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Contemporary Systems Thinking
Manel Pretel-Wilson
Utopics
The Unification of Human Science
Contemporary Systems Thinking
Series Editor:
Robert L. Flood
Maastricht School of Management
Maastricht, The Netherlands
Utopics
The Unification of Human Science
Manel Pretel-Wilson
Pretel-Wilson LLC
Calonge, Spain
ISSN 1568-2846
Contemporary Systems Thinking
ISBN 978-3-030-54176-7 ISBN 978-3-030-54177-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54177-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This book is dedicated to my
daughter, Nayade
Preface
You have in your hands, the work of our thinking imagination through its develop-
ment during the history of Western philosophy and throughout the history of mod-
ern science. Until now, our understanding of the progress of knowledge has been
obscured by the fact that we are blind to what actually determines the way in which
scientists think what they want to understand in the universe. I call this fundamental
ground shaping their thinking imagination a world-hypothesis and its development
is and has always been, the genuine vocation of philosophy for nearly two and a half
millennia. However, today, the situation is different because our civilization has
stopped doing philosophy for too long and to such a point, that it has become a
burden to the further development of science. We have long forgotten those days in
which philosophy and science walked together, giving rise to the Scientific
Revolution and, not so long ago, to the “evolutionary synthesis” in biology from
1936 to 1947. In contrast, the current state of philosophy has resulted in the founda-
tional crisis in physics and its offspring, the interpretational crisis in quantum
mechanics. Still more worrying, however, is the fact that there are two new domains
of science that did their scientific groundwork nearly 70 years ago but are still wait-
ing for their unification.
So this book is about the history of our thinking imagination in its quest for truth
by means of the development of different world-hypotheses and scientific theories
to make sense of the universe. It is also about the history of separation of the human
world from rest of the universe in our present age as well as the hope of reunion of
anthropology and cosmology through the discovery of a new world-hypothesis
coming from without Western philosophy. But there is only one possible way to
realize that hope: by doing philosophy again after the decline of Western philoso-
phy. And this means only one thing: thinking together beyond the logical limits
imposed by the last world-hypothesis. This is a daunting task because that same way
of thinking which gave rise to modern science has spread to all those spheres of
knowledge in which we have applied logical thinking.
This hope is far from being logically impossible given that behind the advance-
ment of science there is already a different world-hypothesis suggesting itself. And
all that I have done in this book is to remember how our thinking imagination got
vii
viii Preface
itself into the present situation, in order to find a way forward that unleashes its full
potential. That journey started with an understanding of the “schism in physics” that
took place in 1927 through the eyes of Einstein, whose suspicious attitude towards
quantum mechanics was far from arbitrary and perfectly rational under the collapse
of the modern world-hypothesis. My curiosity did not stop there. In contrast to
foundational crisis of physics, biology was enjoying its golden age after the “evolu-
tionary synthesis” with the emergence of molecular biology in the early 1950s. As I
found out later, that marked contrast with physics could only be due to the rise of a
new world-hypothesis grounding biology given that Darwin (1859) and Mendel
(1866) had already laid down the scientific groundwork much earlier. But what if
that was also the case with other domains of science yet to be founded?
When I continued my next journey into the foundation of biological science, I
discovered that there was a group of sciences – namely, physiology, psychology and
ethology – that could not be integrated in the evolutionary synthesis because they
belonged to an altogether different domain of science. As with the advancement of
physics, I saw hints of a new world-hypothesis now suggesting that the universe had
a heterogeneous constitution not captured by the physical or the biological world.
To my surprise, the concept of space and time in the cybernetic world is something
unique and that specificity was the ground on which a major discovery had already
been made, Ashby’s theory of adaptive behaviour enabling another pending unifica-
tion: the neo-cybernetic synthesis. However, that scientific legacy is still absent
from the history of science because it cannot be found in his published work but
only in an unpublished Journal (1928–1972) which was made available only
recently. Furthermore, the foundational idea of his general theory of cybernetic sys-
tems, namely, the existence of a feedback mechanism between the organism and its
environment, is actually related to a missing physiological mechanism that solves
the mystery of the cerebellar system in the light of the available scientific evidence.
I was not satisfied with ending my journey here either. So I continued looking for
signs of another possible unification in the domain of human science. Eureka! I
discovered that the “anatomy” of the universe is constituted by spatial and temporal
dimensions that introduce even more heterogeneity in our world. Likewise, the sci-
entific groundwork regarding the laws that apply to the human world was accom-
plished 70 years ago and what was missing was a new concept of human system in
order to reveal who were the actual founding fathers of this new domain of science,
the science of utopic systems. And my conclusion at the end of this fascinating jour-
ney is that, the unlimited quest for knowledge depends, more than ever before, on
the working together of present and future scientists and philosophers given that the
progress in science is not independent from the progress in philosophy and that
world-hypothesis is what makes logically possible the consolidation of different
domains of science.
Lastly, this journey into the world of knowledge was carried out along three dif-
ferent paths that were supposed to be turned into three separate books dealing with
the foundational crisis in physics, the neo-cybernetic synthesis and the foundation
of human science, respectively, but I soon discovered that they were all parts of the
same project pointing the way to the future unification of knowledge. So the book
Preface ix
you have in your hands, including two appendixes, is my contribution towards that
endless endeavour. As to its reading order, it depends on which domain of science
you are most interested in but I cannot think of any scientists or general reader that
is not maximally interested in understanding how our human world works and how
it is being constituted by utopic systems that look into the future to realize some-
thing different from what we see today.
1 Introduction���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1
References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6
2 The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy������������������������������������������ 7
2.1 The Birth of World-Hypothesis�������������������������������������������������������� 7
2.2 The Periodization of Western Philosophy���������������������������������������� 11
2.3 The Founders of Contemporary Philosophy������������������������������������ 14
References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 18
3 The “Foundation” of the Human Sciences�������������������������������������������� 19
3.1 Dilthey’s Demarcation of the Human Sciences�������������������������������� 19
3.2 The Birth of the Last World-Hypothesis������������������������������������������ 21
References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30
4 The Foundation of Utopics���������������������������������������������������������������������� 33
4.1 The Death of Western Philosophy���������������������������������������������������� 33
4.2 Demarcating Philosophy from Science�������������������������������������������� 39
4.3 A New World-Hypothesis���������������������������������������������������������������� 44
4.3.1 How Is Something Rather than Nothing Possible?�������������� 45
4.3.2 How Is the Structure of Everything Possible?���������������������� 47
4.3.3 How Is Knowledge Possible? ���������������������������������������������� 57
4.4 A New Concept of Human System�������������������������������������������������� 64
References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 66
5 The Prehistory of Human Science���������������������������������������������������������� 69
5.1 The Rebirth of a New Civilization?�������������������������������������������������� 69
5.2 Plato’s City-State������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 71
5.3 Augustine’s God-State���������������������������������������������������������������������� 78
5.4 Descartes’s Rational Nature�������������������������������������������������������������� 84
5.4.1 Hobbes’s Civil Society���������������������������������������������������������� 84
5.4.2 Hume’s Human Mind������������������������������������������������������������ 90
xi
xii Contents
Epilogue������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 181
Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 301
Chapter 1
Introduction
Utopics? What a strange title for a book, we might think. The first title that came to
my mind when I started thinking about this project was the “Human Science
Manifesto”. At that moment, I intended to inquire into the foundation of a new
domain of science which, as I thought at the time, was only in its prehistorical
period, and thus all I could hope for was to prepare the ground for its future develop-
ment. But as I was moving closer to my goal, I realized that there was indeed some-
thing like a prehistory but also a comparatively recent history of human science
constituted by a scientific groundwork that had escaped the attention of historians.
In a short span of 80 years, a new domain of science had been born that had little in
common with long prehistory of human science associated with the history of
Western philosophy. More interestingly, none of those two histories coincides in
fact with what we understand today as the history of the social sciences. Furthermore,
as I went along understanding the constitution of our human world, I was convinced
that ours was truly a utopic world, one that was crafted from the realization of pos-
sible ideas by utopic systems who have made reality what was only a thinking pos-
sibility in their imagination. And so it seemed reasonable to name utopics the study
of the human world, all the more reason if I wanted to differentiate it from what we
consider today the humans sciences. Furthermore, as we will learn in this book,
what actually constitutes the real human world is our utopian activity rather than
our linguistic activity because ours is not a symbolic universe.
After justifying my choice of “utopics” for the title of this book, I should add that
it was a natural choice after having termed “neo-cybernetics” another new domain
of science separate from biology and on whose laws the human world depends
(Appendix II). Indeed, human science would not be possible without an understand-
ing of how the cybernetic world works as a prerequisite. Far from being an offspring
emerging from the biological world, the human world overlaps with an intermediate
world which cannot be explained by the laws of biology alone. And given that struc-
tural overlapping, it is all the more important to understand how the laws of the
cybernetic world apply to the human world. The prefix “neo” to qualify
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 1
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
M. Pretel-Wilson, Utopics, Contemporary Systems Thinking,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54177-4_1
2 1 Introduction
“cybernetics” is not random because the untold history of this new domain of sci-
ence is not the standard one that begins with the fathers of the cybernetic movement,
Norbert Wiener and Warren McCulloch, but one that is found in Ross Ashby’s
Journal (1928–1972) which was not available until 2008.
However, to appreciate the birth of new domains of science, we require a torch to
shell some light into the development of human thought. We cannot understand the
progress in science without what I call world-hypothesis and even less in the case of
human science because each “cosmology” has a corresponding “anthropology”.
Indeed, without the development of world-hypothesis is impossible to understand
the prehistory of human science given that the different concepts of human system
have sprung from that original source. Furthermore, in the contemporary age, the
influence of world-hypothesis has been such that it has helped establish its suprem-
acy beyond the traditional human sciences in disciplines such as the sociology of
knowledge or the history of science which are now informed by the concept of the
symbolic animal (Cassirer 1944). I say “animal” rather than “human” because that
“anthropology” has tried to ground itself scientifically on the theory of evolution by
claiming that “linguistic symbolism” is a product of natural selection, a random
mutation which separated “man” from the rest of the universe by opening a new
dimension of reality.
In every age of Western history, we have conceived ourselves according to a dif-
ferent world-hypothesis determining our thinking imagination since the Greeks.
That was the beginning of the prehistory of human science with the first concept of
human system rather than the second half of the nineteenth century as is generally
believed when modern sociology was born with Auguste Comte. What has gone
unnoticed, however, is that the concept of society itself is one of the modern con-
cepts of human system that originated with Hobbes in the mid-seventeenth century
under the influence of a new world-hypothesis. We cannot go without world-
hypothesis as it constitutes the most fundamental ground of human thought, and we
can go as far as claiming that it shapes thinking itself in as much as it determines was
is logically possible or impossible to think within a given “cosmology”. In the case
of science, world-hypothesis is so fundamental that no thought experiment would
be possible without one as they determine what scientists can imagine as being logi-
cally possible or impossible to conceive. In fact, a good case in point is how Einstein
viewed with suspicion with the implications of the quantum formalism as it meant
the acceptance of physical phenomena that were logically impossible within the
modern world-hypothesis such as the problem of non-contiguity suggested by the
famous EPR paradox (Einstein et al. 1935). In fact, the interpretation of that para-
dox in terms of non-locality or action at a distance actually confirms that we are still
under the influence of the last logical possibility conceivable within that “cosmol-
ogy”. Furthermore, that same way of thinking has also been felt in biology where
the current biological concept of species assumes that populations coexist next to
each other occupying different spaces rather than sharing the same ecosystem evolv-
ing together. Indeed, it seems logically impossible to think scientifically without the
all-encompassing principle of contiguity at the core of the modern world-hypothesis
on which general relativity was founded.
1 Introduction 3
This world-hypothesis has permitted the evolution of modern science since the
Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century by grounding physics until the birth
of quantum mechanics in the late 1920s and making possible two syntheses in sci-
ence, the first the Newtonian and then the Maxwellian. In fact, a physicist such as
De Broglie (1924) was hoping that his new theory of quanta, founded on the same
logical ground, would bring the third synthesis but, instead, what resulted was the
foundational crisis of physics and its by-product, the current interpretational crisis
in quantum mechanics. What is the quantum formalism telling us about the quan-
tum world? Most quantum physicists seem to believe that we live in a world of
simultaneous probabilities which collapse into an actual observable event after an
experiment has been conducted, but before that moment they all equally real.
Indeed, before the observer interferes with its measurement, all possibilities are all
equally existing somehow though nobody knows were but certainly not in the ordi-
nary three-dimensional space. In particular, we are told that what the quantum for-
malism is telling us is that in the subatomic world, particles behave as probability
wave in Hilbert space, that is, an abstract object in an abstract space! Are we not
missing a “cosmology” altogether by claiming so? Well, that was the conclusion of
the Solvay 1927 Conference when the Copenhagen interpretation was established.
That foundational crisis in physics made me realized that what had shaped the
scientific imagination for three centuries was a world-hypothesis whose fertility
ended with the development of Einstein’s theory of general relativity. However, its
collapse with the birth of quantum mechanics in the mid-1920s gave a lot of “head-
aches” to the great scientists that did not accept the emerging consensus, such as
Einstein, De Broglie, and Schrödinger, because it was logically impossible to
develop a field theory that could unite macrophysics with microphysics. What phys-
icists have not realized to this day, however, is that they are lacking another compass
to guide their disciplined thinking imagination. In contrast, biologists are enjoying
now their golden age after the evolutionary synthesis in the late 1930s and 1940s
increasing their own scientific prestige and they have even demonstrated that their
science has many applications derived from the discoveries in molecular biology.
Biologists are now looking down on physicists even if some biologists have credited
Schrödinger (1944) for inspiring their own research leading to the discovery of
double helix structure of DNA. What biologists are unaware, however, is that the
evolutionary synthesis was made possible by a different world-hypothesis ground-
ing the mayor discoveries made by Darwin and Mendel nearly 90 years earlier.
Indeed, so far, all the unifications in science have depended on a world-hypothesis.
If that is the case, science in general is grounded on world-hypothesis. And the
implication is clear, human science as such has also to be grounded on a new world-
hypothesis which is something that, to this day, has only happened in the physical
and the biological sciences. Furthermore, what I have said about these consolidated
sciences is also the case in the new domain of neo-cybernetics whose pending uni-
fication is made logically possible by a new world-hypothesis (Appendix II). Does
this mean that we need four world-hypotheses, one for each domain of science? Of
course not, then maybe we can make do with the one grounding biology? That is
also logically impossible because each domain of science, including human science,
4 1 Introduction
assumes a different concept of space and time that only applies to the world they are
studying. This means we have to forget thinking in terms of the homogenous con-
cept of space-time in which time is like space? No, contrary to the modern world-
hypothesis, space and time are non-homogeneous dimensions of the universe, that
is, time is not another dimension of space but an altogether different dimension of
the universe. Instead, what we require is one single world-hypothesis that does jus-
tice to the heterogeneity of the actual structure of the universe in order to ground
science in general, from the physical to the human sciences. And that new world-
hypothesis has to make possible a new concept of human system informing the
science of utopic systems.
We have explained what a world-hypothesis is, something that makes possible
logical thinking itself, and, in the case of science, that way of thinking has led to
fruitful theories making more transparent the universe right in front of our eyes. So,
in a way, we can say that world-hypotheses enable us to see further and further into
the universe. This is certainly the case with the current world-hypothesis which
opened our eyes to the world of biological phenomena which could not be properly
understood in the light of our previous world-hypothesis. However, the prevalent
world-hypothesis is blind to the world of cybernetic phenomena because it con-
ceives an organism as being something separate from its environment and thus it
cannot break free from the principle of contiguity. This is the other fundamental
aspect of world-hypothesis as it makes possible not only thinking but seeing itself
because it rules out as being logically impossible some phenomena before our very
eyes. A good example is the phenomenon of quantum entanglement which only
becomes transparent within a new world-hypothesis. Indeed, our very thinking and
seeing in science is shaped by world-hypothesis, and, thus, it determines what we
see and blind us to what is logically impossible to see according to a given “cosmol-
ogy”. Again, Einstein’s uncompromising attitude towards quantum mechanics until
the end of this life is very revealing; we only have to look at his discussions first
with Neil Bohr and later with Max Born (Appendix I).
Now it is time to explain the actual origin of world-hypothesis. We mentioned
earlier that the prehistory of human science was born in Greece, particularly, in the
early fourth century BC. We have been told that Western philosophy started a couple
of centuries earlier with “the transition from mythos to logos” originating in the
west coast of Asia Minor (Anatolia) thanks to the Milesian school named after its
founder, Thales of Miletus. However, Thales and his disciples did not work out a
world-hypothesis as such though they are often depicted as the first cosmologists
and fathers of scientific thinking. We also hear from the historians of philosophy
that the pre-Socratics, a label that also includes other schools, where the first to
inquire about cosmos and that it was not until Socrates that “man” entered that pic-
ture. Therefore, if cosmology was not the main philosophical focus after Socrates,
how can I argue that world-hypothesis was born then? Well, first we have to under-
stand what we mean by the birth of philosophy. According to Plato, “philosophy
begins in wonder,” but I would add that curiosity without a clear subject-matter was
not the origin of philosophy. In fact, it was Plato himself who was the first to formu-
late a fundamental philosophical question the answer of which originated the first
1 Introduction 5
References
Ashby, W. R. (2008). Journal (1928–1972), The W. Ross Ashby digital archive, 2008. http://www.
rossashby.info/journal. Accessed 19 May 2020.
Broglie, L. (1924). [2004] On the theory of Quanta, Paris: Fondation Louis de Broglie.
Cassirer, E. (1944). An essay on man: An introduction to the philosophy of culture. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., & Rosen, N. (1935). Can quantum-mechanical description of physical
reality be considered complete? Physical Review, 47, 777–780.
Schrödinger, E. (1944). What is life: The physical aspect of the living cell. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 2
The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy
The material cause, however, was only one of the “primary causes”, the one that
explained what persisted behind the changes in the universe, but since “it is surely
not the substrate itself which cause itself to change”, that knowledge had to be
complemented with the source of motion to explain what can “generate the nature
of things that are”, and that was the task of later philosophers who investigated “the
second type of cause”, the efficient cause. Those milestones preceded Aristotle’s
own discovery of the “science of the first causes” to which he added the formal and
the final cause which had been either absent from or not clearly explained in any of
the previous philosophies. Aristotle’s own account of the contributions of his prede-
cessors has exerted a considerable influence on the historians of Western philoso-
phy, particularly the idea that Thales of Miletus was the first philosopher and that
the pre-Socratics were the first to investigate the cosmos.
In addition, every student of ancient philosophy has also been exposed to the
thesis of the “Greek miracle” as a “the transition from myth to logos” brought forth
by the pre-Socratics. We are told that before them reason was not separate from
myth but mixed together as in Hesiod’s Theogony (700 BC) in which the origin of
the cosmos is explained through a succession of primordial deities born from Chaos.
Of course, this myth could not satisfy the seeker of truth, the philosopher, but should
we accept the “Greek miracle” to explain the origin of philosophy? But what is
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 7
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
M. Pretel-Wilson, Utopics, Contemporary Systems Thinking,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54177-4_2
Chapter 3
The “Foundation” of the Human Sciences
We have to start this chapter with Dilthey who is generally credited for having dis-
tinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. This does not mean that the human sciences where born with him or that he
made any scientific contribution. Rather than being remembered for having estab-
lished the human sciences, he is known for providing its subject matter or, more
precisely, the “delimitation of the human studies”. Before him, the domain of the
human sciences had received several names: Hume (1739) called it that of “moral
subjects” and referred to them collectively as “the science of man” and J. S. Mill
(1843) as the “moral sciences”. Unlike his predecessors, Dilthey (1883) wanted to
take distance from the concept of human being as rational nature, “a mere process
of thought”, and argued for man as a “psychophysical life-unit” who is “the carrier
and co-developer of this immense structure of socio-historical reality”. And thus he
conceived “the sciences of individuals”, namely, psychology and anthropology, “as
elements of socio-historical reality” whose study can be further divided into “the
science of the cultural systems” (ethics, art, science) and “the science of the external
organization of society” (law, economics, religion, and language). This was
Dilthey’s original demarcation of the human sciences. But what is the subject matter
common to all the human studies? Well, according to Dilthey, human scientists deal
with a different type of fact when they study the human world, mental facts, and
thus with a different type of experience, inner experiences.
In particular:
Man as a life-unit may be regarded from two points of view […] seen from within he is a
systems of mental facts, but to the senses he is a physical whole. Introspection and percep-
tion are separate acts so we can never grasp what goes on in a man’s mind at the same time
as we observe his body. (Ibid [1989]: 67)
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 19
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
M. Pretel-Wilson, Utopics, Contemporary Systems Thinking,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54177-4_3
Another random document with
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lines missing here and there, as indicated by the ‘deficit versus in
copia,’ which occurs sometimes in the margin. In the numbering of the
chapters the Prologues of Libb. ii. and iii. are reckoned as cap. i. in
each case. The corrections and notes of the rubricator are not always
sound, and sometimes we find in the margin attempts to improve the
author’s metre, in a seventeenth-century hand, as ‘Et qui pauca tenet’
for ‘Qui tenet et pauca’ (ii. 70), ‘Causa tamen credo’ for ‘Credo tamen
causa’ (ii. 84). Some of these late alterations have been admitted
(strange to say) into Mr. Coxe’s text (e.g. ii. 70).
The book is made up of parchment and paper in equal proportions,
the outer and inner leaves of each quire being of parchment. Sixteen
leaves of paper have been inserted at the beginning and twelve at the
end of the book, easily distinguished by the water-mark and chain-
lines from the paper originally used in the book itself. Most of these
are blank, but some have writing, mostly in sixteenth-century hands.
There are medical prescriptions and cooking recipes in English,
selections of gnomic and other passages from the Vox Clamantis,
among which are the lines ‘Ad mundum mitto,’ &c., which do not occur
in the Digby text, four Latin lines on the merits of the papal court
beginning ‘Pauperibus sua dat gratis,’ which when read backwards
convey an opposite sense, the stanzas by Queen Elizabeth ‘The
dowte of future force (corr. foes) Exiles my presente ioye, And wytt me
warnes to shonne suche snares As threten myne annoye’ (eight four-
line stanzas).
With regard to the connexion between D and L see below on the
Laud MS.
for which cp. Wright’s Political Poems, Rolls Series, 14, vol. i. p. 225.
or
but it is also very often used in the correct classical manner. The
MSS. make no distinction between these two uses, but sometimes
join the conjunction to the preceding word and sometimes separate
it, apparently in a quite arbitrary manner. For the sake of clearness
the conjunction is separated in this edition regularly when the sense
requires that it should be taken independently of the preceding word,
and the variations of the manuscripts with regard to this are not
recorded.
Again, some freedom has been used in the matter of capital
letters, which have been supplied, where they were wanting, in the
case of proper names and at the beginning of sentences.
The spelling is in every particular the same as that of the MS.
The practice of altering the medieval orthography, which is fairly
consistent and intelligible, so as to make it accord with classical or
conventional usage, has little or nothing to be said for it, and
conceals the evidence which the forms of spelling might give with
regard to the prevalent pronunciation.
The principal differences in our text from the classical orthography
are as follows:
e regularly for the diphthongs ae, oe.
i for e in periunt, rediat, nequio, &c. (but also pereunt, &c.).
y for i in ymus, ymago, &c.
i for y, e.g. mirrha, ciclus, limpha.
v for u or v regularly as initial letter of words, elsewhere u.
vowels doubled in hii, hee, hiis (monosyllables).
u for uu after q, e.g. equs, iniqus, sequntur.
initial h omitted in ara (hăra), edus (haedus), ortus, yemps, &c.
initial h added in habundat, heremus, Herebus, &c.
ch for h in michi, nichil.
ch for c in archa, archanum, inchola, choruscat, &c. (but Cristus,
when fully written, for ‘Christus’).
ci for ti regularly before a vowel e.g. accio, alcius, cercius,
distinccio, gracia, sentencia, vicium.
c for s or sc, in ancer, cerpo, ceptrum, rocidus, Cilla.
s for c or sc, in secus (occasionally for ‘caecus’), sintilla, &c.
single for double consonants in apropriat, suplet, agredior,
resurexit, &c. (also appropriat, &c.).
ph for f in scropha, nephas, nephandus, prophanus, &c.
p inserted in dampnum, sompnus, &c.
set usually in the best MSS. for sed (conjunction), but in the Cotton
MS. usually ‘sed.’
FOOTNOTES:
1 2nd Series, vol. ii. pp. 103-117.
2 Script. Brit. i. 414.
3 Itin. vi. 55. From Foss, Tabulae Curiales, it would seem that
there was no judge named Gower in the 14th century.
4 Script. Brit. i. 414. This statement also appears as a later
addition in the manuscript.
5 ‘Gower’ appears in Tottil’s publication of the Year-books (1585)
both in 29 and 30 Ed. III, e.g. 29 Ed. III, Easter term, ff. 20, 27,
33, 46, and 30 Ed. III, Michaelmas term, ff. 16, 18, 20 vo. He
appears usually as counsel, but on some occasions he speaks
apparently as a judge. The Year-books of the succeeding
years, 31-36 Ed. III, have not been published.
6 These arms appear also in the Glasgow MS. of the Vox
Clamantis.
7 Worthies, ed. 1662, pt. 3, p. 207.
8 e.g. Winstanley, Jacob, Cibber and others.
9 Ancient Funeral Monuments, p. 270. This Sir Rob. Gower had
property in Suffolk, as we shall see, but the fact that his tomb
was at Brabourne shows that he resided in Kent. The arms
which were upon his tomb are pictured (without colours) in
MS. Harl. 3917, f. 77.
10 Rot. Pat. dated Nov. 27, 1377.
11 Rot. Claus. 4 Ric. II. m. 15 d.
12 Rot. Pat. dated Dec. 23, 1385.
13 Rot. Pat. dated Aug. 12, Dec. 23, 1386.
14 It may here be noted that the poet apparently pronounced his
name ‘Gowér,’ in two syllables with accent on the second, as
in the Dedication to the Balades, i. 3, ‘Vostre Gower, q’est
trestout vos soubgitz.’ The final syllable bears the rhyme in
two passages of the Confessio Amantis (viii. 2320, 2908),
rhyming with the latter syllables of ‘pouer’ and ‘reposer’. (The
rhyme in viii. 2320, ‘Gower: pouer,’ is not a dissyllabic one, as
is assumed in the Dict. of Nat. Biogr. and elsewhere, but of the
final syllables only.) In the Praise of Peace, 373, ‘I, Gower,
which am al the liege man,’ an almost literal translation of the
French above quoted, the accent is thrown rather on the first
syllable.
15 See Retrospective Review, 2nd Series, vol. ii, pp. 103-117
(1828). Sir H. Nicolas cites the Close Rolls always at second
hand and the Inquisitiones Post Mortem only from the
Calendar. Hence the purport of the documents is sometimes
incorrectly or insufficiently given by him. In the statement here
following every document is cited from the original, and the
inaccuracies of previous writers are corrected, but for the most
part silently.
16 Inquis. Post Mortem, &c. 39 Ed. III. 36 (2nd number). This is in
fact an ‘Inquisitio ad quod damnum.’ The two classes of
Inquisitions are given without distinction in the Calendar, and
the fact leads to such statements as that ‘John Gower died
seized of half the manor of Aldyngton, 39 Ed. III,’ or ‘John
Gower died seized of the manor of Kentwell, 42 Ed. III.’
17 Rot. Orig. 39 Ed. III. 27.
18 Rot. Claus. 39 Ed. III. m. 21 d.
19 Rot. Claus. 39 Ed. III. m. 21 d.
20 Harl. Charters, 56 G. 42. See also Rot. Orig. 42 Ed. III. 33 and
Harl. Charters, 56 G. 41.
21 Harl. Charters, 50 I. 13.
22 See Rot. Orig. 23 Ed. III. 22, 40 Ed. III. 10, 20, Inquis. Post
Mortem, 40 Ed. III. 13, Rot. Claus. 40 Ed. III. m. 21.
23 Harl. Charters, 50 I. 14. The deed is given in full by Nicolas in
the Retrospective Review.
24 Rot. Orig. 48 Ed. III. 31.
25 The tinctures are not indicated either upon the drawing of Sir
R. Gower’s coat of arms in MS. Harl. 3917 or on the seal, but
the coat seems to be the same, three leopards’ faces upon a
chevron. The seal has a diaper pattern on the shield that
bears the chevron, but this is probably only ornamental.
26 ‘Et dicunt quod post predictum feoffamentum, factum predicto
Iohanni Gower, dictus Willelmus filius Willelmi continue
morabatur in comitiva Ricardi de Hurst et eiusdem Iohannis
Gower apud Cantuar, et alibi usque ad festum Sancti
Michaelis ultimo preteritum, et per totum tempus predictum
idem Willelmus fil. Will. ibidem per ipsos deductus fuit et
consiliatus ad alienationem de terris et tenementis suis
faciendam.’ Rot. Parl. ii. 292.
27 Rot. Claus. 43 Ed. III. m. 30.
28 Rot. Claus. 42 Ed. III. m. 13 d.
29 English Writers, vol. iv. pp. 150 ff.
30 See Calendar of Post Mortem Inquisitions, vol. ii. pp. 300, 302.
31 So also the deeds of 1 Ric. II releasing lands to Sir J. Frebody
and John Gower (Hasted’s History of Kent, iii. 425), and of 4
Ric. II in which Isabella daughter of Walter de Huntyngfeld
gives up to John Gower and John Bowland all her rights in the
parishes of Throwley and Stalesfield, Kent (Rot. Claus. 4 Ric.
II. m. 15 d), and again another in which the same lady remits
to John Gower all actions, plaints, &c., which may have arisen
between them (Rot. Claus. 8 Ric. II. m. 5 d).
32 Rot. Franc. 1 Ric. II. pt. 2, m. 6.
33 See also Sir N. Harris Nicolas, Life of Chaucer, pp. 27, 125.
34 Rot. Claus. 6 Ric. II. m. 27 d, and 24 d.
35 Rot. Claus. 6 Ric. II. pt. 1, m. 23 d.
36 Rot. Claus. 7 Ric. II. m. 17 d.
37 Duchy of Lancaster, Miscellanea, Bundle X, No. 43 (now in the
Record Office).
38 ‘Liverez a Richard Dancastre pour un Coler a luy doné par
monseigneur le Conte de Derby par cause d’une autre Coler
doné par monditseigneur a un Esquier John Gower, vynt et
sys soldz oyt deniers.’
39 Duchy of Lancaster, Household Accounts, 17 Ric. II (July to
Feb.).
40 Register of William of Wykeham, ii. f. 299b. The record was
kindly verified for me by the Registrar of the diocese of
Winchester. The expression used about the place is ‘in
Oratorio ipsius Iohannis Gower infra hospicium suum’ (not
‘cum’ as previously printed) ‘in Prioratu Beate Marie de
Overee in Southwerke predicta situatum.’ It should be noted
that ‘infra’ in these documents means not ‘below,’ as
translated by Prof. Morley, but ‘within.’ So also in Gower’s will.
41 Lambeth Library, Register of Abp. Arundel, ff. 256-7.
42 The remark of Nicolas about the omission of Kentwell from the
will is hardly appropriate. Even if Gower the poet were
identical with the John Gower who possessed Kentwell, this
manor could not have been mentioned in his will, because it
was disposed of absolutely to Sir J. Cobham in the year 1373.
Hence there is no reason to conclude from this that there was
other landed property besides that which is dealt with by the
will.
43 I am indebted for some of the facts to Canon Thompson of St.
Saviour’s, Southwark, who has been kind enough to answer
several questions which I addressed to him.
44 The features are quite different, it seems to me, from those
represented in the Cotton and Glasgow MSS., and I think it
more likely that the latter give us a true contemporary portrait.
Gower certainly died in advanced age, yet the effigy on his
tomb shows us a man in the flower of life. This then is either
an ideal representation or must have been executed from
rather distant memory, whereas the miniatures in the MSS.,
which closely resemble each other, were probably from life,
and also preserve their original colouring. The miniatures in
MSS. of the Confessio Amantis, which represent the
Confession, show the penitent usually as a conventional
young lover. The picture in the Fairfax MS. is too much
damaged to give us much guidance, but it does not seem to
be a portrait, in spite of the collar of SS added later. The
miniature in MS. Bodley 902, however, represents an aged
man, while that of the Cambridge MS. Mm. 2. 21 rather recalls
the effigy on the tomb and may have been suggested by it.
45 We may note that the effigy of Sir Robert Gower in brass
above his tomb in Brabourne church is represented as having
a similar chaplet round his helmet. See the drawing in MS.
Harl. 3917, f. 77.
46 So I read them. They are given by Gough and others as ‘merci
ihi.’
47 Perhaps rather 1207 or 1208.
48 Script. Brit. i. 415: so also Ant. Coll. iv. 79, where the three
books are mentioned. The statement that the chaplet was
partly of ivy must be a mistake, as is pointed out by Stow and
others.
49 Read rather ‘En toy qu’es fitz de dieu le pere.’
50 Read ‘O bon Jesu, fai ta mercy’ and in the second line ‘dont le
corps gist cy.’
51 Survey of London, p. 450 (ed. 1633). In the margin there is the
note, ‘John Gower no knight, neither had he any garland of ivy
and roses, but a chaplet of four roses only,’ referring to Bale,
who repeats Leland’s description.
52 p. 326 (ed. 1615). Stow does not say that the inscription
‘Armigeri scutum,’ &c.; was defaced in his time.
53 vol. ii. p. 542.
54 vol. v. pp. 202-4. The description is no doubt from Aubrey.
55 On this subject the reader may be referred to Selden, Titles of
Honour, p. 835 f. (ed. 1631).
56 Antiquities of St. Saviour’s, Southwark, 1765.
57 vol. ii. p. 24.
58 Priory Church of St. Mary Overie, 1881.
59 Canon Thompson writes to me, ‘The old sexton used to show
visitors a bone, which he said was taken from the tomb in
1832. I tried to have this buried in the tomb on the occasion of
the last removal, but I was told it had disappeared.’
60 vol. ii. p. 91.
61 Bp. Braybrooke’s Register, f. 84.
62 Braybrooke Register, f. 151.
63 The date of the resignation by John Gower of the rectory of
Great Braxted is nearly a year earlier than the marriage of
Gower the poet.
64 I do not know on what authority Rendle states that ‘His
apartment seems to have been in what was afterwards known
as Montague Close, between the church of St. Mary Overey
and the river,’ Old Southwark, p. 182.
65 At the same time I am disposed to attach some weight to the
expression in Mir. 21774, where the author says that some
may blame him for handling sacred subjects, because he is no
‘clerk,’