G.R. No. 213455. August 11, 2015.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, and HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents

Facts: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed an Information for plunder against Enrile,
Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan
(SB). Enrile responded by filing before the SB (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail); and (2) a supplemental
opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information. SB denied Enrile's motions and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.

Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the SB and filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since
he was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital. SB Presiding Judge Tang denied
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars as the desires of Enrile are substantial reiterations which he raised in his
opposition to the arrest warrant. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Atty. Mendoza subsequently
moved for the deferment of Enrile's arraignment. SB responded by directing the doctors present to determine
whether he was physically fit to be arraigned. After he was declared fit, SB proceeded with Enrile's
arraignment. Enrile entered a "no plea," prompting the SB to enter a "not guilty" plea on his behalf.

Enrile claims in this petition that SB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the
Information filed against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Enrile essentially reiterates the "details
desired" that he sought in his motion for bill of particulars such as series of overt acts that would constitute
plunder, to whom the money was given, describe each alleged project (its location and costs), place and time
where and when the money was received, etc.

Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context different from his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the probable cause issue
was interlocutory and did "not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent proceedings especially in
the context of a different proceeding.

Enrile thus prays that: "(a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the
Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from holding the pre-trial and
subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency of the present
petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion
of the proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan's July 11, 2014 resolution and his
arraignment."

In its Comment, people of the Philippines counters that SB did not exercise its discretionary power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the denial of Enrile's motion for bill of particulars was
erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed SB
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan. The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts;
matters of evidence do not need to be averred. In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for
a bill of particulars is "ancillary to and in implementation" of an accused's rights to due process, to be heard,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the
Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion for bill of particulars is not "a mere denial of a procedural right under the
Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the
offense charged." Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the
Information and prepare for trial.

Issues:
1. W/N SB committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Enrile’s
motion to bill of particulars.
2. W/N Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars.

Ruling:
1. Yes. Court held that SB’s denial of the petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the
details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary — without any explanation supporting this
conclusion — constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Some of the desired details are material facts that
must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan
should have diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary
determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in
his Reply that the "desired details" could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the
prosecution.

Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution
must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show how the various acts reveal a
combination or series of means or schemes that reveal a pattern of criminality.

2. Yes. Court held that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for him to properly plead to the accusations
against him during trial. Particulars are the following:
a. Overt acts which constitute the “combination” of overt or criminal acts. The heart of the Plunder
Law lies in the phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal acts." Hence, even if the
accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act. A reading of the Information filed
against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to particularize
the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts.
b. Approximate dates of commissions or kickbacks. Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates,
at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary
pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. The length of
time alleged 2004-2010 will pose difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his defense and will
render him susceptible to surprises.
c. Projects funded and NGOs involved. Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that
Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of Napoles' NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation,
Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the particular transactions referred to.
d. Government agencies serving as conduits. The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed
Napoles' NGOs are also material facts that must be specified, since they served a necessary role in
the crime charged — the alleged conduits between Enrile and Napoles' NGOs. They were
indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed.

NOTES:
- Elements of plunder are: (1) a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance; (2) accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts i.e., misappropriation
of public funds, receiving any commission kickback for personal benefit, etc.; (3) aggregate amount of ill-
gotten wealth of at least 50,000,000.00
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile's requested details on "Who among the accused
acquired the alleged "ill-gotten wealth" are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.

Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and with
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an
essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00
had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the amount of ill-
gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount
amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million. We point out that conspiracy in the present
case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no
absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the offense charged. Enrile is not entitled to bill of particulars on requested details on Enrile’s PDAF, yearly
PDAF allocations, details of COA audits, other sources of kickbacks and commissions.
- Information vs. Bill of Particulars. It was ruled by SB that Enrile’s grounds on request for bill of particulars
are reiterations of the grounds previously raised in the information. The Court clarified that in the
information, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the bill of particulars, he
already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in
details that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a
defect of form. Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state
the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion
for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately
prepare his defense unless specifications are made. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for
purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate
for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial. The Sandiganbayan grossly missed
these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong and completely inapplicable
considerations to support its conclusion.

- Arraignment. The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to
face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. During arraignment, the accused is granted the
opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.

An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to
him in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is likewise at this
stage of the proceedings when the accused enters his plea, or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. A concomitant component of this stage of
the proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the accusations
made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and prepare a defense.

- Bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an accused may
avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.

In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but
nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know
the theory of the government's case; to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his
acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the prosecution
to observe certain limitations in offering evidence. The rule requires the information to describe the
offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the
court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what the Information means. Main purpose is to guard against surprises during trial.
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to
quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial.
It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under
vague terms.

- If the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the
government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused's Constitutionally guaranteed rights. A bill of
particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on account
that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense. I stress, however, that the issue
in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying Enrile's request for a bill of particulars, and
not a motion to quash. If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot
prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper remedy.
G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006

JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGION XIII, Respondents.

FACTS
 On June 24, 2000, Cabo and Bonifacio Balahay, Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, were charged for
violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
o In the information, it was alleged that Mayor Balahay received from Cabo the amount of
P104,162.31, and that said mayor "intervened in the undertaking by Cabo's company (OIDCI)
for consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo".
 Cabo claimed that she was deprived of her right to preliminary investigation so she filed a motion for
reinvestigation.
o The Sandiganbayan (SB) granted her motion and directed the Special Prosecutor to conduct
one.
 Meanwhile, Cabo filed another motion seeking permission to travel abroad for a family vacation.
o The SB granted it in an order dated May 2004, which stated that, in light of the case still being
under reinvestigation, and considering that she had not yet been arraigned, Cabo expressly
consented to the order that she be arraigned conditionally.
o CONDITIONS:
 If it is found that there is no probable cause to proceed against her, the arraignment
will have no effect.
 However, if there is a need to amend the present information, then Cabo would
have then waived her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as well as her constitutional right against double jeopardy.
 When she was arraigned, she was duly assisted by her counsel and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the offense
charged.
o She also duly affixed her signature in the minutes to signify her conformity to the conditional
arraignment and the legal consequence thereof.
 Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor concluded his reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge
her with the violation of RA 3019.
o The SB then set a new schedule for arraignment in October 2004.
o On the day before arraignment, Cabo filed a motion praying that she be allowed to reiterate
her previous plea in the conditional arraignment so that she may be excused from attending
the arraignment the next day.
o SB, however, did not act on her said motion.
 Balahay, on the other hand, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the same did
not charge any offense.
o It failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said contract under the law, in his
official capacity as mayor.
 The SB sustained Balahay's contention that the information was defective for lack of necessary facts,
but it did not immediately quash the complaint.
o Instead, the court, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, ordered only
the amendment of the information and ordered the prosecution to correct the defect.
o The amended information was filed in February 2005 containing all the necessary elements
of the crime charged.
  Cabo was notified of her re-arraignment in April 2005, but she filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment on the ground that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the amended information
since amendment of the information based on the substance is not allowed after the plea has been
made.
 SB denied petitioner's motion.
o It held that her arraignment on the original information was only conditional in nature to
accommodate her request to travel abroad so that she could be tried in absentia.
o She agreed to the condition that should the information be amended, she is deemed to
waive her right to object to the amendment and to waive her constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
o She was considered estopped from raising her objection to the amended complaint.
 Petitioner filed an MR on the ground that double jeopardy had set in. She asserted that her
conditional arraignment had been confirmed by her October motion reiterating her plea of not guilty.
Thus, her arraignment on the original information was no longer conditional, and double jeopardy
must consequently attach.
 SB denied her resolution. This prompted her to file the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether double jeopardy had attached on the basis of the "NOT GUILTY" plea (which petitioner "reiterated" in
her October 2004 motion).

RULING
Double jeopardy did not attach. Petitioner's assertions must fail.
SB's practice of "conditionally" arraigning the accused has no legal basis. It was only in People vs. Espinosa that
the Court recognized "conditional arraignment", provided that the conditions attached are "unmistakable,
express, informed and enlightened". Otherwise, the arraignment was considered simple and conditional.
The SB was declared to have unequivocally laid down petitioner's conditions for arraignment. Among those
specified was that if there was a need to amend the original information, she forfeits her right to object and
her right to double jeopardy. She was assisted by counsel and thereby informed of the legal consequences of
such conditions.
With regard to her formal manifestation reiterating her not guilty plea, there was no showing that SB affirmed
her motion. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires the accused to be present at
arraignment and personally enter his plea. With respect to the applicability of double jeopardy to the case, two
requisites were absent:
1. 1st Requisite: Double jeopardy was not present since the original information failed to allege the
essential elements for the violations allegedly committed by petitioner and her co-accused.
2. 4th Requisite: There was also no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioner. The SB merely
ordered an amendment.
 According to Section 4, Rule 117, the prosecution is given an opportunity to amend the
defective information if the facts charged do not constitute an offense. It is only when the
prosecution fails to properly amend the information that the motion to quash be granted.

Contrary to petitioner's submission, the original information can be cured by amendment even after she had
pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of form and not of
substance (Section 14, Rule 110).
The amended information did not change the nature of the offense, which was for violation of Section 3(b) of
RA 3019, but it only made the facts more precise. In People vs. Casey, tests to determine whether defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment of the information were set forth, among them are:
 If the defenses of the accused in the original information are still available in the amended
information, and/or if the amended information does not change the nature of the offense charged —
the amendment is one of FORM AND NOT SUBSTANCE, therefore not prohibited.
Section 14, Rule 110 is also not necessary, as petitioner suggested since there was no mistake in the charging of
the proper offense; the prosecution merely failed to allege the appropriate facts necessary to constitute the
crime charged. The petition is DISMISSED.

Taglay v. Daray, G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012, 693 PHIL 45-58

FACTS: Petitioner Estrella Taglay was charged with Qualified Trespass to Dwelling before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Davao Del Sur. After petitioner was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty, the MCTC issued an order to transfer the case to the RTC because the
complainant was a minor. Section 5 (a) of R.A. 8369 or the Family Courts Act of 1997 clearly
provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases where
one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9)
years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission
of the offense. Prior to the presentation of the final witness for the prosecution, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred
the case to the RTC instead of dismissing it. also argued that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction
was further aggravated when she was not arraigned before the RTC. The RTC ruled that it
had acquired jurisdiction over the case when it received the records of the case as a
consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC. The RTC also held that even granting that
there was defect or irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned
before the RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel entered into trial
without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted
that petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution.
Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether the accused should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that her
arraignment before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein
were void. (YES)

RULING: It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings
before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.
Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein,
including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's
arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the RTC. It is also true that
petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC without objecting
that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC to rely on the
case of People v. Cabale, because the accused therein was in fact arraigned, although the
same was made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the similar cases of People
v. Atienza and Closa and People v. Pangilinan, the accused in the said cases were also
belatedly arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active participation of the
counsels of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses during trial without objecting on the ground that their clients had not yet been
arraigned, had the effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover, the
accused in these cases did not object when they were belatedly arraigned. The same,
however, cannot be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC.
On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there is
nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her
client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of
implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of
the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed
to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is
mobilized against him. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment
cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of
arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial court.