Judicial Notice

Dean Ferdinand A. Tan, Evidence: A Compendium for the Bench and the
Bar, 2021 Edition, pp. 178-192

Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and Justice Eduardo B. Peralta,

Insights on Evidence, 2020 Edition, pp. 97-120

Juan v. Juan, G.R. No. 221732, 23 August 2017

In a dispute over the trade name "Lavandera Ko," the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Fernando, emphasizing that technicalities should not hinder the resolution of the
dispute, and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the
rightful owner of the trade name.

FACTS:

the case of Juan v. Juan involves a dispute over the trade name "Lavandera Ko."
Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the name and mark
"Lavandera Ko" in his laundry business in 1994 and obtained a certificate of copyright
for it in 1997. He later formed Laundromatic Corporation to handle the business.
Petitioner Fernando U. Juan, Roberto's brother, registered the same name and mark
with the Intellectual Property Office in 2001. Roberto filed a petition for injunction,
unfair competition, infringement of copyright, cancellation of trademark and name
against Fernando. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition, ruling that
neither party had the right to the exclusive use of the mark because it was the original
work of Santiago S. Suarez. The RTC ordered the cancellation of both parties'
registrations. Fernando appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but his appeal was
dismissed for failure to comply with procedural requirements. Fernando then filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

(D) whether an internet article is cannot be considered as judicial notice.

RULING:

In connection therewith, the RTC's basis or source, an article appearing in a website, in

ruling that the song entitled "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright, cannot be
considered a subject of judicial notice that does not need further authentication or
verification. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. Put
differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional
evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing
and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are
not bona fide disputed. In Spouses Latip v. Chua, this Court expounded on the nature
of judicial notice, thus:

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial
notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that
the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which
are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person.

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case
of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of
particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But
a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a requisite for it to be of
judicial notice to the court because such article is not well and authoritatively settled
and is doubtful or uncertain. It must be remembered that some articles appearing in the
internet or on websites are easily edited and their sources are unverifiable, thus, sole
reliance on those articles is greatly discouraged.

Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it proper to remand the
case to the RTC for its proper disposition since this Court cannot, based on the records
and some of the issues raised by both parties such as the cancellation of petitioner's
certificate of registration issued by the Intellectual Property Office, make a factual
determination as to who has the better right to use the trade/business/service name,
"Lavandera Ko."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court dated January 25, 2016, of petitioner Fernando U. Juan is GRANTED.

Bernardo v. Fernando, G.R. No. 211034, 18 November 2020

The Supreme Court affirms the dismissal of complaints for annulment,

reconveyance, and accounting, ruling that the petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
filiation to the deceased and therefore have no right to claim the subject properties.

Facts:
The case of Bernardo v. Fernando involves a dispute over the ownership of five parcels
of land left behind by the late Jose Chiong. The respondents, Jose C. Fernando and his
family, claimed to be the legal heirs of Jose Chiong based on an "Affidavit of Identity of
Heirs" they executed. This affidavit led to the cancellation of the titles of the subject
properties under the original collective name of "Heirs of Jose Chiong" and their
transfer to the names of the respondents.

The petitioners, Mario Chiong Bernardo and Josefina L. Bernardo, along with other
heirs of Jose Chiong, filed separate complaints for annulment, reconveyance, and
accounting, seeking to establish their legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong and claim the
subject properties. They argued that the respondents were not the true heirs of Jose
Chiong and that their claim to the properties was subordinate to the petitioners' claim.

ISSUE:

WON the Court should take judicial notice of when the signature of the father of the
child was or was not required in the certificate of birth is misplaced.

Petitioners’ allegation that the Court should take judicial notice of when the signature of
the father of the child was or was not required in the certificate of birth is
misplaced. The additional argument that the baptismal certificate should be considered
a certificate of birth as it was executed prior to an established system of registry was also
only alleged but not proved. Mario extends this by analogy, arguing that since at the
time of Barbara’s baptism, there was a strict prohibition in the Catholic religion against
baptism of children born out of wedlock, the baptismal certificate could further prove a
legitimate marriage between Jose Chiong and Ambrosia. This claim, both belated and
unsubstantiated, cannot be considered by the Court as sufficient basis to grant
petitioners’ claim. ATaDHC

Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules provides for the facts which the court must take judicial
notice of without need of proof, to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions. (1a).

Demonstrably, the prescriptions governing the preparation and accomplishment of

birth certificates in the system of registry do not fall under any of the enumerated
categories of facts. At best, this allegation of a past protocol in the system of registry
may fall under Section 2 of the same Rule, which provides for matters that the
court may, in its sound discretion, opt to take judicial notice of. Being discretionary, the
Court may not take judicial notice thereof if it is not convinced that the matter is of
public knowledge, or capable of unquestionable demonstration, or otherwise ought to be
known by judges because of their judicial functions.

That this case has already lasted for over 17 years since Mario first instituted the
Complaint for Annulment, Reconveyance and Accounting is lamentable. Even so, the
Court maintains that no length of time will ripen a mere allegation lacking proof into a
demandable right, least of all in the case where legitimate filiation is the status which
may be granted or withheld.

WHEREFORE, the Consolidated Petitions are hereby DENIED.

Western Sales Trading Company, Inc. v. 7D Food

International, Inc., G.R. No. 233852, 15 September 2021

The Supreme Court of the Philippines rules that a distributorship agreement violation
case cannot be pursued against a Guam-based company in the Philippines, while also
determining that the Philippine branch of the company is not involved in the agreement,
and dismissing the application of forum non conveniens to dismiss the complaint.

Facts:
The case of Western Sales Trading Co., Inc. v. 7D Food International, Inc. involves a
dispute between Western Sales Trading Company, Inc. (WSTC Guam) and 7D Food
International, Inc. (7D) regarding a distributorship agreement for the sale and
distribution of 7D Mango Products in Guam and Hawaii. WSTC Guam is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of Guam, while 7D is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines. WSTC Guam imports products from the Philippines
for sale and distribution in Guam.
In 2012, 7D filed a complaint against WSTC Guam and its subsidiary, Western Sales
Trading Company Philippines, Inc. (WSTC Philippines), alleging that they violated their
verbal exclusive distributorship agreement. 7D claimed that WSTC Guam purchased
competitor products and distributed them in Guam and Hawaii, and that WSTC Guam
and other parties tortiously interfered with 7D's new distributor in Guam and Hawaii.

WSTC Guam and WSTC Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that WSTC Guam cannot be sued in the Philippines because it is not doing business
locally, and that WSTC Philippines is not privy to the distributorship agreement. They
also raised the defense of forum non conveniens, seeking the dismissal of the complaint.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint on the grounds of forum
shopping and litis pendentia, citing the pendency of cases involving the distributorship
agreement in the Guam and Hawaii courts. The RTC ruled that a judgment in the
foreign courts would constitute res judicata in the Philippine case.

petitioners contended that what WSTC Guam had with 7D was an isolated written
contract for exclusive distributorship in Hawaii for a period of one year from July 2003
to June 2004. Further, they averred that WSTC Guam never sold competitor products
and, assuming that it did, there was no prohibition from doing so. On the contrary, they
claimed that it was 7D which terminated the distributorship contract, prompting the
filing of Civil Case No. 1527-11 in the Superior Court of Guam and Civil Case No. 09-1-
000351-02 in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawaii by WSTC
Guam against 7D, among others. They also pointed out 7D's failure to disclose the
pending cases abroad in its Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Ultimately, they sought
the dismissal of the Complaint under the principle of forum non conveniens.

ISSUE:

WON the judgement in civil case in favor of WSTC Guam can take judicial
notice.

Rulling:

No.

Significantly, petitioners claim that the Guam court already rendered its judgment in
Civil Case No. 1527-11 in favor of WSTC Guam on February 25, 2013. Similarly, the
Hawaii court allegedly ruled in favor of WSTC Guam in its judgment dated September
10, 2013 in Civil Case No. 09-1-000351-02. However, as earlier established, courts
cannot take judicial notice of these foreign judgments without the appropriate court
proceedings for their proper recognition.
Notably, the RTC failed to give the parties the opportunity to ventilate their claims and
substantiate their allegations as to the pendency of the other civil suits abroad by its
premature dismissal of the complaint. Petitioners were deprived of the opportunity to
authenticate and prove the pleadings filed in the Guam and Hawaii courts in the same
way that 7D was not afforded the chance to contest the contents of these attached
pleadings.

Significantly, petitioners claim that the Guam court already rendered its judgment in
Civil Case No. 1527-11 in favor of WSTC Guam on February 25, 2013. Similarly, the
Hawaii court allegedly ruled in favor of WSTC Guam in its judgment dated September
10, 2013 in Civil Case No. 09-1-000351-02. However, as earlier established, courts
cannot take judicial notice of these foreign judgments without the appropriate court
proceedings for their proper recognition.

Additionally, as correctly observed by the CA, a remand of the case to the court of origin
for the conduct of further proceedings is proper to likewise settle the choice of forum.
Although petitioners did not raise the issue on the applicability of the principle of forum
non conveniens in the instant petition, this was part of petitioners' Answer below in
support of their stance for the outright dismissal of the complaint. The application of the
principle of forum non conveniens as a ground for dismissal of an action requires a
factual determination which is more properly considered a matter of defense. While the
trial court has the discretion to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances" require the court's desistance. SDIaHE

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no compelling reason to reverse the conclusion
of the CA remanding the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence.

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Luz Gaspe

Lipson and Issuance of Letters Testamentary, G.R. No. 229010, 23
November 2020

The Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to probate an
alien's will executed in the Philippines, regardless of whether it has been probated in the
alien decedent's national court, as long as it is executed in accordance with Philippine
law or the law of the alien's country.

Facts:
The case of Gaspi v. Pacis-Trinidad involves a petition for the probate of an alien's will
executed in the Philippines. Luz Gaspe Lipson, an American citizen temporarily residing
in Iriga City, executed her last will and testament on February 23, 2011, designating
Roel P. Gaspi as the executor. Lipson passed away on October 17, 2015, and Gaspi filed a
petition for the probate of her will on October 3, 2016. However, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, stating that
Lipson's will must be probated in the United States, her country of citizenship. Gaspi
filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the court would take judicial notice on foreign law.

RULING:

The extrinsic validity of a will, that is, that the document purporting to be a will is
determined to be authentic and duly executed by the decedent, is different from its
intrinsic validity.

The intrinsic validity of the will "or the manner in which the properties were
apportioned," refers to whether the order and allocation of successional rights are in
accordance with law. It can also refer to whether an heir has not been disqualified from
inheriting from the decedent.

Generally, the extrinsic validity of the will, which is the preliminary issue in probate of
wills, is governed by the law of the country where the will was executed and presented
for probate. Understandably, the court where a will is presented for probate should, by
default, apply only the law of the forum, as we do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.

This is the situation here. A Filipina who was subsequently naturalized as an American
executed a will in the Philippines to pass real property found in the country. The
designated executor now files a petition for probate in the Philippines.

Respondent motu proprio dismissed the petition for probate, because it purportedly
went against the nationality principle embodied in Article 16 of the Civil Code by not
adhering to the required probate proceedings of Lipson's national law.

Respondent is mistaken.

The nationality principle is embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. aScITE
The second paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code then provides that the national law
of aliens shall regulate their personal rights:

ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Under the nationality principle, Philippine Laws continue to apply to Filipino citizens
when it comes to their "family rights and duties . . . status, condition and legal capacity"
even if they do not reside in the Philippines. In the same manner, the Philippines
respects the national personal laws of aliens and defers to them when it comes to
succession issues and "the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions."

However, the probate of a will only involves its extrinsic validity and does not delve into
its intrinsic validity, unless there are exceptional circumstances which would require the
probate court to touch upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

When it comes to the form and solemnities of wills, which are part of its extrinsic
validity, the Civil Code provides that the law of the country of execution shall govern:

ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine Laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even if we assume that the foreign law applies, it does not necessarily mean that the
Philippine court loses jurisdiction. Foreign law, when relevant, must still be proven as a
fact by evidence, as Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.

Courts, therefore, retain jurisdiction over the subject matter (probate) and the res,
which is the real property in Iriga in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 6, 2016
and November 6, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 in Spec. Proc.
No. IR-2919 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional
Trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision

People v. Montierro, G.R. No. 254564, 26 July 2022

The Supreme Court upholds the trial courts' declaration of invalid DOJ circulars and
affirms the requirement of mutual agreement for a valid plea bargaining, providing
guidelines for plea bargaining in drugs cases and ordering the remand of the cases for
further proceedings.

Facts:
The case involves consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by the People of
the Philippines and Cypher Baldadera, as well as two administrative matters related to
the decisions in the criminal cases. The accused, Montierro and Baldadera, were
charged with drug-related offenses. They proposed plea bargaining agreements, which
were approved by the trial courts over the objections of the prosecution. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) also objected to the plea bargaining agreements. The
accused and the DOJ argued that the guidelines on plea bargaining issued by the Court
were unconstitutional and violated the separation of powers

ISSUE:

WON the Court takes judicial notice of DOJ Department Circular No. 18 dated
May 10, 2022 (DOJ Circular No. 18

RULING:

At the very outset, the Court takes judicial notice of DOJ Department Circular No.
18 dated May 10, 2022 (DOJ Circular No. 18), which took effect on the same date. It
appears that DOJ Circular No. 18 amended DOJ Circular No. 27 to conform to the
Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

Under DOJ Circular No. 27, an accused charged with violation of Section 5 of RA No.
9165 (for less than 5 grams of shabu or less than 300 grams of marijuana) may plead
guilty to a lesser offense under Section 11, paragraph 3 or Possession of Dangerous
Drugs; whereas, under the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the
acceptable plea for violation of Section 5 of RA No. 9165 (for 0.01 gram to 0.99 gram
of shabu or 0.01 gram to 9.99 grams of marijuana) is the lesser offense of Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs under Section 12 of RA No. 9165. This inconsistency was reconciled
in DOJ Circular No. 18, where the acceptable plea for violation of Section 5
of RA No. 9165 is now Section 12 of RA No. 9165, which is in accordance
with the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

With the amendments introduced in DOJ Circular No. 18, the prosecution's objection to
Montierro and Baldadera's plea bargaining proposals, which was based solely on DOJ
Circular No. 27, can now be considered as effectively withdrawn. As such, the issues of
whether the RTC erred in declaring DOJ Circular Nos. 61 and 27 invalid and overruling
the prosecution's continuing objection to Montierro and Baldadera's plea bargaining
proposals are now rendered moot and academic.

Waterfront Philippines, Inc. v. Social Security System, G.R. No.

249337, 06 July 2021

The Supreme Court declared the contract of loan between Waterfront Philippines, Inc.
and the Social Security System void due to lack of authority and violation of the SSS'
charter, ordering mutual restitution and payment of legal interest.

FACTS:

The case of Waterfront Philippines, Inc. v. Social Security System involves a contract of
loan between Waterfront Philippines, Inc. (WPI) and the Social Security System (SSS).
The contract of loan was executed on October 28, 1999, for a term of five years, with an
interest rate based on the Philippine T-bill rate. As security for the loan, WPI mortgaged
two parcels of land and delivered shares of stock to SSS. However, WPI encountered
difficulties in paying the loan, and SSS eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged
properties. SSS then filed a complaint for sum of money against WPI, seeking payment
of the outstanding loan balance.

ISSUE:

WON the court shall take judicial notice of the provisions of RA 8282

Ruling:

Yes. petitioners pointed out that SSS failed to present evidence to prove its authority to
contract with WPI. Also, in the presentation of the Memorandum dated October 21,
1999, petitioners objected to the supposed authority of SSS.

n fact, courts are allowed to take mandatory judicial notice of legislative acts: DIETcH
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature,
the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

To stress, the Contract of Loan was executed in violation of the provisions of R.A. No.
8282. The Court cannot authorize a contract that was executed in stark disregard of the
law. Considering that the main contract of loan is void, the mortgage, which is merely an
accessory thereof, is perforce void.

Additionally, if a void contract has already been performed, the restoration of what has
been given is in order. This principle springs from Article 22 of the Civil Code which
states that "every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Accordingly, the restitution of what
each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract. aCIHcD

In re: Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment of Divorce with

Prayer to Change Civil Status of Janevic Orteza Ordaneza from Married to
Single, G.R. No. 254484, 24 November 2021

A Filipino citizen seeks recognition of her foreign divorce decree, but fails to comply
with the requirements of Article 26 and Rule 108, resulting in the need for separate
petitions to recognize the divorce and change her civil status.

Facts:

The case of In Re: Ordaneza v. Republic involves a petition for recognition of a foreign
divorce decree and a change in civil status. The petitioner, Janevic Orteza Ordaneza, a
Filipino citizen, and Masayoshi Imura, a Japanese national, were married on April 7,
2006, in Pasay City. They obtained a divorce decree by agreement/amicable divorce on
May 13, 2009, in accordance with the Civil Code of Japan. The divorce notification was
duly registered by the Mayor of Karuya-shi, Aichi on May 15, 2009. On December 8,
2016, Janevic filed a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce and a change
in her civil status from "married" to "single" in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kidapawan City. During the trial, Janevic's brother Ricky testified and presented various
documents to support the petition. On December 28, 2017, the RTC granted the
petition, recognizing the divorce and changing Janevic's civil status. The RTC held that
Janevic had complied with the requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),
arguing that Janevic's petition did not comply with Rule 108 and that the divorce decree
did not meet the requirements of Article 26 of the Family Code. On September 7, 2020,
the CA reversed the RTC's decision, ruling that Janevic failed to comply with the
requirements under Rule 108 and that the divorce decree did not sufficiently establish
the foreign spouse's capacity to remarry. Janevic filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the court can simply take judicial notice of the foreign law purportedly
capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry.

RULING:

No.

The Court is mindful that it cannot simply take judicial notice of the foreign law
purportedly capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry without being properly
presented during trial.

In Racho v. Tanaka, the Court found that the national law of the foreign spouse
absolutely and completely terminated the spouses marital relationship, thereby
concluding that they are not restricted from remarrying. The Court explained that the
"Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation
than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely
terminates their marital tie."

In the present case, Janevic alleged in her petition, though not properly presented and
proven during trial, that there are restrictions to remarrying in Japan but these
restrictions apply only to women, and not the male foreign spouse. Similar to the case
of Racho, the fact remains that the divorce by agreement severed the marital
relationship between the spouses and the Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry.
Moreover, the official document Janevic submitted to prove the fact of divorce, the
Divorce Notification, did not indicate any restriction on the capacity of either spouse to
remarry. Therefore, the Court deems it prudent to adopt its ruling in Racho, which
involved the same foreign law, in holding that the capacity to remarry of the foreign
spouse had been established.

Accordingly, the petition of Janevic is granted only insofar as her foreign divorce decree
by agreement is recognized. The other relief prayed for, that her civil status be changed
from "married" to "single" cannot be given due course and awarded in this petition. This
ruling is without prejudice to the filing of a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in compliance with the requirements outlined in Rule 108 where the appropriate
adversarial proceeding may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 7, 2020 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05087-MIN is SET ASIDE. The petition for review
on certiorari of Janevic Orteza Ordaneza is PARTIALLY GRANTED only insofar as
her foreign divorce decree by agreement is judicially recognized.

National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. Bautista, G.R.

No. 232120, 30 September 2020

The Supreme Court upholds the dismissal of an appeal in an expropriation case,

affirming the valuation of a property at P600.00 per sq. m. based on its actual use,
location, and current market value.

FACTS:

The case of National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. Bautista involves an appeal
in an expropriation case. The petitioner, National Grid Corporation of the Philippines,
sought to acquire a property owned by Clara C. Bautista for its transmission line project.
The property is located in Maramag, Bukidnon and is registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-76986. The petitioner filed a Complaint for Expropriation,
stating that the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation for the property is
P10.00 per sq. m. or P13,140.00, while the cost of improvement stands at P40,679.36
for a total price of P53,819.36. The respondent opposed the petition, arguing that the
BIR valuation is lower than the property's fair market value and that the property's
actual use is residential despite its agricultural classification. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) appointed Commissioners to determine the fair market value of the property. The
Commissioners submitted conflicting reports, with one recommending a just
compensation of P25.00 per sq. m. and the other recommending P3,000.00 per sq. m.
The RTC rendered a judgment ordering the petitioner to pay just compensation of
P600.00 per sq. m.

The RTC found that the valuation of the property at P25.00 per sq. m. is too low,
impractical, and unreasonable; that, in the same manner, the P10.00 per sq. m.
valuation of the BIR for taxation purposes is long overdue for revision; that, on the
other hand, respondent's P3,000.00 per sq. m. valuation is too high and speculative as
it is based only on one deed of sale and the proposed Comprehensive Land Use Plan of
the Municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon. Thus, the RTC took judicial notice of the other
expropriation cases pending therein that involved properties similarly located in Brgy.
North Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon classified as agricultural land and yet, upon
ocular inspection, were industrial and/or zoned as "built-up" wherein the recommended
amounts for just compensation were P220.00 and P600.00 per sq. m.

ISSUE:

Won RTC may took judicial notice of other expcropriation cases.

Ruling:

Yes.

There is also no cogent reason for the Court to annul and set aside the amount fixed
herein as just compensation on the ground that the RTC took judicial notice of other
expropriation cases involving properties similarly situated. The RTC did not merely
adopt by reference the commissioner's reports in the other cited expropriation cases,
but took it into account in assessing just compensation because the properties subject of
the other cases were situated in the same place. As opined by Associate Justice Edgardo
L. Paras, "[a] court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same
case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of
its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in
the same court, and of public records on file in the same court." In any case, it was not
the only factor considered by the RTC. As can be gleaned from the RTC Decision, the
court also factored in the subject property's actual use, its location, and its current
market value. Between the valuation submitted by petitioner's commissioner at a measly
sum of P25.00 per sq. m., and that of the other two commissioners at P3,000.00 per sq.
m. based on the purchase price of a single deed of sale, the RTC's computation is more
in accord with the principle that payment of just compensation for private property
taken for public use, as guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill
of Rights, should be measured not by the taker's gain, but the owner's loss and that the
amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED

Denila v. Republic, G.R. No. 206077, 15 July 2020

The Supreme Court denies a petition for reconstitution of title due to the failure to send
notices to all occupants of the lots covered by the titles, nullifying the irregularly issued
Original Certificates of Title and addressing the misconduct of lawyers and court
personnel involved in the case.

The case of Duremdes v. Jorilla involves a Petition for Relief from Judgment filed by
Kenneth Duremdes, alleging extrinsic fraud in a civil case. The respondents in the case
are Caroline G. Jorilla, Rodolfo C. De Leon, Manolito Sioson, Elmer B. Gasang, Michael
De Castro, Gennete E. Rivera, Sylvia Orbase, Irene Magsombol, Nenita R. Domaguing,
and Cherilyn Palma. They filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money plus
Damages against Duremdes and Emerflor B. Manginsay, Jr. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-09-65496. The respondents alleged that Duremdes and Manginsay
were majority stockholders of Vitamins & Cebu Artists International, Inc. (VCAII), and
sought to recover payments they allegedly made to VCAII as victims of illegal
recruitment.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision on March 20, 2014, awarding the
respondents actual and moral damages. The RTC declared Duremdes and Manginsay in
default for failing to file their respective answers or any responsive pleading. Duremdes
then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, seeking the annulment of the RTC
Decision. He argued that the respondents committed fraud by specifying an erroneous
address for the purpose of fraudulently gaining a favorable judgment. Duremdes also
argued that the respondents violated the rules on the institution of criminal and civil
actions and made false statements in their Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping.

Judicial Admissions

Dean Ferdinand A. Tan, Evidence: A Compendium for the Bench and the
Bar, 2021 Edition, pp. 192-210

Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and Justice Eduardo B. Peralta,

Insights on Evidence, 2020 Edition, pp. 120-171

Serna v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 237291, 01 February 2021

People v. Ang, G.R. No. 231854, 06 October 2020

Castil v. People, G.R. No. 253930, 13 July 2022