SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner,

vs.
Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420
February 15, 2001

Topic: Doctrine of damnum absque injuria

Facts:
The instant case arose from Special Proceedings No. 3103 filed before the RTC Pasig
which involves six (6) parcels of land. Petitioner Sergio Amonoy acted as counsel in the said
case. Petitioner’s clients executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the former to secure
the payment of his attorney’s fees. Due to the clients’ failure to pay the attorney’s fees, Amonoy
filed for the foreclosure of the mortgaged lots, including the lot on which the Spouses Gutierrez’s
house was situated. Subsequently, the subject lots were foreclosed and an auction sale was held
where Amonoy emerged as the highest bidder.

Thereafter, the RTC on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession. Orders were issued for
the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of Spouses Gutierrez. On 27
September 1985, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order
(TRO) was granted on 02 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the respondent spouses’ houses.
But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the abovementioned Decision, respondents’
house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered
by the lower court.

A complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by
respondents against petitioner. Petitioner invokes the doctrine of damnum absque injuria in
arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house. He maintains that he was
merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages in favor of respondent spouses.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the doctrine of damnum absque injuria finds no application to this
case. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights, even if it causes loss to
another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a
remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a person's
right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order.
Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights, one must act with justice, give their due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right.
Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the
demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the
RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right
that had been suspended when he received the TRO on 04 June 1986. By then he was no longer
entitled to proceed with the demolition. Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque
injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such
exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or
prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.