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When Should State Secrets Stay Secret Accountability Democratic Governance and Intelligence Genevieve Lester
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WHEN SHOULD STATE SECRETS STAY
SECRET?
Genevieve Lester
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107616530
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs
for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not
guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
For Carole and Omar
and
In memory of Robert M. Hooven
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments page ix
Abbreviations xi
Bibliography 215
Index 229
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ix
x Acknowledgments
were patient and encouraging, even when the book started to make me
a little crazy.
At Georgetown, Bruce Hoffman provided invaluable support,
guidance, and friendship. Elizabeth Stanley was a kind and persua-
sive proponent of completion. Laura Soerensson and Lauren Covert-
Weber supported me, helped smooth over the edges in the final stages
of the book, and were great happy hour friends. Ellen Noble and Shane
Quinlan helped me pull this project together in innumerable ways.
In long projects such as this there are people one turns to over
and over again for guidance, advice, or just to scream with frustration.
For me, those individuals were Bruce E. Cain and Daniel L. Byman.
I thank them for their patience over the years!
Finally, deepest thanks to Carole, Omar, and Dad.
ABBREVIATIONS
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COINTELPRO Counterintelligence Program (FBI)
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
D/CIA Director, CIA (post–advent of Director of
National Intelligence)
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DI Directorate of Intelligence
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DO Directorate of Operations
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
FISCR Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
HUMINT human intelligence
IC intelligence community
IG Inspector General
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
NCS National Clandestine Service
NSA National Security Agency
xi
xii Abbreviations
For decades Congress and the courts as well as the press and the
public have accepted the notion that the control of intelligence
activities was the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Executive and
his surrogates. The exercise of this power was not questioned or
even inquired into by outsiders. Indeed, at times the power was
seen as flowing not from the law, but as inherent in the Presidency.
Whatever the theory, the fact was that intelligence activities were
essentially exempted from the normal system of checks and
balances.1
This quotation from the final report of the Church Committee – the
Senate committee created in 1975 to investigate intelligence abuses
– is indicative of the complex position that intelligence continues to
hold in the American democracy. Intelligence comes laden with fic-
tion, myths, and mysteries, as befits its unique status in the government
and in the public mind. Intelligence activities exacerbate the informa-
tion asymmetry issues inherent in representative government. The
nature of the secret and technical work creates a unique culture distant
from the regulatory mechanisms of conventional democratic gover-
nance. The problem of overcoming this information asymmetry is the
core of accountability and oversight. Mechanisms have developed over
several decades to rebalance this relationship and have had varying
degrees of success. Total equilibrium, of course, between intelligence
1
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, Final Report of the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (Church Committee) United States Senate, Section IV. Conclusions and
Recommendations, April 26, 1976, section (a).
1
2 When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
actors and overseers will never be achieved due to the nature of the
work, its inherent secrecy, and the traditional executive ownership and
control of it.
In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a contractor working for the National
Security Agency (NSA), leaked a trove of classified documents to which
his position gave him access. The leaked documents outlined a range
of programs in which the NSA had been engaged that were aimed at
the domestic public. The stories first published in the British newspaper
The Guardian told readers about massive programs that collected bulk
metadata and Internet communications within the United States. Further
reports described how the NSA was wiretapping the phones of foreign
leaders and that gag orders were placed on companies ordered to provide
the information. The response among both the public and, outwardly at
least, policy makers was deep shock. Even many who had been aware of
the nature of the programs were surprised at the breadth and depth of the
NSA’s activities. One of the outcomes of Snowden’s leaks was a demand
for the NSA to be reined in and for increased oversight to be put in place
to monitor its activities. Legislators argued over new proposals to change
legislation governing the NSA’s activities, and the director of National
Intelligence (DNI) was pressured to release court decisions regarding
domestic intelligence collection. Subsequently, heavily redacted decisions
issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were released to
the public. While a good faith – and unprecedented – effort on the part
of the administration was made to increase transparency, the results were
inconclusive for outsiders trying to understand the extent of domestic
surveillance for the first time.
To take another example of recent events regarding intelligence
that have captured the public eye, in March 2014 Senator Dianne
Feinstein, chair of the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence, con-
fronted Director of the CIA John Brennan about several incidents
related to the committee’s report on enhanced interrogation techniques
(EITs). At root, the controversy surrounded the CIA Detention and
Interrogation Program, a program that emerged quickly in the after-
math of the attacks on 9/11 and used techniques such as waterboard-
ing, shackling, stress positions, and culture-based humiliation in order
to extract information from suspects. The program itself pressed the
boundaries of prior post-Watergate CIA responsibilities, including
An Analytical Approach 3
2
Feinstein Statement on CIA Detention, Interrogation Report, December 13, 2012,
available at www.feinstein.senate.gov/.
3
See John Rizzo, Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA ( New
York : Scribner, 2014), for a discussion of these issues.
4
Interview with Charles E. Allen, February 4, 2010.
5
Interview with General Michael Hayden, April 7, 2010. General Hayden demon-
strated one technique – walling – on himself to convince me that the methods were not
egregious.
4 When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
On the other side of the debate, critics argue that torture “degrades
a society.”6 Some assert that it is operationally ineffective, although this
again is a controversial claim, with senior CIA officials arguing that
the program was an “irreplaceable tool” for the purposes of counter-
terrorism.7 This is, of course, a line of argument that is impossible to
verify one way or the other. Others have more recently defended the
program by stating that information elicited from detainees led to the
eventual killing of Osama bin Laden. The methods used, as described
by former detainees in journalistic accounts, break international law,
violate human rights, and previously would have been considered war
crimes.8 Internally, CIA officers were concerned about the legality of
the program and were anxious lest they be held personally liable for
actions conducted according to its mandates. This extended to tapes
recording the procedures, all of which were destroyed to protect the
identities of the CIA officers involved in the interrogations.9
First, while there are ranging opinions on the value of the infor-
mation gathered from the detainees, it is certain that these activities
not only stretched the mission of the CIA but were also conducted
with minimal accountability. Few within the intelligence community
knew about the program or the locations of the sites, and even fewer
still know exactly what occurred in these locations. In terms of man-
dated reporting to oversight mechanisms, there are many questions
regarding how the program was reported to Congress. For example,
there remains ambiguity as to whether the interrogation techniques
were included in the original finding; second, there are concerns that
the program was briefed to a limited number of individuals; and third,
6
Richard A. Posner, “Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation,” in Torture: A Collection, ed.
Sanford Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 292 .
7
Jane Mayer, “The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the CIA’s Secret Interrogation
Program,” available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/08/13/070813fa_
fact_mayer?currentPage=all (as of January 24, 2012).
8
According to Mayer, soldiers were court-martialed for waterboarding until as recently
as the Vietnam War.
9
See Rizzo, Company Man, for a discussion of the inception of the programs as well as the
furor surrounding the destruction of the tapes. See Jose Rodriguez, Jr., and Bill Harlow,
Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions after 9/11 Saved American Lives ( New York:
Threshold, 2013) for a self-exculpatory explanation of the use of the techniques as well
as the destruction of the tapes cataloging their use.
16 When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
Autonomy