A MODIFICATION O F T H E T H E O R Y O F T Y P E S

I T will be remembered that in Russell's Theory of Types (1) ex-

pressions like "All propositions are false," if understood to be
about the totality of propositions, apply to themselves and land in
a vicious circle—they are constituents of their own constituents,
which means that these expressions only parade as propositions, but
in reality have no significance; (2) the same expressions form gen-
uine propositions when interpreted as being about a restricted to-
tality and as being of a higher order or type than any proposition be-
longing to the restricted totality; (3) the conception of restricted

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totalities leads to the conclusion that there is no such thing as the
totality of all propositions; and (4) the collections of functions and
classes are likewise "illegitimate totalities."
There is one feature in this theory which does not satisfy me,
the assertion that the paradoxes violating "the vicious-circle prin-
ciple" are insignificant expressions. If they were insignificant, they
should not strike one as being paradoxical; and I, for one, believe
that I understand what they are about even when they claim self-
application. As an alternative to Russell's solution I suggest that
they are significant and yet do not lead to contradiction or infinite
regress, because they are not propositions but propositional functions.
A propositional function is an incomplete proposition, i.e., an ex-
pression containing a "blank space" (a variable), which when proper-
ly filled up yields a proposition. Now an expression applying to itself
certainly suffers from incurable incompleteness. For it cannot be
completely understood unless all its constituents are well defined, but
this cannot be achieved because one of the constituents is defined in
terms of the whole expression. Thus the paradoxes in question are
peculiar propositional functions which do not denote any proposition.
To specify this consideration take as an example the simplest
form of logical paradoxes, the expression "This proposition is
false." One may try the use of symbols in its formulation. 'Let p
be the name of a proposition, and let the proposition of which it is
the name be "p is false," so that we can write
p : p is false'.1
1C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, p. 439.
148 T H E MONIST

But the symbolizing conventions just quoted obviously cannot be

satisfied. For if the symbol p were a name of a proposition, it would
not name "p is false," which expression, whatever it is, is not a
proposition. Besides, according to the syntactical significance of p
it is not a name but a variable (of which the values, if any, are
propositions). Hence "p is false" as containing a variable must be
a propositional function and cannot be assigned to p as its value,
which means that the expression does not involve either contradic-
tion or infinite regress. The symbolizing conventions fail because
of the misinterpretation of the word "this" in the expression "this

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proposition is false." If "this" were always used as a name of a
particular, the symbol for "this proposition" should name a proposi-
tion. But the expression concerned is a case in point where the word
"this" is short for a definite description, which will be seen from the
following rendering of "this proposition is false": "x is false and
the value of x is the proposition which results from qualifying x as
false." Of course, the underlined definite description does not de-
scribe anything, yet the whole expression containing it is a signi-
ficant propositional function.2 The source of the paradox is its mis-
leading brief form, which is almost inevitably taken for a proposi-
tion. 3
The paradoxes about totalities of propositions can now be easily
dealt with by the method of partial reduction to the simplest form.
For example, Epimenides' statement that "All Cretan statements are
false," if meant to have self-application may be interpreted thus:
"This Cretan proposition is false and all other Cretan proposi-
tions are false," a compound expression containing a propositional
function of the form "this proposition is false" and a proposition
"all (other) Cretan propositions are false," which might conceiv-
20ne might think that this propositional function yields false propositions,
if one takes the expression about the value of x (following the word "and")
to be a false proposition. But the expression is rather a convention restrict-
ing the significance of x, so that the whole function is a command which can-
not be executed:
"Let the value of x in 'x is false' be the proposition etc."
It is possible, however, that a vain command should be expressible as a
function giving false propositions.
3The form "this proposition is true," though it does not strike one as
paradoxical, would also lead to infinite regress, if it were a proposition. But
if it were a proposition it should not lead to infinite regress, because any
proposition is equivalent to the assertion of its truth and the substitution of
one equivalent form for the other should not result in any alteration. Cf.
W. E. Johnson, Logic, VI, p. 52.
 DISCUSSION 149

ably be either true or false.4 The whole compound is, of course, a

propositional function. Other such familiar paradoxes as "All
propositions are false," "All rules have exceptions," etc. are solved
in the same manner.
There are left some expressions concerning totalities of proposi-
tions which appear to have self-application without an air of para-
dox. I may give as only one illustration the sentence, "All proposi-
tions are either true or false." Interpreted in extension this sen-
tence must be expressed in a kind of propositional function familiar

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by now, viz., "this proposition is either true or false and all other
propositions are either true or false." If "all propositions are either
true or false" is invariably used as a true proposition it is because
the sentence has another meaning, which is the one in the mind of
the user, namely, "the condition of being a proposition is the capac-
ity for being true or false," or, as a universal proposition in inten-
sion "it is false that there could be a proposition which is neither
true nor false." Since this proposition is about the possibility of
propositions and not about their actuality, it does not mean to be
about itself directly; but being an actual proposition it must be pos-
sible and thus, indirectly satisfying the condition of possibility, it
must be either true or false. This interpretation shows that there
is no reason for denying the existence of a totality of propositions.
Accordingly the theory of "illegitimate totalities" must be restricted
to classes and functions.
A. USHENKO.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

*The word "other" is put in brackets because it is conceivable that since

Epimenides' statement is not a proposition, all other Cretan propositions form
the totality of Cretan propositions.