MEMORANDUM May 1, 2024

Subject: Democracy, Political Rights, and Freedom of Expression in Brazil

From: Peter J. Meyer, Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs, pmeyer@crs.loc.gov,
7-5474
This memorandum was prepared to enable distribution to more than one congressional office.

This memorandum provides background on democracy, political rights, and freedom of expression in
Brazil, as well as the Biden Administration’s engagement with Brazil on such matters.

Democracy and Political Rights in Brazil

Brazil’s 1988 constitution establishes a democratic republic with power divided among three branches of
government: an executive branch led by a president with extensive policymaking authority; a legislative
branch consisting of the 513-member Chamber of Deputies and the 81-member Senate; and an
independent judicial branch with the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or STF) serving
as the highest judicial body. Under Brazil’s federal structure, the national government shares authority
with 26 states, a federal district, and some 5,570 municipalities.
Organizations that attempt to track respect for democracy globally generally recognize Brazil’s
democracy for its competitive elections and political pluralism but identify some shortcomings.1 Freedom
House, a nongovernmental democracy and human rights advocacy organization, classifies Brazil as “free”
based on the country’s respect for political rights and civil liberties. The organization notes several
ongoing challenges in Brazil, however, including political violence, endemic corruption, and threats faced
by independent journalists and civil society activists.2 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy
Index—another frequently-cited assessment of democracy—classifies Brazil as a “flawed democracy.”
Among the five categories included in EIU’s overall classification, Brazil scores highest for “electoral
process and pluralism” and lowest for “political culture,” in part due to political polarization.3
As Brazilian society has grown increasingly polarized over the past decade, Brazilians of differing
political ideologies have diverged in their confidence in Brazil’s democratic institutions and in their
perceptions of threats to Brazilians’ political rights and civil liberties. President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-
2022), a right-wing populist, repeatedly questioned the integrity of Brazil’s electoral system in the lead-up

1 For a discussion of efforts to measure democracy, see CRS Report R45344, Global Trends in Democracy: Background, U.S.
Policy, and Issues for Congress, by Michael A. Weber.
2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil, February 29, 2024.

3 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2023: Age of Conflict, February 15, 2024.

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to the country’s October 2022 presidential election.4 Although international observers and Brazilian
politicians from across the political spectrum recognized the official results declaring Luiz Inácio Lula Da
Silva (Lula) the winner of the election, Bolsonaro did not publicly concede defeat.5 Some Bolsonaro
supporters set up camps outside Brazilian military barracks calling for the armed forces to intervene to
prevent Lula and his left-of-center Workers’ Party from taking power; three such supporters were
convicted of planting a bomb in a fuel truck near Brasília’s airport in an attempt to provoke military
action.6 On January 8, 2023, a week after President Lula’s inauguration, thousands of Bolsonaro
supporters stormed Brazil’s congress, supreme court, and presidential palace, occupying and vandalizing
the mostly vacant buildings for several hours until security forces regained control.
Brazilian authorities swiftly and forcefully responded to the events of January 8. By January 9, Brazilian
police had detained 2,170 individuals. Brazil’s Office of the Attorney General (Procuradoria-Geral da
República or PGR) ultimately charged 1,354 of those individuals with crimes including violent
subversion of the democratic rule of law, staging a coup, criminal association, and damage to public
property. Brazil’s STF granted provisional release to most of those individuals by March 2023; however,
283 remained in pretrial detention in June 2023 and 66 remained in pretrial detention in January 2024.7 As
of April 16, 2024, Brazil’s STF had convicted 196 individuals involved in the events of January 8,
sentencing them to between three and 17 years in prison.8 STF Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who the STF
appointed as the rapporteur9 for the January 8 investigations, suspended the majority of the remaining
cases (1,113) in August 2023 to allow prosecutors to consider negotiating non-prosecution agreements
with defendants facing lesser charges. As of April 29, 2024, Moraes had approved 172 such agreements,
in which defendants admitted their crimes and agreed to comply with certain other legal conditions in
exchange for lesser penalties such as fines or community service.10
The Brazilian Federal Police and PGR continue to investigate those who participated in, financed, and
organized the events of January 8 as well as other alleged anti-democratic activities. In January 2024, for
example, Brazil’s Federal Police executed search and seizure warrants against Carlos Jordy, a legislator
from Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (Partido Liberal or PL) and head of the political opposition in Brazil’s
Chamber of Deputies, for alleged links to the events of January 8, 2023.11
On February 8, 2024, the Federal Police launched an operation to investigate a “criminal organization”
allegedly involved in an “attempted coup d’état and the abolition of the democratic rule of law” to keep
then-President Bolsonaro in power.12 The court order authorizing the operation, signed by Justice Moraes,
asserts that those involved in the alleged criminal group engaged in activities to discredit the elections,

4 See, for example, Jack Nicas, Flávia Milhorance, and Ana Ionova, “How Bolsonaro Built the Myth of Stolen Elections in
Brazil,” New York Times, October 25, 2022.
5 See, for example, Organization of American States, “OAS Electoral Observation Mission Presents its Preliminary Report

Following the Second Round of the Elections in Brazil,” November 1, 2022; and Tom Phillips, “Bolsonaro Remains Silent After
Election Defeat to Lula as Key Allies Accept Result,” Guardian, October 31, 2022.
6 “Brazil: Pro-Military-Coup Protests Intensify,” Latin News Daily, November 16, 2022; and Tribunal de Justiça do Distrito

Federal e dos Territórios, “Justiça Condena Mais um Envolvido no Caso da Bomba Próxima ao Aeroporto de Brasília,” August
17, 2023.
7 Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), “8 de Janeiro: A Resposta Imediata do STF aos Atos Antidemocráticos,” January 3, 2024.

8 STF, “Supremo Condena Mais Oito Pessoas Pelos Atos Antidemocráticos de 8/1,” April 16, 2024; and Felipe Pontes, “STF

Condena Mais 15 Réus por Atos de 8 de Janeiro,” Agência Brasil, February 21, 2024.
9 Within Brazil’s judicial system, the rapporteur (relator) is charged with directing the judicial process and preparing a report that

summarizes the case and provides an initial opinion and recommendations to the remaining justices.
10 STF, “STF Valida Mais 48 Acordos de Acusados Pelos Atos Antidemocráticos de 8/1,” April 29, 2024; and STF,

“Esclarecimento a Respeito de Eventuais Acordos com Acusados de Incitar Golpe Pelos Atos de 8 de Janeiro,” August 23, 2023.
11 Reuters, “Brazil Police Target Congressman in Raids Part of 2023 Riots Probe,” January 18, 2024.

12 Polícia Federal do Brasil, “Polícia Federal Apura Tentative de Golpe de Estado e Abolição do Estado Democrático de Direito,”

February 8, 2024.
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pressured members of the armed forces to support a coup, and monitored public officials. They also
allegedly drafted a decree that would have authorized the detention of Moraes, who was simultaneously
serving as the head of Brazil’s electoral oversight body (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral or TSE), and the
holding of new presidential elections.13 The police operation included 33 search and seizure operations
and resulted in the arrests of PL president Valdemar Costa Neto; Bolsonaro’s former international affairs
advisor, Filipe Martins; and three military officers. Others targeted by the operation included Bolsonaro’s
2022 running mate, General Walter Braga Netto; former Bolsonaro security advisor, retired general
Augusto Heleno; former justice minister Anderson Torres; former defense minister Paulo Sergio
Nogueira; and former navy commander Almir Garnier Santos.
Although Bolsonaro himself was not subject to a search, the court order required him to surrender his
passport and prohibits him from leaving Brazil.14 In depositions to Brazil’s Federal Police, some former
Brazilian armed forces commanders have stated that Bolsonaro presented them with a coup plan during
the post-election transition period.15 Bolsonaro has dismissed the various allegations against him and
reportedly maintains that he has suffered “relentless persecution” since leaving office.16 His lawyers filed
a petition with the STF to remove Justice Moraes from the case and void his rulings, arguing that Moraes
is biased since he describes himself in the court order as a victim of the alleged plot; STF President Luis
Roberto Barroso denied that request, ruling that the petition lacked a clear legal justification for
removal.17 Bolsonaro and Moraes frequently clashed during Bolsonaro’s presidential term due to a series
of judicial decisions that overturned Bolsonaro administration policies and imposed restrictions on certain
types of digital communications (see “Freedom of Expression in Brazil” below). Bolsonaro is barred from
seeking public office until 2030 due to a June 2023 TSE ruling that some of his efforts to question
Brazil’s electronic voting system amounted to an abuse of power.18
Some Brazilians have supported the post-January 8 investigations and prosecutions as necessary measures
to protect Brazil’s young democracy, which returned to civilian rule in 1985 after two decades of military
dictatorship.19 Others have criticized Brazil’s judicial institutions for allegedly violating Brazilians’
rights.20 Families and attorneys of those charged for involvement in the events of January 8 have
criticized Brazil’s justice sector institutions for various alleged abuses, including excessive and unjustified
use of pretrial detention, generalized accusations that fail to take into consideration individual actions,
lack of access to investigation materials, and poor prison conditions. Some Brazilian public defenders and
legislators have echoed those critiques.21 One January 8 defendant died in pretrial detention in November
2023, several weeks after the PGR reportedly had recommended that Justice Moraes grant the individual

13 STF, Ministro Alexandre de Moraes, Relator, Petição 12.100 Distrito Federal, January 26, 2024.
14 Ibid; and “Police Investigates Bolsonaro, Military Over Alleged Coup Attempt,” Valor International, February 9, 2024.
15 See, for example, Polícia Federal, “Termo de Depoimento Nº 826726/2024,” published by the STF on March 15, 2024.

16 Reuters, “Net Tightens on Bolsonaro as Police Seize Passport in Coup Probe,” February 8, 2024.

17 Agência Brasil, “Barroso Mantém Moraes à Frente de Inquérito Sobre Golpe de Estado,” February 21, 2024.

18 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), “Por Maioria de Votos, TSE Declara Bolsonaro Inelegível por 8 Anos,” June 30, 2023.

19 See, for example, “Brazil: Government Hails Strength of Institutions After Capital Riots,” Latin American Weekly Report,

January 11, 2024.

20 See, for example, “Parlamentares da Oposição Denunciam Violações de Direitos e Liberdades à OEA,” Gazeta do Povo,

November 16, 2023.

21 Mariana Alvim, “8 de Janeiro: As Denúncias e Polêmicas sobre as Prisões dos Envolvidos nos Ataques,” BBC News Brasil,

August 2, 2023.
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provisional release.22 More broadly, some legal analysts argue the STF lacks the legal authority to serve as
the court of original jurisdiction for January 8 cases involving common citizens.23
Polling data suggest Brazilians are split in their views of the events of January 8 and the Brazilian
judiciary’s response. Among those surveyed in a March 2024 poll, 65% asserted that the events of January
8 amounted to acts of vandalism, 30% asserted the events were an attempted coup, and 5% stated they
were unsure.24 The same polling firm found that 63% of respondents expressed opposition to amnesty for
those involved in the events of January 8, 31% expressed support for amnesty, and 6% stated they were
unsure.25 With regard to the STF’s response to the events of January 8, 37% of respondents rated Justice
Moraes’ actions as “good” or “great,” 24% rated them as “regular,” and 33% rated them as “bad” or
“terrible.”26 The poll found significant differences based on respondents’ political views. Whereas 62% of
self-identified Lula voters expressed favorable views of Moraes’ actions, 60% of self-identified Bolsonaro
voters expressed unfavorable views.27

Freedom of Expression in Brazil28

The Brazilian constitution sets forth several principles related to freedom of expression;29 however,
Freedom House asserts that Brazil’s legal framework, which allows the federal government to proscribe
and regulate certain types of speech, “provides inadequate protection for freedom of expression.”30 Libel,
slander, and defamation are criminal offenses, and press rights groups assert that government officials and
private actors have sometimes used judicial processes to intimidate media outlets.31 In 2021, for example,
then-Attorney General Augusto Aras filed a criminal complaint against a university professor who had
criticized him in a newspaper column and a series of social media posts. The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights expressed concerns about the complaint and urged the Brazilian government to “refrain
from using judicial mechanisms that may violate the right to freedom of expression” and foster a “climate
of self-censorship.”32 More recently, press rights groups and some Brazilian legislators have expressed
concerns about a November 2023 STF ruling that subjects media outlets to civil liability for publishing

22 “Bolsonaro Defende Direitos Humanos de Presos do 8/1 Após Tratar Pauta Como ‘Esterco’,” Folha de São Paulo, November
25, 2023.
23 The Brazilian constitution grants the STF original jurisdiction over criminal cases against the president, members of congress,

and certain other high-ranking public officials. The primary justification for the STF presiding over the January 8 cases of
common citizens appears to be that they are connected to other investigations involving such officials. Willington Santos, “A
Incompetência do STF para Julgar Pessoas Comuns pelos Atos de 8 de Janeiro,” Jusbrasil, September 2023; and Patrick Luiz
Martins Freitas Silva, “Competência do STF para Julgar Cidadãos Comuns,” Consultor Jurídico, September 17, 2023.
24 “65% Acham que 8/1 Foi Vandalismo e 30%, Tentativa de Golpe, Mostra Datafolha,” Folha de São Paulo, March 29, 2024.

25 “63% São Contra Anistia a Responsáveis Pelo 8/1, Mostra Datafolha,” Folha de São Paulo, March 29, 2024.

26 “37% Aprovam e 33% Reprovam Trabalho de Moraes no 8/1, Aponta Datafolha,” Folha de São Paulo, March 29, 2024.

27 Ibid.

28 This section focuses specifically on Brazilian government actions related to freedom of expression. Human rights and press

rights organizations have identified other challenges to freedom of expression in Brazil, including harassment and violence from
non-governmental actors.
29 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Articles 5 and 220, available in English, as amended through 2022, at

https://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/legislacaoConstituicao/anexo/brazil_federal_constitution.pdf. For more information, see

Eduardo Soares, “Brazil,” in Civic Space Legal Framework (Law Library of Congress, 2020).
30 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil, February 29, 2024.

31 Reporters Without Borders, “Brazil’s Supreme Court President Asked to Rein in Judicial Harassment of Journalists,” October

20, 2023; and

32 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Offices of Special Rapporteurs Express Concern About the Use of Criminal

Mechanisms for Defamation Against a University Professor in Brazil and Call on the State to Respect Academic Freedom,” May
28, 2021.
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comments from an interviewee that accuse a third party of a crime if there is “concrete evidence” that the
accusation is false and the outlet failed to verify the facts.33
As in many countries, there is ongoing debate in Brazil about whether, and to what extent, government
institutions should respond to the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation in the digital age.
Brazilian policymakers have considered various measures but have yet to enact legislation focused
specifically on the topic. In the absence of a new legislative framework, Brazilian institutions have sought
to combat online misinformation and disinformation using existing laws and regulations. These include
the libel, slander, and defamation laws discussed above; a 2014 law that established certain rights and
obligations related to the internet; and Brazil’s electoral code, which tightly regulates political campaign
activities.34 Freedom House classified Brazil as “partly free” in its Freedom on the Net 2023 report, in
part due to concerns about the “legality, proportionality, and transparency” of Brazil’s content regulation
measures.35
The STF has taken on an increasingly prominent role in regulating online content since March 2019,
when then-President of the STF José Antonio Dias Toffoli opened an investigation into alleged “fake
news” and internet threats targeting the STF, its justices, and their family members. Some legal analysts
questioned the unusual decision to open an investigation that had not been requested by the PGR.
Transparency and press rights advocates quickly condemned the STF for using the investigation to order
an online media outlet to remove a report concerning an STF justice.36
Justice Moraes, designated as the rapporteur for the fake news investigation, has kept the investigation
open for more than five years. He also has opened additional investigations, including inquiries into
“digital militias”—criminal organizations allegedly engaged in digital attacks against democracy and the
rule of law—and other anti-democratic acts. Moraes is serving as the rapporteur for each of these other
inquiries based on the justification that they are connected to the original fake news investigation.37
Moraes has used his broad powers to authorize searches, freeze social media accounts, and order arrests,
among other actions; his unilateral decisions ultimately must be upheld by the full STF. The following
examples are some of the most high-profile and controversial of Moraes’ orders:
• In February 2021, Moraes ordered the arrest of federal deputy Daniel Silveira of the Social
Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal or PSL, Bolsonaro’s former party) for posting a video on
social media in which he threatened STF justices and praised a repressive dictatorship-era
measure. The full STF and Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies upheld Silveira’s pretrial detention.38
• In March 2022, Moraes ordered the suspension of the Telegram messaging application for
repeatedly failing to comply with judicial orders to block accounts allegedly spreading

33 “Brazil: Top Court Sparks Press Freedom Concerns,” Latin News Daily, November 30, 2023; and “Oposição Condena Decisão
do STF Sobre Imprensa: ‘Fere de Morte a Liberdade de Expressão’,” Gazeta do Povo, November 30, 2023.
34 Eduardo Soares, “Brazil,” in Initiatives to Counter Fake News in Selected Countries (Law Library of Congress, 2019).

35 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023: Brazil, October 3, 2023.

36 Eduardo Soares, “Brazil: Federal Supreme Court Orders Criminal Investigation into Fake News Involving the Court,” Law

Library of Congress, April 1, 2019; Transparency International, “(April 2019) Supreme Court Decision in Brazil Violates
Freedom of the Press and Sets Concerning Precedent,” April 17, 2019; and CPJ, “Brazilian Court Orders Online Magazine
Crusoé to Remove Article About Judge,” April 16, 2019.
37
Typically, the STF uses random assignment to determine which justice will serve as the rapporteur in a given case. Mariana
Schreiber, “Excessos? O Que Dizem Juristas Sobre ‘Superpoderes’ de Alexandre de Moraes Contra Golpismo,” BBC News
Brasil, January 31, 2023.
38 STF, “Por Unamidade, Plenário Mantém Prisão em Flagrante do Deputado Federal Daniel Silveira (PSL-RJ),” February 17,

2021; and Fernanda Calgaro, Gustavo Garcia, and Elisa Clavery, “Por 364 Votos a 130, Câmara Decide Manter na Prisão o
Deputado Daniel Silveira,” G1, February 19, 2021.
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disinformation. The suspension reportedly never went into effect and was lifted after Telegram
complied with court orders.39
• In June 2022, Moraes ordered the suspension of the social media accounts of the left-wing
Workers’ Cause Party (Partido da Causa Operária) after it posted a tweet insulting Moraes and
calling for the dissolution of the STF. The accounts reportedly remained suspended through the
2022 elections.40
• In August 2022, Moraes authorized the Federal Police to execute search warrants against eight
businessmen who allegedly discussed a vote-buying scheme and the merits of a coup in a group
chat on WhatsApp.41
• In January 2023, Moraes ordered the suspension of the social media accounts of Nikolas Ferreira,
a YouTube personality and federal deputy-elect affiliated with the PL, for allegedly disseminating
false information. Moraes lifted the suspension two weeks later but fined Telegram for failing to
comply with the original order.42
• Also in January 2023, Moraes ordered the suspension of the social media accounts of Bruno
Monteiro Aiub, a podcast host and social media influencer known as Monark, for allegedly
disseminating false information about Brazil’s elections. Moraes ordered the suspension of
additional accounts linked to Monark in June 2023, and fined the media personality in August
2023 for failing to comply with court orders.43 Monark reportedly moved to the United States in
September 2023, asserting that he was politically persecuted in Brazil and would continue his
podcast from abroad.44
• In April 2024, Moraes announced that he had opened an investigation into Elon Musk, the owner
of the U.S.-based social media company X Corp. (formerly known as Twitter), for obstruction of
justice and other alleged crimes, and added Musk to the STF’s inquiry into digital militias.45
Moraes made the announcement after Musk asserted that X Corp. would not comply with STF
orders to block certain accounts. (See the textbox below, “STF-X Corp. Dispute”).
The TSE also has exercised its authority to combat the spread of information it deems false. In 2021, for
example, it ruled that a state legislator in Paraná affiliated with the PSL had violated electoral laws by
spreading false information about the electronic voting system during a live broadcast on social media,
and removed him from office.46 According to Freedom House, the TSE regularly ordered online content
to be deleted during the 2022 electoral campaign “at the request of both the Lula and Bolsonaro
campaigns.”47 On October 20, 2022, 10 days prior to the presidential runoff election, the TSE issued

39 STF, “Ministro Alexandre de Moraes Revoga Bloqueio Após Telegram Cumprir Determinações do STF,” March 20, 2022; and
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023: Brazil, October 3, 2023.
40 STF, “Ministro Alexandre de Moraes Suspende Contas do PCO nas Redes Sociais,” June 2, 2022; and Freedom House,

Freedom on the Net 2023: Brazil, October 3, 2023

41 STF, “Ministro Alexandre de Moraes Torna Públicos Documentos Sobre Operação que Envolve Empresários,” August 29,

2022.
42 STF, “STF Determina Reativação de Contas nas Redes Sociais do Deputado Federal Eleito Nikolas Ferreira,” January 26,

2023; and STF, “STF Applies Fine of R$ 1.2 Million to Telegram Platform for Failure to Comply with Decision,” February 10,
2023.
43 STF, “STF Bloqueia Novos Perfis Criados Pelo Influenciador Monark,” June 14, 2023; and Agência Brasil, “Moraes Multa

Monark em R$ 300 Mil por Descumprimento de Decisão,” August 2, 2023.

44 “Monark Confirma Mudança para os EUA: ‘Brasil Virou uma Ditadura do Judiciário’,” Gazeta do Povo, September 27, 2023.

45 STF, “STF Inclui Dono da Rede Social X no Inquérito das Milícias Digitais,” April 8, 2024.

46 TSE, “Deputado Francischini é Cassado por Propagar Desinformação Contra a Urna Eletrônica,” October 28, 2021.

47 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023: Brazil, October 3, 2023.

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updated regulations that authorized the institution’s president (Justice Moraes from August 2022 to June
2024) to unilaterally order the removal of false electoral information online and impose hourly fines for
noncompliance.

STF-X Corp. Dispute

On April 6, 2024, X Corp.’s Global Government Affairs account asserted that the social media company had been “forced by
court decisions to block certain popular accounts in Brazil,” that it was unaware of the reasons for the blocking orders, and
that such orders are “not in accordance” with Brazil’s civil rights framework for the internet (Marco Civil da Internet) or the
Brazilian constitution.48 X Corp.’s owner Elon Musk then denounced the Brazilian judicial orders as “aggressive censorship,”
and announced that the social media company would lift all restrictions on blocked accounts.49 A week later, the company
backed away from Musk’s pledges and stated that X Corp. would comply with all Brazilian judicial orders.50 In the meantime,
STF Justice Moraes opened an investigation into Musk and announced that X Corp.’s non-compliance with STF and TSE
orders would result in fines of R$100,000 (about $19,500) per day for each account the company failed to block. 51
Lawyers representing X Corp. reportedly have stated that the company has blocked 226 accounts in response to judicial
orders in Brazil since 2022—161 in response to STF orders and 65 in response to TSE orders.52 STF and TSE orders
subpoenaed from X Corp. by the U.S. House Judiciary Committee indicate that the blocked accounts have included some
prominent figures associated with the ideological right in Brazil, including former President Bolsonaro; at least six current
federal legislators; and several journalists, political commentators, and social media influencers.53 The full scope of the
accounts blocked and the justifications for the blocking orders remain unclear, though the STF asserts that all of its
decisions are well-founded in Brazilian law and that the affected parties have access to the legal reasoning.54 According to a
market research firm, approximately 40 million of Brazil’s 203 million residents access X at least once per month.55
The STF-X Corp. dispute has spurred renewed debate regarding online content regulation within Brazil’s center-right
congress. Senate President Rodrigo Pacheco has called for the enactment of a bill under consideration since 2020, PL
2630/20, often referred to as the “fake news” bill. The bill reportedly would require large social media platforms, search
engines, and messaging applications to regulate certain types of content, including racism; terrorism; incitement to self-harm;
and attacks against children, women, the health system, and democracy and the rule of law. The bill is backed by the Lula
administration but has faced opposition from technology companies. Chamber of Deputies President Arthur Lira, who had
previously supported the bill, has opted to set up a working group to draft new legislation. Some Bolsonaro-aligned
legislators have renewed calls to impeach Justice Moraes; however, there does not appear to be widespread support for
such an effort within the Brazilian congress.56

In February 2024, the TSE issued several new regulations in advance of municipal elections scheduled for
October 2024. Among other changes, the TSE reportedly imposed labeling requirements on campaign
materials produced using artificial intelligence (AI), banned the use of “deepfake” images and videos
produced by AI, and required online platforms hosting paid advertisements to maintain a repository for
“real-time monitoring of content, the amounts paid, the parties responsible for the payment, and the

48 X Global Government Affairs (@Global Affairs), X post, April 6, 2024,

https://twitter.com/GlobalAffairs/status/1776729732970594483.
49 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), X post, April 6, 2024, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1776739518240170254.

50 Ricardo Brito, “X Reverses Course, Tells Brazil’s Court It Will Comply With Rulings,” Reuters, April 15, 2022.

51 STF, “STF Inclui Dono da Rede Social X no Inquérito das Milícias Digitais,” April 8, 2024.

52 “X Afirma em Inquérito Ter Bloqueado 226 Contas por Ordem do STF e TSE,” Folha de São Paulo, April 19, 2024; and

Ricardo Brito, “Brazil Judge Gives X Five Days to Explain Alleged Non-compliance with Court Ruling,” Reuters, April 22,
2024.
53 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal

Government, The Attack on Free Speech Abroad and the Biden Administration's Silence: The Case of Brazil, Interim Staff
Report, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., April 17, 2024.
54 André Richter, “STF Reafirma que Todas as Decisões da Corte São Fundamentadas,” Agência Brasil, April 18, 2024.

55 Julia Carneiro, “US Committee Releases Sealed Brazil Court Orders to Musk’s X, Shedding Light on Account Suspensions,”

Associated Press, April 18, 2024.

56 “Brazil: Debates Over Regulating ‘Big Tech’ Reignited,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 11, 2024; Agence France

Presse, “Brazil’s Internet Bill Row, Explained,” May 12, 2023; and “Relatório que Expõe Moraes Mobiliza Bolsonaristas, Mas
Governo e Base Minimizam,” Folha de São Paulo, April 18, 2024.
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characteristics of audience groups.”57 Google, unable or unwilling to comply with some of the new
regulations, reportedly has opted to block political advertising in Brazil during the election period.58
Brazilians appear to be split in their views of online content regulation. Among those surveyed in a May
2023 poll, 51% asserted that it was necessary to regulate communications on messaging applications,
websites, and search engine platforms; 38% asserted that such regulation was not necessary; and 11%
stated they were unsure. Similarly, 49% of those surveyed asserted that regulating communications on the
internet is democratic, 38% asserted that it is undemocratic, and 14% stated they were unsure.59

U.S.-Brazilian Engagement on Democracy and Human Rights60

The United States regularly engages with Brazil diplomatically on democracy and human rights issues. In
the lead up to Brazil’s 2022 elections, the Biden Administration repeatedly expressed confidence in
Brazil’s electoral institutions and reportedly urged Brazilian officials not to cast doubts on the election
system or results. By some accounts, the Biden Administration’s sustained, high-level diplomatic
engagement helped prevent a democratic rupture in Brazil.61 In February 2023, President Biden hosted
President Lula for an official visit, during which the two leaders issued a joint statement that identified
“strengthening democracy, promoting respect for human rights, and addressing the climate crisis” as the
center of their common agenda.62 Official readouts suggest U.S. and Brazilian officials have continued to
discuss democracy and human rights issues—both within the two countries and abroad—over the past
year.63 To date, bilateral human rights initiatives have focused primarily on the rights of workers and
marginalized racial and ethnic communities.

Engagement on Freedom of Expression, Disinformation, and Misinformation

Biden Administration officials do not appear to have publicly expressed any concerns about the actions of
the Brazilian judiciary with regard to freedom of expression in Brazil over the past two years.64 The State
Department’s 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Brazil asserts, “An independent
media, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom
of expression, including for media members.”65 With regard to internet freedom, the report states, “The
government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content. Nonetheless,
according to news reports, the online environment remained constrained by threats of violence against
independent bloggers and websites, as well as criminal defamation laws and restrictive limits on content
related to elections.”66

57 “Brazil: Google to Block Political Ads for Municipal Elections,” Latin News Daily, April 25, 2024; and Agence France Presse,
Brazil Seeks to Cub AI Deepfakes as Key Elections Loom,” March 7, 2024.
58 “Brazil: Google to Block Political Ads for Municipal Elections,” Latin News Daily, April 25, 2024.

59 MDA, Pesquisa CNT de Opinião, May 2023, pp. 46-48.

60 This section focuses exclusively on U.S.-Brazil executive branch engagement on these issues.

61 Matt Stott, Michael Pooler, and Bryan Harris, “The Discreet US Campaign to Defend Brazil’s Democracy,” Financial Times,

June 21, 2023; and Oliver Stuenkel, “How U.S. Pressure Helped Save Brazil’s Democracy,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2024.
62 White House, “Joint Statement Following the Meeting Between President Biden and President Lula,” February 10, 2023.

63 See, for examples, U.S. Department of State, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Brazilian Secretary General da

Rocha,” May 15, 2023; White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of
Brazil,” September 20, 2023; and Governo do Brasil, Presidência da República, “President Lula Hosts Meeting with U.S.
Secretary of State, Antony Blinken,” February 21, 2024.
64 CRS was unable to identify any such statements of concern during a review of State Department social media posts and official

releases since 2022.

65 U.S. Department of State, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brazil, April 22, 2024.

66 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service 9

According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, U.S. and Brazilian officials have discussed how to
combat the challenges posed by disinformation and misinformation.67 At the Third Summit for
Democracy in March 2024, Blinken gave a speech on “Building A More Resilient Information
Environment” in which he stated, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines not only the
right to express ourselves; it protects our freedom, and I quote, ‘to hold opinions without interference.’
The manipulation of information undermines our ability to exercise that fundamental right.”68 During the
speech, Blinken noted that the United Stated had exposed alleged hidden Russian involvement in a
Brazilian nationalist organization that disseminated pro-Kremlin disinformation and that a Brazilian
political party had subsequently expelled 50 members tied to the group.69 The United States and Brazil are
also engaging on such issues within multilateral institutions. For example, both countries are participating
in an Organization of American States working group that is helping to update the organization’s “Guide
to Guarantee Freedom of Expression Against Disinformation in Electoral Contexts,” among other
activities intended to strengthen democracy in the Western Hemisphere.70

U.S. Foreign Assistance

The U.S. government provides some foreign assistance to support democracy and human rights in Brazil.
From FY2021 to FY2023, U.S. agencies obligated a net total of about $1.1 million for such purposes.
That sum includes $969,000 provided through the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S.
government agency that supports civic engagement and grassroots development—and $108,000 provided
through the State Department’s Democracy Fund.71
The National Endowment for Democracy, an independent, nonprofit organization primarily funded by
congressional appropriations, reports that it allocated about $1.9 million to Brazil in 2021 (most recent
data available). The funds supported eight activities intended to promote the effective use of digital
technologies and digital voting, foster respect for diverse opinions, defend democratic processes and
principles, enhance legal protections for human rights activists and civil society organizations, strengthen
civil society capacity to engage with the Brazilian congress, defend labor rights, and increase
transparency around public security policies.72

67 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Raquel Krahenbuhl of TV Globo,” February 25, 2024.
68 Anthony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Building A More Resilient Information Environment,” March 18, 2024.
69 Ibid. For more information, see U.S. Department of State, Global Engagement Center, Exporting Pro-Kremlin Disinformation:

The Case of Nova Resistência in Brazil, October 2023; and Lucas Neiva, “Por Ordens de Lupi, PDT Expulsa 50 ‘Infiltrados’ de
Extrema-Direita,” Congresso em Foco, October 23, 2023.
70 Organization of American States, “Implementation of the Work Plan of the Voluntary Group for the Follow-up of the Inter-

American Democratic Charter,” March 1, 2024. The current guide, published in October 2019, is available at
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/publications/Guia_Desinformacion_VF%20ENG.pdf.
71 CRS analysis of data on ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed April 26, 2024. Information about the State Department-funded

activity is redacted.
72 National Endowment for Democracy, “Brazil 2021,” February 12, 2022, https://www.ned.org/region/latin-america-and-

caribbean/brazil-2021/.