of
the sites were rebuilt in the Hellenistic or Roman periods and structures from those
periods cover earlier remains. The Iron Age ceramics that Bar-Adon illustrated find their
apex in the seventh to sixth centuries, however, they also appear as early as the eighth
century. The ubiquity of the forms over the eighth-sixth centuries makes determining any
specific date for these structures quite difficult. Sites for which only a generic date
between the eighth and sixth centuries is possible include: Rujm el-Bahr (Beth-Arabah?),
Qasr el-Yahud (Middin?), ‘Ein el-Ghuweir (Nibshan?), and ‘Ein et-Turabeh (City of
Salt?). Aside from ‘Ein et-Turabeh, it is difficult to determine the nature of these sites.
Turabeh likely was a stronghold of some sort for protecting salt extracted from the Dead
Sea as Bar-Adon posits (1989: 6*–7*), however, aside from local protection, any
strategic benefit that most of these sites would have offered is minimal. There is a wall
with rooms between ‘Ein el-Ghuweir and ‘Ein et-Turabeh that perhaps protected the
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springs in the area, but it more likely served as small residences for people involved in
perfume processing.
viii. Rujm el-Kurrat (BA169). There are two possible elliptical towers from the
“Israelite” period located on the top of a hill south of the Wadi Murabbat on a trail
leading down from BA147 to Rujm Qedimah (BA158). It is unclear if and/or how this
site would have functioned, though it did have visual communication with BA147 further
to the west. In addition, Bar-Adon identified another elliptical “fortress” from the
Israelite period (BA176; 4 m long) at the bottom of the hill upon which Rujm el-Kurrat
sits.
ix. Rujm en-Naqa (BA193). Iron II ceramics were recovered in a survey of this
site, though it has been built over by a modern Jordanian fortress; only one ancient wall
was visible. This site was on the road from Tekoa to Ein Gedi and has visual
communication with BA172.
x. Ras el-Hamame region. There are a few sites, none of which can be discussed
in detail, but which likely allowed for visual communication in the Wilderness just above
Ein Gedi. Not all of the sites were located along the road between Tekoa and Ein Gedi,
but were situated at positions that allowed for sweeping views of the Wilderness. Moving
southeast from Rujm en-Naqa the road would proceed to Ras el-Hamame (BA201),
where it would turn east then proceed down into the upper stretches of the Nahal David.
Communication, however, was conducted from Rujm en-Naqa to BA198 (a 27 x 15 m
compound) or perhaps Ras el-Hamame though visual communication does not appear
possible with the latter site. From BA198, however, communication could be passed to
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Rujm el Hamame (BA202) and/or to BA204 (see below for these latter two sites).
Between BA204 and Ein Gedi, there does not appear to be another site so communication
may have been by foot.
xi. Rujm el Hamame (BA202). This site is comprised of an 8.7 x 8.7 m tower with
adjoining courtyard (ca. 20 x 20 m). The tower was divided into two rooms and had a
large (4 x 8 m at least 1.5 m deep) rock-cut cistern as well as a second rectangular
building nearby. This location has a commanding view over the Judean Wilderness and
the Dead Sea and only produced ceramics from the “Israelite” period.
xii. BA204. Another likely tower on the road between Tekoa and Ein Gedi. This
position was also destroyed by more recent work of the Arab Legion though Iron I and II
ceramics were recovered during Bar-Adon’s survey. This site has a view of the
wilderness and the Dead Sea.
xiii. Tel Goren/En-Gedi. Though Vaughn has recently argued that Tel Goren
should be included among eighth century sites based on the presence of one lmlk
impression, a private stamp seal, and an eighth century burial nearby, the fact that the
impressions were found in a layer of fill and the fact that the ceramics of Str. V, the
earliest stratum, are uniformly seventh century, suggests that the lmlk impression or
private seal (which does not list a name but is iconographic) does not represent a settled
site in the eighth century. Rather, the presence of the lmlk impression appears to parallel
the lmlk impression found at the seventh century fortress of Kh. Silhah between
Jerusalem and Jericho. At both Kh. Silhah and Tel Goren lmlk jars likely appeared
153
following Sennacherib’s campaign as most sites in the Central Hill Country did not suffer
destruction and could have continued to utilize the lmlk jars.110

In the late eighth century there was no viable threat to Judah from the east.
Nevertheless, it does appear that this region of the kingdom was defended just as the
other regions, albeit on a much smaller scale. While the sites along the Dead Sea and the
cliffs above are dated primarily to the seventh century, the paucity and indeterminacy of
ceramic finds makes exact dating difficult. Many were likely founded already in the
eighth century. In addition to these sites, there was a ring of fortresses or towers to the
east of Jerusalem that guarded routes from Jericho and the Buqe’ah Valley; sites at
Zanaba, el-Khirbe, Wadi Abu Hindi, Kh. Abu Tabaq, Kh. es-Samra, and Kh. el-Maqari
served as additional deterrents to any enemy from the east.
The need of an extensive defensive network in the Wilderness was mitigated,
again, by the fact that there were no viable threats to Judah from the east, and also
because sites such as the Mt. of Olives, Tekoa, Ziph, and Carmel, which were located at
the border between the Wilderness and Central Hill Country, had commanding views
over the Wilderness and could relay warning signals quickly.
Despite such commanding views, additional sites were constructed along the main
road through the Wilderness, which connected the Dead Sea with the Central Hill
Country from En-Gedi to Tekoa. The sites at Ma’aleh Amos (BA147), Zahrat el-Miqtah,
110
It is admitted that the presence of an eighth century burial is problematic, though preferable for the
purpose of this study because it would suggest some occupation at En-Gedi in the eighth century. However,
the lack of contemporary finds on Tel Goren makes it difficult to articulate what kind of eighth century
settlement, if any, actually existed.
154
Rujm en-Naqa, and a couple in the region of Ras el-Hamame were likely constructed in
the eighth century and would have allowed an almost complete line of visual
communication from En-Gedi to Tekoa. The only hindrance was a final ascent that
obscured visual communication between Tekoa and the site at Ma’aleh Amos. Signals
would have passed from Ma’aleh Amos to site 34 of Hirschfeld’s survey of Herodion in
order to reach Tekoa.
5. The Center: the Watershed Route

The heartland of Judah is confined to a narrow corridor along the top of the
Judean Mountains that is delineated by steep and deeply eroded wadis on the west and
the infertile Judean Wilderness on the east. This corridor follows a narrow path through
Samaria before reaching the CBP where it broadens to roughly 7 km. South of the CBP,
however, the upper reaches of the Sorek drainage basin form a bottleneck in the corridor
before it again broadens to about 4 km in width in the vicinity of Jerusalem. The region
of Jerusalem is relatively flat—except to the east—and has great productive capability for
grain, olives, and grapes. South of Jerusalem the corridor narrows slightly and rises in
elevation towards Hebron. From Hebron the corridor becomes less noticeable due to a
shift in the direction of the fault lines and in the number of smaller faults that dissect the
area.
While the entirety of the central corridor is fertile due to the terra rossa soil, the
heavy faulting makes the growing of grapes and olives more conducive along the terraced
slopes than the growing of grain. Yet despite the rugged nature of the Judean Mountains,
there are regions in which grain can be grown on a larger scale: the CBP, the region of
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Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and the region of Carmel and Maon to the south of Hebron.
The heartland of Judah has much productive potential, and even if the broader valleys in
the Shephelah are lost, the kingdom of Judah could continue to provide for its people (see
below Chapter Five for more on land use and potential of the various regions of Judah).
One main north-south road transgresses the central corridor: the Watershed Route.
This route runs the entire length of the Hill Country, beginning at Beth-Shean in the north
and continuing south to Beersheba. South of Bethlehem the route splits with one road
continuing along the watershed to Hebron. The second route runs further to the east,
through the western reaches of the Judean Wilderness. It passes Tekoa where it again
splits, with one road heading southwest where it meets up with the Watershed route at
Hebron, and the other road heading southeast to the Dead Sea near En Gedi. Once in
Hebron, the route again splits. The western road descends southwest towards Kh.
Rabud/Debir then on to Beersheba. The eastern road descends toward Ziph, Carmel, and
Maon before finally reaching the fortress at Arad.
There is little need for any east-west roads along the corridor because it is so
narrow, however, just north of Hebron there is a short road that links the two north-south
branches of the Watershed route (linking Halhul and Beth-anoth). A second east-west
road runs from Kh. Rabud/Debir towards Eshtemoa before finally meeting the easterly
north-south ridge route just north of the steep descent to Kerioth.
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*Y149
*Y168
Y194*
*Y205
*Y225
*Y229
Map 8. The Central Hill Country with some important lines of sight
A. Cities
i. Jerusalem. The capital of Judah was the largest city in the kingdom at the end of
the eighth century. In the days of Hezekiah, the size of the city and the population
increased by almost fourfold. Yet, for its importance as a regal-ritual center it was
strategically very poor. Even with the expansion of the city to the higher Western Hill,
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Jerusalem was still surrounded by higher mountains; it had no commanding views in any
direction. Any communications to or from Jerusalem had to be passed to sites upon one
of these higher mountains before they could be relayed anywhere else. To the east was
the Mount of Olives, to the south was “U.N.” Hill, to the west were multiple ridges, and
to the north was Shu’fat Ridge. Not only was Jerusalem insignificant for communication
purposes, but also it was located at least 4 km south of the east-west route through
Benjamin and 1 km east of the north-south ridge route.
Despite such a mediocre geographical setting, Jerusalem was heavily fortified
since it was the capital. Depending on the region of the city, there were one or more walls
surrounding it. A massive seven meter wide wall, W.555 (Avigad and Geva 2000: 45–
58), surrounded the Western Hill and protected the city from the north, which was the
easiest direction by which to attack Jerusalem; Avigad (Avigad 1983: 62) proposed that
W.555 is the “Broad Wall” mentioned in Neh. 3:8 (cf. also Isa 22:10; 2 Chr 32:5).
Elsewhere along the north, at Solomon’s Temple Platform it appears that there was a
large rock-cut moat for added protection. On the east, three walls protected the City of
David (W.501/W.10, W.806 and W.219), including the city’s sole water source, the
Gihon Spring (Ariel and de Groot 2000; Reich and Shukron 2008b; Shiloh 1984).111 In
addition to these walls, Jerusalem’s natural topography offered added protection; steep
valleys surrounded the site on three sides making attack from any direction but the north
impractical.
111
The debates surrounding the date, extent, construction method, and purpose of the Iron Age water
system in Jerusalem are beyond the focus of the current study, however, it is clear that changes to the
earlier Middle Bronze II water system were made in the Iron II, most certainly during the reign of Hezekiah
(cf. 2 Kgs 20:20; 2 Chr 32:30; (Ariel and de Groot 2000; Lancaster and Long 1999; Reich and Shukron
1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2006, 2008a, 2008b)
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ii. Hebron. This original capital of David’s kingdom continued to be an important
site in the Iron II, reusing the 9.1 m wide MBII city wall at least until 701 (Chadwick
1992: 124). Whether or not Hebron was attacked by the Assyrians could not be
determined, however, by the excavations conducted at the site (Chadwick 1992: 126),
though it would be unlikely (contra Chadwick, ibid.) since, as important as Hebron was
for Judah, it was not near enough to any of the trade routes that Assyria was interested in.
Further, Hebron did not need to be passed in order to reach Jerusalem.112
The strategic importance of Hebron is that it could control the central ridge route
in the southern Judean Highlands, though higher mountains surrounded the site itself
making any visual communication potential minimal. Hebron’s importance is suggested
not only by the reference to hbrn in the lmlk impressions, of which 13 have now been
found at Hebron (Eisenberg and Nagorski 2002; Ofer 1985, 1987), but also by the
archaeological finds that suggest the city grew from the Iron I (IIA) to the Iron IIB
(Chadwick 1992: 138).
iii. Khirbet Rabud/Debir. A ca. 4 m thick solid wall (W1) enclosed this ca. 5.0 ha
settlement that overlooked the Eshtemoa-Shephelah and Negev-Hebron roads (Kochavi
1974: 5). This wall was constructed in the ninth century (Str. B-III) and lasted until it was
destroyed at the end of Str. B-II, dated to 701 B.C. (Kochavi 1974: 18, 1993b: 1252).
iv. Kh. el-Karmil (Carmel; Y222). Kochavi surveyed a wall that stood up to 2 m
in places and was built with stones reaching 1 m in length. This site is located along the
112
It should be noted, though, that salvage excavations along the northern slope of the tell uncovered a
four-room house from the eighth century that was violently destroyed (Eisenberg and Nagorski 2002: 113).
Over this house was another partial structure in which eight lmlk handles were found. Whether both
settlement phases should be attributed to the eighth century or whether the former phase is eighth century
and the latter phase with the lmlk handles represents a seventh century fill is unclear.
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ancient road from Arad to Hebron and offered protection over the gently rolling farmland
south of Hebron.
B. Villages
i. Khirbet Badd Faluch (Netofa; H2; Y49). Ceramics typical of the eighth-sixth
centuries were recovered though no trace of a city wall was identified during the surveys
of the site. The site is built over by a modern village, but is important because it sits on
the road between Bethlehem and Tekoa and offers views over the Judean Wilderness just
like those two sites do.
ii. Tekoa (H37; Y62). Tekoa overlooks a cultivable plain to the northwest of the
site and the Judean Wilderness to the east. Surveys recovered eighth-sixth century
ceramics, but most of the structures on the site date to a later period, making the
identification of Iron Age structures difficult without excavation. The identification of
Tekoa as a village is based on the lack of a discernable city wall by the surveys done at
the site, however, the site is listed as one of Rehoboam’s fortified cities in 2 Chr 11:5-12.
iii. Kh. et-Tubeiqa/Beth-zur. Extensive excavations were conducted at this site in
1931 and 1957 with neither identifying a city wall (Funk 1968: 8). Rather, this strategic
site that is at the summit of the ascent from Tell el-Beida and is just west of the central
ridge route, appears to be a large village. While clear stratigraphy of this site is difficult
to establish due to the excavation methods utilized in the early twentieth century, it does
appear that all of the Iron II ceramics come from Stratum III (Lapp and Lapp 1968: 54).
This stratum was originally dated to the seventh century but has since been correctly re-
dated to the eighth century based on the presence of lmlk impressions and other Lachish
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III-style ceramics (Vaughn 1999: 42). The lack of fortifications in Str. III makes the
dating of Rehoboam’s list of fortified cities, which includes Beth-zur, to the period of
Hezekiah, problematic.
C. Fortresses
i. Ramat Rahel (Memshath/mmšt?). Aharoni’s (1962: 15) original assessment of
the site stated that a small royal citadel was constructed at the end of the eighth century
(Str. Vb) for which few architectural remains were preserved, and that a later, larger
palace (Str. Va) was constructed over this citadel, destroying most of it. The existence of
the earliest stratum (Vb) was based largely on the presence of numerous lmlk impressions
and other Lachish III-style ceramics found below sealed Str. Va floors. However, Barkay
re-excavated the site in 1984, focusing on different areas of the hill and discovered
additional remains that he dated to Aharoni’s Str. Vb, even claiming that the site was
actually a small city of 3.0 ha (Barkay 2006: 38; Vaughn 1999: 39–40). Even more recent
excavations have discovered additional early walls attributable to Str. Vb, with the
excavators concluding that at the end of the eighth century Ramat Rahel was comprised
of the large “western tower” and an additional enclosed courtyard or building(s)
(Lipschits, et al. 2009: 61–64).
Ramat Rahel serves a very strategic purpose because south of Jerusalem it is the
highest hill in the vicinity and it has impressive views to the north, west, and south. It
could relay signals from Rujm el-Barish to K[106]77 (“U.N. Hill”) and on to Jerusalem,
and it overlooked the central ridge route linking Jerusalem and Bethlehem. It has been
proposed that Ramat Rahel is either Beth-haccherem or the mmšt of the lmlk impressions
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based on the large number of wine presses and vats near the site and the abundance of
lmlk impressions found at the site (Aharoni 1993: 1261; Barkay 2006: 43; Feig 2003:
225).
D. Watchtowers
i. Ramat Shelomo/Shu’fat Ridge/er-Ras II. The structure found had two phases,
both dated to the eighth century, with Phase II perhaps stretching until the mid-seventh
century BC (Rapuano and Onn 2004: 128). The structure of Phase I was likely
rectangular although only two walls have been preserved. It may have functioned as a
shrine based on an elevated platform along the southwestern wall, however, no
specifically cultic objects were found. The excavators also suggest that the structure is the
remains of a fortress based on the fact that the walls are 1.4 m thick (Rapuano and Onn
2004: 128), and they cite a parallel to the fortress found on French Hill in Jerusalem. The
structure of Phase II is also variously interpreted as a dwelling, watchtower, or storage
room. A couple rim fragments of lmlk-type store jars (Rapuano and Onn 2004: Fig 8:4, 7)
were found in Phase II. Considering the location of the structure on Shu’fat Ridge, it
likely served as a tower overlooking the road and passing signals from the CBP to
Jerusalem.
ii. Giv‘at Shapira (“French Hill”; Nob?). This tower, built on a prominent ridge,
guards the ridge route and access to Jerusalem from the north. At the same time, it is an
essential cog in the defensive network because it has visual communication with the City
of David in Jerusalem as well as Giloh, H. Eres, Tell el-Ful/Gibeah, and Nebi Samwil.
While the excavators suggest identifying this site with ancient Nob, they also admit that it
162
could possibly be Laish, Madmannah, or Gebim, all sites listed in Isa 10:23-32 as north
of Jerusalem (Barkay, et al. 2002: 66).
iii. Giloh (Baal-Perazim?). Mazar (1990b: 96) excavated this site, which includes
a massive 11.15 x 11.15 m tower whose walls are 2.1-2.2 m thick. From the tower, views
are possible in all directions except the southwest. Giloh even has direct visual contact
with the Temple Platform in Jerusalem in addition to the Mount of Olives.
iv. Rujm Artas (Y40). This site is a 7 m diameter tower that has a view to the E-
SE to Tekoa and its vicinity and to Ramat Rahel in the north. Communication signals
were likely relayed from Tekoa to Ramat Rahel in cases of inclement weather when
visibility between Tekoa and “U.N. Hill” (K[106]77) in Jerusalem was not possible.
v. Kh. el-Qatt (Y79). This site is a tower similar in design to that of Deir Baghl. It
is a rectangular settlement (30 x 30 m) with casemate walls on the west, north, and east,
and double casemate walls on the south. The entrance, as can be told from the survey, is
in the eastern wall. “Israelite” pottery was recovered from this site that has a
commanding view over the north-south ridge route and can see to Beth-zur and Halhul in
the south and the Shephelah in the west.
E. Unassignable
i. Har Hotzvim. A rectangular structure (19 x 12 m) with two large courtyards,
one on the east measuring 23 x 18 m, and one on the north, measuring 10 x 10 m was
surveyed on the northern slopes of Har Hotzvim and its walls were ca. 2 m wide with
additional reinforcements. Further, a corner tower (5.5 x 3.5 m) was located on the
163
eastern side of the structure where the eastern courtyard meets it. Mazor (1985: 57) posits
that it may have been a “fort.”
ii. Mount of Olives. Extensive post-Iron Age constructions have obscured any
possible remains from the eighth century. The height of the Mount of Olives, however,
would have allowed an extensive view not only over the Judean Wilderness, but also to
many of the towers and sites around Jerusalem in the north, west, and south. Such a key
vantage point would most certainly have been utilized in the Iron Age.
iii. Jebel Mukabbir/“U.N. Hill” (K[106]77). No date is offered for the remains on
this site, but it would be highly unlikely that there was not an Iron Age settlement. From
this location, signals received from both the north and south can be relayed to Jerusalem,
which is located at a lower elevation.
iv. Rujm el-Barish (K[105]30). Approximately 20 m to the northwest of a large
tumulus excavated by Albright (1923), are the remains of a circular structure (3 m dia).
This structure may have served as a relay tower due to its views to both Kh. el-Abhar and
Ramat Rahel. If this structure did function in the Judean defensive network, it would have
provided a key communication link between sites in the Shephelah and sites in the
Central Hill Country in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem.
v. Bethlehem. Because the modern village of Bethlehem is built over the ancient
site it is difficult to establish what kind of ancient site it was. 2 Chr 11:6 lists Bethlehem
as one of the cities fortified by Rehoboam; since there is no evidence to suggest whether
or not the site was destroyed in the Iron Age it can only be assumed that it was fortified
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during the eighth century (whether 2 Chr 11:6 is to be dated to the period of Rehoboam
or Hezekiah).
Bethlehem sits at the confluence of three routes: the central ridge route, the route
from Tekoa, and one from Jericho. It has views to Tekoa, down the road to Jericho, and
north to Ramat Rahel. Also, an abundance of cereals can be grown to the east of
Bethlehem, before the Judean Wilderness begins.
vi. Kh. Judur (Gedor; Y60). Scattered building remains were surveyed on a hill,
though many are likely from the Roman period or later. This site, however, is located at
the summit of the western ascents into the Central Hill Country and has an extensive
view from Beth-Zur and Halhul in the south to Nebi Samwil in the north, and west to
Socoh and Azekah (Kochavi 1972b: 46). The size and nature of the Iron Age settlement
is unclear.
vii. Kh. Kan‘an (Aphekah?; Y149). This site consists of remains of a settlement
approximately 70 m in diameter. There are two buildings on the top of the tell, one of
which measures 20 x 20 m with 1.5-2.0 m thick walls. While this site is identified with
Aphekah because Kochavi recovered Iron Age ceramics, the majority of the finds were
Hellenistic/Roman in date and it is to this period that the fortress likely belongs.
However, the site does overlook an ancient crossroads, with one road leading from
Hebron to Adoraim and the other from just west of Hebron to the area of Kh.
Rabud/Debir, and it would have been a strategic position to control.
viii. Dura/Adoraim (Y154). This site, as with Kh. Judur, overlooks the western
approaches to the Central Hill Country and serves an immense strategic purpose; signals
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from the Shephelah can be sent to Adoraim, which can then relay them to sites in the
Central Hill Country. In addition to its communication potential, Adoraim is located on
the road between Hebron and Tel Eton (which also passes Site A784). Unfortunately, the
modern city of Dura is built over the ancient site, so identifying the size and class of the
site is not possible.
ix. Kh. Bani Dar (Kain; Y162). This likely village has fertile surrounding territory
on the fringes of the Judean Wilderness. Remains of buildings were found and pottery
was collected over an area of ca. 3.0 ha. The site’s only exceptional view is to the SE,
though the entire area is agriculturally rich; olives can be grown on the hillsides and grain
in the multiple surrounding valleys.
x. Kh. el-Marajim (Y168). A surrounding wall and rectangular tower were
identified during a survey of the site, which was greatly damaged due to modern
agricultural work, and although no date for those features is given Kochavi did gather
“Israelite” pottery. Marajim sits at the top of the ascent from Tel ‘Eton and Kh. Fuqeiqis,
and likely played an important defensive role, but it did not have visual contact with
either of those sites because of a rock spur about 1 km to the west.
xi. El-Hadab (Aphekah?; Y176). This site is possibly ancient Aphekah. Some Iron
II pottery and the foundations of walls were noted in the survey. It overlooks a large,
fertile valley and has a view to the west to Kh. el-Marajim and to the southeast to Juttah.
Further, it overlooks the road from Hebron to Tel Rabud/Debir.
xii. Ziph (Y178). This site is located on a high hill (880 m asl) on the edge of the
Judean Wilderness that overlooks a broad fertile plain to the south, and which is on the
166
same anticline as Kain. The entire area between the two sites is fertile enough to grow
grain. Also, Ziph is on the Hebron-Arad road and is likely the site mentioned in the lmlk
impressions (even though much of the pottery gathered from Kochavi’s survey of the site
was Hellenistic in date and apparently more abundant than Iron II ceramics). Two rows
of walls encircling the site were discerned in the survey. The upper enclosed an area of
ca. 0.5-1.0 ha and the second, lower wall enclosed an area of ca. 2.5 ha. The extent and
nature of the Iron Age site is difficult to determine; whether either of the circling walls
are Iron Age in date is unclear.
xiii. Kh. Umm el-‘Amad (Y205)—Iron II sherds on a site with small buildings,
cisterns, caves, and a possible city wall, though the lines of the wall could not be traced
clearly (Kochavi 1972b: 73). This site may have allowed communication between El-
Hadab (Aphekah?) and Kh. Rabud/Debir depending on how tall the structures on the site
were.
xiv. Yatta (Juttah). This is another site where a modern Arab village is built over
the ancient site, however, extensive Iron II sherds were recovered during a survey of the
village (Dinur 1987: 111). The site is situated on a high ridge in the center of a triangle
formed by Ziph, Eshtemoa, and Khirbet Rabud/Debir, and it has commanding views to
Ziph, Carmel, Maon, and Eshtemoa to the east and south and Aphekah to the northwest.
xv. Kh. Ma‘in (Maon; Y231). This site was most likely a city, however, it is
difficult to trace the city wall at the site. From a defensive and communication
perspective, the site is well situated even though it does not appear that the site was larger
than 1.0 ha (Kochavi 1972b: 77). Maon is just south of Carmel and sits along the Hebron-
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Arad road, but it is at a higher elevation than Carmel, which allows it views to the Judean
Wilderness to Mt. Hebron and to Eshtemoa (Kochavi 1972b: 77). A higher ridge to the
south prevents any communication with Arad, though. A two-winged lmlk jar handle was
found during the survey of the site.
xvi. Samu’a/Eshtemoa. The nature of the site in the Iron Age is unclear and aside
from the famous silver hoard—26 kg of silver in five jugs (Yeivin 1993: 426) dated to the
Iron IIA—the only remain is a fragmentary wall discovered below the later Synagogue.
The ancient site is covered by the modern Arab city. Eshtemoa was midway between
Metzudat Yehuda and Kh. Rabud/Debir and could communicate with Maon and Juttah to
the north and east and Rujm el-Madfa‘ in the south.
xvii. Rujm el-Madfa‘ (Y246). This site is a possible tower with communication
capabilities with Samu‘a/Eshtemoa to the north and which overlooked the secondary road
toward Eshtemoa from Anim in the south (not depicted on Map 8).

Reaching Jerusalem was not an easy task for an invading army. Not only was it
sequestered in the mountains, but also fortified sites and/or topographically difficult
features surrounded it in every direction. If an invading army could reach the Central Hill
Country, they would find that the narrow strip of habitable land along the watershed was
dotted with defensible sites; north-south movement would have been just as difficult as
making the ascent from the west, south, or east. In fact, most of the sites in the Central
Hill County defended crossroads that linked the central ridge route with one of the
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ascents from lower territories. It was only in the region south of Hebron that the terrain
broadened and was more rolling, allowing for greater settlement density.
6. Geopolitical Assessment of Hezekiah’s Entire Defensive Network

The varied topography of the kingdom of Judah made any singular defensive
strategy difficult to implement. Preparations and precautions for defending mountainous
terrain were different than preparations and precautions for defending plains or more
open territory. This reality is born out in the distribution of sites within Judah as a whole
and by the types of sites within each region (see Table 5). It is useful to consider the
writings of Aeneas Tacticus on this point:
“If your territory is not easy to invade and the ways into it are few and narrow,
you should prepare them in advance—with troops distributed in the way already
described—and present an obstacle there to your assailants in their wish to march
on the city itself. Men who can recognize from fire-signals what is happening to
the various detachments should also have taken up their positions; this will enable
the different units to go to each other’s aid, if need be” (Siege 16.16).
This passage applies to the western and eastern ascents into the Central Hill Country. As
has been shown, the limited number of routes that ascend toward Jerusalem were guarded
by defensible sites, though not equally or even extensively in some cases. The sites on
these passes (or more properly, ridges) were generally smaller fortresses and towers. At
the same time, these sites were supplemented with additional towers that were not located
on the ridge routes but were on remote ridges far from actual roads. The isolation of these
supplemental fortresses/towers (e.g., Deir Baghl, Kh. Abu et-Twein, H. Eres) suggests
that their purpose was not to offer protection from any invading army, but rather, to serve
merely as observation points that could report quickly to Jerusalem and/or other sites that
were located along the roads running to the capital. Such towers/fortresses did not need to
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sit directly on roads but were situated at locations that offered the greatest view; the best
view offered the best warning because invading armies could be seen while they were
still at a distance, or at the least, smoke signals could be seen from sites further to the
west.
Region Cities Villages Fortresses Towers Unassigned Total

Shephelah 17 (27%) 2 (3%) 4 (6%) 6 (10%) 34 (54%) 63
Negev 4 (31%) 4 (31%) 1 (8%) 3 (23%) 1 (8%) 13
CBP 2 (20%) 0 1 (10%) 0 7 (70%) 10
Wilderness 0 0 3 (8%) 6 (17%) 27 (75%) 36
CHC 4 (13%) 3 (10%) 1 (3%) 5 (17%) 17 (57%) 30
Total 27 9 10 20 86 152
Table 5. Distribution by type and region of Judean defensive sites in the eighth century.
The real protection for Judah along these ascents actually lay in the ascents
themselves. If and when the sites in the Shephelah in particular were conquered, an
invading enemy would enter a kind of no-man’s land, which, while devoid of any sites of
magnitude, needed to be overcome. Yet, because of the intense faulting and steep ridges
in this area, the western (and eastern) approaches to Jerusalem were a deterrent in and of
themselves. G. A. Smith cogently notes that, “to have taken the Shephelah was to be no
nearer Judaea” (1966: 152).
In more open terrain, such as the Shephelah, Negev, and CBP, a different
settlement pattern and defensive strategy was used. For such terrain Aeneas writes,
“If, on the other hand, your territory is not difficult to invade but offers numerous
places for large armies to enter, you must occupy such strategic positions within
the territory as will make it hard for the enemy to advance…” (Siege 16.17).
In the Negev, the CBP, and especially the Shephelah, large, strongly fortified cities
occupied the strategic positions in most cases. In particular, it is apparent from the
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geographical locations of the fortified Judean sites and the Philistine sites taken by
Hezekiah in the Shephelah that they all were specifically chosen for their geographical
advantages. Cities guarded the western extension of roads or main wadis that ascended
into the Judean Hill Country further to the east. With the conquest of the western
Shephelah, Hezekiah created an enlarged buffer zone between Jerusalem and its enemies.
The enlargement of this buffer zone allowed for strong control of access to the Judean
heartland from the west and appears to be part of Hezekiah’s military strategy for
deterring Assyrian victory and ensuring continued Judean existence. And though the
numerous well-fortified sites in the Shephelah were intended to be a deterrent, they were
not likely intended to stop the Assyrian military. The real stopping-deterrent was the
topography of the western (and eastern) approaches themselves. Even in the Negev the
sudden ascents into the mountains south of Hebron served as a similar deterrent.113
In addition to serving as deterrents due to their strategic positions, the sites in the
Shephelah also offered a very integrated communication network, largely with line of
sight communication and even more extensive with the addition of smoke signals. Such a
strategic distribution of sites can also be seen in the Negev; the terrains of the other
regions—the Central Benjamin Plateau, Central Hill Country, and Judean Wilderness—
113
Luttwak (1976:61) notes,
“the value of defensive systems must be assessed in terms of the type of threat they are intended to
counter. One system may be most effective against “low-intensity” threats (infiltration, hit-an-run
raids, etc.), another against the maximal threat of invasion. Each should be evaluated accordingly,
for defensive systems are normally intended to provide a finite barrier only against a particular
kind of threat, while absorbing, deflecting, or at least filtering other threats greater or lesser in
intensity than those against which the system is designed.”
It may be suggested that the Judean strategy was effective and that the Assyrians were unwilling to attempt
the ascents en mass when it is considered that the lone Assyrian incursion into the Judean Hill Country was
carried out by only a contingent of Sennacherib’s forces.
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were far more rugged and limited the evenness of site distribution. Defensive sites,
nonetheless, were located at strategic locations first, and habitable locations second.
When the regional defenses and lines of site between fortified settlements are
assessed, there actually appears to be a good amount of redundancy in the visual
communication capability of the defense network. Even though there are key
communication sites at strategic locations, a secondary communication network,
comprised of sites situated between more strategic sites, likely operated in conjunction
with the primary sites in cases of inclement weather and/or at specific times of the year
when visibility over longer distances would have been hampered.
The redundancy in the communication network is also dictated by the practical
aspects of smoke or fire signals. Yet, what the system of signals was, how complex it
was, and how easily it was conveyed or confused is unfortunately, largely outside of our
ability to reconstruct. Some ancient sources, however, such as the Mari letters, Lachish
Letter 4, and Aeneas Tacticus do suggest that a rather developed system of fire signals
was in use. 114
114
Fire signals were used at least as early as the Middle Bronze Age at Mari (ARMT II.131.30-31; IV.31.5-
7, 21-22; 32.6-10, 12-17; see also (Dossin 1938; Glock 1968: 119–121). They are also mentioned in the
Lachish letters (cf. Jer 34:7) and later in Herodotus (7.183.1; 9.3.1) and Thucydides (2.94.1; 3.22.7-8;
3.80.2; 4.42.4; 8.102.1) among others (see also Forbes 1966: 171–180; Riepl 1913: 43–74). How fire
signals were used and what information they were meant to convey is not always clear. An extensive
reference to the operation of fire signals comes from Aeneas much later (Whitehead 1990: 111-113;
Aeneas’ original work in which the reference was composed is now lost, but fortunately the passage
relating to the signaling system is preserved in Polybius, who cites Aeneas). He describes a system where
two identical jars are filled with water. Each jar has a release valve/hole and a floating piece of cork that
has a vertical rod fixed in it. Each rod has lines drawn on it at identical intervals, and each line has a
different message. When the first defensive location wishes to signal to a second location, they raise a
torch. The second location then raises a torch to signify that they are ready to receive the signal. The signal
sender then lowers their torch and upon doing so both sender and receiver open the release valve on the
water-filled jars. When the sender raises his torch again both valves are closed and the corresponding
message is read from the rod. This detailed method of communication would decrease the amount of
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Hezekiah’s understanding of Judah’s topography in creating his defensive
strategy is attested in the archaeological record. This understanding is further inferred
from the textual sources. Now that this defensive network is understood and more fully
articulated, it is possible to begin addressing the operation and administration of such a
network, ultimately articulating the interaction between warfare and socioeconomics.
confusion or misinterpretation caused by simple smoke signals; such confusion is demonstrated by the
Athenians when they receive a signal from Boudoron during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.93.4-94.1).
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Chapter 4. The Operation of Hezekiah’s Defensive Network
The necessary operation and maintenance of the 152 sites identified in Hezekiah’s
defensive network attests to Judah’s readiness according to size as discussed in Chapter
Two; that is, the number of fortified sites during Hezekiah’s reign is greater than at any
other time in the history of Judah, and when the strategic locations of almost all of them
are considered, it is clear that Judah was ready for an Assyrian attack. The problem now
becomes identifying who was employed to operate the defenses? Were they soldiers,
civilians, or government officials? In actuality, the traditional division between military
personnel and civilians does not always apply to the ancient world, and this is no
different for Judah in the eighth century. Even military and political roles were conflated
within the officialdom. Therefore, actually establishing who manned the fortified sites in
Judah is fraught with difficulty, as is establishing the nationality of the defenders,
particularly when it is considered that not only Judeans but also Philistines and Israelites
from the northern Kingdom of Israel could have been employed. In fact, from an
archaeological perspective, there is nothing that can identify the military rank or
nationality of the inhabitants of a site during the late eighth century.115
115
This applies to sites within Judah itself. There are artifacts that suggest differences between Judean and
non-Judean sites (e.g., pillared figurines, inscribed weights, and some ceramic forms) as has been shown by
Kletter (1991, 1996, 1999). However, he also notes the caution that must be taken when attempting to use
the material culture for establishing such identities. This is particularly true at sites along the Judean
frontier with Philistia. Material remains such as late Philistine painted wares and Judean ceramic forms
(excluding lmlk jars) can indicate that both groups were at a given site, however, they may also be
reflective of trade.
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Similarly uninformative are the ancient textual sources. With one possible
exception, the Assyrian sources give no clues as to the makeup of Judah’s defenders (see
section A.ii. below). Neither do the biblical texts provide any specifics. At most, the
biblical texts mention the manning or construction of fortified sites or the provision of
weapons by the king to the people for defense of a site, but no list of specific sites,
accurate numbers of soldiers,116 or other details are preserved. Table 6, nevertheless, lists
the Judean kings, their defensive construction projects, and any other comments relevant
for assessing the Judean military organization and operation. The biblical texts do not
record that Hezekiah himself built any new fortified sites (except for Jerusalem), but
rather that he had the means to man and operate such sites (cf. 2 Kgs 20:13; 2 Chr 32:6,
27-29).117
At first glance it would seem reasonable to assume that Judeans were being used
to man and operate the defense network. 2 Chr 32:5-6 infers that the general population
in Jerusalem was given weapons and shields in order to defend the city. Also, Judean
armies are mentioned during the reigns of Asa, Amaziah, and Uzziah. However, upon
further investigation, the issue is more complicated, especially for the reign of Hezekiah.
Most references to the Judean army only mention the commanders of the army (i.e.,
commanders of thousands and hundreds); such titles do not indicate the type of army
(i.e., a standing or conscripted army) or even the ethnic composition of the army or the
116
The book of Chronicles does record the size of the army and/or the number of men who could be called
to military duty, however, the numbers offered are greatly inflated and should not be considered reflective
of actual military capability.
117
2 Chr 32:29 reads: (‫“ )וערים עשה לו‬he made cities for himself.” It may be possible to infer the
construction of fortifications from the verb ‘sh, however, that is nowhere clear.
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King Fortifications Constructed Army Passage
Rehoboam Bethlehem, Etam, Tekoa, Beth- Commanders, food stores, 2 Chr 11:5-12
Zur, Socoh, Adullam, Gath, shields and spears
Mareshah, Ziph, Adoraim,
Lachish, Azekah, Zorah,
Aijalon, and Hebron
Asa Fortified cities by surrounding Army of Judeans with large 2 Chr 14:5-7; 2 Chr
them with “walls and towers, shields and spears, 16:6 (contrast 1 Kgs
gates and bars”; built Geba and Benjaminites with large 15:17-25)
Mizpah shields and bows
Jehoshaphat Built “fortresses and store Garrisons and supplies 2 Chr 17:2, 12; 21:3
cities” cities; commanders of 1000s
Joash Commanders of 100s 2 Chr 23:1
Amaziah Calls up soldiers; handlers 2 Chr 25:5
of spear and shield; hired
100,000 Israelite
mercenaries for 100 talents
of silver
Uzziah Built cities in the territory of the Has an army; makes for 2 Chr 26:6, 9-14
Philistines; built towers in them “shields, spears,
Jerusalem; built towers in the helmets, coats of mail,
wilderness; platforms for the bows, and stones for
towers slinging”
Jotham Built on the wall of Ophel, 2 Chr 27:3-4
“forts and towers on the
wooded hills”
Hezekiah “built up all the wall [in Made weapons and shields 2 Chr 32:5
Jerusalem] that was broken and set commanders over
down and raised towers upon it, the people
and outside it he built another
wall”
Manasseh Built and outer wall for the city Put commanders of the 2 Chr 33:14
of David west of Gihon army in the fortified cities
of Judah
Table 6. Defensive actions taken by the kings of Judah according to the biblical texts.
commanders themselves. In fact, the closest the biblical text comes to explicitly
mentioning a standing army is during the reign of Uzziah (2 Chr 26:11-12), however,
even the wording here may not demand the presence of a standing army; other references
suggest that the army was called-up when necessary (1 Kgs 15:22; 2 Chr 25:5).
Additionally, the fact that so many of these martial matters are recorded only in the book
of Chronicles may call into question their reliability. Also, many of the details concerning
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the army are presented only insofar as they play a part in the theological narrative of
Chronicles.
When the reign of Hezekiah is addressed specifically, there are no definitive
statements preserved in the biblical texts that indicate who was manning the kingdom’s
defensive network and how exactly they operated. Even the above cited verse from 2 Chr
(32:5-6) leaves room for discussion; are the “military commanders” (sare milhamot)
Judeans, mercenaries, or Israelites who had fled the north in the face of Assyrian
pressure? Are the people of the city really being given weapons and shields, or is that
clause in the Hebrew separate from the appointment of military commanders over the
people and their gathering at the square at the city gate? If the people were given
weapons, are they to be equated with the people standing on Jerusalem’s walls listening
to the rab shaqe’s address in 2 Kgs 18:26? Since the evidence concerning who was
manning Judah’s defenses is ambiguous, the following sections will consider the
evidence for the use of the three possible groups for the defense of Judah: Israelite
refugees, mercenaries, and Judeans. Once this evidence is weighed, it becomes possible
to articulate who was being used to man Hezekiah’s defensive network.
1. Who is being employed?

A. Northern Refugees
The Assyrian campaigns into the southern Levant beginning in the mid-eighth
century gradually absorbed lands from the kingdom of Israel and Philistia. This
encroachment started a process of emigration into Judah that reached its apex with the
fall of Samaria. An increase in the number of people who left the northern Kingdom of
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Israel in the face of Assyrian occupation (i.e., “refugees”) finds support in the textual,
inscriptional, and archaeological records. However, before those records are assessed, it
is necessary to define what is meant by the term “refugee.”
Most concisely, refugees are “risk-initiated self migrants” (Burke forthc.-b). They
are people who leave their homes due to disasters, manmade or natural (Oliver-Smith
1996: 305), and for whom the possibility of return to their homes is not viable. Even the
threat of disaster can be enough to instigate a population movement that results in refugee
status for those moving; the Assyrian army, both in reality and psychologically, posed
such a threat to the inhabitants of Israel.118
The Hebrew term that most closely encapsulates what a refugee is, is ger (pl.
gerim). Traditionally, this term is translated as “resident alien” or “sojourner” even
though the references to the noun ger in the biblical texts, “do not mention the reasons
which led the person to become ‫( ”גר‬Ramírez Kidd 1999: 19–20). The verb gwr,
however, does connote the reason(s) why someone would become a ger, e.g., famine
(Gen 12:10; Ruth 1:1; 2 Kgs 8:1-2), war (Jer 42:15, 17, 22; 43:2, 8, 12, 14, 28), or
personal danger (Gen 27:43; 32:5) (Ramírez Kidd 1999: 19–20). Further, while the verb
gwr indicates a movement out of Israelite/Judean territory, the noun ger is used to refer to
people who have come into those same territories.
Having defined what is meant by the term “refugee” it is now possible to assess
the archaeological record for evidence of such people. Recently, Burke (forthc.-b) has
118
Consider the actions of Jonah. Aside from issues of historicity concerning Jonah himself, his actions no
doubt reflect an actual response to concerns common amongst inhabitants in the southern Levant in the face
of the Assyrian threat. He flees south from his home in Galilee, a home directly in the line of the Assyrian
army (cf. also Isa 8:23).
178
addressed the issue of refugees in antiquity with a specific focus on their identification in
the archaeological record in eighth century Judah. He compiles six lines of archaeological
data by which to gauge the identification of Israelite refugees in Judah; these are now
summarized, expounded upon, and critiqued:119 1) radical urbanization of cities such as
Jerusalem, 2) “foreign” influences on material culture, 3) inscriptional evidence
indicative of northern origins, 4) evidence for public works projects that employed
refugees, 5) an increase in the number of settlements within certain areas of Judah, and 6)
territorial expansion by Judah perhaps as a result of internal demographic pressure.
First, radical urbanization can be defined as urbanization that happens very
quickly (within one generation) and on a large scale. In the case of Jerusalem, the debate
has been whether the city expanded onto the Western Hill at the end of the eighth century
(Finkelstein 2008) or over the course of the eighth century, possibly even beginning in
the ninth century (Barkay 1992a: 367). Following the publication of Avigad’s
excavations in Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter, however, this debate can be put to rest.120 The
initial settlement on the Western Hill (Area A, Str. 9) is dated to the second half of the
eighth century based on ceramic parallels to Lachish III, including a preponderance of
wheel-burnished bowls (de Groot, et al. 2003: 15–16). This corpus continues into the
119
The author reached similar conclusions independently about how to identify refugees in the
archaeological record.
120
Actually, the original debate was whether or not Jerusalem expanded onto the Western Hill at all in the
eighth century. Jerusalem “maximalists” claimed that it did, while “minimalists” asserted that only the City
of David was occupied. Avigad’s excavations also put this debate to rest; Jerusalem quadrupled in size in
the eighth century, expanding from the City of David and Temple Mount to include the entirety of the
Western Hill (Avigad and Geva 2000: 82; Geva 2003).
Additionally, Jerusalem expanded further down the eastern slope of the City of David in the eighth
century (Shiloh 1984: 7) resulting in the construction of an additional defensive wall in the Kidron Valley
(Reich and Shukron 2000, 2003: 211f.).
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subsequent stratum, Str. 8, with the only difference being that Str. 8 contains numerous
lmlk impressions, which are dateable to the end of the eighth century. Because the Str. 9-
8 ceramics are virtually the same with the exception of the lmlk impressions, Str. 9 must
be dated closely to Str. 8—the second half to the last third of the eighth century. Even
though the date for the beginning of the Lachish III assemblage is likely in the 780s
according to Mazar and Panitz-Cohen’s dating (2001: see also the discussion in Chapter
Two), the presence of lmlk impressions in Str. 8 and the lack of any noticeable soil
accumulation between Str. 9 and 8 indicate that both strata were constructed over a
relatively short period of time. So while the expansion of Jerusalem onto the Western Hill
could have happened over an eighty-year period, it most likely actually happened in
about half that time.
Further evidence that supports a period of rapid expansion is the additional
neighborhood constructed on the eastern slope of the City of David. This region, which is
also dated to the eighth century by ceramics, had to be built before the neighborhood on
the Western Hill; if the far more expansive Western Hill were occupied first there would
be no need for the densely occupied eastern slope (Reich and Shukron 2003: 217). The
expansion of Jerusalem in the east and the west, therefore, are indicative of two
processes. The neighborhood on the eastern slope of the City of David is more indicative
of “the natural development of the life of a city” (Reich and Shukron 2003: 216), which
may be reflective of the entire time period of the Lachish III assemblage (i.e., ca. 80
years). On the other hand, the neighborhood on the Western Hill cannot be accounted for
by natural population growth over eighty years, let alone only forty; the population boom
180
in this region of the city must be indicative of another phenomenon, namely the influx of
an exogenous population.121 This influx no doubt began already during the days of
Tiglath-Pileser (see below for more on this) and is reflected in the remains of Str. 9 on the
Western Hill. With the prolonged siege of Samaria, the rate of refugees arriving in
Jerusalem greatly increased until a point when the defense of the extensive expanded
population on the Western Hill was warranted—Str. 8, which includes the massive
“Broad” Wall (W.555).
Aside from Jerusalem, evidence for “radical urbanization” is minimal. At pre-
existing cities, there is minimal change in the size of the sites. However, there are some
cities that are newly constructed during the eighth century (e.g., Aroer, Timnah/Tel
Batash). In none of the cities outside of Jerusalem, however, can a relatively conscripted
time period for the settlement of urban centers be defined; therefore, the degree to which
urbanization was “radical” cannot be established.122
As for “foreign” influences on the material culture of Judah, there is nothing that
is overt that would enable the identification of northern refugees. However, there is one
corpus that possibly indicates the influence, if not the actual presence of northerners:
tombs. Burke (forthc.-b) suggests that the different tomb types around Jerusalem as
identified by Ussishkin (1993) may represent two distinct burial customs, a northern and
121
However, limited exposure of Strata 9 and 8 architecture over the Western Hill make it difficult to
determine not only the settlement density of each strata, but also any change in density over the course of
the eighth century.
122
Some of the theories for the increase in population that led to increased urbanization in the eighth
century include: the arrival of refugees (Broshi 1974), the closing of the frontier (Stager 1985), a more
developed economy that created jobs and opportunities (Herr 1997: 155–157), governmental instigation for
the construction of fortifications and other labor projects (Halpern 1991: 25–26), and a combination of all
of these (Geva 2003: 205).
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a southern. Unfortunately, as Burke also notes, there is a dearth of tombs excavated in the
north (cf. also Barkay 1992a: 359). Therefore, no substantive comparison can be made
between Judean and Israelian tomb designs.123
Despite the problem of using the burial evidence, the presence of northerners in
Judah is probable based on one additional trend in the archaeological record, the increase
in the number of olive pressing installations in homes. While this trend is not “foreign” in
the same manner as the tomb evidence may be, it is indicative of a change in the social
structure or organization within Judah in the late eighth century due most likely to the
presence of foreigners (i.e., northern refugees; cf. Schloen 2001: 136ff.).
The site at which this transformation is most visible is Beth Shemesh (and also
possibly Tell Beit Mirsim). In the eighth century destruction layer (Level 2/IIc), olive
pressing installations appear in individual homes instead of in a central industrial area.
Such a distribution suggests a breakdown in the social network typical of Judah; if
Judeans were living there they would be working together in familial compounds with
only one pressing installation.124 Further, the quantity of oil that could be produced at
Beth Shemesh suggests to its excavators that, “the Iron Age IIB Judean oil industry was
incorporated within the social framework of the peasant communities in the Shephelah
rather than being a large-scale industry” (Bunimovitz and Lederman 2009: 137). Small-
123
It may also be that the different tomb types in Jerusalem are a reflection of differences in wealth and not
necessarily an indicator of group identification. Further, Barkay (1992a: 360) notes that many of the details
of the tombs in Jerusalem are also common at other major cities in the late Iron Age Near East (eighth-
seventh centuries), suggesting a “common market of ideas.”
124
See further the work done by C. Meyers on food production, including the role of women in food
production (Meyers 1997).
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scale, individualized production of olive oil is then a possible indicator of the presence of
refugees, as has recently been argued by Schloen (2001: 141–147).125
Unfortunately, the nearness of Israel to Judah makes the identification of two
discrete artifactual assemblages very unlikely (contra Na’aman 2009: 325). In fact, it is
only by chance that any identifiable differences in the material culture (may) exist. Yet,
despite the cultural opacity that results from most types of material culture, inscriptions
exist that are useful for identifying the nationality or nationalities of Judah’s (in
particular, Jerusalem’s) inhabitants.
There is a growing amount of inscriptional evidence for a northern presence in
Judah in the late eighth century. Rendsburg and Schniedewind (2010) argue that the
Siloam Tunnel Inscription (STI) represents an Ephraimite/Benjaminite dialect of Hebrew
and that it was engraved by individuals from southern Samaria and Benjamin who moved
to Jerusalem due to the approaching Assyrian threat to the north.126 The linguistic
argument addresses the terms re‘o, hayat, motza’, and neqibah. The first two, it is argued,
represent northern word forms different from the expected southern Judean word forms,
125
Burke adopts a similar view (forthc.-a). The difference is that Schloen and Burke argue for the scenario
just presented during the seventh century at Tel Miqne/Ekron, not the eighth century. The interpretation of
Miqne, however, is more ambiguous. Perhaps the initial increase in the number of oil presses at Ekron is an
indicator of refugee presence, but overall production capability of all the presses far exceeds any other site
in the region from any other time period; an eventual Assyrian exploitation of the region, which is the
interpretation presented by Gitin (1995, 1997), cannot be denied.
126
The question of whether or not the region of Benjamin fell under Judah’s control prior to or after
Hezekiah’s accession is important to consider. The last biblical reference to the region of Benjamin
suggests that it was under the control of Israel in the days of Amaziah following the sacking of Jerusalem
by J(eh)oash (2 Kgs 13:12; 14:8-14; 2 Chr 25:21-24). The only Judean king who is likely to have reclaimed
the territory prior to Hezekiah (based on the biblical texts) is Uzziah, though there is no reference to such a
land grab. The reigns of Jotham and Ahaz in Judah were fraught with defeat, leaving Hezekiah as the only
viable candidate for reclaiming Benjamin for Judah (a reclamation which is clear from the distribution of
the lmlk jars in all of the major cities of Benjamin).
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which are re‘ehu and hayetah. Motza’ and neqibah both appear to be regionally distinct
terms, the former a Benjaminite term for a spring127 and the latter an Israelian Hebrew
word equivalent to the Judean word ta‘aleh, “tunnel”.
In addition to the STI, there are seals from Jerusalem that attest both northern
(with the theophoric element –yaw) and southern spellings (with the theophoric element –
yahu) of the same name (Avigad and Barkay 2000). The presence of northern spelling is
evidence enough to claim that there were northerners in Jerusalem, albeit specifics cannot
be articulated when it comes to their extent, the specific function they played, or even
their specific origin within the northern kingdom.
A use of northern refugees within the government, however, would come as no
surprise during the reign of Hezekiah. His concern with re-creating the United Monarchy
(see below) juxtaposed with an influx of able-bodied workers would have led Hezekiah
to incorporate many northerners. Not all of the refugees, however, were worthy of
leadership roles; many, if not most, found work in the army (see more below) and/or on
monumental construction projects. Such jobs would have allowed the refugees to address
one of their three biggest problems—homelessness, joblessness, and landlessness—and
begin the process of socioeconomic integration into Judah.
There are two monumental public works projects that are clear in both the
archaeological and textual records: the Siloam Tunnel and the Broad Wall (2 Kgs 20:20;
Isa 22:8b-11).128 Projects such as these were ideal for the employment of a newly arrived
127
Of the other biblical texts that use this word, those that can be geographically situated depict events in
Benjamin (2 Kgs 2:21; 2 Chr 32:30; Josh 18:26).
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population that was not yet integrated into the Judean social and economic fabric. As
Burke (forthc.-b) cogently notes,
“The construction of the Siloam Tunnel, as well as the dismantling of houses [see
Isa 22:10], quarrying of stone, and construction of the Broad Wall, as well as the
work required for water systems attributed to Hezekiah were, therefore, much
more than strategic planning by Judah for a future Assyrian attack. They must
also be regarded as elements of a shrewd approach to the gainful employment of
Jerusalem’s landless and unemployed Israelite refugee population in an effort to
secure their allegiance.”
By using refugees, Hezekiah provided jobs for the jobless, but more importantly, he
minimized the impact upon the traditional social structure of Judah. Without the refugee
population, Hezekiah’s monumental construction projects would have required the
activation of a corvée labor force from among the Judeans themselves. The use of an
external population allowed for uninterrupted Judean economic production while at the
same time it added an additional component/contingent that could and needed to be
integrated into the local society. Even though strain could have been placed on
Judah/Jerusalem’s resources due to the arrival of this new group as Na’aman (2007:36)
argues, they were not likely large enough to require a complete overhaul of the Judean
production capability, but rather would have merely impacted the consumption of stored
supplies in Jerusalem.129 The trade-off between providing supplies in return for a work
128
Additional construction projects, such as the construction of new cities like Aroer or Tel ‘Ira also could
have utilized northern refugees.
129
In fact, Burke (forthc.-a) argues that approximately 5000 refugees arrived in Jerusalem at the end of the
eighth century, essentially doubling the population of the city, thus bringing the total population close to
10,000 people. Of that 5000, only roughly 20% would have been able-bodied males suitable for work.
Burke’s estimate of ca. 10,000 people is closer to Geva’s (2003: 206) estimation of 6000-7000 people and
well below Broshi’s (1975) estimate of 24,000 and Shiloh’s (1980) estimate of 20,000. Depending on
which estimate is accepted the impact created by the arrival of refugees will vary. With a larger population
their arrival would have less of an impact, but with a smaller population then perhaps Na’aman’s view is
more appropriate.
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force, however, could have been met (see Chapter Five) and would have proved a very
important propagandistic tool to Hezekiah as he sought to win favor among the new
population and motivate them to serve Judah (cf. Burke forthc.-b). Not only would
northern refugees have provided a workforce for the construction of monumental
projects, but they also would have provided an able-bodied military regiment who
already had experience fighting the Assyrians.
The fifth line of data for assessing the appearance of refugees is the increase in
the number of settlements in Judah in the late eighth century. Originally, many of the
sites in the Judean Wilderness and the Negev were dated to the seventh-sixth centuries
based on the attribution of the Lachish III assemblage to the days of Nebuchadnezzar.
However, once it was clear that that assemblage actually represents the late eighth
century, the foundation of so many new sites, in those two regions in particular, must be
attributed to the period of Hezekiah. As was argued above in Chapter Three, the Buqe‘ah
sites, sites along the Dead Sea, Tel ‘Ira, and Aroer are indicative of the increasing Judean
population in the eighth century (cf. Thareani-Sussely 2007; Vaughn 1999). The
foundation of at least two cities and scores of smaller settlements cannot be accounted for
with internal population growth alone, but rather indicates an influx of settlers from
outside, i.e., from Israel. More will be said on the settlement picture below in the
discussion of Judeans.
Lastly, Burke notes territorial expansion due to internal demographic pressures as
a possible identifying marker of the arrival of refugees. It is true that the biblical texts
credit Hezekiah with expanding Judah’s territory to the west, into what was typically
186
Philistine (and at the end of the eighth century, Assyrian) land (2 Kgs 18:8; 1 Chr 4:38-
43). Such a picture is corroborated by the presence of lmlk impressions at each of the
main cities in the western Shephelah, cities that sat along the main north-south Coastal
Highway.
While Hezekiah had the support of at least some of the Philistine population (cf.
Sennacherib’s claim in COS 2:119B that the Ekronites gave their ruler to Hezekiah), a
wholesale land grab that claimed the entirety of the western Shephelah would only have
been possible if there were enough people to defend those sites from Assyrian reaction.
As will be shown below, certain Judean males could have been used for this purpose,
however, without the arrival of refugees from the north, it would have been far more
difficult, if even possible for Hezekiah to establish a foothold along the Coastal Highway.
The arrival of a new contingent of people, who were not yet integrated into the social and
economic fabric of Judah, would have provided Hezekiah with the extra man-power
necessary to make his land-grab; Israelite refugees if they did not settle in Jerusalem were
directed to the western Judean frontier. There they established themselves temporarily,
and with Judah’s expansion into Philistia presumably in 705 B.C. they were moved to the
newly acquired sites.
In addition to the criteria discussed by Burke, there are additional passages in the
Hebrew Bible that indicate the presence of northern refugees in Judah. Most, however,
are implicit and it is only through a careful juxtaposition of multiple texts that the
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actuality of Israelite refugees can be drawn out. To begin, Mic 6:9-16 is an oracle
condemning the actions of urbanites against the poor or ruralites.130 Verses 9-12 read:
9The voice of the LORD cries to the city131—

and it is sound wisdom to fear your name:
"Hear of the rod and of him who appointed it!
10Can I forget any longer the treasures of wickedness in the house of the wicked,
and the scant measure that is accursed?
11Shall I acquit the man with wicked scales
and with a bag of deceitful weights?
12Your rich men are full of violence;
your inhabitants speak lies,
and their tongue is deceitful in their mouth.
These verses expose the corruption of the wealthy and the exploitation of the
poor. The question becomes, who are the poor that are being swindled? They no doubt
were Judeans, but even more so they were likely northern refugees. The reason for
suggesting the latter is that they were the group least likely to integrate into the society
and economy of Judah. As such, they were what the biblical texts refer to as gerim (cf.
Cohen 1990: 131). Such people could be used to work the fields (or man the defenses of
Judah) and were grouped with the poor, widows, and orphans. Gerim are those people
who “seek shelter and residence at another place, where his right of landed property,
marriage and taking part in jurisdiction, cult and war has been curtailed” (KB I.201).
Essentially, they are refugees. The fact that numerous laws concerning the protection and
rights of the gerim appear in Deuteronomy (10:18-19; 14:29; 16:11, 14; 24:17, 19-21;
130
The latter term is used by Davis (2009: 156f.), though by the mid- to late-eighth century the two are
largely interchangeable.
131
The “city” is Jerusalem, which is a metonymy of the entire corrupt nation.
188
and 26:12) indicates that this group was being afflicted.132 The next question, however, is
when were these laws imposed?
It is not the point of this research to summarize the voluminous scholarship on the
Deuteronomistic History (DH) and the composition of Deuteronomy, so it will suffice to
say that a triple redaction of Deut and the DH is followed, with the first in the days of
Hezekiah (cf. Lemaire 1986; Schniedewind 1996, 2004: 75–81; Weippert 1972).
Similarly, a determination of whether the Deuteronomist created original compositions or
merely redacted existing documents together is not of concern. The important point is
that a version of Deuteronomy (and the DH) was created that addressed and was
reflective of the culture-historic setting of the late eighth century. Many of the social laws
in Deuteronomy, particularly those laws that address gerim, are appropriately emphasized
in this time period.
It must also be pointed out that Hezekiah consciously was trying to recreate the
United Monarchy of David and Solomon (Schniedewind 2004: 74–81). In order to do
that, Israelites had to be and feel welcomed into the southern kingdom. Thus, there is
motive for imposing laws that protect gerim. Such social reform during the reign of
Hezekiah is related to the religious reforms explicitly attributed to Hezekiah in 2 Kgs
18:4-6, 21-22; 2 Chr 29-31, and whose effectiveness is recounted in Jer 26:18-19 (which
132
Portions of the so-called “Holiness Code” (in particular Lev 25:23-55) also contain statutes for right
treatment of and interaction with gerim. If Knohl (1995: 204–212) is followed, this code was first
composed by Hezekiah’s priests in the eighth century. Similarly, the castigation of the prophets Hosea
(12:8), Amos (2:6-8; 8:5-6), Micah (2:1f.; 3:11; 7:3), and Isaiah (1:23; 5:8) concerning social corruption
may indicate that additional laws in Deuteronomy dealing with judicial matters (e.g., 16:18-20; 17:8-13;
19:15; 21:22-23; 24:16; 25:1-3) were either composed or imposed in light of the massive social upheaval of
the second half of the eighth century (cf. de Vaux 1961: 144; Otto 1987: 135–161, 1994: 103–104;
Schwienhorst-Schönberger 1990: 112–113).
189
is a direct reference to Mic 3:12 but also applies to Mic 6:13-16, both of which promised
destruction due to Judah’s sins).133
Further evidence for social reform in the late eighth century is indicated by a bowl
from Beth Shemesh, which is incised with the term ’hk, “your brother.” Barkay (1991)
argues that this bowl was for collecting tithes for the poor. While such a bowl does not
suggest the presence of Israelite refugees explicitly, it must be viewed in light of the
historical context and the biblical texts, particularly Deut 14:28-29 and 26:12-13. These
passages discuss the tithe of the third year, which was intended for the “poor and less
privileged sectors of Israelite society” (Barkay 1991: 241).134 It is possible to interpret
these laws as a reaction to poverty among certain contingents in eighth century Judah;
poverty that already is explicitly suggested by the eighth century prophets (Amos, Hosea,
Micah and Isaiah). If Hezekiah’s reforms as recorded in the books of Kings and
Chronicles are to be accepted, then religious reform infers moral reform, and, in light of
prophetic denunciations of Israel and Judah, it would appear that Hezekiah re-instated or
created reform laws because the large poor population—some Judeans, but many likely
Israelite refugees—was being exploited. A combination of the increase in refugees and
the disparity between wealthy and poor (or even urban vs. rural) resulted in an increasing
133
The late eighth century, according to Knohl (1995: 224), “was a key point in the entire history of
Israelite faith and worship.” It is the time in which the so-called “Holiness School” developed from the
already existent “Priestly School”, a development reflective of the “infusing of holiness with moral content
and the application of holiness to the entire community of Israel and to the land they inhabited” (1995:
223).
134
See Neufeld (1955) for more on the use of the term “brother” in various Deuteronomistic laws. Though
he assigns a later, exilic/post-exilic date for the “brother” language, he does state that Judah’s (and Israel’s)
theocratic organization promoted implicitly such an egalitarian concept. The presence of the Beth Shemesh
bowl suggests an earlier date for such a societal philosophy.
190
level of poverty that was condemned by the prophets, addressed by Hezekiah (according
to 2 Kgs/2 Chr and Jer), and codified in the laws of Deuteronomy.
The codification of [some of] the Deuteronomic laws would be a way of
legitimization, showing the northerners that Hezekiah was truly interested in integrating
them into Judah. With the hearts of the Israelites won, Hezekiah could entice them into
service for the state, and it appears that many were incorporated into the Judean military
and likely the Judean bureaucracy. If, as it has been suggested, the Israelites were
incorporated into the Judean military, the military capability of Judah would have been
greatly increased (see n.145 below for a quantification), perhaps to the point that it was a
major factor in determining Hezekiah’s decision to rebel against Assyria.
B. Mercenaries
As with the term “refugee”, it is necessary to define the term “mercenary” before
it is possible to determine whether or not Judah utilized such individuals. Mockler (1969:
17) points out that, “a mercenary is a professional soldier, a professional soldier is not
necessarily a mercenary: the difference…implies a moral judgment.” In many ways, the
mercenary can be contrasted with the citizen-soldier, who is an individual that
participates in military activity at the behest of a government or of their own accord, and
whose allegiance is born out of an ethnic or cultural sense of duty rather than payment.
Mercenaries, however, participate in military activity entirely of their own accord and
their allegiance is to the person paying them; they are in the business of war with the sole
expectation of being paid. There are three main types of mercenaries according to
Mockler (1969: 17): 1) the individual soldier of fortune (often because of persecution at
191
home); 2) hired guards; and 3) bands of professional soldiers (who unite under
charismatic leaders).
From an archaeological perspective, the identification of any one of these types of
mercenaries is obfuscated by the fact that they are largely indistinguishable from typical
citizen-soldiers. As with refugees, unless a mercenary or group of mercenaries originated
from a location of sufficient distance whereby making their materiel (e.g., weapons,
ceramics, sealings, etc.) archaeologically distinguishable, it is very difficult to identify
such individuals unless there are specific textual references.
While there are specific Hebrew words for “mercenaries” (śekhire, śokhrim), the
occurrences of these terms are rare and occur in later periods (beginning 6th century).
Mercenaries or mercenary groups are more typically identified by their demonym: Ittai
the Gittite, Uriah the Hittite, the Kerethites, Cushites, Lydians. As there are no references
to any such terms or people groups from the days of Hezekiah, it is difficult to determine
not only whether mercenaries were used, but also to what extent they were employed.
The assumption that Hezekiah employed mercenaries (cf. Halpern 1991: 23f.) is inferred
from biblical references to Israelite/Judean kings as early as David using them (1 Sam
22:1-2; 2 Sam 11:11, 24), from the later Arad letters that mention a group referred to as
the kittim, and from Sennacherib’s mention of a group known as the LÚ.urbi in his annals
(Na‘aman 2000). After assessing the latter two lines of evidence, it will be suggested that
Hezekiah did in fact use mercenaries as has been assumed, however, his mercenaries
were not from a distant land or even professional Judean soldiers (contra Halpern 1991:
22), but were the gerim from the northern Kingdom of Israel.
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It is accepted by many that the kittim mentioned in the Arad Letters (and also Gen
10:4; Num 24:24; Isa 23:1; Jer 2:10; Ezek 27:6) refer to Greek mercenaries (Aharoni
1981: 12–13), however, Rainey has shown that the term kittim could just as easily be
applied to Phoenician traders from the site of Kition in Cyprus (Herzog, et al. 1984:
31).135 Yet, the reason that traders would receive rations at a Judean fortress is not
apparent; an identification of the kittim as mercenaries is most likely. In actuality, though,
the difference between a trader and a mercenary can be a matter of semantics, as Luraghi
(2006) points out. In the case of the Greeks from Euboia, they began as traders but upon
making contact with the east resorted at times to piracy in order to exploit goods. As
pirates they were either hired or subdued into serving greater empires, such as Assyria
(already by the eighth century). What began in trade of goods ended in trade of [military]
services.136
Despite the probable presence of Greek or Phoenician mercenaries at Arad in the
seventh century, there is no concrete evidence that Hezekiah utilized them in the eighth
century. Even if a Greek did incise the bowl mentioned by Yadin (see note 135), one
incised bowl does not necessitate the identification of a mercenary or group of
mercenaries at Arad. If Greek mercenaries were being used it is reasonable to assume that
they would be more identifiable in the archaeological record as they are in the seventh
135
Herzog (2002: 79) bridges the two identifications and states that the kittim were Phoenician mercenaries
from Kition. Yadin (1974: 32), on the other hand, held to a Greek origin for the kittim based on an incised
bowl from Str. IX, which he claimed was incised by a Greek.
136
Such a scenario complements Parke’s work (1981: 7–19) in which he details the history of Greek
mercenaries, albeit from a different sociological perspective than Luraghi. Parke notes that in the eighth
century, mercenaries worked in small contingents that hired themselves out as bodyguards, but by the fifth
century, they were much more widespread and formed entire armies. The epigraphic and archaeological
evidence of Greeks in the Near East corroborate the development of Greek mercenary practices as detailed
by Parke (though the archaeological material is open to various interpretations; see Niemeier 1995).
193
century at sites like Kabri (Niemeier 1995, 2002) and Mezad Hashevyahu (Fantalkin
2001: 137–147).137
Aside from the term kittim, the only other textual reference that may indicate the
use of mercenaries by Hezekiah is the Akkadian term LÚ.urbi. This term occurs three
times, twice in Sennacherib’s annals and once in Ashurbanipal’s (see Na’aman 2000: 621
and the citations therein). In each case the urbi are among the peoples counted as spoil.
Tadmor (1982: 454, 1988: 175–177) and Frahm (1997: 104–105) see the urbi as a type of
elite soldier, while Winckler (1906: 334) and Bauer (1933: 1) opt for “bandits” or
“fugitives” (akin to the munnabtu of the OB and OA texts; see Burke forthc.-b and
Na’aman 2007: 31–35). Alternatively, Von Soden (AHw III.1428) translates urbi as
“work group (?).” The most detailed definition is given by Na’aman (2000: 621), who
suggests that this word refers to groups of fugitives who, in response to Assyrian military
campaigns, fled from their homelands to peripheral areas, formed bands, and served on
occasion as mercenaries in the armies of rulers in revolt against Assyria. He, and more
recently Burke (forthc.-b), then note that such characteristics are typical of the bands of
Habiru so well known from late third- and second-millennium B. C. ancient Near Eastern
documents.
The contexts in which the urbi are referenced, however, do not necessarily infer
their status as mercenaries. Rather, the term urbi is more indicative of the situation of the
people classified under the term. If the term urbi derives from the verb nērubu, “to flee,
137
This assumption may only be true for coastal sites as there was no East Greek pottery at seventh-sixth
century Arad (Str. VII-VI). Perhaps, a more local ceramic repertoire was adopted the further away from the
coast mercenaries moved. Or, perhaps the kittim of seventh-sixth century Arad no longer used their native
ceramics because they had been around since the eighth century and had acculturated.
194
run away, escape” as Na’aman (2000: 622), Winckler (1906), and Bauer (1933) suggest,
then the urbi are in the same situation as the gerim. Nērubu, however, is not found in
Neo-Assyrian texts, suggesting that urbi actually derives from a different root, erēbu, “to
enter.” Nevertheless the noun urbi still belies the situation of the people classified as
such; erēbu can have legal connotations in instances where individuals “enter” into
service of the military, the king, or other individuals (CAD IV.264). The LÚ.urbi would
then be considered those individuals who have entered into a legal contract for some
service rendered; in socioeconomic parlance they are “laborers”, but in military terms
they would be “mercenaries.” A detailed look at the three occurrences of the term urbi
will further clarify its conceptual range of meaning(s).
Sennacherib mentions the urbi during his first campaign against the Chaldeans
(703 BC):
“The urbi (LÚur-bi), Arameans (LÚAramu), Chaldeans (LÚKaldu) who were in

Uruk, Nippur, Kish, Ḫursagkalamma, together with the citizens (mārē āli), the
rebels, I brought forth and counted as spoil”
The second reference is in his third campaign to the Levant (701 BC):
Hezekiah himself, the awe-inspiring splendor of my lordship overwhelmed him,

and he sent me after my (departure) to Nineveh, my lordly city, the urbi (LÚur-bi)
and his elite troops (LÚṣābē-šu damqūti) which he had brought in to strengthen
Jerusalem, his royal city, and were auxiliary troops (iršû tillāti)” (II.37–48).
The final reference comes from Ashurbanipal’s third campaign against Elam (653 BC):
I brought as spoils from the land of Gambulu to the land of Ashur the rest of Bel-
iqisha’s sons, his kinsmen, the members of his family…together with the urbi
(LÚur-bi), the rebels (LÚtēbê), the inhabitants (nišē) of the land of Gambulu…”
What stands out is the fact that the urbi are considered outsiders. In the first
passage they are juxtaposed with the citizens (mārē āli), those who are natives (lit. “sons
195
of the city”), and in the third passage they are differentiated from the inhabitants (nišē) of
the land of Gambulu. Further, in the second passage, the urbi are differentiated from
Hezekiah’s elite troops, weakening the translations of Tadmor and Frahm. Yet, it is not
necessary to disassociate entirely the urbi from any military service. Their inclusion and
even apposition with other groups of rebels and/or elite troops suggests that they did
likely serve some military role. Whether or not they were hired for their services is not
clear from the Assyrian sources; however, it stands to reason that displaced peoples
would require payment for their services as they have few other means of income.
Further, if urbi does derive from erēbu, which is likely, then payment for services is
assured.
The few occurrences of the term LÚ.urbi in the Neo-Assyrian texts suggest that
the line between “fugitive,” “refugee,” and “mercenary” is very blurred. Na’aman (2000)
is most assuredly correct in his definition of urbi as a displaced people group which has
relegated themselves to hiring out their services whether it be for military purposes or
otherwise. In this light, the term LÚ.urbi applies to the same kind of people to whom the
Hebrew term ger applies. With this equation, it may be stated that Hezekiah hired some
portion of the northern Israelite refugees (gerim) as mercenaries (for military or
construction projects) and that Sennacherib recognized this group of people as fugitives
from the Assyrian-controlled north who had entered into the service of Judah (LÚ.urbi).
Determining the number of Israelite mercenaries employed by Hezekiah is
unforutnately beyond reconstruction with the data currently available. There are too many
variables and not enough concrete details regardless of whether an attempt at estimating
196
the number is based on demography, ration lists, or volumetrics of specific ceramic forms
(e.g., the lmlk jars). The only assured statement is that Hezekiah used mercenaries from
the north. Less assured, but highly likely is that Hezekiah paid these mercenaries in kind
with supplies transported in the lmlk jars.
C. Judeans
An understanding of the role that native Judeans played, including which native
Judeans were utilized in the operation of Hezekiah’s defensive network, derives largely
from an assessment of the demographic change seen in Judah over the course of the Iron
II. Even though strict chronological anchors are lacking by which to clearly delineate
spurts in population growth, it is clear that the general increase in the number of sites and
area of cultivable land had repercussions on Judah’s social organization. Population
growth, when viewed through the lens of biblical property and inheritance laws, makes it
possible to claim that there would have been at least one “class” of Judean available for
serving the state: younger sons.138
Table 7 lists the number of surveyed sites from the Shephelah and Central Hill
Country over the course of the Iron Age II (numbers drawn from Dagan 1992b, 2004,
2006a; Ofer 1994: 104–105). An increase in both the number of sites and the estimated
hectarage is evident. In the case of the Shephelah, however, the difference in the total
number of sites is likely greater than the difference in the total hectarage because, as is
shown from excavation, the hectarage of most of the large cities and villages does not
138
Younger sons received less of the father’s inheritance than did the firstborn, who received a double
share (Deut 21:17). Also, the term “class” is merely descriptive, it is not meant to suggest that there were
actual social classes in ancient Judah.
197
appear to change substantially over this period of time. Such a number of sites:hectarage
ratio is also apparent in the results of the Southern Samaria Survey (Finkelstein, et al.
1997: 20f. (vol. 1); 894–902 (vol. 2)). From the end of the Iron I to the end of the Iron II
the number of settlements increased by 93 sites, but only 19 of those sites were larger
than 2 ha. The other 74 sites were less than 2 ha with most being less than 1 ha. The
resultant difference in hectarage was only between 83.3 and 143.1 ha, with the actual
difference closer to the lower estimate.
Number of Settlements (total Iron IIA (10th c) Iron IIA (9th c) Iron IIB/C (8th c)
estimated hectarage)139
Judean Hill Country 30 (33.5 ha) 86 (55.4 ha) 122 (92.6 ha)
Shephelah140 21 (-) 289 (416.5 ha) 289 (416.5 ha)141
Southern Samaria Survey 127 (32.5-76.7 - 220 (115.8-219.8
ha; Iron I) ha)
Table 7. Number of settlements and hectarage during the Iron Age II in the Judean Hill Country and
Shephelah.
Because Judah was removed from the main trade routes through the Levant, it
seldom entered into the larger international sphere of trade, unlike its northern
counterpart, which was split by key north-south and east-west trade routes. This more
secluded location allowed for a generally unhindered growth in population due to few
139
The number of settlements is different than the total number of surveyed sites, some of which were not
actual settlements (e.g., burial sites and sherd scatters).
140
Not all of the Shephelah has been surveyed; Dagan notes that as of 2002 only ca. 63% of the Shephelah
has been surveyed. While the total number of sites and the overall settled hectarage will change, the general
statements derived from the present amounts will remain the same.
141
This hectarage is given in Dagan 2004, however, Dagan 1992b gives 4651 ha; the smaller amount is
correct. Dagan 1992b: viii then offers a total estimated population of 182,035 for the Shephelah since only
51% was surveyed when he published his 1992 thesis (based on a density coefficient of 200 people per ha).
This number far exceeds the estimate of Broshi and Finkelstein (1992: 52), which is 111,500 people for all
of Judah in the eighth century (with a density coefficient of 250 people per ha, and including the Negev).
198
major battles or conflicts, particularly in the eighth century. While the increase in the
population of Jerusalem in the eighth century is a relatively rapid process due to the
influx of refugees, the increase in the number of settlements in the Shephelah is more
indicative of an internal population growth in Judah due to the economically productive
and stable reigns of Uzziah (785–733 B.C.) and Hezekiah in particular (cf. Geva 2003:
204-205).142 Even the reigns of Jotham (758–743) and Ahaz (743–727) allowed for
growth since neither of those kings brought negative Assyrian action against Judah.143
Population (200 p/ha) Iron IIA (10th c.) 9th c. 8th c

JHC 6700 11,080 18,520
Shephelah 4200 - 50,000-
83,300144
Table 8. Estimated population by century in the Judean Hill Country and Shephelah. The density
coefficient is taken as 200 people per ha.
Over the course of 200 years, using the year 900 as the starting date and the year 700 as
the ending date, there is a 0.88% annual percentage growth rate in the population of the
JHC per year. The annual percentage growth rate of the population in the Shephelah,
however, reaches an incredible 5.45–9.42%, numbers that are greater than any given for
population change even in the present period (UN World Populations Prospects: 2006
142
This does not preclude an increase in population due to refugees but merely infers that a substantial
amount of the increase is due to internal development.
143
The regnal dates follow those given in Cogan and Tadmor (1988).
144
The number of 50,000 is the estimate given by Broshi and Finkelstein (1992: 52) while the 83,300 is
that of Dagan 2004. The ceramics of the ninth and eighth centuries are difficult to differentiate, which is
why Dagan offers only one population estimate.
199
Revision).145 Again, the lack of strict chronological markers between 900 and 700 B.C.
makes assessing more idiosyncratic trends impossible; yet, it is most likely that the high
percentage of annual growth was not the actual percentage of growth every single year,
but reflects a large increase in the population towards the end of the period in question.146
Regardless, such a massive population increase impacted Judah’s social structure.
Congruent with the increase in population and number of settled hectares in
Judah, there was an increase in the area of land exploited for agricultural production
(Feig 2003; Gibson and Edelstein 1985: also, see Chapter Five below). This increase in
arable land brought with it claims to that land and legislation meant to address those
claims. Such legislation governing the distribution and inheritance of land is recorded in
Lev 25, 27, Num 26, 36, and Deut 21:15-17. To begin, allotments of land stayed within
the same clan group (mishpahah; pl. mishpahot) in perpetuity. Within the mishpahot,
individual families could become wealthy or poor depending on the number of grown
sons who could potentially inherit a father’s land and whether the family kept redeemed
lands from other families within the mishpahah.
Dealing with the latter issue first, any time a family lost its land, either through a
father’s lack of offspring (both sons and daughters) or through the death of his sons, it
145
The highest annual growth rate anywhere in the world according to the UN reaches just above 4%. The
0.88% of the JHC is near the median.
146
If the 0.88% annual percentage growth rate of the CHC is applied to the tenth century population
estimate in the Shephelah, the population would only be 24,225 people by the year 700. This would mean
that there are an estimated 25,775–59,075 people who are unaccounted for. It is plausible that this amount
of Israelite refugees came to Judah following Shalmaneser’s/Sargon’s conquest of Samaria. Based on
population estimates, there were ca. 350,000 people in the kingdom of Israel in the eighth century prior to
Assyrian interaction (Broshi and Finkelstein 1992: 54). Consider also the 27,290 people that Sargon claims
to have deported following the conquest of Samaria (COS II: 2.118E, 296). That upwards of 20,000
refugees fled to Judah is not improbable, however, determining whether such a group can account for the
missing population in Judah, or whether there was actually a greater growth rate in Judah is unclear.
200
was customary for a member of the mishpahah to redeem (or claim) the land. The
redemption of a family’s land by a member of the mishpahah was considered a duty that
had to be fulfilled, and there was a hierarchy of individuals to whom such a duty fell: son,
(daughter), brother, uncle, nearest relative (Num 27:8-11). Despite the inference that the
redeemed land then would be returned to the redeemed, Westbrook (1991: 60) notes that
the legislation in Lev 25:25ff. never states explicitly that the redeemer (the go’el) is
obligated to return the redeemed land to its owner (cf. Jer 32:6-8). Instead, the purpose of
redeeming the land was to keep it within the mishpahah until the Jubilee, at which time
lands were to be returned to their original owners (every 49 or 50 years). However,
despite legislation mandating such a practice, the actual observation of the Jubilee during
the Judean monarchy is speculative. The result was a society with ever diversifying levels
of wealth.147
Any perusal of the eighth century biblical prophets from either the northern
Kingdom of Israel or from Judah will show that many of the social injustices that those
prophets lament are the results of such disparity in wealth (cf. Isa 5:8; 10:1-2; Mic 2:1-2;
147
Depending on the reliability or level of practice of the Levitical property laws the increase in the number
of cities in Judah in the eighth century could have had a large impact on the social organization. According
to Lev 25:29-34, ownership of a house within a city could be established by anyone regardless of tribe,
clan, or family. Within one year of the purchase of such a house it could be redeemed by the seller,
however, after one year’s time, the house remained in the possession of the buyer and his descendents
forever. This scenario is different for homes in villages, which were treated like fields and could be
redeemed in the Jubilee year. The construction of city walls thus allowed for the disintegration of the
traditional social ties, which during the Iron I, and much of the Iron IIA-B, could be re-established every 50
years. However, if no conscious effort was made to redeem urban homes, then the traditional social bonds
that characterized Israel/Judah were weakened. This process is further complicated if an influx of refugees
to urban areas is factored in. It they remained in Judean cities for one year, then their property was theirs in
perpetuity.
The possibility that individuals outside of one’s mishpahah could move into one’s neighborhood and
remain there is an interesting problem. Were such individuals incorporated into the tribe/mishpahah
because of locality, or were they viewed as different, a view which ultimately would lead to increased
diversity among neighborhoods (cf. Schloen’s discussion of tribal association and neighborhoods in the
Late Bronze Age (2001)).
201
Amos 2:6b-8). Both the Israelites and Judeans are convicted to show mercy to and
support the poor, gerim, widows, and orphans. That these peoples and social injustice are
so emphasized by each of the eighth century prophets implies that there is a contingent of
Judean society that was landless and without any family support system. After all, how
does one become poor? One lacks land and/or the extended family to protect them
through redemption or support. These traits are particularly clear in the case of the gerim
and the orphans, who would have had no recourse but to hire themselves out to either
landed peers or the government. Similarly, younger sons, for whom starting their own
household was difficult because of insufficient wealth and land-holdings (see below),
were relegated to similar means of survival.
Diversification of wealth in the eighth century is also evident in the archaeology,
which shows fewer wealthy extended households and more poor nuclear households.148
In fact, Schloen (2001) posits that at any given time one-third of the total families in a
given ancient Near Eastern culture are extended and two-thirds are nuclear.149 With an
average of 4-6 persons per nuclear family (Schloen 2001: 126; Stager 1985: 21), there
would be only 1-2 grown sons, if that. In reality, though, many family lines would die out
due to high mortality rates and their land would pass back to the mishpahah.150
148
Campbell (1994: 48–49) addresses this difference in household sizes and subsequently, wealth, arguing
that the curses of Amos are manifest in the archaeology of Shechem. In Str. VII, which was destroyed by
the Assyrians, the larger homes had a far more exotic and luxurious material assemblages than smaller
homes.
149
Stager (1985: 20) suggests the number may be closer to one-half.
150
In the case where a father has only daughters (e.g., Zelophahad, Num 27:1-11), those daughters received
the land inheritance but were required to marry within the mishpahah (Num 36:6-8).
202
The preponderance of nuclear households instead of houses clustered around a
larger central house (the bet ’ab) is clear at many eighth century settlements.151 Further,
the number of planned settlements (e.g., Beersheba, Arad, Tel ‘Ira, Aroer, Timnah/Tel
Batash) and monumental/government buildings increases. The part of the population that
traditionally would have necessitated the portioning of the bet ’ab (i.e., younger sons for
whom starting their own household was not possible) now was moving into state-
sponsored settlements and/or government housing, thus allowing them the potential to
start their own household.152 Additionally, the individualization of items like pressing
basins for oil or wine, objects typically shared by multiple families but which are much
more common in the eighth century, indicates a breakdown in the mishpahah-centered
lifestyle that characterized early Israel.
The greater frequency of nuclear households in the eighth century, however, is
actually contrary to what is expected with a population increase like that seen in Judah
over the course of the Iron IIA-B as shown above. As population increases, available land
becomes scarcer and the carrying capacity of the land is often reached (Wilk and Rathje
1982: 627ff.). Scarcer available land makes the practice of partible inheritance, in which
each son receives a portion of the father’s inheritance, less viable—otherwise
inheritances would continue to become smaller and smaller—and it encourages extended,
patrilocal residences. Why there is actually an increase in the number of nuclear
151
E.g., Beersheba, Aroer, and Lachish. This statement does not apply to every site (e.g., Tell Beit Mirsim,
Tell en Nasbeh), but is representative of Judean society on the whole.
152
Incidentally, those who worked for the government because they had no other option often ended up
receiving royal land grants and/or accumulating land through appropriation or excessive taxation (Dearman
1988: 58–61 (Charts 1 and 2), 126–127).
203
residences as opposed to an increase in the number of extended residences is related to
the increase in the bureaucracy of the Judean kingdom, and also likely represents refugee
families who were split apart by war.
This bureaucracy was being operated by the enlarged number of those who left
their extended families because of difficulties in “establishing themselves as heads of
household, with sufficient land and wealth” (Stager 1985: 25); i.e., younger sons.
Essentially, there was a “closing of the frontier,” to borrow Stager’s phrase, which meant
that opportunities for acquiring land were effectively stopped. An increase in the number
of bureaucrats is attested by the number of sealings and impressions found by
archaeologists and dated to the end of the eighth century. However, there were only so
many government jobs, leaving opportunities in the army as the most likely possibility.153
Whether or not the increased Judean bureaucracy evidenced in the days of
Hezekiah was the result or the cause of younger sons leaving the traditional familial
structure is not apparent. It would seem that, as with the scenario presented by the influx
of Israelite refugees, Hezekiah adapted and expanded the government and military in
order to incorporate the increased number of these more alternative people groups. These
changes subsequently hastened the dissolution, or at least the weakening, of the
traditional kin-based social organization of Judah.154
153
As Stager (1985: 28) notes, “it was not the firstborn who made a name for himself in the affairs of the
state…it was from the ranks of late-born noble youths, aggressively pursuing wealth and power to match
their status, that the most important positions in the army, priesthood, and palace were filled.”
Concerning the priesthood, Rainey (1994: 339) suggests that the Levitical names and the “sons of
Korah” which are mentioned on an ostraca from rooms adjacent to the temple at Arad, and which came
from Str. VIII, “might represent new personnel posted there by Hezekiah.”
204
2. Socioeconomic Assessment of Operating Hezekiah’s Defensive
Network
Internal development in Judean society along with the arrival of the Assyrians
beginning with Tiglath-Pileser III set in motion the changes that, shortly thereafter, would
allow Hezekiah the means to begin preparing for a rebellion. These means were
recognized and exploited by Hezekiah, subsequently furthering socioeconomic change in
order to provide Judah with the best opportunity for success against the Assyrians. In
other words, military considerations and warfare influenced socioeconomic development
and change, and socioeconomic transitions allowed for and influenced specific military
actions.
An initial, gradual emigration of northerners into Judah would not have greatly
impacted the social structure or economy; small groups of refugees could easily find a
niche within village or city life. It was largely with the three-year siege of Samaria, a
period before deportation but a period in which the inevitable outcome could be grasped,
that most northerners would have fled to Judah. This larger influx of northerners,
juxtaposed with the increasing population of poor and landless Judeans created the right
conditions for socioeconomic change, which itself enabled Hezekiah to begin preparing
for a rebellion. On the one hand, the economy of Judah benefited, and on the other hand
the traditional kin-based social structure was weakened.
154
Halpern (1991) sees a similar sociological shift but he attributes Hezekiah’s religious reforms as the
catalyst for such changes as opposed to military concerns. This religious reform, according to Halpern,
went hand in hand with the “hedgehog” defense of Judah; Hezekiah deprived people of the rural cults and
forced them into urban settings, both ways of centralizing his power. That the religious reforms should
have such a sociological and demographic reflex, however, is difficult to accept. The number of
agricultural sites with eighth century ceramics (including lmlk impressions) warns against such a
perspective (see the following chapter).
205
Still, even with a rapid influx of refugees, the settlement pattern and the overall
impact that these refugees had on Judah is difficult to determine for sites outside of
Jerusalem. In fact, aside from Jerusalem, it is highly unlikely that a specific quantitative
impact on Judah’s socioeconomics or an estimate of how many northerners arrived can
be determined. At the same time, the presence of Israelite refugees who could be used for
construction projects and military service did have a great impact on the Judean economy
at the end of the eighth century; an impact that was more positive than it was negative.
Despite claims by Na’aman (2007: 36) that the arrival of Israelite refugees would
“undermine the internal equilibrium…[and] would have threatened both the elite and the
general populace”—problems that were quite possible—there is no indication in the
archaeology or texts that such problems occurred. Quite the opposite, the archaeological
record suggests a blossoming economy in Judah and Jerusalem. Also, the arrival of
Israelite refugees was not an unexpected and sudden event, which must be assumed if the
chaos claimed by Na’aman was real, but rather, as has been argued above, it started
already in the 730s when Assyria first appeared in the southern Levant (cf. Burke forthc.-
b).155
155
In agreement with Burke (forthc.-b), the growth of Jerusalem is the result of Israelite refugees not
Judean refugees. The idea of Judean refugees moving to Jerusalem as argued by Broshi (1974) is possible
only following Sennacherib’s withdrawal. To assume that Judeans moved to Jerusalem during that king’s
campaign is to argue against the massive number of fortified sites in the kingdom, particularly the
Shephelah; sites that were fortified exactly for the reason of allowing protection for the people. Only once
Jerusalem survived Sennacherib’s campaign did that city become qualitatively different. Zion theology
developed and an air of impermeability surrounded Jerusalem. Before the end of Sennacherib’s campaign
Jerusalem was just another city and would have instigated no special sense of defensibility that resulted in
an influx of Judean citizens.
206
Even the textual sources (i.e., the prophetic books of Micah and Isaiah)
concerning Judah in the second half of the eighth century belie a burgeoning economy.
Both the local and royal economies were prospering as is indicated by the increase in the
number of agricultural sites and exploitation of greater areas of land over the course of
the eighth century (Dagan 1992b, 2004, 2006a; Feig 2003). At no other time for the
kingdom of Judah is such economic production apparent, or even archaeologically
visible.
The economy was actually strengthened by the arrival of Israelite refugees
because they provided an additional work force not only for agricultural work, but for
more specialized jobs such as government-sponsored construction projects, military
service, and/or administrative positions. Jobs that typically were done by corvée laborers
drawn from the Judean population could now be filled without pulling valuable man-
power from equally important agricultural duties. While the numbers of Israelite refugees
were not likely so high as to preclude the use of all Judeans for government reasons, they
were substantial enough that no corvée of Judeans is mentioned during the reign of
Hezekiah. Before continuing the socioeconomic discussion, it is necessary to consider the
presence and operation of the corvée in Israel/Judah as this institution was intimately tied
to socioeconomics.
As with the use of mercenaries, the use of corvée labor (mas) in the days of
Hezekiah is also an assumption that has not been proven explicitly (contra Mendelsohn
1962). What few biblical references there are to corvée labor suggests that such a work
force was drawn from either the conquered Canaanites (1 Kgs 9:21) or the Israelites
207
themselves (1 Kgs 5:13). Aside from the pre-monarchic and early monarchic (i.e., the
days of David, Solomon, and Rehoboam) periods, however, there are no explicit
references to the corvée. Of the extant references, a number merely refer to the position
of “chief of the corvée” (sar mas; 2 Sam 20:24; 1 Kgs 4:6; 5:28; 12:18) without
specifying who comprised the work force under this official.156
Only one “chief of the corvée” is mentioned in the Bible, Adoram/Adoniram the
son of Abda, who held the position under David, Solomon, and even Rehoboam. Though
this official position is not mentioned again for later monarchs, it may be inferred from
passages such as 1 Kgs 15:22, which states that Asa made a decree concerning the
fortification of Geba and Mizpah that none of the people were exempt from participation.
Also, Jer 22:13 chastises Jehoiakim for making men work without pay, meaning that they
were essentially a corvée labor force. That the corvée was still a viable institution at the
end of the Judean monarchy is illustrated by a seal mentioning one Pelayah, “chief of the
corvée” (Avigad 1980). Though this seal is from an unknown provenance, it is dated by
paleography and ornamental design to the seventh century (and also because the name
Pelayah only appears in the Bible in late contexts).
Yet, the negative connotation given to corvée work (it was the reason the United
Monarchy split) and the explicit reference to it in the days of Jehoiakim, actually suggest
that corvée labor was not a common practice. When it did happen it was worthy of
mention. Further, whether the lack of any seals or other inscriptions that mention a sar
mas during the reign of Hezekiah is “purely accidental” as Avigad claims (1980: 173), or
156
Though, it can be inferred that the labor force was drawn from the Israelites themselves, a fact that
would justify Samuel’s warnings concerning a monarchy in 1 Sam 8:10-18.
208
reflective of the non-use of the institution at that time is not possible to establish with
certainty. A consideration of the socioeconomic situation as presented above, however,
suggests that even if the corvée was a possibility for Hezekiah, he was not likely to have
need of it.157
The term “corvée” infers a government-mandated period of service. When the
population being used for government work, either agricultural or constructional, is not
there because of a mandate, but is there voluntarily and/or as hired workmen, the term
corvée is not appropriate. Between the landless, jobless refugees, poor, and younger sons,
there was an ample body of possible workmen who would have been willing to serve the
government in exchange for food (or possibly some other payment). The need, therefore,
to call upon the general population for the corvée was minimal at best. Further support
for the non-use of the corvée by Hezekiah is seen in the change in social structure of
Judah.
While the economy of Judah was blossoming and continued to benefit from the
arrival of Israelite refugees as well as endogenous growth, the social structure was
breaking down because of these same events. Even with the increase in cultivable land as
attested by the increased number of settlements and agricultural installations, most
intensively in the Shephelah, the increase in the population of Judah would have led to a
new “closing of the frontier.” Partible inheritance would cease leading to an increase in
the number of males whose best chances to build their wealth was to enter the service of
157
The unpopularity of the corvée is illustrated in the “Assur Charter” (K.1349; AR II §133-135) from the
period of Sargon II (721–705 B.C.). This document records how the people of Assur rebelled against
Shalmaneser V, placing Sargon on the throne, after the former imposed corvée on them.
209
the government, military, or even priesthood. The presence of this contingent within
Judah allowed Hezekiah to man his defensive network.
Not only was there a shift in the social organization of the native Judeans, but
even more so, there was a social shift amongst the northern refugees. Kin groups
fractured due to deportations, and the means for survival—i.e., agricultural production—
was lost upon fleeing from their land. And even though most of the inhabitants of Judah
and Israel derived their means of living from agricultural production, those northerners
who fled to Judah found that such a lifestyle was not viable for them (at least initially)
because there was not enough arable land for Judah’s own population. The means of
making a living, which largely influences social organization, had to be reassessed.
Unfortunately, little work has been done on refugees in the ancient world, let
alone any specific studies that might investigate their place in society and their impact
upon that society. Assessing such items is made more difficult by the fact that refugees
should only remain as such for a limited time because the hope is always to return to their
original home or to be integrated into the new society (in which case they would no
longer be considered refugees); the expectation of return is what establishes a refugee as
a refugee instead of as an immigrant (Burke, pers. comm.).
If there were an expected return, then how likely would northern Israelites have
been to build terraces, plant vineyards, or grow olives—all activities that are very labor-
intensive? It makes better sense that refugees would settle in cities where they could work
as specialists or join the military. Though there are not specific biblical passages that
record the expectations or motivations of the northern Israelites following the Assyrian
210
destruction of Samaria, the expectations and desires of the Judeans during the exile offers
a close parallel. There was a clear desire to return “home” amongst an unknown portion
of the exiles. At the same time, however, there was a part of the exilic community that
adopted their refugee status and created lives for themselves in the exile (cf. the Murashu
family); their lack of desire to return home classifies them as “forced immigrants” instead
of refugees.
Ultimately, the potential for integration into or affectation of the Judean social
and economic spheres by the Israelites hinges on whether or not they can be viewed as
refugees. That is, if the Israelites expected to return to their own lands, then how much
effort would be put into preparing a plot of land? Terraces would need to be built, fields
cleared of stones, vineyards and olive orchards planted; each of these items is a labor-
intensive process whose benefits, with the exception of clearing fields of stones, would
not be experienced for multiple years. To maintain any kind of traditional agriculturally
based society as was practiced in Israel, the northern refugees would have to have a
desire to stay, a trait that effectively eliminates their status as refugees; the sense of
permanence inferred from an agricultural lifestyle does not match the expectations of a
refugee.
Unfortunately, the textual and archaeological records obfuscate the status or
desires of northern Israelites in the kingdom of Judah; the biblical texts, while containing
stories from the northern kingdom, are largely written from a Judahite perspective.
Following the destruction of Samaria and the deportation of a (large?) portion of Israel’s
population, there are no references to what happened to the remainder of the people.
211
Some likely fled to Judah, but the biblical texts are not concerned with this group,
choosing instead to focus on the fate of the Judeans themselves. In all probability, many
Israelites likely already fled to Judah following the initial interaction with Assyria under
Tiglath-Pileser III in the 730’s well before the Assyrians destroyed Samaria.
Similarly, the archaeological record is vague as it concerns Israelites in Judah.
While there is a clear increase in the population of both Jerusalem and the Shephelah, it is
unclear whether this increase is due to the same phenomenon, or if there are two separate
scenarios. In other words, where do refugees generally settle? Do they settle in or
clustered around urban centers, or do they diffuse into the countryside? The location of
settlement will require different actions for survival. If refugees settle in an urban
environment, they can survive on markets and by working as specialists.158 While
Schloen’s (2001) arguments against any rural-urban dichotomy still apply to Iron Age
polities, the increase in specialization, along with the closing of the frontier, does result in
the development of some sociological differentiation. Urbanites, particularly government
officials, in the Iron Age no doubt relied more on markets and rations than they did on
their own agricultural capabilities or even skills to procure supplies. Refugees also could
more easily adopt such a lifestyle than they could a rural lifestyle, which would assume
owning some land. In fact, if a desire to return to the homeland is a determining factor in
classifying a refugee, then this desire almost always is accompanied by a sense of the
ephemeral nature of the current situation. A rural lifestyle would not be ideal for any
refugee because such a lifestyle assumes a sense of permanence (see above).
158
This does not infer that there is no agricultural aspect to urban life, merely that the time from preparation
to pay-off is much shorter.
212
A result of the socioeconomic changes just described is manifested in the
ceramics of the late eighth century. There is a standardization of ceramic forms in the
eighth century (Mazar 1990a: 509). As a result, mass production becomes the norm and is
attested by the frequency and wide ambit of similar forms throughout Judah.159 The
ceramics of Stratum A at Tell Beit Mirsim show a high level of standardization (Kelso
and Thorley 1943: 120), as do those in Stratum III at Lachish, a standardization that is not
present in the ceramics of Level IV (Zimhoni 2004b: 1705). This standardization of
ceramic forms, in particular the wheel-burnished wares, could be related to initiatives
established during the rule of Hezekiah. In addition, Defonzo (2005: 13) argues that,
“ceramic standardization can be demonstrated…it is linked with the scale of production,
and that this scale is at least broadly reflective of the level of societal complexity
involved.” Since the scale of production of many Lachish III-style ceramics, including in
particular the lmlk jars, is greater than previous oval-shaped store jars, a greater level of
societal complexity is inferred. The increased number of bureaucrats in the days of
Hezekiah also suggests this complexity.
3. Conclusions
The growth of population in Judah in the eighth century appears to be natural in
the countryside but influenced by the influx of refugees in urban areas, e.g., Jerusalem.
This population increase provided Hezekiah with the personnel and potential to prepare
his kingdom for rebellion. At the same time, the sustenance of the additional population
required a more efficient exploitation of the resources of Judah, a topic that will be
159
The level of standardization is greater among the assemblages of individual sites than it is between the
assemblages.
213
addressed in the next chapter. It appears that the standardization of ceramic forms was
established as a way of exploiting time and resources and is likely the result of a shift
from small-scale production to large-scale (government-established) production. The
countryside continued to produce its goods, only now Hezekiah extracted more of those
goods through taxation in kind, a phenomenon represented by the lmlk jars.
In addition to better production capabilities, increased manpower allowed for a
proliferation of defensive sites in the days of Hezekiah. Further, the locations of the
defensive sites detailed above in Chapter Three attest to Hezekiah’s understanding of
Judah’s topography including what regions had to be protected, and where troops should
be dispatched and/or defensive settlements should be constructed. The necessity of
defending the numerous regions and resources of Judah (which will be discussed in the
next chapter) in turn led to an increase in the size of the Judean military, though, whether
there was a usual standing army or not is beyond determining at present. It is sufficient to
state that this army was composed of native Judeans—mostly younger sons—and
Israelite refugees, people whose incorporation into the military produced the least amount
of impact upon the economics of Judah but whose social status could be improved the
most. Again, warfare and socioeconomics in ancient Judah were entwined—a tight
system in which both parts of the system were constantly interacting and influencing one
another.
214
Chapter 5. The Administration of Hezekiah’s Defensive
Network
In Chapter Four it was argued that landless Judeans and Israelite refugees filled
positions in Hezekiah’s administration (and military) based on archaeological, textual,
demographic, and sociological grounds. It was shown how both the potential for
increasing the bureaucracy and the necessity of increasing the bureaucracy during
Hezekiah’s reign affected Judah’s social structure. We now turn to a discussion of how
these circumstances impacted the economy and the administration of Hezekiah’s Judah,
and in turn, the effect that economy and administration had upon the kingdom’s defensive
preparations. Indeed, an effective administration would have allowed for a maximization
of economic exploitation.
In order to understand Hezekiah’s administration, which itself is not explicated in
the ancient texts, one must assess the divisions of the Judean landscape as recorded in the
town lists of Josh 15:21-62; 18:25-28. After introducing these district divisions and
various views of dating these town lists, the discussion turns to how archaeological finds
at various sites point to a date in the late eighth century, the period of Hezekiah, for these
lists.160 Within this context the important issue of the four place names on the lmlk jars is
then addressed. Yadin (1961) claimed that the names represent district capitals in a
streamlined administrative system dating to the days of Hezekiah. We argue, however,
that these four place names represent an essential economic structuring that Hezekiah
160
There is, however, a precedent for dividing the country along similar lines that dates back at least into
the Late Bronze Age (cf. Alt 1930: 198 n.5; Hess 1994).
215
created to prepare Judah administratively for rebellion. The second section of this
chapter then assesses the changes in Judah’s economy as a result of the administrative
policies adopted by Hezekiah in preparation for his rebellion.
1. The Issue of Judean Districts

Josh 15:21-62 and 18:25-28 are integral for delineating Judean districts. In these
passages there are twelve clusters of sites arranged within four larger regions: one cluster
in the Negev (15:21-32), one in the Wilderness (vv. 61-62), seven in the Central Hill
Country (vv. 48-60; 18:25-28), and three in the Shephelah (15:33-44).161 The smaller
sub-divisions are listed by topographic regions as was noted by Alt (1925) and Noth
(1953), and more recently by Aharoni (1979; cf. also Aharoni, et al. 1993: 106) and
Rainey (1980). In fact, a close investigation of the towns within each sub-division shows
that major geographical features such as wadis, mountain ridges, or in some cases,
ancient roads delineate the clusters from each other (see Map 9). It is generally accepted
that each sub-division reflects a geographically distinct administrative district; districts
that were established by David as part of his census according to 2 Sam 24//1 Chr 21
(Kallai 1986; Na’aman 1986a).
Despite the support given to a Davidic date for the districts themselves, no
consensus was established for the date of the town-lists used to articulate these districts:
Alt (1953) thought the lists reflected the period of Josiah, Cross and Wright (1956) the
161
Josh 15:45-47 includes territory in the Philistine Coastal Plain with the cities of Ekron and Ashdod listed
as the most prominent cities in the two regions there. That these regions were an original part of the
inheritance of Judah is doubted by most scholars (Rainey 1980: 195). Instead, the inclusion of these coastal
regions is suggestive of a Judean expansion into the area, something that happened only during the reigns
of Uzziah and Hezekiah.
216
period of Jehoshaphat, Kallai (1958) the period of Hezekiah, Aharoni the period of
Uzziah (1959), and Rainey (1980) the period of either Uzziah or Hezekiah. Recent
archaeological finds, however, provide an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that
the town-lists preserved in the biblical texts are most reflective of Hezekiah’s day.162
Map 9. Map showing the administrative districts of Judah in the days of Hezekiah
162
This statement does not preclude the fact that there may have been slight adjustments in the days of
Josiah.
217
District Sites Lachish III ceramics Lachish III ceramics
with Lmlk impressions but no lmlk impressions
1 (15:22-32) Arad Y
Aroer Y
Beersheba Y
Sansannah Y
(En-)Rimmon (Halif) Y
2 (vv. 33-36) Eshtaol Y
Zorah Y
Zanoah Y
Adullam Y
Socoh Y
Azeqah Y
Shaaraim (Qeiyafa) Y
3 (vv. 37-41) Migdal-Gad (Amazya) Y
Lachish Y
Eglon (T. ‘Eton) Y
Maqqedah (Kh. el-Qom) Y
4 (vv. 42-44) Libnah (T. Bornat) Y
Ashnah (Idna) Y
Qeilah Y
Mareshah Y
5 (vv. 48-51) Qiryath-sepher (Debir) Y
Eshtemoa Y
Anim Y
6 (vv. 52-54) Qiryath-arba (Hebron) Y
7 (vv. 55-57) Maon Y
Carmel Y
Ziph Y
8 (vv. 58, 59b) Halhul Y
Beth-zur Y
Gedor Y
9 (v. 59a LXX Teqoa Y
only) Ephrathah (Bethlehem) Y
Bether Y
Manahath (er-Ras) Y
10 (vv. 60) Qiryath-baal (Qiryath-yearim) Y
11 (vv. 61-62) Qumran (City of Salt) Y
En-gedi Y
12 (18:25-28) Gibeon Y
Ramah Y
Mizpah Y
Kephirah Y
Motza Y
Jerusalem Y
Table 9. Sites identified in Josh 15 and 18 with firm eighth century dates
218
First, sites such as Aroer IV, Sansannah, er-Ras, and the sites in the Wilderness
initially appear only in the eighth century, as is clear from their Lachish III-style
ceramics. At the same time, lmlk impressions (in addition to Lachish III-style ceramics)
have been recovered from almost all of the towns listed in Josh 15:21-62 and 18:25-28
that have been identified confidently. This latter fact clearly places the towns’
occupations in the late eighth century (see Table 9); at no other time does the archaeology
match the town-lists so well.
Second, as Rainey (1980: 195) has pointed out, the inclusion of Ekron, Ashdod,
and Gaza within the territory of Judah best fits the period of Hezekiah. Such an expansion
into Philistia is not only preserved in 1 Chr 4:41-43, but is also attested in the
archaeological record with the presence of lmlk impressions at the first two sites.
Third, absence of Beth Shemesh from district two fits the literary and
archaeological data, contrary to Cross and Wright (1956: 215–217) who argue that the
absence of Beth Shemesh in Josh 15 requires that the town lists be dated to a period when
that site was uninhabited. Both the original excavations of Grant and the more recent
excavations of Lederman and Bunimovitz have shown that the walled site of Level 3 (IIb)
was destroyed around the middle of the eighth century only to be rebuilt as an un-walled
village at the end of the eighth century. In addition, 2 Chr 28:18 lists Timnah, Socoh, and
Gimzo each “with their villages,” while no villages are attributed to Beth Shemesh (cf.
Aharoni 1959: 244f.); importance has shifted west from Beth Shemesh to Timnah, a fact
also clearly illustrated in the archaeology. Even more, Beth Shemesh is absent from 2 Chr
219
11:10—part of the list of Rehoboam’s fortified cities—while the site of Zorah is listed.163
When all of these facts are juxtaposed it becomes clear that Beth Shemesh was not one of
the main settlements in the district. Its diminished role in Judah, partially as a result of its
poor eastward visibility in comparison to Zorah, relegated it to one of the villages
(hatzerim) within the district. Thus, the exclusion of Beth Shemesh from the list of towns
in Josh 15 does not preclude the list’s composition in the days of Hezekiah, but actually
strengthens such a position.
Since the Judean districts are reflected in the city lists given in Joshua, and also
because those lists reflect the period of Hezekiah, there is a clear delineation of Judah’s
administrative districts at the end of the eighth century. The question then is, do the lmlk
jars/impressions relate to this twelve district administrative system since both are dated to
the period of Hezekiah? If so, how? If not, then what do the lmlk jars/impressions
indicate?
A. Economic versus Political Administration

As early as Clermont-Ganneau (1901: 16) the lmlk jars were associated with
Judean administration. The four sites of the lmlk impressions were considered district
capitals, an idea that was furthered by Macalister (Bliss and Macalister 1902: 114),
elaborated upon by Albright (1925: 49ff.), and refined by Yadin (1961b). Yet it was only
163
There is a debate over the date of the list of Rehoboam’s fortified cities. Some attribute this list to the
period of Hezekiah (Na’aman 1986b), though there is no consensus on this matter (Fritz 1981; Garfinkel
1988). If 2 Chr 11:5-12 is reflective of the period of Hezekiah, then the non-mention of Beth Shemesh
aligns with the non-mention of the site in Josh 15.
The abundance of lmlk impressions (71) found at Beth Shemesh in no way contradicts our statements.
Their presence can be explained by the fact that goods were shipped to Beth Shemesh as the Assyrians
approached in order to make supplies readily available near the Judean border. Prior to the arrival of
Assyria, Beth Shemesh played no special role.
220
Yadin who proposed that the four sites also suggested a four-fold administrative division
of Judah; the previous studies did not fully address the administrative divisions or
adhered to a twelve-district system as presented above. For Yadin, Socoh was the “key
city” in the Shephelah, Hebron in the Hill Country, Ziph in the Wilderness, and mmšt—
identified as Mamshit/Kurnub—in the Negev (1961b: 9–10). Despite these claims,
however, there are problems both with associating the lmlk jars/impressions to political
administration and with associating them with specific districts.164
If the lmlk jars/impressions illustrate some aspect of political administration, then
why are neither Jerusalem nor Lachish listed as one of the place names? These cities
were the two most important administrative cities in the kingdom as can be gauged from
the archaeology and textual sources. Also, if the lmlk jars/impressions relate the
administrative districts then why are there only four? Why do the four not evenly divide
Judah?
Before offering an alternative interpretation of the lmlk jars/impressions that
addresses the aforementioned issues, we must consider the real issue at hand when
dealing with the administration of Judah, that is, “necessity.” In order to understand the
administration of Judah we must establish what Judah needed in order to reach its goal of
conducting a successful rebellion against Assyria. Aside from defenses, which are
obvious, what was truly necessary for a Judean victory was an abundance of supplies.
164
Yadin attempted to make the four place names of the lmlk impressions match with the four regions in
Josh 15: the Negev, Shephelah, Hill Country, and Wilderness. As a result, he was forced to move Ziph
from district seven in the Hill Country into the Wilderness district. Such a move is tantalizing and will be
discussed more below, though ultimately it should be rejected. Similarly difficult to accept is Yadin’s
identification of Mamshit/Kurnub with the mmšt of the lmlk jars; there is no Iron Age occupation at this
site, which is located far south of the typical borders of Judah in an agriculturally marginal region.
221
Without supplies, the soldiers manning the defenses would have no means to sustain
themselves and the effectiveness of the defenses themselves would be negated. Soldiers
would need to abandon their posts or surrender in order to survive. Thus, the protection
and the exploitation of agricultural lands were the necessary concerns that dictated the
Judean military effort, including the administration of the kingdom.
Given this, it must be established which areas of Judah are the most agriculturally
productive. Such locations should meet at least four criteria: 1) they should have a
variegated terrain capable of producing the all-important triad of grain, olives, and
grapes. This terrain would have flatter areas for growing cereals and grapes and nearby
hill slopes that could be terraced for olive trees and also vines.165 2) More specifically,
the slopes need to be comprised of the correct type of limestone bedding. There are
sloping beds and there are flat beds. Typically terracing is done with flat beds as they are
far easier to work with than are sloping beds. 3) The correct type of soil must be present
and there must be ample rain for plant growth. Harder Cenomanian limestone deteriorates
to the rich terra rossa soil, which is good for perennial plants such as olive trees and
vines. The density of the soil, however, makes is less preferable for growing annuals such
as cereals. Instead, cereals grow best in alluvium or in soils that are less dense, such as
the brown forest soil found in many of the major wadis throughout the country. 4) In
addition to being agriculturally productive, the ideal area should also be well protected
and easily defendable. An initial consideration of these criteria suggests seven possible
165
Terraces are generally built for the olive trees while grape vines can grow either on terraces or on hill
slopes. The practice of growing vines on hill slopes without terracing can still be seen today in southern
Samaria (the region of Ephraim) and northern Jordan.
222
regions of exceptional agricultural production: the Valleys of Aijalon, Sorek, and Elah,
the Central Benjamin Plateau, the area just west of Jerusalem including the Emeq
Rephaim and Bethlehem, the region just north of Hebron, and the area within the Ziph-
Juttah-Maon triangle.
Upon closer investigation, however, three of these areas do not actually meet the
fourth criteria: defensibility. Neither the Aijalon Valley nor the Sorek Valley has a
natural western barrier to deter invading forces. The threat of easy conquest makes them
unsuitable as reliable and ample sources of agricultural produce for Judah, regardless of
the fact that both have much rich alluvial soil. Also, the surrounding hills of the
Shephelah from north of the Sorek to north of the Aijalon are not ideal for growing vines
or olive trees, as they are composed of poorer Senonian limestone. The third region, the
Central Benjamin Plateau similarly suffers a problem with defensibility. Numerous roads
bisect the plateau and make defense against any attack, particularly a multi-pronged
attack, exceptionally difficult.
Contrast these first three regions with the remaining four: the Elah Valley, the
region of Jerusalem, the crown of Hebron, and the plateau of Ziph. Each of these areas
meets the requirements of being well protected, having a variegated landscape, having the
right bedding, and having various soils along with sufficient rain (see Map 10). The Elah
Valley is broad and filled with rich alluvium from Azekah in the west to the mountains of
Judah in the east and from just south of Zanoah to just south of Adullam. Though the
Elah is smaller in area than the Sorek or Aijalon, it is far better protected. In the west, the
valley narrows and forms a tight S-shape around the mountain upon which the fortress of
223
Azekah sits. The Elah also has the advantage of roads to both Jerusalem and the Hebron
area; transportation of supplies and/or soldiers was more easily facilitated from the Elah
Valley than it was from the more northern valleys.
Map 10. Judah’s key agricultural regions (marked in green)
224
The three remaining regions in the Hill Country meet our criteria even better than
the Elah Valley does. In the Jerusalem area there is an undulating plateau that extends
west of the city and includes the broad upper stretches of the Emeq Rephaim as well as
the region of Bethlehem to the south. The top of this plateau and the slopes that head
westward to the upper reaches of the Sorek Valley, and which are amenable to terracing,
are covered with rich terra rossa soil. The bedding and the soil provide ideal conditions
for growing olive trees in particular but also vines. Precipitation is abundant. East of the
plateau in the region of Bethlehem, just enough rain falls to make it perfect for growing
grain. In fact, the region east of Bethlehem is so dotted with threshing floors as to belie
any doubt of its grain producing potential. From a defensive perspective, this region had
the steep slopes of the upper Sorek Valley as natural defense and the territory of
Benjamin as a buffer zone in the north.
The region of Hebron is the third region of extreme productivity. From just south
of the Wadi Nusara (just south of Halhul) to Hebron is a rolling plateau wreathed by
higher hills on three sides and steep wadis running down to the Shephelah on the west.
The limestone bedding extending west of Hebron is flat, being suited to terracing. Also,
the abundant rain saturates the terra rossa soil making the region ideal for grape vines.
Stager (1975: 176) even notes that in the twentieth century Hebron was most known for
its grapes (Jerusalem was more known for its olive oil). Yet despite this renown,
demographic and land-use patterns from other time periods indicate the diversity of
225
agricultural products produced in the area.166 This crown of Hebron was also a well-
defended area; an army would need to defeat the triple line of defenses that protected the
southern Shephelah and then make the difficult ascent into the mountains in order to
reach it.
The last region, a broad undulating plain encompassed by Ziph, Juttah, and Maon
is devoid of any major wadis or other features that would limit the possible area of
cultivation. Here, grains predominate among a plethora of other goods (cf. 1 Sam 25:18).
Additionally, the region’s nearness to the Wilderness made it ideal for pasturing sheep
and goats (cf. 1 Sam 25:2). This brings us back to Yadin’s attempt to identify Ziph as the
capital of the Wilderness district based on a reference to the “Wilderness of Ziph” in 1
Sam 23:14. Ziph no doubt could exploit both the desert and the sown from its location,
however, the phrase “Wilderness of Ziph” does not tie Ziph specifically to the broader
Wilderness; multiple other sites have “wildernesses”: En-Gedi (1 Sam 24:1), Beth-aven
(Josh 18:12), Maon (1 Sam 23), and Damascus (1 Kgs 19:15). This phrase is meant only
as a regional moniker and is not an explicit association between Ziph and the Judean
Wilderness. Josh 15:55 makes it clear that Ziph is associated with the Hill Country. Also,
of the sites identified in the Wilderness district according to Josh 15:61-62, all are north
of the Nahal Arugot, specifically in the Buqe’ah Valley or along the Dead Sea coast;
having a district capital at Ziph would not make sense.
When viewed from an economic perspective, the four regions just discussed
provided Judah with the resources necessary for a concerted military effort against the
166
cf. TAVO Ax8, which is based on sixteenth century Ottoman records and TAVO Ax9, which shows the
region ca. A.D. 1880.
226
Assyrians. Hezekiah exploited these resources and organized their processing and
distribution by creating the lmlk institution.167 The jars themselves, as it will be
remembered, were typical jars that appeared already in the ninth century, but applying
stamps to them and coordinating the collection and distribution of their contents was a
Hezekian initiative.
Part of this initiative included establishing centers in or near these economically
abundant regions so that taxes in kind and goods from royally owned land could be
stored. It should be apparent by now that the four regions of economic exploitation are
related to the four place names on the lmlk impressions. Three of these sites are certain—
Socoh (Elah Valley), Hebron (crown of Hebron), and Ziph (plateau of Ziph)—and the
fourth, mmšt, as it will be shown below, oversaw the area around Jerusalem. When the
four place names of the lmlk impressions are considered from an economic perspective, it
allows us to answer the above-posed questions concerning why neither Lachish nor
Jerusalem are mentioned in the lmlk impressions, and why Hebron and Ziph are, despite
their proximity.
Contrast the geographical setting of Lachish with that of Socoh. Lachish is
located along the western extent of the Nahal Lachish where, except in the days of
Hezekiah, it was on the Judean frontier. Such a location was good for interacting with
Philistines, Egyptians, and caravans coming north from the Negev, but bad in times of
conflict. Lachish felt the brunt of numerous conflicts over the course of its existence
167
This is not to insinuate that these four regions were the only places that produced supplies.
227
precisely because it was on the frontier between the Hill Country and the Coastal Plain.168
Its geographical location thus made it both too risky of a choice for an economic center,
and the perfect choice for an important political center. This latter fact is clear from the
city’s plan.
Almost half of the walled city of Str. III is administrative buildings and/or open
courtyards. The normal population of Lachish was comprised largely of Judean officials
and/or military personnel. Herzog (1992: 258) even posits that as little as 15% of
Lachish’s area was dedicated to residential structures, and that the population was only
500 people. These people were not the ones growing and preparing the foodstuffs stored
in the lmlk jars, but were the ones receiving them. The inhabitants of Lachish were
charged with the protection and administration of southwestern Judah while the
inhabitants of Socoh were charged with overseeing the economic production that would
enable the administration to function.
Another geographical consideration highlights why Socoh, and not Lachish, is
listed in the lmlk impressions. The Nahal Lachish is much narrower and contains far less
alluvium than does the Elah Valley, plus there is an outcrop of Oligocene limestone
directly south of the tell. Dagan (1992a: 13*) notes that this region is good only for some
seasonal crops; Socoh offered more economic potential than did Lachish.
A similar separation between political and economic administrative centers is
seen in the pair: Jerusalem and mmšt. Despite the fact that mmšt has not definitively been
identified with an archaeological site, it is safe to assume that if three of the lmlk sites are
168
Consider that Strata VII, VI, V, IV (Amos’ earthquake?), III, and II were all ended by destruction.
228
related to productive geographic regions, then the fourth site is as well. The site of mmšt
should then be sought in the last region of exceptional agricultural potential, the region of
Jerusalem, and, in fact, most scholars identify mmšt with either Jerusalem itself or Ramat
Rahel (Aharoni 1979; Barkay 2006; Rainey 1982). An identification with Ramat Rahel
and not Jerusalem seems most favorable despite Ginsberg’s (1948: 20–21) choice of the
latter based on the argument that mmšt is an abbreviated form of *memshalt (or
memshelet as Barkay prefers), “government.” It is more reasonable that all four names on
the lmlk impressions—not just three of them—are actual place names.
To be sure, an identification of mmšt with Ramat Rahel actually makes much
better sense than one with Jerusalem based on the geographic setting of the former. It is
more centralized to the agriculture; it was midway between the northern stretches of the
plateau west of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in the south, and it overlooked the broad Emeq
Rephaim. The separation of the economic (Ramat Rahel) and political (Jerusalem)
centers in the north mirrors the scenario in the Shephelah.
The last issue, why Hebron and Ziph are both mentioned in the lmlk impressions
despite being roughly 6 km apart, also becomes clear when the agriculture is considered.
Both the crown of Hebron and the plateau of Ziph met the economic criteria listed above
and both regions needed an economic center. The centers chosen were the cities of
Hebron and Ziph. In these two instances, these sites may have served the dual purpose of
both economic and political center: Hebron, because it was the former capital of David’s
kingdom, and Ziph, because it was on the main north-south route (unlike Juttah) and far
enough into the Hill Country to be defended (unlike Carmel or Maon). The respective
229
regions were separated by the impressive Nahal Hebron. North of this feature was the
political and economic sphere of Hebron, and south of the nahal was the realm of Ziph.
B. The Economic System in Operation

Military preparations for the rebellion against Assyria led to the development of
an economic system separate from the regular politico-administrative districts. This
economic system allowed for the controlled and efficient exploitation of the Judean
countryside in order to provide the Judeans with one of the items necessary for a
successful rebellion: an ample food supply. Judean citizens were taxed in kind (e.g., olive
oil, wine, and/or grain) with the taxes collected at the four lmlk centers. From there, the
taxes/supplies were then distributed to: 1) sites that were most susceptible to attack,
and/or 2) officials and/or soldiers who were leading the defense effort.169
There was an initial distribution of full lmlk jars to sites throughout the kingdom.
As Sennacherib approached, however, store jars and personnel were shipped to more
strategic sites; sites that were likely to be affected earlier than later in the campaign. This
redeploying of lmlk jars is what has created the seemingly chaotic distribution of
individual lmlk impression types.
The necessity of preparing for the rebellion—of procuring supplies—had a
marked impact on the administration and economy of Judah as shown by the creation of
169
It is likely that the lmlk jars held any one of the triad: wine, oil, and/or grain. Unfortunately, no residue
analysis has been conducted on any lmlk jar, so the assumption that they held only liquid (i.e., wine or oil)
is no more probable than that they held grain. It is possible that the style of seal indicated the contents (cf.
Fox 2000: 222–223).
230
the lmlk institution. This impact is seen further in the archaeological record and also in
the textual record. It is to these corpora that attention is now turned.
2. Judean Economy in the Days of Hezekiah—Administration and

Exploitation
The purpose of districts is to maximize the exploitation of a political entity’s
production capabilities and to make governance of their region possible. Especially in
periods before modern transportation, governing a large tract of land, such as Judah,
would require some sense of national identity, sanguinal relation, and/or a bureaucracy
that reported to a central power. The method of governing Israel in the pre- and early-
monarchic periods was through the first two methods; kin-based nested hierarchies that
created a sense of belonging (i.e., identity) allowed for the governing of the group and
later the kingdom (Master 2001; Stager 2003). Later in the Iron II, in the second half of
the eighth century, archaeological evidence indicates the increased use of a bureaucracy
that may or may not have been kin-based. Most likely, it was not, following the changes
in social structure as detailed above in Chapter Four. Both the necessity and the desire to
increase the central bureaucracy in the eighth century led to a greater inclusion of the
general population and at the same time, a decrease in the kin-based governmental
appointments.170
170
In discussing the effect of urbanization on Israelite society in the early monarchy period Frick (1977:
110) writes, “the deleterious effect on the family was not so much the result of urbanization as such, but
more the consequence of the economic policies of the monarchy, which were designed to draw the wealth
from the land.” Similarly, Hardin (2010: 195–196) suggests that the Judean monarchy was responsible for
the creation of a more stratified society, which eventually threatened the original bet ’ab land holding
system (cf. also Defonzo 2005: 46).
231
The inscriptional evidence illustrates this change in the scale of bureaucracy; in
recent years an increasing number of seals and bullae have been found from the ninth or
early eighth century. Most come from Jerusalem where around 180 decorated bullae and
roughly 20 seals have been recovered in recent years (Reich 2011; Reich and Shukron
2009; Reich, et al. 2007).171 While these finds attest to pre-Hezekian administration, this
administration is still less robust than it is in the days of Hezekiah when over 267 seal
impressions mentioning some 38 officials have been recovered (Vaughn 1999). More
interesting though, there is a shift in the nature of the seal impressions themselves. The
earlier seals are all iconographic while the later (Hezekian) seals are almost all inscribed
with the names of individuals.172 This shift in the way individuals identify themselves on
their seals mirrors the shift in social structure as detailed above. As kin groups start to
deteriorate, a person’s identity is individualized; their seals mark their individuality.
Earlier, when identity was related to the family (and hence the government through actual
agnatic ties), their seals are generically iconographic; an individual could be identified by
the design on their seal. But there is a conceptual difference between being identified by
an image and being identified specifically by name.
In sociological terms, the late eighth century, during the reign of Hezekiah, can be
considered a transitional period for the way in which political power is expressed or
rationalized. The term “patrimonial bureaucracy” as defined by Schloen (2001: 76)
171
Most of the bullae were from incoming documents (Reich, et al. 2007: 156).
172
Consider the corpus of Hebrew (and non-Hebrew) seals in Herr (1978); only 8 out of 155 epigraphic
seals appear before the mid-eighth century, and most of these eight have imprecise dates. Though
epigraphic seals largely replace the iconographic seals in the eighth century, some of the latter do continue
to appear quite late (Barkay 1992b; Barkay and Vaughn 2004).
232
encapsulates Judah at this time. In a patrimonial bureaucracy a king’s authority, and
hence his ability to rule, is legitimized by both kin- and non-kin-based relationships. In
other words, the traditional or charismatic method of legitimizing power is giving way to
a more legal-rational method, a process that is happening in Judah as a response to
population growth (from both Israelite refugees and native Judeans), territorial
expansions, and Assyrian pressure and interaction in the broader Near East.173
As the social dynamics within Judah changed and as the threat of Assyrian
domination became more of a reality, a necessity arose for both the exploitation of
resources—if the kingdom was to remain a viable entity—and a controlled redistribution
of those resources. Such exploitation would have required the participation of the entire
population.174 Not only is there is exploitation of agricultural resources but also trade
routes; the latter is clear from the texts (see below) and the former is clear in the
archaeology, which attests to a massive increase in the number of agricultural
installations and governmental control of access to those supplies. Many of the
installations found within surveys attest to this, however, debate about their precise date
can be raised. Fortunately, an increasing number of such installations have been
excavated as salvage projects and dated to the late eighth century. Also, governmental
173
The definition of the three methods of legitimizing power are according to Weber (1978: 215) and are as
follows: legal-rational—“resting on an established belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” Schloen (2001: 66) notes that legal-
rational method is tantamount to modern bureaucracies; traditional—“resting on an established belief in the
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them”;
charismatic—“resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.”
174
Morris (1974: 57) notes that within Incan society, “it seems quite likely that groups structured along
religious, and sometimes kin, lines were gradually bent toward economic, political, and military functions
in the service of a centralized authority…the ability to manipulate traditional institutions and organizational
units so that they could serve new functions was an important factor in the success of ancient states.”
233
control of access to the supplies and their redistribution is supported by the presence of
the so-called “scoops” (Gitin 1993) in conjunction with the lmlk jars.
The regions showing the greatest agricultural increase are the Shephelah and the
Jerusalem area, though there is even evidence in the region of Hebron in the south (Batz
2006). Within the Shephelah, numerous excavations have been conducted as part of the
surveys conducted by Dagan (2006a, 2006b, 2011), and not only have eighth century
farmsteads been excavated, but there are multiple sites (at least 17) at which lmlk
impressions have been found. A similar scenario is found around Jerusalem. Excavations
at Beit Ṣafafa (Feig 2003),175 er-Ras (Feig and Adb Rabu 1996), “French Hill” (Mazor
2006), and numerous other sites (Gibson and Edelstein 1985) have exposed farmsteads
with associated wine and/or olive presses, cellars, and terraced landscapes. While the
presence of so many new agricultural sites in the eighth century may, to a certain degree,
be representative of the population growth of Hezekiah’s Judah, the presence of a
considerable number of lmlk impressions at these sites definitely indicates that they are
being exploited by the government since the presence of such jars indicates not the
distribution of the supplies within the jars, but the collection of those supplies.176
175
The extent of the four treading floors is 55 sq m. They fed Vat F, whose capacity was 20,000 L. “During
the vintage season the vat may have been filled at least twice, the volume of the must produced thus
totaling at least 40,000–50,000 liters. As it seems that there were more winepresses at the site, it is possible
to conclude that the quantities that could have been processed here were even larger. This scale of
production may indicate a royal wine industry (2003: 225).”
176
The actual degree to which the Judean government taxed their citizens is unclear, though the fact that
they were taxed rather heavily is suggested by 1 Sam 8:15-17, 2 Kgs 12:5, Hos 5:10, Isa 3:12-15 and Amos
5:11; 6:4; 7:1 (which rails against the northern Kingdom of Israel but is likely the case in Judah as well).
234
It is clear from the study of Mommsen, Yellin, and Perlman (1984) that the lmlk
jars are being produced in the eastern Shephelah.177 From there they must be distributed
through Judah. The stage between their production and final resting place, however, is
generally glossed over. If all of the lmlk jars or impressions found in the archaeological
record are considered to represent the redistribution of the goods held within the jars to
either officials or military personnel, then the presence of so many impressions at small
agricultural sites would mean either that Hezekiah’s bureaucracy was quite immense—
and it definitely was more robust than that of other Judean kings—or that he had some
interest in protecting agricultural installations with soldiers. Option one makes no sense
from an efficiency perspective and option two makes no sense from a strategic point of
view. Rather, what the presence of so many lmlk impressions at agricultural sites
indicates is the collection stage of the lmlk jar institution; the stage before the jars are sent
to their penultimate or ultimate destination. Those impressions found at the agricultural
sites are left from jars broken in transit.
The presence, then, of lmlk impressions at agricultural sites is indicative of
governmental collection of goods, i.e., exploitation of the countryside, which is a more
favorable interpretation than any claiming that each and every lmlk impression is
indicative of the distribution of goods to a single royal official or a group of soldiers
(Na’aman 1986b). Further support for this interpretation comes from the fact that only a
portion of the lmlk jars appears to have been stamped with officials’ names and none
177
1 Chr 4:23 mentions potters “in the employ of the king” and infers that there was a royal ceramic
industry—the lmlk jars are the best illustration of that industry.
235
come from the pertinent agricultural sites.178 If the lmlk impressions are to be viewed
monolithically as indicating the redistribution of supplies, and there are no officials
mentioned by name at the agricultural sites, then to whom were the supplies being
distributed? Soldiers? The improbability of such a scenario has already been mentioned.
To whom else were the supplies within the jars given? Unfortunately, that is beyond
answering based on the current data.
Further evidence of governmental exploitation and control of agricultural supplies
are the so-called “scoops,” which are bowl-like vessels with a vertical, angled, or cyma-
shaped back wall and two handles (Gitin 1993: 100*). Gitin notes that these vessels
appear already in the Late Bronze II and appear to be related to government-controlled
(dry) food distribution, as they appear at Egyptian border sites where military personnel
would have been stationed. In the Iron IIB/C, 154 of the 157 scoops identified came from
public areas or storage facilities, with the large majority in proximity to large groups of
(lmlk) store jars (Gitin 1993: 106*). Gitin further notes that there is a shift in who
controlled the distribution of foodstuffs; in the LBII he suggests it was priests, but in the
Iron IIB/C “it seems more likely that a non-cultic or secular component of the
governmental bureaucracy was in charge of food distribution” (1993: 107*).
The presence of scoops and lmlk jars in related contexts attests to the
governmental exploitation and control of agricultural goods in preparation for the
rebellion against Assyria. Further, Gitin’s Table 2 (1993: 122*) shows that the majority
178
In fairness, none of the jars from the agricultural sites were complete; there is a possibility that some
may have had officials’ stamps as well. However, the presence of officials’ stamps at the agricultural sites
still does not necessarily mean that any officials were stationed there.
236
of Iron IIB/C scoops come from the Shephelah at sites near the border between Judah and
Philistia.
Further evidence that implies governmental control of agricultural supplies, or a
socioeconomic shift at the least, comes from a quantitative analysis of the ceramics.
Unfortunately, few sites have published such quantitative data so the following
discussion relates only to Timnah/Tel Batash. Whether the ceramic trends seen at Tel
Batash are reflective of the rest of the country is unclear, but their articulation offers a
tantalizing view of the socioeconomic change happening in late eighth century Judah.
Table 10 lists the number of bowls, cooking pots, storage jars, and jugs from Strata IV-II.
Class/Stratum IV III II
Bowls 656 (42.8%) 1237 (54.6%) 1690 (52.3%)
Cooking Pots 172 (11.2) 89 (3.9) 216 (6.7)
Storage Jars 254 (16.6) 323 (14.2) 680 (21)
Jugs 194 (12.6) 381 (16.8) 241 (7.5)
Table 10. Quantitative distribution of ceramics by type and stratum at Tel Batash.
What is most noticeable in this chart is the decrease in number and relative
percentage of cooking pots from Str IV to III and the increase in number and relative
percentage of bowls and jugs. If, as the excavator maintains, the settlement of Str IV was
a “modest town” (Mazar 1997: 142) it may be assumed from the abundant domestic
architecture and lack of public architecture that families inhabited the site. Str III,
however, saw the construction of monumental or state-initiated architecture in Areas D,
E, and H, as well as the city wall and gate. When the ceramics are considered it stands to
reason that the family-centered settlement of Str. IV in which each family (or possibly
family unit, which may include multiple households) cooked their own food, shared
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bowls and jugs. With the increased governmental presence in Str. III, however, the social
dynamic shifted. The number of store jars increased (in total number but not overall
percentage) due to the presence of soldiers and officials at Tel Batash because of the
site’s strategic role near Judah’s western border. The dietary needs of soldiers and
officials were met differently than were those of the individual family. State-provided
goods were given in return for service. As such, an increase in the number of storage jars
is expected. Further, it is highly unlikely that soldiers cooked for themselves, instead they
would have their meals prepared for them. Though there is no evidence from Judah to
support or deny such an assumption, there are artistic representations and linguistic
references to cooks in the Assyrian army. These men were responsible for preparing
meals for the soldiers. A similar scenario is even more documented for the later Roman
Army (Roth 1999). With communal meals, fewer cooking pots are required, but the
number of bowls and jugs, however, would increase so that each soldier could receive
their rations.179 Further, it should be noted that “scoops” are found only beginning in Str.
III and continuing into Str. II. If the function of this type of vessel is accepted, then their
presence in Str. III—in building 737 along with the lmlk jars—further supports a
179
A comparison between the ceramics of Str. III-II, albeit less secure due to the difference in total area
excavated for each strata, further supports our hypothesis. In Str. II, the social dynamic at Tel Batash shifts
back to a kin-centered organization, however, now there are fewer ties between the individual kin groups
than there were in Str. IV. Thus, the relative percentage of cooking pots increases indicating a
decentralizing of food production. At the same time, the percentage of bowls stays the same while the total
number of jugs is between the totals found in Str. IV and III. These details indicate numerous non-sharing
social entities (i.e., unrelated refugee/deportee families or individual deportees/refugees); family structure
dominates the social organization, but there are no agnatic ties between the families that would result in
communal food preparation. At the same time, there are likely Assyrian or Judean officials at the site,
which would explain the dual trends in the ceramic distribution. The massive increase in the number of
storage jars is most reflective of Timnah’s role in the Assyrian olive oil producing economy common in the
Shephelah in the seventh century and seen even more dynamically at Tel Miqne just to the west.
238
military/administrative presence that continues, albeit on a much smaller scale, into Str. II
(Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2001: 50–51).
In addition to the trends seen in the relative quantity of each ceramic vessel type,
a similar trend should be sought among the stone vessels used for the processing of grains
and other foods from Tel Batash. Yet, when the stone objects from secure stratigraphic
locations are considered, the sought after trend is ambiguous at best; whether the
difference in the number of each stone object is truly reflective of the social situation or
merely the result of the difference in area of exposure for the different strata is difficult to
determine (Cohen-Weinberger 2001: 231). Table 11 shows the number of each stone
object type and the number of stratigraphically secure examples. The similarity in the
number of each object type from Strata IV to III does not appear to indicate any change
in food production. If, as suggested above, however, the settlement of Str. III was
inhabited largely by soldiers and officials, then it is unlikely that they would be required
to process their own grains/food. Rather, such foodstuffs would arrive pre-processed; a
similar situation is observable at Mezad Hashevyahu (Fantalkin 2001: 127) and at Arad
according to Letter 2, which mentions the distribution of bread and not just flour.
Object Type Str. IV Str. III Str. II

Mortars 4 0 7
Bowls 3 3 8
Upper Grinding Stones 6 8 27
Lower Grinding Stones 1 2 2
Hemispherical Pounding Stones 2 1 4
(Hammerstones)
Table 11. Quantitative distribution of stone objects by type and stratum at Tel Batash.
239
At Lachish, Zimhoni notes that there is a relative lack in the change of frequency
of storage jars from the ninth/early eighth centuries to the mid/late-eighth century (all
roughly 18%), though at the same time there is an increase in the size of the storage jars
(2004b: 1703–1704). She rightly equates this increase in size with an increase in the food
supplies stored in the vessels, then suggests reasons for this: 1) growth in agricultural
surplus and its processing, 2) changes in the trade or taxation network, 3) requirement of
larger quantities of food, 4) change in family size. As has been argued above, all four of
these are happening at the end of the eighth century. A fifth option is also possible: larger
storage jars may also be a reflection of increasing concern over Assyrian presence in the
southern Levant. The writing was on the wall, so to say, and this increase in size may be
a subliminal way that Judeans were preparing for the worst.180
Aside from the archaeology, another line of evidence that illustrates the increasing
level of Judean socioeconomic exploitation at the end of the eighth century is the
Assyrian tribute lists. Holladay (2006, 2009) discusses the tribute lists and notes that they
vary over time and in relation to geographic location. Kingdoms were taxed different
amounts and goods based on what they had or could procure. The wealth of the Judean
tribute both imposed upon Hezekiah and taken as booty after his kingdom was ransacked,
indicate the great affluence of Judah. To be sure, Judah acquired many of the items that
Assyria took through taxing/tolling the trade routes from Arabia. Effective tolling of
these routes, the main one of which proceeded through the heart of the Beersheba Basin,
was due, however, to the power and organization of Judah in the days of Hezekiah.
180
Such long-term preparation—beginning with the arrival of Assyria under Tiglath-Pileser III—is argued
for by Hardin (2004: 75) at Tell Halif.
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3. Socioeconomic Assessment of Administering Hezekiah’s Defensive
Network
Judah had no other threat like that of the Assyrians in the days of Hezekiah. While
districts were in existence both before and after Hezekiah, there was never a need for
them to be exploited the way they were when Hezekiah was preparing for war. Uzziah,
Ahaz, and Manasseh never came into conflict with imperial forces the way Hezekiah did.
Thus, the institutions created and/or exploited by Hezekiah were unnecessary in any other
monarch’s rule (at least to the degree they were during his reign).
The archaeological and textual evidence suggest that Hezekiah had two systems
of administration, a political system of which little can be reconstructed but which is
preserved in Josh 15:21-62; 18:25-28, and an economic system that is preserved in the
four place names of the lmlk impressions. The four sites mentioned in the lmlk
impressions were located in or near to the four most agriculturally productive regions of
Judah; regions that could produce all three staples of the Judean diet, wheat/barley,
olives, and grapes.181
It is safe to assume that these two systems required an extensive number of
officials if they were to operate efficiently and effectively. While is it difficult to quantify
just how many people were needed for the administration, the roughly 40 individuals
identified by their seals or seal impressions is likely close to the number of officials who
were related to the administration of the lmlk system. This number is not the total number
of officials in Hezekiah’s Judah, as the full hierarchy in his time is unknown; there are no
181
Though it cannot be proven, the references in 2 Kgs 20:13 and 2 Chr 32:27-29 to Hezekiah’s
construction of storehouses likely refers specifically to the four sites of the lmlk impressions.
241
archaeological or textual attestations of many of the officials who are known from the
reigns of David or Solomon (2 Sam 8:15-18; 1 Kgs 4:1-6) during the days of Hezekiah.
What is clear, however, is that the lmlk impressions, the officials’ impressions that
are stamped on the same jars, the numerous agricultural installations, and the changes in
the ceramics, attest to an increase in bureaucracy and economic ability in the second half
of the eighth century. The control exerted by the government is what enables Hezekiah’s
military preparations. The necessity of military preparations is what, in turn, leads to a
further demand for an overarching mechanism that will guarantee the efficient
exploitation of the possible resources.
In the end, unfortunately, not all aspects of Hezekiah’s administration can be
clarified. The question of how the lmlk jars were used is a difficult one to answer. The
presence of many lmlk impressions at rural sites that were towers, farms, or merely
presses, suggests the possibility that empty jars were distributed throughout the kingdom
for the collection of taxes in kind, and do not always represent the redistribution of
rations to officials and/or soldiers. Jars were distributed and it was expected that they be
filled with oil or wine or grain and then delivered to a royal/official holding area where
they were counted as taxes and then redistributed to the appropriate officials.
One objection to this view may be that the agricultural sites at which the lmlk
impressions appear are royally owned sites. In such a case, the lmlk jars would not be
used for collecting taxes from the Judean citizens, but were merely used to collect
supplies from industrial centers. If such an objection were raised, the essential question
becomes, can state controlled production be differentiated from local production? Can the
242
level of standardization be used to determine whether something is state-produced or
locally produced?182
The differentiation between state and non-state production in Judah is obfuscated
when one considers that at the end of the eighth century the economy was essentially a
wartime economy. Even if goods were being produced by non-state entities, any sense of
national pride could lead to the offering of those goods/services to the state (Coulomb
2004). Or, on the other hand, localized production of goods and services rendered could
have been appropriated by the state without leaving any archaeological footprint. The
identification of any motives for Judahite citizens during the preparations for the
Assyrians is clearly beyond the capability of archaeology, and is unfortunately
unaddressed in the textual record for this period. Only governmental motivation (i.e.,
exploitation and administration) is manifest in the remains.
182
There are places where such a distinction can be made, cf. C. Morris 1974: 52ff. In parts of the Inca
Empire there is a difference between “Imperial” Inca ceramics and architecture and local productions.
Morris (1974: 53) notes, however, that there is a difficulty in differentiating state and non-state production,
particularly if the state controlled production activities more indirectly.
243
Chapter 6—Conclusions
This research has addressed the issue of how military, socioeconomic, and political
realms interact. The flux within any one of these realms has repercussions for the others
as is shown specifically in the case of Judah during the reign of Hezekiah. Only when all
of these aspects of society are viewed together is it possible to establish a more holistic
and appropriate understanding of the agency behind change over the course of history.
The initial question that directed this study asked whether or not Hezekiah
established a coherent defensive network in Judah in preparation for his rebellion against
Assyria? As shown above, the location and types of excavated and surveyed sites indicate
that there was such a network and that it utilized the geography very effectively. This
study also showed that because the geography of Judah is not uniform, the defensive
strategy for the protection of the kingdom was not uniform. More rugged terrain, such as
the western ascents of Judah, was protected with fewer defensive sites than was the
gentler terrain of the Shephelah. This difference in settlement pattern suggests that the
kings of Judah, in particular Hezekiah, recognized the geographical variability within the
kingdom, the difficulty of navigating portions of that geography, and the fact that certain
regions within the kingdom needed to be better protected than others. The strength of the
defensive network derived not only from the larger tell-sites, but also from the smaller
fortresses and towers, which were located at key geographical locations throughout the
country. These smaller sites offered quick communication potential and in some cases
244
added defense against invasion. Most importantly, they guarded important Judean assets.
Sometimes these assets were roads, other times they were cultivable lands or population
centers. While it is not possible to delineate which sites were newly built by Hezekiah it
is possible to suggest which sites, with a good degree of certainty, were in use during his
reign. The identification of such sites relied upon the presence of Lachish III-style
ceramics and lmlk impressions.
The presence of a coherent defensive network, which was also stockpiled with
supplies as is indicated by the presence of lmlk-impressed jars, suggests that there was a
conscious preparation for a rebellion in the days of Hezekiah. In addition, sites in the
western Shephelah/eastern Coastal Plain and in the territory of Benjamin were seized and
stockpiled by Hezekiah. Such land grabs brought important agricultural resources and
thoroughfares within the borders of Judah, and they created buffer zones on Judah’s two
most vulnerable frontiers. Through seizure of land and the stockpiling of specific sites
Judah achieved a state of military readiness in expectation of the Assyrian response.
Judah’s state of readiness, however, went through two stages during Hezekiah’s
reign. The first stage was from 728/722 to 705 B.C. and entailed the steady increase in
military and defensive potential. This potential appeared in the form of defenses/fortified
sites, economic exploitation and consolidation as evidenced by the increase in the number
of oval-shaped store jars (with and without the lmlk impressions) and agricultural
settlements in Judah, and the increased bureaucracy attested by the numerous seal
impressions of officials. Judah’s potential at this time also included the incorporation of
Israelites from the north into both the administration and army and the training of troops.
245
With the death of Sargon II in 705 B.C., Judah entered a second stage of readiness
that entailed the stockpiling of specific sites and the maneuvering of troops to strategic
locations. While the precise pace at which Hezekiah brought Judah to readiness cannot be
determined, it is suggested that little time was needed. There is a difference between the
time necessary to prepare for war and the time necessary to stockpile for war. That is,
producing the goods that will be used in the case of a siege or to feed stationed troops
takes time and consideration, while the stockpiling of specific sites can occur quickly
based on need. The issue of stockpiling sites revolves around the speed with which the
Judean sites were actually provisioned. Some suggest that it was quick (Na’aman 1979),
others aver that it was gradual (Finkelstein and Silberman 2006). The reality is that both
are correct and depending on the course of an army and the presumed and apparent
importance of a given site, some sites can be stockpiled very quickly (and for a short
period of time) while others can accumulate goods over a much longer period of time. In
other words, the preparations at larger/more important sites began as soon as or, more
likely, even before Hezekiah declared rebellion, while the stockpiling of goods in smaller
sites would not have to occur until the Assyrian army was at Judah’s doorstep.
Overall, however, Judah’s potential military and economic resources could be
mobilized in a short period of time due to the small size of Judah and would be mobilized
quickly because of the uncertainty of when Sennacherib would respond to Hezekiah’s
actions. At a minimum, the Judeans would have had four to six weeks to finalize
mobilization and preparations before the Assyrians could reach Judah on the march.
246
Having illustrated that a coherent defensive network did exist and that conscious
preparations for rebellion by Hezekiah can be identified, the present research turned to
the question of how the maintenance and administration of such a network affected the
social order and economic prosperity of Judah. By asking who was employed to man
Hezekiah’s defensive network it was possible to address the issue of changes in the social
order. Three groups were considered: Israelite refugees, “foreign” mercenaries, and
native Judeans. Drawing upon archaeology, demographic studies, and the biblical texts, I
argue that Israelite refugees and younger Judean sons were the most likely groups to have
manned Judah’s defenses, particularly its fortresses and towers.
Further, I suggest that there was an equation between mercenaries, the biblical
gerim, and the Assyrian LÚ.urbi, with each of these terms referring specifically to
Israelite refugees at the end of the eighth century. As there may have been over 20,000
such refugees over the course of the last third of the eighth century, Hezekiah had to deal
with a sizeable contingent of individuals who were looking for work, a place to live, and
food to eat. The integration of these refugees into Judean society provided Hezekiah with
additional manpower for his rebellion and its preparations, and it also provided the likely
social context for the development of some biblical texts. Many of the Deuteronomic
laws concerning the treatment of gerim and the poor were composed or at least written
down during Hezekiah’s reign suggesting an effort to unite the disparate Judean and
Israelite factions in Judah. Hezekiah showed concern for the Israelite refugees in order to
secure their allegiance.
247
Hezekiah also demonstrated shrewdness by expanding his government, thus
creating additional jobs. Israelites, but usually Judeans as is clear from the onomastic
evidence, filled these positions. Perhaps the positions were actually created as an
economic incentive meant to provide the increasing number of younger, landless Judean
sons with an opportunity. Perhaps they were created in order to exploit agricultural
production or to organize the increasing population of Judah due to both internal and
external growth. An efficient bureaucracy would have been necessary to oversee the
collection and distribution of agricultural supplies and taxes. Whatever the reason for the
expansion of the bureaucracy there were positive and negative effects of that expansion.
On the positive side, many jobs were created. In a culture that practiced partible
inheritance, which favored the eldest son, younger sons were left with smaller and
smaller inheritances as population increased and arable land was used up. The younger
sons, out of necessity, turned to government positions, served in the army, and/or
dedicated themselves to serving the priesthood. At the same time, as population
increased, so did the pool from which the government could draw available manpower
because not everyone could continue the traditional agriculturally based lifestyle common
in Israel’s early history.
On the negative side, the shift in social order, when viewed in light of mortality
rates, meant that disparities in land possession were more common. As younger sons left
the traditional household in order to make a living, families were left with fewer sons to
carry on that household. Even worse, if a fathers’ offspring died, then upon his death his
land could pass to another family within the mishpahah according to Levitical law.
248
Families that were willing and able to redeem land amassed great wealth at the expense
of smaller families, and the level of social (i.e., wealth) disparity in the eighth century
greatly increased. The eighth century prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah each
derided such disparity.
Following the discussion of how Hezekiah’s military preparations impacted and
were enabled by changes in the social order, I turned to the issue of how the same
preparations interacted with the economy. Specifically, the question was how the
administration of Hezekiah’s defensive network affected the economy. Biblical texts
were used to delineate the administrative districts of Judah, and then the lmlk
institution—as clarified by the archaeology and geography—was juxtaposed with those
districts. Clear differences between the administrative districts and the lmlk institution as
gauged from the jar inscriptions appeared when viewed from the perspective of the
economy. The lmlk institution was not directly related to the political administration of
the kingdom but instead represents an economic system that enabled the efficient
exploitation of Judah’s agricultural resources. As such, the four names on the lmlk
impressions are not the names of district capitals, at least as far as the phrase “district
capital” is understood as a political title, but rather, I suggest that they are the names of
key sites at the center of Judah’s economic production.
Prior to the economic infrastructure represented by the lmlk institution there does
not appear to have been any efficient system for mass exploitation of the countryside.
Perhaps this is the result of a lack in resolution within the archaeological record; without
a distinct marker, such as the lmlk jars, it is difficult to isolate concise periods of time in
249
the archaeological record due to the homogeneity of Judean ceramics over much of the
Iron Age and it is difficult to associate specific ceramic forms with government initiative.
The only other time such an economic institution appears is with the rosette-stamped jars
of the seventh century, but this institution is more limited.
Evidence that the lmlk institution was related to the exploitation of the Judean
landscape is clear based on the sheer number of lmlk impressions (over 2000) and the fact
that the four place names on the impressions are related to four of the most agriculturally
productive areas in the kingdom. Further, the presence of lmlk impressions at agricultural
sites that show no evidence for the posting of officials or military units—sites at which
the posting of such individuals would not be an efficient allocation of resources
anyway—also supports an association of the lmlk institution with agricultural exploitation
(see the starred (*) sites in Appendix 1). At such agricultural sites the jars do not
represent distribution, but rather they illustrate the collection of taxes in kind. Such a
method of taxation, mentioned in 1 Sam 8:15–17 and Amos 7:1, applied specifically to
those who owned land, i.e., native Judeans. Those who did not own land, i.e., Israelite
refugees and presumably many of the younger Judean sons, paid taxes through service.
Once the supplies were collected in the lmlk jars they were sent to the place
whose name was stamped on the jars’ handle(s). The jars remained there until they were
redistributed to soldiers and officials throughout the country as a means of sustenance
while those individuals served the kingdom’s cause. When the arrival of the Assyrians
was imminent, many jars were shipped with troops and/or officials as they were re-
250
stationed at sites more likely to be attacked, thus explaining the lack of any discernable
pattern for the distribution of the lmlk jars according to their inscriptions.
Hezekiah’s preparations to rebel against Assyria led to massive changes in
Judah’s socioeconomic situation. These changes are visible in the archaeology and are
both explicit and implicit in the biblical narrative, the works of the prophets, and in
Judah’s legal traditions. In this instance, wars and the threat of wars drove the
socioeconomic change, which, in turn, allowed for a coherent defensive effort.
Maintaining this defensive effort led to an exploitative economic system and to a further
weakening if not outright disintegration of traditional social bonds in Judah.
251
Appendix–List of Sites with lmlk Impressions
Ashdod 1
No. of *Dagan site no. 66 1
Site Impressions Tel 'Eton 1
Lachish 415 *Kh. Beit Ba‘ir 1
Jerusalem 285 Tell 'Ira 1
Ramat Rahel 165 Kh. El-Qom 1
Gibeon 95 Adullam 1
Mizpah 88 Kh. Rabud 1
Beth Shemesh 71 Chephirah 1
Moresheth Gath 39 Eshtaol (Ishwa) 1
Gezer 37 Nes Harim 1
Kh. El-Burj 24 Gedor 1
Mareshah 19 H. Dorban 1
Azekah 17 Kh. el-'Abhar 1
Tell 'Erani 15 Lower Beth-Horon 1
Timna 15 Kefar Ata 1
Gibea 14 Horvat Maon 1
Tel Sokoh 14 Bether 1
Hebron 13 *Kh. Zawiyeh 1
Beth Zur 12 *Beth Safafa 1
Arad 10 Bethlehem 1
Tell es-Safi 7 Bethel 1
Mevaseret Zion 5 Horvat Shilhah 1
Tell Beit Mirsim 4 Nisya 1
Nebi Samwil 4 H. Jaresh 1
H. Zanoah (N) [3] 4 En Gedi 1
Ekron 3 Tell ash-Shuqf 1
Aroer 3 Kh. Qeiyafa 1
H. Marah el-Jumma 3 Givat Haphurit (S) 1
Ketef Hinnom 3 Kikkar Safra 1
*Er Ras 3 Kh. el-Masud 1
Tel Halif 2 Nahalal 1
Kh. Qeila 2 Jaba/Geba 1
Anathoth 2 Arnona 1
Tel Jezreel 2
*Dhahr Wadi Aziz 1
Kh. es-Samra 2
*N. Lakhish (A391) 1
Kh. Qumran 2 *Shi‘b Raiyan
Jericho 2 (A444.2) 1
*Umm Tuba 2 Karmel 1
Kiryat Menahem 2 *Jebel Duweimar
Ein Yael 2 (A763) 1
*Nahal ha-Nativ [12] 2 *Manahat (er-Ras) 1
Tel Zayit 2? *Nahal ha-Elah [72] 1
H. Zanoah 2 T. Burna 1
Beersheba 1 *Ain Merjelan(NH21) 1
Jannaba et Tahta 1
252
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The Socioeconomic Impact of Hezekiah’s Preparations for Rebellion

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures

Kyle Henry Keimer

Kyle Henry Keimer

University of California, Los Angeles

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS................................................................................................ VI

AHw Akkadische Handwörterbuch (3 Vols.). W. von Soden. Wiesbaden: Otto

ARAB II Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Vol. II. D. D. Luckenbill.

ARMT Archives royales de Mari, traductions. Paris, 1950ff.

B Archaeological Survey of the Hill Country of Benjamin. I. Finkelstein and

BA “The Judaean Desert and Plain of Jericho.” P. Bar-Adon. In Judaea,

CAD Chicago Assyrian Dictionary. Chicago: The Oriental Institute, 1954-2011.

COS 2 The Context of Scripture, Vol. 2. Monumental Inscriptions from the

D Map of Lachish (98). Y. Dagan. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority,

FIR Roman Roads in Judaea II: The Jaffa-Jerusalem Roads. M. Fischer, B.

GP “The Land of Ephraim and Manasseh.” R. Gophna and Y. Porat. In

H Map of Herodium (108/2). Y. Hirschfeld. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

K Survey of Jerusalem, 3 Vols. A. Kloner. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

Ka “The Land of Benjamin and Mt. Ephraim.” Z. Kallai. In Judaea, Samaria,

NALK Neo-Assyrian Legal Documents in the Kouyunjik Collection of the British

NY Map of Nahal Yattir (139). Y. Govrin. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

P Map of Deir Mar Saba (109/7). J. Patrich. Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities

Y “The Land of Judah.” M. Kochavi. In Judaea, Samaria, and the Golan:

filing all of my paperwork while I finished my dissertation in Jerusalem. Both George

Numerous other scholars have taken time to discuss aspects of my research, in

the perspective that he has given me; he is a true mentor.

Archaeological Research. I am thankful to the director of the Albright, Seymour Gitin,

thank Biblical Backgrounds, Inc. for allowing me to use their maps.

unending. Words cannot describe how blessed I am.

June 3, 1979 Born, Sandusky, Ohio

2001 B. A., Anthropology

2002 M. A., Biblical Archaeology

2006-07 Graduate Student Researcher

2008-09 Teaching Associate

2009-10 Teaching Fellow

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

––––––. “An Assessment of Hezekiah’s Military Preparations for Rebellion.” Presented

––––––. “Stone Vessels from Idalion” in Excavations on the Eastern Acropolis of

The Socioeconomic Impact of Hezekiah’s Preparations for Rebellion

Kyle Henry Keimer

Doctor of Philosophy in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures

University of California, Los Angeles, 2011

Professor Aaron A. Burke, Chair

This research seeks to determine the socioeconomic impact that Hezekiah’s

Hezekiah’s preparations in Jerusalem, the archaeological record suggests that his

preparations encompassed the entirety of his kingdom; an encompassing defensive

infrastructure was established. This infrastructure is evident in the increased number of

of this research and include: 1) the establishment of a defensive network—what sites

supplies distributed or managed? By addressing these issues it is argued that the

socioeconomic impact of Hezekiah’s rebellion may be articulated, and a better

understanding of the interaction between warfare and socioeconomics may be

considered infrastructure equally important. This infrastructure is evident in the increased

Hezekiah’s preparations cross three realms: geography, society, and economy.

established if Judah hoped to be successful. Before the geography could be utilized,

more extensive the agricultural-based economy had to become. In Hezekiah’s case,