Frolll Stalin To Killl Sung: Andrei Lankov

ANDREI LANKOV
Frolll Stalin to
Killl 11 Sung
The Formation of North Korea
1945-1960
HURST& COMPANY,LONDON
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First published in the United Kingdom by
C. Hunt & Co. (Publishen) Ltd.,
38 King Street, LoodOn WC2E 8JZ
C Andrei l.ankov, 2002
All rip11 n:set mi
ISBN 1-8506S-56>-4
The ript ofAndrei Lankov to be identified

u the authoc of this work hu been asserted by
him in acconlmce with the Copyright, DesigPs
and Patents Act, 1988.
Printed in India
Ot!Oirol fron1
Dlg•tl" "' Got gle UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
To my mother
Valentina LAnkova (Algazina)
ovt•z• Go gle Ong Ml f1om

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
I
&r1~
I o-t'f-<TL
CONTENTS
Preface and Acknowledgements page v11
Note on Transliteration xv
Abbreviations
..
XVII
Chapters
1. North Korea in 1945-8: the Soviet Occupation and
the Birth of the State 1
2. Kim 11 Sung: an Attempt at a Biography 49
3. The Factions in the North Korean Leadership in
the 1940s and 1950s 77
4. The Emergence of the Soviet Faction in 110
North Korea, 1945- 55
5. Ho Ka-I: a Forgotten Founding Father of the KWP 136
6. The August Challenge 154
Afterword 194
Index 199
0191t1zed by Google Original from

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The regime which has ruled North Korea for two generations appean
as one of the most inept regimes of the modem world. There are
good reasons for such a perception. North Korea has the dubious
distinction ofbeing. together with China, the only Communist state
which after 1945 has experienced a major famine in peacetime.
Even compared with those of other Communist countries, North
Korean living standards have always been abysmally low and in the
last decade or so they have been continuously falling. The economy
has been dependent on Big Brother's sponsonhip to a much greater
degree than has been the case with most other socialist countries.
So the history of North Korea might be seen as a story ofspectacular
failure, especially when contrasted with the prosperous and democ-
ratising South. ·
Yet the same regime has demonstrated an uncanny ability to survive
the most dangerous challenges virtually intact. By the late 1990s North
Korea is the only surviving example ofan avowed Leninist (or rather
Leninist-Stalinist) state. To almost everybody's surprise, the seemingly
fragile. awkward and irrational Pyongyang political and social system
has outlived similar regimes which in the 1970s or even mid-1980s
looked far more efficient and more successful. The tide of anti-
communist revolutions in 1989-91 wiped out much of the Socialist
camp (exceptions being China, Vietnam and- by some standards-
Laos), but Pyongyang was left almost untouched by these dramatic
developments. Whatever the hardships and sufferings of the North
Korean populace, the country's elite have some reason to see themselves
if not as victon then, at least as extremely successful survivon.
Indeed the history of the North Korean regime, closely associated
vii
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Vlll Preface and Acknowledgements
with the Kim family and its retinue is above all a history of survival
against all odds and often at the expense of its own people. The
'miracle of the 1990s' attracted much international attention, but it
was only one in a long chain of Pyongyang's unlikely escapes from
almost certain disaster. In the fifty-five years of its history, North
Korea recovered from a military debacle on a scale no other Com-
munist country has ever experienced; it was one of very few coun-
tries of the Eastern block which managed to avoid even superficial
de-Stalinisation in the 1950s; it survived the two decades of quarrels
between its two principal sponsors; and it coped surprisingly well
with the death of its own all but god-like founding father. North
Korea also became the only Communist monarchy with a family
succession. Most of these feats are unique or nearly unique in the
history of world Communism.
The study of the North Korean present has never been easy.
Even by the standards of other Communist countries, Pyongyang is
notably secretive. All official press is exclusively devoted to intense
propaganda, few if any statistical data are allowed to be published,
and it is hard to trust published material ~nyway. Foreign residents
of North Korea, including the citizens of the supposedly 'friendly'
countries, have since the mid-1950s been subjected to constant
surveillance and severe restrictions, while the number of defectors is
very small. No dissidence, however limited, is tolerated, so the amount
of unofficial information about the country is virtually zero. The
study of the North Korean past is an even more difficult task. No
foreigner is allowed to do independent research in Korean libraries,
let alone archives. Indeed, typically a foreign visitor is simply denied
access to the library catalogues! The official history is regularly and
radically re-written in order to suit the ever-changing political situation
and conform to the slogans of the moment. Therefore, contrary to
the 'normal' pattern, in the course of time sources are suppressed
rather than discovered.
These difficulties explain why until the early 1990s the history
of North Korea had been a largely neglected topic. The single excep-
tion was the Korean War, the only event of contemporary Korean
history which had a direct and considerable impact on the major
Western powers. However, this rather extensive Korean War research
has been largely centred around the international and/ or military
dimensions of the conflict. Only a small number ofpioneering schol-
ars (Dae-Sook Suh, Robert Scalapino, Chong-Sile Lee, Bruce C~
in the United States, Haruki Wada and Masao Okonogi in Japan) did
Onginal fron1
01g1tlz•dby Google UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Prtfaa and Aclmowkdgantnts IX
research on North Korean history proper. The situation changed

around 1990 when North Korea began to attract international atten-
tion, including attention fiom many scholars. The Korean War still
remains by far the most popular topic for study, especially in the West,
but an increasing amount of interesting work on North Korean
political and social history has recently been published. At the same
time, changes in the Soviet Union and China - two countries which
possess by far the greatest amount of North Korea-related historic
material-made new soun::es available for scholarly scrutiny and pro-
vided North Korean studies with more reliable foundations. It would
be wrong to overestimate the degree of change, since a very consid-
erable part of the relevant materials both in the Soviet Union and
especially in China remains off-limits to scholars. Politi.cal and ideo-
logical considerations made both Moscow and Beijing very cautious
about granting access to relevant documents, and the most recent
developments--above all, a sudden upsurge of anti-Western feeling
in both countries--have made such resean::h an even more difficult
undertaking. However, a limited amount ofsoun::es is better than no
sources at all.
My interest in North Korea began when I studied there in 1984-
85. Since then I have been gathering material on the country's past,
especially the late 1940s and early 1950s, the formative years of the
Kim Il Sung regime. In 1990-4 I published a few articles on North
Korean history in Soviet/Russian journals. In 1995 a collection of
these papen appeared as a book in Russian (&vemaia Koma, vchera i
ugodnia, Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 1995) and was soon translated
into Korean. The present book is generally based on that publication.
Howewr, the original articles, written before 1994, are now hopelessly
outdated since the last few yean have been a period of very successful
resean::h into North Korean history. Because of this I had to re-
write all the articles extensively in order to include new material. At
the same time, some studies, originally included in the Russian edition,
are absent fiom the present book-mainly because they deal with
North Korea's present rather than its past. Hence the present book is
only in a very limited sense a translation ofthe 1995 Russian edition.
North Korea was created as a Soviet puppet state, and perhaps this
rather derogatory term is more applicable to Korea of the late 1940s
than. to most of the other Soviet-controlled countries at that time.
This is clear fiom the tint chapter of the book, which is a review of
Digitized by Google Ong1nal from

x Preft1a and Adrtwwledpmts
1945-8, the formative years of North Korean history. when the
Soviet military authorities were busy creating the North Korean state.
However, eYCn at that time there \Wl'C some peculiarities which hinted
at the future f.atc ofthis cowttry. The Soviet expcrin~ts in Communist
nation-building fowid in North Korea rather fertile soil, but the Soviet
seeds grew into unusual plants.
The rcgin1e's birth was difficult. Kim 11 Sung is normally repmcntcd
by Pyongyang propaganda as an omnipotent and omnipresent creator
ofthe North Korean state, but this picture is rather far from the truth.
Kim U Sung's biography (chapter two) describes how difficult his way
to the top was, and how great a role sheer luck played in his career. He
was, above all, a lucky survivor, but he was also able to use his luck in
a sensible way.
Kim II Sung began to play a special role in North Korean history
only from the mid- 1950s onwards. Until then Kim had been hardly
more than tint among the equals in North Korean politics. The fint
fifteen yean of North Korean history were a time of intense clashes
between rival factions, each wielding very substantial power. Only
after Kim 11 Sung and his retinue had managed to destroy the other
factions did it become possible for them to embark on their own
political and social experiments. The third chapter traces the history
of the factions and shows how the differences between them were
exploited in the political manoeuvres of the 1940s and 'SOs. Special
attention is paid to the purges of195(Hi(). We also dwell on one of
these North Korean political factions, the so-called Soviet faction. It
consisted ofSoviet citizens ofKorcan origin who had been dispatched
to the North by the Soviet authorities. It has always been known that
these people played an important role in the DPRK's early history,
but reliable information about them has been scarce. The fourth chapter
analyses the background, composition and other peculiarities of the
Soviet faction. The book also includes a biography of a halfforgotten
North Korean politician, HIS Ka-i, who together with Kim II Sung,
Kim Tu-bong and Pale: HISn-ylSng can be considered one ofthe found-
ing fathcn, of the North Korean regime. Once the powerful leader of
the Soviet Koreans, and second in command in Pyongyang, HIS was
purged in the early t 950s and has been almost forgotten since then.
The most serious open confrontation between the factions hap-
pened in t 956, when a group of high-level party cadres undertook
a bold but unsuccessful attempt to ovcrthrow Kim II Sung. Under the
new circumstances in the Communist world his ways were perceived
as too Stalinist; they wanted to introduce the ideas of Khrushchev's
nco-Leninism to North Korea. Similar attempts were made in most
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.
XI
other Communist countries, where de-Stalinisation and related re-

forms eventually achieved varying degrees ofsuccess. North Korea.
however, was a total failure for the reformen. New materials, dis-
cussed in the sixth chapter, shed light on this pivotal incident.
Ofspecial intetcst for this book is the problem ofSoviet influence
over the formation of the North Korean regime. This question has
been attracting scholarly attention for decades. ln the early period,
the perception of the problem was much coloured by the spirit of
the ongoing Cold War. Hence, Western and especially South Korean
scholan often depicted the North Korean regime as a mere puppet
run by all-powerful Soviet masten, as a product ofsocial manipulation
imposed on the helpless North Koreans fiom outside and against
their will. In recent yean, this kind of Western and South Korean
historiography has given way to a new approach. Democratisation
in the South (fiom 1987 onwards) meant that leftist ideas could be
expressed freely and indeed various brands of Marxism soon came
to be quite fashionable in the Seoul academia. New approaches to
North Korean history also began to appear in Western scholanhip,
where a younger generation ofscholan, less influenced by the Cold
War mentality, was rising to prominence. These 'revisionist' authon
tried to downplay foreign (that is, Soviet and occasionally Chinese)
influence and portrayed the North Korean events of 1945-50 as
essentially an indigenous social revolution, a mass movement only
secondarily influenced and aided by the Soviets. They demonstrated
that in the late 1940s the North Korean regime indeed enjoyed a
considerable degree of popular support. However, some of these
historians go too far in disregarding the dominant role of the Soviet
Union in North Korea at that period. It is possible for a revolution
to have local support and at the same time to be totally under foreign
control. I hope this book will show that both local and external
facton have to be taken into account in undentanding the formation
of the North Korean state and its early developments.
In the late 1940s, the external facton of North Korean develop-
meant, above all, the pervasive influence of the Soviet Union,
although at later stages Chinese patterns and ideas also came to play
a considerable and gradually increasing role in North Korean politics
and society. Nevertheless, due to the nature of the sources available,
the present book largely concentrate on the Soviet impact. This does
not mean that the Chinese influences after 1949 were negligible, but,
having said this, it is mostly the Soviet impact on North Korea that
we shall discuss.
At the same time, we now know that in later years North Korea

..
Xl1 Prefoa and Aclmowledgemmts
evolved in a very specific direction. It mm.aged to slip &om the seem-
ingly unbreakable Soviet domination and join the ranks of the coun-
tries where 'national Stalinism', to borrow Ivan Berend's expression,
flourished after the dismantling ofSoviet Stalinism in the mid-1950s.
Alongside Albania and Romania in Eastern Europe, North Korea
became one of the Jess politically (albeit not economically) dependent,
but, one may argue, also Jess prosperow and Jess liberal Communist
societies. These developments took place·fiom the late 1950s onwards
and hence are beyond the scope of the present book. However, in
spite of all the friction and clashes with the post-Stalinist Soviet Un-
ion, North Korea inherited &om it the essentially Stalinist social and
political system. The development ofindependent (or, ifone prefen,
chuch'e) Stalinism would have been impossible had the foundations
ofsuch a society not been laid in 1945-56 when North Korea was
still a country of'dependent Stalinism'. In this book we attempt to
show how the mechanics ofthe Stalinist state were tint introduced to
North Korea.
Apart &om its debt to the publications ofWestern, South Korean
and Japanese scholars, the'book is based on documents &om the Soviet
archives I studied in 1994-5 and 1997-9. After the fall ofcommunism
some Soviet archives were opened for research. This openness has
always been rather conditional, and after 1995 it has been to a very
large degree revened, but nevertheless a considerable amount of new
and important data became available to students of North Korean
history. 1\vo major sources of information for the book were the
Archive of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy (Foreign Ministry
archive) and the Centre for Preservation and Study of the Cunent
History Documents (its official name has changed a few times-origi-
nally it was a part of the former Communist Party Central Archive).
The former keeps documents of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang
as well as Foreign Ministry papen, while in the latter most Korea-
related data can be found in the papen of the Central Committee's
International Department. In addition, I managed to gain access to
some documents in private archives, including copies of Korea-
related decisions of the Soviet Politburo meetings in the late 1940s.
However, many important documents remain beyond the reach of
scholars, or at least beyond my reach. Most regrettable is the current
inaccessibility ofmany (indeed, most) papen generated by the so-called
Soviet Civil Administration (really a military administration) and other
Soviet military bodies in 1945-8. This material could considerably
influence our perception of North Korean history in its early stage.

Preface and Acltnowkdgmimts Xlll
However, in the current political situation and with the prevailing

public mood in Russia, it looks unlikely that these important sources
will surface in the foreseeable future.
Another source widely used in some parts of the book are inter-
views with some surviving participants of the events. Many former
North Korean officials escaped to the Soviet Union after 1956, and
some of them were still alive and willing to grant interviews. New
data was also obtained through interviews with some former Soviet
officials who worked in North Korea in the 1950s and 1960s.
It is necessary to stress that the present work, like works of other
students of North Korea, is ofa preliminary nature. Real research in
North Korean history is only beginning. An overwhelming majority
of the relevant material is still hidden in the archives of Pyongyang,
Moscow and Beijing. No doubt, new materials and publications will
make us change many estimations and correct currently unavoidable
mistakes. Still, North Korea is a rather unusual place, and it is difficult
(indeed, impossible) to understand its present without knowledge of
its past. I hope that the present volume will help readers learn some-
thing about this country and trace some of the historical roots of its
current idiosyncrasies.
Ackncwledgements
I am grateful to many friends, colleagues and officials whose support
made this work possible. I would like to particularly thank DrVadim
P. Tkachenko, DrVladimir D. Tihomirov, Dr Lev R . Kontsevich, Dr
Irina N. Selezneva, General Kang Sang-ho, Dr Vilali N. Naishul,
Professor Bill Jenner, Dr Kenneth Wells, Professor Peter Rutland,
General Ch'oe Sok-rip, Dr Ko T'ae-u, and Dr Kim Sok-hyang for
their constant support and encouragement of this undertaking.
I am grateful also to Dr Elena Chiniaeva who prepared the initial
translation, and to Darrell Dorrington and Ann Gunn who edited
the manuscript.
Faadty ofAsian Studies ANDREI LANK.ov

Australian National Univmity. Canberra
Dtambtr 2000

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
Romanisation of Korean names is according to the McCunc-

Rcichaucr system. except where other~ have become commonly
accepted as in the case of Kim Il Sung. For the purposes of better
standanlisation, the spelling follows the modem South Korean pattern
in cases when it is different from the current North Korean spelling
(e.g. Nodong Sinmun, not &d<mg Sinmun; Yi, not Ri or Li). Consonants
arc shown vocalised while between the \'OWels, but not in the beginning
of the words (a surname and a given name arc treated as two different
words). Chinese names arc romanised according to the pinyin system
and Russian according to the Library of Congress system, with similar
exceptions for commonly accepted spellings. Whenever possible, the
translation of the names ofNorth Korean official institutions follows
Dae-Sook Suh's book, currently the most comprehensive Western
publication on the North Korean bureaucracy (Kortan Communism
1945-1980: A Referma Guide to the PoUtica1 System. Honolulu: University
ofHawaii Press, 1980).
xv

ABBREVIATIONS
AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

(Moscow)
cc Central Committee
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
KPA Korean People's !umy
KWP Korean Workers' Parry
NKWP North Korean Workers' Party
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RTsHIDNI Centre for preservation and study of documents for
contemporary history (Moscow)
SCA Soviet Civil Administration
SKWP South Korean Workers' Party
..
XVll
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1
NORTH KOREA IN 1945-8
THE SOVIET OCCUPATION AND THE BIRTH OF THE STATE
For half a century two states have existed on the Korean peninsula:
the Korean Republic in the South and the DPRK in the North.
The division of Korea remains one of the most difficult problems of
East Asian international politics, and is a constant source of political
instability and potentially dangerous tensions. The roots ofthis situation
are to be found in the first post-war years when two independent
and mutually hostile states were established with the direct support,
respectively, ofthe United States and the Soviet Union. In this chapter
we trace the events and decisions which shaped North Korean society
in the first post-war years and eventually led to the establishment of
a separate North Korean state. Special attention is paid to the role
played by the Soviet military in North Korea.
On 9 August 1945, the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan
and on 11 August, after two days offighting, the troops of the 25th
Army crossed the Chinese-Korean border. At the same time, Soviet
marines landed in some ports on the eastern coast. The victory was
surprisingly swift. During the next few days, the resistance ofJapanese
garrisons north of the 38th parallel was overcome. On 15 August
the Japanese military forces in Korea surrendered, although some
units, contrary to orders from their own headquarters, continued
fighting for a few more days.
It was mainly units of the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front
that participated in combat action on the Korean peninsula. Not
surprisingly, this army was also entrusted with the task of ruling
the newly occupied territory. On 10 August, on the eve of combat in
1

2 From Stalin to Kim II Sung
Korea, the 25th Army included, among other units, the 17th, the
39th, and the 88th Rifle Corps, the 386th and 393rd Rifle Divisions,
and the 10th Mechanised Corps. 1 The 25th Army was commanded
by Colonel-General LM. Chistiakov, while Major-General N.G.
Lebedev was its political commissar, or, in the Soviet parlance of the
day, its 'member of the Military Council'. In April 1947, Lieutenant-
General G.P. Korotkov was appointed commander of the 25th Army
in place of Chistiakov. However, neither Chistiakov nor Korotkov
were particularly active in North Korean politics. This was not the
case with N .G. Lebedev, a professional political officer, intelligent and
energetic, who had a taste for political work and seriously influenced
North Korean developments from 1945 to 1948.2
Next to Lebedev, two other people played a significant role in
Korean matters immediately after the war: Major-General Andrei
Alekseevich Romanenko, who in October 1945 became the head of
the Soviet Civil Administration, and, es}>ecially, Colonel-General
Terentii Fomich Shtykov, a 'member of the Military Council' (i.e.
Political Commissar) of the 1st Far Eastern Front. From the first
days of the Soviet occupation, Shtykov frequently visited Pyongyang
and made a significant impact on the decision-making process and
the functioning of the Soviet authorities. In fact, in 1945-8, he was
the real supreme ruler of North Korea, the principal supervisor of
both the Soviet military and the local authorities.
Shtykov was a party functionary rather than a military officer.
Born in 1907 into a farmer's family, he joined the Party as a worker
in a Leningrad factory in 1929 and subsequently made a brilliant
career. By 1938 Shtykov had become the second secretary of the
Leningrad region party committee3 and, as a result, came to be close
to A.A. Zhdanov, then Leningrad party boss, who during the first
post-war years was for a while considered Stalin's principal lieutenant
and even likely successor. It was due to Zhdanov's consistent support
that Shtykov, initially a young komsomol (Communist Youth) activist,
1For the composition of the 25th Army according to the Soviet publicatioru of
the 1%Os, see Eric van Ree, Soaalism in One Z.One. Stalin~ Policy in Korra, 194~1947.
Oxford and New York: Berg, 1989. p. 70.
2The author had an opportunity in 1989 •nd 1990 to meet N.G. Lebcdcv.
who, in spite of being very old, still had a vivid memory which was in striking
contrast to his ph}'1ical frailty.
3 For Shrykov's biographical data see Cenae for Preservation and Study of
Documents for Contemporary History (hence RTsHIDNI), fond 644, opis 2, delo
SS, list 117.

The Soviet Oaupation and the Birth of the State 3
made rapid progress in his career. 4 By 1945 Shtykov held the rank of
colonel-general, then the highest possible for a political commissar
(besides him, only three political officers had the same rank in the
entire Soviet army). Through Shtykov, direct communications, both
formal and informal, were made between the Soviet military authorities
in Pyongyang and Zhdanov and Stalin in Moscow. 5
A few other people, less well-known and less important than
Shtykov, Lebedev and Romanenko, also played a notable role in North
Korea: A.M. lgnatiev, G.M. Balasanov and A.I. Shabshin (Kulikov), the
latter two both members of the Soviet intelligence services. Gerasim
Balasanov ran the 'administration of the Political Adviser'. Not much
is known about this body but, taking into account Balasonov's affil-
iation with the NKVD, one can surmise that this 'apparatus' was in
fact a Pyongyang office of Soviet foreign intelligence. The activities
of Colonel A.M. Ignatiev are better known: he was the key figure in
the creation ofthe North Korean Party apparatus and the 'Godfather'
of the Workers' Party ofKorea. A.I. Shabshin, who had been stationed
in Seoul prior to 1945, was dealing with South Korean Communist
networks.
Finally a group of officers, the staff of the so-called '7th depart-
ment' of the Political Administration of the 25th Army, was ofspecial
importance in defining Soviet policy in North Korea. In the Soviet
army, the '7th departments' (subordinated not directly to the unit
commander, but to its political commissar) were engaged in 'psycho-
logical operations'. When the armies were acting or stationed over-
seas, these '7th departments' were also responsible for maintaining
contacts with local authorities. Usually, the people working in these
bodies were well-educated and well-versed in local politics or, at least,
had acquired such expertise though their jobs. Of'7th deparnnent'
4ln September 1938 Shtykov even replaced Zhdanov himself in a special three-
man committee investigating 'counter-revolutionary' crimes. Effectively it meant tlut
Shtykov was brieOy in charge of purging the second most important party branch in
the country (Soviet Politburo decision of 27 September 1938, copy in the author's
archive).
5'f.F. Shtykov was later appointed as the first Soviet ambassador to the DPRK but
in November 1950 was sacked fiom this post and sent to Moscow. Once an active
supporter of Kim's aggressive war plans, he was held responsible for the military
catastrophe ofSeptember--October 1950. On the decision of the Politburo from 3
February 1951, his milittry rank was lowered to lieutenant-general when he was
appointed to the second-ranking post ofdeputy chairman ofthe regional administration
in IUluga, several hundred kilometres south of Moscow. ln the bte 1950s he had a
short stint as an ambassador to Hungary and died in 1964 in Leningrad.

4 From St4lin to Kim n Sung
personnel working in Korea, G.K. Melder and V.V. Kovyzhenko should
be specifically mentioned.
Until early 1947 the Korean problem had been handled almost
exclusively by the military. under rather loose, albeit gradually increas-
ing. supervision of the central authorities in Moscow. Most decisions.
were made on the spot, and the military reported to Moscow only
some problems and plans (a majority of the Korea-related papers in
the Central Committee archives were generated by military bodies).
Even the CPSU Central Committee itself was unhappy about the
scarcity ofinformation on Korean affairs; thus in 1948 a Central Com-
mittee official complained that 'The Foreign Relations Department
[of the CPSU Central Committee] until the present time has not
been receiving regular and detailed information about the situation
in Korea', since 'the administration ofthe political adviser [Pyongyang
office of the Soviet security agencies] and 7th Department of the
25th Army, located in Pyongyang, send all the information to their
respective Departments'.6 A side-effect of this situation is that, since
the military papers are still mostly inaccessible at the time of writing,
we have no access to some material of primary importance.
Among the people who in the late summer of 1945, much to their
own surprise, found themselves rulers of North Korea, there were
no specialists on international relations and foreign affairs, let alone
experts on Korea. Judging by available data, before August 1945 the
25th Army had considered future action in Korea as a purely mili-
tary operation while its political aspects had been largely ignored.
Moscow's attitude seems to have been much the same. Korea had
never been high on the Kremlin agenda. Before the Second World
War, the Soviet policy towards Korea, a fairly passive one, had been
handled by the Communist International and, to some extent, by
numerous Soviet Koreans who then served in the army, intelligence,
and foreign policy agencies. However, most Party functionaries, mili-
tary and intelligence officers of Korean extraction perished during
the Great Purge of 1936-8. The Korean section of the Comiritem
was annihilated, except for a handful of people who at the time were
engaged in underground work in Korea, Manchuria, and Japan. The
purge, among other things, led to a considerable loss of Korea-related
expertise.7 In addition, Soviet activity in the Korean peninsula through-
6Memo to the CPSU CC Secretary M.A. Suslov, RTsHIDNI , fond 17, opis
128, delo 1440, list 9.
7 In this respect the fate of Peu Tsoi (Ch'oe P'yo-di>k), who in 1937 was a tank
01gitized by Google Original frcm

The Soviet Oaupation a11d the Birth ofthe State 5
out the pre-war period had clearly been subordinated to the much
more important tasks ofSoviet policy toward Japan and China, Korea
itself not being taken too seriously.
Thus, when the 25th Army entered North Korea, even Korean
interpreters were absent: the army had been preparing to fight with
the Japanese and a Korean factor was not taken into account. In fact,
the commanders of the 25th Army knew nothing about the country
which they now unexpectedly had to govern. Most decisions had
to be improvised.
According to J.M. Chistiakov, the most important political deci-
sion - to entrust the 25th Army with the occupation of Korea - was
taken on 25th August, after the actual fighting had already finished.
Marshal K.A. Meretskov, the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front,
met J.M. Chistiakov and, having told him about this decision, offered
two possible locations for the 25th Army Headquarters: Hamhung
or Pyongyang. Chistiakov chose Pyongyang.8 This half-accidental
decision probably determined the location of the future North Korean
capital. Whatever reasons Chistiakov had (and his considerations may
well have been purely military}, his choice was quite reasonable: of
all the cities located in the Soviet zone ofoccupation, Pyongyang was
not only the biggest but also one of the oldest. It was one of Korea's
historical capitals, which made a government located there look more
legitimate.
In the economic field the new Soviet military authorities had to
sustain the North Korean economy, satisfy the needs of the population
in food and basic supplies, organise emergency repair works and main-
tain public order. It was not an easy task. As the Japanese retreated,
they inflicted significant damage on the Korean economy. According
to Soviet estimates, often cited in later Soviet publications, out of
1,034 small and medium-sized enterprises then existing in the territory
of North Korea, 1,015 were destroyed by the retreatingJapanese.9
officer and one of many profession.al Korean officers in the Red Army, is insuuctive.
Lilce many others, he was arrested in 1937. The investig;ators denlalldcd that he
admit to being a Japanese spy, but he did not give in. When former Soviet security
chief Ezhov was cfurnissed, the new bosses of the secret police g;ave the order to
free all military officers who did not confess their 'crimes'. Ch'oe was freed, fought
in the war and later spent some time in the DPRK, first as a Soviet military adviser
and then as one of the commanders of the Korean army.
81.M. Chistialcov, 'Bocvoi put' 25 arrnii', Osvobozhdmk Kam, Moscow: Nauka,
1976, p. 44.
9Ibid., p. 51.

6 From Stalin lo Kim II Sung
In addition, the Japanese who occupied most middle-level and al-
most all high-level managerial and professional positions had either
left before the occupation or intended to leave soon.
It was also necessary to bring Soviet soldiers to order. Their be-
haviour at the beginning of the occupation was far from exemplary.
According to numerous testimonies in contemporary publications,
in the first weeks theft, looting and rape were rather widespread.
Some of these accusations might have been dictated by hostile prop-
aganda if they had not also been made by those sympathising with
the Soviet Union and its Korean policy. to The author himself was
told by some older Koreans about looting committed by Soviet
troops during the first days of the occupation. By late September,
however, the Soviet military leaders had taken measures to improve
the discipline of the troops. These measures were generally success-
ful, but some problems remained and throughout 1945-8 the con-
tinuing presence of a large number of often rather thuggish Soviet
troops was a major source of irritation between the locals and the
Soviet administration. 11
10An example of a non-friendly source is found in the declassified and published

files of the American military intelligence: 'North Korea Today. for American Eyes
Only (G-2, American Army Forces in Korea, August 1947)', An Anthology ofSelttted
Pitcn from the ~lass!fitd Fik of &aet US Matnials in Korea before and during the Korean
War, Seoul: National Unification Board, 1981, p. 31. Such incidents are reported, for
instance, by Bruce Cumings who is very critical of US policies in Korea: Bruce
Cumings, ~ Origins of tht Korean War, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 388.
Another such item of evidence is a remark made by Anna Saong (as mentioned by
Eric vm Ree in So<iolism in <Alt ZPne. Stalin~ Policy in Katra, 1945-1947, p. 85 footnote).
Anna Louise Soong was a notoriously pro-Communist jourrulist. Among other thing.,
she glorified the extermination of the kulaks in Russia in the 1930s and the 'Great
Leap Forward' in China in the 1950s. She would therefore hardly have made critical
rem.arks about the beh2Viour of the Soviet aoops without having very serious grounds.
11 The Soviet Army materials carry some confirmation of this. For example,
according to an official military report, in early 1947 in one month from mid-January
(or one and a halfmonths- the wording is ambiguous) in South P'y6ngan province
alone the Soviet troops committed: seven murders, one attack resulting in injury,
two rapes, five robberies, five thefts, and one case of looting. These statistics are
related only to a very short period, and to just one province (although it was the
province where most Soviet garrisons were concentrated). In addition, 1947 was
much better in this regard than, say, 1945. Ifwe try to extrapolate this data, the total
of the most serious incidents, such as murders and rapes, is likely to be numbered in
thousands for the period 194~. See Dok/ad o politichesltom i tk<momichtskom
polozhtnii v &vanoi Koret (Report on the political and economic situation in North
Korea), signed by Major Kornilov. A copy in the author's personal archive. The
document has no date, but it is evident from its content that the report was written
between February and August 1947 (most likely April or May 1947). In China the

The Soviet Occupation and the Birth of the State 7
However, it was politics and not the economy which was most
important to the Soviet authorities in Korea. They had to conduct
what in the Western and South Korean literature is often called the
'comrnunisation' of the country,12 that is, the establishment ofa pro-
Soviet government there. It would be a gross exaggeration to think
that from the Vt!ry beginning the Soviets had a clear-cut plan or a
pre-determined course of action. It is possible that Moscow initially
planned to occupy Korea only temporarily. However, the Cold War
was under way. The logic of a global confrontation, as well as the
intention (often quite sincere) to 'help progressive forces', did not
leave the Soviet leaders and their representatives in Korea much of a
choice: by the beginning of 1946 it was clear that the interests both
of the Soviet Union and of 'social progress' (as it was understood
then in the Soviet Union) urgently demanded the creation ofa pro-
Soviet regime in North Korea.
Korea had always been perceived as a potential bridgehead for a
Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. Following 1945, Japan and
eventually South Korea were turned into an American military base
which made the creation of a protective 'defence buffer' in North
Korea particularly vital for the Soviet security. Obviously, the Soviet
Union would not have minded having a friendly government (prefer-
ably a Communist one) on the entire Korean peninsula. Just as obvi-
ously, the Americans would not allow that to happen. Thus, as early
as the spring of 1946, the Soviet Union started to work toward the
creation of a separate North Korean government.
Throughout the Cold War period there have been many discus-
sions on the degree of the Soviet/ American responsibility for the
eventual division of Korea. It is not possible to give a precise answer
to many questions yet (and in general the entire discussion often seems
to be rather pointless), but it looks as ifSoviet policy in Korea was to
a very large extent a result of improvisation and ad hoc decisions. It is
very probable that Moscow did not initially rule out the possibility
situation wos so serious that in 1948 it wos deemed necessary to launch a special
investigation of!he discipline in the 39th Army stationed in north cast China. The
~tion confirmed that 'lack of politeness, plundering, rapes committed by some
soldiers and officers ... did take place in the troops ofthe 39th Army' (Memo to G.M.
Malenkov, the CPSU CC Secretary, RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1142, list
74-75).
12Morc open-minded Soviet military men and politicians sometimes talked
about the 'sovietisation of the liberated territories'. However, this term wos not
used after 1945, but belongs essentially to the pre-World War II parlance. The tem1
'comrnunisation' is purely Western, and never used by the Soviet press.
oig1t1ze-0 by Google Original frcm

8 From Stalin to Kim R Sung
of an eventual compromise with the Americans. As late as March
1946 Soviet military experts were drafting proposals on the compo-
sition of a future all-Korean government (the proposal envisaged
for Kim II Sung the relatively humble role of defence minister).13
However, in the spring of 1946, when it became clear that a plan for
joint trusteeship over Korea and the eventual foundation of a united
Korean government was not to be realised, the Soviet authorities finally
opted for an independent state in the North. An analogous process
started in the South, where the US military was actively backing Yi
Sting-man (Syngman Rhee), an aged nationalist leader with good
connections in Washington and iron-clad anti-Communist creden-
tials. Under American auspices, Yi Sung-man's nationalists started
to develop their 'own' state, which from its very beginning had
been based on the ideology of anti-Communist westernising na-
tionalism. The talks between the Soviet and American delegations
continued for a while, but neither side was willing to compromise.
However, these talks are generally beyond the scope of the present
study, where we try to deal with domestic developments in North
Korea itself.
The essence of the policy undertaken by the Soviet Civil Admin-
istration in Korea - directly or through a system of people's com-
mittees under its control - could not be understood without a brief
remark on the official Soviet Marxism-Leninism of that period, and
above all, the theory of a 'people's democracy' and 'people's demo-
cratic revolution'. According to this theory, specially designed for
Soviet- controlled territories, the events in Korea, as well as in other
Soviet-controlled countries, were perceived as a 'people's democratic
revolution', which only later should grow into a 'socialist' revolution.
According to this scheme, the establishment of the 'people's democ-
racy' on the basis of a united front would be followed by 'general
democratic reforms', such as radical land reform, partial nationalisa-
tion of industry and banking, the declaration of gender equality, and
the establishment of democratic freedoms (one must mention, how-
ever, that most of these declared freedoms remained on paper or, at
best, were understood as the right of the people to support the new
regime, but not to oppose it). Meanwhile, the 'people's democratic
revolution' did not include socialist reforms. At this stage, private
13Such a list W2S drafted in Pyongyang and sent to Mrucow for approval. Centre
for Preservation and Study of Documents for Contemporary History (henceforth
RTsHIDNI), fond 17, opis 128, delo 61, list 1-11 .

property in industry could be retained (albeit in a restricted form)
and nobody yet spoke about the collectivisation of agriculture. Some
non-Communist parties could also be tolerated, although in reality
they were to be subjected to the Communists as soon as possible.
Socialism (in a Stalinist sense) was to be introduced at a later stage,
after the 'people's democratic revolution' had laid the necessary foun-
dation for a genuine socialist transformation. This scheme served as
a guide for those who conducted the 'communisation' policy of North
Korea.
Non-Communist observers depicted the same developments in
less flattering. albeit perhaps more realistic terms. As early as 1951, Hugh
Seton-Watson described a typical Communist take-over as a three-
stage process consisting of: 'genuine coalition' between the Commu-
nists and some other forces; 'bogus coalition' when the non-Communist
parties were reduced to the position of puppets and all forces not
directly controlled by the Communists were pushed out of political
life; and eventually the 'monolithic regime'. 14 Seton-Watson's perio-
disation has been cited many times since then, and with good reason:
it reflects the general pattern quite well.
Strictly, a North Korean regime friendly to the Soviet Union
did not necessarily have to be Communist, nor, indeed, did it have
to copy the Soviet model as accurately as was done in all the countries
which came under Soviet control after the Second World War. Such
copying is understandable, however, given the circumstances. First,
those Soviet officers who were responsible for conducting Soviet
policy in the occupied countries considered the Soviet system the
best possible and believed that its eventual spread all over the globe
would be the surest w.rt to human happiness. Perhaps not all of them
were sincere in these belie&, but any doubt on this issue was fraught
with danger. Second, the Soviet military authorities based their activities
on the support oflocal Communists who perceived the Soviet Union
as ideal and, hence, considered all Soviet political and public institutions
to be exemplary and beyond criticism. Sometimes, local Communists
were 'more Catholic than the Pope himself', copying the Moscow
pattern with a zeal that even their Soviet patrons occasionally found
a bit excessive. 15
14H ugh Seton-Watson, 77u &ut Eu~4n Revolution, Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1985 (reprint of the 1951 edition), pp.167-71.
15N.G. ubedev mentioned these problems in passing in his book published in
1965 - a time when frank revelations on this subject were certainly unwelcome.

10 From Stalin to Kim fl Sung
It is important to recognise that the situation in Korea was not
unique. However, in one way North Korea differed significantly from
the countries of Eastern Europe. In Europe, as well as in Chinese
Manchuria, the Soviet military conducted its policy of'sovietisation'
with the substantial support oflocal Communists. The strength of the
local Communist movement may have varied considerably between,
say, Yugoslavia and Romania, but some form of organised Communist
party was nevertheless present in all these countries. In addition, in all
these countries there were some local Communist politicians who
had spent many years in exile in Moscow and enjoyed a degree of
personal standing in Soviet political circles.
In Korea, the situation was different: the Communist movement
there was very weak. Created in 1925, the Communist party ofKorea,
never a really strong and cohesive force, was eventually dissolved in
1928 by the Cornintern because of perpetual feuds between party
leaders. A few separate Communist groups worked underground,
mainly in the South, in the 1930s and 1940s, but they were very small
and, in general, politically insignificant. The influence of Communists
in North Korea had been negligible, and no Korean Communist had
enjoyed any standing in Kremlin circles before 1945. The right-wing
nationalists were far more influential to the north of the 38th parallel,
although they too did not constitute a united political force. Thus, the
Soviet authorities had to create an artificial base for their policies by
establishing a local Communist party from scratch while simultaneously
making agreements with local nationalists whom they hoped to win
to their side.
In 1945 a generally recognised leader of the nationalists in the
North was Cho Man-sik, often called the 'Korean Ghandi'. Cho
Man-sik was born in 1882 and educated in the Confucian tradition,
though later he converted to Christianity. He graduated from the
Faculty of Law in the Japanese Meiji University and later worked in
Pyongyang as a school principal while taking an active part in the
nationalist movement and supporting non-violent resistance to the
colonial regime. In the 1920s, Cho Man-sik stood at the head ofthe
movement for economic self-development and was a leader in a
number of nationalist associations. He became particularly well-
known during the war when the Japanese authorities attempted to
Talking ofthe events of 1945, Lebedev !<lid: 'Jn some plac~ demands were ni~d to
introduce the Soviet order and other ultra-leftist slogans in Korea.' 'Zaria svobody
nad Ko reei' in Vo imia dn1z hby s narodom Korti, Moscow: Nauka, 1%5, p. 41.

make Koreans change their traditional surnames to Japanese ones.
Cho Man-sik publicly refused to do so. 16
At the moment ofJapanese surrender, Cho Man-sik was outside
Pyongyang but upon receiving the news he immediately rushed to
the city. On 17 August he formed· there an organ oflocal self- govern-
ment which was called the 'South P'yongan Committee for the Prepa-
ration for Independence' (Korean P'yongnam le0ngule chunbi wiwOnhoe;
Pyongyang is located in South P'yongan Province). This happened
with the tacit agreement of the still present colonial administration:
by then the Japanese had realised they would have to leave Korea
and were striving to maintain stability for·the few days they needed
for the evacuation. The Committee consisted of nine departments
(general, public order, propaganda, education, economic, finance, daily
life, local administration, and foreign affairs). Beside Cho Man-sik,
there were about twenty Committee members who mostly repre-
sented various nationalist groups. Only three out of the initial twenty
members were Communists: Yi Chu-yon (the head of the general
department), Han Chae-dok (the head of the propaganda depart-
ment), and Kirn Kwang-jin (without a portfolio). 17 It is important
that most activists of the North Korean Communist underground
remained outside this body at this stage. Such prominent Commu-
nists as Hyon Chun-hyok, Kirn Yong-bOm, and Pak Chong-ae were
not included, although the latter probably had some connections with
the Committee. As Eric van Ree noted, this weak representation (com-
pared to Seoul) of Communists in the self-appointed local adminis-
tration reflected the political situation in Pyongyang. 18 In August
1945, Pyongyang was a stronghold of the nationalist right, while in
Seoul and generally in South Korea Communists were if not a de-
cisive then at least a very influential political force. This was to change
quite soon.
The P'yongan Committee was not the only such body: during
last days of August similar Korean self-government groups sprang
up throughout the country, both in the North and in the South.
Sometimes, they were founded under the control or by the direct
initiative of the Soviet military (in Najin, Ungi, Ch' ongjin and other
16Pak Che-ch'an, 'P'yCSng'an kCSnguk chunbi wiwCSnhoe kyCSl'song-gwa Kodang

Cho Man-sik', Pu/than, no. 8,1985, S. 44.
17 Pultlum sasip rryJn, Seoul: Oryu munhwa sa, 1988, p. 101; Pak Che-ch'an,
P'yMig'an ltmtgult chunbi wiwl!nh« ltyOl'song-gwa Kodang Cho Man-silt, p. 47.

18Eric van Ree, Soa4/ism in Ont :zone, p. 87.

12 From Stalin to Kim ll Sung
ports on the Eastern coast), but often they emerged independently
to fill the vacuum of power left by the sudden Japanese retreat.
Sometimes these bodies were acting in parallel to the colonial
administration, which also continued to function but cared mostly
about the evacuation of the Japanese troops and industrial property.
Regardless ofthe circumstances oftheir emergence, these committees
enjoyed broad public support. They were usually dominated by the
nationalists, though Communist influence, particularly in the South,
was also notable. At first, these organs of local administration had a
variety of names: 'Committees Preparing for the Restoration of
Statehood', 'Committees to Maintain Order', 'National Administration
Committees' etc. From early September, they came to be uniformly
called 'People's Political Committees' (Kor. inmin cJWngch'i wiw0nhoe).
South Korean historians suggest that this name was imposed by the
Soviet authorities.19 It could indeed be the case as the word 'people's'
was very prominent in the Soviet political vocabulary of the time
('people's democracy', 'people's army' etc.), but it is also possible that
this term was first used by a Korean Communist and then stuck.
Around early October 1945, 'People's Political Committees' changed
their name again: they started to be called 'People's Committees'.20
In the South, the US military soon found themselves on a collision
course with the People's Committees, often controlled by the Left,
and eventually disbanded them. In the North, the Soviet military
chose to manipulate these self-proclaimed structures and gradually
developed them into core institutions of the pro-Soviet regime. With
the wisdom of hindsight one has to agree that the Soviet decision
was a better political trick. Although in reality the Soviet policy in
Korea was at least as restrictive and paternalistic as that ofthe Americans,
this prudent manoeuvre allowed the Soviets to pose as benevolent
protectors ofKorean political initiatives.
On 26 August, when the headquarters of the 25th Army arrived
in Pyongyang, the temporary capital of North Korea, a delegation
of the South P'y<Sngan Committee for the Preparation for Inde-
pendence met with Soviet military leaders. From the beginning, the
members of the Committee attempted to establish a working contact
with I.M. Chistiakov himself, but he escaped this encounter. In his
memoirs Chistiakov wrote: 'After a short conversation I understood
19Pultlum sasip nyms, p. 36.

:ZOS. V. Shchctinin, 'Vlast' - narodu', Vo imia druzhby s narodom Korti, Moscow :
Nauka, 1%5, p. 121, footnote.

that there were so many complicated problems that without the
comrades from the Military Council we ... would not manage'.21
Most probably, Chistiakov, a professional military man, decided not
to deal directly with politics, which at the time could be perilous: the
memories of the 1937 Great Purge were still too vivid among the
Soviet military. He entrusted N .G. Lebedev, his political commissar,
with the task of co-operating with the North Koreans. It was his job,
after all. At the meetings on 28 and 29 August, Lebedev first met with
the representatives of the Committee on the Prepantion for Inde-
pendence. 22 There, the leaders of the Committee appealed to the
Soviet leadership for help and co-operation.
Some Western and South Korean authors give a different version
of this event, insisting that General Chistiakov was present at this
meeting and demanded the inclusion ofmore Communist members
into the Committee.23 This view seems inconsistent with the available
data. Most probably, Chistiakov did not participate in the meeting
of29 (28?) August, as he stated explicitly in his memoirs and as was
confirmed to me by Lebedev in a private interview. There is no reason
not to believe them: they might keep silent about the discussion
itself, but not about Chistiakov's participation. Van Ree's assertion
regarding C.histiakov's demands for the introduction of Communists
into the Committeez.4 also seems doubtful, as at that time Chistiakov
had no information about what was happening in the country. Also
his obvious desire to avoid 'politics' should be taken into account.·
Most probably, the demand to turn the 'Committee for the Preparation
for Independence' into the People's Political Committee and to change
its personal composition was made in the name of the Soviet military
leadership (perhaps, even in the name ofChistiakov himself}, but not
by him personally. This could presumably have been done by N .G.
Lebedev; and may have happened later than 29 August neither Lebedev
nor Chistiakov mentioned this issue among those discussed on this
day. Anyway, by early September Communists had been incorporated
·into the Committee.
211.M. Chistialcov, 'Boevoi put', p. 48.

22Interview with N.G. Lcbedev, 13November1989, Moscow. N .G. Lcbedev, a
Soviet general, wu in 1945 a member of the Military Council of the 25th Army;
btcr he wu the head of the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea. 1.M.
Chistiakov, 'Bocvoi put:
23Robert A.Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Com111J1nism in KOtN, vol. I, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972, p. 315; Pultlum sdSip nym, p. 36.
24Eric van Rec, Sod4/ism in One Zone, p. 92.

14 From Stalin to Kim n Sung
Meanwhile, the first meeting with the members of the Committee
gave Lebedev the chance to get to know them. Cho Man-sik made
a particularly negative impression on Lebedev, w ho then reported
this to Chistiakov. This perception of Cho was mentioned both in
Chistiakov's memoirs and in a private interview Lebedev granted
the author. Chistiakov says of Cho's conduct during the meetings
with the Soviets: 'During a conversation, Cho Man-sik would sit in
a chair motionless with eyes closed as if asleep. From time to time, he
slightly moved his head in agreement or disagreement. He behaved as
the most senior among those present, obviously being of the opinion
that the less he talked, the more authoritative he would seem'. 25
Such behaviour was understandable and, indeed, expected for any
highly placed and elderly Korean. After all, Cho 'behaved as·the most
senior' member of the delegation because this was in fact his posi-
tion. However, Soviet officers, accustomed to a very different style of
communication, did not like such behaviour.
Nevertheless, at the beginning, the Soviets hoped to win Cho
Man-sik to their side. This made perfect sense, since at the time he
was by far the most popular political figure in Pyongyang. In the
autumn of 1945, Soviet officers met Cho regularly and tried to
convince him to head the emerging North Korean administration,
but the negotiations proved very difficult. 26 A person of right-wing
allegiances with a strong dislike for the Communists and an equally
strong distrust of foreign powers, Cho Man-sik would have agreed
to co-operate with the Soviet authorities only on his own terms,
including, for instance, a demand for extensive autonomy. Cho Man-
sik remained the chairman ofthe South P'yongan People's Committee,
and was eventually persuaded to head the 'Administrative Committee
offive Provinces-', a temporary organ ofself-government on the entire
territory ofNorth Korea, the establishment of which was declared at
a Soviet-sponsored meeting ofthe People's Committees' representatives
fi:om five provinces on 8 October 1945. It was the first Soviet attempt
to create a North Korean proto-government. However, this body
proved to be short-lived and did not leave many traces in North
Korean history.
Initial attempts to put in charge a person not closely related to
2s1.M. Chiuiakov, 'Boevoi put', p. SO.

2'>[nterview with Yu SClng-ch'61, 18January 1991, T:uhkent. In 1941-6, Yu SClng-
ch' 61 served in Soviet military intelligence, and in 194S-56 was head of.the operative
administration of the North Korean General Suff.

The Soviet Occupaticn and the Birth of the State 15
Communists were made for theoretical as well as practical reasons.
As we remember, the processes then going on in the North were
considered to be a 'people's democratic' - as distinct fi:om a 'socialist'-
revolution. As such, it should have had national and general democratic
tasks and might have been led by a public figure ofnationalist, though
'progressive', orientation. 27 In addition, the Soviet authorities had to
take into account the fact that the influence of Communists in the
North at the time was still insignlficant. Using the prestige of Cho
Man-sik and other well-known nationalist leaders seemed very useful.
Thus in North Korea, as in some East European countries, the Soviets
initially put in place a rather broad coalition in which Communists
were an important force but still worked in close contact with the
'progressive' nationalists. Such a regime was to become a step towards
the eventual establishment of a purely Communist government, though
this transition could take years.
Simultaneously with the creation ofthe local institutions, the Soviet
military government began to reorganise itself. At first, the Soviet
authorities were locally represented by military kommendants, dispatched
to all major Korean counties and cities. However, these people were
mostly professional military men who lacked the qualifications and
experience necessary to deal with complicated political and economic
problems. Since the occupation was going to last longer, more pro-
fessional administration was deemed necessary. Hence, the Soviet Civil
Administration (SCA) was founded to take care of the social and
economic life of North Korea. Officially, the SCA was inaugurated
on 3October1945.28 Its head was A.A. Romanenko, and its activi-
ties were supervised by T.F. Shtykov. Despite its somewhat deceptive
name, the SCA was a purely military institution with all its staff
serving in the Soviet army. When the SCA needed specialists (for
instance, Korean interpreters), they were first found in the Soviet Union,
drafted to the army and only then sent to North Korea as Soviet army
servicemen.
On 15 November, ten departments were created in the SCA.
These departments were to play a quasi-ministerial role, responsible
for different spheres of North Korean life. There were departments
rTAn interpretation of the events of1945-7 as an "anti-feudal, natio.W-liberation,

anti-imperialist' revolution which later grew into a socialist one was broadly accepted
in the official Soviet historiography (sec, e.g.• El. Shabshina, Sotsialisticheskaia Kortia,
Moscow: lzdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1963, pp. 7{}-1). This definition is still
echoed by the North Korean official historiogr:aphy.
28J3.V. Shchetinin, 'Vlast- narodu', p. 125.
Origiral frcn1
of industry, transport, communications, finance, land and forest, trade
and supplies, health, education, justice, and police. According to a later
article by B. V. Shchetinin, who took an active part in the creation of
the SCA hinuelf, the number of staff members in different depart-
ments varied from seven to fifty. The personnel was overwhelmingly
of Korean origin, although in son1e exceptional cases Japanese spe-
cialists were also employed. The staff were selected by Soviet offic-
ers, whose choice was determined by whether a candidate seemed
'progressive and den1ocratically oriented' or not. 29 In Shchetinin's
words, 'departments could issue orders and decrees compulsory for
all provincial People's Committees.'30 Thus the organs of the local
self-appointed administration were directly subordinated to the So-
viet occupation authorities and became their representatives in the
.
provinces.
The Soviet authorities soon began to feel that the alliance with
local nationalists was increasingly uneasy. Cho Man-sik tried to use
his position to conduct his own policy which often contradicted
the plans of his Soviet supervisors. In this situation, the Soviets had
to look for new political combinations and new politicians, who
may still have been perceived as additions to, rather than substitutions
for, Cho Man-sik and his group. By late September 1945, the North
Korean political situation had also changed: by the end of August,
Soviet Koreans and Korean Communists, former emigrants, began
to arrive in the country. Their arrival made it possible for the Soviet
administration to distance itself from the nationalists and eventually
to find a new political footing in Korea.
From the early autumn of 1945, the military authorities in Soviet
Central Asia started to draft Soviet Koreans (mainly those who
occupied notable positions, had good educations, and were considered
'politically mature'), who then were sent to Pyongyang at the disposal
of the 25th Army's headquarters. In addition, the military began to
look for those Soviet Koreans who had already been in the army.
They were also sent to Pyongyang. In a situation when the majority
of Soviet officers knew almost nothing about Korea, these people
became not just interpreters but consultants with a significant role
in decision- making.31
29 Jbid., p.
126.
·"'Ibid., p. 126.
31lnterview with Kang Sang-ho, 30 November 1989, Leningrad. Kang Sang-
ho was a Soviet jour03list and party functionary, who in 1945-59 worked in the

At the same time, in the autumn of 1945, Korean Communists
began to return from exile and prisons. The Communist movement
in Korea was weak, and after the dissolution of the Communist
party of Korea in 1928 and after the elimination of almost all members
of the Korean section of the Cornintern during the Great Purge, the
v.ui.ous surviving groups ofKorean Communists had found themselves
in complete isolation. Among those Communists who returned
to Korea in 1945, there was a small band of former anti-Japanese
guerrillas in Manchuria, who had spent the period between 1941
and 1945 in the Soviet Union. Among them was Kim II Sung, a thirty-
three-year-old Soviet officer and former guerrilla commander, who
had the rank of captain in the Soviet army. Together with his former
guerrilla fighters, then also Soviet servicemen, Kim II Sung arrived
in Pyongyang in late September 1.945. One must say that it was a very
timely arrival.32
By then the Soviet authorities were beginning to realise that
their attempts to establish co-operation with the local nationalists
and with Cho Man-sik personally were doomed to failure and, hence,
another figure should be found to become an instrument of Soviet
policy in the North. It is likely that at the beginning such a figure
was perceived as an 'addition' to Cho Man-sik, who in October was
still the quasi-leader of North Korea. At first glance, the most suitable
figure might have seemed to be Pak Hon-yong, the leader of the
Communist party of Korea, but he was not eventually chosen. We
know that the basic decisions were made by the military in Pyongyang,
and might surmise that the Soviet generals had some reservations
about Pak. Acting in Seoul, Pak was not personally known to the
Soviet authorities in Pyongyang and thus seemed less reliable than
Kim II Sung. Besides, in the early 1930s Pak was connected to the
Cornintern, and it is a well-known fact that Stalin and his entourage
did not like former Cornintern cadres and generally distrusted them.
Anyway, Pak was rejected. It was also impossible to choose a candidate
from among the Soviet Koreans, the majority of whom had just
recently arrived in the country for the first time in their life and
were absolutely unknown there. Thus, the arrival ofKim II Sung, a
young, energetic captain in the Soviet army, formerly a well-known
DPR.K occupying a number of posts, among others the director of the Party School
and the Deputy M inister of the Interior.
32fnterview with Yu SOng-ch'ol, IS January 1991, Tashkent.

guerrilla commander and currently a deputy commendant (deputy
chief garrison officer) of the city of Pyongyang. was very timely. The
choice fell on him and after a series of consultations with Moscow
a decision was made to give full support to Kim II Sung as the future
leader of North Korea.33
A first sign of Kim II Sung's future promotion was his meeting
with Cho Man-sik arranged by G.K. Mekler, a Soviet lieutenant-
colonel, the head of the 7th department of the 25th Army. The meet-
ing took place in the club Hwabang, a typical Far East 'jolly house' -
a cross between a restaurant, an elite club and a high-class brothel -
on the evening of 30 September 1945. It may seem strange that
such a meeting should happen in such a place, but within the frame-
work of East Asian traditions it was quite normal: unofficial meet-
ings of politicians and intellectuals often took place in such clubs.
The meeting, in which Major Mihail Kang, a Soviet-Korean trans-
lator, also participated, was a part of the Soviet efforts to tame Cho
Man-sik. G.K. Mekler recalled in the early 1990s: 'I asked Cho Man-
33in early 1993 reportS appeared that in September 1945 Kim II Sung had
been sent to Moscow to meet Stalin when supposedly his candidacy for the post of
leader of!he Norlh Korean state was approved. This version is based on evidence
given by I.I. Kobanenko, a former Soviet party official who during the war was an
officer in Marshal Vasilevskii's headquaners in the Far Eas•. Around 1992 he met a
South Korean journalist and told him of a secret meeting between Stalin and Kim
11 Sung which he claimed he knew about as a headquarters officer: Pirolt Chos3n
minjujuin inmin ltong"-gult. Ha, Seoul: Chung'ang ilbosa, 1993, pp. 202-0. Although
it is not impossible that such a meeting took place, there are serious grounds for
questioning the credibility of this story. Most sources reveal that the process of
choosing !he future leader o f the North Korean state was chaotic and spontaneous
- an opinion expressed in the aulhor's interviews with General N.G. Lebedev,
General Yu S<Sng-ch '61, l.G. Loboda (a Soviet journalistic diplomat and intelligence
officer who was responsible for the political work in 88th Brigade during the war) ,
and V.V. Kovyzhenko, an officer of the political department of the 25th Army. It
is supported by data collected by the same Korean journalistic group in the Soviet
Union (see, e.g., Pirolt Chos3n minjujuui inmin ltonghwagult. Ha Seoul: Chung'ang
ilbosa, 1992, pp. 48-56, 65-72). The information given by I.I. Kob;inenko does not
look very plausible in the context of !he general situation in Korea. If a decision to
promote Kim 11 Sung was indeed made in September, the uncertainty of Soviet
policy in Korea, so evident in the autumn of 1945, is difficult to explain (one can
cite, for instance, the fact that it was the little-known Kim Yong-b<Stn, and not Kim
II Sung, who was elected leader ofNonh Korean Communists). In addition, in the
autumn of 1945, the great difference in status between Stalin and Kim II Sung, who
wasjust a humble junior officer, ~uld have made a meeting between them unlikely.
Finally, !here is no olher source which supports Kobanenko's version. However, it
cannot be completely disregarded without being thoroughly checked.

'The Soviet Occupation and the Birth ef the State 19
sik to cooperate with the Soviet administration, while he demanded
help in the "building of a united national state"'. 34 The very fact
that Kim II Sung was also invited to this meeting indicated that the
Soviet military authorities were already paying particular attention
to him.
On 14 October the future leader of the DPRK spoke publicly
for the first time. The o,ccasion chosen for his first public appearance
was a mass rally to honour the Soviet army. The official North Ko-
rean historiography maintains that this rally was organised in hon-
our of Kim II Sung. This version has become so well-established
that even participants in the event have sometimes called it in their
memoirs a 'rally to honour Kim II Sung'.35 However, the reports in
the contemporary Soviet press and photos taken at the rally itself do
not leave any doubts about its real character. Yet it was remarkable
that Kim II Sung spoke at the rally as a 'representative of the grateful
Korean people'.
Later the official propaganda maintained that about 100,000
people had participated in the rally. This is probably an exaggeration,
though it was indeed a mass event with, perhaps, several tens of
thousands ofpeople participating. General Lebedev opened the rally,
which began at 11 a.m., and presented Kim II Sung as a 'national
hero' and an 'outstanding guerrilla leader'. This was an overstatement:
many of those present had not heard of him before, while for the
majority he was a half-legend, almost a folklore figure (for many, the
thirty-three-year-old Kim looked 'too young' to be an experienced
guerrilla leader, so the persistent rumours about '£Use Kim' were
born that day). Kim II Sung, dressed in a civilian suit borrowed from
Mihail Kang especially for this occasion, with the Soviet 'Order of
the Red Banner' on his breast, made a speech, as one might expect,
about the liberating mission of the Soviet army. Later, all photos of
this rally had to be published in North Korea in a retouched form,
without the embarrassingly foreign decoration worn by the Great
Leader of the Korean People. Kim's speech itself was written by the
political department of the 25th Army in Russian and then translated
by one of the Soviet Koreans. 36 Because of that, the speech contained
34Mi rolr Choron minjwjui inmin konghwagulr. Seoul: Chung'ang il'bo sa, 1992, pp.
52-3.
35Ibid., pp. 54, 88.
34Accordingto Pak Kil-ryong, the author ofthe translation W2S a Soviet-Korean
poet ChlSn Tong-hylSJc, then an officer in the Red Army (Mi rolr Chos/$n mif!iujui

some idioms specific to Soviet publications in Korean but strange
and even incomprehensible to most of those present. Cho Man-silc
also addressed the rally as the head of the Provisional Administration
Committee of Five Provinces and, hence, the formal head of the local
administration. The chairman of the rally was the newly elected head
of the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea, Kim
Yong-born.37 Thus Kim II Sung publicly appeared as one of the three
top politicians in North Korea, though not yet even the 'first among
the equals' (ifanybody, it was Cho Man-silc who was perceived as the
No. 1 man in the Pyongyang hierarchy).
By the time of the rally, Kim II Sung had already occupied an
important post, although this fact was not yet known to the majority
of the rally participants. On 13 October, in Pyongyang, the North
Korean Bureau of the Communist Party ofKorea was established at
a special clandestine meeting convened by the Soviet authorities.
The Bureau was technically subordinate to the Central Committee
of the Korean Communist Party located in Seoul and headed by
Pak Hon-yong, and its mission was to co-ordinate the activities of
Communists in the regions under Soviet control. Its dependent status
was emphasised in a telegram sent to Seoul expressing 'support for
the correct political line of comrade Pak Hon-yong'. The creation
of the Bureau was made public only a week later, on 20 October.
The reasons for this delay are not clear.
There is another secret related to the meeting on 13 October.
Starting in 1958, North Korean historiography began to maintain
that the meeting took place on 10, not 13, October. Later this day
became one of the North Korean official holidays. It is not clear
why the date had to be changed. It should also be noted that since
1956 the modern North Korean historiography has also intentionally
distorted the name of this important body, the creation of which
inmin kongh.....gult, pp. 88). The practice of checking the drafts ofimportant speeches
continued for a while even after the DPRK was officially established. In 1949, for
exa1nple, G.I. Tunkin, a prominent Soviet diplomat and counsellor at the Soviet
Embassy informed Moscow: 'Pak Tong-jo handed me the draft of Pak H6n-y6ng's
speech for the meeting on 14 August and con~d Pale H6n-y6ng's request for
our views on the project. I responded that we would remark on the project after it
was translated into Russian' (Record of conversation berween G. Tunkin and Pak
Tong-jo, 9 August, 1949; Archive of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation, fond
102, opis S, papka l 1, dclo 8. list 21).
37 Mi rol< ChoWll minjujlli immirt konglnuogult, p .85. Interview with N.G. Ubcdcv,
13 November 1989, Moscow.

marked the beginning of the history of the ruling Workers' Party of
Korea. Modern North Korean historians call it the 'Organisational
Bureau of the Communist Party of North Korea' (Kor. kongsandang
Puk Chason chojik wiw0nhoe) instead of the correct 'North Korean
Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea' (Kor. Chason kongsandang
Puk Chason punguk). This belated re-naming was to obscure the
dependence of this body on the Seoul Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Korea headed by Pak Hon-yong, later purged
as an American and Japanese 'spy'. 38
The first chairman of the bureau was not Kim II Sung, but Kim
Yong-born, who in the 1930s was sent by the Comintern to Korea
for an underground Communist activity. Obviously. his chairmanship
is not mentioned by modern North Korean historiography which
always stresses Kim II Sung's allegedly exclusive role in leading all
Communist activity in Korea. The sudden ascent of Kim Yong-bOm
is not easy to understand, since he did not seem well suited for such
ajob. As Maia Hegai, a daughter of A.I. Hegai, the influential leader of
the Soviet Koreans, recalls, in the late 1940s the North Korean elite
did not take Kim Yong-born seriously, and Kim, a connoisseur of
cold noodles and old art, did not strive for the top positions. Timid
and quiet, Kim was, perhaps, better known as the husband ofhis wife,
the energetic and ambitious Pak Chong-ae, than as a politician in
his own right. Perhaps the temporary ascent of Kim Yong-born was
due to the general confusion and disarray which reigned supreme in
Korea during the first weeks after Liberation. As for the future 'Great
Leader and the Sun of the Nation', Kim II Sung was initially just a
member of the bureau, and only two months later took Kim Yong-
bOm's place as its chairman and thus technically became the top leader
of the North Korean Communists. A formal decision about Kim II
38Changes in the official dating of the meeting are followed in detail in an

article by So Dong-man: 'Chos<Sn kongsandang Puk chos<Sn punguk 10 wol 10 ii
ch'angs<SI chujang-e taehayo', ~k$a pip'y~ng, no. 30, Seoul, 1995. So Dong-man
suggests that the discrepancy in dates appeared because there was in fact not just
one but s~ral meetin~ of the North Korean Communists. This explanation seems
pLiusible. He also surmises that for some reason (perhaps opposition from Pak
Hon-yong's Communist headquarters in Seoul) a proposal to establish the North
Kotean Bureau was voted down at the meeting of 10 October, and IGm 11 Sung
succeeded in putting it through only on 13 October. On the fall of the South
Korean ('Domestic') faction in 195'-6, the date of 10 October- i.e. the day ofthe
first, unsuccessful attempt to create the North Korean Bureau - was testored. This
~rsion is worth attention, but any definite answer can be gi~n only in the future.

Sung's promotion was made at the Third Extended Plenum of the
Bureau, which took place on 17 and 18December1945, although
there is little doubt that everything had been decided by Soviet
politicians and generals earlier. 39
The establishment of the North Korean Bureau was made public
a week after a decision by the Soviet military authorities to allow
the existence of political parties. This decree was published on 13
October. The time was chosen with the Communists' interests in
mind, but other political forces used this permission as well. On 3
November 1945, Cho Man-sik also established a party ofhis own. It
was called the Democratic Party (Kor. Minjudang). At the beginning,
he probably intended to turn it into an authentic political organisation
of the nationalist Right, but such a development hardly fitted the
plans of the Soviet administration. Under Soviet pressure, the former
guerrilla Ch'oe Yong-gen was elected the first deputy chairman of
the Democratic Party. In his early youth Ch'oe had been a pupil of
Cho Man-sik, but later he became a comrade in arms of Kim II Sung
and also served in the 88th Brigade of the Soviet army. Kim Ch'aek,
another Communist guerrilla, was made the head of the Democratic
Party secretariat. Thus, from the very beginning, the Democratic Party
was infiltrated by the agents of the authorities, though in late 1945
the majority of its leaders were genuine nationalists.•0
Another party established during the first months after Liberation
was the party Ch'ondogyo-Ch'ong'udang (the Party ofYoung Friends of
the Celestial Way) which brought together the supporters ofa Korean
religious sect, Ch'ondogyo (Teaching of the Celestial Way), then quite
influential in the country. With the permission of the Soviet authori-
ties, this party was founded on 5 February 1946.41 However, no more
non-Communist parties were allowed by the Soviet authorities in
the North, while in the South there were several dozen if not several
hundred parties.
The establishment of a new regime in the North was not an easy
process, and from the first week it met some resistance. The most
serious were the clashes in the city ofSinuiju on the Korean-Chinese
39P. Krainov, &r'ba Mrrulrogo ""1'0"4 za naavisimost', Moscow: Gospolitizdat,

1948, pp. 7~1; interview with F.I. Shabshina, 23 January 1992, Moscow; interview
with Mm Hegai (a daughter of A.I. Hega.1 (HlS Ka-i, a prominent Soviet Korean
politician}, 15January 1991, Tashkent.
40Pulrlum sasip ny3n, p. 38.
41
Kim Hak-<:hun, Pultlum 50 ny3n sa, p.1 OS.

border, where on 23 November student demonstrations and riots
accompanied by anti-Communist slogans broke out. The protests
were promptly suppres;ed by the local security forces and Communist
militia, with some participation of the Soviet military. In March
1946, there were also student riots in Hamhung, a large city on the
northeastern coast. 42
Meanwhile, in Pyongyang the nationalists and the Soviet-backed
Communists were increasingly on a collision course. A decisive
conflict between them, long expected, broke out in early 1946, when
the Koreans learned about the results of a conference of foreign
ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain, held in
Moscow in December 1945. This conference made a decision to
establish a joint trusteeship of the great powers over Korea for a
period offive years. This decision evoked mass protests by nationalists
and their supporters in the North and South. Nationalists perceived
the trusteeship as a thinly veiled attempt to postpone the country's
independence, a scheme to substitute the old Japanese domination
with a ne\v Soviet-American one. Such a view was shared by most
Koreans and anti-trusteeship rallies in Seoul attracted huge crowds.
At the beginning, Communists in the South also protested against
the conference decisions, but a few days later, upon receiving new
instructions from Moscow, they changed their position radically.
Yet it was in Pyongyang that the trusteeship controversy had the
greatest consequences. There it led to a governmental crisis and a
final break-up of the relationship between the Soviet military and
the nationalist Right. In early January the Soviet authorities required
the South P'y~ngan People's Committee to express its support for
the trusteeship plan, but nationalists refused to do so. Cho Man-sik,
the Committee's chairman, not only declined to sign the declaration
ofsupport, but also resigned in protest. He was followed by almost all
the other nationalist members of the Committee. After this incident
Cho Man-sik was promptly arrested. 43 For a while he was held in
comparatively comfortable confinement at a good hoteL since the Soviets
42Cho Tong-ylSn, 'Nae-g2 kylSkld1n Sinuiju haksaeng pangong UiglS' Pultlum,

no. 8,1985; Kim Halt-chun, PultMn 50 ny3n UJ., Seoul: Tong'a ch'ulp'ansa, 1995, pp.
9tr-97; Mi rolt Ghoson minjujuui inmin ltonghwagult, pp. 163-70.
43It is not clear who arrested Cho Man-sik. In an interview with the author
(13November1989, Moscow) Lebedev rruintained that it was done by the 'Koreans

themselves'. On the other hand, it is very doubtful that in early 1946 the 'Koreans
themselves' could have arrested anybody, at least not without an explicit approval
fiom the Soviet authorities.

had not given up their hopes of persuading him, but to no avail.
Eventually Cho was transferred to a 'normal' prison. In October 1950,
during the hectic evacuation of Pyongyang, it was decided to treat
all political prisoners, including Cho, in the good Stalinist manner:
they were shot and hastily buried in unmarked tombs. 44 So died the
person who was by far the most popular politician in 1945 Pyongyang
and who for a while looked like the almost certain candidate for
supreme power in North Korea.
The Democratic Party lost any of the political independence it
may have had in February 1946, when Cho Man-sik, accused of
'contacts with South Korean reactionaries' and even of 'secret co-
operation with the Japanese police', was ousted, with the aid ofSoviet
pressure, from the post ofthe party chairman (in absentia, ofcourse).
He was replaced by Ch'oe Yong-gCSn, a former Communist guer-
rilla and close friend of Kim ll Sung, who, as we remember, had
been initially introduced into the party to control Cho Man-sik. A
very thorough purge of the party followed, and in a few weeks a great
number of Cho's supporters were expelled. Many of them were
imprisoned, many more escaped to the South. 45 The Democratic
Party was eventually transformed into a puppet front organisation
under total command of the emerging Communist authorities. The
main rationale for the party's prolonged existence in the late 1940s
may have been to lure into it the politically troublesome part of the
population, which was easier to control inside the party than outside
it. In addition, the existence of non-Communist parties was useful for
propaganda. However, both non-Communist parties were essen-
tially front organisations, deprived of any independent voice and
significance.
The nationalist Right, now outlawed, did not readily accept
the new situation. They tried to organise resistance to the Soviet
authorities and the new regime. In these attempts the nationalists
"The circumstances of Cho Man-sik's death were related to South Korean

journalists by Pak Kil-yong, a Soviet Korean who occupied major positions in the
OPRK. This version needs further verification, but in general it looks plausible
(the sununary execution ofprisoners W2S a st:mdard maction to the enemies' advance
in Stalin's Russia). See Mi rolt Choson minjujuili inmin ltong/1WOgult, pp. 331-4.
•s1. Kravtsov, Agmsiia amtrikansltogo imptrialisma, p. SB; P. Krainov, Bot'ba ltomskogo
naroda za nezavisimost, p. 176. Another non-Communist party of North Korea,
Ch'l>ndogyo-Ch'ong'udang (The Party of Young Friends of the Celestial Way),
much less influential than the Democratic Party, retained some independence for a
few more years.

were often supported by like-minded activists in the South. Material
recently published in South Korea shows that southern nationalist
authorities were involved in organising terrorist operations in the
North. As early as F-ebruary 1946, the Department ofPolitical Intelligence
ofthe newly-established provisional government ofthe Korean Republic
in Seoul (this self-proclaimed nationalist government in exile returned
to Korea in the autumn of1945) sent a group ofits agents to the North.
Their mission was to assassinate a number of North Korean leaders,
including Kim II Sung himself. In the spring of 1946, assassination
attempts indeed took place. An attempt to kill Kim II Sung during a
mass rally on 1 March 1946 was a close call, and Kim was saved thanks
to the brave actions of the Soviet officer Ya.T. Novichenko, who
managed to catch in his hands a grenade thrown at Kim II Sung. 46
In the spring ofthat year, terrorists from the South organised a number
of attacks on other North Korean officials, but they were generally
unsuccessful: the only victims were family members of Kang Yang-
uk, a left-wing Christian activist who also was a distant relative of Kim
II Sung. 47
According to Soviet documents, occasionally some anti-Com-
munist leaflets were distributed and acts of disobedience took place
here or there. On the whole, however, the new regime did not meet
much popular resistance. It is difficult to say whether the majority
of the population supported the regime, but it is quite certain that
most North Koreans, at least, were not ready to fight against it. The
mass resistance one would expect had the new government been
really unpopular was absent. In August 1947 Colonel Ignatiev com-
piled an extensive memorandum on the anti-government activity
in North Korea. There can be little doubt that he, following good
old Stalinist tradition, included on this list some incidents which, in
reality, were hardly connected with any kind of sabotage. lgnatiev,
*Extensive Soviet literature exists concerning this incident and .Ya.T. Novichenko.
The incident, more or less forgotten in the 1960s when Kim's regime was unpopular
in Moscow, reappe-ared as a major topic of official publications around 1984, during
a short improven1en1 in Moscow-Pyongyang relations. Ya.T. Novichenko, then still
alive, was even invited to North Korea by Ki1n ll Sung, and the visit received ntuch
publicity. For a 'view from the other side' of the assassination attempt see Mi rok
Choson minjujuui inmin konghwaguk, pp. 318-23, and Pultha11 minju t'ong'il undong sa.
P'yo11g'an-do p'y0n, Seoul: Pukhan Y6nguso, 1990, p. 289.
47 1n the early 1990s South Korean journalists found and interviewed all living
members of a terrorist group sent to the North in the spring of 1946: Mi tok Choson
minjujuui inmin konghwaguk, pp. 31~24.

26 From Stalin to /(jm II Sung
for example, mentioned seven industrial incidents, mosdy fires, which
he reported as likely (or certain) results of arson or sabotage. It is
worth remembering that around the same time many thousands of
Soviet citizens perished in prison as victims of accusations of sabo-
tage which followed virtually every major industrial incident, so we
can hardly take all of these accusations at face value. Apart from these
doubtful conclusions, all the anti-government actions mentioned
in Ignatiev's memo were of a very moderate scale: distribution of
anti-Communist leaflets, sermons by nationalist preachers, some clan-
destine student groups or, at most, unspecified 'attacks on local
cadres'. According to Ignatiev, these attacks were largely related to
the land reform which, as we might guess, stirred up class and per-
sonal tensions in the countryside. The only major incident mentioned
by lgnatiev was an attack by nationalist guerrillas on a police station
in Northern P'yongan Province (it took place on 24 February
1947).48
The relative weakness of the resistance in the North becomes
evident ifone compares it with the situation in the South, where, by
the end of 1946, the left-wing opposition was waging a civil war
against the US-sponsored regime. In the strikes and anti-government
rallies in the South hundreds of thousands if not millions of Koreans
participated, while thousands went to the mountains to join the
Communist guerrillas, increasingly trained, armed and supported
by the North. Nothing even remotely like this was happening in
the North. Even the above-mentioned Sinuiju riots were very small
in scale if compared with contemporary Communist rallies and riots
to the south of the 38th parallel. It would be a simplification to explain
such tranquillity only as a result ofthe ruthless efficiency of the North
Korean repressive apparatus: the North Korean police was indeed
efficient and cruel, but, at the time, the South was also far from an
exemplary democracy and its police force could hardly be called soft
on the opposition. Probably the popularity ofthe North Korean regime
was genuine, at least to some extent. To many contemporaries it
seemed to be (and at that stage probably actually was) somewhat
more efficient and remarkably less corrupt than its rival in the South.
Its land reform and its new Jaws were very democratic (alas, only on
paper), and its significant and generally successful efforts to promote
48Spravlra o dtiakl'nosti
rtalttsii v &vnnoi KDrtt (Mmto Dfl I~ activity of tltt rtaction
in Norllt Korta), 19 August 1947, signed by Colonel lgnatiev. A copy is in the author's
personal archive.

national culture and education made many Koreans believe that the
new people in power in Pyongyang were indeed striving to improve
the life of the majority. Besides, there was another means of easing
the tensions in the North: discontented citizens could always 'vote
with their feet' by crossing the 38th parallel southward. There was,
indeed, a very considerable number of such refugees.
The resignation and subsequent arrest of Cho Man-sik as well
as the purge of other genuine nationalist leaders meant the quiet
dissolution of the short-lived 'Administrative Committee 0f Five
Provinces'. However, the Soviet authorities did not abandon their
attempts to create a proto-government in North Korea. The next
step took place in February 1946 when, in place ofthe 'Administrative
Committee of Five Provinces' there was established the 'North
Korean Provisional People's Committee' (Kor. Puk Choson imsi inmin
wiw/Jnhoe). This body consisted of ten departments (Kor. kuk) and
three bureaux (Kor. pu). The departments were established to match
the respective departments of the SCA. Even the traditional order
of the departments in the list was identical with those of the SCA.
Only the three bureaux (of propaganda, general affairs and planning)
had no counterparts in the SCA structure. Perhaps it was for this
reason that they were not also called 'departments', but got a different
name. 49
After the creation of the North Korean Provisional People's Com-
mittee, the SCA published a declaration stating that the SCA had
achieved its task, and fi:om now on the power in the country would
belong to the local administration organs, while the respective organs
of the SCA would perform mainly consulting functions. The depart-
ments of the SCA, the courts and the office of the procurator general
were to be submitted to the control of the North Korean Provisional
People's Committee.50 To a large extent it was an exercise in propa-
ganda: the actual control over the decision-making process still remained
..~There are discrepancies in descriptions of the structure of the Provisional

People's Committee. According to Kravtsov, it had nine departments (I. Kravtsov,
Agrtssiia amailta11Sltogo imptria/is,,,,., p. 87). South Korean scholars believe that there
were ten departments (see J>Nlthan ch'tjt surip ltwaj6ng. Seoul: Ky6ngnam taehakkyo
kuktong munje y6nguso, 1991, p. 76). Since both publications include a list of the
departments, it is possible tQ make comparisons. The 'excessive' department, not
mentioned by Kravtsov, is the department of communications. It was quite probably
Kravtsov's mistake, especially if we take into consideration the fact that the structure
of the Provisional Committee mirrored that of the SCA.
SOJJ.V. Shchetinin, 'Vlast- narodu'. p. 126.

firmly in the hands of the SCA (as demonstrated by one example in
particular, in the spring of 1946 the Soviet authorities prepared and
realised land reform). Nevertheless, there were seeds of truth in the
SCA promises, since the young North Korean state apparatus was
playing an increasing role in the running of the country, albeit under
general Soviet supervision.
In the late spring of 1946 the Conununist Party of North Korea
was finally established as a body independent of the Central Com-
mittee in Seoul. Pak Hon-yong's Party in the South was restyled the
Conununist Party of South Korea. This reform guaranteed the
Pyongyang leadership more freedom, while the Soviet authorities -
the most likely initiators of the move - also enjoyed better control
over the party's everyday activities, since the Soviet generals were
understandably reluctant to deal with a Conununist Party whose
centre was located on American-controlled territory. The former
North Korean Bureau of the Conununist Party of Korea became
the Central Committee of the North Korean Conununist Party. The
transformation from the North Korean Bureau to the North Korean
Conununist Party was most likely not a result of one single decision
but developed gradually, stage by stage. Some South Korean authors
maintain that the decision to establish an independent Conununist
Party was made in December 1945. This is not the case, however.
According to Kim Ch'ang-sun, up to 29 January 1946 the North
Korean official press had used only the term the ' North Korean
Bureau'. Later, a neutral formula, the 'Communist organisations of
the Northern part [of the country]', appeared, and only after 17 April
did the term the 'Conununist party of North Korea' come into use. SI
Most probably, the establishment of the independent Conununist
Party was an extended process. Some secondary evidence of this may
be found in a Soviet document from 20 May 1946: 'The Conununist
Party ... is a part of the Conununist party ofKorea; however, at present,
because of the division of Korea into the Soviet and American zones
of occupation it acts as if rpresent author's italics] it were an independ-
ent political party in North Korea.' 52 Hence, even a Soviet officer
who was an active and direct participant in the events was himself not
quite sure whether in May the North Korean Conununist Party could
SIKimCh'ang-sun, 'Charon nodongdang-iii ch'angdang', Puklian, no. 11, 1989.

S2From Spravka o politicl1tski/1 partiiah i obslichtstverinyh organizalJiiah v sowtskoi
zont okkupa1Jii Korti (Memo on political parties and public organ.isarions in the
Soviet zone of occupation of Korea) , RTsHIDNI , fond 17, opis 128, delo 205.

Tiu Soviet Oaupation and the Birth of the State 29
be considered a party in its own right, or just a regional sub-division
of an all-Korean political institution.
As was to be expected, Kim II Sung became the leader of the
newly established party. However, most of those Communists who
had been exiles in China did not join the Communist Party of North
Korea upon their return fiom China. On 16 February 1946, they cre-
ated their own New People's Party (Kor. Sinmindang) on the basis of
the 'League of Independence' which had existed in the Communist-
controlled territories of China. In its programme, this new party
was very close to the Communists, although it looked somewhat
more moderate on some issues. This moderation, according to South
Korean researchers, helped the Party to gain additional support among
relatively well-off strata of the population, including many intellec-
tuals. 53 New sources lead us to believe that the creation of this party,
a party with a less radical programme was also conceived by the Soviet
authorities. In the North, the New People's Party was designed to be
a counterbalance to the Democratic Party, which, although purged,
was still perceived as a potential threat. It was thought that the New
People's Party would attract peasants, petty bourgeoisie and intel-
lectuals, thus making the social base of the Democratic Party shrink. 54
On 22 July 1946 the United Democratic National Front (Kor.
Puk Choson minjujuui minjok t'ong'i/ chonson), which amalgamated all
legal parties of the country under the leading role of the Communists,
was created in Pyongyang. Following that, all parties found themselves
under the strict formal control of the Communist leadership and in
fact, of the Soviet authorities. The founding ofsuch a United Front
was a standard political measure undertaken by the Communists and
the Soviet administrations in virtually all countries of Eastern Europe.
Indeed, it was prescribed by the concept of the 'people's democracy'
(in Seton-Wauon's terms it would be called an important tool of the
'bogus coalition' policy). By making all parties join such a Front, the
Communists (officially, according to the Front's by-law, recognised
as iu 'leading force') made other parties and groups formally relinquish
their freedom of action. In addition, such Fronu could be very handy
devices in electoral politics, as we shall see below.
Soon, the New People's Party and the Communist Party merged.
Unfortunately, we know little about the actions undertaken by the
Soviet authorities to speed up the process of unification, although
"Pulthan hyilnd« so, Seoul: Kongdongch'e, 1989, p. 109.

S4Mi rolt Chason minjujuui inmin ltonghwagult. Ha, pp. 81-2.
Onginal fron1
they doubtless were of crucial importance. We might surmise that
the instructions regarding this merger were given to Kim II Sung
and Pak Hon-yong during their secret talks with Stalin in Moscow
in 1946 (the parties merged just after their return from Moscow), but
it cannot be maintained with absolute certainty as the documents on
the meetings are still unavailable. In any case, it is highly probable that
the merger was seriously discussed in Moscow.ss
It is also worth remembering that a merger of left parties (normally
Communists and Social-Democrats) was another routine rneasure
undertaken by the Soviets in virtually all countries under their control.
In most countries, however, the merger took place later, in 1948. This
was the case in Poland (Socialist Party and Workers' Party into Polish
United Workers Party); Hungary (Social Democrats and Communist
Party into Hungarian Workers' Party); Bulgaria (Socialist Party and
Communist Party into Bulgarian Communist Party); Romania (Social
Democrat Party and Communist Party into Romanian Workers' Party);
Czechoslovakia (Social Democratic Party and Communist Party into
Communist Party) and Albania (where there were no minor leftist
parties to merger with, but the ruling Communist Party was renamed
the Albanian Workers' Party anyway). The general uniformity of the
new names also indicates Soviet involvement. However, only in two
countries - North Korea and East Germany-did the merger take
place as early as1946 (in East Germany the Social Democrat Party
and Communist Party fused into the Socialist Unity Party in April
1946). It looks as if the two countries were the first place where the
concept was put to test, and Korea was the first place where the
new institution was called the 'Workers' Party, the name later used
by five of the eight ruling Communist Parties in Soviet-controlled
territories.
Formally, the events were as follows: on 23 July 1946, a day after
the establishment of the United Democratic Front, there was a session
ofthe New People's Party Central Committee. There, Ch'oe Ch'ang-
ik, the deputy chairman, proposed a merger with the Communists.
As could be expected, the Central Committee 'unanimously agreed
551nterview with F.I. Shabshina, 23 Jan~ry 1992, Moscow. F.I. Shabshina's

husband, A.I. Shabshin, took part in the talks during a secret visit of Kim II Sung
and Pak H6n-y6ng to Moscow in the summer of 1946. Most South Korean scholars
also believe that the merger was one of the main itenu on the agenda during the
secret negotiations (if the term is applicable) in Moscow. See, e.g., Kim Hak-chun,
Pultluin 50 ny0n so, p.112.

The Soviet Occupation and the Birth of the Stau 31
with this plan. Then Kim Tu-bong addressed Kim II Sung with a
letter with an official proposal. On the morning of24 July, the Ple-
num of the Communist Party Central Committee was opened to
'discuss' this question. An hour later, at 9:30, Kim II Sung expressed
his formal agreement (most likely prepared beforehand). On 27 July
the delegations of Central Committees from both parties met, and
on 28 July a session of a special commission on the unification was
held. Finally, on 29 July 1946 a joint Plenum of the Central Com-
mittees of the New People's Party and the Communist Party ofNorth
Korea adopted an official declaration regarding the unification. During
the next month, all provincial, regional and city organisations were
also merged. 56
On 28-30 August 1946, the first congress ofthe united party took
place: under the name of the North Korean Workers' Party (hence
NKWP, Kor. Puk Choson Nodongdang) it now accounted for more
than 170,000 members (134,000 came from the Communist 'Party,
and 35,000 from the New People's Party).57 Stalin was elected the
honorary chairman ofits First Congress. The Central Committee and
the ruling bodies of the new party were also elected there. However,
the first chairman of the NKWP was not Kim 11 Sung, but Kim Tu-
bong, the former leader of the New People's Party, a renowned
linguist and left-wing politician.58 Ki'm 11 Sung, having temporarily
lost the highest party post, remained the head of the chief executive
organ - the Nortli Korean Provisional People's Committee. It is
likely that the appointment of.Kim Tu-bong was meant to reassure
Kim Tu-bong's supporters. Kim II Sung was elected Kim Tu-bong's
deputy, though it soon became clear that the real control over the
party was in the hands of Kim II Sung and his closest aides from
56RTsHJDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 205, lists 121-31.

571?. Krainov, &r'ba lwmsltogo naroda za ntzavisimost', p. 174. The exact number
of the NKWP's memben at that time is uncertain. Available documents give differing
figures: from 170,000 to 370,000. The lower figure, given by a well-informed though
non-Korean source, seems more plausible. Krainov's book was written as part ofan
anti-American propag;onda campaign, and the author probably had access to materials
from Korea. On 1 March 1946, the 7th department ofthe Main Political Directorate
of the Soviet Armed Forces estimated the number of North Korean Communists
at 30,000 (RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1004, list 41). On 20 May a Soviet
officer (probably using information obtained from the North Korean leadenhip)
reported to Moscow that there were already 43,000 parry memben (RTsHJDNI,
fond 17, opis 128, delo 205, list 25).
58A. Pigulevslcaia. Komsltii 1111roJ v bor'~ za naavisimost' i demoltmtiiu. Moscow:
lzdatel'stVO akademii nauk, 1952, p. 57.

32 From Stalin w Kim ll Sung
among the former Manchurian guerrillas and Soviet Koreans (first
ofall, A.I. Hegai, who had extensive experience in party management),
while Kim Tu-bong remained more or less a symbolic figure. 59 This
could partly be explained by the Soviet support for Kim 11 Sung,60
and partly by the clear unwillingness of Kim Tu-bong himself to deal
with the daily routine.
Later there was a similar unification of the leftist parties in the
South (in the South Korean Workers' Party, SKWP), but until 1949
the Workers' Parties of North and South Korea remained technically
independent, though in close contact: from October 1945 illegal visits
of Pak Hon-yong, the leader of the South Korean Communists, to
Pyongyang were frequent and in late 1946 he moved there for good.61
The South Koreans eventually developed in the North a significant
infrastructure to support their guerrilla operations and illegal activities.
In 1946-50 the majority of the leaders of the South Korean Workers'
Party, under increasing anti-Communist pressure in the South, had
to move to the North. Pak Hon-yong himself maintained contacts
with the leadership of the 25th Army, and in the summer of 1946, as
already mentioned, he and Kim 11 Sung secretly met Stalin in Moscow,
wht;re they discussed the political situation in Korea. 62
The most important part of the 'people's democratic reform'
was, of course, the redistribution of land. On 5 March 1946, the law
on land reform was published and went into effect. It was issued by
the People's Committee of North Korea and signed by Kim 11 Sung,
although, according to V.P. Kovyzhenko, it was in fact drafted by the
experts from the SCA and its real authors were two consultants on
agricultural economics specially invited from Leningrad. 63 The law
envisaged the confiscation and redistribution ofland which belonged
to Japanese legal entities and individuals, as well as to those who rented
it out, but most importantly. it applied to all land estates exceeding five
chongbo (1 chongbo-0.99 ha), regardless of the landlord's nationality.
The confiscated land had to be distributed among the poor peasants.
591ntervicw with Kan Sang-ho, 30 November 1989, I..eningnd.

"°The Soviet press of the period aJw:iys underlined the special role of Kim ll
Sung as the 'leader of the Korean people', while Kim Tu-bong, technically his
immediate superior, was mentioned rarely and in passing.
01 Mi rolt Claosi!n minjujui inmin ltonghU111guk, p. 105.
02lntervicw with F.I. Shabshiva, 23 January 1992, Moscow.
6Jlntervicw with V.V. Kovyzhenlco, 2 August 1991, Moscow. Kovyzhenlco was a

Soviet military officer and diplomat, who in 1946-7 served in the political
depamnent of the 25th Army.

Formally, the reform had to be overseen by people's committees,
although in reality they worked in close contact with (or rather under
the guidance of) the SCA and the Soviet military authorities in the
regions.64
Article 17 of the law ruled that land reform would have to be
finished by March 1947. However, in practice it was done much
earlier: the main work had been done by late March 1946, just before
the commencement of the agricultural season. Most probably, this
sped-up tempo was envisaged from the beginning. The reform was
generally successful and this strengthened the position of the new
regime in the North and helped its popularity in the South where
the shortage of land was acute. In real life the farmers' gains were
less impressive than on paper, since the taxes were remarkably high,
but the political effect of the reform was still considerable.
It looks as if the break with the nationalists sped up the general
pace of the reforms. Compared with most Soviet-controlled territories
in Eastern Europe, North Korea was well ahead in terms of the
speed ofreform. In August 1946, the nationalisation ofindustry began.
Like the land reform, this important measure was from beginning to
end prepared by the SCA, though it was again conducted on behalf
of the local authorities. 65 According to the letter of the law, only the
property of the Japanese and collaborators was to be nationalised,
thus making this measure part of a 'people's democratic' rather than
a 'socialist' programme. However, in colonial Korea the absolute
majority oflarge and medium-sized enterprises had been forced to
collaborate with the Japanese authorities; hence all large and almost
all medium-sized industries were nationalised. As a result of these
measures the economic structures ofthe North and the South became
drastically different. While in the South the capitalist market economy
continued to exist, the North was steadily moving toward a Soviet-
type command economy. The first North Korean economic plan
was adopted in February 1947.66 In December 1947 a currency
reform took place in the North. This meant the introduction of a
separate currency in the North and thus further widened the gap
and handicapped the interaction between the two economies.67
64
Pultlum lryimd« "'· PP· 353-4.
65 !nterview with N.G. Lebedev, 13 November 1989, Moscow.
66P. Krainov, Bor'ba leo,.isltogo ""10da za nezavisimosl', p. 93; Pulthan di'onglam,
Seoul: Pukhan ylSngwo. 1985, p. 290.

67F.I. Shabshina, Sotsialistichnltaia Kottia, p. 95; Interview with Kim Ch'an,

On 5 September 1946 the North Korean Provisional People's
Committee decided to conduct on 3 November the elections to the
regional, provincial and city people's committees. This was another
important step towards the formation of a separate state in the North.
Before that, people's committees were not elected organs, but were
formed by local political activists from among the Communists and
nationalists approved by the Soviet authorities. Since February 1946,
all important legislation had been adopted in the name of people's
committees. However, the legal status of these institutions remained
unclear and dubious. After the elections, the people's committees
could more persuasively claim the status oflegitimate bodies elected
by democratic means. However, the suppression of the Democratic
Party, the only influential anti-Communist organisation, as well u
the full control exercised by the Soviet authorities and the NKWP
committees essentially made the elections a formality, guaranteeing
the NKWP a majority at all levels.
In order to avoid any unwanted 'incidents' during the elections,
special administrative and political measures were taken. The Workers'
Party participated in the elections as a part of the United Democratic
National Front, a Communist-controlled body which encompassed
virtually all parties and major public organisations allowed by the
Soviet military authorities. In each constituency there was just one
candidate who represented the United Front, that is, all legal parties
and groups. A voter thus faced three choices: to vote for an official
candidate; to vote against him/her (without the possibility of sup~
porting somebody else); or not to vote at all. The idea was copied from
the notorious 'unbreakable bloc of the Communists and non-party
candidates' which had existed in the Soviet Union for almost half a
century. Such a bloc made one-candidate elections legally possible.
In addition, although the elections were supposed to be secret, there
were different ballot boxes for voting 'for' and 'against' (white and black
respectively). Thus the authorities could in fact easily spot those who
dared to !fproach black boxes and eventually put them under sur-
veillance. Avoiding participation in the elections was also dangerous
as it was clear that a person was trying to avoid not the elections as
such but the necessity of voting for a government candidate. At the
15 January 1991, Tashkent- Kim Ch'an was a financial specialist in, who worked
in the DPRK 1945-56, occupying a number of important positions in bank-
ing.
68 Pu/than ~ndM so, p. 281.

same time, the elections were accompanied by an intense and skilful
propaganda campaign.
Not surprisingly, the participation level was 'very high'. According
to the official data, about 99.6% of registered voters took part in the
elections, of whom 97% voted for candidates imposed from above.
The November elections were followed in February by the elections
of village people's committees (officially declared participation rate
99.82%, of whom 86.38% were said to have voted for the govern-
ment candidates) and, in March, by the elections for the ward (Kor.
myon) people's committees (99.9/96.2%). Among 70,454 deputies,
29.3% were without a party affiliation, 57.7% represented the NKWP.
7.7% the reformed and beheaded Democratic party, and 5.3% the
Ch'ondogyo-Ch'ong'udang Party. 69 Obviously, the percentage was
determined beforehand, as happened during the 'elections' in the Soviet
Union. It is remarkable though that the leadership ofthe NKWP and
the Soviet authorities decided to allow both non-Communist parties
to have such a large representation. The actual monopoly ofthe NKWP
on power was still far ahead.
At the session of the election commission on the eve of the
election day, as well as in his speeches on the election's results, Kim
ll Sung underlined that the elections had to facilitate the establishment
of a united Korean government according to the decisions of the
Moscow Conference. However, in reality the very fact that the
elections took place meant the further legalisation ofa separate North
Korean state. On 17 February 1947 the First Congress of People's
Committees opened in Pyongyang. These organs symbolised the
local legislative power, though the real power belonged to the party
apparatus, just as the Stalinist views on society and the state prescribed.
In the name of the Congress a new North Korean government was
formed and the People's Assembly of North Korea, a kind of a proto-
parliament, was elected. Kim 11 Sung remained the head of the
government. 70
All these actions were taken with the agreement, or often on the
direct initiative, of the Soviet authorities. Thus, a decision to call the
69We quote the results in such detail because in the South Korean publications
there are considerable discrepanci~ in data about th~e election$ (probably due to
incidental mixing of the results of these three subsequent elections). T he results
quoted here are from a recently declassified contemporary Soviet document: Lieut.-
Col. M.T. Gaidar. K sommtnnomu polozhmiiu Korti (The present situation in Korea),
completed 18August1947, RTsHIDNI, fond 17. opis 128, delo 1119).
70
1. Kravtsov, Agrwiia a1nniluznskogo imperialisma v Kortit, p. 101.

First Congress ofPeople's Committees was made by T.F. Shtykov who
accounted for it in detail in his diary. On 19 December he discussed
his plan with two other senior Soviet officers, Marshal K.A. Meretskov
and General A.A. Romanenko. At this meeting, the Soviet generals
(no Koreans were present at this stage) decided that 1, 153 deputies,
elected by a secret vote from among the people's committees mem-
bers, would participate in the congress. They were to 'elect' the People's
Assembly of North Korea consisting of231 members. What these
'elections' were like in reality is clear from the fact that the Soviet
generals themselves distributed the places among the parties. The
North Korean Workers' Party was given 35% ofplaces, the Ch'ondogyo
Party and the Democratic Party were to receive 15% each, and finally
the deputies without a party affiliation were to get 35%. In their wis-
dom, the generals even took care of women whose representation
was fixed at 15%. The social origin of the future deputies was also
pre-determined: 40 workers, 50 peasants, 45 intellectuals, 10 traders, 7
entrepreneurs, 10 priests and 10 cra.fumen. 71 If we have a look at the
actual composition ofthe Assembly, we can see that these instructions
were followed with only minor deviations. 72 The generals closely
followed a Soviet model: all 'right' social groups were to get their
representation according to the results determined by the party or-
gans beforehand. The plan was reported to Moscow and approved
71 In the early1980s there was a popuhrjoke in the Soviet Union on this subject:
'Is it possible to predict the results of the electioru to the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR in 2000' 'No'. 'Why? 'Because in the Central Committee they have compiled
the lists ofdeputies only until 1999'. The relevant part ofShtykov's diary was published
in part by Ch<ln Hyon-su as 'Shtykov ilgi-ga malhanlin Pukhan ch<lnggwon-iii songlip
kw:ajong'. Yi!ksa pip'yl!n, no. 30, 1995. On the preparation of the Congress sec pp.
145--6.
7
2The total of the figures suggested by Shtykov is not 231, but 172
(40+50+45+10+7+10+10). Perhaps the difference of59 was to be occupied by the
P,,rty cadres and not by token representatives of various social groups? This secnu
likely since, as we know, in the rttlly 'elected' Assembly there were 237 membcn, of
whom 56 were'clerical worken' (Kor. samuwiJn). This social category, a translation of
the Russian s/uzlwluhii, was used both in the DPRK and the Soviet Union as a
name for the party cadres, though it also included some other groups, e.g. clerical staff
and junior management. At any rate, the eventual outcome ofthe 'electioru' predictably
matched the generals' 'suggestions'. Among the fint People's Assembly memben th¢re
were 52 worlten (40 were suggested by Shtykov}, 62 peasants (50), 36 intellectuals
(45), 10 traden (10), 7 entrepreneun (7), 10 priests (10), and 4 craftsmen (10) (for the
data on the Assembly composition see Chosl!n chmua, vol. 23, Pyongyang: Kwahak
paekkwa ch'ulp'al1S3, 1981,p. 33).

The Soviet Oaupation and the Birth ofthe State 37
there; only then, on 3-4 January 1947, was Kim II Sung invited to
take part in the final consultations. 73
Simultaneous with the creation of the state and party structures
and economic reforms, the Soviet authorities and North Korean
Communists began to develop their own army and security services.
In 1946, the first units of the North Korean army were established
under the guidance of the Soviet military, trained by Soviet advisers
and equipped with Soviet weapons. At the beginning, an open
establishment of a North Korean armed forces could have led to
confrontation with the Americans in the South, and therefore they
were disguised as a police force and as railway defence units.74 Even
the North Korean navy posed for a while as a maritime police. By
February 1948, the North Korean army had amassed a formidable
military potential and was posing a serious threat to its southern
neighbour. 75 Only then, on 3 February, did the Soviet Politburo in
Moscow make a decision 'to allow [emphasis added) the People's
Committee of North Korea to create the Department of National
Defence and on the final day of the session of the People's Assembly
to organise in Pyongyang a meeting and a parade of the Korean
national military force'.76 After this decision from Moscow, on 8
February 1948 the creation ofa separate North Korean army (called
Korean People Army, KPA) was duly declared by Pyongyang.
Many lower-ranking Korean officers were trained in China and
the Soviet Union, while generals were mainly former guerrilla fighters
or, more often, officers ofthe Chinese Communist army. The General
Staff was headed by Kang Kon, the former Manchurian guerrilla
fighter, who had once served together with Kim II Sung in the 88th
Brigade.77
The North Korean police force and security services were born
in 1946. Then a Security Department (Kor. poanguk) headed by Ch' oe
Yong-gon was established within the North Korean Provisional
73ChlSn HylSn-su, 'Shtykov ilgi-ga malhanun Pukhan chlSnggwlSn-ui songlip'.

74An old saying tlut 'ripe ideas Oy in the air' was once more vindic:ited by the
fact tlut the formation of the separate armed forces also took place in the South (it
siarted there in late 1945). Bruce Cumings, TI1t Origins ofthe Korean l«ir, pp. I 70-2.
7SAn Ch'ang-gil', 'Jnmingun ch'angglSn kw.ijlSng-gwa paljlSn-e kw.inhan ylSngu',
PllltMn, no. 10, 1990.
76Decisions of the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions. Politburo
decision of 3 February 1948. A copy of the document is in a private collection.

77Jnterview with Kang Sang-ho, 3 I October I 989, Leningrad.

People's Committee. However, in practice local police units (normally
organised and controlled by the local People's Committees} had existed
earlier: thus, in November 1945, such units suppressed the anti-
Communist student riots in Siniiiju.78
From the very beginning a remarkable role in the North Korean
political police was played by Pang H ak-se, a former Soviet police
officer, who arrived in Korea in 1946.79 On his arrival he was ap-
pointed the head of the Section of Political Defence of the State,
within the Security Department, which became the fint organisation
of the political police and counter-intelligence in the North. For the
rest ofhis life, Pang Hak-se remained one of the supreme supervisors
of the North Korean repressive machine. In later times, Pang was
amongst the principal masterminds behind the purges of the 1950s
and 1960s. Pang Hak-se belonged to few former Soviet Koreans who
never lost Kim II Sung's trust. This is evident from the extraordinary
fact that Pang did not eventually share the fate of his Soviet col-
leagues Ezhov and Beria, but continued to occupy high posts in the
country's repressive system. Until the late 1980s he· was the chair-
man of the DPRK Supreme Court and the only Soviet Korean who
during the last, Sixth, Congress of the KWP (1980) was elected a
member of the KWP Central Committee. He died in 1992 at a ripe
old age.
T he Soviet authorities provided the North Korean leadership
with extensive support and assistance in dealing with a variety of
problems, the most vital of which was the lack of qualified personnel.
Under the colonial regime Koreans usually had no chances to receive
college education. The few qualified professionals came from privi-
leged families, and seldom sympathised with the North Korean
political developments and social reforms. An increasing number of
these people were leaving the North for the American-occupied
South. There was a northward immigration movement, too: some
leftist South Korean intellectuals came to the North where, they hoped,
'their talents would be used to serve the people'. Some of those who
came then to Pyongyang later made a significant and lasting contri-
bution to the cultural and intellectual life of the North (dancer Ch'oe
Siing-hui, writer Yi Ki-yong, historians Paek Nam-un and Pak Si-
hy6n) but the majority of these defectors were purged soon after the
fall of Pak H6n-y6ng and his Domestic faction in the rnid-1950s. In
78Cho Tong-yl:ln, 'Nae-g;a kyl:lklcun Sinl:liju haksaeng pangong ujgon', pp. 52- 3.
79 Interview with Kan Sang-ho, 30 November 1989, Leningrad.

The Soviet Occupation and tM Birth of the State 39
any case the influx of left-wing intellectuals and professionals to the
North was not sufficient to compensate for the mass departure of
their right-wing counterparts.
The problem was much relieved by Soviet Koreans who were
arriving in Korea. from 1946, North Korean students began to study
in Soviet universities. In the 1947-48 academic year there were already
120 undergraduate students and 20 postgraduate students studying
in the Soviet Union. 80 There was also persistent and considerable
investment in education inside Korea. Ofparticular significance was
the establishment of Kim II Sung University in Pyongyang in the
sununer of 1946. This school, as well as other new colleges, widely
employed Soviet lecturers, normally of Korean ethnic background
as well as some renowned Soviet scholars who were sent to Pyongyang
to teach. Shtykov's diary is dotted with remarks about the necessity
to lobby Moscow for more specialists and university teachers. The
documents of the CPSU Central Committee also contain numerous
papers where Shtykov and the SCA ask for engineers, university
professors, medical doctors and scientists to be dispatched to North
Korea. Education, especially in the fields of engineering and science
as well as teaching Russian, was clearly among the top priorities of
the Soviet authorities in Pyongyang.
The Soviets also did their best to train notjust the young generation
ofK.oreans but also North Korean officials and party cadres themselves.
In the sununer of 1946, the SCA opened in Pyongyang the High
School for Cadres, in which Soviet Koreans taught future North
Korean leaders according to the curriculum used in the Soviet system
of party cadres' education.81
Later on, in 1947 Shtykov proposed having a special school for
North Korean dignitaries established in Moscow. In 1948, the Soviet
Central Committee approved his suggestion and a special school for
North Korean top officials came into being. from the Shtykov diary
we know that the establishment of the school was discussed during a
special meeting on Korean problems, presided over by Stalin himseJ£82
The school was located not far from Moscow, in the village of
,
&Ooecisioru of the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questioru. Politburo
decision of21August1947. A copy of the document is in a private collection.
81
IntnviNi with Pak PyJng-yul, 25 January 1990, Moscow. Pale Pyllng-yul was a
Soviet school teacher; in 1947-59 he worked in the DPRK and in 1947-50 was
principal of the Kangdong political school.
82Shtykov ~ries. Entry of 24 April 1948. A copy is in the author's personal
archive.

40 From Stalin to IGm II Sung
Nagornoe (hence its name, Nagornoe School, often used for the sake
of secrecy). It had only thirty-five students, all high-level NKWPI
SKWP functionaries. They were given a crash course of Russian,
Marxist Political Economy, History of the Soviet Communist Party,
Dialectical and Historical Materialism, International Relations, World
History, Theory of Party Building and Geography. It was indeed a
crash course, since the students were expected to have ten hours of
classes every day! All expenses were paid by the Soviets, including
even quality clothing provided for the students. The Soviet staff
consisted of twenty-five, excluding the teachers! For thirty-five
students, there were, among others, two cooks, two waitresses and
two kitchen hands, as well as a librarian, a nurse and a plumber.83 The
fact that the Soviet government went to such lengths to provide proper
ideological training for the North Korean dignitaries may be
explained by the constant shortage of ideologically trained cadres in
Pyongyang. Unlike other 'people's democracies', in North Korea, with
the exception of the Soviet Koreans, no top cadres had undergone
training in the spirit of the official Marxism-Leninism as understood
in Stalin's Soviet Union. Hence, even those South Korean Communists
of the older generation who had received a less orthodox (or, one
might say, more authentic) Marxist background must have looked
rather suspicious to the Soviet generals and commissars: hence the
perceived necessity to redeem them as soon as possible.
In 1946-8 the South Korean Workers' Party (SKWP), officially
outlawed by the Americans, remained one of the important political
forces in the South. It enjoyed significant popular support - a fact
which was recognised even by its enemies. The SKWP ran an extensive
system of illegal committees around the country. From 1947 the
party's leadership, acting in close contact with the Soviet military and
the North Korean authorities, put its stakes on an armed struggle
against the South Korean regime and launched a nationwide guerrilla
campaign. In September 1947, in Kangdong, near Pyongyang, a
special school was established to train specialists for illegal activities
in the South. Pak Pyong-yul, a Soviet Korean, became its principal. At
the beginning, the students were mostly Communist leaders at the
provincial and regional levels. After a few months of training they
were sent back to South Korea. Some students were meant to lead
IPVarious documents related to the school (its curriculum, table oforganisation,

budget, etc.) can be found in RTsHIONI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1148, list20-45. At
that time the school's existence was a closely guarded secret.

The Soviet Oaupation and tht Birth of the State 41
the guerrilla units and thus, as well as general political subjects, they
also received basic military instruction. At the end of 1948, when
the guerrilla movement in the South became even more active, the
training ofthe future guerrilla commanders became the school's main
task.84
A serious symptom of the deepening split in Korea was a steady
closing down of all contacts and exchanges between the two parts of
the country. Since the very beginning the Soviets had tried to fence
off'their' zone, but in practice during the first month ofthe occupation
the movement ofpeople and goods between the Soviet and American
zones continued, although it was increasingly restricted. Throughout
1945-8 the 38th parallel slowly turned into a heavily guarded state
border. However, illegal trade over the 38th parallel continued on a
significant scale until the beginning of the Korean war. 85
For all practical purposes, by the end of 1947 a separate state had
emerged in the north of the Korean peninsula. It poSSCS1ed all necessary
attributes: borders, government, currency, legislation, army and police
forces. A similar process took place in the South, thus making the final
split of Korea into two states unavoidable. Such developments were
only stimulated by the ongoing preparation for a possible armed
conflict. According to Yu SOng-ch'ISI, the former head of operations
in the North Korean General Staff, North Korean generals began to
draw up war plans for a campaign against the South as early as 1947.86
However, the North Korean leaders could not start the war without
Moscow's explicit approval, and such an approval was not easy to
obtain. At first, Pyongyang's suggestion to overthrow the Seoul regime
by a sudden powerful strike was rebuffed by Moscow, and not until
1950 did the North Korean leaders and the Soviet embassy manage
to persuade Stalin to sanction the attack, (this problem, however is
beyond the scope of our topic).
Militant hints could be heard in Pyongyang from very early on.
On 27 March the Second Congress of the NKWP met in Pyongyang.
This Congress became the last significant event organised by the
NKWP before the declaration of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea. Carefully reading the materials of the Congress, a modern
114 Interviewwith Pale Pyllng-yul, 25 January 1990, Moscow; Kim Nam-silc,

Namnodang, Seoul: Hangulc sunggong yllnguwlln, 1979, pp. 46(H!.
85 Chang Hwa-su, '38 mil muy6lc sij6r-ui nambulc mulja lcyoyolc', Pukhan, no.
8, 1985, pp. 62-8.

86lnterview with Yu S6ng-ch'6l, 19January1991, Tashkent.

observer might notice a number of hints of the impending Korean
war. The main report to the Congress was made by Kim II Sung
who remained the deputy chairman of the North Korean Workers'
Party (its head was still Kim Tu-bong). Speaking about North Korea,
Kim II Sung for the first time called it 'a base of democracy' (Kor.
minju kij1) - a new term reminiscent of the Chinese 'revolutionary
bases' - provinces controlled by Communists during civil wars. 87
Meanwhile, the preparations for the formal inauguration of an
independent state were proceeding fast. In the autumn of 1947 the
drafting of a North Korean Constitution began. This step meant that
the declaration of a separate North Korean state was only a matter
of time. On 18 November, the Third Session of the North Korean
People's Assembly adopted an official resolution on the beginning
of work on the Constitution. It also elected a Provisional Constitu-
tional Commission headed by Kim Tu-bong. In practical terms, the
Constitution in a Stalinist (or, for that matter, Leninist) regime was
a remarkably decorative document, without much impact on the
real life and work of the country's political machinery. However, the
decision to draft the Constitution was important itself, since it sym-
bolised a significant turning point in North Korean nation building.
In early February, a draft of the 'Provisional Constirution', loosely
based on the Soviet 1936 Constitution and adapted to the concept of
the 'people's democratic revolution', was published for 'public discus-
sion' - as the Soviet tradition demanded. A decision not to adopt the
Constitution in February but to conduct a 'public discussion' was
again made in Moscow by the Soviet Politburo (Politburo decision
of 3 February 1948) and followed by the North Korean bodies. In
this way everything, down to the agenda of the People's Assembly
session, was confirmed in advance by Moscow. 88
Apart from the standard symbolism of'public discussion' prescribed
by the Soviets, the Constitution draft also went through a much more
serious test. It was sent for examination to Moscow, where the experts
from the Soviet Central Committee carefully studied it. Their im-
pression was not particularly good, and the International Department
of the Soviet Central Committee proposed a dozen amendments.
On the whole, the draft was assessed negatively: 'The main deficiency of
the draft of the Provisional Constitution of the Democratic People's
87 Pultlu"' h~nd~ <a, p. 290.

88Dccisionsof the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions. Politburo
decision of 3 February 1948. A copy of the document is in a private collection.

The Soviet Occupation and the Birth ofthe State 43
Republic of Korea is that it does not fully [reflect), and sometimes
even wrongly reflects the existing social and economic relations and
the level of the development of people's democracy in the country.
Most articles are poorly edited ...'89 However, the final word was to
be had by the top authority, the Soviet Politburo and Comrade Stalin
himsel£ For some reason, Stalin did not agree in full with the criti-
cism of the draft. After Stalin's meeting with Shtykov (to be discussed
below). on 24 April, the Soviet Politburo approved the draft presented
by Pyongyang with only three amendments (Articles 2 and 14 were
fully rewritten in Moscow, while Article 6 was extended). A decision
was sent to Pyongyang.
From the Shtykov diary we also know that 24 April was marked
by an important event - a special meeting on the Korean situation,
presided over by Stalin himsel£ It was the second known meeting
specially convened on such a level to discuss Korean problems (another
meeting took place in summer 1946, during Kim 11 Sung and Pak
Hon-yong's secret visit to Moscow). During the meeting Stalin,
Shtykov, Zhdanov (the CPSU chief ideologist) and Molotov (the
Soviet foreign minister) discussed military problems, the draft of the
Constitution (approved by the Soviet Politburo later the same day),
and other measures aimed at establishing an independent North
Korean state. From Shtykov's notes it is clear that it was Stalin himself
who re-wrote Article 2 of the Constitution and ordered the dropping
ofthe term 'Provisional' fiom its name. However, much more important
were the strategic decisions made during that meeting which lasted,
according to Stalin's well-known habits, from midnight to the early
morning. The most significant one, perhaps, was the final approval
of a plan to stage elections and create a separate government based
in Pyongyang, but claiming to be an all-Korean government.90
89for notes on, and assessment of, the DPRK Constitution draft sec RTsHIDNI,
fond 17, opis 28, delo 1173, list 51.
'!OWc believe it is worth quoting the entry from Shtykov's diary at length:
'24 April 1948, 0.30 to 8.00 a.m.
A phone call 6:om V. M[olotov] [the Soviet foreign ministcr-A.L.], [who ordered
me] to come wgendy to the [Foreign] Ministry. Comrade Stalin wants to discuss
all Korea-related questions. Having arrived at the Foreign Ministry, inuncdiately
went with V._M[olotov] to 'Blizhniaia' ['Blizhniaia dacha' - one of Stalin's
countryside rcsidcnccs-A.L.] where were received by l.V S[talin). V M[olotov)
and A. Zh[danov) took part in the conversation. The topics of the conversation.
1. 'The result ofthe Pyongy.ing Conference ofthe political parties and organisatiom.
(Comrade Stalin] was plcascd with the results, (he said] it was well done.

On 28 April 1948, the Constitution was officially approved by the
Special Session of the People's Assembly (an instruction to this effect
was also given by the Soviet Politburo four days earlier). In July,
again according to instructions fi:om Moscow, the Fifth Session 'ruled'
that until the unification of the country the Constitution would be
valid only in its northern part. After that, no doubt remained that
the North Korean leadership did not intend to recognise the southern
administration and now presented itself as the only legitimate power
on the territory ofthe Korean peninsula. Syngman Rhee's government
ofthe Republic ofKorea (ROK), which was inaugurated on 15 August
1948 in Seoul, adopted the same, if not even more irreconcilable and
belligerent attitude toward its northern neighbour. This incompatibility
and militancy were leading to increased tension. In a situation ofmutual
non-recognition, a war between the North and the South seemed to
both states a legitimate and fully constitutional action, hardly more
than a large-scale police operation aimed at establishing order and
restoring legitimate power on the territory occupied by a handful of
traitors supported by foreign powers.
Just before the final step - an official declaration of a Communist
state in the northern part of the peninsula - North Koreans (again
2. Military problems. Korean military units.

3. About our Anny. It cannot be kept on the Korean account. Withdraw an
Army Headquarters and one division. One bomber air corps to tnnsfer
deeper from Kansiu Uapanesc name ofa certain place in North Korea, which
the present author could not identify).
To introduce an oath in the Korean Army.
To enrol Koreans into (military] Academies, but create a department for the
Orientals. In Siberia, where there are no embassies.
To continue enrolment of volunteers into the Army.
Party problems.
1. About ille-gal Central Committee. [Stalin) approved. [Shrykov means a plan,
mentioned a few times in his diary, to establish secretly a united Centnl
Committee for the Workers Parry of South and North Korea).
2. (Stalin) also supports the legalisation of some part.
3. Concerning the school for the [Korean) Parry cadres [the aforementioned
Nagornoe School. established in September 1948).
On tht Constitution. Re-wrote the second article. Who has the power.
On rtligion. Left only tlut freedom of consciousness is guaranteed.
(Stalin) suggested changes concerning land. Added that private holdings might
have been from 5 to 20 ha.
On decision. Constitution should not be called provisional. (It) will become
effective after the elections in the South. Create a government with the par-
ticipation of the Southerners.
(Shrykov diaries. A copy is in the author's personal archive.)

with Soviet backing) undertook a skilful propaganda manoeuvre.
By then it had become clear that South Korean nationalists would
have separate elections, backed md approved by the United Nations.
To counter their claims of legitimacy, Pyongyang held an all-Korean
conference of political parties and organisations which was presented
as an attempt to work out a compromise for the eventual establish-
ment of a single Korean government. This conference took place
fiom 19 to 23 April 1948. The decision to hold the conference was
authorized by the Soviet Politburo on 12 April. Moscow 'advised
Com. Kim II Sung' to convene the conference. The Soviet Politburo
also drafted an agenda for the conference and a resolution that it would
be 'advised' to pass. The conference was ordered to '(1) denounce
illegal decisions of the (UN] General Assembly and (UN] Commis-
sion, which were taken without participation of the Korean people,
and require the immediate recall of the UN Commission fiom Korea;
(2) welcome the Soviet proposal about the withdrawal of foreign
troops fiom both North and South Korea and demand an immedi-
ate withdrawal of the foreign troops fiom Korea; (3) insist on hold-
ing all-Korean elections after the withdrawal of the foreign troops.' 91
This Soviet-sponsored event, politically quite meaningless, was a large
propaganda success. It managed to attract some well-known South
Korean politicians, including Kim Ku, a patriarch of Korean nation-
alist politics and a staunch anti-Communist, who was then pushed
aside by his arch-rival Syngman Rhee. Kim II Sung promised Kim
Ku that the North would not establish a separate government first.
The entire conference and, in particular, Kim Ku's decision to visit
Pyongyang and his friendly meetings with Kim II Sung provided
the North Koreans with substantial propaganda capital and allowed
then1 to portray themselves as firm supporters of Korean unity against
the separatist intrigues of the South Korean rightists and their US
sponsors.
Since the very beginning it was clear that neither the North Korean
authorities nor their Soviet supervisors wanted to present the DPRK
as a separate state. On the contrary, they went to great lengths to
present it as the only legitimate power on the whole Korean penin-
sula. There was no ambiguity regarding this matter in the DPRK
Constitution, according to which even the capital of the DPRK
was not Pyongyang but Seoul - a slightly bizarre situation which
was to last until 1972. Now we know that this line was also explicitly
91 Decisionsof the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions. Politburo
decision of 12 April 1948. A copy of the document is in a private collection.

suggested by the Soviet supervisors. On 24 April an order to hold
all-Korean (sic) elections was finalised by the Soviet Politburo and
sent to Pyongyang from Moscow. The Soviet Politburo suggested: 'If
in South Korea separate elections are held and a [separate] South
Korean government is organised, Com. Shtykov will have to rec-
ommend to Com. Kim 11 Sung to convene a special session of the
People's Assembly ofNorth Korea to adopt the following decisions:
(a) until the unification ofKorea the draft (constitution) of the Demo-
cratic People's Republic ofKorea adopted by the April session of the
People's Assembly should be considered effective on the territory of
North Korea; and (b) according to the Constitution elections should
l>e held for the Supreme People's Assembly ofKorea. 92 This recom-
mendation followed the decisions worked out by Stalin, Molotov
and Shtykov on 24 Apr]. As we know, this scenario was strictly
followed-how could it have been otherwise?
Since the South Korean 'Nationalist' elections were depicted as
'separatist', the 'Communist' elections were staged as an all-Korean
action, to take place in both South and North Korea. It was decided
to conduct 'two-stage illegal elections' in the South. First, each region
had to elect seven or eight representatives who would then meet in
the city ofHaeju and elect 360 deputies from the southern provinces
to the Supreme People's Assembly. Obviously, the 'illegal elections'
in South Korea should not be taken too seriously, although it would
have also been somewhat ofa simplification to ignore them as a complete
f.ake. Leftist activists did collect some votes by going from house to
house. They usually visited those sympathising with the leftists
(otherwise, they would have been reported), so the results of the vote
were hardly objective, yet a considerable number of people took part
in this campaign. Around 1,100 South Korean representatives met
in Haeju on 21-26 August and elected 360 deputies of the Supreme
People's Assembly. 93 On 25 August 1948 elections to the Supreme
People's Assembly (Kor. ch'oego inmin hoei41) took place in North Korea
as well. The authorities claimed that 99.97% of registered voters
took part in it. 94
On 2 September 1948 the first session of the Supreme People's
Assembly was opened in Pyongyang, with 572 deputies attending.
'12I)ecisions of the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions. Politburo

decision of24 April 1948. A copy of the document in private collection.
93 Ibid., pp. 405-7.
94Kim Nam-sik, Nomnodang, p. 403.

Out of212 North Korean det>uties, 102 (4S°/o) represented the NKWP,
while the ever obedient Ch'ondogyo-Ch'ong'udang and Democratic •
parties got 35 seats (16%) each. In the Supreme People's Assembly
in general, the Workers' Parties of the South and North -the SKWP
and the NKWP-combinedhad 157 (27.5%) seats, well ahead of any
other group (the second largest one could boast only 7% of the seats).95
On 8 September the Constitution was approved (unanimously,
as everybody with some knowledge of the Stalinist politics could
easily predict) and the next day, 9 September, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea officially came into being. Interestingly, the very
name of the new state might have been proposed by General N.G.
Lebedev, who allegedly refused an earlier version, the 'Korean People's
Republic', suggested by the North Koreans themselves (the Chinese
People's Republic did not then exist).96 Kim II Sung was appointed
head ofthe first Cabinet of ministers, while Kim Tu-bong remained
the chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, that is, the head of
the legislative power.
On 7 October 1948 the Soviet Politburo sent to Pyongyang a
new set of instructions, again signed by Stalin: '1. Suggest the Korean
Government to address the Soviet Government with a proposal of
establishing diplomatic relations. Approve the draft of the Soviet
Government's reply to the Korean Government. [...] Advise the
Koreans to address other countries of the people's democracy (with
exception of Albania) and Mongolian People's Republic with a
proposal to establish diplomatic relations'. 97 Needless to say, all 'advice'
was obediently followed. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
entered 'the great Socialist camp'. A new period of Korean history
began.
The declaration of the ROK and the DPRK inaugurated the epoch
of the division of Korea, which has lasted until the present. In the
autumn of1948, the DPRK was created under the strict guidance of
*rite election results according to Report on the results of the Korean Supreme
People's AJsembly Elections. Sent to Secretary Suslov on 6 September 1948.
RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, dclo 617. list 49. lt worth mentioning that. for some
reason, later North Korean publications did not describe the composition of the
1948 Supreme People's Assembly in great detail.
96Interview with N.G. Lebedev, 13November1989, Moscow.
97Soviet Politburo decision of27 September 1938. A copy of the document is
in a private collection.

the Soviet military, supervised and occasionally checked by the Kremlin.
The policy of the 'people's democracy', devised for Soviet-controlled
territories, was applied in Korea with great success. In just a few years
the Soviet authorities, using minimal resources, managed to found a
viable pro-Soviet Stalinist state on the Korean peninsula.
•

2
KIM IL SUNG
AN ATIEMPT AT A BIOGRAPHY
Even the most consistent adherent ofhistorical determinism would

hardly disagree that the personality of a leader leaves some impact
on a country's fate. This applies even more to dictatorships, particularly
those in which the power of the ruler is limited neither by tradition
nor by foreign 'patrons' or public opinion. North Korea is exactly such
a dictatorship, and for forty-nine years it was ruled by the same man,
the 'Great Leader, the Sun of the Nation, the Marshal of the Mighty
Republic', Kim Il Sung. He became the head ofthis state at the moment
ofits inauguration and how long the 'Mighty Republic' will survive
its first ruler remains a large question several years after his death.
Being a leader for half a century is a rare phenomenon in the
modern, mostly republican world, which alone makes the biography
of Kim Il Sung worth studying. Besides, North Korea is in many
ways a unique state and this uniqueness attracts even more attention
to the personality of its founder.
The biography of the North Korean dictator is difficult to speak
about, since not much is known for certain. In his childhood Kim II
Sung, as the son of a rural intellectual, did not attract much attention,
while in his youth, being a guerrilla commander, he did not want to
advertise his family background and connections. In the later years,
as the ruler of North Korea, he was forced to hide his personal life,
while creating for himselfa new, politically more appropriate biography.
This invented biography seldom followed the real facts, but reflected
the needs of the current political situation. The political situation
changed frequently and the official version of Kim's life followed
these changes. What Korean historians wrote (or rather were ordered
to write) about their leader, say, in the late 1950s is very different from
49

so From Stalin to Kim II Sung
what they write about him today. The debris ofthe contradictory and
mostly falsified data is difficult to get through, while reliable documents
on Kim's life are very rare. Thus, a person who was one ofthe longest-
serving rulers of the twentieth century remains a rather mysterious
figure. For these reasons, an account ofKim II Sung's life will be full
of more or less educated guesses, assumptions and unconfirmed facts.
Nevertheless, during the last decades much has become known,
thanks to the efforts ofAmerican, South Korean and Japanese scholars,
foremost among them Dae-sook Suh in the United States and Wada
Haruki in Japan.
Not much is known about the family background and the childhood
years of Kim II Sung. Although North Korean propaganda has pub-
lished countless volumes on this subject, it is difficult to separate the
truth from later falsifications. Kim II Sung was born Kim Song-ju
on 15 April 1912 in Mangyongdae, a small village near Pyongyang.1
His father Kim Hyong-jik (1894-1926) changed occupations many
times during his short life. In the biographical references on Kim II
Sung published in the Soviet press, his father was usually called a
'village teacher', which, for a Soviet editor, sounded respectable since
teaching is a noble vocation and also an 'appropriate' occupation for
the father of a Communist leader. It was not untrue: Kim Hyong-jik
did sometimes teach in primary schools, but on the whole the father
of the future Great Leader belonged to the world of the Korean petty
intellectual, semi-modern and semi-traditional, not always poor but
seldom affluent, who earned his living either by teaching or by doing
office work, or in some other way. Besides teaching, Kim Hyong-jik
also practised traditional herbal medicine.
The family of Kim II Sung was Christian. Protestantism, which
had come to Korea in the late nineteenth century, was spreading in
the North of the country throughout the colonial period. Christi-
anity was often perceived in Korea as an ideology of modernisation
and, partly, of modern nationalism. Kim II Sung's father attended a
missionary school and maintained lifelong connections with Chris-
1In one of the semi-official biographies of Kim II Sung published in Japan with
North Korean support in 1964, it was said that he was born in the house of his
mother in Hari, though he grew up in Mangyc'Sngdae (Wada Haruki, Kim II Sl!ng-
gwa Manju Hangil chonjatng, Seoul: Ch'angjak-kwa pip'yong sa, 1992, p. 26) . This
information is worthy of attention, since the early 1960s was a time when the
falsification of Kim II Sung's biography had only just begun.
Origiral frcn1
An Attempt at a Biography 51
tian churches and missions. Until recently, the fact that the parents of
Kim II Sung were not just Christians but Christian activists had not
been mentioned by Pyongyang publications, while their contacts with
religious organisations were explained away by an imputed inten-
tion to find a legal cover for their alleged revolutionary activities. The
mother ofKim II Sung, Kang Ban-s0k (1892-1932), was the daughter
of a local Protestant minister. Besides Kim Song-ju, the future Kim
Il Sung, there were two other sons in the family.2
Like the majority of rural intellectuals, the Kim family hardly
managed to make ends meet. According to North Korean histori-
ography, the parents of Kim Il Sung, particularly his father, were
prominent leaders of the national movement. From the late 1960s
onwards, the official propaganda even insisted that Kim Hyong-jik
was the principal figure in the entire anti-colonial resistance. This is
far from being the truth, although the family's attitude to the Japanese
colonial regime was, in all probability, indeed hostile. Some docu-
ments from Japanese archives indicate that in 1917 Kim Hyong-jik
did play a rather active role in an underground nationalist group or-
ganised by the students of his school. Some of his fellow-members
eventually became prominent Communists, although this happened
later. 3 North Korean publications maintain that Kim the elder was
even arrested and spent some time in a Japanese prison, but it is not
clear to what extent this assertion is true.
Apparently, for both political and economic reasons, the parents
of Kim Il Sung, like many other Koreans, moved to Manchuria in
about 1920. There little Kim Song-ju attended a Chinese school. As
a child he mastered Chinese, which he spoke fluently till the end of
his long life: it was said that in his later years his favourite reading
was classic Chinese novels. At some point he returned to Korea to stay
with his grandfather for a while, but soon left his homeland again
to return there only twenty years later. In Manchuria the situation
of the family did not improve and in 1926 Kim Hyong-jik died
2Tne most detailed information on the childhood and the youth of !Gm 11 Sung
and his funily, fieed from the laym of propaganda, is contained in a book by Dae-
Sook Sub, a professor at the University of Hawaii (Dae-Sook Suh, Kim R Sung: The
North Kt>rtan Ltad.,, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Of considenble
interest is a book by Hll Un-bae, published in Japan under the pseudonym Lim On
in the early 1980s (Lim On, The Founding ofa Dytwty in North Korta, Tokyo: Jiyu-sha,
1982). A book by Wada Harulci should also be mentioned: Wada Haruki, Kim RSOng-
guia Mmiju Hangil chonjamg, Seoul: Ch'angjak-kw:i pip'yong sa, 1992, p. 26).
'Wada Harulci, Kim R SOng-guia Manju Hangil chonjamg, p. 28.

52 From Stalin to J(jm II Sung
at the age of thirty-two. Kim SOng-ju was just fourteen years old.•
In Jilin, while a high school student, Kim S<Sng-ju joined an
underground Marxist group, created by a local youth organisation
of the Chinese Communist Party. The group was almost immedi-
ately discovered by the police and the seventeen-year-old Kim, the
youngest ofits members, was imprisoned for several months in 1929.
As could be expected, the official North Korean propaganda main-
tains that he was not just a member but the founder and leader of
the group - an assertion fully disproved by documents. 5 He was
soon released, but his life radically changed: without apparently even
having graduated from school, the young man joined one of many
guerrilla bands then active in Manchuria. He went to fight against
the Japanese and their local collaborators for a world more just than
the one he saw around him. At the time it was a choice made by
many young and honest Chinese and Koreans who refused to adapt
to the occupation regime or make a career and fortune in what they
saw as the world of injustice and repression, both national and so-
cial. It was, however, important that for these young revolutionaries
national goals were often seen as more important than social ones.
After all, the worst acts of social injustice were perpetrated by foreign
exploiters, so the national struggle fused with the social.
The early 1930s were a time when the anti-Japanese movement
was gathering momentum in Manchuria. 6 Among its members and
leaders there were both Koreans and Chinese, people of all political
inclinations, from Communists to extreme nationalists. Young Kim
S<Sng-ju, who since his school years had been connected with the
Communist resistance, joined a Communist guerrilla unit. Not much
is known of this period of his life. According to the official North
Korean propaganda, from the beginning Kim II Sung headed the
Korean People's Revolutionary Army which was said to have been
created by him and which, although maintaining some contacts and
co-ordination with units of the Chinese Communists, on the whole
acted independently. This version has nothing to do with reality. No
Korean People's Revolutionary Army ever existed. This 'Army' was
first mentioned by Korean propaganda in the late 1940s and finally
4 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim fl Sung: ~North Korean uadtr, p. 6.

5 Jbid., p.
7; Wada Haruki, Kim fl SJng·gwo Manju Hangil thonjatng, pp. 41- 2.
"See Chong-sik Lee, Rtvolutionary Strugglt in Manchuria: Chinest Communism
and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945, Berkeley: University of California Pms, 1983.

established itself in the official North Korean historiography a dec-
ade later.7 From the late 1950s onwards, North Korean propaganda
has tried to present Kim Il Sung first of all as a national Korean leader
and thus tried to conceal or downplay his early contacts with China
and the Soviet Union. For instance, the North Korean press never
mentioned his membership in the Chinese Communist Party (from
1932) or his service in the Soviet army during the Second World War.
Around 1935 Kim S~ng-ju also adopted a norn de guerre under
which he was to remain in history - Kim Il Sung. The young guerrilla
must have shown himself to be a good soldier, because his career
progressed fast. In 1935, soon after guerrilla units acting near the
Korean-Chinese border were amalgamated into the second division,
itself part of the United North-Eastern Anti-Japanese Army, Kim II
Sung became the political commissar of the 3rd detachment, about
160 strong. 1\vo years later, the twenty-four-year-old fighter occupied
the post of commander of the 6th division, usually known as the
'division of Kim Il Sung'. The term 'division' should not mislead: in
this case it meant a guerrilla unit numbering, at most, a few hundred
soldiers. Neverthdess, it \\'35 a measure of his success, showing that
the young man had some military talent, as well as leadership skills.8
The best known ofhis operations wz a succes.Wl raid on Poch'onbo,
after which Kim II Sung even acquired some international fame. In
the early morning of 4 June 1937, about 200 people under his com-
mand crossed the Chinese- Korean border and made a sudden attack
on the small town of Poch'onbo. They destroyed a local police post
and some Japanese offices and withdrew after a few hours. Although
modern North Korean propaganda has blown the scale of this opera-
tion out of all proportion, adding it to the activities of the mythical
Korean People's Revolutionary Army, this episode was indeed of
7A detailed analysi.; ofhow N orth Korean propa(?llda invmted the Korean People's
Revolutionary /lmJy is contained in the book by Wada Harulci (Wada Harulci, Kim R
S2lng-gwa Manju Hangil c/Wnjamg, pp. 136-41). There is an amusing fact related to it. In
the second edition of a book by Han C~k. one ofKim ll Sung's early eulogists,
published in 1948, the KPRA is mentioned, but in a supplement containing docmnents
on the guerrilla period of Kim II Sung's life this term W2S not used; at the time.
historical sources were not yet directly falsified. Thus in a special footnote it W2S said:
'The VYOrds the "United Anti-Japanese North-Eastern Army" [units of the Chinese
Communists and nationalises in which Kim U Sung fought) must be read correctly as
the "Korean People's Revolutionary /lmJy" (ibid., p. 137).
80n the career of Kim II Sung see ibid., pp. 112, 14!Hl.

some importance. In the 1930s, the guerrillas ahnost never succeeded
in crossing the strictly guarded Korean-Manchurian border and
penetrating into Korean territory. Following this xaid, the news of
which quickly spread all over Korea, Kim II Sung started being taken
seriously as a military leader. The press wrote about the xaid and its
organiser, while the Japanese police force included him into their
lists of particularly dangerous 'Communist bandits'.
In the late 1930s Kim II Sung met his wife Kim ChCSng-suk. the
daughter of a farmhand from North Korea, who herself had joined
a guerrilla unit at the age of sixteen. It is likely that she was not his
first but his second wife; his alleged first wife, Kim Hyo-sun, had
also fought in his unit but in 1940 she was taken prisoner by the
Japanese. Later, she lived in the DPRK and occupied various middle-
level administrative positions. At this stage it is difficult to say whether
this information about Kim's first marriage is correct. According to
an official version, the first wife was Kim ChCSng-suk, the mother of
Kim ChCSng-il, future heir and successor to Kim II Sung. According
to the recollections ofN.G. Lebedev, who met her in the 1940s, she was
a small, quiet woman, not particularly well educated, but friendly and
life-loving. Kim II Sung lived with her through the most turbulent
decade ofhis life, during which he rose from a commander of a small
guerrilla unit to the ruler of North Korea. 9
By the late 1930s, the situation of the guerrillas had radically
worsened: in 1939-40 significant Japanese forces were concentrated
in Manchuria to suppress the armed resistance. The guerrillas suffered
serious defeats. By then Kim II Sung had already become the
commander of the 2nd operational region of the 1st Army, with the
guerrilla units in the province ofJiandao subordinated to him. His
fighters occasionally managed to inflict considerable damage on the
Japanese, but time worked against them. By late 1940, of all the top
leaders of the 1st Army-the commander, the commissar, the chiefof
staff and the commanders of three operational regions - only Kim II
Sung remained alive, and the Japanese launched a hunt for him. The
situation was becoming desperate. In late 1940, together with a dozen
of his fighters, he fought his way to the north and crossed the frozen
Amur river. His exile in Soviet Union had begun. 10
9Jnterview with N.G. Lebedev, 13 November 1989, Moscow; Dae-Sook Suh,

Kim n Sung: JM North Kore1111 l.Latler, pp. 50-1.
1°N.G. Lebedev recalled that Kim II Sung crossed the border in December
1940 (interview with N.G. Lebedev, 13November1989, Moscow), although some

For a long time there were persistent rumours among specialists in
Korea as well as the Koreans themselves that in the Soviet Union the
Leader was 'substituted'. It was maintained that the 'real' Kim ll Sung,
the hero ofPoch'onbo, was killed or died around 1940, and that an-
other person then assumed his name with Soviet help. These rumours
began spreading in 1945, when Kim Il Sung returned to Korea and his
obvious youth surprised many people. In the South this version be-
came so popular that it even got into American intelligence reports.11
Nevertheless this hypothesis, reminiscent ofnineteenth-century ron1a11tic
novels, could hardly be true, and its support by some South Koreans
in the 1960s and 1970s was largely due to propaganda reasons. There
are people who spent their years of exile with Kim ll Sung. There are
also people who, being responsible for the guerrillas in Soviet territory,
had often met the future Great Leader during the war,12 and these
witnesses also reject this version completely. Finally, the diaries of Zhou
Bao-zhong, Kim's superior both before and after his defection to the
Soviet Union, were recently published in China, and this document
also rejects the 'substitution' theory. A legend about a Korean 'man in
an iron mask' could hardly be considered reliable, but this is not to say
that the natural human tendency to love conspiracy theories and sensa-
tionalism might not still result in some 'breathtaking' new journalistic
revelation in years to come.
Kim's forced defection to the Soviet Union was not unusual.
From the mid-1930s, Manchurian guerrillas often crossed over into
Soviet territory. After 1939, when the Japanese radically increased
the scale of their anti-guerrilla campaign, the exodus of the remnants
of the defeated guerrilla forces to the Soviet Union became massive.13
other sources gave other dates. However, recent Chinese publications confirm thU
date (Wada Haruli, Ki"' n S6ng-gwa M""ju Htmgil ch0njomg, pp. 245, 247).
11 'North Kocea Today, for American Eyes Only (G-2, American Army Forces
in Kocea, August, 1947)' in An Anthology of & ltt:ttd Piem from tht Dttlassifitd Filt of
&mt US Matnia/s in Korea btfort and during tht KorNn War, Seoul: Nation.al Unification
Board, 1981.
l2Jnterview with I.G. Loboda, November 1990, Moscow. l.G. Loboda was a
Soviet jounWist, diplomat and intelligence officer, who had been dealing with the
Far East since the 1940s. During the Second World War he was a political officer in
the Soviet Far East and often visited the 88th Brigade. JnterView with Yu Sllng-ch'lSI,
18January 1991, Tashkent. Yu SlSng-ch'lSI worked in the Soviet intelligence service
in 1941-6, and in 1948-56 was head of operations in the Korean army's General
Staff. Interview with Yu Sllng-ch'lSI, 29 January 1991, Tashkent.
1'B.G. Sapozhnikav, 'lz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi druzhby', Osl'Obozlrdn* Korti,
Moscow: Naulca, 1976, p. 164.

On their arrival the guerrillas were submitted to security checks. If
they passed the checks well, their Jives could take very different routes.
Some joined the Red Army, some were recruited by Soviet intelligence
services, some were found suspicious and sent into prison camps,
while others, having adopted Soviet citizenship, lived ordinary lives
as peasants or, rarely, as workers. Like others, Kim and his soldiers were
for some time interned in a 'filtration' (investigation) camp. However,
Kim's name had already become known, at least to those who 'had
to know', so the security check did not last long. According to G.K.
Plotnikov, Kim received some training at the Khabarovsk infantry
officer school where he studied until the spring of 1942; however,
no other source has confirmed this fact so far. It was the tint time in
a decade of wandering, hunger and exhaustion that he could rest and
feel safe. His life went well. In February 1942 (according to some
sources, in February 1941) Kim Ch<Sng-suk gave birth to a son who
received a Rwmn name, Yura, a short form ofYuri. He was to become
the 'Dear Ruler, the Great Successor of the Chuch'e Revolutionary
Course, Marshal Kim Ch<Sng-il'. 14
In the summer of 1942 the Soviet military decided to form a
special unit from the former Manchurian guerrillas. This was the
88th Independent Brigade, which was located in the village ofViatsk
(Viatskoe) near Khabarovsk. The young captain of the Soviet army
Kim 11 Sung (who in those days was more often called Jin Ri-cheng,
according to the Chinese pronunciation of his name's characters) was
sent to this unit. Zhou Bao-zhong, a prominent Manchurian guerrilla
leader, by then a lieutenant-colonel in the Red Army, became the
commander of the brigade. He was assisted, advised and, one might
presume, also controlled by~ Soviet officers. The brigade consisted
mostly ofChinese, so training was conducted in Chinese. The brigade
contained four battalions, a total, according to different estimates, of
1,000 to 1,700people, ofwhomabout200-300were Soviet personnel
attached to the brigade as instructors and ideological indoctrinators.
Korean guerrillas, most of whom had fought under the command
+nus account of the service of Kim II Sung in the Soviet army is based on the
1
present author's interviews with Yu SOng-ch·111, who himself served in the 88th
Brigade; l.G. Loboda, who during the war was responsible for political work in the
88th Brigade; and G.K. Plotnikov, who once worked with documents of the 88th
Brigade, now iru;cccssible to researches. But see also Sydney Seiler (transl.) Kim ll-
Sung, 1941-1948:1Ma"2lion ofa kgmd, tM building ofa irgime,Lanlum, MD: Unil'mity
PtrJs ofAmnit4, 1994.

ofKim 11 Sung in the 1930s, served in Kim's first battalion. According
to the estimations of Wada Haruki, the battalion had a strength of
between 140 and 180 (much smaller then a 'normal' Red Artrrf batt:ilion
was supposed to be). 15
The life ofa military unit located far behind the fiont line during
the war was monotonous and fairly difficult. & is clear fiom the
evidence ofpeople who served with Kim II Sung at the time or had
access to the materials ofthe 88th Brigade, it was not a special-purpose
unit despite its specific contingent. In its weapons, organisation and
training, it did not differ fiom the ordinary units of the Soviet army.
Yet fiom time to time some servicemen fiom this brigade were selected
to carry out v:lrious intelligence and sabotage operations in Manchuria
and Korea. The training for these operations was not conducted in
Viatsk and Kim ll Sung hinuelf during the war never left his brigade,
nor was he ever in Manchuria or Korea. 16
Kim II Sung, who had been involved in action since he was
eighteen, seemed to have liked the difficult and dangerous but orderly
life of a professional officer; it seems that he was satisfied with his new
position and that his superiors did not complain about him. During
their life in Viatsk, Kim II Sung and Kim Chong-suk had two more
children: a son named Shura (short for Alexander) and a daughter.
Children were given Russian names, which might indicate that at
the time a return to Korea did not look very likely to Ki.m and his
wife. According to eyewitnesses, Kim had a clear vision ofhis future:
service in the army, a military academy. then command of a regiment
or maybe even a division. Had history taken a different turn, Kim II
Sung, as a retired colonel or major-general of the Red Army, might
have lived out his days in Moscow, with his son Yuri working in
some Moscow research institute and in the late 1980s participating
enthusiastically in the pro-democracy rallies.
The 88th Brigade did not take part in the short campaign against
Japan so one must reject the fables of North Korean historiography,
which predictably insists that Kim II Sung personally fought for the
liberation of the country and even made a decisive contribution to
it. Soon after the end of the war the 88th Brigade was disbanded and
15For the estimates based on the memoin of the Chinese soldien who served
there sec ~da Haruki, Kim R SOng-gwo Manju Hangil cMnjaeng, pp. 271, 277.
161nterview with G.K. Plotnikov, 1 February 1990. G.K. Plotni.kov was a Soviet
officer and historian, specialis.ing in the military a.spect of the Korean problem.
lntcrvi~ with Yu SISng-ch'ISI, 18 and 29 January 1991, Ta.shlcent.

its soldiers and officers received new appoinnnents. Most of them
were sent to the Soviet-controlled cities of Manchuria and Korea
to become the aides of the Soviet kommendant (a military officer
responsible for order in a certain district under military control). Their
main mission was to maintain reliable communications between the
Soviet military authorities and the local population. The largest Korean
city then under Soviet control was Pyongyang, and logically Kim II
Sung, who had the highest nnk among the Koreans of the 88th
Brigade, was appointed deputy kommendant of the future North
Korean capital, and went there together with some soldiers of his
battalion. A first attempt to reach Korea by land ended in failure as
a railway bridge on the Chinese-Korean border was damaged, but
in late September 1945 Kim arrived in Korea aboard the steamship
Pugachev via Vladivostok and Wonsan. 17 Recently, it has been reported
in the South Korean press that the role of Kirn II Sung as the future
national leader had been determined before his departure for Korea
during his meeting with Stalin which supposedly took place in early
September 1945. Though not entirely impossible, these assertions
look very doubtful. It is probable that atthe moment ofKim II Sung's
arrival in Pyongyang neither he nor those around him had any
particular plans for his future.
However, the arrival ofKirn ll Sung was timely. As we remember
from Chapter 1, by the end ofSeptember, the Soviet command had
realised that its initial attempts to rely on the local nationalists headed
by Cho Man-sik were doomed to failure. In early October the Soviet
military and political leadership started to look for a figure who
could head the emerging regime. Due to the general weakness of
the Communist movement in the North, it was impossible to rely
on local Communists: there was hardly anybody among them who
enjoyed any popularity in the country (see Chapters 1 and 3). In this
situation a young officer of the Soviet army, whose guerrilla past was
relatively well known in Korea, appeared to be the best candidate
for the still-vacant post of 'leader of the North Korean progressive
forces' . A few days after his arrival in Korea Kim II Sung was invited
(or rather ordered) to deliver a short greeting at a pompous rally to
honour the 'Liberating Soviet Army' (14 October). His appearance
at the rally was the first sign ofhis political ascent. Several days earlier,
he was included in the North Korean Bureau of the Communist
Party of Korea, although at the time he was not yet the formal leader
17 Interview with Yu S<Sng-ch'CSI, 29 January 1991, Tashkent.

AnAttnnpt at a Biogmplry 59
of the Communists in the North. Another step to power was his
appointment as chairman of the North Korean Bureau of the Com-
munist Party of Korea in December 1945; then in February 1946
the Soviet authorities made him head of the North Korean Provi-
sional People's Committee, the country's provisional government (for
North Korean state building in 1945-8 see Chapter 1).
Thus in early 1946 Kim II Sung formally became ruler of North
Korea. Although in retrospect much has been said about his cunning
and ambitions, V.V. Kovyzhenko, who often met Kim in late 1945 and
1946, insists that he was rather frustrated by the turn of events and
took his political appointment without much enthusiasm. At the time
Kim II Sung might have preferred a career as a Soviet army officer
to the strange and complicated life of a politician. V.V. Kovyzhenko,
then head of the 7th Department of the political administration of
the 25th Army, who often met Kim, says: 'I remember very well when
I visited Kim II Sung after he was invited to become the head of the
people's committees. He was very frustrated and told me: ~·1 want (to
command] a regiment and then - a division. What is this for? I don't
understand anything and don't want to do this"' 18
Thus Kim II Sung found himself at the top ofthe power structure
in North Korea almost by accident. Had he arrived in Pyongyang a
few weeks later or been sent to another large city. his fate would have
been different. However, in 1946 and even in 1949 he was hardly the
real ruler of Korea. The Soviet military authorities and the apparatus
of advisers had a decisive influence on the life of the country, and in
the first years of the DPRK Kim was only nominally ruler.
Like most North Korean leaders, Kim II Sung, with his wife and
children, settled in the centre of Pyongyang, in one of the small villas
which had earlier belonged to Japanese administrators. His first years
there were overshadowed by two personal tragedies: in the summer
oft 947 his second son Shura drowned in a pond in the courtyard of
his house, and then in September 1949 his wife Kim Ch6ng-suk died
due to complications in childbirth. Throughout his life he retained
warm memories of her, and according to eyewitnesses was badly
affected by both bereavements. 19
However, the turbulent events unfolding around Kim II Sung
did not leave much time for mourning. The main problems during
the first years of the DPRK's existence were the split of the country
11Inrerview with V.V. Kovyzhenko, 2August1991, Moscow.

191nterview with Kang Sang-ho, 30 November t 989, Leningrad.

60 From St41in to Kim ll Sung
and the factious rivalry inside the North Korean leadership. According
to the decision of the Potsdam conference, Korea was partitioned
along the 38th Parallel between the Soviets and Americans. Initially
the division was considered a provisional measure, but on the ground
the gap between the two Koreas was widening fast. While in the
North a pro-Soviet regime was established, the Americans brought
to power the government of Syngman Rhee in the South. Both
Pyongyang and Seoul claimed to be the only legitimate force on
the Korean peninsula, which led to an increase oftension and armed
conflicts on the division line. A war became imminent The final decision
was apparently taken in the spring of 1950 during a visit of Kim II
Sung to Moscow, where he met Stalin. Before this visit, long secret
discussions had taken place in Moscow.
It appears that Kim II Sung was not the most decisive supporter
of a military solution to the Korean problem. The leaders of the
South Korean Communist underground headed by Pak Hon-yong
were prone to overestimate the left-wing sympathies of the South
Korean population, so they too were very active in advocating the
military plans, insisting that the South would collaps~ after the first
attack by the Northern armies. This conviction ran so deep that a
prepared plan of attack, according to Yu Song-ch'ol, one of its co-
authors, did not envisage the continuation of military operations
after the fall ofSeoul - they were deemed unnecessary.20 Kim Il Sung
took an active part in the preparation for the war and kept petitioning
the Kremlin for permission to attack. 21 From 1945 onwards he had
paid particular attention to the development of the armed forces,
arguing that the army could become the most powerful instrument
ofnational unification, but his interest in a military solution may have
been greatly reinforced by the fact that the armed forces were his
major power-base. His exclusively military experience was also likely
20Interviews with Yu SISng-ch'ISl,18 and 29January 1991, Tashkent. This sounds

a bit strange and even doubtful, since the Soviet genel'21s who were drawing up the
opetational plan hardly paid any attention to political wishful thinking. Ne1>ertheless,
eYen ifYu SISng-ch'ISl's memory is faulty in this particular case, it may still be indicative
of the general mood in the North Korean headquarters, where few if any generals
anticipated a prolonged war after the capture of Seoul.
210n 12 August 1949 Kim II Sung and Pale HISn-ylSng met the then Soviet
ambassador Shtykov and asked for permission to attack. On 24 September Stalin

rejected the plan on the grounds that such an attack would be too rislcy. (Decisions of
the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions, decision of24 September 1949. A
copy of the document is in a private collection.)

An Attempt al a Biography 61
to have led him to overestimate the effectiveness ofmilitary force in
politics.
Early in 1950 Stalin, having given up his opposition, somewhat
reluctantly sanctioned the attack, and on 25 June 1950 the Korean
war began with a sudden attack by North Korean troops. The next
day. on 26 June, Kim ll Sung made a radio appeal to the North Korean
people in which he accused the South of aggression and reEorted a
successful 'counter-offensive' by the North Korean forces.
For a while the North was victorious. Although the expected
general uprising in the South failed to materialise, the South Korean
army fought without much zeal. On the third day of the war Seoul
fell to the Communist divisions, and by late August 1950 more than
90% of the country's territory was under the control of the North.
Victory seemed to be very close. However, an American decision to
intervene and the landing of their troops in Inch' on, some thirty
miles from Seoul and far to the rear of the advancing North Korean
troops, radically changed the situation. The North Korean troops
had to retreat in great disarray and by November the situation was
the complete opposite ofwhat it had been: it was now the American
and South Korean troops who controlled about 90% of the country.
Kim ll Sung and his headquarters were driven to the mountains on
the Korean-Chinese border. On his insistence, and with the blessing
of the Soviet leadership, Chinese troops entered the territory of
North Korea, and pushed the Americans back to the 38th Parallel.
By the spring of 1951 the warring armies found themselves roughly
in the positions from which they had started the conflict, and engaged
in trench warfare.
In late 1950 Kim 11 Sung returned to the destroyed capital.
American planes regularly bombed Pyongyang, and the city was
reduced to ruins, but the government found safety in huge under-
ground bunkers: their complicated network was carved out of the
rocks below Morangbong hill. Although bloody trench w.ufare lasted
for two more years, the role of the North Korean troops was modest
and limited mainly to operations of secondary importance. They
generally acted as auxiliaries, securing communications and guarding
the rear lines. The main military burden was carried by China: since
the winter oft 950-1 , the war had acquired the character ofan Ameri-
can-Chinese conflict fought out on Korean territory. However, the
22KUn II Sung, Sochineniia, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House,

198(}...95, vol. S, pp. 9-17.

Chinese seldom ifever interfered in the internal politics ofthe DPRK.
Thus in a way the war untied the hands of Kim II Sung, since it
significantly weakened Soviet influence in the country.
By then Kim had apparently fully come to terms with his new
role as the country's supreme leader, and was steadily turning into a
shrewd and highly ambitious politician. As to the specifics of his
political style, it was marked by notable skill in manoeuvring and
an uncanny ability to exploit contradictions between his enemies, as
well as his friends. He often showed himself a master of political
intrigue, and a skilled tactician. His weaknesses were determined by
an obvious lack of general education; he hardly ever had time for
serious study and probably drew most of his social and economic
views from the traditions of Korean society or the political instruction
sessions he had attended in the guerrilla units and in the 88th Brigade.
As a result, he knew how to take and reinforce his power, but often
did not know how to use the opportunities it gave him.
ln the early 1950s Kim II Sung faced a task which required his
excellent skills in manoeuvring: the annihilation of factions in the
North Korean leadership. The four main ones - domestic, Soviet,
Yanan and guerrilla - had secretly intrigued against each other for
years, even when their rivalry was strongly discoura~ed by the Soviet
supervisors. The only route to absolute power for Kim lay in the
elimination of all factions except his own, and in casting off both
Soviet and Chinese control. In the 1950s he devoted all his efforts to
achieving this dual goal.
In the course of this struggle, Kim 0 Sung showed himselfa skilful
and cunning politician, who knew how to exploit the differences
between his enemies. The means by which the factions were eliminated
in the 1950s are analysed in Chapters 3 and 4, so we do not need to
dwell on this problem here. Suffice it to say that in 1953--5 a first
attack was undertaken against the domestic faction. In 1957-8 it
was the turn of the Yanan faction; while this conflict was in progress
in September 1956 a joint Soviet-Chinese delegation arrived in
Pyongyang, and it threatened to depose Kim 11 Sung if he did not
meet their demands to rehabilitate the suppressed cadres. Although
the concessions which Kim made under this pressure were only
temporary, this episode remained in his memory for a long time,
and later he often related it to foreign delegations visiting Pyongyang.
He could not be satisfied with his position as a puppet who could at
any time be removed from the scene by an omnipotent puppet-master:
from the mid-1950s he started cautiously but confidently distancing

himself from his one-time patrons. Finally the ITlaM purge of1957-62,
though not so bloody as Stalin's Great Purge of1937 as victims were
often allowed to leave the country, led to the complete destruction
of the once influential Soviet and Yanan factions. By the early 1960s
Kim 11 Sung had become not only supreme, but also the omnipotent
ruler of North Korea, - no longer merely 'first among equals', as had
been the case in the late 1940s.
During the first post-war period the North Korean economy
achieved impressive successes. Not only was the damage inflicted by
the war restored, but the country achieved rapid progress. A key role
was played by aid from the Soviet Union and China. According to
some South Korean estimates, Soviet aid to the DPRK over the
years 1945-70 amounted to US$1,146 million (US$364 million in
credits on very favourable terms, and USS782 million in grants),
while Chinese aid came to US$541 million (US$436 million in
favourable credits and USS105 million in grants). 23 These figures
might be questioned, but the assistance was undoubtedly very
considerable. In addition to this direct aid, the Soviet Union and
China also provided many kinds of indirect economic support. For
example, they sold valuable commodities like oil or gas at artificially
low prices, and sometimes agreed to be paid in low-quality North
Korean products which would otherwise have been unsaleable on
the international market. They were also ready to be 'patient' and
wait for years until North Korea could pay off even these dis-
counted sums. The Soviet Union and, to a less extent, China also
contributed in the training and education of a skilled workforce
and provided Pyongyang with necessary technologies, often at no
cost. The weapons and military technologies were also normally
provided at huge discounts. This aid, combined with the efforts of
the North Korean people, helped secure economic success. There
was no North Korean 'economic miracle', but the achievements of
the late 1950s were impressive. For some time the economy of North
Korea left that of the capitalist South far behind. Only in about 1970
:u-rbe amount of Soviet and Chinese assistance to the DPRK is difficult to

calculate in dollan, not least because of the artificial narure of prices used in a siate
socialist economy. The quoted estimates in US dollan are from l'Mkhan 40 nyMi,
Seoul: Oryu rnunhwa sa, 1988, p. 460. N. Bazhanov:a calculates that by 1972 the total
amount of Soviet credits to the DPRK had reached 567.12 million roubles. If one
uses an official (arti6cially low) rouble to dollar exchange rate, the amount in US
currency is indeed around USSl billion. N.Ye. Bazhanova, Vnahnmlonomidttskit svUizi
KNDR: V poislt4h vylwda iz tupika, Moscow: Vostochnaia liteatura, 1993, p. 16.
01g1tlz•dby Google Onginal fron1

64 From St4/in to /(jm n Sung
did South Korea manage to overtake North Korea in the economic
field.
However, the international environment was seriously changed
by the Sino-Soviet conflict. The strife between the two Communist
giants played an ambiguous role in the biography ofKim Il Sung and
in the history of the country in general. On the one hand it created
difficulties for the North Korean economy, which greatly depended
on foreign assistance, but it also helped Kim II Sung to free himself
fiom Soviet and Chinese control while still retaining many institutions
ofSoviet and Chinese origin. However, the opportunities obtained
through this newly-found independence were mostly used by him
to increase his personal power. One can speculate that ifNorth Korea
had remained in the Soviet zone of influence after de-Stalinisation
(in other words, if it had followed the path taken by, say, Hungary
or Mongolia) it would be a less repressive and economically more
successful society. But for the strife between Moscow and Peking in
the late 1950s, Kim II Sung could hardly have achieved his godlike
status.
Despite the noisy assertions of North Korean propaganda, the
dependence of the North Korean economy on the Soviet Union
and China was never really overcome. Kim II Sung had to establish
his independent policy by taking advantage of the differences between
Moscow and Peking, but he also had to make sure that they would
not terminate their vital economic and military aid. At first Kim was
more willing to make an alliance with China: the cultures of the
two countries have many similarities, Korean revolutionaries had
maintained close contacts with the Chinese leadership for decades,
and, last but not least, Kim was not enthusiastic about Soviet de-
Stalinisation. By the late 1950s, economic management in the DPRK
was increasingly employing Chinese methods. Following the Chinese
'great leap forward', the DPRK launched the Ch'onlima movement
which was a Korean imitation of the now notorious Chinese model.
At that time, the key Chinese slogan of'relying on own strength' (Kor.
Charyok kaengseang) was taken up in Korea. The influence of Mao's
China was also very noticeable in North Korean ideology and culture
of the 1960s and 1970s.
At first the North Korean press did not mention the Soviet-
Chinese conflict, and Korean delegations of all levels continued to
visit both Moscow and Peking. In July 1961, in Peking, Kim II Sung
and Zhou En-lai signed a treaty of friendship, co- operation and
mutual assistance, which is still in force today, and this strengthened

the alliance between the two countries. A week earlier a similar treaty
was signed with the Soviet Union and both treaties went into effect
simultaneously.24
After 1962, however, the DPRK began its drift toward Peking.
The North Korean media ceased to cite Soviet examples. In 1962-4,
following the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, where
open criticism was directed against Chinese leaders, the rapprochement
between the DPRK and China accelerated. For a few years North
Korea almost unconditionally supported the Chinese position on
all important issues. The main source of the conflict between the
Soviet Union and North Korea was that the KWP leadership (that
is, Kim II Sung) could not support the new ideological principles,
such as the denunciation of Stalin and his personality cult, the
introduction ofthe principle ofcollective leadership, and the theory
of peaceful coexistence. The latter was perceived by Kim as a sign of
capitulation before the imperialist enemy, while criticism ofStalin's
unlimited power threatered his own unlimited power. During these
years Nodong sinmun, an official daily newspaper, often published
articles in support of the Chinese position on various issues. For
example, in October 1963 an unusually long editorial in Nodong sinmun,
entitled 'Let's Defend the Socialist Camp', contained unprecedently
sharp criticism of the Soviet position towards China. In this article
the Soviet Union was accused of using its economic and military
power as a means ofputting political pressure on the DPRK. On 27
January 1964 Nodong sinmun denounced 'one person' (hinting at
Khrushchev) who was arguing for peaceful coexistence. On 15
August the same year an editorial expressed solidarity with the Chinese
Communist Party which was opposing a planned world convention
of Communist parties. For the first time this article contained direct
criticism of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communists, rather
than just the usual hints. The North Korean leadership unconditionally
supported China during the Indian-Chinese border conflict in 1962
and denounced the 'capitulation' of the Soviet Union during the
Caribbean missile crisis.25 The Chinese ideological idiom was widely
used in North Korea, and many Chinese patterns were emulated by
2AJ<.im H.ak-chun, PWiMn 50 nyJn S4, Seoul: Tonga ch'ulp'ansa, 1995, pp. 213-15.
25An old but 5tilluseful account of the split between North Korea and the Soviet
Union in the early 1960s can be found in Chin 0 . Chung, P'yongyang ~- ~/ting
and MOSCD1V: Nortlo K~a~ inllOMntml in IMSi,,,,..Sovi<t Dispute, 195~1975, Tuscaloosa:
Univenity ofAlabama ?=1, 1978.

Pyongyang (more often than not, without explicit reference to their
'outside' origins).
The Soviet Union's response was predictable and reasonable: it
cut off its aid to the DPRK, and did so very radically. This measure
brought some North Korean industries to the brink of collapse and
greatly damaged the country's military capabilities (the air force proved
to be particularly vulnerable). For a briefwhile, Kim might have hoped
that Chinese aid would take the place of the lost Soviet assistance,
but it soon became clear that China was neither able nor willing to
provide the necessary amount of support. Besides, after 1965 the
'Cultural Revolution' in China also led the North Korean leadership
to reconsider its position. The chaos this provoked intimidated the
North Korean elite who were striving for stability. In addition, some
Red Guard publications in China attacked North Korean domestic
and foreign policy as well as Kim II Sung personally. In December 1964
Nodong sinmun for the first time criticised Chinese 'dogmatism' (since
then a code word for Mao's reckless experiments). On 15 September
1966 the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China was also attacked
in a slightly veiled fashion as the cause of'left-wing opportunism' and
for some re:l!.on as the manifestation of the 'Trotskyist theory of a
permanent revolution'. 26
In February 1965 a Soviet delegation headed by then Soviet prime
minister A.N. Kosygin visited Pyongyang. This was a major turning-
point, and from 1965 onwards the North Korean leadership turned
away from a pro-Peking orientation and maintained strict neutrality
in the Soviet-Chinese conflict. The endless manoeuvres ofPyongyang
often irritated Moscow or Peking or both, but Kim II Sung generally
succeeded in conducting his policy in such a way that it never resulted
in the termination of vital economic and military aid from either
sponsor. The new status ofNorth Korean-Chinese relations, an alliance
which was combined with the DPRK's strict neutrality in the Sino-
Soviet conflict, was emphasised during a visit to the DPRK in April
1970 of Zhou En-Jai who, remarkably, chose North Korea for his first
foreign visit after the tumult of the Cultural Revolution. Throughout
the 1970s and 1980s China was the DPRK's second most important
trading partner after the Soviet Union, and its share of North Korean
foreign trade fluctuated between 15 per cent and 25 per cent.27
26 Ibid.
27N.Ye. Bazhanova, Vneshneekonomichtskie sviazi KNDR: V poiskah vyhoda iz

tupiJul, p. 135.

An Attonpt at a Biography 67
Thus from the late 1950s to the early 1960s there were considerable
changes in North Korea: Soviet models were partly abandoned in
favour ofsome specifically North Korean methods and cultural and
mor21 values. Even where the Soviet patterns were retained - as
often happened - they were invariably presented as indigenous. The
changes found their expression in the promotion of chuch'e ideas, and
an emphasis on the superiority of all things Korean over all things
foreign. The term chuch'e was used by Kim for the first time in his
speech 'On the Uprooting ofDogmatism and Formalism in Ideological
Work and the Establishing ofChuch'e', delivered on 28 December
1955, although later the official propaganda maintained that chuch'e
was first worked out by the Leader in the late 1920s. It was not long
before documents in support of this theory began to appear. After
1968 several speeches, supposedly made by Kim 11 Sung in his guerrilla
youth, and all containing the word 'chuch'e', were published. Since the
late 1960s, the North Korean propaganda has underlined the superiority
of truly Korean chuch'e ideas (sometimes called 'kimilsungism') over
Marxism and all other foreign ideologies. Chuch'e, with its stress on
nationalism and Korean superiority, was first of all of practical
importance for Kim since it allowed him to free himself from foreign
- i.e. Chinese and Soviet-influences. It is also likely that the ambitious
Kim, who had long been living among constant eulogies, enjoyed
the notion of himself as a world-class theoretician and philosopher.
In the late 1960s, distancing the country from the Soviet Union
was complemented by increasing aggressiveness toward South Korea.
Kim II Sung had apparently been much impressed by the spectacular
victories of the South Vietnamese guerrillas, so he decided to launch
in the South a guerrilla movement of the Vietnamese type. Until
the mid-1960s, such intentions had been checked by Moscow, but
later the Soviet position was declared 'revisionist'. Kim and his advisers
did not realise that South Korea was quite different from South
Vietnam and that the population of the South was not ready to fight
its own government. In the mid-1960s, the large rallies in the South
under pro-democracy slogans were mistakenly perceived by Pyongyang
as a sign of South Korean internal weakness. Again, as in the late
1940s, when the plans for an attack on the South had been prepared,
the North Korean leadership confused their own hopes and dreams
with reality.
In 1967 the North Korean secret services set out to destabilise
the Seoul government. As had happened two decades earlier, 'guerrilla'
groups trained in the North were sent to South Korea. The largest

incident of this sort was on 21 January 1968, when a group of thirty-
two North Korean commandos attempted to storm the Blue House,
the official residence of the South Korean president. The attack was
unsuccessful, and almost all the North Korean commandos were
killed. Simultaneously Kim II Sung (possibly, influenced by Chinese
militantly anti-American rhetoric) caused a crisis in relations with the
United States. On 23 January 1968, just two days after the failed attack
on the Blue House, Korean ships seized the American intelligence-
gathering ship Pueblo in international waters. American diplomacy
had just managed to solve this problem - the negotiations ending in
the release of the crew lasted almost a year - when on 15 April 1969,
on the birthday of the Great Leader, North Korean fighters shot
down an American reconnaissance plane EC-121, killing its crew. 28
Earlier, in October-November 1968, about 120 members of the
North Korean special forces undertook their biggest intrusion into
the South. There is little doubt that Kim II Sung endorsed, if not
initiated this hard-line stance.
However, by the early 1970s it became clear that North Korean
policy was not welcomed by the South Koreans, and the realisation
of this fact resulted in a series ofsecret negotiations with Seoul. The
major - and at the time sensational - outcome of these consultations
was the Joint Declaration of 1972, signed by representatives of both
Korean governments. This document laid the foundations for contacts
between the two governments.
However, the DPRK did not altogether abandon military methods
in dealing with its neighbour and enemy. Its special services continued
terrorist actions aimed at destabilising the South. On 9 October 1983
three North Korean agents planted an explosive device in Rangoon,
the Burmese capital, in an attempt to blow up a visiting South Korean
delegation headed by the then President Chon Du-hwan. The President
survived, but seventeen members of the delegation, including the
foreign minister and the deputy minister of foreign trade, were killed
and fifteen were wounded. The assassins were soon arrested. In
November 1987 North Korean agents blew up a South Korean plane
over the Indian Ocean, again near Burma. One agent committed
suicide, while his female partner Kim Hyon-hw was arrested. The
motive of this act was simple: by sabotaging the South Korean aircraft
Pyongyang hoped to prevent foreign tourists from coming to the
Olympic games in Seoul. The rapid economic development of the
28Kim Hak-chun, Puklum 50 nyiin sa, pp. 249-57.

An Atttmpt at a Biography 69
South, which had by then left the North far behind, proved a serious
challenge for the North Korean leadership. By the end of Kim 11
Sung's rule, the contrast between the two Koreas in the living
standards and the degree ofpolitical freedom was plain for all to see.
South Korea was a success story, while the North had become the
very embodiment of failure. It could only be guessed to what extent
Kim 11 Sung himself appreciated the degree of backwardness of his
realm.
In the 1960s serious changes were implemented in the North
Korean economy. In industry the 'Taean' system of management
was established. This system, named after the plant where it was first
introduced, ignored material incentives and emphasised ideological
indoctrination and militaristic discipline. The economy was milita-
rised, central planning was taken to extremes{ and whole industries
were reorganised on a military pattern (for instance, miners were
divided into detachments, companies and battalions, and given military
ranks). Similar reforms were introduced in agriculture, where they
were usually called the 'Ch'6ngsanl-ri' method after a small village
near Pyongyang in which Kim 11 Sung in February 1960 spent fifteen
days 'guiding the work' of a local co-operative. Private kitchen gar-
dens and markets were declared to be a 'legacy of the feudal and
capitalist past' and abolished. Self-sufficiency and 'the revolutionary
spirit of reliance on one's own resources' were declared to be the basic
principles of economic policy, of which the ideal should be the full
autarchy of a production unit. somewhat akin to the autarchy of a
guerrilla detachment in Kim's early days.29 We can only guess to what
extent the personal experiences of Kim and his guerrilla past con-
tributed to these developments, but there is little doubt that harsh
discipline, sacrifice and autarchy as the solution to all problems found
a very positive response among the former guerrilla fighters.
However, all these changes did not lead to any improvement in
the economic situation. On the contrary, the economic successes of
the first post-war years, achieved largely due to massive Soviet and
Chinese aid, were now succeeded by failures. The system established
in the DPRK after Kim 11 Sung had concentrated all power in his
own hands turned out to be much less efficient than that imposed
on the country from abroad in the late 1940s. This was a further
manifestation of Kim's major weakness: he had always been strong
in tactics, but not in strategy - in power struggles, but not in the
29Ibid., pp. 20~.

management of his country. His victories far too often became his
failures. Beginning in the early 1980s, the DPRK economy fell into
stagnation, growth ceased, and living standards, which had never
been more than modest, started to drop even further. Because of the
total secrecy surrounding economic statistics in the DPRK, one cannot
assess the dynamics of economic development. Most South Korean
experts believe that although in the 1970s the tempo of economic
development significantly decreased, on the whole the economy
continued to grow. 30 Meanwhile, some well-informed Soviet specialists
have told the author in private conversations that economic growth
in North Korea had stopped by 1980 or soon afterwards. In the early
1990s industrial production had declined to such an extent that it
had to be officially acknowledged by North Korean propaganda.
In this situation, ~tability could only be maintained in North
Korean society by means of strict controls over the population to-
gether with massive ideological brain-washing. A special role is played
by the self-imposed information blockade - total isolation ofthe popu-
lace from any unsanctioned overseas information. Judged according
to the scale of the activities of repressive organs and the extent of
ideological control, the regime established by Kim Il Sung (and
now run by his son) has no equal in today's world. Once all power
in the country was safely in his hands, Kim 11 Sung embarked on an
unprecedented campaign ofself-glorification. Since 1962 the North
Korean authorities have always reported that 100 per cent of regis-
tered voters participated in the elections and that all 100 per cent
voted for the official candidates. After 1972, when Kim 11 Sung's
sixtieth birthday was celebrated with great pomp and ceremony, the
deification of the 'Great Leader, the Sun of the Nation, the Iron All-
Victorious General, the Marshal of the Mighty Republic' reached
unprecedented heights. While earlier his personal cult had not on
the whole differed much from that ofStalin in the Soviet Union or
Mao in China, after 1972 he became the most praised leader in the
modern world. All North Korean adults were obliged to carry on
their clothes badges with his portrait, while the same portraits were
to be found in all houses and offices, and even in the metropolitan
railway carriages and buses. Monuments to Kim and his relatives were
erected throughout the country. In 1974 his birthday was turned into
the main national holiday.
According to official propaganda, 'burning loyalty to the Leader'
30Pukha11ch'o11glam, Seoul: Pukhan y6nguso, 1983, p. 294.

(Kor. pul-gwa kat'un ch'ungsong) was supposed to be the main char-
acteristic ofany Korean. Pyongyang social scientists have even worked
out a special academic discipline called suryonggwan (which can be
loosely translated as 'leaderology'). This particular branch of the social
sciences specialises in studying the special role of the leader in history:
'The masses of the people without a leader and his guidance could
not become true subjects in the historical process or play a creative
role in history. Loyalty to the Party, a class attitude and democraticism,
inherent in Communists, receive their highest expression in the love
of, and loyalty to, the leader. Being loyal to the leader means to
understand that the decisive role belo~ to the leader, to strengthen
his importance, to believe him in any situation and to follow him
without hesitation'. 31 Now the remarkable scholarly achievements
of Pyongyang 'leaderologists' are applied to Kim II Sung's son, Kim
Ch~ng-il.
Not much is known about the personal life ofKim II Sung after
the late 1950s. He distanced himself more and more from foreigners
as well as from most other Koreans. The days when he could call in
at the Soviet embassy just to play billiards had long gone. Evidently
the North Korean elite knew something about the personal life of
the Great Leader, but they are not inclined to share this information
with foreign journalists or academics. South Korean propaganda
spread reports portraying the leader of North Korea in an extremely
unfavourable light, but, while they often contain the truth, they should
still be treated with caution.
In his later years Kim 11 Sung had an ostentatious palace on the
outsk.its ofthe capital, more luxurious than those of Arab oil sheikhs
(after his death in 1994, it became his memorial), as well as splendid
residences around the country. However, a luxurious train carrying
the Great Leader - he hated flying and preferred the railway even
when travelling abroad - was frequently seen around the country as
Kim, accompanied by numerous bodyguards, visited factories, villages,
offices, military units and schools. He did not stop travelling even after
reaching the age of eighty. Until his death, Kim was in good shape,
and a whole research institute - the so-called Institute of Longevity,
located in Py0ngyang - dealt exclusively with the health of the
Great Leader and his family, while a special group was responsible
for buying high-quality food abroad for their consumption. One of
the important tasks oflocal Party bodies was to select young women
3! Ch'6/halt, Pyongyang: Kim II Sung chonglup taehak, 1983. pp. 261, 275.

to serve in the Great Leader's residence - South Korean p~paganda
often represented them as a harem for the Leader and his son, but
this was not necessarily the case. 32
Kim 11 Sung was surrounded by the people he trusted most - his
former guerrilla comrades-in-arms. The political prominence of the
former independence fighters allowed the Japanese historian Wada
Haruki to call North Korea in Kim's last years a 'guerrilla state'. 33
Indeed, the KWP Central Committee elected at the Party's 6th and
most recent congress in 1980- Kim II Sung, like Stalin, did not bother
to call Party congresses regularly - included twenty-eight former
guerrillas. In the 1980 Politburo, twelve former guerrillas formed a
majority. However, by 1994 not many of them were still alive or, if
alive, in good health. Their place was gradually taken by their children,
and thus the North Korean elite acquired a closed and hereditary
character. The trend toward gradual restriction of upward social
mobility existed in most Communist countries, but in this quality
North Korea stands out. From the late 1980s onwards, a high (and
increasing) proportion of North Korean high officials have been
sons of high officials. ·
A particular role in DPRK politics was played by North Korean
'royalty', Kim II Sung's own clan. In the 1960s he began actively
32
An account of the activities of this institute is given in the memoirs of Ko
YlSng-hw.m, a one-time counsellor at the North Korean embassy in Congo, who
defected to the South (Ko YlSng-hw.m, P'yimgyang-ui 25 sigan, Seoul: KorylSwlSn,
1992, pp. 111-123). Some other defectors also confirm its existence.
~is known about the so-called "'.Joy" Group' (Kor. 'Kippum' cho) - a staff of
female servants ofKim II Sung and Kim ChlSng-il. The group is often mentioned by
defectors and there is no reason to doubt its exi5tence. Local party bodies regularly
selected young, good-looking and politically reliable girls for this group. Officially
they all receiYeed military ranlcs. {For one of the most detailed descriptions by a
defector ofthis bizarre institution see Kim ChlSng-ylSn, P'yJngyrmg y0ja, Seoul: KorylS
slSjlSk, 1995, vol. 1, pp.241-4). However, whether the "'.Joy" Group' was indeed a
harem for the Great Leader and/or his son could not be checked for obvious reasons.
Incidentally, this approach to the service personnel is reminiscent of the tradition of
'palace women' (gun~) under the ChoslSn (Yi) dynasty, whettby pretty and healthy
virgins from noble (yongban) families were regularly recruited to serve the king. They
were not the kings concubines in a strict sense, although liaisons between them and
the king were possible and occasionally happened Virginity was a necessary
precondition for the recruits, and any sexual relations with men other than the king
were considered a crime. Their main wk, however, was to work in a huge palace
household and to make the king's life comfortable. Deliberately or not, Kim II Sung
decided to continue this tradition.
33Wada Haruki, Kim ll' Song-gwa Manj11 Hangil chi5njaeng, p. 314.

promoting his relations, apparently as a result of his decision to transfer
his power to his son. In the early 1990s, just before his death, a
dozen of the country's top leaders belonged to his clan. At the time
his highflying relatives included Kang Song-san, premier of the Ad-
ministrative Council and Central Committee secretary; Pak S6ng-
ch' ol, a vice-president of the DPRK; Hwang Chang-ytlp, Central
Committee secretary (his defection to the South in 1997 made head-
lines worldwide); Kim Chung-rin, Central Committee secretary;
Kim Yong-sun, Central Committee secretary and head of its inter-
national department; Kang Hui-won, secretary of the KWP
Pyongyang City Committee and vice-premier of the Administra-
tive Council; Kim Tal-hyon, minister of foreign trade; Kim Ch'an-
ju, minister of agriculture and vice-premier of the Administrative
Council; and Yang Hyt>ng-wp, president of the Academy ofSocial
Sciences and the chairman ofthe Supreme People's Assembly. 34 These
people came to the top exclusively through their blood and family
connections with the Great Leader and retain their positions only as
long as the Kims remain in power. The same is true of the numerous
children of the former Manchurian guerrillas. Perhaps, by promot-
ing them Kim hoped to safeguard his (and his son's) position, to
protect himself from dangerous moves of nomenltlatura which top-
pled not one Communist leader. If this was indeed his intention, he
succeeded.
In the late 1950s or early 1%Os Kim II Sung married again. The
biography ofhis second (third?) wife Kim Song-ae is almost unknown
and even the date oftheir marriage is uncertain. Their eldest son Kim
P'yong-il, now a diplomat, was born in 1954, which allows us to suppose
that the marriage took place around this date, although according to
some sources it was much later. 35 It is said that Kim S6ng-ae had once
been a secretary in Kim II Sung's bodyguards' office,36 but in general
34'fhe list according to ChosJn ilbo, 21 October 1992.

35 Pultlran inmyJng sajJn (The Biographical Dictionary of North Korea, Seoul:
Chungang ilbo sa, 1990, p. 457) refen to the year ofKim II Sung's imrriage to Kim
SISng-ae as being 1963, a date also supported by Dae-Sook Suh in his classic political
biography of the Great Leader. Meanwhile, in his article about Kim P'yong-il, Yu
Yong-ok insists that the marriage took place in the mid-1950s, referring to the age
ofthe eldest son ofKim JI Sung from this marriage (Yu Yong-ok, 'Pukhan kwonryok
silnggye-ili pyonsu Kim P'yong-il'. Puklian, no. 7, 1991, p. 87). There are also rumours
that Kim JI Sung met Kim SISng-ae as early as in the bte 1940s (see Kim Hak-
chun, Pulthan 50 n~n sa, Seoul: Tonga ch'ulp'ansa, 1995, p. 142).
36Dae-Sook Suh, Kim II Sung: Tht North. Kortan uadrr, p. 193.

74 From St4/in to /Gm II Sung
she has kept a low profile through the years. The first lady of North
Korea seldom appeared before the public and her influence on
political life was not considered significant. t..Jorth Koreans knew
that the Great Leader had a new wife, since her presence at official
receptions was sometin1es mentioned in passing in the press, but
neither in propaganda nor in the mass consciousness was she ever
given a place comparable to that occupied by Kim Chong-suk, who
decades after her death has remained the principal comrade of the
Great Leader. This may have been determined partly by the feelings
of Kim II Sung himself and partly by the role of heir intended for
their son Yuri born in Khabarovsk in 1942 and later given the Korean
name Kim Chong-ii. According to some sources, Kim Junior was
not particularly fond of his step-mother and half-brothers.37 The
author heard rumours ofsuch family conflicts from North Koreans,
so they are quite widespread.
Around the late 1960s Kim 11 Sung decided to make Kim Chong-
il his heir, turning the DPR.K into a sort of monarchy, the only one in
the Communist world (something like it took place in Bulgaria, but
there the sudden death ofthe likely heir rendered the plan impossible).
Kim's decision was probably dictated by political calculations, leaving
aside the understandable personal bias. The developments after the
death ofStalin and, less so, of Mao taught Kim II Sung that, from the
viewpoint of a new leader, criticism of a defunct dictator might be
among the best means of gaining popularity. By transferring power
to his son, Kim II Sung created a situation in which the succeeding
regime would have a vested interest in upholding the prestige of the
Founding Father.
Around 1970 the rapid political ascent of Kim Chong-ii began.
In 1973, aged thirty-one, he was appointed head ofthe Central Com-
mittee Propaganda Department, and in February 1974 was brought
into the Politburo. After this the intentions of the Leader-father becan1e
clear. According to Kong T' ak-ho, a top officer in the North Korean
security services who defected to the South in 1976, the North
Korean elite was by then sure that Kin1 Chong-ii would eventually
become the heir of Kim II Sung. Indeed in 1980, at the 6th congress
of the KWP, he was declared his father's heir, the 'successor of the
great chuch'e revolutionary cause'. Propaganda praising his superhu-
man wisdom had the intensity earlier reserved only for his father.
37Yu YlSng-ok, 'Pukhan kwlSnryllk sunggye-ui pyllnsu Kim P'yllng-il'. Pukhan,

no. 7,1991.

Throughout the t 980s, control over the most important aspects
of the country's life was steadily given to Kim Chong-ii and those
closest to him.
By the end of his life Kim II Sung found himself once again in a
complicated situation. The collapse of the socialist camp and the
sudden end of the Soviet Union had a strong impact on the North
Korean economy. Although the relationship between Moscow and
Pyongyang after 1960 had never been particularly close, their strategic
interests and a common enemy made them forget their mutual distrust.
However, after the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and later
the Russian Federation had no reason to consider the DPRK an
ideological, military or political ally in the struggle against 'American
imperialism' or any other perceived hostile force. On the contrary,
South Korea, being economically sound and increasingly powerful,
appeared a much more profit.ible partner. This change in orientation
led to the establishment ofdiplomatic relations between Moscow and
Seoul in t 990. China followed suit and officially recognised Seoul in
1992, although strategic and ideological considerations made Beijing
somewhat more careful than Moscow: some aid from China continued
to go to the North, but it was not enough to keep its economy afloat.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became evident that
Soviet direct and indirect aid played a much greater role in the North
Korean economy than Pyongyang propaganda had ever been prepared
to admit. The 'reliance on [our] own strength' proved to be largely a
myth which did not survive the termination of the subsidised supplies
ofSoviet raw materials and equipment. The new post-Communist
government in Moscow did not intend to waste any more of its scarce
resources supporting Kim II Sung's regime (indeed, after 1990 Kim
became decidedly unpopular with the Russian public), and around
1990 Soviet assistance was terminated. It was a heavy blow and, in
the last few years ofKim's life, even the North Korean authorities had
to recognise officially that the country's industrial output was declining.
In a desperate search for new sources of foreign help, Kim II Sung
tried to play the 'nuclear card'. Nuclear research had been under-
taken in the DPRK from the t 970s, and in t 993-4, amid mounting
international suspicion over the nature of Pyongyang's nuclear pro-
gramme, Kim tried nuclear blackmail. Political intrigue had always
been his favourite medium, and he was successful again. North Korea
made the 'American imperialists' agree to give economic assistance in
return for closing down the nuclear programme. Thus the blackmail
strategy was rewarded, but this diplomatic victory was the last success

of an old master. On 8 July 1994, shortly before a scheduled summit
with the South Korean president, which would have been the fint
such meeting in the history of the two Koreas, Kim ll Sung suddenly
died in Pyongyang after a heart attack. His son Kim Ch~ng-il in-
herited his father's country and its problems.
Kim II Sung had a long and unusual life: son of a Christian activist,
guerrilla commander, officer in the Soviet army, puppet ruler of
North Korea, and finally the Great Leader, the absolute dictator of
the North with unlimited power. He managed to survive through
these tumultuous events and die at a ripe old age. Although the results
ofhis rule in North Korea are lamentable, it is hardly worth demonising
the late dictator. There is no doubt that he was ambitious, ruthless
and merciless, and responsible for much bloodshed, but it is also true
that he could be an idealist at times capable ofself-denial and sacrifice
- at least in his youth when power had not yet fully absorbed and
corrupted him. It is likely that in many cases he sincerely believed that
his actions were serving the best interests of the people and helping
the prosperity of Korea. Alas, people are judged not by their intentions
but by the results, which in Kim II Sung's case were catastrophic:
countless deaths of people who were killed in the war or who died
in prisons, a destroyed economy and lost generations.

3
THE FACTIONS INTHE NORTH KOREAN
LEADERSHIP INTHE 1940sAND 1950s
The 1950s was a period of great significance for the DPRK, since it
was when the basic social and political structures of the North Korean
state finally took shape. The North Korea we know would not have
existed without the decisive victory of Kim 11 Sung over his once-
powerful rivals within the Pyongyang ruling elite. This political
victory (or, rather, chain of victories) was achieved in the course
of the 1950s. In 1950 North Korea was just another 'people's
democracy', which, for all practical purposes, was a Soviet puppet
dependent on Moscow both politically and economically. By the
early 1960s it had been transformed into one of the most idiosyncratic
countries of the Communist camp - able to challenge Moscow as
well as launch its own (often bold but seldom successful) economic
and political experiments. This chapter considers the history of
the political struggle in the North Korean leadership between 1945
and 1960. Another chapter in this book deals with the 1956 crisis,
so the main focus here will be on the events preceding the dramatic
move on behalf of the opposition at.the August (1956) Plenum of
the KWP Central Committee, as well as on the purges of the late
1950s. The early history of the Soviet Koreans is also discussed in
Chapter 4, hence the relevant parts of this chapter will be as brief as
possible.
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Korea was divided

along the 38th Parallel: the North became the Soviet zone of occupa-
tion and the South was to be taken over by US troops. As the Cold
War gathered momentum, both great powers did what they could
77

to bring to power those political forces which suited them best. From
1945 onw.u:ds, the Soviet military had been engineering the creation
ofa Communist regime to the North of the 38th Parallel. However,
the Soviet tactics were influenced by the fact that, unlike most East
European countries, in North Korea there were few Communists if
any, on whom the Soviet aulhorities could rely. Under the circum-
stances, they had no choice but to 'import' their future supporters -
cadres ofa yet-to-be-created pro-Soviet regime, who were to be found
mainly among the overseas Korean Communists. However, before
1945 the Korean exile communities had been remarkably isolated
from each other. After the Communist Party was disbanded in 1928,
there was no recognised centre of the Korean Communist movement
and Korean Communists acted chiefly within the structures of other
Communist parties - Soviet, Chinese andJapanese. Thus fiom the very
beginning the political elite of the DPRK was not homogeneous: it
consisted ofseveral groups whose members in the years before 1945
had amassed very different political experiences and had lived very
different lives. These differences interacted with the ingrained Korean
traditions of factionalism, thus increasing the likelihood of clashes in
the North Korean leadership.
The political history of North Korea in 1945-60 is, above all,
that of two closely-related but quite distinct processes: the creation
of a Communist state under Soviet auspices and a factionalist struggle
within this state. The first process (or, rather, its initial but most pivotal
stage) was described in Chapter 1, so now we shall concentrate on the
second.
By the late 1950s, Kim II Sung and his supporters had managed
to eliminate other factions and finally established a regime based on
the Great Leader's unlimited personal dictatorship. The period 1945-
60 was for Kim what 1924-36 had been for Stalin. Stalin in 1924 and
Kim II Sung in 1945 were still 'first among equals' in their parties.
Possibly they were not even 'the first', since they were surrounded
by more famous and more popular politicians and had to reckon with
opposition both inside and outside the party. By 1936 Stalin had
become the unchallenged ruler, as Kim II Sung had by 1960.
In the mid-1940s, there were four factions in the North Korean
leadership: the Domestic, Yanan, Soviet and Guerrilla factions. The
Domestic faction consisted of those Korean Communists who were
engaged in underground work in Korea throughout the colonial
period. In August 1945, immediately after Liberation, the Communist
party of Korea was re-established in Seoul and was soon to become

The FtJCtions in the North Korean Leadership 79
a major political force. It was headed by Pak Hon-yong, the veteran
of the Korean Communist movement. In the early 1930s Pak had
lived for a time in the Soviet Union, but he soon returned to Korea
where he was arrested and spent some time in jail. 1 At first, his 'Seoul'
headquarters were considered the seat of the national leadership,
hence the Communists in the North were also formally subordinated
to it. However, by the spring of 1946 Kim II Sung, with the blessing
of the Soviet authorities, established a party of his own, the North
Korean Communist Party, which in August 1946 became the North
Korean Workers' Party (NKWP). Meanwhile, as early as 1945-<>, some
prominent underground Communists from the South also moved
to the North and joined Kim's Party where they occupied significant
positions. Eventually their number increased as more and more South
Korean Communists were forced to escape to the North. However,
a majority of the South Korean Communists, including those who
had moved to the North, remained active within the organisational
framework ofthe South Korean Communist- later Workers' - Party.
The Yanan faction consisted of those activists of the Korean
Communist movement who in the 1920s and '30s left the country
for China. At first they lived mostly in Shanghai, but later, as the
Japanese aggression in China progressed, many exiles found them-
selves in Shanxi province, in the small town of Yanan where the
Chinese Communist Party then had its headquarter. In 1942 they
established the League of Independence (or, to cite its full name, the
North-Chinese League for the Independence of Korea), the largest
among all the Korean Communist organisations abroad. The League
and the whole Yanan faction were headed by the prominent linguist
Kim Tu-bong. However, Kim normally preferred to remain aloof
from practical politics and, in spite of his eventual spell of political
prominence followed by his tragic death, he has been remembered
in Korean history as an academic rather than as a politician. The
Yanan faction was actually led by Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, also a veteran of
the Korean Communist movement. 2 Besides exiled intellectuals, the
Yanan faction also included many Koreans who had fought in the
Chinese 8th and New 4th Armies (i.e. the Communist armed forces),
among whom, General Kim Mu-jong - much better known by his
1For a detailed account of Pak H6n-y6ng's life and activity sec Pak Cbong-
rong, Pait HOn-yllng "'"'Seoul: lngan sarang, 1992.
2Sim Cbi-y6n, kh'hylljin hyllngmyllngga-ili ch~ang: Kim Tu-bong yllngu, Seoul: lngan
sarang, 1993, pp. 74--86.

nom de gume Mu Chong, - was most notable. Mu Chong later played
a major role in the early stages of the Korean war. All these people
had good personal connections with Mao's China, spoke Chinese
fluently and were to a large extent influenced by Mao's version of
Marxism- Leninism, which was quite different from Stalin's. The Yanan
faction was the main conduit for the Chinese influence in Korea.
They brought with them the ethos of Chinese Communism and its
bureaucratic patterns and political idioms.
The Soviet faction included Soviet Koreans who were sent to
the DPRK by the Soviet authorities in 194~. There was one
significant difference between the Yanan and Soviet factions: while
most Yanan exiles were born and grew up in Korea and only later
moved to China, among the Soviet Koreans there were few recent
arrivals in Russia. The reason was the Great Purge of 1937 when a
majority of the politically active Korean emigrants to the Soviet
Union were eliminated as 'Japanese spies'. Thus the Soviet faction
consisted of people who had been born or at least grown up in the
Soviet Union, had never been to Korea and had had next to no contact
with the country for most of their lives. In addition their knowledge
ofthe Korean culture and occasionally even the langwge was somewhat
limited in comparison to the intellectuals from Yanan or the Domestic
faction. This, however, was partly compensated for by a generally good
knowledge of Russian and Western cultures. (For the background of
the Soviet faction see Chapter 4.)
The Guerrilla faction consisted of the former Manchurian
guerrillas. The latter movement developed after the occupation of
Manchuria by Japan in 1931, and drew into its ranks both the Chinese
and Korean ethnic groups. The guerrilla activity was strong for a
while, but in the late 1930s the Japanese managed to suppress their
armed resistance. A few survivon escaped to the Soviet Union where
some of them were drafted into the Red Army, including Kim II
Sung, who had the rank ofcaptain and was one of the most prominent
of these. In September 1945 the former guerrillas were sent back to
Korea as Soviet servicemen. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kim soon attracted
the attention of the Soviet generals and was chosen as a future leader
of the country.3
After Liberation, all four groups met in Pyongyang and soon found
themselves leaders of one party - the North Korean Communist
3 Dac-Sook Suh, Kim II Sur1g: The North Korea11 Ltadtr, p. 71.

TM Factions in the North Kortan Leadership 81
Party. This party included those few Korean Communists who had
been active within the territory of North Korea before t 945 or had
arrived from the South in the first months after Liberation and were
thus closely related to the Domestic faction. It also included a constantly
increasing number of the Soviet Koreans who were then arriving in
Pyongyang. The former guerrillas returned in September and some
of them played a prominent role in the Party as well. The winter of
1945--6 also saw the mass return of Korean exiles from China. The
Soviet authorities were rather suspicious of these 'Yanan exiles' and
for example, in October 1945, prevented the Korean Communist
troops from moving to Korea from China. 4 However, these suspicions,
though quite real, must not be overestimated: to the Soviet generals
the Yanan exiles were, above all, useful Communist cadres, which at
the time they badly needed. For a while the former. Yanan exiles
maintained a separate party of their own, but in August 1946 they
merged with the Communists to form the North Korean Workers
Party (NKWP) 5 Although formally the leader of the new party was
Kim Tu-bong, the real power was in the hands of Kim II Sung,6
who thus became the master of North Korea - the territory which
was to be the main basis for the Communist movement in the country.
The factions consisted of a few hundred members each: approxi-
mately 15(}-200 Soviet Koreans, about 500 domestic Communists
and about 130 guerrillas.7 However, it was not their numbers but their
4 For a detailed account of these events based on interviews with the participants
sec Mirolt Ciaos/In minjujuui i11mi11 ltonghwagult, Seoul: Chungang ilbo sa, 1992, pp.
148-55.
51t is now well known that a decision to merge the parties was taken (or rather
co~ to the Korean leaden) in the summer of 1946 during a secret visit of Kim
Il Sung and Pak H6ng-y6ng to Moscow: Mirolt Claos611 minjujuilj inmin ltonglawogult,
pp. 235-41.
"The literature on the parties' unification is extensive: Sim Chi-ylln. /cla'lry6'ii11
1aya.my611gga-yj chosang, pp. 118-24. Some material on the manoeuvres in the
leadership of both parties and the activities of the Soviets is published in Mirolt
ClwsMt minjuju6i inmin ltonghwogult (Ha), Seoul: Chungang ilbo sa, 1993, pp. 223-8.
7 For details on the number of Soviet Koreans, sec Chapter 4 in this book. The
number of domestic Communists is based on a 1953 Soviet document. Sec a

conversation ofV.A. Vasiukevich, the first secret2ty of the Soviet embassy, with Pale
Ch'ang-ok, the secretary of the KWP, 4 April 1953, Archive of Foreign Policy of
the Russian Federation (hereafter AVPRF), fond 0102, opis 9, delo 9, papka 44.
The number of guerrillas is estimated by Wada Haruki in Kim n Sl!ng-gwa manju
laang'il dwnjomg, Seoul: Ch'angjalc-kwa pip'ylln sa, 1992, pp. 294-8. Unfortunately,
there are no data on the Yanan faction numbcn, which could have been large ifone

proportional representation which mattered. The analysis of the com-
position of the Central Committee elected at the NKWP First Con-
gress in 1946 gives a good picture of the balance of power inside
the party at that time. There were forty-three members of the first
Central Committee, while its Standing Committee (North Korean
Politburo) consisted of thirteen members.
Table 3.1. FACTIONS INTHE NKWP AR.ST CENTRAL

COMMITTEE (1946)
S14nding Committtt Qn1,./ Committtt in gmml/
Soviet 3 8
Yanan 6 15
Domestic 2 10
Guenilla 2 4
Unknown 6
.SO...: Data ptOYided byw.do Haiuki (albeit with urtain changes" explained in no<e 7). See 'Md> Haruki,
/Gm JI Silftg,... ...,Yu ,,.,,,,ii tloMJomi, S.Oul: Ch'angj.k-kwa pip'y6n ,., 1992, pp. 310-12.
From Table 3.1. it is obvious that the role of the former Guerrillas
was not very significant in 1946. Most of them had neither the expe-
rience nor the education necessary to act as high 0fficials, so they
were initially pushed to the margins of political life and had to satisfy
themselves with relatively minor positions. The Domestic faction was
also slightly under-represented in the 1946 Central Committee: at
the time, the most prominent of the former underground activists
were still operating in Seoul and hence were technically considered
members of the South Korean Communist Party, not of its North
Korean counterpart. Meanwhile, both the Soviet Koreans and par-
ticularly the Yanan factions were quite well represented. It is worth
noting that at least twenty-two members of the first KWP Central
Committee, one half of its original members, eventually became
victims of Kim II Sung's purges. 8 The real number was probably even
higher, since in many cases purges v1ere not made public.
takes into account the military personnel who were transferred from China before
the Korean war. However, the number of'civilian' cadres was rather small, perhaps
only a few hundred.
8Th.is calcubtion is based on data from Pulthan inmy~ng saj~n. Seoul: Chungang
ilbo sa, 1990.

The Factions in the North Korean Leadership 83
In 194<r-9, there were t\W co-existing networks ofthe t\W Workers'
Parties in North Korea: one belonged to the North and another to
the South Korean party. The latter largely played the role of a rear-
base for the South Korean underground and growing guerrilla
movement. The South Korean party was outlawed by the American
military authorities in 1946, and most of its leaders, including Pak
Hon-yong himself, found refuge in the North, where they ran a
guerrilla training centre, warehouses, workshops, printing presses and
radio stations - the sophisticated infrastructure necessary to support
intensive guerrilla warfare. Technically South Koreans were considered
members ofan independent body, but this was on the whole a fiction,
and the line between the North and South Korean parties and their
institutions was often blurred. Both Northern and Southern parties
depended greatly on the Soviet authorities. 9 In addition, the fact
9 Confirmations of such dependence are numerous. Some examples are cited in
other chapters of this book, but here it is sufficient to say that all major decisions of
the South Korean Workers' Party in 19~ were also made only after consultations
with the Soviet authorities. The recently discovered Shrykov Diary contains much
evidence to this effect (see Chlln Hy6n-5U, 'Ssui'ttiii'kkop'u ilgi-ga malhanun Pukhan
chllnggwlln-ui sllnglip kwajllng', YO.ftsa pip'yJn, no. 30, 1995). The role of the Soviet
authorities in the unification of the Workers' parties of the South·and North is clear
from a memorandum sent to A.A. Zhdanov, then the secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party in Moscow, by the Soviet military in Pyongyang. It deser= quoting
at some length:
In order to facilitate and speed up the unification of the Communist Party, the
People's Party, and the New People's Party, Lieutenant-General Comrade Sorokin
proposes the following measures:
(I) Arrange for a letter to be sent from the leaders ofthe democratic (i.e. officially
recognised] parties ofNorth Korea to Y6 Un-hyllng demanding adherence
to a policy strictly upholding the unification of the left-wing parties of
South Korea. In case this letter does not have the expected impact on Y6
Un-hyllng, HI\ Hlln should be prepared to become the leader of the united
parry in South Korea.
(2) Publish in the press the decisions of the Communist Parry and the New
People's Parry ofSouth Korea to expel from their ranks the separatists and
opposition activists who hinder the unification of left-wing parties in
South Korea as reactionaries and enemies of democ9cy.
(3) Launch a broad propaganda campaign denouncing the activities of
reactionaries in South Korea. The leader of the New People's Parry in
South Korea, Paek Nam-un, should be recalled by the People's Parry Central
Committee to work in North Korea' [Paek Nam-un was at that time
opposing the merger, hence his recall was deemed necessary to make the
entire affair move smoothly] .
Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Current History Documents

that the South Korean party organisations were active in the territory
controlled by Kim II Sung and 'his' party and received military,
technical and financial assistance from his government (or, rather,
channelled through his administration from the Soviet Union)
made the Southerners increasingly dependent on the North Korean
leadership.
In June 1949 the relatively inferior status of the once-powerful
and popular Southerners was confirmed when the Workers' Parties
of the South and North were merged into the Korean Workers'
Party (KWP). Kim II Sung became the new party's chairman, while
Pak Hon-yong, who merely four years earlier had been the widely
recognised leader of all the Korean Communists, was appointed to
the rather modest post of deputy chairman.
Up till the beginning of the Korean War, all the more complicated
and significant political manoeuvres had been orchestrated by the
Soviet authorities rather than by Kim 11 Sung and his supporters;
they, most probably, had initiated the creation of an independent
North Korean Communist Party, the merger of the North Korean
Communist Party with the New People's Party in the NKWP in
1946, and the unification of the Workers' Parties of the North and
South in 1949. 10 The main goal of all these divisions and mergers was
clear: first, to create a united all-Korean Communist Party, and secondly
to secure a leading role for Kim 11 Sung within it. By the late 1940s
both these tasks had been successfully achieved. At the time, Kim
was considered by Moscow to be their ideal 'man in Pyongyang'. His
interests and those of the Soviet authorities coincided (or so it was
perceived in Moscow).
However, the promotion ofKim 11 Sung did not necessarily mean
the automatic promotion of his former entourage as well. On the
(hereafter RTsHIDNI), fond 17, opis 128, delo 205. This text makes clear the
extent ofSoviet control, and in addition the fact that at fint PU H6n-y6ng W2.S not
expected to become the united party leader, but rather either Y6 Un-hy6ng or
H6 H6n. This is reminiscent of the North, where it W2.S not Kim II Sung but the
New People's Party leader Kim Tu-bong who technically became leader of the
unified party.
1
°In April 1948 V.V. Kovyzhenko, then in the 25th Army, sent a memo to the
Soviet Cenlnl Committee in which he says in passing: 'In the future, when the time
comes for the unification of the Workers' parties of South and North Korea'
(Memorandum ofl<ovyzhenko to L.S. Baranav, 20 April 1948. Archive ofthe author).
This shows that the idea of unification already existed at that time, a year before it
actually took place.

contrary: in 1945--6, the Guerrilla faction was the least influential of
all factions. Most ofits members, despite their services to the Korean
Communist movement, seemed to stand little chance of forging
significant careers, let alone achieving a monopoly on power. While
the leaders and prominent members of other factions were usually
well-educated people with rich political experiences, few ofthe former
guerrillas had been able to receive even a middle school education,
and many of them were semi-literate. 11 Nor did they initially enjoy
real prominence within the country. In the Domestic and Yanan
factions there were many who had long been at the centre ofKorean
political and intellectual life, renowned among Korean intellectuals
and political activists, if not among the general public. By contrast,
the majority of the guerrillas had come from poor peasant families
in Manchuria and North Korea and were virtually unknown outside
their native villages. 12 The guerrillas shared this trait with the Soviet
Koreans, who were also practically strangers in the North. However,
the former guerrillas had a further handicap - their lack of practical
expertise which could be useful in the building of a 'new socialist
Korea'. In this regard they differed from the Soviet Koreans, most of
whom had formerly been party cadres or, at the very least, teachers.
Even the military experience of the former Manchurian fighters
had been limited to small-scale guerrilla warfare - hit-and-run raids
- which was scarcely applicable to the operations of a large regular
army.
However, despite these obvious handicaps, it was the former guer-
rillas who eventually won the battle for power. The decisive factor was
the support of their leader (albeit not necessarily of themselves) by
the Soviet military, and it was this which elevat.ed a former Red Army
captain be to ruler of North Korea, and created the preconditions
11 According to the data ofWada Haruki, a leading expert in the history of the
Korean guerrilla movement in Manchuria, thirty out of thirty-six guerrilbs whose
social origin is known, came from farmen and the urban poor. Only one guerrilla
is known to have had a college education, and no more than a handful ofthem ever
reached secondary school. According to Wada Haruki, 'the majority ofthe guerrillas
were people who prior to entering the guerrilla units had not had an opportunity
to receive any education'. See W2da Haruki, Kim R smtg-gwa """'ju hong'il th11njtm1g,
Seoul: Ch'angjak-kwa pip'ylln sa, 1992, pp. 302-3. .
12Wada Haruki established the place of birth of thirty-five guerrillas: twenty of
them originated in the remote and underdeveloped north-eastern provinces North

and South Hamgyong, eight were born in Manchuria, and two in other parts of
China. None ofthem wis born in Seoul and few originated from the more deYeloped
and politically important provinces of central Korea. Ibid., pp. 301-2.

for the eventual rise of his entourage, made up almost exclusively of
former guerrillas. Not only their personal bonds and loyalty, forged
in hard and long guerrilla campaigns, but also their material and
career interests caused the guerrillas to close ranks around the future
'Great Leader', 'Ever-victorious General' and 'Genius of the Revo-
lution'. ~'ithout his patronage the former guerrillas would not stand
much chance of competing with the Yanan and Soviet Koreans. Kim
ll Sung also knew that he could always rely on his former comrades-
in-arms' unquestioning loyalty. By the mid-1960s the members ofthe
Guerrilla faction had almost a complete monopoly of power over
the country, a position which by the 1990s had, to some extent, been
inherited by their children.
In the late 1940s the North Korean press began to call Kim the
'Leader' ('sury0ng' in Korean), a term which in Korean-language
publications had nonnally been applied to Lenin and Stalin. However,
in the late 1940s his authority, no matter how great, was a far cry from
being absolute; on one hand he was restricted and controlled by his
Soviet 'advisers', without whom no decision of any significance could
be made, 13 and on the other he had to take into account the interests
of other fu:tions. He could only achieve his goal offull and unrestricted
power by casting away Soviet control and neutralising the rivals
inside his party. During the 1950s he managed to solve both these
problems.
On the whole, the divisions between the four factions were clearly
definable. There were rare exceptions - a handful of people who
belonged to several factions at the same time. This was the case of
Pak Chong-ae (Vera Tsoi), almost the only notable female politician
in North Korean history (the few other women who have reached
the upper echelons of the Pyongyang political elite have done so
largely through their family connections with prominent male
statesmen). Pak Chong-ae had lived and studied in the Soviet Union,
and in the 193-0s she had been sent to work illegally as a Comintern
operative in Korea, where she established contacts with the local
underground. However, after Liberation she was one of the first to
reorient herself towards the Guerrillas and their boss. Thus she could
be considered a member of two if not three factions simultaneously,
although her Soviet connections perhaps were ofprimary importance.
13Interview with N.G. Lebedev, 13 N~mber 1989, Moscow. Lebcdev was a

Soviet general in 1945, a member of the Military Council of the 25th Anny, and
later head of the Soviet civil administration in Korea.

Another example is the above-mentioned Han Pin, who, in spite of
his early activity in the Soviet Union, eventually came to be associated
with the Yanan faction. Nevertheless, such cases were far from the
norm. Genel'2lly there was little doubt about the faction to which a
particular person belonged. One's factional affiliation was seldom a
matter ofchoice. Rather it was a function ofhis/her biography: it was
determined by where one had come from before arriving in Korea
in 1945-50, and what one had done previously.
Until the late 1940s the differences between the four factions were
suppressed. This was the deliberate policy of the Soviet authorities,
which understandably feared these internal feuds. The Soviets promoted
Kim II Sung and the Soviet faction in order to secure their own
control over the North, but they were not prepared to allow any
internal strife within the KWP to endanger its political stability. As
we shall see below, the Soviets took signs of internal discord in the
KWP very seriously. The balance and even approximate equality
between the factions was a necessary precondition for keeping the
North Korean Party and state viable. This equality of the factions
was confirmed in March 1948 when the composition of the newly-
elected Central Committee of the KWP demonstrated a virtual
arithmetical parity between all four factions. The balance was also
almost ideal: in the Standing Committee (i.e. the Politburo) three of
the four major groupings - the Yanan, Soviet and Domestic factions
- had four members each, while the Guerrillas had three.14
Still, right from the beginning relations between the factions
were far from idyllic. Members of each faction, united by their
common past, worldview and habits, kept together and each had its
own circle of connections and leaders. The Soviet faction was led by
A.I. Hegai whose home became a favourite meeting-place for Soviet
Koreans. Among the Yanan exiles the same role was played by the
trio of Kim Tu-bong, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Pak Il-u (the latter was
to become the first North Korean Minister of the Interior). The
members ofdifferent factions often viewed each other with suspicion
or disdain. The representatives of the Domestic faction di,d not fully
trust the Yanan exiles and, especially, Soviet emigrants who h8'! played
no part in the underground struggle and, hence, could be pereeived
as 'impostors' or 'pseudo-revolutionaries'. All factions saw the Soviet
14Fora list of Politburo mem~n. including those elected later, see Dae-Sook
Suh, KDfNtt Communism, 1945-1980: A Refama Gwilk to the Poliliad Systmt, Honolulu:
Univenity ofHawaii Pi=, 1981.

Koreans, who had been largely Russified in their outlook and culture,
as not quite Korean, while the Guerrillas could be (and indeed were)
looked down upon as uneducated ignoramuses with no experience
either in Marxist-Leninist scholastics or in matters of state/party
administration. The Domestic faction was tainted with persistent and
not neces.urily false rumours of renunciation by its memben, many of
whom did indeed, under police pressure, sign the infamous 'repentance
declarations' in the 1930s, as well as more sinister suspicions about
their co-operation with the Japanese political police.15 Even after about
half a century, in interviews conducted by the author, the depth of
the mutual animosity inside the Korean leadership in the late 1940s
and early 1950s could easily be felt. 16
The mutual differences and clear divisions could not fail to cause
strain. The tensions between the factions were evident during the
first years of the DPRK's existence. According to one of the Soviet
Koreans, as early as 1947 he had overheaxd how former guerrillas
not only mentioned the 'Chinese' and 'Soviets' with a great deal of
animosity but also expressed the desire to be rid of them in due
course.17 At least some Soviet diplomats and military officers were
well aware that the rivalry between the factions presented a grave
threat to the new regime's political stability. This view was best
expressed by V.V. Kovyzhenko, who wrote a lengthy memorandum
on this topic to the Central Committee of the Soviet Conununist
Party in April 1948.18 As far as we know, this is the first contemporary
attempt at an unbiased inquiry into the North Korean 'faction
problem', undertaken by a well informed Soviet observer. It merits
close attention.
Kovyzhenko, later a prominent diplomat, was working in the
Political administration of the 25th Army at the time. He begins his
15 For example, for at least a decade after Liberation there had been persistent
rumoun that Pak Chllng-ae had collaborated with the Japanese police. For one of
the many references to them see record of conw:nation ofS.N. FilatoV (Counsellor
of the Soviet Embassy) and Pak Ch'ang-ok (deputy-premier of the DPRK Cabinet
and a member of the Presidium of the KWP Central Committee), 21July1956,
AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, dclo 6, papka 68.
16
Intervicws with Kim Ch'an, 15 January 1991, Tashkent, and with Yu S6ng-
g61, 22January 1991, Tashkent.
17 Jntervicw with Yu S6ng-g61, 22January 1991, Tashkent. Yu S6ng-g61 was a
Soviet teacher, bter a police officer. In 194s-60 he held a number of important

posu in the DPRK army.
18Memorandum ofKovyzhenko to L.S. Baranov, CPSU Central Committee,
20 April 1948. Archiw: of the author.

memorandum with a general review of the situation. He mentions
the four factions in North Korea: (1) former underground activists
headed by Pak Hon-yong; (2) guerrilla-emigrants returned from
China and led by Kim ll Sung, Ch'oe Yong-gon and Mu Chong;
(3) Soviet Koreans; and (4) emigrants-intellectuals returned from
China and headed by Kim Tu-bong. Kovyzhenko did not classify
Kim ll Sung and his guerrillas as belonging to the Soviet faction as
had long been the practice among foreign observers. At the same
time he considered [Kim) Mu Chong as belonging to the Guerrilla
faction. Subsequent developments did not support this conclusion,
but it remains the only point of difference from our current percep-
tions. It is notable that, although he wrote his memorandum a year
and a half before the formal unification of the Workers' Parties of
the South and North, he considered the two as a virtually united
organisation.
Kovyzhenko described in great detail the conflicts and intrigues
which raged between the factions, especially the covert campaign
against the Southerners and personally against Pak Hon-yong. 'Al-
ready in 1946,-he wrote,-the attitude of Kim II Sung (who was
fond of indulging in flattery), towards Pak Hon-yong and his com-
rades from South Korea was noticeably cold.' Some interesting epi-
sodes were also mentioned in the memorandum. In 1946 A.I. Shabshin,
then a Soviet military intelligence staffmember who maintained close
contact with Pak Hon-yong and was sympathetic towards him, wrote
(under a Korean pseudonym) an article entitled 'Pak Hon-yong, the
Great Patriot of the Korean People'. However,, the official North
Korean newspapers refused to print it, feeling that it would displease
Kim ll Sung. Eventually it was published. but only after a 'certain
pressure' (to use KovyzhenJco's expression) had been applied by the
Soviet administration where Shabshin played a very significant role.
Still, its title was changed to sound more moderate: 'Pak Hon-yong, a
well-known Korean statesmen'. Kovyzhenko also mentioned that
the Southerners were constantly monitored by Kim Il Sung's men
and cited some examples of this.
As to the reasons for these differences, Kovyzhenko wrote: 'The
basis of this tension is not some fundamental differences on important
political issues (in this respect the leaderships ofboth [the South and
North Korean Workers'] Parties are unanimous), but personal interests,
the struggle for the dominant positions. Korean politicians are generally
prone to factionalist rivalry and intrigues and [the situation] has been
aggravated by a Jack of experience and political maturity'. Kovyzhenko

90 From St41in to Kim fl Sung
mentioned that he had discussed the situation with the Soviet Generals
N. G. Lebedev and A.A. Romanenko, as ~u as with Colonel lgnatiev,
but the measures taken proved ineffective and the relations between
the factions continued to deteriorate. Hence Kovyzhenko decided
to contact Moscow directly, although we do not know how the
Central Committee responded to his warnings.
However, Kovyzhenko was not alone in his worries. It is likely
that around the same time General T.F. Shtykov, then chiefsupervisor
of Korean affairs, decided to brief the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Molotov on the existing friction. At least, when in early 1948 Shtykov
was preparing his visit to Moscow where he would meet top Soviet
leaders, he wrote in his diary: 'Questions (to discuss with) Comrade
Molotov [...) Relations between Kim II Sung and Pak.' 19
It is not quite clear what Shtykov meant in this entry. (It is very
short, and as Shtykov was writing only for himself he did not need to
make himselfclear to any other readers.) However,~ know that a few
months earlier Shtykov found himself in the midst of a controversy
obviously related to the factional strife. On 10 December 1947, A.A.
Zhdanov, then one of the top Soviet politicians, was informed that
Pak Hon-yong had told G. Balasanov, the Soviet special service man
in Pyongyang. that 'leaders of the North Korean Workers' Party cre-
ated in South Korea a political committee which consists offactionalists,
former members of the South Korean Workers' Party. (This Com-
mittee) is engaged in subversive activity, directed against the leaders
of the South Korean Workers' Party. Amongst its members arc So
Won Sok, Kim Hak, Li Se Sur' (this is one of few cases when the
original Korean spelling can be easily reconstructed from the Russian
transcription: SO Won-sOk, Kim Hak, Yi Se-sul). However, on 1 March
1948 Pak Hon-yong insisted to another Soviet general, N. Lebedev,
that he had been misunderstood and misinterpreted. Pak stated that
'he never thought that this committee was created by the leaders of
the North Korean Workers' Party for subversive activity directed against
the South Korean Workers' Party'. Around the same time, the com-
mittee was depicted to Shtykov (probably by somebody from Kim
II Sung's entourage, if not Kim himself) as a normal intelligence-
gathering organisation, engaged in spying in the South.2D It is difficult
19Shtykov diaries. An undated entty (before April 1948). A copy in the author's
person21 arcllive.
WShtykov diaries. Entries of29 Febnwy (?)and I M=h 1948. A copy in the
author's person21 archive.

Tht Factions in tht North Korean Leadership 91
if not impossible to figure out the background of these two mutu-
ally exclusive statements of Pak HCSn-yCSng. Perhaps he was indeed
misunderstood :o some extent, but it is still doubtful that Balasanov
would create the entire affair out of nothing. It is quite likely that
the 'activity of this body did arouse some suspicions among South
Korean Communists, who eventually preferred to deny their own
previous remarks.
Although some of the activities ofKim II Sung and his adherents
occasionally worried Moscow or, at least, some more perceptive Soviet
officials, his interests generally coincided with those of the Soviet
authorities up to 1950. However, in the early 1950s the situation changed.
The Korean war, in spite of the expectations of both Moscow and
Pyongyang, did not result in the unification of the country under
the aegis of the DPRK (and indirectly of the Soviet Union). On the
contrary, only the intervention of Chinese troops, euphemistically
called 'Chinese People's Volunteers', saved the North Korean regime
from total annihilation. The presence of the Chinese troops, which
carried the main burden of the military operations predictably led
to an increase in Chinese influence at the expense of Soviet power
in North Korea. Meanwhile, Kim II Sung further consolidated his
power- base during the war, and his need for Soviet backing dimin-
ished. Moreover, constant Soviet control increasingly irritated him.
A new set of circumstances allowed him to initiate a gradual libera-
tion from it.
The first sign ofKim's new strategy was the removal ofA.I. Hegai.
The leader of the Soviet Koreans lost his position in 1951 and was
driven to suicide (or murdered) in 1953.21 Kim also attacked the
Yanan faction. On 21December1950, immediately after Chinese
intervention had saved the DPRK from total defeat, an emergency
Plenum of the KWP Central Committee took place in the small
town ofKanggye near the Chinese border. Kim, who had to explain
away the reasons for the recent military disaster and find plausible
scapegoats, put the responsibility on a number of North Korean mili-
tary leaders, notably Mu ChCSng, the best-known of the Yanan gen-
erals. All those who were 'guilty' found themselves expelled from
the party, but those who belonged to the Guerrilla faction eventually
made a comeback and went on to forge quite impressive careers. Mu
ChCSng, as a member of the Yaman faction, was not as lucky: after his
21 For the life and activities of A.I. Heg:ai sec Chapter 5 in this book.

92 From St41in to Kim nSung
dismissal he was forced to return to China where he died. 22 At the end
of the war, Kim II Sung got rid of another influential member ofthe
Yanan faction - Pak 11- u, then Minister of the Interior. Rumour
had it that an immediate pretext for the fall of this politician, who
was reputed to be the defaao personal representative ofMao in Korea,
was that he had made critical remarlcs about Kim D Sung. This might
have been true, since the Chinese did not hold Kim in very high
regard at the time,23 but it is also pomble that the real reason was Kim's
desire to neutralise such a prominent leader of the Yanan faction.24
The removal of Hegai, Mu Ch6ng and Pak 11-u weakened the
influence ofboth the Chinese and the Soviet Koreans, although Kim
D Sung was not yet in a position to start an all-out attack on them
because in 1953 the risk of direct intervention by Moscow or Peking
was still too great. Therefore, his tint strike was directed at the Domestic
faction which did not enjoy Soviet or Chinese backing and thus
could not appeal for foreign help. Without any outside support, these
former resistance leaders made conveniently vulnerable targets, all
the more so since not only the Guerrillas but also members of other
factions could join in a campaign against them. By the end of the
Korean war the practical importance of these people had also di-
minished considerably. During the war, the former Southerners
had been instrumental in running the South Korean underground
network of guerrilla bands and intelligence agents. However, in
early 1953, when the war was clearly nearing its end, control of the
Communist underground in the South ceased to be the important
consideration it had been earlier. Hence, Kim and others could safely
ignore the negative impact which the elimination of the Domestic
faction would have on their contacts with the South Korean under-
ground.
The signal for the attack on the Domestic faction was a long
speech by Kim II Sung at the December 1952 Plenum of the Central
Committee. Although in the speech - at least in a version now pub-
lished in North Korea - there was no direct mention of the activists
from the Domestic faction, their existence was implied throughout
220ac-Sook Suh, Kim n Sung: ~North Ko!T411 I..eaJn; pp. 122-3. For details
of the fate of Mu ChlSng sec Mirolt Chos&t minjujuiU inmin lwnghWllgMlt, pp. 135-48.
23 V.V. Kovyzhenko mentioned that in 1956 Mao made very unflattering remarks
about Kim 11 Sung. Interview with V.V. Kovyzhhenko, 2 August 1991, Moscow.
24
For the fall ofPak 11-u sec Dae-Sook Suh, Kim ll Sung: ~North Korean Letukr,
p. 142.

The Factions in the North Kortan Leadmhip 93
the speech by the denunciation of rivalry between the factions. Pak
Ch'ang-ok, then secretary of the KWP, who after the removal of
Hegai attempted to assume the leadership of the Soviet faction and
was enthusiastically engaged in administrative intrigues, was more
open. Speaking at the Plenum, he directly attacked former leaders
of the South Korean Workers' Party.25
On 15 January 1953, immediately after the December Plenum,
Pak Ch'ang-ok himselfcomplained to V.A. Vasiukovich, fust scaetary
at the Soviet embassy, about the continuing conflicts between the
factions. According to him, the situation had worsened in late 1952.
He said: 'It is very difficult to work. Policies decided by the party
and the government are realised slowly, under pressure. [...JA number
of party and state cadres do not trust the information of the Korean
radio. The remnants ofsectarianism have become more evident, those
"discontented" strive to attract to their side those who are still hesitant.
[...)The situation was such that this question had to be raised at the
fifth Plenum, and this was done by Kim Il Sung in his report. [...]
Three main goals were intended: firstly, to give all the factionalists a
serious warning that the party will take decisive measures against
factionalist activity; secondly; to isolate from the factionalists the hesitant
members of the party; and thirdly, to encourage criticism and self-
criticism in the party organisations and thus improve their efficiency;
. and lift the work of the whole party and state apparatus to a higher
level.'26
Following the December Plenum, the situation of the Domestic
faction worsened. In early 1953, rumours of the Southerners' aborted
attempt to stage a coup spread around Pyongyang. Soon after that, a
number of the leaders of the Domestic faction were arrested. In late
March and early April Pak Hon-yong, then Minister ofForeign Affairs,
as well as Yi Sung-yop, Minister ofState Control, were removed from
their posts. The latter was immediately arrested on the absurd but
typical Stalinist charge of'spying on behalfof the United States'. Pak
Hon-yong remained free - for a short while.
On 4 April the Soviet diplomat Vasiukovich, acting on instruc-
tions from the ambassador, visited Pak Ch'ang-ok in order to get
25Pulthan ch'onglam, Seoul: Pukhan y6nguso, 1983, p. 294.

:z&convenation between V.A. Vasiukovich, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy,
and Pak Ch'ang-olc, the secretary of the KWP. 15 January 1953. AVPRF, fond
0102, opis 9, delo 9, papka 44.

the latest information on the situation after the arrests and to clarify
who from among the South Koreans still remained in the govern-
ment. The ambassador probably wanted to know who among the
Pyongyang leaders should now be considered 'living dead', i.e. doomed
for the immediate future. Pak Ch'ang-ok, like many leaders of other
factions, welcomed the fall of the Domestic group and provided the
required information. At the time, in the state and party apparatus
and in various public organisations there were more than 500 Party
cadres who at different times had come from the South: eighty-two
of them were in the party apparatus, 2:37 in the state organs and 186
were members of various co-operative and public organisations and
in the press. Clearly, only medium- and high-level cadres were taken
into account, since the number of common refuges was consider-
able. During the conversation with Vasiukovich Pak Ch'ang-ok even
tried to pique his former rival, A.I. Hegai, by asserting that Hegai had
aggravated the situation by promoting 'too many' Southerners. There
could be some truth in this remark, since Hegai's sympathy toward
the Domestic activists has been confirmed from other sources. How-
ever, according to Pak Ch'ang-ok, 'in regard to the revelation of a
conspiracy group headed by Yi Sung-yop, the KWP Central Com-
mittee is taking measures to tighten control over cadres who had come
from South Korea'. In other words, a new purge was in the making. 27
Pak Ch'ang-ok later regularly informed the Soviet embassy on the
events surrounding Pak Hon-yong and Yi Sung-yop, reporting to
Soviet diplomats every absurd confession which had been beaten out
of the accused.
On 3 August 1953, just a week after the Armistice had been
signed and the Korean war ended, the fint show trial in the DPRK's
history opened in Pyongyang. It was also to be the last, since the next
trial (that of Pak Hon-yong in 1955) proceeded without much pub-
licity and later the North Korean regime did away with show trials
altogether. The trial lasted four days. 1\velve defendants including
Yi Sung-yop, the former secretary of the Central Committee, stood
before the Supreme Court of the DPRK. All were veterans of the
Communist movement, who after Liberation had become leaders
of the South Korea Worken' Party. At the time of their arrest they
occupied significant posts in the DPRK, and most were engaged in
27Convenation between V.A. v..siukovich, the lint seactary ofthe Soviet embas.ry.
and Pale Ch'ang-ok, the secretary of the KWP. 4 April 1953. AVPRF. fond 0102,
opis 9, dclo 9, papka 44.

the organisation of the underground and guerrilla activity in the
South. Beside Yi Sung-yop, they included all the major leaders of
the Domestic faction (with the notable exception ofPak Hon-yong):
Pae Ch' ol, former head of the so-called 'liaison department' of the
KWP Central Committee (the department responsible for clandes-
tine operations in South Korea), his deputies Pak Sung-won and Yun
Sun-dal, the writer Yim Hwa, and the Deputy Minister of Propa-
ganda Cho 11-myong. These were tried on four main charges: plan-
ning a coup, sabotaging the Communist movement in the South,
co-operation with the Japanese police during the occupation, and
espionage on belulf of the United States.28
Thus, the principal defendant, Yi Sung-yop, confessed that in
July 1950 A. Noble, an American diplomat whom the trial orches-
trators wrongly believed to have been in Seoul at the time, informed
him of a plan to land American troops in Inch' on. According to Yi
Siing-yop's 'testimony', Noble demanded that an uprising be organ-
ised in Pyongyang in support of the US and South Korean troops. 29
At this point, any notion of plausibility seems to have deserted the
script writers of the show trial; it is too improbable that the Amer-
icans would have trusted their agent with such highly classified infor-
mation at such an early date. Nevertheless, as overseas observers soon
pointed out, Noble was not in Korea at the time of his alleged
meeting with Yi.30
Still, the main charge was the planning of a military coup. As was .
stated at the trial and slavishly confirmed by the broken defendants,
planning for the coup started in September 1951, but it was post-
poned several times and finally planned for the first weekend of
September 1952.31 The conspirators supposedly meant to remove
Kim II Sung by force and form a new government. At the trial, even
the new composition of the government that would seize power was
'disclosed': Pak Hon-yong was to be prime minister, Chang Si-u and
Chu Yong-ha his deputies and Yi Sung-yop himself was to be the
first secretary of the KWP. 32 The coup was to be carried out by the
units of the Kiimgan~ school, a training centre for guerrilla groups,
29For a detliled report on this trial sec Kim Nam-sik, Namnodang yi!ngu, Seoul:
Tolpcg;ic, 1984,pp.48~06.
29/bid.
lOl)ae-Sook Suh, Kim ll Sung: Th~ North Kortan uadtr, p. 132.
31 Kim Nam-silc, Nanmod4tlg yi!ngu, p. 483.
nlbid., p. 575.

which the Domestic faction controlled. Logically enough, there was
also the obligatory theme ofsecret US support which made the accu-
sations look more sinister: it was alleged that, if a coup had taken
place, the Americans would have landed in Wonsan and Anju. This
accusation again appeared extremely implausible because the mili-
tary units subordinated to the 'conspirators' consisted of only a few
companies armed with light weapons. Meanwhile, Chinese troops
were in the country and would hardly have tolerated an attempted
coup, not to mention the still considerable Soviet presence. 33 Even
more improbable was the accusation of espionage on behalf ofJapan
and the United States and of participation in sabotage against the
DPRK. The prosecution could not make accusations stick, and for-
eign researchers, in particular Dae-Sook Suh, have later exposed
major contradictions within the charges. 34
The defendants easily confessed and supported each other's
evidence. They behaved differently from Traicho Kostov, who at a
similar trial in Sofia had refused to plead guilty and ruined the entire
show, or Bukharin, who at his trial in Moscow was evasive and
managed to sound deliberately ambiguous (a tactic later employed
by Pak Hon-yong). It could only be imagined how these people,
many of whom had on more than one occasion proved beyond a
doubt their loyalty and bravery on behalf of the Communist cause,
were brought to obedience. Various theories have been advanced on
the techniques used in relation to the exemplars of the Pyongyang
show - the Moscow trials of 1936-7 as well as their later copies in
Eastern Europe. A combination oftorture, blackmail and false promises
was the most likely explanation. Whatever the reason, the defendants
played their roles obediently. Yi Kang-guk, former official in the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, began his speech at the trial with the words:
'I am a running dog ofAmerican imperialism!', which he later repeated
several times.
33When duce yean later, in 1956, the Yanan faction did indeed make an attempt
to remove Kim II Sung, it fint established a contact with the Soviet embassy (and
probably with the Chinese as well) in the hope of obtaining at least the passive
support of Moscow and Beijing, without which any action against Kim would be
doomed to Wlure. This was even more the case in 1952: in the midst ofa continuing
war, neithct the Soviet nor the Chinese governments would tolerate a forcible change
of power in North Korea. Kim Hak-chun dismisses the accusation as totally
unreasonable: Kim Hak-chun, Pulthlln 50 ~" sa, Seoul: Tong'a ch'ulp'ansa, 1995,
p. 190.
:14Dae-Sook Sub, Kim R Sung:~ North KorNn I..udn, p. 132.

On 6 August 1953, the last day of the trial, the staged nature of
the undertaking became particularly clear as the stand was taken
fint by the defence lawyen and then by the defendants themselves.
Remarkably, the former did not try to cast doubt on any ofthe charges.
Such an act could have undennined the logic ofthe trial, and therefore
the so-called 'advocates' of the defendants started their speeches with
an assertion that all accusations had been proved beyond doubt. In
many cases, the tone of their speeches did not differ much from that
ofthe prosecutor's statement. Thus Yi Siing-y<Sp's advocate declared:
'As for Yi Sung-y<Sp, although he called himself a Communist, he
has been an adherent of a petty bourgeois ideology, a penon who
could never overcome the influence of backward and reactionary
bourgeois nationalism'. 35 Similar speeches were made by the other
defence lawyen: claiming fint that the guilt of their clients had been
fully proved, they commented on their 'bad' social origins and life-
histories which supposedly caused the defendants to be carrien of a
reactionary ideology almost in spite of their own will, and finally
made a request for leniency. The advocates normally asked the court to
take into account the non-proletarian origin ofthe defendants, which
determined their inclination towards 'petty bourgeois nationalism',
and their sincere repentance, as had been confirmed by their co-
operation with the investigation.
In their final words all the defendants repented and expressed their
readiness to accept any punishment. Their speeches were standard
like those of their advocates. Itwas as ifone of the trial's orchestraton
(the secret police chief Pang Hak-se or Kim ll Sung himself?) had
outlined what the defendants were to say and their speeches were
written strictly according to this format. Thus Yi Sung-y<Sp declared:
'I am grateful for having been provided with an advocate and for the
opportunity to speak freely during the four days ofthe trial. Whatever
punishment I am given by the trial [judges], I will accept with gratitude.
Had I two lives, to take them both would have been too little'. Yi
Kang-guk declared: 'I am deeply grateful to the Motherland and to
the people for the opportunity to die as a decent man who in open
repentance has cleared himself before the people.' Cho Yong-bok
asked the trial for permission to appeal to his children with the
following final testament: 'Use all your strength in the struggle again.st
American imperialism which has made your father a baneful enemy
of the Motherland.' Yim Hwa, a writer who had attempted suicide
35Kim Nam-sik, Namnodang yilngu, p. 600.

98 From St4lin to Kim fl Sung
while in prison, repented of this act saying that 'a wish to die in fear
before a trial by the people makes a crime even more disgusting' which
he, like the others, followed up with an expression of gratitude for
the opportunity to die after having publicly repented. The trial which
had started as farce ended as black comedy. 3{>
After an hour of'deliberation' -appearances had to be maintained
- the guilty verdict for all defendants was declared. The sentence
followed the suggestions by the prosecutor (who was almost certainly
carrying out orders from above): ten defendants were sentenced to
death, while two others received lengthy prison terms.37
The events of 1953 in Pyongyang were not unique; indeed they
were part of the process which then encompassed almost all the
Communist capitals. In the early 1950s similar trials offormer lead-
ing activists of the Communist movement took place in all socialist
countries (e.g. Laszlo Rajk in Hungary, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria,
and Rudolf Slansky in Czechoslovakia). These trials followed the
pattern ofthe infamous Moscow show trials of the 1930s, and were
apparently aimed at eliminating potentially unreliable elements and
intimidating the potentially disloyal. As in Korea, the victims were
mostly former activists of the underground Communist movement,
and had often been closely linked to the Comintem in the pre-war
period. 38
The main concept of the Pyongyang trial - to accuse a substantial
number offormer leaders of the ruling party of espionage, sabotage
and conspiracy - as well as the particular form it took originated in
the Moscow trials. There were many imitations of the Soviet pattern
which betrayed a close knowledge of the 1930s trials by the Pyongyang
directors. As in Moscow, the cases were prosecuted in the Military
Section of the Supreme Court because the main accusation was high
treason which was perceived as basically a military-related offence.
The court was conducted openly with all formal legal norms and
technicalities strictly adhered too: witnesses were questioned (there
were thirteen of them in Pyongyang), all defendants had defence
lawyers, journalists - including foreign ones - were allowed into the
court, and the detailed reports were published in the press. As in
36Ibid., pp. 600-3.

37Yi Yi-hwa, Hangulr kundat hy0ndat Jd saj3n, Seoul: ~ram. 1990, pp. 305-6.
38For a summary of the East Europe:in show tri21s see, e.g., Joseph Rothschild,
Rttum to Divmity: A Politic41 History ofEast Central Europe sina World War II, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993, Ch. 4.

Moscow i:oo, the police had managed to break the defendants
completely before they were exposed to public view. However, such
show trials were not typical of the North Korean justice system as it
developed later. Apparently this demonstrative openness and the
attempts to maintain the legal formalities, clearly evident in Yi Siing-
y6p 's trial, were the result ofSoviet influence, which was still strong
at that time.
At this point we might consider whether there was any direct
Soviet involvement in the trial. From material published recently it
is evident that Soviet advisers in the security organs ofEastem European
countries had helped to stage similar trials there. Whether it was also
the case in North Korea is not quiet clear at the time of writing.
The striking similarity between the Pyongyang and earlier Moscow
trials, as well as trials in East European capitals, is remarkable, and this
fact alone makes Soviet involvement possible, but evidence to support
this is lacking. The final answer may be given only after the relevant
material in the former KGB archives is declassified-something which
is unlikely to happen soon. In the declassified diplomatic papers the
trial was mentioned only in passing. and its coverage in the contemporary
Soviet press was also sparse compared to earlier East European trials.
It appears that Soviet diplomats did not really believe the official
version, but also had no particular wish to refute it. This suggests that
the Pyongyang process might have been closer to the political trials
staged by Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania as late as October 1954 than the
earlier Slansky or Kostov trials in the more controlled countries of
Eastern Europe. Romanian trials are thought not to have been directly
initiated by the Soviets. On the contrary, as Ivan Berend remarked,
'Romania was the only country ofthe region where purges, although
initiated by Stalin, did not serve direct Soviet interests.' 39 This might
also have been the case in North Korea, where the trials were likewise
the first step toward future 'national Stalinism'. However, it is still not
impossible that some advisers from the Soviet Ministry of the Interior
or MGB (the contemporary name for the KGB) might have taken a
hand in preparing the trial while receiving instructions from Moscow
through their own independent channels of communication. In any
case, the very concept ofsuch a trial was unmistakably Soviet, whether
or not Soviet advisers were involved in it and whether or not it was
used for Soviet purposes.
391van Berend, Central and &stem Europe 1944-1993: Detour from Ptriph~ to
Periphny, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

During the trial Pak Hon-yong, leader of the Domestic faction,
had not yet been fonnally arrested, although, according to the material
from the Soviet embassy, he was in fact kept under house arrest
from late July. 40 His name was frequently mentioned at the hearings:
according to the defendants, he was to head the new government in
the event of a successful coup. The sixth extended Plenum of the
Central Committee (5-9 August, immediately after the trial) expelled
Pak Hon-yong from the party and ordered an investigation into his
activities.'41 few doubted that all this foreshadowed a mock trial
followed by execution in the immediate future. However, his trial,
which took place on 15 December 1955, was conducted under rather
different circumstances, and preparation for it lasted some two and a
half years. Pak Hon-yong was accused of being an American agent
from 1939, sabotaging Communist activity during the first months
after Liberation, masterminding assauinations ofunderground activists,
and finally preparing, in conspiracy with Yi Siing-yop and others, a
coup to seize power in the DPR.K.
Despite all efforts undertaken by the authorities, an attempt to
stage another big show trial either failed or, more likely, was deemed
unnecessary. By the end of1955, when Pak's trial finally took place,
the world situation and the situation in the Communist camp espe-
cially had changed markedly, such that a new open trial was no
longer desirable. The very concept was too Stalinist for the new era,
when witch-hunts were becoming unpopular in most Communist
countries. Hence, the former leader of the Korean Communist Party
was tried in semi-closed hearings which lasted a mere nine hours.
In a further retreat from Stalinist pseudo-legality, the defendant was
not provided with a defence lawyer, while the coun was presided
over by Ch'oe Yong-g0n, a former guerrilla commander and a per-
sonal friend of Kim II Sung, but a man with no legal background. 42
Formally, this trial was considered to be open, but the audience
was very carefully selected and consisted ofpolice officers and trusted
party functionaries, while the amount of publicity was much less
than during the 1953 show trial; only short reports were published
<l&fhe diary of S.P. Suzdalcv, Soviet charge d'affaires, 27 July 1953, AVPRF.
fond 0102, opis 9, dclo 9, papk2 44.
• 1The diary ofS.P. Suzdalcv, Soviet charge d'affaire., 10 August 1953, AVPRF,
fond 0102, opis 9, delo 9, papk2 44.
42For materials on the trial of Pak. H6n-y6ng se-e Kim Nam-sik., Namnodang
yongu, pp. 506-11, 574-82.

The Factions in the North Kort4n Leadership 101
in the newspapers. Kang Sang-ho, who was present, says that Pak
Hon-yong's behaviour was rather ambiguous: he tlid not challenge
the accusations and he admitted the charge of espionage and con-
spiracy, but often sounded Jess persuasive than the defendants in the
1953 trial. For example, when asked if he had provided the US·
military with information about the Korean Communist movement,
Pak answered in the affirmative, remarking however that he had passed
such information only to people whom he considered to be Commu-
nists. 43 Kang Sang-ho's impression was that Pak avoided blaming others,
instead claiming that he himselfwas solely responsible for his 'crimes'.
The published materials of these hearings confirm such a view. Even
in his brief final statement, Pak again stressed that he was solely
responsible for everything. Pak also confirmed his 'spying activity'
for the United States, while managing to avoid taking responsibility
for any alleged 'terrorist acts' against South Korean Communists.
Nevertheless, in the best spirit ofStalinist-Maoist justice these absurd
claims were confirmed by 'witnesses' and hence were considered to
be proved beyond doubt. The court pre<lictably sentenced Pak Hon-
Yong to death, but, according to Kang Sang-ho, this verdict was not
carried out immetliately since the authorities hoped to get adtli-
tional evidence fiom Pak to be used later in the internal political
struggle. Kang Sang-ho insists that Pak was murdered in the autumn
of 1956 during the tumultuous events which followed the August
(1956) Plenum of the KWP Central Comrnittee. 44
The Yi and Pak trials were followed by the arrest of other former
activists and members of the South Korean Workers' Party throughout
the country, who were accused of espionage and factionalist activity.
The trials of these minor figures tlid not attract much publicity. In
some cases, trials were not held at all: the individuals were simply
ousted from their positions and sent to the countryside with minimal
concern for legal niceties. Such a simplistic ~pproach to justice was
gaining popularity in Pyongyang around this time.
The Domestic faction was not eliminated immediately: many
Jess notable or luckier Southerners escaped repression for some time,
43 /bid., p. 507.
44 lnterview with Kang Sang-ho. 30 November 1989. LeningDd. Most South
Korean specialists believe that the verdict in respect to Pak Hon-yong was c:arried
out immediately. However, Kang Sang-ho could be right, particularly if we take
into account the fact that Yi Kang-guk and Cho 11-myong appeared in P2lc HISn-
ylSng's trial as eyewitnesses, even though they had been sentenced to death two
yean earlier with Yi Siing-ylSp.

although only a handful of them survived for more than a couple of
years. Nevertheless, after the trials of Yi Siing-y6p and Pak H6n-
y6ng, the Domestic faction lost most ofits leaders ofany significance,
leaving its surviving members easy victims oflater pwges. In the second
half of the 1950s, the Domestic faction practically ceased to exist; it
was eliminated mainly by the former guerrillas, with a degree ofsupport
and participation from the Soviet and Yanan factions whose members
hoped to use the opportunity to strengthen their own positions. Kim
II Sung's policy of exploiting the rivalry between the factions was
paying dividends.
The Soviet and Yanan factions were to become the next victims
of the purge, especially as the changing international situation made
such a turn in internal Korean policy possible for Kim. The beginning
of a de-Stalinisation campaign in the Soviet Union resulted in the
steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, which in tum gave
the North Korean government more space to manoeuvre and an
opportunity to follow a more independent policy. Kim II Sung also
feared that the Soviet criticism directed towards Stalin could threaten
his own position, since the analogies between the two leaders were
striking. In December 1955 he organised a brief attack on a number
ofprominent Soviet Koreans who were accused ofconducting a 'wrong
policy in the field ofliterature'. Some of them, including their leader
Pak Ch' ang-ok. were deprived of their posts. We can surmise that by
undertaking this attack Kim possibly hoped to reduce the dangerous
influence ofa de-Stalinising Soviet Union. However, events soon took
a very different tum: some activists of the Yanan faction, supported by
Pak Ch'ang-ok and a handful ofSoviet Koreans, openly criticised Kim
and his politics at the August (1956) Plenum ofthe Central Committee.
This incident is discussed in Chapter 6 at some length.
When news ofthe dramatic confrontation in Pyongyang reached
Moscow and Peking, ajoint Soviet-Chinese delegation led by Anastas
I. Mikoyan and Peng De-huai was dispatched to Pyongyang to inves-
tigate and 'instruct' the KWP leaders as well as to stop any purge of
the Yanan faction. The delegation forced Kim to convene another
Plenum of the KWP Central Committee: this Plenum took place on
23 September and officially pardoned all participants in the August
incident. Still, Kim was not disposed to carry out the 'September
decisions' imposed on him under foreign pressure. Though formally
rehabilitated, the dissenters were never restored to their former po-
sitions, and in early 1957 large-scale purges of the Yanan faction
began.

From late 1956 the North Korean authorities conducted so-called
'ideological inspections' of 'unreliable elements'; these inspections
consisted of very public interrogations of a suspect, often held in his
work unit. The co-workers ofthe accused were encouraged to come
forward with information of their wrongdoing. The idea was obviously
borrowed fiom Mao's China where the same methods were widely
used during the Cultural Revolution, but it had been invented much
earlier. Often, these interrogation sessions lasted for days and even
weeks and had to be complemented by public repentance by the
victims, often again at special meetings in their workplaces. In most
cases an 'ideological inspection' was just the preliminary for a formal
arrest. The Yanan faction members were the first victims of these
'inspections', but from 1958 onwards they were also increasingly applied
to Soviet Koreans. Real or imaginary connections with the August
conspirators were the most usual pretext for such purges. Almost all
prominent Soviet or Yanan Koreans had some such connections,
however superficial, so anybody could be accused ofassociating with
the 'factionalists'.
As a result of the purges, in 1957-8 the Yanan faction ceased to
exist. One of the campaign's victims was Kim Tu-bong, the first
chairman of the KWP and first head of the North Korean state, and
accused ofbeing the mastermind of the entire conspiracy, although
he had not been directly involved in the August attack. 45 Some
members of the Yanan faction retained their posts, but their influence
was waning, and, more importantly, they could no longer act as a
united force. This time there were very few who managed to escape
to China and find asylum there. 46 The number offugitives rose in
45 1Gm Tu-bong was ofliciaUy accused of being a conspirator (even a secret

mastermind of the entire August affair) in December 1957 and was subjected to
humiliating 'seuions of criticism'. He appeared briefly at the KWP Fint Conference
in March 1958. Thert",l>jt .former secretary was made to air a standard set offantastic
accusations against him, and Kim Tu-bong was summoned before the C onference
briefly to plead guilty and deliver a standard speech of repentance and 'self-criticism'.
Soon afterwards he disappeared for good, and no reliable information about his
subsequent fate is available at the time of writing. According to sriU unconfirmed
rumours, Kim Tu-bong is believed to have been assassinated or to have died in the
early 1960s in some remote part of North Korea.
46Apart from the successful escape of Yun Kong-hllm and his group of four to
China, there were few similar incidents throughout late 1956 and 1957. By January
1957, the total number of fugitives had reached eleven, and probably increased
thereafter. This information about the escapes was provided by North Korean officials
during their talks with the Soviet diplomats. See record of conversation between

104 From Stalin to Kim nSung
the late 1950s, although there is no evidence that the North Korean
authorities ever allowed such large-scale legal re-emigration ofYanan
faction members as they did for the Soviet Koreans, who were often
allowed and sometimes encouraged to return home.
After the elimination of the Yanan faction, the Soviet Koreans
remained the only non-Guerrilla faction in the Korean leadership
and by the late 1950s even they were no longer beyond Kim's reach.
The Soviet influence in North Korea had significantly declined
during the Korean w.u and afterwards, while the ongoing Sino-Soviet
conflict made a direct Soviet intervention on behalf of the Soviet
Koreans unlikely.
In the autumn of 1958 the first arrests of Soviet Koreans took
place. Among the victims were Kim Ch'il-song, the former chiefof
w
staff of the North Korean navy, and Pak Ui-wan, an outspoken deputy
prime minister. During 1959 there were arrests and 'ideological
examination' of the Soviet Koreans. People were disappearing. Ac-
cording to the estimates of their former comrades, at least forty-five
prominent Soviet Koreans (roughly a quarter of their initial total)
were purged and died in the North in the late 1950s and early
1960s.47 Although in the North Korean situation it was often im-
possible to learn much about what had befallen the prisoners, not to
mention the accusations against them, it was common knowledge
that Soviet Koreans, like the former Yanan exiles, were usually ac-
cused of'factionalist anti-party activities'.4a
The deterioration of Soviet-Korean relations and intensifying
purges meant that contacts with the Soviet Union ceased to be a basis
for the Soviet Koreans' privileged status - on the contrary, these con-
nections soon became dangerow for them. Some Soviet Koreans tried
to adapt to the new situation; a few even took an active part in purges,
obviously in the hope of securing Kim II Sung's trust. Such were,
for instance, the cases of Pang Hak-se, Nam II and Pak Chong-ae.
However, the vast majority of former Soviet citilens did their best
to leave Korea and return to the Soviet Union. Since 1958, after the
V.J . Pelishenko (provisional charge d'atfaires) 211d Pak Ch6ng-ae (depucy chairman
ofthe KWP Central Committee), 17December1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 13,
delo 6, papka 72. Record ofconvenation between V.I. Pelishenko (provisional chargC
d'affaires) and Nam 11 (Minister of Foreign Affain), 4 January 1957, AVPRF. fond
0 I 02, opis 13, delo 6, papka 72.
"Mirolt Chosiln minjujuili inmin ltonghwagult, pp. 371-2.
48 Interview with Pak Z.P., 1 February 1991, Tashkent.

initial arrests, a mass exodus of Soviet Koreans from the DPRK to
the USSR began. It lasted until late 1961.49
In December 1957 the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed an
official agreement which made dual citizenship impossible. For Kim
ll Sung the agreement was a major diplomatic success, since it became
an obstacle to one of the possible avenues for Soviet influence over
North Korean politics. Under the agreement, all Soviet citizens who
had been working in Korea (i.e. a majority of the Soviet Koreans) had
to choose either ofthe two citizenships. Those who chose the Soviet
Union were officially considered 'foreigners' and as such could not
normally occupy official positions any longer. Hence, understandably
most of the Soviet Koreans opted for North Korean citizenship. They
did so in order to keep their posts, but at the same time they now
became even more vulnerable to the ongoing purges. Nevertheless,
the legal status of many of them remained uncertain through 1958
and 1959, thus enabling many of them still to apply for permission
to return to the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens.
Fearing that attempts to rescue Soviet Koreans would be considered
an 'interference in the internal affairs' of the DPRK and would thus
damage the delicate balance of intrigue in the Moscow-Peking--
Pyongyang triangle, the Soviet embassy abstained from any decisive
measures and often failed to act on behalfof the Soviet Koreans. On
10 February 1956, when the purges of the Soviet Koreans were still
very limited in scale, A.M. Petrov, then Soviet charge d'affaires, remarked
to Kim II Sung (as recorded in an official diary): 'In the opinion ofthe
Soviet Union, people from among the Soviet Koreans who committed
offences should not escape punishment by returning to the Soviet
Union. Hence, everybody who has committed an offence must answer
for it here and should be appointed to a lesser post than [he] previously
held'. 50 This approach did not change much subsequently, when the
purges escalated after the failure of the opposition attempts at the
August Plenum. This was only too typical ofSoviet (and Russian) policy:
49Emigration to the Soviet Union did not necessarily mean that a defector had
belonged to the Soviet faction earlier. Thus Yi Sang-jo, the DPRK ambassador to
the Soviet Union, who refused to come back to Pyongyang and wrote Kim II Sung
a very critical letter, had been a prominent member ofthe Yanan faction. Together
with Yi, several other minor Yanan figures remained in the Soviet Union. Among
those postgraduate students who did not return to Korea li:om the Soviet Union in
the late 1950s were some memben of the DomC$!ic faction.
Sl>Jbe diary of A.M. Petrov, Soviet temporary charge d'a.ffaircs, 9-15 February
1956, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
rron1
oig1tlze1lby Google Origi~al
disdain for the country's own citizens and a tendency to sacrifice
everything and everybody for what the government in power rightly
or wrongly might consider the 'national interests'.
While this cautious Soviet approach might somehow be justifiable,
there were other, less excusable, problems. When the Korean side
had allowed somebody to leave Korea, it was usual for the Soviet
authorities to subject the application to return to the Soviet Union
to a bureaucratic procedure which took several months. This delay
cost some people their lives, because after a few months the North
Korean authorities often changed their minds and the would-be
escapee was apprehended and then disappeared for ever. 51 However,
it would be unfair not to mention that some staff members of the
Soviet consulate helped Soviet Koreans return to the Soviet Union.
One such man was Vadim P. Tkachenko, later head of the Korean
department in the Soviet Central Conunittee.52 However, these were
exceptions. Perhaps the most spectacular exception was the case of
Nikolai Pak (Pak Kil-nam), former head ofthe engineering department
in the Korean People's Army headquarters. Pak was arrested in the
late 1950s and for forty days was subjected to 'ideological inspection'.
After his release he immediately took refuge in the Soviet embassy
in the quarters of General Malchevski, the military attache, and after
Jong and uneasy negotiations the embassy obtained permission from
the Korean authorities for Pak Kil-nam to return to the Soviet Union.
This outcome was said to have been determined by the good contacts
of Pak's wife, who since her youth had been known to the Soviet
elite: rumour had it that she knew Marshal K.. Voroshilov and some
other top Soviet leaders well, and managed to use these lifelong
connections to save her husband from almost certain death. Pak's case
was by no means typical. 53
The main goal of Kim II Sung was not so much the physical as
political elimination of the Soviet faction, and the best way to do this
was by pushing these people out of politics and, preferably, out of
the country. Both 'ideological inspections' and the arrests of some
well-known Soviet Koreans were part of the intimidation campaign.
Intimidated Soviet Koreans were more likely to remain silent or,
better still, start packing their luggage. In the late 1950s Soviet Koreans
511nterview with Kang Sang-ho, 30 November 1990, Leningrad.

52Interview with Yu S<Sng-~I. 22 January 1991, Tashkent.
53Interviews with Kang Sang-ho, 7 March 1990, Leningrad, and with G.K.
Plotnikov, 1 February 1990, Moscow.

Tht Factions in tht North Korean uadmhip 107
were not usually prevented fiom leaving the country ifthey wished to
do so, and indeed, in many cases the authorities themselves encouraged
them to leave. In 1959, for instance, the chief of the North Korean
general staff called a special meeting of all Soviet Korean senior
officers and said that all who wished to return to the Soviet Union
could do so.S4 Often such offers were made individually. Thus Yu
Si>ng-hun, the former rector of Kim II Sung University, was advised
by his superiors to go to the Soviet Union 'to have a rest and to improve
his health' (and it was made clear that he should postpone his return
indefinitely).55
By the late 1950s Kim 11 Sung had managed to use the differences
that deeply divided the North Korean ruling elite to eliminate his
enemies one by one, using them against each other. His victory was
celebrated in 1961 at the 4th Congress ofthe KWP, which was marked
by the unprecedented praising ofthe 'Great Leader'. The new situation
was reflected in the composition of the party's highest organ.
Table 3.2. FACTIONS INTHE KWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 1%1
Mtial Committtt Tit< CattnJI Com1t1illtt in '"""'1
Soviet 2 2
Yanan I 3
Domestic I 3
Guerrilla 6 37
Othnl.lunknown I 23
As Table 3.2. shows, the former guerrillas formed a majority in

the 1961 KWP Central Committee although there were still some
lucky survivors from other factions. It should also be noted that
there were fewer changes in the Political Committee (Politburo)
than in the Central Committee as a whole. At that time, paradoxically,
54 Inrtrview with Sim Su-ch'61, 17 January 1991.

55 Inrtrview with S.P. Yug;ai,January 1990, Moscow.
56-fhis table is chiefly based on Wada Haruki's results (Wada Haruki, Kim D
~ng-gwo Monju hang'il c/Wnjatng, pp. 310-12), but with two minor adjustments.
First, Pak Ch6ng-ae is considered to be a member of the Soviet and not the Domestic
faction. Second, one cannot agiee with Wada Haruki in classifying all those Centnl
Committee memben who had lived in North Korea before 1945 as belonging to

108 From Stalin to /(jm fl Sung
there were still members ofthe non-Guerrilla factions in the Politburo.
Perhaps at such a high level Kim ll Sung could retain several people
whom he knew personally and could largely trust in spite of their
dubious backgrounds. Thus the Soviet faction was represented in
the Political Committee by Pak Chtsng-ae and Nam ll - men whose
personal loyalty to Kim had by then been tested more than once.
Apart from these, there were no other Soviet Koreans in either the
Politburo or the Central Committee (even the notorious Pang Hak-
se was not 'elected' a member in 1961). The same is true ofthe only
Politburo member with a Yanan background, Kim Ch'ang-rnan, who
had become one of those most adulatory of Kim ll Sung as early as
1948-50. Kim Ch'ang-rnan had also been one of the most zealous
prosecutors of the factionalists, including his fellow Yanan comrades,
during the purges of 195~0.
However, most of these survivors did not last for Jong. In the
summer ofl 968 Pak Chtsng-ae suddenly disappeared from the North
Korean political scene to reappear again two decades later and in a
secondary position and Nam II died mysteriously in a car accident
in 1976. Kim Ch'ang-man disappeared from the political arena in
1966 and supposedly died in a remote village where he worked as a
farmer in an agricultural co-opel'2tive. 57 By the late 1960s, with few
exceptions, the DPRK was run by either former guerrillas or young
technocl'2ts who had carved out their careers after Libel'2tion and
were also Kim's men.
The consolidation of Kim II Sung's personal power took slighdy

Jess than fifteen years to complete. At first his influence was much Jess
than that ofmany other Communist leaders, and his Guerrilla faction
was the weakest among the four distinctive and competing groups.
But it was the fact that Kim was chosen by the Soviet authorities to
be the North Korean leader that determined his eventual success. In
the Domestic faction. Before 1945, most of these people (about fifteen of them
were in the 1961 Central Committee} had few ifany contacts with the Communist
movement and their road to power and prominence started after Liberation. Some
of them were first North Korean technocrats, others were party cadres of a more
traditional type. However, a majority of them entered the party after Liberation
and it was within the party of Kim DSung that they had made their careers. Their
political experience and world view had nothing in common with the people
from the Domestic faction.
57Pultlum inmy6ng saj6n, p. 119.

The Factions in the North Korean Leadmhip 109
order to promote him and the Soviet Koreans, the Soviet military
authorities strove to limit the influence ofboth Yanan exiles and local
underground Communists. As a result, a relative balance of power
had emerged in North Korea by the late 1940s between the four
major factions inside the KWP. while Kim II Sung was transformed
into the unchallenged leader of the regime.
From the beginning of the Korean war in 1950, Kim II Sung, at
first timidly and then more brazenly, began to distance himself from
Soviet policy and Soviet interests. In the struggle for the consolidation
of his regime he was supported by the former Manchurian guerrilla
fighters who were bound to him by both personal loyalty and political
interest. In 1950-3 Kim cautiously eliminated a few of the most
dangerous leaders of the Yanan and Soviet factions. However, his main
efforts were directed towards the Domestic faction which was the
most vulnerable due to its lack of foreign patronage. In 1953-5 the
Domestic faction was eliminated.
In 1956 Kim went on the defensive for a while, as he resisted the
efforts of the Yanan faction to depose him. The plot of the Yanan
group, supported by some Soviet Koreans and known as the 'August
incident', ended in failure and became a signal for a general offensive
against the Yanan faction. Most ofits prominent members were purged
in 1957-9. The final elimination of the Soviet faction followed, when
the majority ofits activists were forced to return to the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the early 1960s, Kim II Sung's power had been consoli-
dated. This led to profound changes in North Korea's internal and
foreign policy. In cultural and economic policy and state administra-
tion, the blind and slavish copying ofSoviet patterns was abandoned,
and the policy of chuch'e or nationalistic self-reliance was launched
- this word was used then for the first time. Needless to say, the new
was not necessarily better than the old, and often the reverse was the
case. Foreign policy became more independent: no longer a Soviet
satellite, North Korea turned into a country manoeuvring more or
less successfully between the Soviet Union and China, trying to use
the differences between the two rival giants to its own advantage.
Simultaneously, the regime became much harsher towards its own
population, as the relative (very relative) freedoms of the 1950s were
curtailed. All these changes became possible after the elimination of
the factions and were themselves largely the result of this process.

4
THE EMERGENCE OFTHE SOVIET
FACTION IN NORTH KOREA,
1945-55
Very important roles in the formation of the North Korean state

and its early development were played by numerous Soviet Koreans
- Soviet citizens ofKorean extraction. They were sent to North Korea
. by the Soviet authorities and occupied various leading positions during
the period ofl 945-60. This chapter considers the circumstances of
their arrival in North Korea, their activities in 1945-50, and the
emergence of the so-called Soviet faction in the North Korean
leadership. It is based on some materials which the author discovered
in the Soviet archives, but also on interviews with several Soviet
Koreans. These were conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
when most of these figures were still alive. I have tried to rely more
on contemporary papers to which I managed to obtain access during
my research in Russia. However, so far only a fraction of the related
documents from the Soviet archives have been de-classified and
exposed to study. Hence this work is only a starting point for more
detailed studies to be undertaken in the future, However, in spite of
its limitations it sheds some light on a period which has hitherto been
somewhat shrouded in mystery.
Russia is a multinational state comprising over 130 nationalities.

Many of the Russian ethnic minorities consist of descendants of
immigrants. Besides Koreans, one can find in Russia German, Polish,
Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian and Hungarian communities, but the
Korean community was one of the largest. Their immigration into
the Russian Far East began in the late 1860s, and by the 1890s had
became a significant phenomenon. By the time of the Communist
110

The Emergen« ofthe Soviet Faction in North Korea 11 1
Revolution in 1917, about 100,000 ethnic Koreans were living there.
The governments of Russia and the Soviet Union, like those of
many other states with a similar ethnic and political make-up, have
often used the 'minority factor' in their foreign policy. After the
Second World War, when the Soviet authorities launched a policy of
'communisation' in the Soviet-occupied countries ofEastern Europe
and the Baltic Republics, many people ofsuitable ethnic background
were sent to the lands of their (or their ancestors') origin to facili-
tate the establishment of Communist regimes and ensure better Soviet
control over them. The former Soviet nationals became a part of the
new ruling elites in many Communist countries- e.g., a Polish army
created in the Soviet Union during the Second World War consisted
largely of Soviet Poles. Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, a leading
Soviet commander, himself of Polish descent, was sent after the war
to Poland where he was Minister ofDefence from November 1949
until October 1956. He was accompanied by a group ofSoviet offic-
ers, many of them also ethnic Poles. A similar pattern can be observed
in some other Soviet-occupied countries of Eastern Europe and,
notably, in the Baltic Republics (for example, in Es•onia the Siberian-
born Estonians continued to play an important political role until
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991). Thus the participation of
Soviet Koreans in the development of the state, party and military
structures of North Korea in the 1940s was not an isolated phe-
nomenon. However, in no other 'communised' country outside the
Baltic Republics did Soviet nationals play such a critical role as in
Korea.
As we have seen in previous chapters, the specifics of this role
were determined first of all by the unique political situation in North
Korea after its occupation by the Soviet army. In Eastern Europe, the
occupying Soviet authorities could rely on local Communists whose
influence was sometimes considerable. Hence, in such countries the
Kremlin only occasionally used Soviet citizens of a specific ethnic
background (or political emigrants who had long lived in the Soviet
Union) in order to secure better general control over the country or
transmit the obligatory Soviet experience. In North Korea the Com-
munist movement had been weak, and thus the Soviet authorities had
to create a foundation for the sort of regime they wanted to see there.
Hence the special role of the Soviet faction, as well as of other Koreans
who came from abroad.
Depending on the time and circumstances of their arrival in
Korea, the Soviet Koreans can be generally divided into four 'waves'.

112 From Stalin to IGm n Sung
The first consisted of those who had been sent to Korea by the Soviet
intelligence agencies and/ or the Comintern before Liberation, in
the 1920s, '30s and early '40s. The second included those who came
to Korea after Liberation, in 1945-6, as Soviet army personnel. The
third consisted of those dispatched to Korea in 1946-8 as teachers
and civilian advisers. The second and third waves were by far the
most numerous and important. Irrespective of the circumstances of
their arrival and their initial plans, these Soviet Koreans soon found
themselves working in North Korean institutions and normally
occupying quite important positions. The final fourth wave, consisting
of the Soviet citizens of Korean origin who came to North Korea
mainly for personal reasons during and after the Korean war, was
politically the least important. 1
The first group - Soviet Koreans who had come to the country
before Liberation - was not numerous. Since the mid-1920s, the
Soviet intelligence services and Comintern agencies had dispatched
Soviet Koreans to instigate underground operations in Korea. It was
not difficult to find suitable operatives. The vast majority ofRussian
Koreans supported the 1917 Communist Revolution, and during
the Civil War many ethnic Koreans joined the Red Army and Com-
munist guerrilla units. Among Koreans living in the Far East in the
1920s, there were many party and Communist youth (Komsomol)
activists who dreamed of the 'romance' of underground activity in the
land of their ancestors. For them such an activity meant struggling
against the hated Japanese (or rather the 'Japanese imperialists') while
1This idea of four 'waves' might seem a bit too general, since every 'wave'
encompasses many sepante arrivals of snWI groups and individuals. This is especially
true of the 'tint wave' which by definition consisted of individual arrivals (one can
hardly imagine spies arriving in big and well-organised groups). So f.ir in the literanin.
there have been two anempa to sort out the information on individual and snWI
group arrivals (in both cases the data were obtained through penonal interviews
conducted in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1990s). The first was
undertaken by Hll Un-bae (nickname Lim On) in The Founding of" Dyruuty in
Nonh Kort11, Tokyll Jiyu-sa, 1982, and another by a group ofSouth Korean journalisa
who conducted their research in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s (Pirolt Clu>1on
minjujuui inmin ltonghwogult, Seoul: Chung'ang ilbosa, 1992). However, there are
numerous contradictions between the data of these two books, as well as between
these and data collected by this author. These discrepancies are mostly of a minor,
even trivial, nature, but sorting them out or even listing them in this chapter would
require more space than is available. Hence I have decided to limit myself to a
general picture and not to dwell unduly on details. These things will be sorted out
in due time, when all relevant sources are available.

The Emergence of the Soviet Faction in North Korea 113
at the same time fighting for the great Communist cause in which
they sincerely believed.
In the early 1920s, when the Soviet-Korean and Soviet-Chi-
nese borders were not as strictly controlled as they were later, some
young Koreans departed for 'revolutionary work' in Korea, more or
less on their own initiative. Thus a group of the so-called 'anarchists-
syndicalists', including Lavrentii Kang (Kang Chin), Boris Kim (Kim
Chin), Mikhail Han (Han Pin), all originally from the Posiiet district,
left the Soviet Union in the mid-1920s. In the opinion of Han Pin,
who was considered the ideologue of this group, the Soviet Com-
munist Party did too little for the world revolution and particularly
for a revolution in Korea. Around 1926-7 these youngsters left for
Manchuria and Korea for underground work. 2 Some of them per-
ished in Japanese prisons, while others, Han Pin and Kang Chin
among them, participated in the Communist movement in the South
after Liberation and then occupied important posts in the DPRK -
where they later became victims of Kim 11 Sung's purges.3
From the mid-1920s onwards, sending Soviet Koreans to do under-
ground work in Korea and Manchuria became common practice
for the Comintern. Their tasks were to propagate Communist ideas
and to establish connections with the local Communist underground.
Although the details of their activities will be known only after the
archives of the Comintern, as well as those of the intelligence and
security services, are opened, it is clear that during more than two
decades Moscow sent a considerable number of people to Korea.
Most died or were killed, and only a handful survived till 1945. Among
21n an interview with the author, Kmg Sang-ho told ofrumoun that the depar-
ture of this group might have been organised by the Comintcrn but was presented
as an independent action for conspiratio1121 reasons. However, a collection of 'char-
acteristics' of Korean politicians compiled for the CPSU Central Committee in
1946 states: 'Han Pin ... In 1926 excluded fiom the Soviet Communist youth
IC<lgue for factionalist activities. Carne to Korea via Manchuria, organised a ML
group'; 'Kang Chin ... In 1927 excluded liom the Soviet Communist youth IC<lgue
for factionalist activities. Came to Korea together with Han Pin' (RUS$ian Centre for
Preservation and Study ofDocwncnts for Current History (henceforth RTsHIDNI),
fond 17, opis 128, delo 61). IfHan Pin and Kang Chin were indeed sent to Korea
by the Comintcrn, this would probably have been mentioned in their 'characteris-
tics'. Eventually Han Pin played a significant role among Yanan exiles. In 1957-8,
during the purges of the Yanan faction, he was presented as one of the principal
culprits.
3 Interview with Kim Ch'an, 15 January 1991, Tashkent. Kim Ch'an was a
finance specialist who in 1945-56 worked in the banking institutions of the DPRK.

these survivors one must mention Pak Chong-ae and Kim Yong-
bom, the best- known members of this 'first wave', who played an
important role in the post-war developments in the DPRK. Pak
Chong-ae (Vera Tsoi) graduated from a teachers' 'tehnikum' (a sort of
junior college) in Voroshilov (now Ussuriisk) in the Soviet Far East and
went to Moscow to continue her education.• There she was admit-
ted to one of the Comintern's schools and after some training was
sent to Korea together with Kim Yong-born (probably in 1931). For
reasons of their 'cover', they had to pose as a couple, though soon this
marriage became real.5 Pak Ch'ang-ok, the future leader of the Soviet
faction, had also been sent to Korea just before Liberation with a
secret mission.6 Most of the Soviet Koreans sent by the Comintern
became active in Seoul and the South. Very few were in Pyongyang
when the Soviet army arrived there in August 1945.
In 1937 all Soviet Koreans were forcibly deported from the lands
in the Far East where they had lived since the 1870s and moved to
Central Asia. The official explanation was that Koreans were politically
unreliable, being suspected of spying for the Japanese - thus they
could not be allowed to live near the border with Japanese-controlled
Manchuria. In their new place of residence they were subjected to
various restrictions, inter alia on their freedom of movement. It was
the first case in Soviet history when an entire ethnic group was
punished for alleged (or potential) collaboration with the enemy,
and when ethnicity was seen as a sufficient reason for persecution. At
the same time, the Soviet Korean intellectual and political elite were
<4-fhe fact that Pale Ch6ng-ae studied at the Voroshilov Teachen' Tehnilcum is
confirmed by a 1946 document (Memo Biographical data and personal
characteristics of leaden of parties and social groups in North Korea, sent by T.F.
Shtylcov to Suslov, CPSU Central Committee, RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis' 128,
delo 61). In the same document it is said that Kim Yong-Mm W2S sent to Korea in
1931. Pale Ch6ng-ae's authentic surname W2J Ch'oe, traditionally transcribed in
Russian as Tsoi, but only her Russian given name Vera is lcnown (she must have
also had a Koiean given name, as ii W2S a norm among the Koreans at the time) .
51nterview with Kang Sang-ho, 7 March 1990, Leningrad. In 1945-59 Kang
Sang-ho, a Soviet reacher, journalist and party cadre, worlccd in the DPRK, in
particular as director of the High Party school and the deputy minister of the
interior.
6Accotding 10 Lim On, Pale Ch'ang-olc W2S already in Korea in August 1945
running a covert mission: Lim On, nu Founding ofa Dynasty in North Korea, p. 143.
The same information W2J given to the author by Yu S6ng-ch'6l, a former staff
member ofthe Soviet military intelligence: interview with Yu Sling-ch' 61, 29January
1991, Tashlccn1.

The Emergence ofthe Soviet Faction in North Korea 115
subjected to purges - quite severe even by the brutal Soviet standards
of 1937. Around the same time Comintern agents ceased being sent
to Korea, and the training of Soviet Koreans for underground work
became the prerogative ofSoviet intelligence services; the tasks of the
agents had also shifted from igniting the local Communist movement
to more 'conventional' spying. However, even in the earlier period
there had been no clear-cut division between spying and political
tasks, since people sent by the Comintern earlier also provided the
Soviet Union with political intelligence.
In 1940 a military intelligence school near Moscow established a
special year-long course exclusively for training officers from among
Soviet Koreans. In 1942 the graduates of this course numbered six
(it is unknown how many graduated in 1941). They were sent on
secret missions to Korea and Manchuria, and most eventually found
themselves in the 88th Brigade, together with Kirn II Sung and his
guerrillas. The most famous of these graduates, Yu S<Sng-ch'<Sl, later
served as the head of operations of the North Korean General Staff.7
When in August 1945 Soviet troops entered the territory of North
Korea, they found there only a few former Soviet Koreans, among
whom ambitious and energetic Pak Ch<Sng-ae was by far the most
notable. Later some other Soviet Koreans, who had earlier worked
illegally in the South, also moved to the North, but even then the
number offormer Soviet agents and Comintern cadres in the DPRK
elite remained very small and their role in North Korean nation-
building was not very considerable.
The second and most nume.rous wave of Soviet Koreans in the
DPRK consisted of those who came to North Korea during the
first year after Liberation as servicemen in the Soviet Army. After
their deportation to Central Asia, Soviet Koreans were not normally
allowed to serve in the army and were enlisted only in exceptional
circumstances. However, these restrictions did not apply to Koreans
who prior to 1937 had lived in regions other than the Soviet Far
East, and therefore had avoided deportation. Some of the ethnic
Korean officers arrested in 1937 were released before the Second
World War and had participated in the fighting, but most of them
perished during the battles against the Germans. Some Koreans from
the regions outside Central Asia were also drafted (or volunteered)
to the army and took part in the Second World War. A few officers
ofKorean origin also served in the Far East in the 7th sections of the
71ntcrviews with Yu S6ng-ch'61, 18 and 29 January 1991, Tashkent.

political departments in various units, which were responsible for
'special propaganda' (psychological warfare) among the soldiers and
civilians of the enemy, as well as in Soviet-occupied territory. The
most prominent among these officers was Major Mikhail Kang, who
later significantly influenced Soviet policy in Korea. There were also
several Korean poets and writers, including Cho Ki-ch'on and Chon
Tong-hyok. For a short period before his untimely death in 1951,
Cho Ki-ch'on was one of the key figures in the North Korean literary
establishment.8
As we have mentioned, the command of the 25th Army, which
defeated the Japanese forces in North Korea in August 1945, had
been preparing to fight in Korea but not to rule the occupied coun-
try. Strangely, even Soviet officers of Korean origin who were fluent
in Korean participated in the war as 'ordinary' servicemen, conunanding
military units, like Chong Sang-jin, a marine captain. In interviews
all participants in the August battles pointed out that there were no
interpreters, which at the beginning seriously hampered communi-
cation between Russians and the local population, particularly ordi-
nary Koreans who had not masteredJapanese. 9 Japanese, the language
of the colonisers, was at first used for communication. On the whole,
the Soviet military authorities literally had no common language with
those whom they governed, and the only solution to this problem
was to bring Korean-speakers from the Soviet Union.
In late August a first group of around twelve Soviet Koreans was
sent to Pyongyang and put at the disposal of the 25th Army's political
administration. By then all members of this first group had already
served in the Soviet army, at the Far Eastern front headquarters. The
group was led by Major Mikhail Kang and Captain 0 Ki-ch'an.
Their main goals were to facilitate the communication between the
Soviet military and the locals, to undertake all kinds of translating
and interpreting, and first and foremost to conduct propaganda
activities. Kang and his group launched a Korean-language newspaper,
the ChosMI sinmun published by the Soviet military. Among its editors
and authors were several Korean men of letters, including Cho Ki-
80n the role ofCho Ki-ch'6n in North Korean literary circl~ sec an interesting
study by Brian Myers: Han Sol-ya and North Kortan Lilnlllu~: 'IM Foilu~ ofSoci41ist
JWilism in tM DPRK, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 40, 50-1.
9Interview with N.G. Lcbcdev, 13 November 1989, Moscow. Lcbcdev w.s a
Soviet general, in 1945 a member of the Military Council (political commissar) of
the 25th Army, later head of the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea.

ch' on and Chon Tong-hyok. 10 'Kang's group', often also called 'the
Soviet army press company', consisted of personnel fiom the 7th
department, who in theory were responsible only for translating and
publishing propaganda materials. However, in a situation where the
majority of Soviet officers and generals knew little about Korea,
ethnic Korean servicemen seldom limited themselves to psychological
operations and propaganda in a narrow sense. They chiefly acted as
consultants who exercised a significant influence over decision-making.
Their role was increased by a lack of Korea-related expertise among
the Soviet military and civilian managers. Not surprisingly. the first
years ofthe DPRK's existence were later called by Ho Un-bae the 'rule
of the Soviet interpreters'. 11
In 194~. Mikhail Kang was perhaps the most important of
these Soviet Koreans, an embodiment of the 'rule of the interpreters'
in the North. However, he soon left North Korea and played no role
in the country's development after 1948. On his return to the Soviet
Union, he retired fiom the army and worked as a journalist. In 1945
he held the highest military rank ofany Soviet Korean, and according
to eyewitnesses the very fact that among the Soviet troops was a major
of Korean origin impressed the locals: the more so since in the
Japanese Imperial army, which was better known to them, a major
was a more important rank than in the Soviet army. Formally Kang
arrived in Korea to publish the Choson sinmun, but this was only a
fraction of his diverse duties.
Soon, in September and October, the first group was joined by
other Soviet Koreans, who also had served as army officers: Chong
Hak-chun, Ch'oe Chong-hak, Ch'oe Hilng-guk, Chong Sang-jin
and Valentin Ch'oe (I'soi). 12 In September 1945 it became clear that
the needs of the Soviet military required many more Korean-speaking
interpreters and consultants than were available at the time in the
entire Soviet armed forces. Thus the military undertook a rational
step: it was decided to tap into a natural reservoir of linguistic and
other Korea-related expertise which was to be found in the large
Korean community in Soviet Central Asia, fiom among whom some
were enlisted into the army in the autumn of1945. Around the same
IOMuch material on the 2ctivities of this group is now 2vail2ble. E.g., see Lim
•
Un, TM Founding of a Dynasty in North Korta, pp. 143-4; Mirok Choson minjujai
inmin ltongMgult, Seoul: Chungan ilbo sa, 1992, pp. 178-81.
111.im On, Tht Founding of a Dynasty in North Korta.
12/bid.
rron1
118 From Stalin to Kim H Sung
time, the Central Conunittee collected the available data on the number
ofSoviet Koreans who were Party members. They numbered 3,853, a
vast majority ofwhom lived either in Kazakhstan (1, 719) or Uzbekistan
(1,926), while the remaining200 were scattered throughout the country
and probably had been outside the Far East xegion at the time of forced
relocation.13 However, only a fraction of these ethnic Korean Party
members were up to the task, since educated Koreans had much less
chance of surviving 1937. So the choice was not large.
In September-October 1945, groups were selected in Central
Asia by officers from Moscow and the representatives of the 25th
Army. Particular attention was paid to those ethnic Koreans who
had a good education and were considered 'politically and morally
reliable' - teachers and other professionals, as well as party and state
cadres of middle and low rank who had somehow managed to survive
1937. While most of those enlisted were rank-and-file, a few, including
A.I. Hegai and Kang Sang-ho, had been reserve officers and received
appropriate - generally rather junior - ranks once drafted.14 In the
beginning many of them served in the 7th Department ofthe political
administration of the 25th Army, although the majority worked as
interpreters in the Soviet Civil Administration and the offices of
Soviet kommendants Qocal military representatives). A contemporary
document (a memo sent by a Soviet officer from Korea to the Central
Committee in 1946) states that 128 Soviet Koreans arrived in North
Korea in September-November 1945, 15 but it is not clear whether
the Koreans who had arrived earlier with Major Kang are also included
this number - probably not, since the memo refers to 'a group of
Soviet Koreans who had been sent to North Korea from Central
Asia in September-November 1945', and all those whom it mentions
by name had been drafted into the army after August. Thus we can
estimate that by early 1946 there were probably already some 140-
150 Soviet Koreans in North Korea.
In the spring of 1946 the DPRK power structure was gradually
emerging. However, the lack of qualified cadres was clear. The Soviet
authorities badly needed people who had organisational skills and a
good education, who could explain the Soviet political idiom to Koreans
13For the data see RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 998, list l-4.
14Mirolt Choson minjujui inmin /rongh~ult,p. 178; in interview with Kang Sang-
ho, 31 October 1990, Leningrad.
15Memorandum to Suslov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,
RTsHIJ)NI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 55, list 5.
rron1
The Emergence of the &mt Faction in North Korea 119
and implement the Soviet models, while at the same time being
'politically reliable' and Joyal to the Soviet Union. This need was felt
by the North Korean Communists themselves: in April 1946 Kim II
Sung himself began to petition the Soviet authorities to send more
Soviet Koreans to North Korea. 16 Starting in 1946, Soviet Koreans
were transferred from the Soviet army to local administrative organs;
they retained Soviet citizenship and up till 1948 were technically
considered servicemen of the Soviet army. 17 An important shift in
recruiting happened around the summer of 1946. Before this time
the Soviet Koreans had been sent to the North as military personnel
after being drafted into the army. Since then Soviet civilian bodies (as
usual supervised by the party} became increasingly involved in the
recruitment which had previously been conducted exclusively by
the military. From late 1946 onwards decisions to send more Soviet
Koreans to Pyongyang were made by the Party Central Committee,
although the requests from the military authorities were taken into
consideration (it is also possible that for a while the military kept
recruiting Soviet Koreans independently, alon~ide civilian bodies, but
there is no proof of this in available material). In late 1946 the civilians
of the 'third wave' of Soviet Koreans began to arrive in the North.
These latest arrivals were mostly teachers and other civilian specialists,
who had been recruited by party institutions, rather than through
enlistment in the army. In reality the difference between those who
arrived as servicemen and their civilian colleagues was not great, since
both performed basically the same tasks.
At first the Soviet government considered that the primary mis-
sion of the new groups would be to teach Russian to the Koreans.
On 11 December 1946 the Soviet Politburo made a decision to organ-
ise, from 1 January 1947, six-month courses at the pedagogical 'in-
stitutes' (colleges) in Alma-Ata and Tashkent for 100 students (fifty
in each 'institute'). Their purpose was to train teachers ofRussian for
the schools and colleges ofNorth Korea. Students were supposed to
be college-educated and politically reliable Koreans living in the
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Soviet Republics. 18
16 Forone such letter, sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and eventually
forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee, see Copy ofletter by Kim II Sung to
General Ronunenko, RTsHIDNI , fond 17, opis 128, delo 205, p. 5.
171nterview with Kang Sang-ho, 30 November I 990, Leningrad.
18Decisions of the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions. Politburo
decision of 11December1946. A copy of the document is in a private collection.

120 From St4Un to Kim ll Sung
This decision had important consequences. Future teachers were
selected fiom Central Asia in late 1946 and sent to the 'special counes'
for teachers and, after their training, to North Korea. According to
Pak Pyong-yul. who had been a srudent on one of these counes, the
instruction was conducted under the dual control ofparty and military
bodies. Thus we can surmise that the military was still closely involved
in the process. 19 On 10October1946 the Soviet Politburo sent thirty-
six Soviet Koreans to Korea. One year later, on 27 October 1947, the
Soviet Politburo passed a decision to send to the DPRK thirty-four
teachen ofRussian (making, with their families a total oft 07 penons).
On 2 March 1948 a similar decision was made by the Politburo, and
another twenty-two people (sixty-three, including family members)
went to North Korea.20 Some of those who had initially moved to
Korea without their families later applied for permission to invite
their family members, which was normally granted (material available
does not mention a single case of rejection}, although approval was
needed at a very high level, by the Party Central Committee itself. As
a result of these family arrivals, the number ofSoviet Koreans slightly
increased. 21 There is reason to believe that, apart fiom the three above-
mentioned cases, the Politburo did not approve any other decisions
on sending Soviet Koreans to the North. Thus we can roughly estimate
the number of civilians dispatched to North Korea in 1946-8 at around
100, excluding family members. However, this number does not include
people who were sent to Korea by the military authorities, and at the
time of writing it is not clear whether the military ceased recruiting
Soviet Koreans after the spring of 1946 (although undoubtedly such
recruiting was greatly decreased). It is also likely that some Soviet
Koreans were sent by the special services as well, although their number
was scarcely significant.
In the first months after their arrival, these people worked in North
Korean schools and, more often, colleges. However, the shortage of
qualified personnel and educated people in general was so acute that
a majority of them were soon transferred to North Korean party
1
~he author was told of these courses in detail by Pait Py6ng-yul, a former
student of the programme, in an interview on 25 January 1990.
:!O[)ecisions of the Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions, Politburo
decision of 2 March 1948. A copy of the document is in a private collection.
21 For example, such permission was granted to Yi Sang-nam's wife and two
children (6 April 1948, RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 1143, list 167), Kim
Siing-hwa's wife and three children, and Afuwii Ogai's wife and three children (7
~ 1948, RTsHIDNl. fond 17, opis 128, delo 1143, list 168).

and state agencies. Thus Nam II, formerly the dean of Samarkand
Pedagogical Institute in Uzbekistan, who came to Korea with the
'group ofthirty-six', became the deputy head of the Education Bureau
ofthe Provisional People's Committee ofNorth Korea (in otherwor:ds,
deputy minister for education). During the Korean war he was the
chief of the General Staff and eventually replaced the disgraced Pak
Hon-yong as the DPRK's Foreign Minister. Pak Pyong-yul, who
also came to Korea in 1947 as a teacher, soon found himself as the
head of the Kangdong political school, the main training centre for
South Korean guerrillas and under:ground activists.22 Likewise their
military predecessors, the civilians of the 'third wave' had technically
remained Soviet citizens till the mid-1950s. However, not all Soviet
Koreans were expected to became teachers in Pyongyang. For example,
in January 1947, when the move toward the eventual creation of a
separate North Korea was gaining momentum, Shtykov specifically
asked the CPSU Central Committee to find two suitable ethnic Koreans
to be appointed secretaries to Chairman ofthe North Korean People's
Committee (i.e. Kim Tu-bong) and First Secretary ofthe South Korean
Workers Party (i.e. Pak Hon-yong). By then Kim 11 Sung already had
a Soviet Korean secretary. We may presume that their presence was
deemed necessary for the sake ofboth control and 'guidance' of the
local administration. 23
In late December 1948 the last Soviet troops left North Korea.
The Korean authorities compiled a list of those Soviet Koreans from
the Soviet military who had been offered the opportunity to remain
in the North Korean state, party or military structures. Shortly before
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Colonel A.M. lgnatiev, one of
the key figures in implementing Soviet policy in North Korea, had
assembled ethnic Korean military personnel and offered those whose
names were included on this list the choice ofwhether to remain in
North Korea or return to the Soviet Union. Although some returned
home with the Soviet army, the majority preferred to stay. 24 It is not
known (and is in any case doubtful) if the civilians had ever been
offered this same choice.
Only after the relevant archival documents become available will
22 1ntA:rview with Pak Py6ng-yul, 25 January 1990, Moscow.

23Memo of P. Strunnikov (head of the CPSU CC personnel department) to
A.A. Kuznetsov (CPSU secretary), 26November1947. RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis
127, delo 1482, list 152.
24Int<:rview with !Ung Sang-ho, 30 November 1990, Leningrad.

122 From St4lin to Kim II Sung
it be possible to establish just how many Soviet Koreans were sent to
work in the DPRK. HIS Un-bae (writing under the pseudonym Lim
w
Un) reports that in January 1949 there were 428 in Pyongyang; he

does not disclose his sources, which is understandable since HIS Un-
bae 's book was written in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, when such
research often amounted to a covert operation. 25 Lim On's figure can
be checked only when new documents become available, but in the
interim it looks plausible. Ifwe combine the four basic available figures,
three ofwhich have been mentioned ahow- 1~150 Soviet servicemen
ofKorean origin, 100 civilian teachers and advisers, 110 funily members
of the latter and an unknown number of the servicemen's families
(presumably around 100-150) - and take into account those Koreans
who left with the Soviet troops in 1948 or were recalled by Moscow,
we arrive at roughly the same figure - 400-450. However, less than
half of there were actually politicians and specialists, and a majority
were their children and/or spouses.
It is also necessary to mention that the 'cadre traffic' between the
Soviet Union and North Korea was not all in one direction. Some
Soviet Koreans were recalled to the Soviet Union. In most cases recall
was punishment for 'indecent behaviour', which at the time could
have included anything from bribes and corruption to critical remarks
about Stalin to illicit love affairs. For example, on 16 May 1951 the
Soviet Politburo made a special decision to recall nine Soviet Koreans,
seven of whom had 'misbehaved in Korea' (further investigation was
deemed necessary), and two of whom were simply 'of no use' there
(while not complimentary, this wording was less menacing). 26 Similar
incidents had occurred earlier as well (for example, V.V. Kovyzhenko
casually mentioned this fact in his 1948 memorandum). 27
Perhaps, the most widely discussed story was what happened to
Nikolai A. Pak, who arrived in Korea in September 1946 alone,
leaving his wife and two children at home. In 1947 it became widely
known that Pak was having an affair with a 'local Korean woman',
none other than HIS ChlSng-suk, who was then vice-head of the
propaganda department (vice-minister) of the North Korean gov-
ernment and could be considered the second most prominent North
25Lim Un, TM Founding ofa Dynasty in North Kami, p. 146.

26Decisions ofthe Soviet Politburo on Korea-related questions, Polilburo decision
of 16 May 1951. A copy of the document is in a pl'Mte collection.

27Letter ofV.V. Kovyzhenko IO L.S. Baranov, CPSU Central Conunitt.ee, 20 April
1948. In the author~ archive.

Korean female politician of the period. In the new situation, Pak
suddenly refused to go back to his family. A married man's romance
with a 'local' was a serious breach of the rather puritanical code of
conduct the Soviet authorities expected from their citizens overseas.
In addition to this much talked-of affair, an official document reports:
'according to the data acquired by the security agencies [i.e. presum-
ably provided by a police informer] Pak took an incorrect position
during the negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet foreign
trade agencies'. The document docs not clarify the last accusation so
we can only guess what 'incorrect position' means, but in June 1947
Pak was recalled to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Shtykov, who
was not afraid to argue with his superiors when necessary, began to
lobby for Pak's return and eventually had his way: in June 1948 Pak
was sent back to Korea. However, the situation changed yet again:
on his way back to Korea, Pak lost his passport (on purpose?), so he
could not cross the border and had to stay in the Soviet Union for
good. 28
The recalls were not always a result of misconduct; sometimes
the Soviet Koreans themselves petitioned for permission to leave.
After 1956 the number who opted to leave increased greatly under
mounting political pressure and threat of purges, but even earlier in
1953-5 some people asked for permission to go back to the Soviet
Union and were occasionally granted it. The author is aware of two
such cases (Ch'oc Pyo-diSk and Kim Ch'an, who both left after the
death of A.I. Hegai whose close friends they both were), but there
were undoubtedly other examples. Until after the 'August incident'
of 1956 the North Korean leaders had been reluctant to grant such
permission; for example, when Kim Chae-uk (then deputy minister
of agriculture) applied for a permit to leave North Korea in the
spring of 1956, Kim II Sung himself spent two hours trying to
persuade him to stay.29 In addition, the Soviet authorities sometimes
2&'fhere an: a few papen relating to the Pak affair: Memo to the CPSU CC
Sectctary A.A. Kuznetsov, 22 June 1948; Memo to L.S. Baranov, 14 April 1948; and
handwritten notes on the latter (RTsH!DNI , fond 17, opis 128, delo 1143, list
170-71).
:!'>fhis co~nation took place on 25 May. Two weeks later Kim Chae-uk
himself told a Soviet diplomat about it. Convenation ofS.N. Filatov, counsellor at
the Soviet embassy in the DPRK, with Kim Chae-uk, the DPRK deputy minister
ofagriculture, 9 July 1956, Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive (henceforth
AVPRF), fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.

124 From S14Iin to Kim n Sung
recalled an ethnic Korean whose presence in the Soviet Union was
considered more necessary. For example, in March 1949 they planned
to recall two Soviet Koreans who had arrived in the North in 1945 as
military personnel, because of the need for good translators and editors
at the government-run Foreign Languages Publishing House in
Moscow. For some unknown reasori., this particular plan was not carried
through, and the individuals in question remained in Pyongyang. 30
Until the launch oflarge-scale purges in 1957-8, the affiliation
with the Soviet Union had given Soviet Koreans considerable pro-
tection, but did not make them absolutely immune to prosecution,
especially when the accusations were grave enough and of a non-
political nature. Perhaps the biggest scandal of this sort was in 1952
when Ch'ae Kyu-hyong, then the North Korean Attorney-General
(and from 1948 the candidate member of the KWP Central Com-
mittee), was ousted, tried and executed. The main accusations against
him were not political: he was charged with corruption, although
eventually some of his friends protested his innocence and insisted
that 'the Chinese Koreans' (i.e. the rival Yanan faction) had framed
Ch'ae for their own political purposes. The Soviet embassy obviously
did not take these statements seriously.31
The last or 'fourth wave' of Soviet Koreans made no significant
impact on the country's history. It included the few people who
arrived during the Korean war or after it, around 1955. Among the
Soviet technical specialists who participated in the post- war recon-
struction ofthe North Korean economy in the mid-1950s were some
ethnic Koreans (for example, some 25 engineers who were sent to
Korea in 1955) but most remained there only a few years and left
when their contracts expired. On the whole these specialists took
no part in the political life of the country, and even if they wished
to stay permanently in Korea, they had become increasingly unwel-
come: after the Korean war the Soviet Koreans were a nuisance
to Kim II Sung. They could not hope to gain the same degree of
prominence as earlier arrivals, since association with the Soviet
30Memo to M.A. Suslov, secretary of the SPSU Ceneral Conunittee, 7 March

1949, RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 618, list 41.
' 1The entire affair had a rather low profile, although it was mentioned in some
contemporary Soviet documents. Fo r the story about alleged Yanan faction
involvement see Diary of N.M. Shesterikov (counsellor at the Soviet embassy),
AVPRF. fond 01 02, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68, entry on 18September1956.

Union was becoming a handicap in the new circumstances. A few
of the Soviet-Korean women married North Korean students who
had studied in the Soviet Union, and eventually went with their
husbands to the DPRK. They took no active part in Korean public
life, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s almost all were forced out
of the country as Soviet-North Korean relations worsened.
Most Soviet Koreans had been school teachers, particularly at
the low and middle levels, or education officials before their departure
for the DPRK. This preponderance had several causes. First, in the
1940s teachers were generally considered the most politically reliable
stratum of intellectuals. Secondly, it had been very difficult since
1937 for Koreans to receive a college education in fields other than
education or medicine. Thirdly, it was (wrongly) expected in 1946
that the Soviet Koreans sent to North Korea through civilian channels
would largely act as language teachers, and hence their choice seemed
reasonable to Soviet officials. Besides teachers, the Soviet faction also
included some party and state cadres, mostly from the Posiiet region,
all lucky survivors of the 1937 purge- such as Ho Ka-i (A.I. Hegai),
Kang Sang-ho and Kim Ch'an. There were also former military officers,
spies and Comintern agents, such as Ch'oe P'yo-dok, 0 Ki-ch' an, Yu'
Song-ch'ol, Pak Chong-ae and Pak Ch'ang-ok. Among those who
came from Central Asia, there were former workers from collective
farms, mainly tractor drivers (the best educated of the peasantry) and
low-ranking farm managers, but almost no engineers or scientists. An
Tong-su, a tank officer whose unit was the first to enter Seoul during
the Korean w:u, had earlier been a tractor driver in the Chirchik district
near Tashkent.
Many members of the Soviet faction had known each other well
before their arrival in North Korea: some had worked together in the
Soviet, Party or Komsomol (Communist youth) structures in the Far
East before 1937 or in Central Asia afterwards, and other occasionally
met at various teachers' conferences in the Soviet Union. But on the
whole the Soviet faction was less cohesive than the Yanan or Guerrilla
factions because they did not have the common experience ofworking
or fighting together for many years as a team. Competing ambitions
and mutual animosities divided them. Tensions existed between
the graduates of Korean and Russian schools; the latter usually did
not master Korean completely although they tended to be better
educated because it was easier for them to study at the colleges and

126 From Stalin to J(jm R Sung
universities. 32 Tension between the leaders was largely determined
by conflicting personal ambitions.
The most influential leader of the Soviet grouping was Ho Ka-i
(A.I. Hegai, 1908-53), who before 1937 had been one of the most
notable party cadres ofKorean origi.n in the Far East. His house was a
meeting place for the more prominent members of the group. 33 After
his removal and death, the role of the leader ofthe Soviet Koreans was
assumed, or rather claimed, by Pak Ch'ang-ok, a former middle-level
cadre. 34 In Korea, he had had a substantial career- a member of the
the Politburo of the Korean Workers' Party in 1946-56, and even as
a deputy prime minister for a short time after 1954. However, he had
much less authority among the Soviet Koreans and general political
influence than Ho Ka-i. Pak obviously considered Ho a rival, and
their relations were quite hostile. Virtually on the day after Ho's alleged
suicide (or murder?) in 1953, Pak referred to Ho very negatively in a
conversation with a Soviet diplomat. 35
At first most Soviet Koreans, as former teachers, worked in the
North Korean education sector or in training party personnel for the
newly-emergi.ng regime. The High Cadres School established by the
Soviet military authorities in June 1946 was ofparticular importance.
Formally it was a North Korean institution, with Kim 11 Sung himself
considered its principal, but in fact it operated under the direct control
of the political department of the 25th Army. The Soviet military
drew up its curriculum, appointed lecturers, and provided materials
and finance. The lecturers were exclusively Soviet, and most were
of Korean origi.n, such as Pak Yong-bin, Yu Song-hun, Kang Sang-
32 lnterView with Alexander Son (Sling Ch' lll), 31 January 1991, Tashkent. Sling
Ch'lSI is a son of Sling WlSn-silc, a well-known member of the Soviet faction.
"Interviews with Maia Hegai, 15 January 1991, Tashkent and Lira Heg:ai, 26
January 1991, Tashkent.
34 In the early 1940s, Pak Ch'ang-olc was the chairman of a district education
committee (Rwsian llliono) in Soviet CenlI2I Asia. Disttict (Rus. mion) is an administntiYe
unit, similar to Ko=n county, with a population of a few tens of thousands or,
occasionally, over 100,000 (interview with Prof. Mihail Pale, 12January 2000). Pale
was sent to North Korea as an intelligence agent before Liberation. In 1956 he
mentioned that in the Soviet Union he lud occupied 'small posts' (co11YCrsation of
S.N. Filatov, counsellor at the Soviet embassy in the DPRK, with Pak Ch'ang-olc,
deputy prime minister ofthe DPRK and membet of the KWP Central Committee,
12 March 1956, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, paplca 68).
35The diary ofS.P. Suzdalev, Soviet charge d'affaires in the DPRK, 2July 1953,
AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 9, delo 9, paplca 44.

Tht Emtrgtnct of tht ~t Faction in North Korea 127
ho and Yi Ch'un-baek. Later, all lecturen from this school occupied
important posts in the North Korean state and party apparatus and
played an important role in the political life of North Korea.36
Those Soviet Koreans who had experience in administrative work
were sent to work in the party and state institutions soon after their
arrival in North Korea. Often they were heads of the organisational
departments of the party committees or secretaries of the provincial
committees. The organisational departments were responsible for
promotions and appointments, and hence the control of these vital
agencies meant the control of the entire Party bureaucratic machine.
In August 1946, when the North Korean Workers' Party was officially
established, three out of five provincial party organisations were also
led by Soviet Koreans: South P'yongan province by Kim Chae-uk,
Kangwon f rovince by Han II, and South Harngyong province by
Kim Yol.3 In the first NKWP Central Committee (1946), Soviet
Koreans headed three out ofeight departments: organisational, labour
and youth.38
In 1948, when the Soviet faction's influence was at its height, its
memben accounted for a quarter of the NKWP Central Committee
memben and one-third of Politburo members. The Politburo at that
time included Ho Ka-i, head of the tremendously important Central
Committee organisational department, Pak Ch'ang-ok, head of the
propaganda department, Kim Chae-uk, chairman of the South
P'yongan provincial committee of the NKWP,39 and Ki Sok-pok,
editor of the official party newspaper, Nodong sinmun. The political
prevalence of the Soviet faction was emphasised by the tact that
soon after the unification of the Worken' Parties of the South and
North, A.I. Hegai, the leader ofthe Soviet Koreans, became the First
secretary of the united KWP while Kim II Sung was Party chairman.
By contrast, the Soviet Koreans' role in the establishment of the
North Korean armed forces was modest at best, mainly because
most of the high-ranking officen of Korean origin in the Soviet army
had died in the purge of1937-8. Hence those Soviet Koreans who
served in the North Korean army were usually engaged in political
indoctrination or some technical or administrative work. The Yanan
36lnterview with Kang Sang-ho, 13 January 1990, Leningnd.
31PiJtNm ~ii« 10, vol. I, Seoul: Kongdongch'e, 1989, pp. 114--16.
llllnJ., P· 29.
»J'he Nonh Korean capital Pyongyang is in the province of South P 'yongan.
The ranks are given as valid in 1948.

128 From Stalin tc Kim fl Sung
faction played a far more significant role in the military. Particularly
important were the former officers of the Chinese 8th and New
4th Armies who had acquired considerable experience fighting in
the Chinese civil wars and in the Chinese war against Japan. One of
the few exceptions was Ch' oe P'yo-4'Sk, a Soviet colonel and former
commander of the Saratov Armour Officers School, who first came t.o
North Korea as a Soviet military adviser but soon, under the influence
ofhis friend and son-in-law H6 Ka-i (A.I. Hegai), transferred into the
Korean anny.40 Many former memben ofSoviet military intelligence,
including Yu S<Sng-ch'61, Pak Kil-nam and Kim Pong-yul, also joined
the North Korean military. There were also numerous Soviet Koreans
among the political officen (commissan). At different times, the
political administration of the North Korean army was headed by
the Soviet Koreans Kim Chae-uk and Ch'oe Chong-hak, while many
othen worked as political officen at division, corps and army levels.
With the beginning of the war, the situation changed and many
Soviet Koreans were enlisted in the army. However, even during the
war a majority of the Soviet Koreans were still engaged in political
indoctrination and technical work. Nevertheless, a few Soviet Koreans
did command army units.
In contrast to the military, the Soviet Korean contribution to the
establishment of the North Korean police and security institutions
was substantial. From the beginning, the North Korean political police
was run by Pang Hak-se, who arrived in North Korea in 1947.41
Under the guidance ofSoviet advisers, the most remarkable ofwhom
was G.M. Balasanov, Pang created the repressive security machine
virtually &om scratch. Many Soviet Koreans were officials in the
Ministry ofthe Interior, which combined the tasks of criminal police,
intelligence agency and counter-intelligence. In the mid- t 950s
the foreign intelligence department was run by Kim Ch'un-sam
401nterview with Liudmila Tsoi,26 January 1990, Moscow. Liudmila Tsoi

(Russian ttanscription ofCh'oc) is a daughter ofCh'oc Pyo-dlSlc.
41 Not much is known about Pang Hak-sc's pre-Korean past Kang Sang-ho once
mentioned that before his arrival in Korea Pang had 1-n working in the local
attorney administration somewhere in Central Am, possibly in Kzyl-orda. The date
of his arrival in the North is uncertain, since the pre-1950 Soviet official papen tend
to use Russian and not Korean given names for the Soviet Koreans, while post-1950
docwncnis normally mention only their Korean given names. Identification of two
secs of such names is always a cliflicult task. If our tentative identification of Pang
Hak-sc as Nikolai lgnatieevich Pan is correct, he was sent to Korea by a Politburo
decision of I 0 September 1946 (his actual arrival could have occurred later).

The Emergena of the Soviet Faction in North Korta 129
(Nigai A.N.), a former Soviet teacher and wartime intelligence
operative. In 1955-9, the political Department of the Ministry of the
Interior was headed by Kang Sang-ho. In 1957, when a new united
North Korean intelligence agency - the Information Agency of the
Council ofMinisten - was created, Semion Nam (Nam Sang-yong,
Nam On Yong) became its deputy head:42 Nam Sang-yong was also
a former KGB officer who had been stationed in Korea from 1946
and initially worked under G. Salanov's supervision.43
A rough but interesting and reliable picture of how the Soviet
Koreans were distributed among the various branches of state and
party organisation can be deduced from a contemporary document,
compiled for the Soviet Politburo in 1951 . In the summer of 1951
the North Korean authorities decided to decorate a large number of
civilian officials and army officen who had made significant contri-
butions to the country's military efforts. From the av.Wable documents
it is not clear whether the orden were to be conferred only on former
Soviet Koreans, or whether it was part ofan even broader 'decoration
campaign'. Nevertheless, 128 Soviet Koreans were chosen to receive
awards. Since all were still Soviet citi2ens and a bureaucratic proce-
dure of the period therefore required special clearance from Moscow,
a list of all candidates was compiled and duly delivered to the Kremlin.
This was largely a formality, and permission was forthcoming. The
128 names on the list must be those of the majority ofSoviet Koreans
then active in the DPRK.44
As one would expect in a time ofwar, many of them were in the
military - forty-eight out of 128 - but it is remarkable that only one
Soviet Korean actually commanded a battle unit (Ch<Sng Ch'<Sl-u
[Alexei Ten), commander of the 17th Mechanical Division). Some
nineteen, or roughly one-third of the total, were commissars, while
the othen were either headquarten or technical and administrative
staff. Uncertain cases were Han II-mu, commander-in-chief of the
{almost non-existent) North Korean navy, Ch'oe P'yo-d<Sk, com-
mander of armoured troops, and Nam II, chi~f of the General Staff.
•21o. oonversation ofYu.I. Ognev, an aaache at the Soviet embassy in the DPRK.
with Nam On En, deputy head of the lntclligcncc Conunittce at the DPRK Cabinet
ofMinistcn. 19June 1957, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 13, dclo 6, papka 72.
43Jntcrviews with Kang Sang-ho, 30 November 1989, Leningrad, and Pak
Pyc'Sng-yul, 25 January 1990, Moscow.

44Lllt of Soviet citizens of Korean origin, currently on Korean service, to be
awarded Korean decorations, RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 3, dclo 1090.
rron1
The second most important field was education, press and culture
(or, rather, cultural management) where thirty out of the 128 Soviet
Koreans were employed. Their positions varied fiom vice-ministers
to humble professors at second-rate universities to newspaper editors.
1\venty-four were engaged in industrial management - a number
which included nine deputy ministers and one minister. The number
of Soviet Koreans in the security service, police and judiciary was
also predictably high, at sixteen: these included Pang Hak-se, the
much-feared minister of public security, his deputy and a deputy
minister of the interior. Five Soviet Koreans mentioned in the list
were professional party functionaries, and five were state officials
(including two diplomats). Usually, Soviet Koreans were not appointed
to the leading positions in their institutions - such a situation would
have provoked talk of 'Soviet domination' - but mostly they were
second-in-command. Thus in 1950 the first North Korean govern-
ment had only three Soviet Koreans as ministers, but six as deputy
ministers. 45 In 1951 , according to the above- mentioned list (which,
we must remember, may be incomplete) the Cabinet included only
two Soviet Korean ministers, but there we1e fourteen deputy minis-
ters. Ofthe eighteen ministries, twelve contained deputies fiom among
the Soviet Koreans, while the remaining ministries were mostly of
secondary importance.
Years later the participants in these events, including surviving
Soviet Koreans, unanimously stressed that the majority of them en-
thilsiastically welcomed the opportunity to work in North Korea.
It seems that most Soviet Koreans felt a dual loyalty: they regarded
both the Soviet Union and Korea as their homes. Up till the mid- .
1950s this ambiguity gave rise to no complications since they be-
lieved that the interests of the Soviet Union and of the DPRK
coincided. Almost all were committed Commun~sts and believed
that by helping the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang they were pro-
moting the happiness of the Korean people. Even in the late 1950s,
when the purges began, some Soviet Koreans refused to leave Korea;
they perceived returning to the Soviet Union as a sign of cowardice
and betrayal - an attitude which later cost some of them their lives.
For instance, Pak Ch'ang-sik did not leave Korea even when the
threat of arrest became obvious. He was arrested and soon died. "6 In
the early post-war years many Soviet Koreans, particularly educated
' 5Pu!than-ui dr/!ng<l1'i, Seoul: Oryu munhW2 sa, 1990, p. 55.

'6Jnterview with L.I. Pak, 20 January 1991 , Tashkent.
Onginal fron1
TM Emergence ojtM Soviet Faction in North Korea 131
ones, often in spite of advanced age and poor health. made consider-
able efforts to get to Korea. 47
The activities of the Soviet Koreans in the DPRK cannot be
depicted simply in black and white. They often despised the local
population and local cadres since they felt themselves superior in
education and eXf1erience. For most of them the move to Korea had
meant a promotion ofsuch magnitude that they would hardly have
dared to dream of it under ordinary circumstances. Former school
teachers became professors, district Party secretaries instantly found
themselves Central Committee members, petty officials received
vice-ministerial positions. These positions meant not only power
but also material benefits. Nevertheless, on the whole, most Soviet
Koreans were people. of integrity and their intention to contrib-
ute to Korea's economic and social development was undoubtedly
.
sincere.
The first Soviet Koreans who arrived in Pyongyang in 1945 and
1946 lived in Korea alone, separated from their families, but in the
autumn of 1946 about 100 family members arrived from Tashkent. 48
Subsequently families were included in the groups sent to work in
North Korea. During the Korean war the families moved to Harbin
in Manchuria, from where they returned only after the armistice
agreement in the summer of 1953. Although data are lacking, one
can surmise that most Soviet Koreans were already married when
they moved to the North: the Soviet authorities normally avoided
sending single people abroad. and there was no reason to think that
Korea was an exception to this general rule {it was felt, not without
reason, that a single person was more likely to establish undesirable
sexual liaisons with the locals and hence was easier to influence or
blackmail). However, there were at least a few cases of'intennarriage'
with local North Korean women.
The children of Soviet Koreans seldom shared their parents'
enthusiasm for Korea. The younger generation, brought up in the
Russian tradition and much less connected to Korean culture, were
often not fluent in Korean (at least not initially) and regarded the
life around them as poor, backward. alien or, at best, exotic. Most of
them were unable and/or unwilling to assimilate, although few tried
hard to become 'true Koreans'. In most families the children largely
47 Interviews with Kang Sang-ho, 30November1989, Leningrad, and Sim Su-

ch'<SI, 23January1991, Tashkent.
48Interview with Maia Hegai, 15 January I 991, Tashkent.

132 From Stdlin to /(jm n Sung
or exclusively spoke in Russian at home. 49 Finally, most of them left
Korea to study in Moscow and Leningrad and, with few exceptions,
never returned. After 1958-9 such a return was obviously far too
risky, as both young Soviet Koreans and their families and friends
undentood only too well. They knew that purges in North Korea
were in full swing, and they or at least most of the older generation
ofSoviet people around them still vividly remembered Stalin'.. purges
of 1937 (the ongoing de-Stalinisation campaign reinforced such
memories).
In Pyongyang most children ofSoviet Koreans studied in the so-
called '6th High School' (Kor. Yuk Ito jung}, established chiefly for the
children ofSoviet diplomats and specialists. Its graduates were groomed
for further education in the Soviet Union. The school was technically
considered a Korean institution, but the language of instruction was
chiefly Russian and the school's curriculum followed the curriculum
ofSoviet schools with only minor adjustments to the local conditions
(e.g. some briefcourses in Korean and KWP history, as well as intensive
military training). In 1957 the school was closed and this act was rightly
seen as a sign of the widening gap between Moscow and Pyongyang.
As a result, many children of the Soviet Koreans returned to their
relatives in the Soviet Union in order to get a better education before
entering a Soviet university. 50
Like other representatives of the North Korean elite, the Soviet
Koreans enjoyed a very agreeable life. They came to North Korea
fi:om the Soviet Union at the end of the Stalinist period, when a
system of privilege for the nomenklatura was fully developed and the
egalitarian experiments of the early Communist years had become
ancient history. This system ofprivilege was copied in North Korea.
As part of the ruling elite Soviet Koreans lived in houses formerly
belonging to Japanese officials and officers, received good rations,
and enjoyed the comfort of chauffeur-driven cars, seaside resorts
and·many other things which were seen as luxuries in impoverished
post-colonial North Korea.
One ofthe most important aspects ofthe activities ofSoviet Koreans
49My teacher, Professor Anantolii G. Vasiliev, who studied in the DPRK in the
mid-1950s, once recalled that at the time one could often see in downtown
Pyongyang groups of well-dressed young Koreans who spoke only Russian among
thenuelves. They were second-generation Soviet Koreans.
S<>fhe author was told of the life of Soviet Koreans' children by Kim Mil-ya, a
daughter of Kim Chae-ulc. Interview with Kim Mil-ya, 27 January 1991.

Tht Emttgtn« of tht Sovitt Fodion in North Kort1i 133
in North Korea was their relationship with the Soviet embassy. There
is little doubt that Moscow meant to use them as instruments of
Soviet conttol, although it would be an oversimplification to conclude
that this was the principal purpose of their dispatch to Pyongyang
(the absence of reliable and experienced officials was at least equally
important). However, these plans were only part fulfilled. Over time,
many Soviet Koreans lost their contacts with the Soviet embassy,
but, according to material in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives,
some - such as Pak Ch'ang-ok (first deputy prime minister, then
~
Party secretary), Pak Ui-wan (deputy prime minister), and Pak Kil-
yong (deputy foreign minister) - maintained close contacts with
the Soviet embassy and regularly met Soviet diplomats till the late
1950s, but they were exceptions rather than the rule. It also looks as
ifmost Soviet diplomats were not, to put it mildly, aggressive in seeking
information, and did not try very hard to use the opportunities Soviet
Koreans might have been able and willing to provide. Such negligence
could be partly explained by the fact that before the Korean war the
North Korean government had been so dependent on its Soviet
sponsor that any small tricks of diplomacy seemed unnecessary. In
that early period North Korean officials often acted on direct orders
from Soviet diplomats and advisers. Thus Kim Ch'an recalled that
shortly before the war he, as a newly-appointed member ofthe Military
Council (political commissar) ofthe 2nd Army, together with a Soviet
Korean member ofthe Military Council ofthe 1st Army, Kim Chae-
uk, were called to Kim II Sung. The Soviet ambassador T. F. Shtykov,
present at the meeting, turned to them saying: 'The time has come.
Get in tanks and forward - to unite Korea!•ft
Up till 1948 all Soviet Koreans who had at first been enlisted
through military recruiting committees (R.us. 110tnlwmat) were tech-
nically Soviet servicemen and, in addition to their basic pay, received
the allowances of Soviet soldiers but after the Soviet army left the
situation changed. Those Soviet Koreans who decided to stay in North
Korea were obliged to transfer from the Soviet Communist Party to
the Korean Workers' Party, while nominally retaining their Soviet
citizenship. Around 1950 the process of the Soviet Koreans' transfer
to North Korean citizenship began, but by 1956 it was far from com-
plete, and a considerable number of the former Soviet Koreans
remained Soviet citizens.52 However, by the mid-1950s their passports
51Interview with Kim Ch'an, 15January 1991, Tashkent.

52ln the late 1940s, it was fairly common for a high-level official in one of the

134 From Stalin to Kim D Sung
had expired since most of them had not visited the Soviet consulate
for a decade or so. 53 In the mid-1950s, when Kim II Sung started to
distance himself from the Soviets, the Soviet embassy continued to
act cautiously. and avoided the use ofSoviet Koreans as an instrument
for soliciting information or applying pressure - at least. no partici-
pants in the events told the author ofany such attempts, although
some additional information could be contained in the still-closed
archives. Soviet Koreans occasionally tried to exploit their links with
the embassy, but gained little from it.
The history of the Soviet faction was very short - it lasted only
about fifteen yean. In late 1955 Kim 11 Sung undertook his first attack
on it - this was still relatively restrained. August 1956, when Pak Ch'ang-
ok, as leader of the Soviet faction, took part in an ill-fated conspiracy
against Kim 11 Sung, was a major turning-point. Although on the
whole the scale of participation in this event by the Soviet Koreans
was modest, they became the urget of the purges in the late 1950s
and soon faced a hard choice: to leave Korea or risk arrest and perhaps
execution or death in prison. In 1958-61 most Soviet Koreans left
the DPRK., and did so involuntarily. Many ofthose who remained in
the country were purged and the Soviet faction ceased to exist. In the
mid-1960s few Soviet Koreans still occupied high positions and by
the end of the decade even those few who did had also disappeared.
Only Pang Hak-se, the 'Korean Beria' and arguably the most notorious
figure in the whole Soviet faction, managed to survive both physically
and politically, to die at a ripe old age in 1992. About half a dozen
less significant Soviet Koreans also avoided persecution and kept
some positions well into the 1970s and even 1980s, but their political
importance was negligible.
Since more than half a century has passed since the emergence of
the Soviet faction in North Korea, and the events of the first years of
the DPRK's existence have become history, we can now try to assess
objectively the activities ofSoviet Koreans in North Korea in 1945-
newly established 'people's democracies' to be a Soviet citizen (normally s/he was

a formal emigrant who had spent many yean in exile in Moscow). For example, a
Soviet document of 1948 lists among these Soviet citizens such prominent
personalities as the Romanian Foreign Minister Ann2 Pauker and the Chairman of
the German National-Democratic Parry Lotar Boltz (RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis
128, delo 1143, list 224).
5'Interview with V.V. Kovymenko, 23 January 1991.
rron1
The Emergena ofthe Soviet Faction in North Korea 135
60. The personal honesty of these people need not be doubted.
They went to Korea to help the country of their ancestors, in a belief
that the St.alinist socialism that they strove to build was the best social
order possible. The Soviet faction played an important role in the
establishment of the North Korean state, and without its efforts the
economic success of the 1950s would not have been possible. The
mass exodus ofSoviet Koreans in the late 1950s and early 1960s was
one of the factors contributing to the deceleration of the country's
economic development. On the other hand, the Soviet Koreans did
much to help the development of the political police and the armed
forces of North Korea and so helped to establish the dictatorship of
Kim ll Sung. They were actively engaged in transplanting Stalinist
methods there. The history of the Soviet faction is inseparable fiom
the history of'Communisation' of the Korean peninsula, conducted
by the Soviet authorities in the late 1940s. The Soviet faction was one
of the most powerful instruments of this policy and as such shares
the responsibility for its consequences.

5
HO KA-I
A FORGO'l"l"EN FOUNDING FATHER OF THE KwPl
& we have discussed in Chapter 4, in the 1940s and 1950s, nu-

merous Soviet Koreans, sent to North Korea by the Soviet authorities,
played a significant role in the creation and development of the
North Korean state. In the early years of North Korean history, the
most prominent and influential of these was Ho Ka-i (A.I. Hegai),
who came to be a symbol of the entire Soviet Korean faction. Before
coming to North Korea, he had occupied comparatively high positions
in the Soviet Union and acquired extensive administrative experience
1The author collectcd material on H6 K2-i, fiom interviews with funner North
Korean officials who later liwd in the Soviet Union/CIS or with their rdatiws. The
author was also very fortunate to have had the opportunity to we documenlS from
the penonal archive ofH6 K2-i, preserved by the family ofhis son Igor Hegai. Some
material about Hegai can be found in archives, the moit important being his Party
registration card, currently in RTsHIDNI. The author is grateful to all those who
aped to share with him their memories and documenlS, but moit of all to H6 K2-
i 's daughters Maia and Lira and son Igor, as well as to Kang Sang-ho.
In this chapter the main focus is not so much on the political activities of A.I.
Hegai, but on his penonal biography, which has been largely hidden fiom historians.
For obvious reasons, the main emphasis is placed on the life of H6 K2-i before his
departure to North Korea.
Information about the 'Soviet period' ofH6 K2-i's life that can be found in most
South Korean reference books is not very reliable. For instance, such a good and
generally reliable publication as PulJum inmyling $/ljlin (Biographical Dictionary of
North Korea), Seoul: Chung'ang ilbo sa, 1990) says ofH6: 'Born in 1900 in the
province ofHamgyong-pukto. Graduated fiom Moscow Univenity: As we shall see,
Hegai was not born in 1900 or in Hamgyong-pukto, and did not srudy at (let alone
graduate fiom) Moscow University. Such mistalces are una~idable because the Soviet
past of many leaden of the DPRK was not disclosed in North Korea, and therefore
we know very little about their activities before ariving in the D PRK.
136

A Forgotten Founding Father of tht KWP 137
there. Because of this practical experience, he remained apart from
other Soviet Koreans, most of whom had previously worked in the
Soviet Union as school teachers or low-I~ officials, and fi:om memben
of the Guerrilla, Yanan and Domestic factions, who also mostly had
little experience of matters ofstate or party administration. Thus he
became the 'main architect' ofthe Korean Workers' Party. instrumental
in creating its bureaucracy.
Aleksei lvmovich Hegai was born on 18 March 1908 in Khabarovsk,

a major urban centre of the Russian Far East where his father was
teaching in a Korean school. It was a time when an increasing number
ofKoreans from all walks oflife were moving to the Russian Far East.
A great many ofthem were attracted by the abundance of cheap land
and economic opportunities, while a substantial minority hoped to
escape political persecution by the pro-Japanese regime or, from
1910 onwards, the Japanese colonial administration. The division
between economic and political migration was, as usual, blurred. We
do not know (and perhaps will never know) the reasons why Hegai's
parents left their native land, but perhaps both political and economic
circumstances influenced their decision.
Unlike most Russian Koreans, who usually had two given names
- Russian Orthodox and traditional Korean - A.I. Hegai apparently
did not have a Korean name at all. The given name 'Ka-i' by which
he later became known in North Korea was probably a transcription
of a Russified version of his family name. At the tum of the century,
when an influx of Korean immigrants came to the Russian Far East,
Russian immigration officials felt uneasy about registering the
newcomers with single-syllable Korean family names. Since common
Korean surnames such as H6, Cho, Yu, Q seaned too 'short' for a Russian,
the suffix '-gai' (perhaps from the Sino-Korean 'ka' meaning 'family')
was routinely added to them. Thus such 'Russo-Korean' surnames
as Hegai, Tiagai, Yugai and Ogai appeared and are still common among
the Koreans in the former Soviet Union.
A.I. Hegai lost both his parents at a very early age: his mother died
in 1911 and a few months later his father committed suicide. Young
Hegai and his brother were brought up by their uncle, who for a
while was a digger in gold fields and then made a living as either an
unskilled worker or a small vendor. The family was poor, so Hegai
had to start working early. In 1920, at the age of nine, he began work
at a tobacco factory in Khabarovsk. The boy had to changejobs many

times: he sold newspapers, was a barber's apprentice, and worked as a
day labourer. His childhood coincided with the chaotic years of the
Russian civil war which lasted in the Far East till 1922. Nevertheless
Hegai somehow managed to receive a school education. He went
to a Korean primary and then a Russian secondary school. 2 Taking
into consideration the strained economic circumstances of his uncle,
such a feat indicated a strong determination on the part of both the
boy and his foster family. It was clearly at this time that Hegai began
to develop a keen interest in books and reading. Later in life he always
kept an extensive library, while many people who worked with him
remarked on his erudition.
After 1917 a majority of Russian Koreans supported the new
Bolshevik government During the civil war, they established numer-
ous guerrilla units which fought on the side of the Red Army against
the Japanese forces and their White allies. There were good reasons
for the Russian Koreans to side with the Communists and their revo-
lution: its ideology of internationalism emphasised a particular re-
spect for minorities and opposed any form ofnational discrimination;
the revolution was anti-Japanese (in the Far East); it set up the goal
of improving the lives of the lower classes to which the majority of
Koreans then belonged. Thus it is not surprising that Hegai, like many
other young Koreans, started to be involved in Communist politics
and joined the 'Komsomol' (Soviet Communist Youth League) in
1924.3 From about 1926, in spite ofhis youth, he was well on his way
tc becoming a promising Komsomol functionary. He took part in a
number ofconferences and meetings, and in December 1930, at the
age oftwenty-two, he joined the Communist Party. 4 One ofhis three
necessary 'recommendations' for joining the Party was received fiom
Manasii Kim, a well-known personage in the Far East, who during
the civil war had commanded one of the largest Korean guerrilla
units. Another came fiom Listovsky, a secretary ofthe Far Eastern krai
(region) committee ofKomsomol.s By then Hegai was a professional
Komsomol cadre, his promotion said to have been much assisted by
Postyshev, who in the 1930s became a leading Soviet politician.
2 1nterview with Maia Heg:ai, 15 January 1991, Ta.ihkent. Communist Party
member Registration form no. 1780202 (old series) in Centre for Preservation and
Study of Documents for Contemporary History (henceforth RTsHIDNI).
3Komsomol mcmbenhip card no. 1651660, issued to A.I. Hcg:ai by the
Khabarovsk ltrai committee of the Komsomol on 20 March 1935.
•communist Party member registration form no. 1780202 (old series).
5 1ntcrview with Maia Hegai, 15 January 1991, Ta.ihkent.

A Forgotten Founding Father of the KWP 139
Postyshev is said to have been present at a Komsomol meeting at which
the final resolution was drafted by Hegai, and to have liked the final
resolution so much that he wanted to meet its author. After this Hegai's
promotion gained momentum. 6
The fact that he was not an ethnic Slav only facilitated his political
ascent. In the 1920s the Soviet policy was remarkably internationalist,
so that members of the 'national minorities' who had contributed
significantly to the victory of the Communists in the Revolution and
civil war had even greater opportunities for successful careers than
the Russians themselves. Only in the mid-1930s did this situation
start to change as the Soviet regime grew more nationalist in char-
acter. As a young Korean of remarkable will power, intelligence and
organisational skills, Hegai was already well-known in the Far East by
the early 1930s as the secretary of the Far Eastern krai committee of
Komsomol. 7
In the spring of 1933 Hegai left the Far East for Central Russia,
and it is not clear whether this was his own decision or that of the
Komsomol Central Committee. Still, he was sent by the Komsomol
Central Committee in May of that year to Kinesluna, a district town
in the Ivanovo region, a few hundred kilometres fiom Moscow,8 where
he worked for a while as second secretary of the district Komsomol
committee. Although we do not know why Hegai was moved to
such a distant place, we may surmise that it was done on his own
initiative, since being stationed near Moscow greatly improved his
chances of continuing his education. In September or October 1934
he went to Moscow to study at the Svexdlov All-Union Communist
Agricultural University. He had always dreamed of having higher
education, but although he was a good student, as the documents
show, he was not able to remain at the University. On 10 July 1935
he left due to 'family reasons', 9 - reasons which were indeed serious.
In the autumn of 1927, while still in the Far East, Hegai, when aged
61nterview with Yu S<'Sng-glSI, 22 January 1991, Tashkent.

7
Idcntity caid no. 139/2 of the secretary of the Komsomol lm1i committee
issued to A.I. ·Hegai on 3 September 1932.
9An excerpt from the protocol Council ofthe Komsomol Central Committee,
no. 72, 19 May 1933. Hereafter we translate RUS$ian 111ion (an administrative unit,
nornully with a population of a few teru of thousands or, sometimes, one or two
hundred thousand) as 'district', while RUS$ian oblasl and lmii (administrative units
with a population of a few million) arc translated as 'region'.
9An order by the rector ofthe All-Union Communist Agriculture University no.
106 from 10 July 1935.

140 From Stalin to IGm R Sung
only nineteen, married Anna Innokentevna Li (Li Sun-i, 1908-47), 10
with whom he had five childien, tOur daught.en and a son. 11 Supporting
such a big family on a meagre student scholanhip proved to be impossible,
so Hegai had reluctantly to abandon his studies and return to the Far
East where he again became a Komsomol executive.
Following his return in February 1936, Hegai worked as head of
the organisational deparnnent of the Amur region Komsomol com-
mittee. In late 1936 or early 1937, he was tnnsferred to the Posiiet
district where he became fint secretary of the district Komsomol
committee. Career-wise this appeared to be a slight backward step,
but in fact the appointment also involved a huge responsibility: as a
result of the mass purges, the state and Party bureaucracy ofthe Posiiet
district, populated mainly by Koreans, had been decimated. Many
local activists had been arrested - Koreans in a border area were
usually falsely accused of'spying for Japan'. Hegai had to revive the
normal work of the Komsomol organisation in the district, and ful-
filled this task successfully since he was promoted just halfa year later
to the new post of second secretary of the district party committee in
Posiiet. 12 His was the typical career of a professional Party functionary:
working in the Komsomol apparatus was regarded as a good school-
ing, following which a person who had reached the age of thirty
would be ready to start a 'real' (i.e. a Party) career.
Thus Hegai became one of the top Party functionaries in a district
where the majority ofSoviet Koreans then lived. Perhaps he was the
highest (or at the very least one of the highest}-ranking Koreans in
the Soviet Party hierarchy. Posiiet was the most important centre of
Korean cultural and public life in the Soviet Union. Many future
North Korean leaders including Kang Sang-ho, Pang Hak-se and
Mihail Kang - were drawn from among the Komsomol and Party
activists of that district. Hegai was the second most important person
in the district and he knew many of these people quite well. In the
modest offices of the Posiiet Party committee many connections and
acquaintances were made which ten or fifteen years later were further
developed in North Korea.
Hegai became second secretary in 1937, the year when Stalin's
IOJt is not quite clear how the given name of his wife was spelled in Korean.
The Russian transcription 'Li Sun-i' allows for three pouible spellings: Sun-i, Sun-
iii andjwt Sun (the suffix '-i' is very common among the Soviet Koreans).
11
Phone interview with Maia Hegai, 19 March 1991.
12!nterview with Kang Sang·ho, 3 t October t 989, uningnd.

purges among the Party and military elite reached their height. Middle-
and upper-level Party leaders were particularly hit in the purges,
especially those who had made their careers in the 1920s. Their relative
independence and freedom of mind were seen by Stalin as a potential
threat to his power. Also objects of repression were cadres of the
minorities, particularly ofthose nationalities whose countries oforigin
were not part ofthe Soviet Union, lilce the Chinese, Poles, Hungarians
and Koreans. The Soviet regime was losing its initial internationalist
character and becoming nationalistic. Thw Hegai found himself under
a double threat - as a Korean and as a middle-level Party activist.
Indeed, his survival was a near miracle. In the autumn of1937 Sen'ko,
the first secretary of the district Party committee, was arrested, while
Afanasii Kim and Listovskii, who had both recommended Hegai to
the Party, were also declared 'enemies of the people'. Hegai was
excluded from the Party because ofhis 'contacts with the enemies of
the people'. In 1937 exclwion from the Party on those grounds would,
in 90 per cent ofcases, have led to arrest and probably to execution, as
Hegai well understood. At the end oft 937, according to his daughter,
he made all necessary preparations for his impending arrest. There
was always a small suitcase at the ready with warm clothes, underwear
and basic necessities crucial to a stay in prison. At that time many such
suitcases stood ready in thousands of Soviet homes waiting for the
likely knock at the door after midnight. Not once did Hegai discuss
with his wife what she should do to take care of the children and
herself in the event of his arrest: in 1937 wives were often arrested
soon after their hwbands. 13
Yet Hegai was not arrested. He was probably saved by what was
a tragedy for most Soviet Koreans - forced deportation to Central
Asia. In the late 1930s many Soviet citizens avoided arrest ifthey were
decisive enough and suddenly moved to new places of residence,
preferably beyond the border of an administrative unit. As a rule the
authorities and secret police did not look for those who had disap-
peared. Even some former high-level cadres who constituted a major
potential threat to Stalin's government, including even Lenin's former
personal secretary, managed to survive in hiding; they would have
had no chance if the police apparatus had been better organised.
Thousands owed their survival to the defective information exchange
system within the police networks.
13Interview with Maia Hegai, 15 January 1991, Tashkent.

142 From Stalin to ](jm R Sung
In Central Asia A.I. Hegai and his family found themselves in
Yangiyul, a small rural town near Tashkent, where he got work as a
bookkeeper in a •zagotkontora', a state-run company which bought
fruit and vegetables from local peasants. In 1939 the wave of terror
subsided, and the new leadership of the NKVD (the Soviet secret
police), headed by L.P. Beria, even officially admitted having committed
'certain mistakes and excesses' in 1937. In the course of this new
campaign a handful of the 1937 victims were officially rehabilitated,
among them A.I. Hegai. In 1939 a Central Committee commission,
which visited Uzbekistan to reconsider previous decisions on exclusion
from the Party, found Hegai innocent and fully restored his Parry
membership. Following this he returned to Parry work, although he
had to begin his career again from a rather low level and it took him
several years before he reached his previous rank. For a while he
wo1ked in the Yangiyul district Party committee as an aide to the
first secretary, then as an 'instructor' (a low-level Parry functionary -
the term was later translated into Korean as chidow0n), and later
still as head of the committee's administrative department. Eventually.
in the summer of 1941, he again became second secretary of the
Party district committee. Late in that year he was transferred to the
neighbouring Nizhnii Chirchik district, where he also worked as
the second secretary of the Party committee. The first secretary was
then Rasulov, a figure of great authority in the Parry circles of
Uzbekistan who later, during the war, served as commissar of the
First Uzbeki Cavalry Brigade. Rasulov valued Hegai's abilities and
played an important role in his career, and it was on his initiative
that Hegai received a new appointment in 1943 - as deputy secretary
of the Party committee at the construction works of the Farhad hydro-
electric power station near Tashkent, where he remained almost till
the end of the war. During the winter of 1944-5, he headed the
construction of small hydro-electric power stations in villages near
Tashkent.14
In the autumn of 1945, the Soviet authorities began actively to
select Soviet Koreans for work in Korea. The first groups ofSoviet
Koreans were selected through military recruiting boards (special
organisations dealing with conscription) in September and October
1945. These people were conscripted and, as servicemen, placed at
the disposal ofthe 25th Army headquarters. Most of them were rank-
and-file soldiers or non-commissioned offices and few were of officer
14 lbid.

A Forgottm Founding Father ofthe KWP 143
rank. Special attention was paid to people who possessed an education
and were regarded as reliable Communists: schoolteachers and a
few Party and state cadres who had somehow survived 1937. Hegai
was also selected and in the autumn ofl 945 he was conscripted. On
29 October a dozen Soviet Koreans, Hegai among them, left Tashkent
for the Far East, where they were expected to serve as translators at
the headquarters of the Soviet 25th Army. This was apparently the
second big group ofSoviet Koreans sent to Pyongyang after Liberation.
Travelling by train, the group reached Kraskino station, on the Soviet-
Korean border, near the places where Hegai had worked a decade
earlier, and from there they proceeded by road to Pyongyang, where
they arrived in early November. 15
At the beginning most ofthe Soviet Koreans worked as translators
in the Soviet civil administration and its local bodies, later being
transferred to the agencies of the emerging North Korean regime.
A mass transfer of Soviet Koreans from the organs of the Soviet
administration to the North Korean agencies began in the summer
of 1946. Hegai was apparently an exception, since almost from the
beginning he was appointed to leading positions within the North
Korean Communist Party and hardly ever worked for the Soviet
military administration. By the end of 1945 he had played a significant
role in the emerging Communist Party of Korea.
Such a role was ~bly envisaged for Hegai by the Soviet authorities
even before he went to Korea: according to his daughter Maia, he was
recommended for work in Korea by Rasulov.16 lfhe had been sent
there as a mere interpreter, such a high recommendation would hardly
have been necessary, but this is speculation. Even ifHegai had gone
as an interpreter, his political experience and rather high status in
the Soviet Union would soon have attracted attention. Hegai was
possibly the first Soviet Korean to work directly in the state apparatus
of the North Korean regime, which was still in an embryonic stage.
By the end of 1945 Ho Ka-i, still technically a Soviet citizen, was
already .i high-level executive in the Korean Communist Party. At
the Third Extended Plenum on 17-19 December 1945 of the Party's
North Korean Bureau he was among the Presidium (in fact, Politburo)
15Interview with Yu S<'Sng-g61, 22 January 1991, Tashkent. In the literature one

sometimes reads that A.I. Hegai arrived in Korea in December. It is probably a
mistalce since Yu S<'Sng-g61, who was in the same group of Soviet Koreans as A.I.
Hegai, gives another date.
16lnterviewwith Maia Hegai, 15January 1991, Tashkent.

members and drafted the Plenum's resolution - he had arrived in
Korea barely a month earlier. 17 At this Plenum he was elected deputy
head of the Bureau's organisational department. 18
It was around this time that Aleksei lvmovich Hegai became HIS
Ka-i. It is believed that this name was invented for him by Kim Tu-
bong, a well-known linguist and revolutionary, and the leading figure
of the 'Yanan (Chinese) faction' in the leadership of the KWP. Ac-
cording to rumours it was Kim Tu-bong who transformed the suffix
'-gai' into a given name, 'Ka-i'. Many of those who worked with HIS
Ka-i in North Korea referred to this story, but they seem to have
been mistaken. A deputy mandate of the First conference ofKorean
women of the Posiiet district (17 February 1937), where Hegai made
a speech, was issued in the name of'HIS Ka-i' .19 Apparently he him-
self had transcribed his name in this style earlier, whereas Kim Tu-
bong might only have proposed how it could be better expressed
using Chinese characters (incidentally, the transcription ofhis name
in Chinese characters was not uniform).
Hegai's mission in Korea was to help create the Communist Party
there. Since this party, like most Communist parties in the Soviet-
dominated countries of Eastern Europe, was patterned on the Soviet
original, the extensive experience HIS Ka-i had acquired through his
work in the Soviet Union became very useful. Of the four main
factions of the North Korean Communist Party- Guerrilla, Soviet,
Chinese and Domestic - only the Soviet one had the knowledge and
experience needed for building up the state apparatus and the ruling
Stalinist party, and ofthe Soviet Koreans HIS Ka-i was the most expe-
rienced in this field. Thus it is not surprising that he played a decisive
role in establishing the Party organisations in North Korea, setting up
their daily activities and drawing up bureaucratic rules. Apparently he
was also one ofthe authors ofthe Statute ofthe Korean Workers' Party,
modelled on that of the Soviet Communist Party. When in August
1946 the Communist Party of North Korea was amalgamated with
the New People's Party of North Korea into the North Korean
Workers' Party, HIS Ka-i became a member ofits Political Committee
on Politburo (chongch'i wiw0nhoe) and head of the organisational
l7Mirolr CJroWn minjujuili inmin ltong'-gulr, Seoul: Chung'an ilbo sa, 1992, p. 174.
18/bid., p.191.
19Possieju kuy6k che ii ch'a kory6in ch'ongny6n ny6ja taehoe taep'yo chung
no. 13 (Fint Conference of the Possiet District Korean Female Youth, 13th delegate
mandate).

department (chojile pu} of its Central Conunittee. 20 It meant that he
oversaw all practical activities of the Party organisation. He was also
able to exercise a significant influence on the appointment and transfer
of party cadres. This was particularly important given the incurably
factional character of Korean political culture and the constant skir-
mishes between the factions. Hegai was a close analogue to the so-
called 'Muscovites' in East European Communist Parties. 'Muscovites'
were people who had spent a long time in the Soviet Union and
hence were normally backed by the Soviets, who perceived them as
more reliable and controllable than those who had been active in
the Party underground before 1945. 'Muscovites' were universally
and with some justification perceived as the principal harbingers of
Soviet influence in the East European parties.
In September 1948 Ho Ka-i was 'elected' first deputy chairman
of the North Korean Workers' Party, and so became the third most
senior person in the North Korean official hierarchy, ranking just
below Kim Il Sung and Kim Tu-bong. At the time this standing was
reflected in rosters, where Ho Ka-i was given third place until after
the beginning of the Korean war. Simultaneously, he was a member
of the Party's Politburo. In 1949, when the Workers' Parties ofNorth
and South Korea merged, Kim 11 Sung replaced Kim Tu-bong as
Chairman of the newly established KWP, while Ho Ka-i became first
secretary of the Central Conunittee. The presence of two paramount
posts in the party - that of Chairman and first secretary - might
sound strange now, but this custom was not peculiar to North Korea,
having existed in some other Communist Parties (e.g. in Bulgaria)21
up till the late 1940s. The Chairman oversaw overall strategy, while
the first secretary was responsible for the daily bureaucratic and
organisational work. Having become first secretary, Ho Ka-i was for
20Jn the late 1940s the (North) Korean Workers' Patty had a rather unusual
three-tier leadenhip system, dilferent from the then standard Communist two-tier
model. The Central Committee (Kor. drung'ang wiwilrrli«) appointed the Standing
Committee (Kor. sangmu wiwMhoe) which, in turn, appointed a higher body, the
Political Committee (Kor. cMngdt'i wiui:lnll«). All memben ofthe Political Committee
were ex offitio memben of the Standing Committee as well. On average, in the 1940s
the Central Committee had sixty to seventy memben, the Standing Committee
eleven to fifteen, and the Political Committee five to eight.
2 'John Bell, The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blag«v 10 Zhivltov, Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1986, p. 104; Memo to A.A. Kuznetsov, Secretary ofthe
CPSU Central Committee, signed by Strunnikov, CC CPSU Penonnel department,
26November1947, RTsHIDNJ, fond 17, opis 127, delo 1482, list 152.

some time the 'No. 2 man' in the entire Party hieran:hy ofthe country.
It was the peak of his political career.22
Amidst all these events, there also occurred changes in Ho Ka-i's
personal life. His family joined him in Pyongyang in the autumn of
1946, but his wife Anna Li was already seriously ill, since deportation
and the wartime years had undermined her health. Soon after her
arrival in Pyongyang in 1947 she died of tuberculosis. On 1 January
1949 Ho Ka-i married Nina Tsoi, a daughter of Piotr Invanovich
Tsoi (Ch'oe P'yo-dok), one of the very few Korean officers in the
Red Army who had survived the mass terror of 1937-9, who arrived
in Pyongyang as a military adviser in August 1948. In 1938 he had been
arrested and spent eleven months in prison, but, in spite of being
tortured, did not admit to 'spying for the Japanese intelligence'. Such
stubborn resistance sometimes bore fruit in the bizarre atmosphere
of the Great Purge, and Piotr Tsoi was released and even allowed to
return to the armed forces. Tsoi made a career during the Second
World War conunanding tank units and by the end of the war he
headed the tank officers' school in Saratov. He came to Korea with
the rank of colonel in the Soviet army and initially served as a Soviet
adviser in the armoured troops. 23 His daughter Nina (1922-72), the
future wife of HO' Ka-i, graduated fi:om the philological faculty of
Kharkov State University and arrived in Korea with her father. Ho
Ka-i had known Piotr Tsoi since the early 1920s, and on his insistence
Ch'oe P'yo-dok, as he had become, reluctantly agreed to be transferred
into the 'Korean People's Army', where he became commander ofits
armoured troops (according to his daughter Liudmila, he would have
preferred to continue his service in the Soviet army). 24 Ch'oe P'yo-
dok later played a significant role in preparing and carrying out the
attack on Seoul in June 1950.
Ho Ka-i's responsibilities were not limited to running the KWP
bureaucracy in the North. Together with Pak Hon-yong and other
South Korean Communists who had moved to the North, he also
oversaw the operations ofthe Communist underground in the South.
Following his appointment as first secretary of the KWP in 1949, he
:Z:ZOae-Sook Suh. Kim n Song: TM North Korron uoder, p. 92; Pulthon inmy6ng
soj6n, Seoul: Chung'an ilbo sa, 1990, p. 424.
23 Interview with Kan Sang-ho, 7 March 1990, Leningrad. Chang Hak-pong,
'Ch'oe P'yo-tok-ill' hoegohaylf in unin ltich'i, 28 November 1990.
24 1nterview with Liudrnila Tsoi, 26 January 1990, Moscow.

became responsible for the Party work in both North and South Korea.
According to Pak PylSng-yul. who before the beginning of the Korean
war had headed the Kangdong military political school (the main
centre for training South Korea guerrillas), the school had frequent
visits fiom Pak HISn-ylSng and Yi Silng-ylSp, who were both senior
leaders of the South Korean Communist movement, and by HIS Ka-i.
According to Pak PylSng-yul, Ho Ka-i had great respect for Pak Hon-
ylSng and maintained a close relationship with him and other South
Korean Communists. 25 It was possibly these connections which later
provoked gossip connecting the supposed suicide of HIS to the purge
of the Domestic (South Korean) faction.
According to Yu SOng-ch'ol, then chiefof the operational depart-
ment of the North Korean army headquarters, the planning of the
attack on the South began in 1947, but, as we have seen earlier, the
final decision was only taken after a meeting of Kim 11 Sung with
Stalin in the spring of 1950. Yu SOng-ch'ISl confirmed that HIS Ka-i
was one of the few who knew of the planned attack.26 It is unlikely
that he felt uneasy about it; having been brought up in the traditional
Communist spirit, he most probably saw nothing wrong with the
idea of installing a Communist regime through an armed interven-
tion. After all, such a war would be no more than a revolution by
other means. In addition, as many informed eyewitnesses have told
the author, the North Korean leadership at first believed that one
strike would be enough to provoke a general uprising against Syngman
Rhee in the South, bringing the war to a swift conclusion. 27
However, the main task of HIS Ka-i was party-building. It was he
who signed most documents regimenting the Party life of North
Korea, and among the North Korean leaders and cadres he was some-
times referred to as 'professor ofParty affairs'.28 As deputy Party chair-
man and eventually its first secretary, and as head of the controlling
commission, he influenced all appointments to major state and Party
posts, and supervised the inner workin~ of the Party bureaucracy.
With the outbreak of the Korean war, North Korea's position
changed markedly. The war weakened Soviet influence, while Chinese
influence increased. In this new situation, Kim II Sung, who did his
2Sfnterview with Pak Py6ng-yul, 25 January 1990, Moscow.

26 Interviewwith Yu S6ng-ch'6l, 18January 1991, Tashkent.
27 Interviews with Yu Sling-ch' 61, 18 January 1991, Tashkent; Pak Py6ng-yul,
25 January 1990, Moscow; and Liudmila Tsoi, 26 January 1990, Moscow.
:zalntcrview with Kan Sang-ho, 31 October 1989, Leningrad.

148 From St4lin to /(jm n Sung
best to use the war to strengthen his personal power, saw a chance to
OO:ak with those Soviet Koreans whom he considered his most dangerous
rivals. Most prominent among them was Ho Ka-i: as long as Ho
continued to play a major role in the North Korean government,
Kim II Sung could not consider himself the sole master of Party
affairs. Ho's leading role among the Soviet Koreans might also have
been a major concern for Kim, who was uneasy about the factions
(apart from his own, of course). In addition, it can be surmised that
Kim regarded Ho Ka-i as a symbol of Soviet control, which was
gradually becoming burdensome and annoying to the future 'Great
Leader'.
Late in 1951 Ho was ousted from his position as a result of the
'Party ID cards controversy'. This had begun in December 1950,
when, after a successful Chinese counter-offensive, North Korean
forces regained control over the territories which had been briefly
occupied by the US forces and their South Korean allies. At the Third
Plenum of the Central Committee of the KWP in that month, Kim Il
Sung ordered a thorough check of those Party members who during
the North Korean anny's retreat had remained in American-controlled
territory, and this task was given to the controlling commission headed
by Ho Ka-i. The checks were meticulous, and most of those who
had lost their Party cards during the occupation were excluded from
the Party. Exceptions were made only for those few who played a
direct role in the underground resistance or guerrilla operations.
Thus in Sunch'on county (P'yongan-pukto province) 154 out of164
Party members were excluded.29 Meanwhile, Ho Ka-i also made the
rules for entry to the Party much stricter than they had been before.
This was in line with Soviet traditions which he knew well: during
the Second World War Soviet Party members who had been in
German-occupied territory and lost their ID would have had little
chance ofhaving their Party membership restored. This policy initiated
by Ho Ka-i provoked serious criticism from Kim II Sung, which he
expressed at the Fourth Plenum of the KWP Central Committee
(second convention) on 1-4November1951. On his initiative, Ho
Ka-i was accused at the Plenum of'liquidationism' and sacked from
his post. It should be noted that this term used by Kim or someone
close to him was somewhat ill-chosen because in the Communist
tradition it referred to the practice of the moderate wing of an
underground party ofliquidating illegal organisations and terminating
29i)ae-Sook Suh Kim n Sung:~ North Korun uader, p. 124.

A Forgotkn Founding Fathn of the KWP 149
illegal activities. Thus, it could hardly be used ofa party which acted
legally - particularly a ruling party like the KWP.
ProfeMor Dae-Sook Suh, a leading international authority on the
history of North Korea, believes that the conflict between H6 Ka-i
and Kim II Sung concerned the main principle of party building:
H6 backed the idea ofan elitist party while Kim strove to turn the
KWP into a mass organisation.30 Such strategic differences might
have contributed to the conflict between H6 and Kim, but it seems as
ifthey were secondary, while personal politics were uppermost. For
Kim the entire affair was a good pretext to get rid ofH6 Ka-i, but if
the party membership problem had not arisen he would have found
some other means ofneutralising his dangerous rival. Kang Sang-ho,
relying on the rumours which circulated among the North Korean
ruling elite, also believes that H6 fell into a trap prepared by Kim II
Sung. According to this interpretation, Kim first advised H6 to be
tough and then used this toughneM to destroy him. 31
NevertheleM, sacking H6 Ka-i fiom his post did not mean his
total removal from political life. Kim II Sung was still too weak in
1951 to dare to eliminate such an influential person completely. H6
Ka-i was appointed deputy prime minister; this appointment brought
a significant drop in his status, but he remained an important figure
in the North. His responsibilities included the overall management
of agriculture and in particular of the Water reservoirs, which were
often attacked and damaged by the US air force. When the Sunan
water reservoir was damaged by the bombing, its repair was seen as
being too slow, and Kim 11 Sung used this to mount a decisive attack
on H6 Ka-i, who was accused offaulty organisation of the reservoir's
defences and general neglect of his duties. In early July a meeting of
the KWP Politburo was to discuss the question ofH6's responsibility
and his punishment. On 30June 1953 H6 visited the Soviet embassy
and met the charge d'affaires S.P. Suzdalev. This meeting is described
in recently declassified documents of the embassy. H6 told Suzdalev
that at a meeting of the Cabinet which had taken place on that day
he had been accused of'bureaucratism' and mismanagement of repair
works. The sharpest criticism had come fiom Kim II Sung and Pak
Ch'ang-ok, who since H6's demotion had claimed informal leadership
of the Soviet group and obviously saw H6 as a rival. Kim proposed
sacking H6 fiom the post of deputy prime minister and appointing
30fbiJ., pp. 124-5.

31 Interview with Kang Sang-ho. 31October1989, Leningrad.

him minister for foreign trade. H6 himselfbelieved that the accusations
were unfair, and driven largely by the personal animosity of Kim II
Sung and Pak Ch'ang-ok towards him. H6 also told the Soviet diplomat
that one of the reasons for the accusations could be his disagreement
with actions by Kim and the Central Committee on certain questions
such as cadre appointments and the tax system, as well as Hos scepticism
about the 'excessM: praise for Kim Il Sung' (this criticism ofthe growing
personality cult ofKim considerably predated the anti-Stalin campaign
in Russia). H6 Ka-i told Suzdalev that he had been given two days
to answer these accusations. Suzdalev advised H6 Ka-i 'to think his
speech over seriously and calmly at the forthcoming meeting of the
Political Committee, admit his mistakes honestly and promise to correct
them. As for accusations which he did not agree with, he should speak
of them openly.'32 Having heard Suzdalev's advice, H6 Ka-i left the
embassy which he would never visit again. Within two days came the
announcement ofhis death. According to an official statement meant
exclusively for the top Party cadres and reported by Pale Ch6ng-ae,
he committed suicide at his residence on the night before the meeting
of the Political Committee scheduled to discuss his mistakes. The
embassy documents show that he died on 2July 1953, at about 9.30.
Suzdalev was informed of his death by Pak Ch'ang-ok. 33
The main question remains: did Ho Ka-i really commit suicide
or was he murdered by Kim II Sung's henchmen, who then tried to
make it look like a suicide? Probably nobody will ever be able to
answer this question with certainty, because even after the unifica-
tion of Korea materials shedding light on the incident will probably
not be found. However, the sources at the author's disposal can be
seen as supporting a conclusion that H6 Ka-i was murdered. There
are a number of factors that lead one to treat the suicide version with
suspicion. For example, on the evening before his death H6 Ka-i was
visited by his father-in-law Ch'oe P'yo-d6k (Piotr Tsoi), and they
spent the whole evening together. H6 Ka-i spoke at length about his
small son, who was also his visitor's grandson, and of how much he
would like to see him after the war (his family was in China at the
time). He mentioned several times that in the current siniation he did
not want to remain in Korea and did not rule out the possibility of
32Tbe dWy ofS.P. Suzdalcv, the chugC d'affaircs, Archive of Foreign Policy of
the Russian Federation (hencefonh AVPRF), fond 0102, opis 9, dclo 9, ~pka 44,
30 June 1953.
"Ibid., 3 July 1953.

A Forgottm Founding Fathn of the KWP 151
going back to the Soviet Union when the war ended. Hes asked Ch'oe
P'yo-d<Sk to stay overnight, but Ch'oe was in a hurry to get to his
headquarters and declined the offer. When they parted late that night
Hes did not seem particularly worried or disturbed; he spoke of the
coming Politburo meeting calmly and there were no signs of an
intention to commit suicide. 34 It could, of course, be said that this
decision came suddenly, but all who knew Hes are of the unanimous
opinion that he was a particularly self-controlled and level-headed
person, alw.iys maintaining his reserve and carefully thinking out every
step (his behaviour in 1937 noted above is a case in point).
At least, Ch'oe P'yo-desk himself had no doubts regarding Hes's
death. According to his daughter, the day after the reports of Hes Ka-
i's suicide Ch'oe P'yo-desk called Kim ll Sung and in rage accused
him of murder. Following that, he resigned. 35 The outraged Ch' oe
was a source of some anxiety for official Pyongyang, and it is clear
fi:om embassy papers that in the first days after Hes's death the North
Korean leaders, and Kim 11 Sung particularly, appealed several times
to the Soviet diplomats to call Ch'oe P'yo-d<Sk back. On 6 July Kim Il
Sung spoke about it with Suvialev. On 7 July Pak Ch'ang-ok explained
the reasons for such a hurry, saying: 'Tsoi [Ch'oe P'yo-desk] should
be called back to the Soviet Union because, following his son-in-
law's suicide, he does not want to maintain a normal relationship with
Kim 11 Sung. Already Tsoi does not show loyalty to Kim 11 Sung and
is making unfounded accusations about the reasons for Hegai 's death
[a clear hint at Ch'oe P'yo-desk's insistence on Kim's involvement
in Hegai's murder].'36 Ifthis had happened in 1956 or 1957, when
Kim Il Sung had become complete master ofhis country, Petr lvanovich
and Nina Petrovna Tsoi would have met a bloody end, but in 1953
he still depended too much on Moscow to dare to eliminate a high-
ranking Soviet military officer. Therefore, efforts were made to send
him out of Korea, and he left, followed by his daughter Nina, Hes
Ka-i's widow (Hes's children moved to the Soviet Union a few years
later). Another piece ofevidence that supports the possibility ofmurder
is that when Nina arrived at Hes's residence fiom Harbin (where the
families of the majority of North Korean leaders lived through the
34Interviews with Lira Hegai, 26 January 1991, Tashkent. Liudmila Tsoi, and 26
January 1990, Moscow.
35 Interview with Liudmila Tsoi, 26 January 1990, Moscow.
36'fhe diary ofS.P. Suzdalev, the charge d'aff.aires, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 9,
delo 9, papka 44, entry on 2July 1953.

152 From Stalin to Kim H Sung
war), she found that her husband had already been buried. She was
not able to meet anyone who had been at the house on the morning
of his death: his aides, driver and servants had already been transferred
somewhere else and nobody was in the house. It seems that the
authorities had something to hide.37
To many the circumstances in which HIS Ka-i was found dead
seemed suspicious. His body lay in the small bed of his son, with a
hunting rifle in his hands and a belt from his wife's dress tied to the
trigger. Some of those who were there during the first minutes and
hours thought that he had definitely been murdered and that the
appear21lce ofsuicide was merely a set-up. All the people I met during
my studies who had known HIS well, including those whose orientation
was pro-Kim Il Sung, were almost unanimous in believing that he
was murdered. Most of those who had known him regarded suicide
as incompatible with his level-headed character (in this an important
exception was Kang Sang-ho). But ifHIS Ka-i was indeed the victim
ofa murder organised by Kim USung, why was this necessary? Why
would Kim see as dangerous a man who after 1952 had been practically
ousted from power? Three reasons suggest themselves. Fint, Kim
might have feared that HIS Ka-i could head a movement or a plot
against himself (at that time Kim might even have feared direct Soviet
support for such a plot). Intelligent. influential and popular, HIS could
be dangerous even in disgrace. Secondly, there was the psychological
side to the problem: in the first yean after Liberation, Kim 11 Sung,
being fully under the control of the Soviet authorities, perceived HIS
Ka-i, the most influential Soviet Korean, as an important instrument
of this control. Thlldly, Kim surely knew ofHIS's intention to return
to the Soviet Union where, being out of his reach. he could do a lot
ofdamage (e.g. by criticising the situation in Korea and Kim's activities
to the Soviet government or even being used by Moscow as a leader
of anti-Kim opposition). Thus it would not have been expedient for
Kim II Sung to let him escape alive.
While it is not easy to make a historical or moral assessment of the

role played by HIS Ka-i in Korean history, we should note the ambi-
guity ofhis role. On the one hand, his persi:>nal integrity, energy and
intelligence seem unquestionable. Like many other Korean Com-
37Interviews with Mm Hegai, 15 January 1991, Tashkent, and Lira Hegai, 26

January 1991, Tashkent.

A Foigotten Founding Father oftM KWP 153
munists - those born and brought up in Korea, as well as those who
came from abroad - H6 sincerely believed in Communist ideas. He
thought he was working for the great cause of a just social order.
All who knew him refer to his modest, undemanding and unselfish
character. During the Second World War, when he occupied impor-
tant posts in the Soviet Union, his family lived like thousands of other
Soviet families: in need and sometimes on the brink ofstarvation. His
managerial talents and organisational skills also cannot be doubted.
On the other hand, the results ofhis activities in North Korea are
hardly praiseworthy. All his intelligence and energy were dedicated
to the establishment on Korean soil of a carbon copy ofStalin's Soviet
Union. H6 and other Soviet Koreans unwittingly cleared the road
to power for Kim II Sung and his group, who eventually made the
regime more repressive and cruel than its Soviet archetype ever was.
The Soviet Koreans were instruments of the Soviet foreign policy
aimed at the 'communisation' of the Korean peninsula. Most pro-
tagonists of this policy were not calculating careerists or cynical
pragmatists; rather, in all likelihood they sincerely believed that they
were bringing the Korean people prosperity and happiness. Be that
as it may, what they did had a tragic consequence.

6
THE AUGUST CHALLENGE
For the Communist camp the mid-1950s were critical years when
the political, social and cultural landscape ofmost Communist countries
underwent changes. For us, who witnessed the even more dramatic
transformation and eventual collapse of the Communist world in
the late 1980s and early '90s, the changes of the 1950s might appear
less important than they did to contemporaries. After 1953 the
de-Stalinisation campaign, launched in the Soviet Union by Nikita
Khrushchev, was rapidly changing the entire situation in the Communist
countries.
Among these few years 1956 was pivotal in most Communist coun-
tries, and North Korea was no exception: a turning-point in its history
occurred in that year. North Korea, together with Albania, Romania
and China, was one of the few Communist regimes that rejected the
new Moscow line and remained more or less true to the old Stalinist
patterns, increasingly reinforced with nationalistic rhetoric. This new
political course had become obvious by the end of the 1950s, but its
foundations were laid earlier, in 1956-7. For North Korea, 1956 was
also marked by domestic events of great significance, above all by
the August Plenum of the KWP Central Committee at which Kim
11 Sung's power was openly challenged. The present chapter deals
with this abortive attempt to replace Kim. We discuss the prepara-
tions for the Plenum and what took place during a few fateful hours
on 30 August. The subsequent September Plenums, unsuccessful
Soviet intervention and the purges of 1957 are not dealt with in this
chapter.
In 1992-5 this author found some materials relating to the August
Plenum in the recently opened Russian archives, but the part which
154

~August Challenge 155
has been de-classified - still only a fraction of the total - does not
necessarily contain the most important or most revealing documents,
and at the time of writing the chances of gaining access to them do
not seem very high. The documents accessed and used for this chapter
mainly comprise official records of conversations between Soviet
diplomats and Korean officials, mostly prominent members of the
Soviet faction who attempted to keep the embassy informed of current
political trends. These records were normally composed within days
of the conversation taking place and eventually sent to Moscow. To
the best ofour knowledge, none ofthe documents have been previously
published or used by historians. Interviews conducted by the author in
1987-95 with some former Soviet diplomats and North Korean officials
now residing in the former Soviet Union are also used in this chapter.
However, in spite of considerable effort, the available information
remains far from complete, and access to Chinese data, which in this
case is of equal or even greater importance, remains no more than a
dream. The distribution of available material is also uneven, but a
result of this is that we know much more about some incidents of the
1956 crisis than about others. It is a safe bet that in time many more
documents will surface from archives. Yet even the materials already
available provide us with a considerable amount of new information
about the 'August incident' and the activity of the opposition within
the North Korean leadership in the vital summer of 1956.
In 1955-6 the domestic and international situation in North Korea

permitted the emergence of an opposition group within the Party
leadership. This window of opportunity was both the first and last in
the entire history of Kim Il Sung's DPRK. Previously it had been
prevented by wartime conditions and the steely grip of foreign con-
trol, while after 1956 the more authoritarian character ofKim Il Sung's
regime was the deciding factor. .
Up till 1956, while North Korea was (to borrow J. Rothschild's
phrase) 'in the grip of mature Stalinism', 1 any challenge to the Soviet-
backed Kim Il Sung would have seemed (and, most likely. was) suicidal.
Even if some members of the leadership were not happy with his
policies or their own places within his system, they were forced to
keep that discontent to themselves. The fate of Pak Hon-yong and
1joseph Rothschild, &tum to Divmity: A Poliliul History of&st Centro/ Eu~

sina ™irld War II, New York: Oxford Univenity Press, 1993, p. 145.

other leaders of the Domestic faction, as well as the tacit approval of
their purge by the Soviet authorities, were a fairly clear indication
of the fate likely to await any potential opponent of Kim II Sung. 2
The entire event was not a total surprise to Kim, since he perceived
the de-Stalinisation campaign in the Soviet Union as likely to lead to
domestic political complications and to threaten his own position.
This was shown by a short campaign to limit Soviet influence which
he organised in late 1955. Kim ll Sung's analysis of the situation proved
to be correct, but at the same time he probably incorrectly identified
the primary danger. It appears likely that he perceived the Soviet
Koreans as the main potential trouble-makers, and in an attempt to
eradicate this latent threat he launched a preventive strike against
them in late 1955. But Kim's power was challenged not by the Soviet
Koreans, who were seen as being especially responsive to the latest
ideological fashions in Moscow, but by the Yanan faction. It was the
one-time 'Chinese Koreans' who formed the core ofan opposition
group and undertook an open attack on Kim II Sung. Although a
few discontented Soviet Koreans joined this conspiracy, their roles
were largely marginal, the entire plan remaining essentially a 'Yanan
ffi . •
aJJr.
No direct evidence of the existence of a clandestine opposition
group within the North Korean leadership appears in the Soviet
embassy papers till July 1956, when the opposition leaders secretly
established contact with the embassy and informed the Soviet diplomats
oftheir plans. However, these contacts (to be discussed below) looked
like the deliberate actions of a well-organised group, and this gives
us ample reason to surmise that the opposition had already existed
for some time - certainly by the early summer of 1956.
The development of the crisis was probably facilitated by Kim II
Sung's prolonged absence from the country: in the first half of the
summer of 1956, from 1 June to 19 July, he was on an unusually
extensive overseas trip. During these seven weeks he visited nine
Communist countries and stayed in Moscow twice - on his way
both to and from Eastern Europe. It was the longest overseas trip he
ever undertook as leader of North Korea. The physical absence ofa
211 seems that,unlike in many Eastern European countries, the approval w:is tacit
and Soviet police experts took no direct part in preparing this, the only show trial in
North Korean history. ln this regard ii is noteworthy that Pak HlSn-ylSng's daughter
Viva, who then lived in the Soviet Union and held Soviet citizenship, was not harassed
by the Soviet authorities, and later built a remaricable career in Moscow as a dancer.
rron1
Tht August Challenge 157
dictator from his country always provides favourable conditions for
· fomenting discontent, and it is therefore almost certain that Kim's
extended overseas trip created a unique opportunity for the disaf-
fected members of the North Korean elite.
The Moscow trip also raised some other hopes among the North
Korean leaders who were unhappy with current political trends in
the DPRK. As is clear from the embassy papers, some members ofthe
political elite apparently hoped that the meetings and conversations
with the Soviet leaders would influence Kim 11 Sung's policies and
help to achieve the changes they considered necessary. These officials
did their best to ensure that the Soviet leaders should discuss with
Kim his attitude to the personality cult and other sensitive questions.
On 16June Yi Sang-jo, the North Korean ambassador in the Soviet
Union, had a deliberately frank conversation with a high-ranking
Soviet diplomat in Moscow. He spoke of Kim 11 Sung's personality
cult and 'distortions ofsocialist legality' (a standard Krushchev-period
euphemism for arbitrary arrests, torture and executions) in North
Korea. Yi Sang-jo explicitly suggested that the Soviet leaders should
discuss these problems with Kim himselfduring his visit to the Soviet
Union. 3 This was not the first incident of its kind. When in March
Leonid Brezhnev (eventually the CPSU General Secretary, but at
the time a Soviet representative to the KWP 3rd Congress) was in
Pyongyang, some Soviet Koreans tried to contact him. This proved y
difficult, since Brezhnev was obviously 'well cared for', but Pak Ui-
wan, then Minister of Construction, did manage to briefhim on the
current situation in the DPRK as he saw it.4 These attempts were not
in vain. In the summer of 1956, during his negotiations with the
Soviet leaders, Kim 11 Sung was obviously reprimanded for 'improper
behaviour'. Although the minutes of the Moscow negotiations are
still beyond the reach of investigators, there are enough hints in the
3Record ofconversation between I.F. Kurdiukov (head of the First Far Eastern
Department ofthe Soviet Foreign Ministry) and Yi Sang-jo (DPRK ambassador to
the Soviet Union), 16June 1956, Archive ofForeign Policy ofthe Russian Fedcntion
(henceforth AVPRF), fond 0102, opis 12, delo 4, papka 68.
4 We know about this meeting because a few weelcs later it was mentioned by
Pak Kil-yong. the then-deputy ministet of foreign affain, to a Soviet diplomat. See
record of the conversation between V.l. Ivancnko (6nt secretary ofthe Soviet Ministry
for Foreign Main) and Pak Kil-yong (deputy minister for foreign affain), 17 May
1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 4, papka 68. A record of this conversation
(or these conversations) between L.1. Brezhnev and Pak Ui-wan certainly exists,
but probably remains classified.

emb:my papers to reconstruct what occuned in Moscow. The 'remarks
ofthe Soviet Communist Party Central Conunittee' concerning Kim
II Sung and his personality cult were mentioned by Nam 11 and Pak
Chl>ng-ae (both probably witnesses of the meeting) as well as Yi
Sang-jo, who later explicitly stated that he had not witnessed it. 5
However, while Kim was being subjected to this unpleasant 'friendly
advice' from the Soviet leaders (no names are mentioned in the
documents, but the reprimands were probably delivered by none
other than Krushchev himself), back in Pyongyang the opposition
group was busy preparing an open attack on him. Its leaders decided
to keep the Soviets informed of their plans, and some of the more
important details of their actions have emerged from the archives.
The existence ofa plot became known to the Soviet embassy in
July 1956. The first hint ofsomething unusual came on 10July when
Kim Silng-hwa, minister of construction and a member of the Soviet
faction, visited the Soviet embassy to discuss with the charge d'affaires
(in the absence of the ambassador) A.M. Petrov some routine business
- the ongoing construction ofa new embassy compound- and turned
the topic of conversation to the 'widespread dissatisfaction' among
North Korean Party cadres who were critical of the Kim II Sung
personality cult. Kim Siing-hwa, who by that time had already been
a member of an anti-Kim II Sung group, certainly overestimated the
extent of this 'dissatisfaction', but he nevertheless hinted that all was
not well in the DPRK. 6
5hl Ch6ng-ae's commena about Moscow's remarks were delivered to a meeting

ofhigh-level caches in late July and were soon reported to the embassy by a participant
in that meeting. Sec record of convenation between S.N. Filatov (counsellor of the
embassy) and Yun Kong-hum (minister of commerce), 2 August 1956, AVPRF,
fond 0102, opil 12. delo 6, papka 68. Yi Sang-jo mentioned thuscveral times in the
autumn of 1956. See, for example, Record of convenation between l.F. Kurdiukov
(head of the First Far Eastern Department, Foreign Mini!try) and Yi Sang-jo (DPRK
ambassador to the Soviet Union). 11 August 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opil 12, delo
4, papka 68. Ho Un-bae in hi! early study, which was based mostly on data obtained
via interviews with North Korean dcfccton to the Soviet Union, also mentions
the meeting$ and couna both Nam II and hl Ch6ng-ae among ia participana.
H6 Un-bae also says that it was B.N. Ponomarev (at that time the head of the
international Department ofthe Soviet Central Committee) and Khrushchev himself
who made these remarks. Unfortunately. both statcmena cannot be verified at the
present time, but they certainly look plauuble: Lim On, ~ Founding of a Dynasty
in North Kotta, Toky6 Jiyu-sha, 1982, p. 225.
6The diary ofA.M. Pebov (provisional charge d'alfaircs), 19June- 10July 1956,
AVPRF, fond 0102, opil 12, dclo 6, papka 68.

The August Challenge 159
The situation took a new turn the day after Kim Il Sung's return
from his trip. We have a considerable amount of evidence to show
that for some reason his return and, possibly, some information about
his trip triggered opposition activity. On 20 July Yi P'il-gyu, head of
the department ofconstruction materials in the Cabinet and a promi-
nent figure from the Yanan faction, came to the embassy to speak
with the same provisional charge d'affaires, A.M. Petrov, and they had
what was, perhaps, the most outspoken of the conversations between
the conspirators and Soviet diplomats. Yi was a prominent member of
the Yanan faction: after 1945 he had been deputy chiefofthe General
Staff, commander of the 6th Army and deputy minister of the inte-
rior (under Pak 11-u as minister). After Pak 11-u, Yi's close friend and
an authority among the former Yanan exiles, was purged, Yi lost his
job but not all ofhis connections in the Ministry of the Interior. His
influence inside the Yanan faction probably remained considerable.7
From the start of his conversation with Petrov, Yi P'il-gyu set
diplomatic niceties aside and came down hard on Kim 11 Sung. Yi
accused the North Korean leader of establishing a personality cult,
exaggerating the importance ofhis guerrillas during the anti-Japanese
struggle at the expense of the role of the Soviet army and other
resistance forces, taking an 'incorrect attitude' to other members of
the Party leadership, and other transgremons. He is reported as saying:
'Kim Il Sung's personality cult has become quite intolerable. He
will not brook any criticism or self-criticism. Kim 11 Sung's word is
law. He has gathered sycophants and lackeys all around him in the
Central Committee and Cabinet'. Further, Yi P'il-gyu informed A.M.
Petrov that a plan to remove Kim had matured among the top North
Korean leadership: 'A group of executives consider it necessary to
undertake certain actions against Kim II Sung and his closest associates
at the earliest possible opportunity ... The group sets itself the task of
putting new people in charge of the KWP Central Committee and
government. There are two ways of achieving this ... The first is a
sharp and decisive criticism and self-criticism within the Party.
However, Kim 11 Sung will not agree to this course of action ... The
second is forcible upheaval. This path :s difficult and will probably
call for some sacrifice. There are people in the DPRK who are ready
to embark on such a course and are currently making appropriate
7Record of conversation between A.M. Petrov (charge d'aJfaim) and Yi P'il-

gyu (head of the department of building materials) on 20 July 1956, AVPRF, fond
0102, opu 12, delo 6, papka oil.

160 From Stalin to IGm R Sung
preparations:8 PetroV asked Yi P'il-gyu who the members of this group
were, but Yi evaded the question. Subsequently he asked Yi about his
'attitude towards the ... underground group'. Again Yi was evasive, but
A.M. PetroV wrote of this conversation: 'I was under the impression
that he definitely played an important role in this group'. Another of
Petrov's questions was why Yi had decided to inform the Soviets (after
all, members of the Yanan faction were not frequent visitors to the
Soviet embassy). Yi P'il-gyu replied, 'They [the opposition] would
like to alert the Soviet Embassy to the possibility ofcertain forthcoming
events in the DPRK.'9
Yi P'il-gyu's visit, important as it was, was neither accidental nor
isolated. The next day, 21 July saw another meeting at the embassy-
between counsellor S.N. Filatov and Pak Ch'ang-ok. After the alleged
suicide of Ht"S Ka-i in 1953 Pak Ch'ang-ok had become the dt facto
leader of the Soviet Koreans, although his reputation among them
never stood as high as Ht"S Ka-i's had alone. Pak told Filatov that the
attack on Kim II Sung would take place during the next Plenum
and that he himself would have a hand in it.10 1\vo days later, on 23
July, yet another meeting took place at the Soviet embassy. This time
Counsellor S.N. Filatov received Ch' oe Ch' ang-ik, then vice-premier
and a member of the KWP Central Committee's Politburo, and the
second most prominent leader of the Yanan faction. In the mid-
1950s Kim Tu-bong was still the supreme authority among the former
Yanan exiles, but he normally did not intervene in practical politics
and, after the fall of Pak 11-u, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik had replaced him as
the 'acting leader' of the entire Yanan faction. He visited the Embassy
for the same reason as Yi P'il-gyu and Pak Ch'ang-ok - to inform
the embassy of their plans for Kim II Sung's removal. He announced:
'I am becoming more and more convinced that Kim Il Sung does not
understand how harmful his behaviour is. He paralyses the initiative
of members of the Standing Committee and other executives of the
Party and State. He intimidates everyone. Nobody can voice an opinion
on any question.' 11
'Ibid. Dots[... ] are used in these quotations only to replace such phrases as 'Yi
P 'il-gya w "d'.
9JbiJ.
1°R.ecoro of convmation between S.N.Filatov (counsellor at the Soviet embassy)
and Pak Ch'ang~ok (deputy premier in the DPRK Cabinet and member of the
Presidium of the CC KWP), 21July1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6,
papka 68.
11 Recoro of conversation between S.N. Filatov and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (vice-

True to the spirit of the new times, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik reproached
Kim chiefly for the propagation of his persomlity cult in its various
fonns: 'Kim II Sung ... does not wish to change the fonns and methods
ofleadership. He does not wish to subject the mistakes he has made
to criticism and self-criticism. This kind ofbehaviour by Kim Il Sung
cannot facilitate the development of our Party activity or contribute
to strengthening its ranks. Kim II Sung's personality cult has infiltrated
our Party. It has spread and continues to spread on a large scale.
Democratic legality in our country is distorted and the Leninist
principle of collective leadership is not adhered to'. Like Yi P'il-gyu,
Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik explained the reason for his visit to the embassy as
a wish to inform the Soviet authorities that 'at the next Plenum of
the Central Committee, Kim ll Sung will probably be subjected to
sharp criticism.'12
All these visits were followed on the next day (24 July) by a
meeting between Kim Sung-hwa and Counsellor Filatov. Kim Silng-
hwa, then minister of construction, was a Soviet Korean and a close
personal friend of Pak Ch'ang-ok. He came to report his recent
conversations with Kim Tu-bong, the scholar and supreme leader of
the Yanan faction (they had discussed the political situation in the
DPRK and the possible attempt to censure Kim II Sung). 13 In addition,
on 2 August yet another member ofthe Yanan faction - the minister
of commerce Yun Kong-hum, who was to play a major role in the
forthcoming events - visited the embassy. Yun also met Filatov and
told him in detail ofan important meeting which had been organised
by the KWP Central Committee in July (to be discussed later). 14
However, following Yun's visit on 2 August the opposition members
ceased calling at the Soviet embassy as suddenly as they had started
(at least, none is recorded in the de-classified documents).
We can assume that the visits of the opposition leaders to the
Soviet embassy during 21-24 July were deliberate and indeed an
integral part oftheir strategy. This suggestion seems to be confirmed
pmnier, member of the KWP S12ncling Committee), 23 July AVPRF, fond 0102,
opis 12, dclo 6 , papka 68.
12JbiJ.
13Record of convenation between S.N . FilatoV and Kim Sllng-hwa (minister
ofco.-uction and membtt of the KWP Centnl Committee), 24July 1956, AVPRF,
fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
14Record of convenation between S.N. Filatov and Yun Kong-hum (minister
of commerce), 2 August 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.

by the fact that all these meetings took place almost simultaneously
and their content varied very little. It seems highly probable that this
was part of the conspirators' plan - the use of this word is justified by
the fact that their organisation was necessarily clandestine or semi-
clandestine, although - as we shall see - they hoped to achieve their
goals within the framework ofexisting institutions and by legal means.
Obviously the opposition tried to secure Soviet neutrality ifnot support,
and avoid the impression that they were doing something behind the
Soviets' backs. It can be assumed that they feared an unexpected and
covertly prepared attack on Kim D Sung, carried out without prior
Soviet approval, touching offa negative reaction in Moscow. Tiris would
doom the attack to almost certain failure. Moscow was still perceived
as the supreme arl>iter in North Korean politics and, more broadly, of
the entire Commwmt movement. To be assured of success, the opposition
would at the very least require Soviet neutrality. which they undoubtedly
tried to secure.
This intense flurry of contacts began almost within a day of Kim
II Sung's return from his overseas trip. We can therefore surmise that
the basic decision to act during the next Plenum was approved by
the opposition only after Kim had returned home, when its leaders
had received some feedback from his trip and probably also learned
something of his meetings in Moscow. As we shall see, until at least
26 July the next Plenum had been officially scheduled to take place
on 2 August. Thus the opposition probably felt pressed for time and
wanted to fix everything within the few remaining days - hence the
frequency of their contacts with the embassy.
However, not everyone who met the Soviet diplomats during
those hot July days belonged to the opposition. On 24 July A.M.
Petrov was invited to speak with Nam 11, then Minister of Foreign
Affairs and formerly a professor in the Soviet Union. Although Nam
II had been a member of the Soviet faction, he had, along with Pak
Ch6ng-ae and Pang Hak-se (the influential and reclusive chief of
political police), gone over to Kim II Sung early and decisively and
become one of his staunchest supporters, rivalling the ex-guerrillas
in his consistent devotion. When the situation in the North Korean
ruling circles became more delicate, Nam Dalso considered it necesw-y
to contact the Soviet embassy, though it is not clear whether he indeed
was asking for advice or just probing for a possible Soviet reaction to
the looming crisis. Being the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he did not
go to the embassy, but requested A.M. Petrov, as acting ambassado1; to
call at his office on 24 July. He told Petrov that in July (the first day

ofthe opposition's feverish activity) Pak Ch'ang-ok visited his home,
something he had never done before. Nam II had just come back
from accompanying Kim II Sung on his trip. Pak Ch'ang-ok, perhaps
hoped to draw Nam Il into a conspiracy, or at least to ascertain his
position, counting on factional solidarity. Pak Ch'ang-ok had told
Nam II that a group of Central Committee members were going
to organise a move against Kim Il Sung at the next Plenum. Kim
would be accused of incorrect leadership methodology, propagating
a personality cult and persecuting Soviet Koreans. Pak Ch'ang-ok
suggested that Nam II take part in the action. 15
Nam II was extremely hostile to the idea. He remarked to A.M.
Petrov that 'such sharp propounding of the problem of the personality
cult in the Korean context ... would lead to undesirable consequences,
could undermine the prestige of the Party and government leaders,
discredit Kim II Sung in the eyes of the mass Party membership and
the people generally, ar,d cause considerable discussion within the
Party'. Echoing Kim 11 Sung's own reasoning, Nam 11 added that
there was no particular need to criticise Kim 11 Sung himself, so long
as the latter tried to correct his mistakes. As Nam 11 put it, 'although
he is a little too sensitive about the comments of the leaders of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee regarding
himself, his attitude in general is quite correct'. Nam II stressed that
'in spite ofall Kim 11 Sung's shortcomin~ and mistakes, there is nobody
in the DPRK who could replace him'. Afterwards Nam II asked Petrov
point-blank if he should report his meeting with Pak Ch'ang-ok
to Kim Il Sung, to which Petrov answered that this was a matter
for Nam II himself to decide, but that if he had a conversation with
Kim he should refrain from naming the participants in the proposed
action.16
It is probable, and even very likely, that something serious also
took place on 28 July when Petrov met Nam 11 and Pak Ch<'Sng-ae,
another Soviet Korean who was a staunch supporter ofKim 11 Sung.
In his diary, Petrov gave no details of their talk on this occasion, but
merely mentioned that 'the information about the conversation was
sent to Moscow by telegraph'. The same is to be found again in his
diary entry for 1 August, which mentions a new meeting with Nam
IL Since the telegrams have not been de-classified (and are unlikely
15Record of conversation between A.M. Petrov and Nam II (minister of foreign

affain), 24 July 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opi.s 12, delo 6, papka 68.
16Jbid.

to be any time soon), we can only guess at the purpose of these
meetings. However, it is most probable that they were connected
with the developing crisis. 17
Kim ll Sung was undoubtedly well aware of the opposition's plans
and did everything possible to engineer their eventual failwe. On 31
August, just a few hours after the conclusion of the Plenum which
thwarted those plans, one of its participants, Ko Hw-man, remarked
to the first secretary of the Soviet embassy, G.Ye. Samsonov: 'The
intention of this group to use the forthcoming Plenum for anti-party
attacks against some executives in the Party and government was known
before the Plenum'. 18 Indeed there is no doubt that the opposition
could not keep their plans secret, and that Kim 11 Sung had all the
information about them that he needed. As Kang Sang-ho (then
deputy minister of the interior) recalls, in the summer of 1956, while
Kim 11 Sung was still overseas, Ch'oe Yong-g0n had called him in
and said that some former members ofthe ML Marxist group, which
had existed in Seoul in the 1920s and was to lay the foundation for
the Yanan faction, had decided to use Kim ll Sung's foreign trip to
prepare an 'anti-Party plot' and planned to speak against Kim at the
next Central Committee Plenum. He had ordered first that measures
be initiated for the safety of Kim Il Sung and secondly that Pang
Hak-se, the minister of the interior, and Sok San, the chiefofmilitary
security,19 be summoned urgently from abroad.
Probably the most effective and shrewd ofKim II Sung's counter-
measures was postponing the Plenum itself. In September 1956, while
speaking with a Soviet diplomat in Moscow, Ko Hui-man boasted:
'Having been informed that the attack had to take place at the Cen-
tral Committee Plenum, the leaders of the Central Committee kept
delaying the Plenum to confuse the [opposition] group. The date
was announced only on the eve of the first day of the Plenum thus
17The diary ofA.M. Pe11ov, 20 July-3 August 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis
12, delo 6, p;apka 68. This is not the only reference to important documents which
still remairu beyond the reach of researchen.
18Record of con"Yenation between G. Ye. Samsonov (fint secretary) and Ko
Hiii-man (departmental head in the KWP Centnl Committee), 31August1956,
AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
19Memoin ofKang Sang-ho (manuscript, copy in author's archi"Ye). According
to Pulthan inmy(lrtg SlljJn ((Biographical dictionary of North Korea), Seoul: Chungang

ilbo sa, 1990, p. 201), S<Sk San in 1956 was head of the Political Dep;artment (basically.
a political commissar) of the North Korean Ministry of National Defence, but
Kang Sang-ho mentions him as the person responsible at that time for the security
apparatus in the military.

disorganising their [the opposition's) actions'.20 This appean to be
true. As late as 26 July Kim II Sung had stated to A.M. Petrov that
the Plenum would take place on 2 August;21 the same date was also
mentioned on 21 July. 22 This deliberate delay gave Kim Il Sung pre-
ciow time to thwart the opposition's plans. Within this critical month
he secured the support of a majority of Central Committee memben
while the opposition, kept in the dark till the very last day, was forced
into passivity. Perhaps the sudden cessation of contact between the
opposition and the embassy reflects this involuntary delay, since the
opposition had no option but to wait.
One ofKim Il Sung's foremost concerns mwt have been reducing
the number of potential trouble-maken. We do not know much
about 'individual work' (i.e. political bribing and blackmail) which
was used against less reliable memben of the Central Committee,
though there is little doubt that this occurred. Still, we know ofsome
steps aimed at winning more general support from the Party cadres.
On 20 July Kim 11 Sung met the vice-premien and deputy chairmen
ofthe KWP Central Committee to tell them about his visits to Moscow
and other Communist capitals. The next day the same information
was delivered to the KWP Standing Committee. We have quite a
detailed picture of these meetings since on 23 July Ch'oe Ch'ang-
ik reported them to Filatov. Among other things Kim II Sung had
mentioned the current crisis in Poland - stimulated, he insisted, by
the mistakes of the Polish leaden. Their three principal mistakes were:
'They told people too much about the decisions ofthe 20th Congress
[of the Soviet Communist Party] regarding the penonality cult';
they did not exercise 'rigorous leadenhip'; they did not pay attention
to the 'dangerow ideological trends' among the intellectuals. According
to Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Kim 11 Sung considered that the best leadenhip
style was to be found in Romania and Albania - two countries
which had managed to avoid even moderate de-Stalinisation and
were soon to begin distancing themselves from Moscow. 23 Obviously
the message Kim II Sung wanted to deliver to the North Korean
ruling elite was the simple one that de-Stalinisation would probably
21lR.ecord of conversation between S.P. Lazarev (fint secretary of the Soviet

Foreign Min.Utry) and Ko Hiii-man (departmental head in the KWP Central
Committee), 18 September 1956, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 4, papka 68.
21 The diary of A.M . Petrov, 20 July- 3 August 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis
12. delo 6, papka 68.

22R.ecord ofconversation between S.N. Filatov and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik on 23 July.
23/bid.

spell dangerous political instability and might put their collective
position in jeopardy.
Kim ll Sung did not con.fine himself to the probable perils of de-
Stalinisation. He not only tried to terrify the North Korean elite with
the likely dire consequences of over-hasty reforms, but for the more
liberal-minded part ofhis audience he did not reject reforms outright
and signalled that he himself was going to right all wro~. This had
been one of his favourite tactics at least since February - a tactic he
probably used in Moscow with Soviet leaders as well as with the
North Korean 'inner circle'. 24 On 30 July there was a meeting of
the heads and deputy heads of the departments of the KWP Central
Committee and some ministers also participated. We know of this
meeting from the record of S.N. Filatov's conversation two days
later with Yun Kong-hlim, then minister ofcommerce. The speeches
at the meeting were delivered by the deputy chairman of the KWP
Central Committee Pak Kmn-ch'c51 and by Pak Chc5ng-ae. Both were
considered close to Kim ll Sung, and therefore their speeches were
taken as an indirect statement by Kim himself. They were more or less
identical in both ideas and structure, and both were conciliatory, almost
penitent in tone.
Pak Kilm-ch'c51 recognised that 'there were serious shortcomin~'
in the work of the KWP Central Committee: 'First of all, there was
and still is a Kim II Sung personality cult within our party. But
this is not the damage which Stalin's personality cult did within the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and continues to do at present.
Therefore the leaders of the KWP Central Committee decided to
overcome the personality cult and its consequences gradually, with-
out submittinJ the question to wide discussion among the party
membership.' Besides, Pak Kilm-ch'c51 declared, 'The KWP Central
Committee has committed some mistakes in its selection and dis-
miNl ofpersonnel'. He promised that these errors would eventually be
corrected.26 This was an obvious hint that some cadres who recently
24This 'self-criticism' was

(perhaps for the first time) delivered by Kim II Sung
on 18 February to a group ofhigh-level government and Party officials. The embassy
learned about the incident shortly afterwards from a participant at that meeting.
See Record ofco~rsation between S.N. Filatov (counsellor at the Soviet embassy)
and Pak Oi-wan (vice-premier), 21 February 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12,
delo 6, papka 68.
25Record of conversation between S.N. Filatov and Yun Kong-hilm, 2 August
1956.
26Jbid.

lost their positions YJOuld have the chance to be restored while othen
who thought they deserved better could hope for promotion. Pak
Ch<Sng-ae spoke in much the same style. She also reluctantly admit-
ted that the penonality cult existed in the DPRK, but appealed for
a calm, discreet solution to the problem: 'During the visit of our
delegation to Moscow the problem of the personality cult had been
discussed at the meeting with the leaders of the Communist Party
of the Soviet. Union. Because Kim II Sung's penonality cult is not a
danger to our party we decided not to discuss the question too widely
but to overcome all its shortcomings in our connected work step by
step.'27
There is little doubt that both speeches were written according
to a set of guidelines which in all probability had been approved by
Kim II Sung himself At any rate, the general mode ofboth speeches
was in accordance with Kim's latest tactic which had been evident
from February 1956 onwards. The tactic was simply that Kim or his
mouthpieces should admit that the accusations ofa personality cult
might not be completely groundless, and promise that Kim himself
would gradually put things right. The obvious goal was to smooth
out any discontent and show would-be dissenters that there was no
need for any precipitate action.
As often happens, some indications of this new line could be found
in the official press. On 1 August Nodong sinmun published a lengthy
editorial explaining the recent Soviet ideological developments and
newly-introduced concepts: 'peaceful coexistence', multilineal roads
to socialism, collective leadership and so on. All these concepts soon
became anathema to the Pyongyang ideologues, but in the editorial
they were presented in a quite favourable light. The main message
of the editorial was not dissimilar to the announcements Kim him-
self had recently made on his meetings with the top cadres. The
difference was rather in degree - in this case the degree of openness,
since the writers in the newspaper could not be as frank and had to
wrap the ideas in the traditional verbiage, which would be transpar-
ent to an experienced reader. In the editorial there were also hints
that the KWP and Kim II Sung himself were doing everything to
fix the problem: immediately following its critical remarks about
Stalin's personality cult, the editorial quoted at length those parts of
Kim's speech to the KWP 3rd Congress in which he promised to
follow the 'historic decisions' of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.
27 lbid.
rron1
168 From S'41in to J(jm ll Sung
However, the main emphasis of the article was on the attempts of
'enemies of the working class' to use the new trends to divide and
weaken Communist movements and undermine the great achieve-
ments of the socialist countries. The ostensible conclusion was the
same as other official pronouncements on the topic: the personality
cult might be bad, and the struggle against it might make sense. but it
must be done in an orderly and controlled manner so that enemies
would not use it for their own purposes.28
After almost a month of stalling, the Plenum opened on 30 August

and continued for two days. On the official agenda were two questions:
the results of Kim ll Sung's visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and the situation in the national health service. However, on
this occasion, as on many other similar ones, the official agenda was
misleading. The main topic of the Plenum was not the health service
or even the East European trip, but an assault on Kim II Sung. The
opposition made its attack but lost instantly, and everything was over
within a few hours. What had taken place was kept secret for several
months.
The August Plenum has been described, at least briefly, in most
books dealing with North Korean history. Among the better-known
examples are an early study by Koon Woo Nam, Dae-Sook Suh classic
political biography of Kim II Sung, and recently published general
reviews ofNorth Korean history by Kim Hak-chun and Ch'oe ~ng.29
There is also a briefdescription, in a single paragraph, of the Plenum
•
in the book by Hc3 Un-bae ('Lim Un'), which is based primarily on
testimonies of the North Korean exiles in the Soviet Union.30 Some
original and reliable (albeit briet) contemporary documents are also
to be found in the Russian archives. In addition, we can use a manu-
script version of Kang Sang-ho's memoirs along with records of
interviews with him. This new material sheds some additional light
on what happened in Pyongyang on 30 August 1956.
However, our picture is far from complete. Due to the particular
'ZBNodong sinmun, 1August1956.

29K.oon Woo Nam, The North Korean 1..udmhip, 1945-1965: A SlUdy of
NaiOl1'Jlism and Po/ititAI Consolidation, Tuscaeoosa: University ofAlabama Press., 1974;
Dae-Sook Suh, Kim n Sung: The North Korean Luder, pp. 149-52; Kim Hak-chun,
Pulthan 50ny6n Sd, Seoul: Tong'a ch'ulp'ansa, 1995, pp. 189-92; Ch'ocS<lng. Pu/than
clWngch'i s••• Seoul: Pulp'ich', 1997.
'°Lim Un. The Founding of• Dyruuty.

sensitivity of the situation, which was well perceived by the Soviets
at the time, the most important Soviet material relating to the August
Plenum was kept highly secret. Hence official contemporary Soviet
accounts ofit are still inaccessible. There is little doubt that such rnatcrial
was compiled by the embassy and/or by other Soviet agencies, but
they are beyond the reach of the author at the time of writing. As a
result we still know far less about the Plenum itself than about
preparations for it. Nevertheless, among the de-classified documents
is one interesting paper - an official record of conversation between
Ko Hui-man and G. Ye. Samsonov, which took place on 31 August,
the second day of the Plenum. Ko Hui-man - then a departmental
head of the KWP Central Committee and a zealous devotee ofKim
Il Sung-met the Soviet diplomat by chance at the Morangbong theatre
(protocol had dictated that they should both attend a performance
by a visiting Hungarian group).31 According to the record, Ko Hw-
man appeared rather agitated by the recent confiontation, and on
seeing the Soviet diplomat he rushed to tell him about the Plenum.
Since this is probably one ofthe earliest possible accounts ofthe •August
incident', related by a witness only a few hours after the event, it is
worth quoting at length:
'The main body of the Plenum agenda did not consist of these
questions [i.e. the official agenda items) but of the eradication of
an anti-Party group consisting ofCh'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak Ch'ang-
ok, So Hwi, Yun Kong-hum, Yi P'il-gyu and some others.
'Even before the Plenum it had been known that this group
was going to use the forthcoming Plenum for its anti-Party attacks
against some leaders of the Party and government, including Pak
Chong-ae, Chong Chun-t'aek and Han Sang-du, who were
considered [former) pro-Japanese elements [by the opposition),
and against Ch'oe Yong-g6n, Chong Il-ryong and Kim Hae-il,
who were seen as mediocre and unworthy.
'... Furthermore, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik attacked Kim 11 Sung on
the Standing Committee, [insisting that) he had concentrated
the entire state and Party power in his hands. [Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik]
said that it had become difficult for him and others to work with
Kim Il Sung ... Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik also sharply criticised the Party
31According to NoJong sinmun., there W2S a performance by a Hungarian folk

music group on 31 August in the Morangbong theatre (Nodong sinmun, 2 September
1956).

line on industrWisation while the overwhelming majority of the
population was starving. According to Ch'oe's opinion, it would
be better to use the aid from fraternal countries to improve the
life ofthe working people. Kim 11 Sung objected to this suggestion,
pointing out that this very policy was being pursued in South
Korea where American and other aid was spent on ahns for the
population. We do not want this, nor do the people. The Party
could not base its policy merely on the needs ofthe day, as Ch' oe
Ch'ang-ik insisted. In this he will not be supported by the people.
' ... [T]he Central Committee foresaw the possibility of a salvo
from the anti-Party group attacking the Party leadership. Indeed
this occurred. The first speech was delivered by Yun Kong-brim
who stated that a police regime exists within the Party, and that
there are many unreliable persons within the leadership, citing
Ch'oe Yong-g6n [as an example]. The Plenum deemed Yun's speech
to be an anti-Party [act). On its first day, Yun was expelled from
the Central Committee and the Party ... Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak
Ch'ang-ok, SO Hwi and Yi P'il-gyu also made speeches and they
were also rebutfed.'32
Another source ofinformation is Kang Sang-ho's memoirs. Kang
Sang-ho himself was not a participant in the Plenum, but as a highly-
placed member of the Pyongyang hierarchy at the time (as deputy
minister of the interior) he had many opportunities to discuss the
events with direct participants. According to his memoirs, the first to
rise and speak at the Plenum was Yun Kong-hum. In his short speech,
drowned out by cries ofprotest, he stated that 'Kim 11 Sung's personality
cult has taken root', and 'irresponsible persons are permitted to join
the leadership'. However, Yun Kong-hum's speech did not achieve
the effect the conspirators had anticipated: almost no one supported
his accusations. Kim II Sung's supporters, who were in full control,
immediately branded Ins speech an 'anti-party sally'. 33 According
to Kang Sang-ho, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and other opposition members
also tried to speak, but they too were unable to win over the Plenum,
and their speeches almost went unheard amid the hubbub. It is worth
noting that participants in the opposition's 'offensive', according to
32R.ecord of conversation between G.Ye. Samsonov (fint secretary) and Ko

HUi-1112n {departmental head in the KWP Central Committee), 31August1956
AVPR.F. fond 0102, opis 12, dclo 6, papb 68.
33'Mcmoirs of Kang Sang-ho' (1112nusctipt - copy in author's archive) and
interview with Kang Sang-ho. 31 October 1989. Leningrad.

The August Chal/mge 171
Ko Hui-man, were Yun Kong-hum, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak Ch'ang-
ok, S(> Hwi and Yi P'il-gyu. The main accusations were the personality
cult, the policy of development of heavy industry at the expense of
light industry (and ultimately of living standards}, and Kim ll Sung's
attempt to promote cadres who were personally Joyal but incompetent.
Ifwe compare the accounts of the incident by Ko and Kang with
the depictions in published works, we inevitably see some divergences
although the general picture is more or Jess the same. For example,
most scholars, following South Korean government publications as
well as some later North Korean official accounts, state that S(> Hwi
in his speech demanded that the trade unions be made independent
from the state and particularly from the Party. Such a statement can
be found in the books by Ch'oe S(>ng and Kim Hak-chun as well as
in North Korean publications (the latter probably, influenced the
former). For example, in 1981 the voluminous North Korean 'Gen-
eral History of Korea' credited a 'factionalist' (obviously S(> Hwi)
with having said: 'The Party can not guide the trade unions. The trade
unions have more members and are a bigger organisation than the
Party. Since all Party cadres are members of trade unions they must be
guided by them'. 34 It appears extremely unlikely that S(> 1-Iwi would
have ever said anything remotely like this, or indeed anything about
weaning the trade unions away from Party control. Such an opinion
might not look particularly outrageous to a modem Western reader.
Indeed, it probably even looks reasonable, but for any Marxist-Leninist,
Stalinist or not, this pronouncement was a sinister heresy. Worse still,
it was an old and well-known heresy which had long been con-
demned. When in the early 1920s the Russian Communists discussed
the role of the trade unions in the newly-established Communist
state, some Soviet cadres expressed opinions identical to the above
remark, so improbably attributed to S(> Hwi. However, these people
were promptly and severely rebuked by none other than Lenin him-
self. In the late 1930s the 'trade union discussion' had been described
at some length in the official Stalinist 'History ofthe CPSU (b): Short
Course', the principal textbook on Stalinism-Leninism both in the
Soviet Union and in North Korea. Since then the topic had always
remained staple fare for Communist indoctrination. Every Party cadre
who had been on a course of political study was expected to know
about the 'trade union discussion' and to be easily able to identify this
~Chown ch6nsa, wl. 27, Pyongyang: Kwahak paekkwa sajlSn ch'ulp'ansa. 1981.
p. 291.
rron1
172 From Sl41in to Kim ll Sung
heresy. It is more likely that SO Hwi said something mildly critical
about excessive official control over the trade unions, and that these
remarks were later reinterpreted in such a way as to present him as
an apostate and anti-Leninist revisionist. The fact that Ko Hiii-man
did not mention such an outrageous declaration (from an orthodox
Leninist point ofview) to Samsonov also indicates that SO Hwi prob-
ably never made such a statement.
Kim Hak-chun in his book mentions additional allegations later
made by Kim USung himself. According to such accusations, Ch'oe
Ch'ang-ik allegedly cited 'peaceful coexistence' to insist on the neu-
trality of the Korean peninsula, and suggested the abolition of the
Communist system in the North to create the conditions necessary
for such neutrality. 35 The first part of this statement (i.e. 'neutrality of
Korea') might have been possible, however improbable, but the second
part was a heresy even more abominable than SO Hwi's alleged decla-
ration about the independence of trade unions, and sounds fantastic.
It is impossible that any sane Party functionary, especially one backed
by the increasingly militant Maoist China, would ever have said any-
thing like that. It was almost certainly a later addition by propagan-
dists, designed to illustrate to Party members just how tar from the
true revolutionary path Ch' oe had deviated. We can only agree with
Kim Hak-chun when he approaches this accusation with consider-
able scepticism - or the accusation can be disregarded completely.
Incidentally, had Ch'oe indeed said something even remotely like
this, and had Kim U Sung been able to present any proof of it, it
would have been unthinkable for the joint Soviet-Chinese delega-
tion in September to have insisted on Ch'oe's political restoration.
No pardon was possible for such a reactionary who was even ready
to give up the hard-won revolutionary achievements of the North
Korean people!
The opposition did not win a majority in the Central Committee.
Indeed it would appear that it did not even manage to win to its
side a single member of the Central Committee who had not already
been a member of their group. This was probably a result ofKim U
Sung's thorough preparations for the Plenum, and of the various
opportunities which his position gave him to bribe and blackmail
cadres individually. Manoeuvring, promising to right old wrongs and
give the discontented officials their due, to downsize the personality
cult, to revise old policies etc., he won to his side many neutrals. The
351bid., p. 190.

The August Chalknge 173
outcome of the crisis shows how successful Kim II Sung was in his
manoeuvring, and that when the Plenum began he was ready for the
~
decisive show-down. According to 'Lim Un' {H6 Un-bae), even sitting

· arrangements were carefully arranged. so that the seats of known
opposition supporten - and there were quite a number of them - were
surrounded by Kim's most reliable and aggressive henchmen. 36 The
cacophony ofyelling and whistling pIC'Yented the opposition members
6:om delivering the speeches in any sort of convincing way, and the
Plenum was quickly transformed into a shouting match where sheer
decibels decided the outcome. There may have been other Plenum
participants who were ready to support the opposition cause but, faced
with the apparent predominance of the better-organised Kim loyalists,
they would have chosen to be prudent and remained calm, ifthey did
not join in the chorus.
Thus the majority supporting Kim 11 Sung literally silenced the
opposition and obediently voted for repressive action against the rebels.
As a result, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik was expelled 6:om the Presidium and
Central Committee, and Pak Ch'ang-ok 6:om the Central Committee.
However, because both were pre-eminent politicians, neither was
expelled 6:om the Party at that stage. Nevertheless, on the evening of
31 August Ko Hw-man told G.Ye. Samsonov that 'the KWP Control
Commission had been asked to consider the question of their party
membership' 37 - a hint at their likely fate (expulsion 6:om the Party,
arrest, interrogation and a possible show trial followed by imprisonment
or execution, according to the traditional Stalinist sequence). The
less prominent Yun Kong-hi:im, 56 Hwi and Yi P'il-gyu were expelled
6:om the Party straightway at the Plenum itself. None of these events
took more than one clay. since on 31 August the second and last day
of the Plenum, Ko Hw-man said that Yun Kong-hilm and others
'had disappeared somewhere'. We can therefore conclude that the
bold escape of the opposition leaders (to be discussed later) which
followed the Plenum debacle took place late on the evening of 30
August.
The concluding speech was delivered by Kim 11 Sung himself.
According to Ko Hw-man, he expressed regret for having been 'too
kind' to the factions and their advocates, and particularly to Ch'oe
Ch'ang-ik. 38 This statement augured ill for the opposition supporters
36Lim Un. The FounJ;ng oftht Dynasty in North Ko~a, p. 229.

37Record ofconversation between G.Ye. Samsonov and Ko Hili-man, 31 August
1956.

(both real and alleged) and for their friends. As was customary at the
time, the information about the Plenum was not published in the news-
papers for a while - until 9 September - and even then the report
revealed only the official agenda {apart from a concluding sentence
mentioning 'an organisational question' - a traditional euphemism
for dismiru)s or promotions or both).39
Thus the attempt to change the North Korean political line and
replace the country's leadership by legal means, as was permitted by
the country's constitution and the Party statutes, ended in a complete
failure. The scenario which under very different circumstances
succeeded that year in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland - where
conservative Stalinist leaders succumbed to the pressure of the local
opposition (sometimes supported and encouraged, sometimes opposed
and contained by Moscow) - was not and probably could not have
been realised in North Korea as it was in 1956. As was to be expected,
purges of opposition participants followed. A lesson would be drawn
from the attempt, and a lesson would be given to every North Korean:
no one should dare to challenge the Leader and hope to get away
with it.
The supporters of the unsuccessful opposition group were pro-
claimed to be 'splittists' and 'factional elements' {the latter term -
chongp'a punja - was to be used in all official North Korean publica-
tions to define them throughout the following decades) - accusations
of more heinous crimes like spying. sabotage and mutiny, which pre-
viously had routinely been applied to fallen politicians, seem to have
been dropped this time. While some of the key figures, due to their
boldness or to sheer luck, managed to escape Kim 11 Sung's wrath, a
· general campaign against the opposition was launched. Nevertheless
this time Kim seemed to act in a more restrained manner than he had
during the purges of the Domestic faction in 1953-5, at least initially.
Perhaps he was afraid of the reaction of both Moscow and Beijing at
the persecution of'their men in Pyongyang'. It is also possible that
Kim was afraid of the discontent which a large-scale purge, especially
undertaken in a rather uncertain political environment, could trigger
among the Party elite. There is indeed some evidence ofsuch latent
38Record of conversation between S.P. l.azarev and Ko Hill-mm, 18 September

1956. In mid-September, just two weela after the conversation with Samsonov in
the Morangbong theatte, Ko Hui-mm W2S in Moscow where he met another
Soviet diplomat, l.azarev, with whom he again spoke of the recent Plenum.
39Nodong sinmun, 9 September 1956.

discontent. For example, in October 1956 in the remote northern
province ofRyang'gang, Ye.L. Titorenko (probably the most per-
ceptive Soviet diplomat then in Pyongyang) met Ch'oe Silng-hun,
the deputy chairman of the KWP committee, who said that the ex-
pulsion ofCh'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak Ch'ang-ok and othen had been 'a
serious distortion of intra-party democracy'. 40 For whatever reason,
the campaign against the participants of the Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik- Pak
Ch'ang-ok group and their supporten was conducted for a time with
a low profile and it was not accompanied by the customary diatribes
in the official press. Even the lengthy articles on the problems of
Marxist-Leninist theory or Party history, which had been frequent
in the Nodong sinmun in late 1955 and early 1956, almost disappeared
after the August events, and for a year or so the North Korean press
seemed to shun the more sensitive subjects of domestic politics,
restricting itself to safer topics such as glorifying the heroic labour
of the masses and verbal attacks on the 'South Korean puppets' and
'their American masten'.
Both disgraced leaden of the opposition were temporarily left at
large and were even given new posts, although these were manifestly
not of any importance: Pak Ch'ang-ok became deputy director ofa
sawmill while Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, with crude and rreswnably
intentional
irony, was appointed manager of a pig farm.4 Still, this was only a
temporary postponement of the inevitable. Their fate resembled that
of many ofStalin's former opponents in the early 1930s, before the
~ni ofconversation between Ye.L. Titorenko (second secretary at the Soviet

embassy) and Ch'oe Siing-hun (deputy chairman of the KWP Conuninee of
Ryangganprovince), 230ctober 1956, AVPRF,fond0102, opis 12, delo 6, paplca 68.
According to PulrMn inmy0ng saj~n. Ch'oe Siing•hun W2S a section chief (lavajang) in
the KWP Centnl Conunittee in October 1956; perhaps he hadjust been rransferrcd
to (or fi:om?) Ryanggan-do. This could be a coincidence, since there may have been
another penon called Ch'oe Siing-hun, although it is Yer}' unusual to find two Koreans
with exactly the same ll2.llle. If this W2S the same penon, which is highly probable, it
is also noteworthy that, in spite of such a liberal statement in 1956, he W2S lucky
enough to survive politically (let alone, physically) until (at the earliest) 1965, when
he W2S deputy departmental head lpubujang) in the KWP Centnl Conunittee.
41 The diary ofN.M. Shesterikov (counsellor of the Soviet Embassy), AVPRF.
fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, paplca 68, entry on 16 September 1956; Reconl of
conversation between Ye.L. Titorenko and Ch'oe Siing-hun, 23 October 1956.
According to some sources obtained by the embassy, Pak Ch'ang-ok W2S not a deputy
director but the director of the mill. See record of conversation of R.G. Okulov
(.Plrrvda correspondent) and C.V. Vasilie\o (TASS correspondent) with Sin Ch'ong-
c'aek (deputy minister ofcommunication), 3February1957, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis
12, delo 6, paplca 68; The diary ofN.M. Shesterikov.

176 From St4Iin to JGm ll Sung
launch of large-scale purges in the Soviet Union. At that time, an
obscure post for a fallen politician was often the prelude to a torture
chamber and firing squad a few years later (for exmiple, NJ. Bukharin
in the last years before his trial was made editor ofa newspaper and
director of a small research institute). Fate nevertheless was kind to
the opposition since an unusually high proportion of them managed
to escape persecution. Of the eight original conspirators whose names
were mentioned in the embassy papers compiled before the incident,
four escaped Kim's wrath and fled to safe havens in China or the
Soviet Union. Rarely after any purge among Party bosses in a Stalinist
country have so many of the accused succeeded in fleeing danger.
In Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany. Romania and.
earlier, in the Soviet Union itself no prominent figure (say, a Central
Committee member) escaped abroad during the terror. lfwe think
not of the top figures, but of lesser cadres, the rank-and-file of the
Yanan and later Soviet groups, the situation was different and their
'casualty rate' was high as usual, although most ofthem originally had
nothing to do with the conspiracy. Thus the initiators ofthe 'August
incident' were lucky and avoided the usual fate of purge victims. To
take individual cases, Kim Sung-hW2 had already left the country
for Moscow by early September 1956 to study at the Academy of
Social Sciences and did not return. Indeed he may have left in late
Augustjust before the Plenwn. 42 Yun Kong-hi'im and S6 Hwi escaped
to China. The night after the Plenum they secretly managed to leave
42Thc exact date of Kim Sung-hwa's departure is not known. Wh2t is known is
that it took place no earlier than 25 July and no later than 12 September (on the latter
date he was referred 10 as 'Kim Sung-hwi who lw left for the Soviet Union to study'
- see the ~ry of N.M. Shcsterilrov). He had probably left Korea just before the
August Plenum although one year later, on 26 October 1957, B.K. Pimenov remarked
that Kim Siing-hwa had left Korea in September 1956 - see Record of conversation
between B.I{. Pimenov (first secretary of the Soviet embassy) and Pale Kil-yong
(head of the First Department in the DPRK Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1957,
AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 13, dclo 6, papka 72. Kim H ak-chun in his recent study of
North Korean history (Pu/cMn 50 myJn sa, p. 190) listed Kim Siing-hwa among the
participants of the Plenum. Since the precise time of Kim Siing-hwa's departure for
Moscow remains unknown, his participation in the Plenum cannot be completely
ruled out, although it seems very unlikely. Had he been one of the challengers, he
would hardly have been permitted to leave the country afterwards. Nevertheless, by
mid-September he was certainly already overseas. It is more lilccly that the defectors,
whose accounts were used by Kim Hak-chun for his rcsean:h, confiued Kim Siing-
hwa's participation in the conspiracy. which, as we have seen, was quite real, with his
direct participation in the Plenum.

the house where they were held under guard, took a friend's car and
spent a night driving to the Chinese border, which they crossed in
the early morning. They had many old and influential friends in China,
and their actions and conversations there triggered the September
crisis, which is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
The bold escape of a few fortunate individuals could not save the
rank-and-file of the Soviet and Yanan factions. The purges began in
early September. As usual, the results ofthe Central Committee Plenum
were to be 'studied' at provincial and city-level Party conferences
where not only an official agenda but more sensitive information
about real events was provided. Within a couple of weeks after the
'August incident', many members of the Yanan faction were dismissed
from their posts. For instance, in Pyongyang the city Party secretary Yi
Song-un told a Soviet diplomat that three high-level executives of
the city committee (including two deputy chairmen) had been relieved
of their duties on the charge of having connections with Ch'oe
Ch'ang-ik. 43 Even official information about the Party conference
in Pyongyang menacingly mentioned 'enemies among us', 'splittists'
and 'factionalists'. According to the article in the Nodong sinmun, the
participants of the conference were reminded that 'enemies are
engaging in all types of conspiracies in order to destroy our party'.44
Similar events were taking place elsewhere in North Korea, and the
bold initiative of the opposition had ended in total failure.
Although the material available does not provide us with any infor-
mation regarding the early history of the conspiracy, we can be certain
that the opposition had existed before 20 July, when the conspira-
tors began to frequent the Soviet embassy. For example, Yi Sang-jo,
who, in spite of being ambassador to Moscow, certainly stayed in
touch with the opposition (on 9 August he warned a Soviet official
•3Re<ord ofconversation between G.Ye. Samsonov (first secretary ofthe Soviet

embassy) and Yi Song•u n (chairmm of the Pyongyang City Conunittee of the
KWP), 23 November 1956, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, dclo 6, paplca 68. Yi Song-
un was one of Kim II Sung's uusted henchmen, having been a prosecutor in the
show trials against Domestic Communists (1953) and Pale H6n-y6ng (1955), and
phyed a significant role in a witch-hunt in the late 1950s. He htcr occupied some
important positions, including ambassador to the Soviet Union (1960-4) . Kim
Hak-chun considers him ' unusually able for somebody with a guerrill2 &ction
background' (sec Kim Hak-chun, Pulth4n 50 nyon sa, p. 169).
44 Nodong sinmun, 15 September 1956.

of imminent changes in the DPRK), and began openly criticising
Kim Il Sung in early June.45 In late June or early July, Kim Siing-hwa
met Kim Tu-bong to ascertain his position in case ofa move against
IGm II Sung. 46 Even in the unlikely event that Yi Sang-jo and Kim
Siing-hwa at first acted independently of each other, the opposition
must have existed from June at least, since it would take some time
for them to organise themselves to the extent that was obvious by
late July. At the same time, it is unlikely that the opposition could have
appeared any earlier than 1955, when the accelerating anti-Stalinist
campaign in the Soviet Union began to influence North Korean
politics.
After August, a great many people - in fact the vast majority of
both the Yanan and Soviet faction members - were purged as prcpo-
nents of the opposition. In most of the cases these accusations were
hardly justified, and the majority of the later purge victims bad very
little to do with the people who had really been responsible for the
'August incident'. The contemporary (that is pre-August) embassy
material identifies half-a-dozen certain members of the opposition:
Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (vice-premier), Yi P'il-gyu, Yun Kong-hum (minis-
ter of commerce), SO Hwi (chairman of trade unions), Pak Ch'ang-
ok (vice-premier), Kim Siing-hwa (minis~r of construction) and Yi
Sang-jo (ambassador to Moscow), all full members of the Central
Committee, except for Yi P'il-gyu and Yi Sang-jo, who were candi-
date members. Doubtless this is not the full list of conspirators, but it
is possible that among the highest levels of the DPRK leadership,
that is among Central Committee members, the opposition had few,
ifany, other active supporters, since with the sole exception of Kim
Siing-hwa and Yi Sang-jo (both ofwhom were overseas}, these poli-
ticians were the only people who delivered anti-Kim DSung speeches
during the August Plenum.47 No one else joined them.
The recognised leader of the Yanan faction, IGm Tu-bong, who
was getting old and apparently disillusioned with politics, might not
have been a member of the opposition in the strict sense, although
' 5Record ofconversation between J.F. Kurdiukov (head of the First Far Eastern
Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry) and Yi Sang-jo (DPRK ambassador to
the Soviet Union), 16June 1956, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 4, pap1ca 68.
"'Record of conversation between S.N. Fi.btov and Kim Siing-hwa (minister
of construction and member of the KWP Centnl Committee) on 24 July 1956,
AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, pap1ca 68.
' 7Rccord ofconvcnation between G.Ye. Sanuonov and Ko Hlli-man, 31 August
1956.

he was later purged as its secret mastermind. But we know for sure
that he was at least aware of the opposition's existence and was prob-
ably sympathetic towards it. On this we have contemporary cor-
roborative evidence. On 24 July Kim Silng-hwa told S.N. Filatov
of his two recent meeting.1 with Kim Tu-bong (they had lunched
together). Kim Sung-hwa had spoken at these meeting.1 of the eco-
nomic difficulties and hardships endured by the people, and the
unrestrained praise heaped on Kim 11 Sung: 'Kim Tu-bong indicated
that the Kim 11 Sung personality cult is widespread in the KWP and
that while, following the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist
Party, all communist parties have been seriously engaged in an
attempt to overcome the personality cult and its consequences, noth-
ing has been done in our Party so far ... Ki.m II Sung does not want
to rectify his mistakes.' 48 Kim Sung-hwa asked Kim Tu-bong what
his reaction would be if a group of cadres rose up against Kim 11
Sung at the next Plenum of the Central Committee. Kim Tu-bong
indicated that he would look favourably on such an undertaking,
but added: 'The current circumstances are so difficult that only a
few will make up their minds to speak against Kim II Sung.'49 In the
event Kim Tu-bong's prophecy proved correct. Nevertheless, the
records of conversations available to us show him to have been a sym-
pathiser rather than an active and direct participant in the opposition
manoeuvres.
Among the members of the group mentioned in the embassy
sources, only two, Pak Ch'ang-ok and Kim Silng-hwa, were Soviet
Koreans. Because most of the Soviet faction tended to discuss all
sensitive problems with the Soviet diplomats (as had been clearly
demonstrated a few months earlier, during the campaign against the
Soviet Koreans in late 1955), we can be fairly certain th.at there were
few ifany other Soviet Koreans ofany prominence who were initial
supporters (at least, active supporters) of the opposition. Even Pak
Ch'ang-ok himself was scarcely among the original founders of the
'August group'. Until the spring of 1956 he had been very critical
towards the Yanan faction and personally towards Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik.
For example, as recently as March 1956 Pak Ch'ang-ok, in conversation
with a Soviet diplomat, accused Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik ofbias towards the
41R.econl of convenation between S.N. Filatov and Kim Siing-hwa (minister

of Construction and member of the KWP Centnl Committee), 24 July 1956,
AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, paplca 68.
49
1biJ.

180 From Sl4lin to Kim fl Sung
Soviet Koreans and in genenl was openly hostile tow:uds him. SO
However, when in late 1955 Kim ll Sung launched a campaign against
the Soviet Koreans, Pak Ch'ang-ok, along with Pak Yong-pin, was
its primary target, and it is probable that his support ofthe opposition's
cause was in no small part fuelled by his desire for revenge. The notion
that it was mostly the personal attacks on him that drew Pak Ch'ang-
ok to the opposition seems also to have been current among Korean
officials soon after the 'August incident'. In February 1957 the then
deputy minister of communications, Sin Chong-t'aek, remarked to
two Soviet journalists: 'Pak Ch'ang-ok did not belong to that group
earlier. They recruited him, using the injuries that had been inflicted
on him by the leadership'. 51 Kim Sung-hwa's actions, on the other
hand, were probably motivated by a feeling of solidarity with Pak
Ch'ang-ok, who was a close personal friend.
The main goals and methods of the opposition can be seen clearly
from the new materials. First of all, they wanted to replace Kim II
Sung and his coterie with new leaders (themselves, predictably).
The opposition members were quite frank about this. On 20 July
Yi P'il-gyu said: 'The [opposition) group sets itself the task ofputting
new people in charge of the KWP Centnl Committee and govern-
ment'.52 On 9 August Yi Sanf-jo even named future leaders who
were to replace Kim II Sung. 3 One whom he mentioned in his
meetings with a Soviet diplomat - Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik - was not so
frank, and insisted that his main task was to rectify the situation
within the Party. He also hinted that it might eventually be deemed
SOJtccord of conversation between S.N. Filatov and Pale Ch'ang-ok (vice-pre-

mier and member of the Presidium of the KWP Central Committee), 12 March
1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68. As late as 24 May Kim Siing-
hw.a expressed the same negative attitude tow.arm the 'nationalist' Ch'oc Ch'ang-ik
and obviously did not sec any difference between him and Kim II Sung's staunch
lieutenant Pale Kum-ch'<SI. Therefore this date (24 May - or r.ither the day follow-
ing) may be the earliest possible date on which he (and Pak Ch'ang-ok) could have
joined the opposition cabal. Sec Record of conversation berwecn S.N. Filatov and
Kim Siing-hw.a (minister of construction and member of the KWP Central Com-
mittee), 24May1956, AVPRF. fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
5 1Record of conversation of R.G. Okulov (P,.,,,da correspondent) and C.V.
Vasiliiev (TASS correspondent) with Sin Ch'ong-t'aek (deputy minister of
communications), 3 February 1957, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
52Record of conversation between of ofA.M. Petrov and Yi P'il-gyu on 20 July
1956. .
~ofcommation between l.F. Kurdiukcw and Yi Sang-jo (DPRKambas.ladoc
to the Soviet Union). 9August1956, AVPRF. fond0102, opis 12, delo 4, papb 68.

The August Cluilknge . 181
necessary to oust Kim ll Sung.S4 But what were the main reasons and
motives behind their decision to take the extremely dangerous step
ofjoining the conspiracy? Certainly these questions are (and to some
degree will always remain) open to speculation, and the innermost
motives of the people who dared to challenge Kim 11 Sung in 1956
will never be known for certain. Still we can surmise that these motives
were as complex as any impulse for political action has ever been
throughout history. However, in the available documents we can find
information from which some reasonably plausible gu~ are possible.
The 'August group' did not by any means consist of incorruptible
idealists - there was a great deal offactional hatred and jockeying in
their motivations, as the high incidence of personal attacks on politi-
cians from other factions indicates. Although officially their concern
was to get rid ofinefficient cadres, there is little doubt that the main
reason behind the use of this kind of invective had much to do with
personal political interests. The opposition members vehemently
criticised Kim 11 Sung's coterie - mostly former Guerrillas, but also
those members of the Soviet (e.g. Nam 11 and Pak Ch<Sng-ae), Yanan
(e.g. Kim Ch'ang-man) and Domestic (e.g. Han SCSI-ya) factions who
from an early stage had allied themselves with Kim 11 Sung. Lengthy
diatribes against these cadres formed a large part of all the conversa-
tions between the opposition members and Soviet diplomats. The
opposition generally paid considerable attention to matters of per-
sonnel, which no doubt reflected the harsh reality of the factional
struggle and the desire to eliminate rivals. However, it would be an
obvious oversimplification to assume that the opposition consisted
merely of position-seekers who were anxious to use the new inter-
national and domestic situation to remove their political and personal
enemies (who never hesitated to use every opportunity to do the
same thing in return). The dissenters had some personal agendas and
they wanted to gain more power, but there is reason to believe that
a significant motivating factor was the desire to create a more humane
and prosperous (i.e. more democratic) North Korea. They wanted
de-Stalinisation, which was perfectly in line with the current trend in
the rest of the international Communist camp.
The main reason for the opposition's dissatisfaction was Kim 11
Sung's personality cult, a fact cited by the opposition supporters at
54Record of convenation between S.N. Filatov (Counsellor at the Embassy)

and Ch' oe Ch'ang-ik (vice-premier and member ofthe KWP Standing Committee)
on 23 July, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.

182 From Sl4Jin to J(jm n Sung
almost every meeting with the Soviet diplomats. Another often-stated
problem was that of'distortions ofsocialist legality' (a post-Stalinist
Soviet euphemism for arbitrary a.rrests, torture and executions). But
apan from Kim U Sung's personality cult and 'distortions ofsocialist
legality', the opposition figures frequently alluded to the suffering
caused to the people by an overzealous~ for heavy industrialisation
and the consequent disregard for human life. This subject was raised
by Kim Sung-hW2 during his conversations with Kim Tu-bong, was
briefly mentioned by Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Yi Sang-jo during their
encounten with the Soviet diplomats, and discussed at some length
by Yi P'il-gyu, whose words show how a well-informed official viewed
the general situation in the DPRK: 'Farmen compose 80 per cent
ofthe population of[North] Korea. After Liberation they were offered
an excellent opportunity for a better life but they remain very poor.
The government's taxation policy is incorrect. Instead of 25 to Z7
per cent tax they took more than 50 per cent from the farmen. That
policy continues to this day. It is not necessary to recount the methods
used in 1954-5 to gather taxes. Tax-gathering was accompanied by
~. murders and arrests. 1be Party's activities are based on violence,
not penuasion. The co-operative movement is based on violence'. ss
These statements echoed a discussion ofNorth Korean industrial policy
which took place in 1954-5 and was studied by Masao Okonogi.s6
At the time, Pak Ch'ang-ok insisted on paying more attention to
light industry and improving living standards, but Kim II Sung
eventually rejected this line. At his meeting with a Soviet diplomat,
Pak Ch'ang-ok returned to this question, observing that the North
Korean leadenhip was indifferent to the hardships of the common
people.57
Whatever one may think about the applicability ofsuch terms as
'democracy' or even 'legality' to political institutions in a Stalinist state,
it is worth emphasising that in a sense the opposition was clearly
legal. They were intending to act within the institutional framework
of the Party's statutes and declared political rules, so that they might
be said to have planned to achieve their goals by legal means, although
55Record ofconversation between A.M. Peacw and Yi P 'il-gyu on 20 July 1956.

56Masao Okonogi, 'Nonh Ko~an Conununism: in Search of Its Prototype', in
Dae-5ook Suh (ed.), New Pocifa Cwmnts, Honolulu: Uoivm;ty ofl-Uwaii Prea, 1994.
57Record of conversation between S.N . Filatov and PU Ch'ang-ok (deputy
premier and member of the Pmidium of the C C KWP), 21July1956, AVPRF,
fo nd 01 02, opis 12, delo 6, ~ka 68.

these means were not exactly 'democratic' {they could not be, since
the North Korean state also was in no sense 'democratic'). The dmenten
wanted to criticise Kim II Sung during the forthcoming Plenum
and hoped to win over a majority of Central Committee members
to their side. Because Paragraph 36 of the Party Statutes (adopted in
1956) established that the Party chairman was technically elected by
the Central Committee, the Committee also had the right to re-
elect him. This was hardly a democratic procedure, since the Central
Committee was a tiny, secretive and basically self-appointed body of
big shots, who in 1956 comprised seventy-one full members and
forty-five candidate members who had no voting rights but could
participate in discussions. However, it was a stricdy legal procedure.
Later Kim II Sung insisted that his enemies' intention was to
replace him by force if necessary. Dae-Sook Suh in his well-known
study concluded that this accusation was implausible, since by 1956
the Guerrilla faction was already firmly in control of the military
and 'any serious military move by any group other than the partisans
would have been suicidal at that time'.58 We can only agree with
this conclusion and add that in the embassy papers there is no mention
of any such plans. Apart from one remark by Yi P'il-gyu which
could indeed be interpreted as hinting at possible if unspecified
'violent measures', all other opposition members spoke of peaceful
and legal means of achieving their goals. Ho Un-bae's informants
also remarked that it would have been better had they decided to
use military force against Kim in 1956. Ho Un-bae says, with some
regret, that the opposition did not contemplate any military action,
although he (or his informants) obviously considered it a possibility.
However, these remarks were made in the late 1970s, and probably
betray belated wishful thinking. We agree with Dae--Sook Sub's opinion:
even ifthe 'Yanan faction' had sufficient influence in the military, this
was not the case in 1956. Sub's opinion seems even more plausible if
we recall that no such accusations appeared during the initial stage of
the purges, in the first months after the Plenum. It took a year before
the opposition was accused of plotting a mutiny.
It is not clear whom the opposition v- ould have liked to see as
1
the new North Korean leader in place of Kim II Sung. No names

were mentioned in the meetings at the Soviet embassy. However,
rumours circulating soon after the crisis in late 1956 and in 1957
58l)ae-Sook Suh. Kim D Silng: Tht North Korron Leadtr. p. 152.

insisted that the opposition hoped to install Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik as the
new chairman of the Party and Pak Ch'ang-ok as the new premier.59
This does not seenu impossible especially since Pak had already
been a vice-premier and Ch' oe, by virtue ofbeing opposition leader,
would have been an ideal candidate for the top position. However,
these rumours originated after the Plenum and cannot be considered
entirely reliable. The only contemporary information about the
opposition plans is a remark by Yi Sang-jo, the North Korean
ambassador to the Soviet Union. On 9 August while briefing a Soviet
diplomat about the ongoing preparations for an attack on Kim II
Sung's policies, Yi Sang-jo said that the opposition wanted to appoint
Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik as the new Party chairman and Ch'oe Yong-g<Sn,
then mistakenly regarded as a sympathiser, as commander-in-chief
of the armed forces. 60 A year later at a new Plenum, Ko Pong-gi
argued that the opposition wanted to appoint the disgraced Yanan
leader Pak Il-u as chairman of the Party, with Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak
Ch'ang-ok and Kim Siing-hwa as his deputies. 61 However, this
statement was delivered well after the opposition had failed in its
endeavour and its text was obviously written by the authorities as part
ofa deliberate propaganda campaign- hence its unreliability although,
like any propaganda, it could have contained a grain of truth if
that truth had been considered by the authorities as in line with its
objectives.
Thus it appears plausible that Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik was seen in
opposition circles as the future leader of North Korea. However, it is
noteworthy that the conspirators did not mention his name or any
other names to the Soviet diplomats, as ifthey had deliberately decided
to keep their counsel on this important question (Yi Sang-jo does
not really count here, since he was in Moscow at the time and could
have been unaware of tactical decisions made in Pyongyang). We
can speculate that the conspirators remained silent either because
they did not want to alienate the Soviets by suggesting an obviously
pro-Chinese candidate, or because they did not want to look like a
59[)u-Soolc Suh cites these rumoun which~ based on information obtained

6:om ckfecton (/(jm R Sung: The N.mh Korran IAuln. p. 151).
"°Record of convenation between l.F. Kurdiulcov and Yi Sang-jo (DPRK
ambassador to the Soviet Union), 9August1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, cklo
4, paplca 68.
61Record of conversation between B.K. Pimenov and Pale Kil-yong (head of
the Fint Department in the DPRK Ministry of Foreign .Alfain), 8 Decem'ber
1957, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 13, cklo 6, paplca 72.
rron1
The August Cluilkngt 185
group of power-hungry office-seekers who had already distributed
the political booty among themselves.
How did Moscow and the Soviet embassy react to the situation?
This question is of great significance, but as long as such important
materials as the telegraphic exchanges between Moscow and the em-
bassy in Pyongyang as well as most Soviet Party documents remain
classified, the answer to this question can only be speculative and
inconcl~. Howe\'er,judging fiom the~ papers currently avail-
able, the official Soviet attitude seems to have been cautious and even
reluctant. It appears that the Soviet diplomats did not try to talk the
discontented opposition figures out oftheir proposed action, or express
direct support for them, although they often appealed to them to be
'cautious'. Such neutrality is understandable. By 1956 Kim Il Sung
was no longer the direct prorege or even the puppet of Moscow he
had been in 1945 or 1949, and consequently the Soviet diplomats
were no longer willing to show any determination to defend him
against domestic challenges. They were also not opposed to the per-
sonnel changes in principle. After all, 1956 was a time of great change
in both politics and the ruling circles ofmany Socialist countries, result-
ing in the dismissal of a significant number of Communist leaders:
Chervenkov in Bulgaria (April), Rakosi in Hungary (July) and Ochab
in Poland (October). Everywhere in the Communist world 'little
Stalins' who had established their cults in line with the old Soviet
pattern were becoming an endangered species. The ideas ofthe 20th
Congress and their various interpretations - exploited and supported
at times by blatant opportunists, at times by national Communists and
at times by surviving Marxist idealists - were spreading fiom Prague
to Pyongyang. The actions against Kim Il Sung did not seem at all
extraordinary and fitted into the general picture of the Communist
camp during that turbulent summer.
On the other hand, the political stability of the DPRK inevitably
worried the Soviet diplomats. Replacing Kim Il Sung with somebody
who could command more support within the KWP might have
been politically feasible and even desirable, but only provided such
actions did not jeopardise the stability ofthe easternmost Communist
country, which also formed a protective buffer between the US
troops stationed in South Korea and the vital industrial regions of
Chinese Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. Therefore, irrespective
oftheir attitude to Kim Il Sung. the Soviet diplomats had to be cautious,
and many conversations ended in much the same way as the discussion
between S.N. Filatov and Pak Ch'ang-ok on 21 July. S.N . Filatov
0191t1zea by Google Origical frcn1

186 From Stalin w Kim R Sung
himself described the convenation in his report as follows: 'At the
end ofour conversation I once more called hl Ch'ang-ok's attention
to the gravity of the situation which had arisen and warned him
against hasty decisions. I asked him to study attentively the situation
in the Party and not to permit his actions to be used by those who
were dissatisfied with Kim Il Sung's policy.' 62 The same attitude w.as
expressed by the charge d'affaircs A.M. Petrov during his meeting
with Nam II on 24 July: 'I stated my penonal opinion that Nam H's
worries over the sharp criticism of Kim II Sung (suggested by Pak
Ch'ang-ok] deserved a great deal of attention and that Pak Ch'ang-
ok's position on this question w.as evidently incorrect. I said the
initiative ofsharp criticism of Kim ll Sung by Soviet Koreans might
be misinterpreted, and this could cause undesirable repercussions both
within the country and abroad.'63
However, some people belie~ that Soviet diplomats might have
taken sides with Kim II Sung, a view that w.as quite widespread in
Pyongyang yolitical circles soon after 1956. For example, H<S Un-
bae wrote in his pioneering study of North Korean history: 'One of
the causes [of the opposition's eventual failure] w.as that the councillor
of the Soviet Embassy breached the faith. When he spoke to Ch'oe
Ch'ang-ik, the councillor took an affirmative attitude, but he later
made a formal report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North
Korea regarding their talks. This might have been a cautious manner
for a diplomat, but it constituted a dishonourable breach of faith
from the standpoint of a politician and revolutionary.'6'4 We cannot
analyse this opinion at length, but can still observe that this opinion
seems to be based on remarks made by Kim 11 Sung himself in
December 1957.65 At that time it made perfect sense for him to pretend
to have the Soviets on his side, whether it was true or not, but some
indirect evidence makes us rather sceptical of this fact. We cannot be
sure for the moment, and the question will require further study.
A related and equally important question is the role played by
China in the •August incident'. Herc too, unfortunately, the lack of
relevant sources is the greatest obstacle to any research. Because it
will probably be decades before the corresponding material from
62R.ccord ofconvenation between S.N. Filatov and Pait Ch'ang"<>k, 21 July 1956.
63Record of convenation between A.M. Pccrov and Nam n. 24 July 1956.
64Lim On, ~Founding ofd Dynasty in Norlli l<Dra, p. 225.
65Record of convenation between B.K. Pimenov and Pait Kil-yong, 28
November 1957, AVPRF, fond0102, opis 13,delo6,papka 72.

the archives in Beijing becomes accessible, only a tentative answer
to the question can be attempted at this stage. It is necessary to
remember that the core opposition consisted of the Yanan faction,
which had always maintained close connections with the Chinese
Embassy. After the Wlure ofthe opposition attempt, the more fortunate
of the unsuccessful conspirators fled to China, where they had no
difficulties in securing asylum. There is little doubt that even if the
Chinese leaders were not the immediate initiators of an anti-Kim ll
Sung action, they were none the less aware of it well in advance. If
members of the opposition considered it appropriate to inform the
Soviet embassy of their plans, there is no reason to doubt that they
also met with Chinese diplomats (their relations with China were
much closer, after all). Kang Sang-ho, who at that time was the deputy
minister of the interior and thus had reliable sources of information,
told the author that there was a secret connection between the
conspirators and the Chinese embassy. 66 It would even appear highly
probable that the whole stntegy was formulated after initial suggestions
from Beijing, or at the very least that Beijing's approval was conveyed
to the opposition.
In the summer of 1956 China was passing through what was
perhaps the most liberal phase of Maoist rule. On 2 May 1956 a new
campaign was launched in Beijing with the engaging title 'Let a
hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools contend'. It lasted
only for a short time, but it was the closest Mao ever came to tolerating
any kind ofpolitical dialogue. Like Khrushchev's Secret Speech, this
campaign, which was certainly well known among the former Yanan
exiles, formed a background to the entire North Korean crisis. Thus in
the summer and autumn of 1956, the Chinese Communist leadership
was probably not against such radical reform as the opposition was
suggesting, and was probably even ready to support the reformers.
This might also have been seen as potentially furthering China's own
agenda - the wish to be perceived in the Communist movement as
the protector of national liberties against Soviet hegemony.
However, the Chinese position and the reasons why China probably
permitted or even encouraged the North Korean opposition remain
an open question - and a very important one - and we can only hope
that future studies by Chinese and foreign historians will throw more
light on it.
66 1ntcrvicw with Kang Sang-ho, 31October1989, Leningrad.

188 From S"1lin to Kim R Sung
Why did the attempt to dismiss Kim II Sung ultimately fail? The
North Korean government survived the crisis while similar attacks
by opposition groups led to profound changes in Bulgaria, Poland
and Hungary. However, Kim II Sung did not merely become another
Chervenkov, Ochab or Rakosi. Unlike these 'little Stalins', the now
virtually forgotten Communist strongmen of Eastern Europe, Kim
for better or worse was to lead North Korea for almost four more
decades and eventually became the world's longest-ruling Communist
autocrat. Why was this so? And why did the opposition attempt fail
in that fateful year of 1956?
The August challenge in Korea was to a great extent the result of
outside influences, and perhaps was even a part ofgreat powers' schem-
ing. However, it also had domestic roots: it reflected a longing for
change that was shared by some Party cadres and many intellectuals.
They were not dissenters in the later Soviet sense, since their goals
were definitely within the established framework of Leninist social-
ism. The 'August group' wanted a more humane, less constrictive kind
ofstate socialism. a society that would give more to the common peo-
ple but still leave most political and social fundamentals unchanged.
Like all politicians since time immemorial, they did not forget their
own personal agendas while fighting for the cause, but it is difficult
to blame them for this.
Undoubtedly, Kim II Sung's own personal qualities: - prudence
and a remarkable capacity for tactical manoeuvring and machiavellian
intrigue - greatly contributed to his political victory. He succeeded
in isolating the opposition and engineering the whole course of the
August Plenum. However, this was more than merely a victory for
Kim's ruthlessness (or wisdom) over the naivete (or stupidity) of his
opponents. The general situation in the country at the time also has
to be considered, and in many ways North Korea in 1956 was very
different from Polandor Hungary. Reformist ideas, so strong in Eastern
Europe, found no comparable popular support in North Korea: there
were few, if any, serious signs of public discontent outside academic
circles and Party functionaries, which meant that the opposition could
not rely on mass support which was so important in Poland and
Hungary.
There were many reasons for this political tranquillity. Unlike
the countries of Eastern Europe, North Korea had no example of
capitalist affluence or democratic freedoms in its vicinity. South Korea
in the mid-1950s might have had marginally higher living standards
(even this is far from certain), but it was definitely not a model of

Tu August Chalknge 189
either prosperity or democracy. The hardships in the North were
also more easily accepted because a mere three years had passed since
a devastating war. The peasants might have a heavy tax burden to bear,
but they had not yet been alienated by the mandatory introduction
of the notorious Stalinist collective agriculture. Many of them thus
had reason to hope that their hardships might only be temporary -
they were still, after all, owners of the land they tilled (this was to
change all too soon). In addition Korea was different from the East
European countries in its even greater lack of any meaningful
democratic traditions. North Korea had never experienced any type
of democracy, and the very idea was alien to the majority, most of
whom remained traditional peasants or former peasants. Not only
had the vast majority of Koreans never been involved in elections or
democratic politics of any sort, but they had hardly even been citizens
in the strict sense. Ifanything, their civil liberties were now enhanced
in comparison with pre-Communist times when, as second-class
subjects of a foreign monarch, they had lived under a particularly
harsh and oppressive type of colonialism. Unlike the peoples of the
Baltic Republics and Eastern Europe, the North Koreans had no
shared memory of a democratic past or civil liberties now lost.
However, the mass discontent that might have arisen was not nec-
essarily a clamouring for democracy. Neither Hungary nor Poland
had been bona fide democracies before coming under first Nazi and
subsequently Communist control. In these countries the main inspi-
ration for the anti-Communist mass movement came from nation-
alism and (partly) religion rather than any desire for 'pure' democracy.
In this too the North Korean situation was different. Politically active,
pro-Western (and eventually anti-Communist) Protestant Christi-
anity had been a significant part of North Korean spiritual life before
1945, but by the early 1950s its strength had been severely under-
mined by aggressive anti-religious propaganda, police harassment and
an exodus of religious activists. It was also much more difficult to
arouse nationalistic feelings in North Korea than in Eastern Europe.
Although the Kim II Sung regime was a product of Soviet political
engineering, it had nevertheless replaced a colonial administration,
not a more or less legitimate national regime, as was the case in
Poland, Hungary and most of the other East European countries. In
addition, Kim II Sung probably had a more solid basis for an appeal
to Korean nationalism than his opponents, whose overseas connec-
tions were only too obvious and who advocated concepts that, no
matter how good they might be, were 'imported'. Ifnationalism could

have been mobilised in Korea, it would probably have been in
support of the local Stalinist regime rather th.an against it. A similar
paradox was exploited by other Stalinist survivors - e.g. Romania.
Kim Il Sung hinuelf read this feeling well. It was a time when he
was putting increasing emphasis on 'Koreanness', and it is probable
that the nationalist overtones of his new ideas found positive reso-
nance among Koreans, including intellectuals and Party cadres, who
had had enough of the obligatory Russomania and were prepared to
welcome a more independent policy such as the one Kim personified
(had they fully appreciated the future effects otsuch a policy, many of
them might well have had second thoughts).
Thus the opposition's chances of winning IJl2SS support from the
population as a whole were not great. However, a mass movement
was not a necessary precondition for the opposition to succeed. After
all, the change in Bulgaria from the ultra-Stalinist Chervenkov to the
marginally more open-minded Yugov in 1956 was achieved in almost
exactly the same way as Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Pak Ch'ang-ok envisaged
for North Korea - as the outcome of intricate and secretive political
horse-trading at the top levels of the Party hieran:hy and without any
overt mass activity. The absence ofany mass movement did not create
insurmountable obstacles to their plans; Kim Il Sung could have been
replaced through successful bureaucratic intrigue. But the opposition
members lost their struggle, and the main reason, apart from their
own tactical mistakes and the shrewdn~ oftheir enemy. was obviously
the lack of support from Party cadres, whose role was decisive in the
absence of any mass movement. An important reason why the cadres
proved unsympathetic towards the opposition's cause was because
its strongest supporters - Soviet and Yanan Koreans - were widely
perceived as 'strangers' and even as 'half-foreigners'. The cadres chose
to support Kim and not his challengers. The attack on Kim 11 Sung in
August was derailed by the inaction of the majority in the Central
Committee who failed to support the opposition, and their action in
helping to shout it down. As V.V. Kovyzhenko recollects, 'Kim II Sung
was known to be backed by the majority ofboth rank-and-file Korean
Communists and Party cadres, including Central Committee members.
Under the circunutances, how could he have been dismissed?' 67
Kovyzhenko refers here to the September C'Yetlts, but his remark applies
equally to the August crisis.
67 Interview with V.V. Kovyzhhenko, 2 August 1991 , Moscow.

The reason for this support is probably linked to the new com-
position of the North Korean ruling elite which had undergone
considerable changes since 1945-6. By 1956 the majority ofthe middle
and low nomenklatura were native Koreans who had entered the Party
after 1945 and whose worldview had been shaped by the Korean war
and the intense glorification of Kim II Sung. They were also more
nationalistic than the older generation, whose members had spent
much time overseas, were fluent in foreign languages and had been
exposed to a significant amount of foreign culture. The attitude of
these younger officials towards 'foreigners' from both the Yanan and
Soviet factions was also hardly positive. This is even mentioned in
the embassy documents, although the Soviet diplomats usually tried
to avoid such perilous.subjects. For example, even the normally cau-
tious counsellor S.N. Filatov acknowledged the existence of friction
and noted that many Soviet Koreans 'treated local cadres rather arro-
gantly'.68 In 1956 a Soviet Korean, Son Din-fa (it has not been
possible to verify the Russian transcription of this name] having
returned from a stint of're-education through labour' (he had worked
as a labourer on a building project for a month as punishment for his
'irresponsible talk about the personality cult'), met the First Secretary
I. Byakov and, as the latter wrote, 'began to speak of the unhealthy
attitude of the Oocal] people towards Soviet Koreans'. Unfortunately
the conversation became a little too sensitive and the diplomat abruptly
changed the subject. 69 In addition, it seems that the Korean tradition
of personal politics, which was deeply rooted in the minds of con-
temporaries, caused the conflict between the opposition and Kim II
Sung to be seen largely as a personal struggle for influence, with the
result that few people were willing to intervene in it. For many party
cadres it was all about personal power, no matter what the partici-
pants said.
Recently de-classified material enables us to have some insight
into ·the minds of the top Korean bureaucrats during that fateful
year, 1956. In November Ye.L. Titorenko met Ch' oe Chong-hyon,
his former classmate at Kim II Sung University, and by then a post-
graduate in the 'ideological' Department of Marxism-Leninism at
68 Record of conversation between S.N. Filatov and Pak Ch'ang-ok, 12 March

1956.
69Record of conversation between I.S. Biakov (first secretary at the Soviet
embassy) and Son Din-fa (former editor of Ntw Korea magazine), 15 February
1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.

192 From Stalin to J(jm D Sung
the same school. Ch'oe, with some reservations, could be consideted
a young member of the nomenklaturo and probably to have been well
on his way to being a full-time Party functionary. It became clear from
the conversation that Ch'oe, who obviously relied on rumours that
circulated among university intellectuals and local Party functionaries,
already had a generally correct grasp of the events surrounding the
August Plenum. While talking with his Soviet interlocutor about the
perception of the August and September Plenums at his University,
Ch'oe Ch<Sng-hy<Sn said: 'There were different factions in the KWP
and many members of the Party were aware ofthis. There were such
factions as the group of former members of the South Korean
Communist Party led by Pak H<Sn-y<Sng, the group ofSoviet Koreans
headed by Pak Ch'ang-ok, and the group of Chinese Koreans headed
by Pak ll-u and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik. All of these courted Kim II Sung
and Ch'oe Yong-gen, trying to gain high posts within the government
and Party. They were office-seekers. Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik had more
influence and was cleverer than the others'. 70 This would appear to
be a reasonable assessment of the situation while remaining quite free
ofany sympathy toward the opposition or its slogans of'struggle against
the personality cult' and 'collective leadership'. The opposition is seen
as merely another bunch ofpower-hungry politicos, and not as people
fighting for a cause - even a 'reactionary' or 'counter-revolutionary'
one.
The prevalence of such an attitude is confirmed by another
interesting insight into the mood of the North Korean bureaucracy.
This testimony was obtlined by the Pmvda correspondent R.G. Okulov
along with TASS correspondent G.V. Vasiliev during their conversation
with the deputy minister of communications, Sin Ch'ong-t'aek (a
possible re-transcription from Russian). 71 The latter had a long and
frank conversation with Soviet journalists Qubricated, we dare to
imagine, with a certain amount ofvodka) and offered his opinion of
the 'August incident': 'The group that had spoken out at the August
Plenum of the Central Committee and was led by Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik
7°R.ecord of conversation between Ye.L. Titorenko (second secretary at the

Soviet cmbmy) and Ch'oc Ch6ng-hy6n (postgraduate from Kim Il Sung University),
4 November 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68. The correct
spelling ofCli'oc Ch6ng-hy6n's name can be ascertained from the Nodong simnam
(6 August 1957), where he is mentioned as a student who had nude accusations
ag;.inst the '&ctionalists', including his former teacher.
. 71 Record of conversation ofR.G. Okulov and C.V: Vasiliev with Sin Ch'ong-
t'ack, 3Pcbruary1957.

had no progranune based on [any] principle. They were not against
building socialism and communism. Their single aim was to fight
for ~rand for the prospect ofplacing their people in high positions
and on the [KWP] Central Committee in the first instance'. 72 As in
the case ofCh'oe Ch6ng-hy6n, this a«ess1nent appears quite reisonable,
ifcynical. The two accounts are quite similar, and we can suspect that
the majority of the rwmtnklatura appraised the situation in much the
same way. They did not see any reason to join in a dangerous adventure
which they saw as essentially a raw ~r struggle, an attempt to satisfy
the penonal ambitions of people whom they did not much like and
distrusted.
The outcome of the 1956 crisis meant a personal victory for Kim
Il Sung. whose reign eventually became the longest in the entire history
of Communism and ended with an unprecedented dynastic succession
(such as would have taken place in Romania ifCeau~escu had died in
~r. and did happen in Syria on the death ofHafez al-Asad, one of
Kim's greatest admiren). However, the crisis was not only about personal
power. Its outcome determined the direction of North Korean
development over the following decades. Before 1956 the country
had been a typical 'people's democracy', in many respects not unlike
the regimes of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, but after 1956 it
began to traiisform itselfinto a much more idiosyncratic Communist
state: thoroughly controlled, extremely militarised, devoted to a fanatical
penonality cult and a particular type of ideology, and far removed
fi:om 'orthodox' Marxism-Leninism. The very term for this ideology,
'chuch'e' was coined on the eve of the 1956 crisis, in December 1955.
121bid.

AFTERWORD
The fact that North Korea managed to muddle through the turbulent
1990s without either collapsing or undergoing major changes may
seem surprising. However, with the wisdom of hindsight it does not
seem so strange. North Korea was different from a majority of other
Communist states even in the 1960s and 1970s, although then this
difference was not always obvious to foreign observers.
The North Korean regime was conceived not simply as a result
ofsocial engineering, but as a result offoreign social engineering; to
a very large degree it was imposed from the outside. It would be a
mistake to underestimate its initial dependency on its Soviet creators.
Now it is rather fashionable among young South Korean revisionist
(and leftist) scholars to downplay this embarrassing dependence and
to portray early North Korea as a creation of the local social and
political forces, a result of the Korean national Communist revolu-
tion, but in reality the Soviet presence (indeed, omnipresence) was
the single most important fact of North Korean politics of the late
1940s. For the first few years of North Korean history Kim 11 Sung
and his government were hardly more than puppets, thoroughly con-
trolled by their Soviet puppet masters. This does not preclude the fact
that the regime the Soviets were establishing through and by these
people probably enjoyed a considerable measure of popular support.
The North Korean revolution oft945-50 was launched and directed
by a foreign power, but it was a revolution anyway.
Nevertheless, the definition 'Soviet satellite' is perhaps closer to
the truth in regard to the North Korean regime in its early years than
to most Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. It was partly a result
of the relative political weakness of the local Communists who were
194
rron1
Aftnword 195
even less willing and less able to challenge their Soviet supervison
than the East European parties. However, this situation was soon to
change. While in most Communist countries the local regimes to a
large (albeit diminishing) extent remained puppets till the end and
were easily dismissed once the Soviets were politically finished in the
late 1980s, North Korea, like a handful of other Communist states,
developed along its own particular path. From the early 1950s onwards,
the North Korean political elite, led and penonified by Kim II Sung
but obviously supported by rather significant forces within the country,
gradually began to liberate itself fiom Soviet control. The major
turning-point in this struggle to 'nationalise' the regime and also to
concentrate all power in their own hands occurred with the purges of
die Domestic faction (1953-5) and the Soviet and Yanan factions (1956-
60). The attempts to fi:ec themselves fiom Moscow control proved to
be succes.1ful, and by the early 1960s North Korea had occupied a
rather unique place which had much in common with some other
countries with 'national Communism': Romania, Vietnam, Albania
and, of coune, Mao's China. All these countries were challenging
Moscow domination in world Communism, but the mechanics of
their government and many essentials of their ideology and culture
were Soviet imports.
In the 1960s and '70s some of these examples of'national Com-
munism' were often lauded by sympathetic Western observen, not
least because they were rightly perceived as disrupten of the Soviet-
controlled Communist camp, a sort of'fifth column'. However, per-
haps a less flattering term, 'national Stalinism'. - once suggested by
Ivan Bercnd-would be a far better description of their domestic and
foreign policies. It is not accidental that these countries with varying
degree ofstubbornness kept resisting the Soviet pressure to remove
Stalin fiom their official pantheons. In spite of all differences, these
countries shared typically Stalinist features: the penonality cult of a
near-divine leader; militant and, occasionally, confrontational foreign
policy; mass mobilisation campaigns of great intensity; increasing
incorporation of nationalist and chauvinist clements into the official
ideology; a bias towards isolationist policies; and so on. The same trends
could be found in post-Stalinist societies of 'real socialism' as well,
but they were much less pronounced there.
We would not like to join a long discussion on the social roots of
Stalinism and its local varieties, but we cannot overlook that the
countries of'national Stalinism' did have much in common. Within
the Communist camp they were among the least developed economi-

196 From St4Jin to Kim n Sung
cally and socially, had a very high proportion of traditional peasantry,
and lacked democratic traditions, even compared with other mem-
ben of the Communist camp. The seeds of Stalinism might have
initially been planted by outsiden, but they found a very fertile soil
in these societies. When in the 1960s some of these regimes were
briefly in vogue among the Western intellectuals, their nai've Western
admiren were correct in one assumption: these regimes were more
'genuine' than their less independent (but, one must add, also less
murderous and generally more prosperous) counterparts. At least for
a while, they did enjoy a considerable degree ofmass support. Other-
wise their leaden would have been unable to resist the pressure for
de-Stalinisation, which was so strong in the late 1950s, and survive
the difficult challenges they had to deal with in the 1960s and 1970s.
The 'national Stalinist' project has proved to be a dead end in historic
development. It imposed hardships and sufferings on both its enemies
and admiren, it devoured countless human lives, but, at least for a
while, it had a substatitial amount of genuine adherents and looked
like a viable option. In the coune of time this support has almost
certainly diminished, but once the system and its bureaucracy had
been established it proved to be stable and cohesive enough to with-
stand serious challenges from outside while promptly suppressing
challenges from within.
Nowhere else (with the possible exception ofAlbania) have these
trends found such an expression as in North Korea. None of the
'nationalist Stalinist' regimes managed to survive as long as the 'Com-
munist monarchy' ofthe Kirns. Some ofthese regimes collapsed around
1990, some eventually chose to reform themselves. However, this was
not the case with North Korea. From the mid-1960s, the existence of
increasingly successful and afiluent capitalist South Korea has made all
attempts at political reform very risky. At the same time, geography,
strategy and history made it possible to insulate North Korea from
the outside world to a far greater degree than was ever thinkable in,
say, Romania or even Albania. Southern Europe. generally speaking, is
not the best place to exercise a deliberate policy ofstrict self-isolation.
Hence, the combination of factors which made North Korean
'national Stalinism' such a long-term phenomenon. Although there
are few doubts that the North Korean regime will collapse sooner or
later, numerous attempts to forecast its immediate disintegration have
proved spectacularly wrong. The experience of North Korea dem-
onstrates that, in spite of their normally unsatisfactory economic
perfurmance, the Stalinist regimes can be very tenacious ifthey succeed

Afterword 197
in cutting their populace off from outside influences, are ready to
resist foreign pressures stubbornly, and refuse to reform themselves
whatever hardships such a decision imposes on the populace.
North Korea is likely to leave behind a troublesome legacy. Its
early modest, albeit real, achievements in education, health care and
general social development do not stand any comparison with the
dramatic progress of its chiefadversary, South Korea, although they
would perhaps look somewhat more impressive if compared with a
less successful country. At the same time, many problems - not merely
economic, but also social and cultural - created by North Korean
'national Stalinism' are likely to stay with the North, either as an
independent state or as a part ofunified Korea, for many years. The
seeds planted (almost unwittingly) in the late 1940s will continue to
bear fruit for many decades to come.

INDEX
agriculture 69 Ch'ISn Tong-hyok 116, 117

aid (Soviet and Chinese) 63-4, 66, 75 Ch'ISndogyo 22
Albania 30, 47, 154, 165, 195, 196 Ch'ondogyo-Ch'ong'udang 22, 24n, 35,
AnTong-su 125 36,47
anti-Communist resistance 22-3, 25-6, Chang Si-u 95
38 China 1, 29, 37, 47, 52, 53, 56, 61-2,
anti-Japanese mistance, stt guerri.IW 6:HI, 69, 70, 75, 79-a(), 91-2, 96, 102,
armed forces 37, 44, 60, 107, 121, 127- 103,109, 128,151-2,154, 172,174,
8, 129, 133, 146-7, 164, 184 176-7, 185, 186-7, 195
'August incident' (1956) Chapter6pa.uim Ch.istialrov, Col.-Gen. J.M. 2, 5, 12-14
Cho 0-mylSng 95, 101n
Bahsanov,G.3.~1.128 Cho Ki-ch' ISn 116
Baltic States 111, 189 ChoMan-sik 1(}-11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20,
border (North and South Korea) 41, 60 22.23-4.27,58
Brezhnev, L.I. 157 Cho YISng-bok 97
Britain 23 Christianity 5<>-Sl, 189
Bulgaria 30, 96, 98, 99, 185, 188, 190 Chu YISng-ha 95
Burma 68 chuth'~ 67, 193
Comintern 4, 10, 17, 21, 86, 98, 113,
CeniralAsia 114-15, 117-18, 119-20, 114, 117, 125
121, 125, 128n,141-3 Communism in Korea before 1945 1(}-
Ch'ae Kyu-hylSng 124 11, 17,52-8,78,1 12-16
Ch'oe Ch'ang-ilc 30, 79, 87, 160, 161, Communist Party of Korea 10, 2(}-21 ,
165,169-71,172,173, 175,177,178, 58-9,78-9
179-80, 182,184,186,190,192 Communist Party of North Korea 28,
Ch'oe Chong-halt 128 29-31, 79, 144
Ch'oe ChlSng-hylSn 191-3 Communist Party of'South Korea 28
Ch'oe P'yo-dlSk (P.l.Tsoe) 125, 128, 129, Constitution 42, 45
146, 150-1 Cultural Revolution (China) 66, I 03
Ch'oe Song 171 Czechoslovakia 30, 98, 99
Ch'oe Sling-bun 175
Ch'oe Yong-glSn 22,24,37,89, 100, 164, Democratic Party 22, 24, 29, 34, 35, 36,
170,184,192-3 47
199

200
Domestic faction 62, 78--9, ~ 109, KangKISn37
155-6, 174, 181 Kang Sang-ho 101, 118, 125, 129, 140,
DPRK proclamation 47 149,152,164,168,170-71,187
Kang Sl5ng-san 73
economy 63-4, 69-70, 197 KangYang-ult 25
~cation 39, 119-21, 125, 126-7, lJO, Kang, Major Mikhail 18, 19, 116-17,
132 118, 140
dections (1946-7) 34-7, (1948) 45-6 Khrusbcbev,N.S.65, 1S4, 157, 158, 187
Ki Sl51t-pok 127
factions in l~nhip 62-3, Chapter 3, Kim Cb'aek 22
Chapter 6, 195 Kim Cb'an 123, 125, 133
Filatov, S.N. 160, 161, 166, 179, 180n, Kim Cb'an-ju 73
185-6,191 Kim Cb'ang- man 108, 181
Fint Congress of People's Committees Kim Cb'ang-sun 28
35-6 Kim Cb'il-s6ng 104
Kim Ch'un-sam 128
Germany, East JO Kim Chae-uk 123, 127, 128, 133
Great Purge (USSR) 4, 17, 96, 98, 115, Kim Chin 113
118, 125,127, 140-2, 1-46,175-6 Kim CblSng-il 56, 71, 74-5, 76
Guerrilla faction 72-3, 78,~109, 181, Kim Chung-rin 73
182 Kim Hak-chun 171-2
guerrilbs ofanti-Japanese rmstance 51- Kim nSung8, 17-22, 25, JO, 31-2. 35,
7, 72-3, 8(}-1, 85 37, 38, 42, 45, -46, 47, Chapter 2
possim, 77-109, 119, 121, 123, IS,
Han Pin 113 126, 127,133,134, 145, 147-8,149-
Han 561-~ 181 S0, 151-2, 154-93
Hegai, A.I. (HIS Ka-i) 21, 22n, 32, 87, KimKu 45
91-2,93,94, 118,123,125,126,127, Kim Pong-yul 128
Chapter 5 JNWiln, 160 Kim Sllng-bwa 158, 161, 176, 178, 179-
HIS ChlSng-suk 122 80, 182, 184
HIS Ka-i= Hega.i (9.11) Kim Tal-hylSn 73
HIS Un-bae 112n, 117, 122, 158n, 168, Kim Tu-bong 31-2, 42, 47, 79, 81, 87,
183, 186 89, 103, 121, 144, 145, 160, 178-9,
Hungary JO, 64, 98, 185, 188--9 182
Hwang Chang-ylSp 73 KimYong-b6m 11, 18n,21 , 114
HylSn Chun-hylSk 11 Kim Yong-sun 73
KIS Hill-man 164-S, 169-71, 172, 173,
lgnatiev,A.M. 3, 25-6, 90, 121 16'}-70, 173
industry 33, 66, 70, 75, 182 Kornsomol 2, 125, 138--40
KongT'ak-ho 74
Japan 1, 4, 5-6, 7, 11, 17, 32, 33, 51-7 Kon:a, South 7, 8, 25, 26, 32, 40-1, 44,
80,88,95-6, 112-13, 116, 137, 138, 46-7,61-2,63-4,67-9, 75,76,79,
140, 189 92, 121,185, 188,196
Joint Declantion of 1972 (North and Kon:an emigrants in USSR and China;
South Kon:a) 68 1ttals0Soviet Ko=ns 16-18,29,32,
'J oy' Group 72n 38, 39, 40, 78, Chapt~r 4
Kon:an Wu 3n,41-2,60-2,91, 94, 121,
Kang Chin 113 125,128,129, 131, 133,147-8, 150-
Kang HISi-won 73 2. 191

201
Koran Worten' Party (KWP) 3, »- Pait Ch'q-rik 130, 134
21, 65, 83-4, 87, 107-8, 127, 146-9, PakCMng le 11,21,86,88n,103n,104,
154-93 10711, 1()8, 114, 115, 125, 150, 158,
Korotkav, Lt.-Gen. G.P. 2 162, 163, 166-7, 169, 181
~V.V.4, 18a,32,59,84o,88- Pait H6n-y6Dg 17,20,21,28,30,32,38,
90, 122, 190 43,60,79,83,89-91,93-4,1~2.
121,147,155,192
land n:futm 26, 32-3 Paitn:.u 87, 92, 1S9, 160, 184, 192
Lebedev, N.G. 2, 9n,13, 14, 18n, 19, 47, Pak Kil-mm 106, 128
54,90 Pait Kil-yong 133, 1S7n
Loboda, l .G. 1811, 55n Pait Kllm-ch'111 166-7
Pait Pyiing-yul 120, 121, 147
Manchuria 4, 17,32,51-7,•1.85, 113, Pait Sllng-ch'111 73
114, 131. 152, 185 Pak Sling-wiin 95
Mao Zedona64,66, 70, 74,80, 92, 174, Pak Oi-wm 104, 133, 157n
187 PakYong-pin 180
Melder, G.I. 4, 18-19 Pak, Nikolai A. 122-3
Mereakov, Manbal IC.A. 5, 36 Pmg Hak-ee 38, 97, 104, 128, 130, 134,
Mikoyan.A.I. 102 140, 162, 164
militarilation 69 People'• AwmNy ofNorth Korea 35-
Molotov,V. 43, 46, 90 6, 42, 44, 45
Mongolia 47, 64 People's Conuniuca (194-0s) 11- 13, 14,
Mu Cb6ag80, 89, 91-2 16,23,33,34,37
l\:tuw,A.M . 105, 158-6S, 186, 191
Nagomoe School 40 Poc:b'onbo nUI S3-4, SS
Nam ll 104, 108, 121, 129, 158, 162-3, Poland 30, 111, 16S, 18S, 188-9
181 police 37-8, 128-9, 130
naaonatiuaon of iDduscry 33 Poliiet (USSR) 140, 144
New People's Party 29-30, 31, 84, Pl"6lo 68
144 PIUF of195'H2 63, 1~7. 124, 134,
North-Chinese League fur the Inde- 154-93
pendence of Korea 79 Pyongyang 5, 12, 18, 39, S8, 61,73, 177
North Korean Bureau (of Communist
Party of Korea) »-2, 28, 58-9 Red Army~. 12, 17, 22, 33, 36, 53,
Nonh Korrm Pnwisioml People's Com- 56-7, S8-9, 80, 112, 115-19, 120,
miuee 27, 31, 32, 34, S9 121,126,127-8, 138,142-3,146
North Kon:an Worken'Pany (NKWP) Republic ofKorea, 1« Kon:a, South
31, 34, 36, 40, 41-2, 47, 79, 81-4, 90, Romanenlto, Maj.-Gen.A.A. 2, 1S, 36,
127, 144, 145n 90
Novi.chenko,Ya. T. 25 Ron1ania30, 99, 154, 165, 190, 193, 195,
nuclear pc!'ftr and 'Wapotll 7S 196
0 Ki-ch'an 125 Samsonov, G.Ye.164, 169-70, 172, 173,

1n
Pae Ch'& 9S security services 37-8, 128-9, 130, 13S
Pak Ch'ang-ok 93, 94, 9S, 102, 114, 125, Seoul 17, 23, 28, 44, 45, 60, 61, 78,
126, 127, 133, 149, 150, 151, 160, 163, 114
169, 171, 173, 17S, 178, 179-60, 182, Shabehin,A.I. 3, 89
184,185-6,190,192 Shchetinin, B.V. 16

202 Index
Shtykov,Col.-Gcn.T.F. 2, 15,36,39,43- 77-8,80,84,86,87-91,98-9, 102,
4, 46, 90, 121, 122, 123 104-7, Chapter 4 passim, 137-53,
~Hwi 169, 170-2, 173, 176-8 156-86,192-3, 194-5
~kSan 164
South Korea. stt Korea, South "Ymukovich,V.A. 93-4
South Korean Worken' Party 32, 40, 47, Vietnam 67-8, 195
79,83-4,90,93 Worken' Party of Korea, see Korean
South P'y6ngan Conunittee for the Worken' Party
Prq>antion for Independence 11-
14, 23 WorldWM,Second 1-2, 57-8, llS-16
Soviet Civil Administration (SCA) 1S-
16, 27-8, 32-3, 39, 118, 143 Yanan faction 62-3, 79-80,81-109, 144,
Soviet Koreans and Soviet faction 16, 156,158-187, 190, 195
78, 80-109, Chapter 4 p<Wirn, 136- Yang HylSng-sop 73
53, 156,16()...86, 190, 191,195 Yi Kang~guk 'Xr7, IOln
Soviet Union, - USSR Yi P'il-gyu 159-61, 169, 170-1, 173,
Stalin 2-3, 17, 18n, 30, 31, 32, 39, 43, 178,180,182, 183
47,60n,61,70, 74, 80, 102, 14()...41, Yi Sang-jo 105n, 157, 158, 177-8, 180,
150, 166, 167,19s-6 182,184
Supmne People's.Assembly 46-7 Yi ~ng-man (Syngman Rhee) 8, 44,
Suzdalev, S.P. 149-50, 151 45,60, 147
Yi Song-un 177
'Taean' system 69 Yi ~ng-ylSp 93, 94-7, 100, 147
wcation 185, 189 Yim Hwa 95, 97-8
Titorenko,Ye.L.1 75, 191-2 Yu ~ng-<:h'lSI, General 18n, 41, 56, 60,
trade unions 171-2 115, 125
Yun Kong-hum 103n, 161, 166, 169,
United Democntic National Front 29, 170-1, 173,17lr-7, 178
34 Yun Sun-dal 95
United Nations 45
USA 5, 7, 12, 23, 28, 60, 61, 68, 75, 83, Zhdanov, A.A. 2-3, 43, 83n, 90
9s-6,97,l()(}..1, 148,1 49 Zhou Bao-zhong 55, 56
USSR 1-46, ~2. 63-7, 69, 71, 75, Zhou En-lai 64, 66


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ANDREI LANKOV

The ript ofAndrei Lankov to be identified

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Preface and Acknowledgements page v11

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research on North Korean history proper. The situation changed

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other Communist countries, where de-Stalinisation and related re-

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However, in the current political situation and with the prevailing

Faadty ofAsian Studies ANDREI LANK.ov

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Romanisation of Korean names is according to the McCunc-

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AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

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10An example of a non-friendly source is found in the declassified and published

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16Pak Che-ch'an, 'P'yCSng'an kCSnguk chunbi wiwCSnhoe kyCSl'song-gwa Kodang

P'yMig'an ltmtgult chunbi wiwl!nh« ltyOl'song-gwa Kodang Cho Man-silt, p. 47.

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19Pultlum sasip nyms, p. 36.

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211.M. Chistialcov, 'Boevoi put', p. 48.

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2s1.M. Chiuiakov, 'Boevoi put', p. SO.

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rTAn interpretation of the events of1945-7 as an "anti-feudal, natio.W-liberation,

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13 November 1989, Moscow.

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38Changes in the official dating of the meeting are followed in detail in an

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39P. Krainov, &r'ba Mrrulrogo ""1'0"4 za naavisimost', Moscow: Gospolitizdat,

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42Cho Tong-ylSn, 'Nae-g2 kylSkld1n Sinuiju haksaeng pangong UiglS' Pultlum,

(13November1989, Moscow) Lebedev rruintained that it was done by the 'Koreans

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"The circumstances of Cho Man-sik's death were related to South Korean

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..~There are discrepancies in descriptions of the structure of the Provisional

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