Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The American Culture of War The History of U S Military Force From World War II To Operation Enduring Freedom Adrian R. Lewis
The American Culture of War The History of U S Military Force From World War II To Operation Enduring Freedom Adrian R. Lewis
The American Culture of War The History of U S Military Force From World War II To Operation Enduring Freedom Adrian R. Lewis
https://textbookfull.com/product/luftwaffe-kg-200-the-german-air-
force-s-most-secret-unit-of-world-war-ii-stackpole-military-
history-series-thomas-geoffrey-j-ketley-barry/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-gospel-of-freedom-and-power-
protestant-missionaries-in-american-culture-after-world-war-
ii-1st-edition-sarah-e-ruble/
https://textbookfull.com/product/military-dogs-of-world-war-
ii-1st-edition-susan-bulanda/
https://textbookfull.com/product/operation-crossbow-the-history-
of-the-allied-bombing-missions-against-nazi-germany-s-v-2-rocket-
program-during-world-war-ii-charles-river/
Destructive Creation American Business And The Winning
Of World War II 1st Edition Mark R. Wilson
https://textbookfull.com/product/destructive-creation-american-
business-and-the-winning-of-world-war-ii-1st-edition-mark-r-
wilson/
https://textbookfull.com/product/slavery-by-another-name-the-re-
enslavement-of-black-americans-from-the-civil-war-to-world-war-
ii-blackmon/
https://textbookfull.com/product/all-about-history-book-of-world-
war-ii-coll/
https://textbookfull.com/product/u-s-army-chevrolet-trucks-in-
world-war-ii-1st-edition-didier-andres/
https://textbookfull.com/product/war-s-logic-strategic-thought-
and-the-american-way-of-war-1st-edition-antulio-j-echevarria-ii/
i
Now in its third edition, The American Culture of War presents a sweeping critical examination of
every major American war since 1941: World War II, Korea,Vietnam, the First and Second Persian
Gulf Wars, US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the war against ISIS. As he carefully consid-
ers the cultural forces that surrounded each military engagement, Adrian Lewis offers an original
and provocative look at the motives, people and governments used to wage war, the discord among
military personnel, the flawed political policies that guided military strategy, and the civilian per-
ceptions that characterized each conflict. This third edition features:
• A new structure focused more exclusively on the character and conduct of the wars
themselves
• Updates to account for the latest, evolving scholarship on these conflicts
• An updated account of American military involvement in the Middle East, including the
abrupt rise of ISIS
The new edition of The American Culture of War remains a comprehensive and essential resource
for any student of American wartime conduct.
Adrian R. Lewis is Professor of History at the University of Kansas. He has taught at the Naval
War College and at West Point, and is a retired United States Army Major. He is the author of
Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory.
ii
iii
Adrian R. Lewis
iv
The right of Adrian R. Lewis to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any
electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used
only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2007
Second edition published by Routledge 2012
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-138-68425-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-68426-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-54402-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Out of House Publishing
Visit the companion website: www.routledge.com/textbooks/9781138684263
v
To Family
my daughters
Alexandria Adrienne
Allison Michele
Aubrey Danielle
Anastasia Kathryn
Angelica Noelle
my first granddaughter
Sawyer Victoria
my sisters
Allison and Charisse
my father and brother
John and John Jr.
Contents
Introduction 1
PART I
Tradition and an Envisioned Future Collide 9
viii Contents
4 Truman, the Cold War, and the National Military
Establishment, 1945–1950 73
Truman, the Policy of Containment, and National Strategy 74
Strategic Airpower and National Military Strategy 84
From the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense 94
PART II
The Efforts to Adapt to a Nuclear World 179
Contents ix
10 The Vietnam War: The Final Phases, 1967–1975 266
Censorship, the Media, and Public Opinion 267
New Personnel Policies: The Result of Transformation 270
McNamara Changes Course 279
The Tet Offensive 282
Nixon and the Vietnamization Phase 287
PART III
The New American Practice of War: War Without the People 299
x Contents
16 The Second Persian Gulf War: Operation Iraqi Freedom II,
the Nation-Building and Counterinsurgency War, 2003–2010 453
The Media, Public Opinion, and War 456
What Went Wrong: The Insurgency War 461
The Multi-National Force—Iraq: New Leadership, New Strategy 469
The New Way Forward: “The Surge,” New Leadership, New Strategy 479
The New American Practice of War 490
Notes 496
Index 548
xi
This study provides the most comprehensive, authoritative single-volume history available
on the American conduct of war since World War II. It covers more than seventy years of US
military history, from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.1 It pro-
vides rich descriptions and analysis of the major wars, policies and strategies, technologies and
doctrines, and major national security arguments and debates in relatively few words. History
is always a work in progress. New sources and information, new interpretations and argu-
ments, and new access and foreign scholars are always revising our perspective of the world
and knowledge of history. I have updated this third edition with new sources and interpret-
ations. For example, Korean and Chinese scholars have made significant contributions to our
knowledge and understanding the Korean War. The historiography on the Vietnam War has
also evolved. I have worked to make this edition more readable and accessible for my students.
Three chapters have been eliminated, parts of their content merged into other chapters. This
edition is designed to be more concise and more focused on the wars. The primary thesis,
delineated in the introduction, has not changed; however, the cultural method of analysis has
been expanded to include the cultural tenets of: racism, gender exclusion, and militarism. The
strengths of this volume are as follows:
• Each of the major wars is covered in two chapters. Students can gain a rich understand-
ing, and comprehensive descriptions and analysis, of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and
other wars, in relatively few pages.
• Major topics are summarized at the end of the chapters in a few pages, for example: the
events that led to the Cold War, Eisenhower’s defense policy and strategy, the explanations
and arguments on the outcome of the Korean War, the Vietnam Wars, and other wars, and
the history of Western involvement in the Middle East.
• The words of historical actors are used to delineate their arguments and thinking on issues
of national security and war. Rather than rewording what Truman said, what MacArthur
said, what Eisenhower, Kennedy, Bush, Mao Zedong, Osama Bin Laden, and others said
I have let the history makers speak for themselves. The words of every President, com-
manding general, and government official who led the United States through major wars
since World War II are in this single volume.
• Part of the objective of this work is to illuminate the debates, to make accessible the many
discussions and arguments about national security, the decisions for war, and the decisions
on the conduct of war. Hence, students get not only the opinions and assessments of key
decision makers, but also the opinions and assessments of those who disagreed with them.
• An extended table of contents is provided to accommodate the study of particular issues
or institutions from one war to the next, for example, the role of the media in Korea, in
Vietnam, in the Persian Gulf; or personnel policies, the air war, strategic and operational
xii
The three most significant questions in the study of war are as follows: First, what were
the causes of the war? Delineate the major arguments on the causes of war. Second, why did
the opponents, and their allies, fight the ways they did? Explain the conduct of war from the
perspectives of both belligerents at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. And
third, why did one side win and the other side lose? Explain the outcome of war. Delineate
the major arguments from both perspectives that explain victory and defeat. These questions
are interrelated. Explaining one helps in explaining the others. Historians disagree. Hence, it
is important for students of war to master the historiography of the wars they study. Students
of war who can best explain the conduct of war, the more difficult task to master, can better
explain the causes and outcomes of war.
The emphasis of this work is on the conduct of war.This single volume explains the causes,
conduct, and outcomes of the wars of the United States since World War II, and because one
war influences the conduct of the next, this work provides a unique perspective, not available
in works devoted exclusively to a single war. For example, you cannot understand Johnson’s
conduct of the Vietnam War without some understanding of Truman’s conduct of the Korean
War. And, you cannot understand the Korean War without some understanding of how World
War II ended in the Pacific.To provide a more complete explanation of the wars of the United
States I have used anthropological and political science theories, and historical methods. I have
provided a cultural explanation for US military practices in peace and war.
The study of humanity at war is still necessary. Let me conclude with the words of a
reviewer of the second edition, Gregory J. W. Urwin: “The American Culture of War should be
mandatory reading for policy makers, military leaders, students of military history, and all Americans with
the slightest interest in national security.”
Adrian R. Lewis
xiii
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to a great many scholars whose works are dutifully noted. This study covers
more than seventy years of American history. It is, thus, a synthesis of a great many works. It
is also an analysis of the American conduct of war based on primary documents, the official
and unofficial publications and documents of the services, the professional journals of services,
and the spoken and written words of the historical actor: from privates to generals, from sec-
retaries to presidents, and from private citizens to professors. I have endeavored to be fair to all
concerned by letting the historical actors speak for themselves. While endeavoring to present
the various sides of the historical issues addressed I have not failed to render an opinion based
on my analysis. However, if I have erred in judgment or fact, the fault is mine.
Thanks are due to my many students, graduate and undergraduate. My undergraduate stu-
dents have influenced my thinking about how to express complicated issues in relatively few
words, and impressed upon me the importance of summarizing explanations and arguments
into a few pages. My graduate students have contributed significant to the evolution of my
ideas about particular wars. Their research has expanded my knowledge and led me in new
directions. Specifically, I would like to thank my students from the Republic of Korea Army
(ROKA), Kim Youngjun, KeeHyun “Ken” Ahn, and Hosub Shim; from the US Army, Gates
Brown, Randy Masten, Eric Price, Ad Godinez, Garrett Gatzemeyer, Lee Kruger, and Brendan
Griswold; from the US Air Force, Christopher Rein; and from KU, Nicholas Sambulak, Hans
Juergen Kruger, Christopher Carey, and John Hess. I am grateful to my graduate and under-
graduate students.
Michael Geyer my teacher, mentor, and friend at the University of Chicago has been one of
the most influential and consistent people in my life. I am grateful for his wisdom, guidance,
and help. We don’t get through life alone. We need other people. Routledge Press has again
gone the extra mile to work with me on this project. I am grateful. As always, any mistakes or
omissions are my fault alone. Finally, I am blessed to have five intelligent, healthy, strong, beau-
tiful daughters: Alexandria, Allison, Aubrey, Anastasia, and Angelica. Each volume of this study
has been dedicated to them; however, I am now doubly blessed. I have a new granddaughter,
Sawyer Victoria Alston. Life is a wonderful thing.
Adrian R. Lewis
Professor, University of Kansas
xiv
Illustrations
Figures
4.1 President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff 75
4.2 1947 chart showing the relationship of major elements of the National Security 100
4.3 Chart of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 105
4.4 Chart of the Administrative/Logistics Chain of Command 105
4.5 Chart of the Unified Command Structure 106
5.1 Arrival of General Collins and General Vandenberg 117
5.2 Mao Zedong and the Red Chinese hordes, 11 December 1950 137
6.1 General Curtis LeMay, United States Strategic Air Force Command, 4 September 1950 146
6.2 Number of KATUSA assigned to US Units for selected dates, 1950–1953.
(From Military Affairs 38, April 1974, 53) 170
6.3 Black American soldier with a 75-mm recoilless rifle guarding the approach to a
command post in Korea 171
7.1 Dwight D. Eisenhower was President from 20 January 1953 until 20 January 1961 182
7.2 General and Mrs. Matthew B. Ridgway bid farewell to General George
C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense, as he leaves Haneda Airbase, Tokyo, Japan, for
the United States 189
8.1 President John F. Kennedy signs General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Commission as
General of the Army, as others look on during a ceremony at the White House 202
9.1 President Lyndon B. Johnson and General William C. Westmoreland,
Commander, US Military Assistance Command,Vietnam, present SSG Charles
Morris, 173rd Abn Div. with the Distinguished Service Cross, 26 October 1966 240
9.2 Chart of Pacific Command, 1967 241
9.3 US Troops in Vietnam 251
9.4 Major US Combat Units in South Vietnam. 252
9.5 Men of the 1st Cavalry Division on a landing zone 254
9.6 General Westmoreland with Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman (USMC),
CG III MAF, and General Wallace M. Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps 258
10.1 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of Defense-designate
Clark M. Clifford, 7 February 1968, Washington, DC 287
10.2 President Richard M. Nixon and President of South Vietnam Nguyen Van Thieu,
30 January 1969 289
7
Introduction 7
no new taxes to pay for the war, and that, in fact, there would be additional tax cuts. In the
midst of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) the President of the United States promised
the American people they would not be called upon to fight or to sacrifice. Rather than call
upon the American people to serve—an act that both Bush and Kerry considered political
suicide—the Bush Administration chose to increase the burden on active duty, reserve, and
National Guard personnel. The Administration extended tours of duty, put in “stop loss pol-
icies” to preclude people from leaving the services, and rotated soldiers and marines back to
Iraq after a relatively brief dwell time at home. This was a first for the United States, confirm-
ing the separation between state and nation.
In the months just prior to 9/11, the Rumsfeld Pentagon was planning to deactivate two of
the Army’s ten remaining divisions, in part to secure additional funding for three new jet fight-
ers, one for each air service.7 Had this reduction in force taken place, the United States would
have been incapable of fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as defending Korea
and Europe and maintaining its other commitments around the world. And while billions of
dollars of airplanes sat idly on runways, soldiers purchased their own body armor, purchased
communication equipment from Radio Shack, and “jerry rigged” armor plating for their
military vehicles in an effort to reduce their casualties.
The Bush Administration accepted greater risks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Eastern Europe,
and other parts of the world by reducing troop strength. It “out-sourced” the war. It employed
PMFs, American and foreign contractors and sub-contractors, to provide security and support
to American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. It endeavored to replace soldiers with technol-
ogy by employing UAVs, satellites, aircraft, and information technologies. It employed Special
Forces to carry out missions normally conducted by much larger units. It employed surrogate
forces, which held no loyalties to the United States or its political objectives. And it lived with
the prospect of failure in the insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and disaster in some
other parts of the world.
The United States, with all its great power, was stretched thin in the type of combat power
necessary to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The consequence was that soldiers and
marines died and were unnecessarily wounded in an insurgency war that might have been
avoided had the Bush White House and the Rumsfeld Pentagon listened to the advice of
Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, and deployed sufficient numbers of troops at
the outset to win the peace.8 In 2007 during the “Surge” the Army and Marine Corps had
too few soldiers and marines to fully employ its counterinsurgency doctrine. And while they
struggle to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, the most advanced aircraft known to man proved
incapable of stopping an insurgent with a rifle or a suicide bomber, was incapable of dis-
criminating between a determined enemy soldier and a frightened child, and was incapable
of establishing the kinds of relationships with indigenous people required to win their con-
fidence and support. And while the United States invested billions of dollars to develop and
manufacture the most advanced aircraft ever produced, and to replace the most advanced air-
craft ever produced, it was incapable of fighting an insurgency war, a “People’s War,” in only
one of the small countries targeted by the Bush Administration in the GWOT. And, to be sure,
the world and our enemies watched, concluding that much of the power of the United States
was an illusion. While there were voices that called for a more traditional response to war, and
for conscription and taxes to pay for the war, they were too few to form a chorus large enough
and loud enough to influence policy. Out of 300 million Americans, less than 1 percent car-
ried the burden of the GWOT. This is the new American practice of war: war without the
people. It is not sustainable.
*****
8
8 Introduction
This work is divided into in three sections. The first section covers the Truman years from
World War II to the end of the Korean War, the period when the traditional American practice
of war was no longer capable of achieving political objectives, and a new vision of war emerged
as a function of nuclear weapons and airpower. The second section covers the Eisenhower,
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years—the Vietnam War Era—the period of attempted adapta-
tion of the traditional, cultural norms to the new practices of artificial limited war. The final
section covers the new American practice of war, from the end of the Vietnam War to the
present.The common themes that run through each section include national strategy, national
military strategy, defense and foreign policies, civil–military relations, force structure, technol-
ogy, strategic and operational doctrines, inter-service rivalry, the media, personnel policies,
the air war, the ground war, the cultures of the services, American culture, and the role of the
American people.This consistency allows readers to trace the evolution of these various facets
of the American practice of war over the more than seventy years of change. Because each of
the wars discussed is the subject of numerous volumes of works a comprehensive, definitive
treatment of each war is beyond the scope of this book. The notes and bibliography pro-
vide a rich source for finding additional works. A bibliography of the major wars fought by
the United States since World War II is provided online at: www.routledge.com/textbooks/
9781138684263
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
magasins de se prêter à ce commerce. Il prescrivit aussi de
nouvelles formalités pour l'aliénation des biens des mineurs qui se
trouvaient débiteurs du fisc.
Au mois d'avril de l'an 326, Constantin consul pour
la septième fois, ayant pris pour collègue son fils An 326.
Constance âgé de huit ans et demi et déja César,
résolut d'aller à Rome, dont il était absent depuis xlviii. Mort de
long-temps. Il passa par Aquilée et par Milan, où il Crispus.
paraît qu'il fit quelque séjour. Il était à Rome le 8
de juillet, et y demeura près de trois mois. Il y
célébra de nouveau ses vicennales. Le concours Idat. chron.
des décennales des deux Césars Crispus et
Constantin augmenta la solennité. Mais la joie de Cod. Th. Chron.
ces fêtes se changea en deuil par un événement
funeste, qui fut pour l'empereur jusqu'à la fin de sa
Philost. l. 2, c.
vie une source d'amertume. Crispus qui avait si 4.
heureusement remplacé son père dans la guerre
contre les Francs, qui l'avait secondé avec tant de
succès et de gloire dans la défaite de Licinius, et Vict. epit. p.
qui donnait encore de plus grandes espérances, 224.
fut accusé par sa belle-mère, d'avoir conçu pour
elle une passion incestueuse, et d'avoir osé la lui Eutrop. l. 10.
déclarer. Quelques auteurs attribuent cette
méchanceté de Fausta à la jalousie que lui Amm. l. 14, c.
inspiraient les brillantes qualités du fils de 11.
Minervina: d'autres prétendent qu'embrasée d'un
criminel amour pour ce jeune prince et rebutée
avec horreur, elle l'accusa du crime dont elle était Zos. l. 2, c. 29.
seule coupable. Tous conviennent que Constantin
emporté par sa colère, le condamna à mort sans Sidon. l. 5,
examen. Il fut mené loin des yeux de son père à epist. 8.
Pola en Istrie, où il eut la tête tranchée. Sidonius
dit qu'on le fit mourir par le poison. Il était âgé Cod. orig.
d'environ trente ans. Sa mort fut bientôt vengée. Const. p. 34.
Le père infortuné commença par se punir lui-
même. Accablé des reproches de sa mère Hélène et plus encore de
ceux de sa conscience, qui l'accusait sans cesse d'une injuste
précipitation, il se livra à une espèce de désespoir. Toutes les vertus
de Crispus irritaient ses remords: il semblait avoir renoncé à la vie. Il
passa quarante jours entiers dans les larmes, sans faire usage du
bain, sans prendre de repos. Il ne trouva d'autre consolation que de
signaler son repentir par une statue d'argent qu'il fit dresser à son
fils; la tête était d'or; sur le front étaient gravés ces mots: C'est mon
fils injustement condamné. Cette statue fut ensuite transportée à
Constantinople, où elle se voyait dans le lieu appelé Smyrnium.
La mort de Crispus, chéri de tout l'empire, attira
sur Fausta l'indignation publique. On osa bientôt XLIX.
avertir Constantin des désordres de sa perfide
épouse. Elle fut accusée d'un commerce infâme, Mort de Fausta.
qu'il avait peut-être seul ignoré jusqu'alors. Ce
nouveau crime devint une preuve de la calomnie.
Aussi malheureux mari que malheureux père, Zos. l. 2, c. 29.
également aveugle dans sa colère contre sa
femme et contre son fils, il ne se donna pas non Philost. l. 2, c.
plus cette fois le temps d'avérer l'accusation, et il 11.
courut encore le risque de l'injustice et des
remords. Il fit étouffer Fausta dans une étuve.
Vict. epit. p.
Plusieurs officiers de sa cour furent enveloppés 224.
dans cette terrible vengeance. Le jeune Licinius
qui n'avait pas encore douze ans, et dont les
bonnes qualités semblaient dignes d'un meilleur Eutrop. l. 10.
sort, perdit alors la vie, sans qu'on en sache le
sujet. Ces exécutions firent horreur. On trouva Sidon. tit. 5,
affichés aux portes du palais deux vers satiriques epist. 8.
où l'on rappelait la mémoire de Néron[36]. Des
événements si tragiques ont noirci les dernières années de
Constantin: ils contribuèrent sans doute à l'éloigner de la ville de
Rome, où s'étaient passées tant de scènes sanglantes; il la regarda
comme un séjour funeste.
[36]