Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation

of Turkish Eurasianism

Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu

The new millennium ushered in a significant paradigm shift in Turkish for-

eign policy. This shift has played a major role in bringing an approach that is
capable of exploiting the country’s accretion of historical knowledge and its
sociocultural advantages to bear on foreign policy. Turkey began to pursue its
foreign policy with greater confidence, fortified by its recent political stabil-
ity and economic growth. The space where this confidence finds reflection
in foreign policy is the former Ottoman territory of the Middle East and the
Balkans along with South Caucasia and Central Asia, with which Turkey has
ethnocultural, historical, and economic ties.
In this essay, changes to Turkish foreign policy are assessed in the context
of Eurasianism. The essay first addresses the doctrines of Eurasianism and
neo-Eurasianism. Then, following an effort to interpret changes to Turkish
foreign policy with recourse to neo-Ottomanism, the essay examines the rela-
tionship between Turkish Eurasianism and neo-Ottomanism.

Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism

The term Eurasia is used to refer, broadly speaking, to the region where the
European and Asian continents converge and is perceived by some geopoliti-
cal theorists to be “the center of the world.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, considering
the zone encompassing Turkey, Central Asia, and the Middle East to be an

Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu is assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Giresun

University, Giresun, Turkey.

Mediterranean Quarterly 25:2 DOI 10.1215/10474552-2685776

Copyright 2014 by Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.
86 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

integral part of Eurasia, called the region the Eurasian Balkans.1 Eurasian-
ism, taking this region as its basis and placing great store by the conclusions
of geopolitical theories, manifests itself as a drive for regional integration
with Russia at center stage, a reflection of the imperial project instinctively
followed by that country.2 Eurasianism views Russia through the prism of the
heartland theory, to which Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer attached
such importance.3 Russia, in the eyes of the Eurasians, is located in the very
heartland and represents a land-based civilization.4 Eurasianism does not
differentiate between the space that was dominated by the Russian Empire
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and considers Russia to be Eur-
asian as the expression of a unique identity in both a cultural and political
sense. The main thrust of Eurasianism has been the creation, through widen-
ing the inclusiveness of Russian identity, of a common Eurasian identity that
will manage to fuse together all of the peoples living in Eurasia. The emer-
gence of Eurasianism against the background of widespread political change
in Russia demonstrates that this concept was at the same time an imperial
strategy based on a geographical and cultural partnership that would be
formulated with Russian political presence at the helm. Eurasianism first
appeared during the period of turmoil in which the USSR took the place of
the Russian Empire. There was a second stage in the 1990s, when Russia
underwent severe social, political, and economic turmoil following the dis-
solution of the USSR. At that time Eurasianism was brought into line with the
new reality on the ground and achieved prominence in the political sphere.5
Eurasianists point to the multicultural nature of Russian identity as a rea-
son why it should serve as the foundation for the erection of the Eurasian civ-
ilization’s political partnership. Russian culture came into being through the

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Impera-
tives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
2. Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Hard-line Eurasianism and Russia’s Contending Geopolitical Perspec-
tives,” East European Quarterly 32, no. 3 (1998): 315 – 34.
3. Semra Rana Gokmen, “Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations” (PhD diss., Gradu-
ate School of Social Sciences, Middle East Technical University, 2010), 29 – 44.
4. Vladimer Papava, “Central Caucaso-Asia: From Imperial to Democratic Geopolitics,” Bulletin
of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences 4, no. 1 (2010): 183 – 7.
5. Natalia Morozova, “Geopolitics, Eurasianism, and Russian Foreign Policy under Putin,” Geo-
politics 14, no. 4 (2009): 667 – 86.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 87

amalgamation of Hellenic, Byzantine, Slavonic, and Turkish identities and is

the common thread of Eurasianism’s shared civilization. The Orthodox faith
is a major determinant of Russian identity, and thus of Eurasian civilization,
but Eurasians draw attention to their vision of a totality of common values
that will include, rather than exclude, all Eastern religions, including Islam,
and thus endeavor to ward off the danger of religious exclusivity sabotaging
the political union to be forged under Russian leadership.
There is a striking similarity between the circumstances that gave birth to
classical Eurasianism and those that led to the eruption of neo-Eurasianism
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lev Gumilev is a source of inspiration
for the neo-Eurasianist authors, of whom the most important is Aleksandr
Dugin. Neo-Eurasianists consider it to be Russia’s duty to take charge of Eur-
asian civilization and see Russia’s future not as part of the West but as exist-
ing within an overarching Eurasian regionalism. Neo-Eurasianists, whose
vision is to create their own set of values rather than adopt the liberal values
steeped in Western civilization, attach importance to the need to strengthen
administrative centralism. One key point on which neo-Eurasianist analysts
dwell is the potential for the “near abroad,” referring to former Soviet terri-
tory, to be attached in an economic, sociocultural, and, finally, political sense
to Russia.6
Dugin, one of the leading lights of the neo-Eurasianist movement, per-
ceives the Eurasian space to be the center of the land-based civilization.
Dugin construes the Atlantic civilization to be the systemic bloc with which
the land-based civilization is in competition. Dugin, in calling on the Euro-
pean landmass to ally itself with the Eurasian civilization to be led by Rus-
sia, draws a distinction between continental Europe and the bloc lead by
the United States and the United Kingdom, which he names the “Atlantic
civilization.” Dugin aims his pitch at a huge geographical space by includ-
ing countries such as Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan within the borders of
the Eurasian civilization.7 However, of late, Dugin increasingly attaches far
greater importance to Iran, Turkey, and, more generally, Asia at the expense

6. Anton Shekhovtsov, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe,” Religion
Compass 3, no. 4 (2009): 697 – 716.
7. Dmitry Shlapentokh, “Dugin Eurasianism: A Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an
Intellectual Ploy?” Studies in East European Thought 59 (2007): 215 – 36.
88 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

of a potential systemic alliance with continental Europe. 8 The tendency

inherent in Dugin’s conception of Eurasianism to differentiate between the
United States and its allies in the West, and China and India in the East, has
the potential to embroil Russia in conflict erupting on two fronts.9
According to Andrei Tsygankov, neo-Eurasianism tends to promote impe-
rialism at the expense of nation-states, from which it distances itself with the
perception that they are a product of Western civilization.10 Aleksandr Pan-
arin, who has made a major contribution toward the development of the socio-
cultural component of neo-Eurasianist thought, has argued that the collapse
of the USSR was tantamount to the break-up of the union that had been cre-
ated in Eurasia and the confirmation of the superiority of the Western civili-
zation. Panarin states that the reestablishment of the Eurasian union through
Russian initiative will boost multipolarity and will create a significant sphere
of influence for China, India, and the Islamic world. Panarin asserts that
Russia’s attempts to attach itself to Western civilization have ended in failure
and views the very communism that underlay the USSR as being a product of
Western civilization alien to Russia.
Neo-Eurasianism may be subclassified in a number of ways, but in gen-
eral, this movement progresses along the two main axes of extreme and mod-
erate Eurasianism. Moderate Eurasianism is rooted in systemic precepts
informed by defensive realism. This approach, also known as pragmatic
Eurasianism,11 asserts that Russia does not have to internalize the values of
Western civilization as a whole in order to modernize. Moderate Eurasianists
speak of the need for Russia to embrace a unique identity and civilization
that will facilitate communication between Western and Eastern civilizations,
and, to this end, of the necessity for Russia to persuade or force the former
components of the USSR to move in step with it in a political and economic

8. Marlène Laruelle, “Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander

Dugin’s Networks in Turkey,” Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2008).
9. Shlapentokh.
10. Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, “National Ideology and IR Theory: Three
Incarnations of the Russian Idea,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010):
663 – 86.
11. Evgeny Vinokurov and Alexander Libman, “Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: Beyond the
Post-Soviet Borders,” Eurasian Development Bank: Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012 (Almaty,
KZ: Eurasian Development Bank, 2012): 81 – 7.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 89

sense. Moderate Eurasianists, with certain reservations, accept the notion of

Western-style democracy and are not averse to the market economy. Moderate
Eurasianists wish for balanced relations with the West and perceive the pro-
posed Eurasian civilization’s relations with Western civilization progressing
through dialogue and cooperation. The Russian administration’s approach to
government arguably bears an overall resemblance to this program by the
moderate Eurasianists.12
Extreme Eurasianists, for their part, foresee an offensive realist concep-
tual and systemic structure. In their view, the amalgamation of the Eurasian
peoples under Russia’s leadership will serve to challenge Western civiliza-
tion’s global superiority and also foster multipolarity. Advocates of this view-
point underline the need for the Eurasian landmass to be stripped of Western
civilization’s economic and political influences.
Russian president Vladimir Putin harnesses both the moderate and extreme
aspects of neo-Eurasianism to further Russia’s interests in the international
arena and, in this manner, combines his own pragmatic nature with the
pragmatic precepts and nature of neo-Eurasianism. The great efforts toward
making possible the formation of a Eurasian Economic Union have borne
their first fruit in the form of the customs union established among Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus.13

Turkey’s Changed Foreign Policy and Neo-Ottomanism

During the Cold War, Turkey, as the Euro-Atlantic alliance’s frontline sentry
post on the Soviet border, acquiesced to the preferences and strategies of the
systemic bloc of which it was a member.14 Turkey also showed that it was pre-
pared to move in an opposite direction to its structural allies if ever there was
any direct challenge to its own national interests. The best example of this is
Turkey’s actions vis-à-vis Cyprus, because the Cyprus crisis brought Turkey

12. Emre Ersen, “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s Multipolarism in Russian Foreign Policy,” Turkish
Review of Eurasian Studies Annual 4 (2004): 135 – 72.
13. Steven Blockmans, Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The Challenge of Integration and
Unity (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2012).
14. Tarik Oguzlu, “Turkey’s Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” Washing-
ton Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012): 153 – 64.
90 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

and Greece, two neighboring members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, to the brink of war. In fact there had already been other developments
that had tested Turkey’s unidimensional foreign policy in the context of the
Euro-Atlantic alliance during the Cold War years: prior to the Cyprus inter-
vention there was the so-called Johnson letter (from US president Lyndon
Johnson) and the tensions over opium cultivation,15 while after the interven-
tion there was the arms embargo imposed by the United States from 1975 to
1978.16 But developments surrounding the Cyprus question, which has been
the object of historical, sociocultural, ethnic, and political rivalry for decades
up to 2014 and probably will remain so, do not alter the reality of the unidi-
mensional foreign policy that Turkey pursued throughout the Cold War.
In the first half of the 1990s Turkey perceived the need to distance itself
from the unidimensional policy. This called for devising a strategy that would
develop bilateral, multilateral, and institutional relations with countries of
the Balkans, Caucasia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, reversing the
disengagement of systemic considerations, historical and sociocultural prob-
lems, and security concerns of Turkish foreign policy.17 The dissolution of
the USSR would pave the way for a regional makeover, an idea first rooted in
the dying days of the Cold War, in which influences of an economic, socio-
cultural, and, at the final stage, political nature would be exerted over a
wide area encompassing the greater Black Sea Basin and the Middle East.
The discourse constantly promoted in the first half of the 1990s by Turkey’s
then president Turgut Ozal and then prime minister Suleyman Demirel of
a “Turkish World stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”
clearly delineates the region where the new policy would bring Turkey’s
influence to bear.18 However, attempts to implement the desired changes
to post – Cold War Turkish foreign policy strategy remained largely elusive

15. Philip Robins, “The Opium Crisis and the Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey-US Rela-
tions,” Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 1 (2007): 17 – 38.
16. Melike Basturk, “The Issue of Cyprus in the EU Accession of Turkey,” Claremont- UC Under-
graduate Research Conference on the European Union (2011): 15 – 22, scholarship.claremont.edu
/urceu/vol2011/iss1/4.
17. Sedat Laciner, “Ozalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?” Yone-
tim Bilimleri Dergisi 1, nos. 1 – 2 (2004): 161 – 202.
18. Ertan Efegil, “Turkish AK Party’s Central Asia and Caucasus Policies: Critiques and Sugges-
tions,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 2, no. 3 (2008): 1 – 2.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 91

throughout the 1990s. One of the main reasons for this was the political
instability created by the endless stream of coalition governments throughout
the decade and the economic crises engendered by this continual instabil-
ity.19 The reluctance of Turkish governments to develop a new foreign pol-
icy strategy and shoulder the costs it would entail may be cited as a further
reason.
In any examination of the dynamics that brought the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP) to power, it becomes quite clear that foreign policy was
not a particularly significant element in the mix. Foreign policy occupied
relatively little space in the manifesto distributed by the party before enter-
ing the 2002 election.20 The European Union had symbolic importance for
the AKP because the party leadership, a large proportion of which had their
roots in political Islam, were aware that if they managed to take significant
steps toward the EU, they could win the approval of the West, which had
viewed the AKP with some trepidation, as had some of the Turkish public.
Therefore, from 2002 to 2006, the AKP appeared to be highly focused on
EU membership. As it turned out, foreign policy, which initially had been
very much a secondary issue, actually became the linchpin of AKP’s social
and political legitimacy. From 2006 onward, Turkey’s foreign policy agenda
changed. The EU membership process was put on pause, and Turkey began
to turn its attention to neighboring geographical regions with a view to taking
advantage of the power vacuum that had developed in the area, which Turk-
ish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu referred to as Afro-Eurasia. It is hardly
surprising that the Turkish government’s focus is on foreign policy. The AKP
set out using foreign policy as a vehicle for social and political legitimacy, but
now a foreign policy agenda is essential in order to maintain regional effec-
tiveness in the face of the problems and opportunities arising in the area.
Turkey’s new foreign policy, the theoretical basis of which is outlined in
Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s book Strategic Depth,21 has been dubbed neo-

19. Ziya Onis, “Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political Economy,” Turkish Policy Quar-
terly 9, no. 3 (2010): 45 – 61.
20. Omer Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of Moderate Political Islam,”
Alternatives 2, no. 1 (2003): 95 – 116.
21. Ahmet Davutoglu, Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari,
2000).
92 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

Ottomanism by international actors and analysts.22 In fact, in the period in

which this foreign policy strategy first saw the light of day, it took the form of
a civilizational project. From 1983 until 1993, Turkish prime minister and
then president Ozal desired, by means of this strategy, not only to rid Turkish
foreign policy of its unidimensionalism but also to bring about comprehen-
sive change that would encompass and incorporate social differences. His
goal was to create a multicultural and socially inclusive political culture. The
envisaged goal of a Turkey that was multicultural, pluralistic, and at peace
with religiosity would make it easier for Ozal and his successors to deal with
issues such as the Kurdish problem and Islam, on which so much of Turkey’s
social factionalism is based.23 However, Ozal’s early death and the political
instability and economic crises that dominated the 1990s combined to pre-
vent the political, social, and economic preconditions for neo-Ottomanism
from flowering.
Davutoglu’s declaration, despite broadly stated references to Ottoman terri-
tories and civilization that he did not subscribe to the neo-Ottoman current of
thought, was a piece of straightforward political pragmatism. The Ottomanist
discourse carries imperial overtones that are likely to provoke negative social
and political responses from other populations in the region outside Turkey’s
borders and from Western countries, and they can also be just as upsetting
for a considerable proportion of Turkish society itself. The latter is apparent
in questions appearing in the Western press—“Is Turkey changing direc-
tion?”24 and “Is Turkey moving away from the West?”25 —and also in the

22. On neo-Ottomanism, see Nora Fisher Onar, “Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies, and Turk-
ish Foreign Policy,” Discussion Paper 3 (London: Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research,
2009); Saban Kardas, “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles,” Middle
East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010): 115 – 36; Omer Taspinar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between
Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism,” Carnegie Papers 10 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2008); Inan Ruma, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: New Activ-
ism, Neo-Ottomanism, or So What?” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2010): 133 – 40.
23. On these points, see Umit Cizre Sakallioglu and Menderes Cinar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism,
Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” South Atlantic Quarterly 102,
nos. 2 – 3 (2003): 309 – 32; Yilmaz Ensaroglu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Question and the Peace Process,”
Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 7 – 17.
24. This and similar remarks are found in Alexander Murinson, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the
Twenty-First Century,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies 97 (2012): 1 – 23.
25. Kilic Bugra Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?”
Insight Turkey 12, no. 1 (2010): 205 – 5.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 93

alarm caused, in the midst of the events surrounding Gezi Park, by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s comments has appeared to set the Ottoman
flag on an equal footing with the Turkish national flag.26 Any acceptance of
the neo-Ottomanist discourse, and especially any increase in references to
religion in this context, is likely to provoke a strong reaction from the part
of Turkish society that is particularly sensitive on the matter of secularism,
as well as from the Turkish army that has, for the time being, been pushed
to the sidelines. The Ottoman past is looked on by a significant proportion of
Turkish society, and especially by the Alevis, as a nightmare. They fear that
the secular and modern state established by Ataturk on the basis of Turk-
ish national identity might be undermined by a discourse that harks back to
the Ottoman world. Davutoglu is well aware of these concerns and therefore
declines to label his foreign policy approach as neo-Ottomanism.
The thrust of Davutoglu’s doctrine, which sits easily alongside the neo-
Ottomanist approach, is in the direction of a full-blown regionalist initia-
tive, with consideration given to both economic and political factors such as
mutual interdependency and soft power.27 The criteria on which it draws the
region’s borders come from the Ottoman past religious and sectarian com-
monality, with ethnocultural kinship. For example, while in the Middle East
and Balkans the Ottoman past or sociocultural and religious/sectarian com-
monality was drawn on,28 generally speaking, ethnocultural phenomena, reli-
gion weighed much more heavily in the approach adopted toward Caucasia
and Central Asia.
Important factors combined to create fertile ground for the neo-Ottomanist
approach in the postmillennium period. Above all, the single-party govern-
ment of the AKP, which appears to be comfortable with the imperial past, is a
major factor. As the ruling party questioned the validity of the bureaucratic-
military guardianship in Turkish politics and managed to win ever larger
sections of society over to its side, the ensuing removal of the army from the

26. “Turkish PM Warns over Possible Rise of Sectarian Tensions,” Hurriyet Daily News, 23 June 2013,
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-warns- over-possible-rise- of- sectarian-tensions-.aspx
?pageID=238&nID=49343&NewsCatID=338.
27. Kemal Kirisci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,”
New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29 – 57.
28. Hajrudin Somun, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans and Neo-Ottomanism: A Personal
Account,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 3 (2011): 33 – 41.
94 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

political process is another important factor.29 The concept of Strategic Depth

asserts that Turkey is situated at the center of several geocultural basins,
such as the Middle East, Balkans, and Central Asia, as was the Ottoman
Empire. The prime goal for Turkey is to engage in active diplomacy through-
out the region, to achieve a positive shift through the exercise of soft power,
and, consequently, to enhance its political and social legitimacy. The depth
that was created and maintained by the Ottoman Empire may be leveraged to
enhance Turkey’s regional reach and strength.30
Davutoglu has criticized the nature of the foreign policy pursued dur-
ing and after the Cold War for its tendency to exclude Islamic identity and
the Ottoman past from the policy creation process and to base itself to a
large extent on orientalism. 31 The new Turkish foreign policy is rooted in
an extreme pragmatism that views the factor of religion (Islam) as one of
its frames of reference, capable of embracing the multiculturalism that was
exhibited by the Ottoman order, and, where necessary, emphasizes Turkish
identity. Allusions to Ottoman geography and the culture of coexistence bear
testament to the abandonment of geographical determinism and an approach
to security predicated on the Treaty of Sèvres.32 The basic goals of the Turk-
ish foreign minister’s approach are to place Turkey at the nexus of a series
of geopolitical interconnections in which different geographical realities are
interlocked and to foster relationships within the context of political, eco-
nomic, and social cooperation between Western and Eastern civilizations.
Strategic Depth is a project whose goal is, as Davutoglu puts it, to transform
Turkey from being a “peripheral country” to being a “central country.”33 Tur-
key’s new foreign policy attaches weight to certain matters of both internal
and external political significance. The first of these is the desire to rid the

29. Begum Burak, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: To Guard Whom from What?”
European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 4, no. 1 (2011): 161 – 5.
30. Onar, 12; Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,”
Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 6 (2006): 945 – 64.
31. Ahmet Davutoglu, “Medeniyetler Arasi Etkilesim ve Osmanli Sentezi,” in C. Cakir, Osmanli
Medeniyeti: Siyaset, Iktisat, Sanat (Istanbul: Klasik Yayinlari, 2005).
32. On this point, see Gulnur Aybet, “Turkey and the EU after the First Year of Negotiations:
Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (2006): 543 – 4;
Pinar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization,” European
Journal of Political Research 44 (2005): 175 – 201.
33. Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey
10, no. 1 (2008): 77 – 96.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 95

country of societal division based on identity and to remove the constraints

imposed by Turkish identity in an ethnic sense. Particularly in the context of
the Kurdish problem, the government has shown a willingness to entertain
constitutional and administrative change and reform.34 The attempt to ensure
the multicultural and innovative spirit that imbues foreign policy also finds
particular reflection in the proposed new constitution.
A second important matter is the foreign minister’s strategy of “zero prob-
lems with neighbors,” which is the subject of lengthy debate and may be
feasible only as an ideal. This position takes its place, along with multidi-
mensionalism and rhythmic diplomacy, 35 as one of the main planks of the
new Turkish foreign policy.
The Arab Spring resulted in major changes in Turkey’s attitude to the
Middle East and also to the view of Turkey held by Middle Eastern popula-
tions. In this connection, the Syrian crisis has been critical because Syria was
the most visible actor in terms of Turkey’s altered foreign policy approach to
the Middle East. Turkey’s relations with Syria had been the very model of the
traditional approach of zero problems with neighbors. When events started
to develop in Syria within the context of the Arab Spring, Turkey’s adoption
of a position of support for those who opposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad
signaled a significant transformation. The overwhelming majority of the oppo-
sition in Syria to whom Turkey was providing support were Sunni. The fact
that Assad is Nusayri (that is, Alevi or Alawite) and also that the regime is
supported by Iran made it look as though Turkey’s Middle East strategy was
to support only members of the Sunni sect. The Arab Spring and the Syrian
crisis thus made it appear that Turkish foreign policy was taking a factional
line, and this has resulted in a deterioration in Turkey’s relations not only with
Syria but also with Iran and the central authority in Iraq. The same goes for
relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon. For Turkey today, “zero problems with
neighbors” no longer applies, particularly in the Middle East.36

34. Ensaroglu.
35. The strategy of assessing conjointly the factors of harmony and movement in diplomacy has
been named rhythmic diplomacy by Davutoglu. For more information, see Ahmet Sozen, “A Para-
digm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010):
103 – 23.
36. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “What Went Wrong with the Zero Problem with Neighbors Doctrine?”
Turkish Policy Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2012): 85 – 93.
96 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

The fact that Turkey makes common cause with Sunni actors, as has been
seen in the Syrian crisis, has also had repercussions within Turkish society
itself. The relationship between the government and the Alawite population
in particular has deteriorated, and this lack of trust has made itself felt in a
number of issues. There is considerable tension between the Alawite com-
munity in Turkey and the AKP, as may be seen from the arguments about
the recent naming of the third bridge across the Bosporus and the protests at
Gezi Park.37 The proposal was to name the bridge after Sultan Yavuz Selim,
responsible for widespread massacres of Alawites in the sixteenth century.
The bloody Syria-related terrorist actions in cities on Turkey’s border with
Syria have precipitated criticism of the Turkish government from a significant
proportion of the Turkish population, who fear that Turkey is being drawn
into the Syrian quagmire.38
A third and final important point is the effort to enhance Turkey’s geo-
economic strength and influence and turn Turkey into a regional financial,
commercial, and energy hub. Neo-Ottomanism’s economic dimension con-
sists of interconnecting the Middle East and Europe through the commerce,
transport, and energy projects; developing economic relations with Russia;
and developing manufacturing capabilities that will meet the needs of neigh-
bors. The commercial trade volumes currently attained and the steady devel-
opment of economic relations between Turkey and Russia bear witness to
the geoeconomic efficacy of efforts to turn Istanbul into a financial center of
Eurasia as a whole, as evidenced by the Borsa Istanbul initiative and energy
projects such as NABUCCO, Trans-Anatolia, and South Flow, in which Tur-
key is involved.

37. Merve B. Ozturk, “Controversy over Bridge’s Name,” Today’s Zaman, 31 May 2013, www
.todayszaman.com/columnists/merve-busra-ozturk_317002-controversy-over-bridges-name.html;
Tarik Oguzlu, “The Gezi Park Protest and Its Impact on Turkey’s Soft Power Abroad,” Ortadogu
Analiz 5, no. 55 (2013): 10 – 5.
38. Oytun Orhan, “Reyhanli Saldirisi ve Turkiye’nin Suriye Ikilemi,” Ortadogu Analiz 5, no. 54
(2013): 10 – 6.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 97

The Relationship between Neo-Ottomanism

and Turkish Eurasianism

Neo-Ottomanism bears a striking resemblance in terms of geographical

scope and political aim to Turkish Eurasianism. The goal is to melt into a
single pot the regions governed during the Ottoman period (areas such as
Central Asia and the Caucasus region), with which closeness could be forged
on the basis of Turkish identity, and to transform Turkey into a regional cen-
ter that would court the attention of the peoples of Eurasia.39 In the process,
an agreement based on mutual interest would be brokered with Eurasia’s
dominant power, Russia, thus circumventing the potential of conflict with
Russia.40
The steps that Ozal took and wished to take in the 1980s and early 1990s
were informed by his notion of Turkish Eurasianism, rooted in the endeavor
to reorganize Turkey internally and externally and bring the country into line
with the systemic realities of the post – Cold War period. The discourse of
a “Turkish World stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”
demonstrates that Turkish Eurasianism perceived its borders to be those
of Eurasia as a whole. Demirel, who succeeded to the Turkish presidency
following Ozal’s death, attempted to continue the Eurasianist foreign policy
strategy of endeavoring to foster closeness in diplomatic, political, cultural,
and economic terms. Generally speaking, Turkish Eurasianism, which found
institutional form in the media (such as TRT Eurasia radio, Eurasian File,
and the newspaper Zaman), education (the Turkish schools opened in Central
Asia and the Balkans), and economic and technical assistance bodies (Turk-
ish Cooperation and Development Agency), encountered a stark dilemma in
its early stages. It revolved around the framework within which Turkey would
conduct its opening to the whole of Eurasia. Indeed, in the initial stages of
Turkish Eurasianism, much greater emphasis had been placed on former
Ottoman territories rather than on ethnic identity. The second half of the
1990s witnessed the shift toward an approach in which “Turkish” identity
came to the fore and the Turkic republics of Central Asia were targeted to a

39. I. P. Khosla, “Turkey: The Search for a Role,” Strategic Analysis 25, no. 3 (2001): 343 – 69.
40. Emel Akcali and Mehmet Perincek, “Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Dis-
course in Turkey,” Geopolitics 14 (2009): 550 – 69.
98 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

greater extent. The discourse adopted reduced the scope and social legiti-
macy of Turkish Eurasianism.
In Turkey, the attempt was made to cast the notion of Eurasianism in three
different political-ideological molds. One of these that demands consideration
is the socialist Eurasianism represented by the Workers Party (ISCI Partisi,
or IP). In this configuration, Russia and China are considered to be the two
main actors in Eurasian space, and the creation of an anti-Western alliance
is the main goal. This wing, whose ideas deviate little from those of Dugin,
has been dubbed as Dugin’s Turkish branch by a number of analysts. The
second dominant thread within Turkish Eurasianism is the approach champi-
oned by parties and groups inspired by Turkish nationalism. This approach,
which places the Eurasianist movement within the context of Turkish nation-
alism, considers Russia and China to be actors who must be combated along
the Eurasian axis.41
The third interpretation that strives to weave itself into the fabric of Turk-
ish Eurasianism is the approach advanced by the conservative wing that has
focused its cooperation with the Muslim peoples in former Ottoman territo-
ries. This thread asserts that the notion of Eurasia expresses the Ottoman
world within its broadest boundaries and, thus, that the neo-Ottomanist strat-
egy to be pursued within the geographic space that is Eurasia is the most
important course of action that will underline Turkey’s role as a regional
leader.42 In this manner, clear reference is made to the mutual complementa-
riness of Turkish Eurasianism and neo-Ottomanism.
Turkish foreign policy, rooted within the concept of Strategic Depth, must
be interpreted within the context of the conservative approach to Turkish
Eurasianism that makes reference to Ottoman territories. Davutoglu did not
use the term Turkish Eurasianism to describe the current direction of Turk-
ish foreign policy. We know that Davutoglu does not accept the term neo-
Ottomanism either, but this is related to the pragmatism which is integral to
his foreign policy strategy. At the heart of the Strategic Depth approach there
is an understanding that Turkey might be able to adopt a position of regional
leadership within Afro-Eurasia and become a bridge between the civiliza-

41. Emre Ersen, “Turk Dis Politikasinda Avrasya Yonelimi ve Sanghay Isbirligi Orgutu,” Ortadogu
Analiz 5, no. 52 (2013): 14 – 23.
42. Ibid., 16 – 7.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 99

tions. (The term Afro-Eurasia refers to former Ottoman territories such as the
Middle East and North Africa taken in conjunction with the Eurasian land-
mass.)43 Davutoglu does not define current foreign policy within a framework
of Eurasianism or Turkish Eurasianism. One important reason for this is that
Eurasianism is an imperial interpretation, one that is identified with Russia.
Turkey, heir to the Ottoman state, has to demonstrate that it is not pursu-
ing any kind of Afro-Eurasian-centered imperial project. Another important
reason is that the term Turkish Eurasianism suggests a political discourse
based on “Turkish” identity, which is narrow in social terms. Since Turkey
aims to create a regional cooperation that is independent of identities within
an Afro-Eurasian context, and hopes to be a leader within that initiative, it is
well aware that it cannot adopt any ethnic interpretation in the form of Turk-
ish Eurasianism, an exclusive and narrowly conditioned term. That is to say,
Strategic Depth is a composite of both the Ottomanist and Eurasianism cur-
rents. An Afro-Eurasian discourse may be viewed as an attempt to link Otto-
man geography to Turkish Eurasianist thought. To this extent, it represents a
more conservative interpretation of Eurasianism.
Turkey’s new foreign policy can also be considered a “geopolitical
approach based on civilization,” in view of the emphasis that it attaches to
Ottoman heritage and Islamic civilization.44 The seeming inability of Turkey
to overcome the problems it experiences with Israel and Armenia points to
an effort on the part of Turkey to exclude from its definition of Eurasia those
countries that defy categorization in terms of being fellow Muslims and the
Ottoman heritage. This is apparent even in the face of the political legitimacy
that Turkey has gained among the peoples of the Middle East and North
Africa.
It is clear that the notion of Eurasia and Turkish Eurasianism underwent
serious change in terms of definition and scope over the past decade. Tur-
key’s new foreign policy, which has embraced the conservative interpretation
of Turkish Eurasianism, has, through its references to Ottoman heritage and
Islamic civilization, made Turkey a bridge between the Western and Islamic
civilizations. Turkey’s role in the Alliance of Civilizations Project has made

43. Ertan Efegil, “Rationality Question of Turkey’s Central Asia Policy,” Bilgi Dergi 19, no. 2
(2009): 72 – 92.
44. Ersen, “Turk Dis Politikasinda,” 16 – 17.
100 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

Turkish Eurasianism into a civilization-based geopolitical approach. How-

ever, it must be noted that Turkey’s new foreign policy is rooted in pragma-
tism,45 and, in defining itself with reference to Ottoman heritage and Islamic
civilization, it also uses Turkish identity as an important frame of reference
in places where Turkish identity merits reference, such as in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
Turkey’s current foreign policy may make reference to Eurasianist ideas
through the term Afro-Eurasia, but the Eurasian vision intrinsic to Strategic
Depth and Eurasian doctrine as understood in Russia are quite distinct. Eur-
asianist doctrine is, generally speaking, understood to be an imperial term
associated with Russia. Eurasianism states that Russia must encompass the
whole of Eurasia in political terms. That is to say, Eurasianism as a doctrine
is an imperial strategy based on Russian identity and political leadership.46
Dugin refers to the combative character of Russian Eurasianism, pointing out
that any Eurasian civilization under Russian leadership is bound to be in con-
flict with the Atlantic civilization and China. Moreover, the doctrine of Eur-
asianism aims to make the former Soviet populations within the geography
of Eurasia adjuncts of Russia, by force and pressure if necessary. Strategic
Depth, in contrast, is a vision which, by prioritizing the opportunity to exploit
the economic and commercial potential of Afro-Eurasia, hopes to raise Turkey
to a position that will make it a regional focal center for populations in the geo-
graphical region. Another aim of this vision is to make Turkey a diplomatic,
political, sociocultural, and commercial bridge between the Western and Mus-
lim civilizations. The Turkish Eurasianism that lies behind Strategic Depth is
not based on the creation of an identity, as is the case in Russian Eurasianism;
does not attempt to apply force or pressure to the populations of Afro-Eurasia;
and does not seek, competition with Western civilization but rather seeks
cooperation in every field. It is not a political creation that seeks to impose
monolithic uniformity. The Eurasianism constructed on Russian identity is not
the Eurasianism that Davutoglu envisages, and it is for this reason, of course,
that Davutoglu avoids using the template of Turkish Eurasianism.

45. Tarik Oguzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate From
the West?” Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (2008): 3 – 20.
46. G. Smith, “The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift, and the New Eurasianism,”
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24, no. 4 (1999): 481 – 94.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 101

The Eurasianist vision intrinsic to the Strategic Depth approach is quite

different from the interpretations based on socialist identity of the IP or based
on Turkish ethnicity emerging from nationalist circles. Turkey, which rejects
socialism in favor of commercial and economic cooperation on a free market
basis, aims to set economic operations between Afro-Eurasia and the West
on a more sound footing. Strategic Depth does not seek to assert any Turkish
identity-based political dominance over the Eurasian landscape. The Eur-
asianism adopted by the IP includes an opposition to the West based on alli-
ance with Russia and China, while Davutoglu’s interpretation would increase
cooperation between civilizations and is an initiative that gives Turkey a
role as a bridge between Western and Muslim civilizations. Turkey’s goal of
EU membership will crown this cooperation as a vital and significant step
toward the principal objective of making Turkey a genuine bridge between
civilizations.
Neo-Ottomanism assigns Turkey a leading role within the Eurasian para-
digm. Turkey structures the neo-Ottoman conception with the aim of fos-
tering sound communication and cooperation between Western and Eastern
civilizations. Turkey is thus set to acquire the position of a bridge between
the Euro-Atlantic world and Islamic civilization.47
Neo-Ottomanism does not harbor an expansionist or imperialist vision of
foreign policy, as may be ascribed to Russian Eurasianism. It can also be
noted that this doctrine equally diverges from the notion of an Islamic union,
such as what Necmettin Erbakan attempted to construct with countries such
as Indonesia, Iran, Libya, and Malaysia in the 1990s.48 Turkish Eurasianism
as propounded by Davutoglu aims to fill a gap and overcome misunderstand-
ing between the countries and communities in Eurasia, particularly those
that may be placed within Islamic and Western civilizations, and so to dis-
prove Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis.49 One of the most
important characteristics of Turkey’s new foreign policy is the way it envis-
ages giving free reign to the expression of the plurality of social identities that

47. Ersen, “Turk Dis Politikasinda,” 16 – 7.

48. Omer Taspinar, “Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria,” Washington Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012):
127 – 40.
49. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
Touchstone, 1997).
102 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

Turkey has nurtured. It should be noted in this context that this policy has
imbued geographic space with the same kind of meaning as Eurasianism in
Russia and, particularly, has assigned to the former Ottoman territories the
function of an overarching identity. Turkish Eurasianism (neo-Ottomanism)
gives expression to Turkey in terms of a plurality of identities such as West-
ern, Turkish, Muslim, Kurdish, Eurasian, and secular. Turkey is thus trans-
formed into an overarching roof that accommodates, protects, and assists
in the development of all these identities. The ethnic dimension of Turkish
identity is consequently relegated to a subordinate position, and Turkishness
finds expression as a multidimensional cultural construct. However, this must
not be construed to mean that no further significance is attached to Turkish
identity in ethnic terms. Events such as the Turkish Olympics (an interna-
tional competition in Turkish language) organized in Turkey, efforts to pro-
tect historic monuments that testify to Turkish identity in Central Asia, and
the Turkic-Language-Speaking Countries Summit are all initiatives that bear
testament to the new Turkish foreign policy’s pragmatic leanings.50
The new foreign policy strategy of Turkey is also beneficial to the United
States and Russia, which have stood on opposite sides of many issues within
the international system.51 Yet even if these two actors have managed to find
common ground on very important matters relating to the system as a whole,
there is a perceptible strategy of escalation centered on Eurasia, even if
behind the scenes. However, Turkey’s presence and the Eurasianist foreign
policy strategy that it pursues oblige both actors to work together with Turkey.
Turkish foreign policy, thanks to the social and regional legitimacy that it
has acquired, opens up a space that can be used by the Western actors. The
same situation can be applied to Russia’s Black Sea and Central Asia poli-
cies. Even if Russia has not forged effective cooperation with Turkey as part
of its near abroad, it prefers to enhance the regional clout of Turkey, which
wishes to engage in strategic cooperation with Russia, rather than see the EU
or United States impose a direct influence in Eurasia. Russia compares Tur-
key to France, which belonged to the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the Cold War

50. Nadir Devlet, “Taking Stock: Turkey and the Turkic World 20 Years Later,” GMF Analysis
(Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, 2011).
51. Thomas Ambrosio, “Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity: A Response to US Foreign Policy in the
Post–Cold War Era,” European Security 10, no. 1 (2001): 45 – 67.
 Tüysüzoğlu: Strategic Depth 103

period but withdrew from NATO’s military wing and opted for an indepen-
dent foreign policy strategy within the alliance. Indeed, some analysts argue
that, in the long run, Turkey will follow France’s suit.52
The upgrading of Turkish-Russian relations to the level of strategic coop-
eration, thanks to the economic, energy-based, and political relations that
Turkey has developed with Russia, points to neo-Ottomanism’s comprehen-
sive and cooperative approach with reference to Eurasia.53 Turkish Eurasian-
ism is a civilization-based geopolitical initiative rooted in the endeavor to join
Eurasian space through a regional initiative that attempts to foster integration
with reference to the Ottoman order and on the basis of political, social, and
economic cooperation. Turkey’s position as a model country that serves as an
example for the conflict-ridden Middle East, and the appearance of Turkey as
a problem-solving actor with reference to the issues marring relations among
the Balkan communities, point to the efficacy of such policies. Even the slo-
gan of “Bridge Together” in Turkey’s bid to host the 2020 Olympics bears
testament to the value attached by Turkey’s new foreign policy to cooperation
between civilizations.

Conclusion

The foreign policy strategy put into practice by Davutoglu has been likened
in many respects to Russia’s Eurasianist approach. This policy, as it strives
to open up into neighboring space, joins Turkey with former Ottoman ter-
ritories and strips Turkish identity of its ethnic significance, with the aim of
turning it into an overarching identity that will encompass a multicultural
social structure. The Strategic Depth plan strives to organize Turkey into a
center that will attract the attention in diplomatic, political, cultural, and,
especially, economic terms of the peoples and states situated in the Afro-
Eurasian confluence. This policy can be said to be a civilization-based geo-
political initiative.

52. Omer Taspinar, “The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey,” US-Europe Analysis 50 (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 2011).
53. Emre Iseri, “Eurasian Geopolitics and Financial Crisis: Transforming Russian-Turkish Rela-
tions from Geopolitical Rivalry to Strategic Cooperation,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies 12, no. 2 (2010): 173 – 86.
104 Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2014

Turkey’s new foreign policy, also named neo-Ottomanism on account of

the way that it appears to address all of the former Ottoman territories across
the Afro-Eurasian confluence, can actually be interpreted within the frame-
work of Turkish Eurasianism. However, Turkish Eurasianism in this sense
has nothing to do with the type of mindset that courts conflict and manifests
itself within foreign policy strategies in opposition to Western civilization or
embraces a discourse based on Turkish ethnic identity. Eurasianism as for-
mulated by Davutoglu is an initiative that fosters multiculturalism throughout
Eurasia as a whole and in the former Ottoman territories in particular; that
seeks its justification in terms of shared values, issues, and opportunities
that bring communities together; and that aims to set up cooperation with the
civilizations outside the Afro-Eurasian confluence (particularly Western civi-
lization) in a spirit not of conflict but of shared interest and gain. For Turkey,
which is pursuing accession negotiations with the EU, to at the same time
upgrade its relations with Russia to the level of strategic cooperation bears
witness to the stress laid by Turkish Eurasianism, or neo-Ottomanism, on
multilateral cooperation and attests to Turkey’s pragmatism.