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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY
A Relational Approach
to Governing Wicked
Problems
From Governance Failure
to Failure Governance
Peeter Selg
Georg Sootla
Benjamin Klasche
Palgrave Studies in Relational Sociology
Series Editors
Nick Crossley
Department of Sociology
University of Manchester
Manchester, UK
Peeter Selg
School of Governance, Law and Society
Tallinn University
Tallinn, Estonia
In various disciplines such as archeology, psychology, psychoanalysis,
international relations, and philosophy, we have seen the emergence of
relational approaches or theories. This series, founded by François
Dépelteau, seeks to further develop relational sociology through the pub-
lication of diverse theoretical and empirical research—including that which
is critical of the relational approach. In this respect, the goal of the series
is to explore the advantages and limits of relational sociology. The series
welcomes contributions related to various thinkers, theories, and methods
clearly associated with relational sociology (such as Bourdieu, critical
realism, Deleuze, Dewey, Elias, Latour, Luhmann, Mead, network analysis,
symbolic interactionism, Tarde, and Tilly). Multidisciplinary studies which
are relevant to relational sociology are also welcome, as well as research on
various empirical topics (such as education, family, music, health, social
inequalities, international relations, feminism, ethnicity, environmental
issues, politics, culture, violence, social movements, and terrorism).
Relational sociology—and more specifically, this series—will contribute to
change and support contemporary sociology by discussing fundamental
principles and issues within a relational framework.
Peeter Selg • Georg Sootla
Benjamin Klasche
A Relational Approach
to Governing Wicked
Problems
From Governance Failure to Failure Governance
Peeter Selg Georg Sootla
School of Governance, Law & Society School of Governance, Law
Tallinn University and Society
Tallinn, Estonia Tallinn University
Tallinn, Estonia
Benjamin Klasche
School of Governance, Law
and Society
Tallinn University
Tallinn, Estonia
ISSN 2946-4110 ISSN 2946-4129 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Relational Sociology
ISBN 978-3-031-24033-1 ISBN 978-3-031-24034-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24034-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
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Preface and Acknowledgments
In this book, we argue that moving from a substantialist to a relational

approach to governance entails accepting the inevitability of governance
failure and orienting oneself to failure governance. Adopting failure gov-
ernance is what we propose as the most reasonable strategy for governing
wicked problems. In a different vocabulary: failure governance entails true
acceptance of the contingency of the social and political world as we know
it. Analytically it requires moving from the presumption of the “elegant”
world of bounded entities, grasped by independent and dependent vari-
ables, to a world of constantly changing and constitutive relations.
Accepting these features of the world, in turn, brings in the need to also
move from various toolboxes to a self-reflective ethos toward the world. It
is similar to moving from various ethical imperatives—be they categorical
or hypothetical—to the underlying ethical mechanisms themselves. To
bring an even more robust parallel: it would be a movement from a list of
jokes to a sense of humor. To say, “I know a lot of jokes” makes sense, but
to say, “I have a sense of humor” makes way less sense since sense of
humor is something that emerges out of a complex network of relations
and practices (of which telling jokes could be an important part) through
which one “acquires” one’s sense of humor. Also, a sense of humor is
never fully given but manifests itself in practice. One cannot say that now
they finally “have” a sense of humor for good or that they soon are going
to have sense of humor. Bottom line: like power and governance, sense of
humor is an example of phenomena that should be approached in rela-
tional terms. But it is a huge leap—if it even is possible to take it at all—to
v
vi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
propose normative guidelines for how to have a great sense of humor.

Similarly, in this book, we propose a relational approach to governance of
wicked problems. Analytically this has been way easier a task than norma-
tively. It is easier to imagine a world in which nothing is fixed or given than
to envision some “positive program” of governance for such a world, let
alone policy advice, a notion so heavily contaminated by “tools talk,”
which presumes “variables talk” at the analytical level. But is there still
hope for a positive program? Can we still hope to teach or give guidelines
for failure governance? It is as tricky as asking how to gain a sense of
humor, when all we have is a list of jokes. This is what we tackle in the
current book.
Writing it has been a wicked problem for us, and in many ways, we have
practiced what we preach. We want to thank Joonatan Nõgisto for care-
fully reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this book. Also, we
thank the Estonian Research Council for the research grant PUT1485,
out of which this book emerged.
Peeter would like to thank his partner Maria Koldekivi for her tremen-
dous support and patience during the enormously difficult times of writ-
ing this book. Georg would like to thank his wife Alija, for putting up the
long hours, weeks, and months of being alone when he struggled to write
his chapters. Benjamin would like to thank Peeter for inviting him to par-
ticipate in the project that led to this book. He also wants to thank Peeter
and Georg for thinking together, without whom this book would never
have been realized. Finally, he would like to thank his wife, Airi, and his
daughters, Linda and Lilian, for all their love and support.
Last but not least, we all thank the late François Dépelteau for making
it all possible in this volume (and numerous others) on relational sociol-
ogy. The breadth and depth of his work in setting the relational sociology
movement truly aflame on a global scale are still partly to be discovered,
but its fruits will never be forgotten.
Tallinn, Estonia Peeter Selg

Georg Sootla
Benjamin Klasche
Contents
1 Introduction:
A Relational Approach to Governing
Wicked Problems 1
References 14
Part I A Relational Definition of Wicked Problems of

Governance 19
2 Aren’t
All Problems Wicked? Addressing the Constructive
and Destructive Critiques of the Concept of Wicked
Problems 21
2.1 Should We Have an Ontological Notion of Wicked
Problems in the First Place? 22
2.1.1 Some Constructive and Destructive Criticisms of
the Notion of Wicked Problems 22
2.1.2 What Are Methodology and Ontology, and How
to Justify Them? 29
2.2 How to Understand Problems: Alternative Typologies and
Frameworks 32
2.2.1 Alford and Head’s Contingency Framework 32
2.2.2 Grint: Tame, Critical, and Wicked Problems 34
2.3 Simple, Complex, Wicked, and De-Problematized Problems 35
References 45
vii
viii Contents
3 From
Categorical Distinctions of Policy Problems to a
Relational Approach to Wicked Problems 49
3.1 Substantialist and Relational Understanding of Social
Processes 51
3.1.1 Process as Instigated by “Things”: The Notion of
Self-action 51
3.1.2 Process as “Thing”: The Notion of Inter-action 53
3.1.3 Process as Constitutive Relation(S): The Notion
of Trans-action 54
3.2 From Studying to Governing Wicked Problems: From
(De)Politicization to (De-)problematization 59
3.2.1 Colin Hay’s Model of (De)politicization 61
3.2.2 Toward Discursive/Semiotic Notion of (De)
politicization 63
3.3 From Discursive Approaches to (De)politicization to the
Notion of (De-)problematization of Wicked Problems 67
3.4 Two Ideal Types of De-problematizing Wicked Problems:
Self-active and Inter-active Governance 69
3.4.1 Self-active Governance as Politics of
De-problematization: Individualism and
Structuralism 69
3.4.2 Inter-active Governance as Politics of
De-problematization: Networks 71
References 74
4 From
Governance Failure to Failure Governance: A
Relational Approach to Governing Wicked Problems 77
4.1 Trans-Active Governance as Politics of Problematization:
Governing Wicked Problems as Un-Owned Processes 77
4.1.1 The Contingency of the Socio-Political 78
4.1.2 From Contingency to Failure: Bob Jessop on
Metagovernance 80
4.1.3 From Governance Failure to Failure Governance 86
4.2 Governance Failure: How and Why De-problematization
Occurs 91
4.3 Looking Ahead: Policy Theories as Sources of
Problematization and De-problematization 96
References 98
Contents ix
Part II The History of the Present of the Theories of the

Policy Process: From Self-Action to Trans-Action 103
5 A
Genealogy of Self-Active Governance in Policy Theories105
5.1 The Inception of “Policy Orientation”: The Context
and Key Principles of the Normative Model of the
Policy Process107
5.1.1 The Policy Orientation107
5.1.2 Policy Process: Knowledge Production vis-à-vis
Politics110
5.1.3 Policy as Finding Solutions to Problems112
5.1.4 Policy as Decision-Making Process114
5.1.5 Policy as Causal Chains of Functionally Linked
Activities115
5.2 The Discursive Context of Policy Sciences117
References120
6 Problematizing
Theoretical Understandings of Problems:
From Self-actionalist to Inter-actionalist Approaches in
Policy Sciences123
6.1 What Is a Problem?124
6.2 What to Do with Problems?128
6.2.1 Problem Solution128
6.2.2 Problem Resolution135
6.2.3 Problem Dissolution136
6.3 Beyond the Givenness of Problems140
6.3.1 From Problem-Solving to Policy as Design140
6.3.2 From Problem Resolution to Problem Structuring
as an Analytical Strategy142
6.3.3 Policy in the Context of Contingency and Chaos:
An Inter-actional View149
6.3.4 Inter-actional Approaches to Ensuring
Substantive Outcomes in the Policy Process153
6.4 In Sum: From Self-actionalism to Inter-actionalism in
Policy Theories—Toward Increasing Recognition of the
Contingency of the Socio-political157
References160
x Contents
7 The
(Re)turn to the Political: Deepening the Grasp of
Contingency in the Theories of the Policy Process167
7.1 On the Constitution of Policy Problems: Bringing the
Political Back In172
7.1.1 From Street-Level Bureaucrats to Backward
Mapping: The Problem of Policy Implementation172
7.2 Four Basic Patterns in Theorizing Policy as a
Contingent Process176
7.2.1 The Theory of Policy Streams176
7.2.2 The Theory of Advocacy Coalitions177
7.2.3 “Thick” Institutionalism in Rational Choice
Theory178
7.2.4 The Theory of attention shifts178
7.3 The Emergence of the Theories of Policy Networks179
7.4 The Emergence of the Notion of Governance as
Governing Through Networks182
7.4.1 The New-Institutionalist Roots182
7.4.2 Mixing Theories and Practices: The Roots from
New Public Management183
7.4.3 The Roots from Organization Studies and
Political Science185
7.4.4 Multi-Level Governance and/as Network
Governance187
References191
8 Speaking
Truth to Power? The (Political) Constitution of
Knowledge and Rationality in Policy-Making and
Governance199
8.1 Sources and Roles of Knowledge in the Policy Process:
From Knowledge as Representation to Knowledge as
Active Ordering200
8.1.1 Herbert Simon and the Problem of (Bounded)
Rationality201
8.1.2 Lindblom Against Professional Social Inquiry:
“Muddling Through” the Plurality of Policy-
Relevant Knowledge210
8.1.3 The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis212
8.2 Knowledge, Truth, and Experts214
References219
Contents xi
9 From
De-Problematized Expert Knowledge to Politics of
Critical Dialogue: Toward Process-Relational Policy
Theories223
9.1 Beyond Policy/Politics Dualism224
9.2 Institutionalization of Politics in Policy Networks232
9.3 The Political Constitution of Policy Through
Issue Framing236
9.4 Frame Reflection as Practical Bridging of Frames239
9.5 The Politics of Critical Dialogue250
References257
Part III Theory and Practice of Failure Governance and

Governance Failure 265
10 A
Theory of Governance as Problematization and
De-problematization267
10.1 Inter-actional and Trans-actional Orientations in the
Analysis of the Policy Process267
10.2 A Political Semiotic Theory of Governance as
Problematization and De-problematization273
10.2.1 A Theory of Political Semiotics274
10.2.2 Methodological Consequences of the Political
Semiotic Theory of Governance283
10.3 A Dialogical Understanding of Theory in Case Study
Research286
References289
11 The Whole-of-Nation-Failure-Governance: Taiwan’s

Politics of Problematization of COVID-19293
11.1 C1: Taiwan as an Epitome of Success293
11.2 Taking Stock of Alternative Explanations295
11.3 A1: The Whole-of-Nation-Failure-Governance of More
Than 100 Measures299
11.4 C2: Taiwan’s Poor Performance at the Beginning of the
Vaccination Phase of the Crisis307
11.5 A3: From Domestic Politics to Geopolitical Crisis309
11.6 Conclusion311
References312
xii Contents
12 Making
America Do Their “Own Research” Again?
Trump’s Politics of De-problematization of COVID-19315
12.1 C1: The US as an Epitome of Failure315
12.2 Taking Stock of Alternative Explanations318
12.3 The Fauci/Trump Dialectics and the Constitution
“Doing Your Own Research”322
12.3.1 “It’ll Go Away”322
12.3.2 From “It’ll Go Away” to “New Hoax” of the
Democrats to “It’s Totally Harmless”325
12.3.3 “A Cheerleader for the Country” Meets Fauci325
12.4 Conclusion: Making America Do Their “Own Research
Again”? On the Epistemic Authority Crisis of the US328
References331
13 Germany’s
Road from Failure Governance to Governance
Failure335
13.1 Introduction335
13.2 Operationalizing the Ethos of Failure Governance338
13.3 The Beginning of the Crisis: Embracing the Ethos of
Failure Governance340
13.3.1 The German Leadership341
13.3.2 Germany’s Institutional Starting Conditions
and Administrative Culture346
13.4 From Failure Governance to Governance Failure350
13.5 Conclusion356
References358
Part IV Concluding Remarks 363
14 In
Place of Conclusions: Failing Better or Waiting for
Godot in a Clumsy World of Wicked Problems?365
References380
Index385
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Alternative types of complex problems. (Source: Alford &

Head, 2017, p. 402) 33
Fig. 3.1 Mapping the political realm. (Source: Hay, 2007, p. 79) 61
Fig. 3.2 Politicization and depoliticization. (Source: Hay, 2007, p. 79) 62
Fig. 3.3 Principles, tactics, and tools of depoliticization. (Source: Buller
& Flinders, 2006, p. 299) 64
Fig. 4.1 Elegant (single-mode) solutions to global warming. (Source:
Grint, 2010b, p. 24) 88
Fig. 4.2 Clumsy solution for the wicked problem of global warming.
(Source: Grint, 2010b, p. 25) 88
Fig. 7.1 The pattern of the iterative policy process. (Source: Conklin,
2006, p. 10) 170
Fig. 10.1. Semiotic categories for constitutive explanation of the political.
(Source: Selg & Ventsel, 2020, p. 242) 278
Fig. 10.2 Semiotic categories for explaining governance as a process of
problematization and de-problematization. (Adapted from
Selg & Ventsel, 2020, p. 242) 278
Fig. 11.1 Conditions of an effective whole-of-nation approach.
(Source: Hsieh et al., 2021, p. 311) 298
Fig. 11.2 The drastic upsurge of COVID-19 deaths in Taiwan in spring
and summer of 2021 (Source: Johns Hopkins University
CSSE COVID-19 Data—retrieved October 4, 2022) 309
xiii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Three types of problems of governance 36

Table 2.2 Four categories of problems of governance 39
Table 2.3 Criteria for distinguishing different problems represented as a
truth table 41
Table 3.1 Three approaches to problems as social processes 59
Table 4.1 Governing simple, complex, and wicked problems 91
Table 6.1 Decision strategies 149
Table 6.2 Development of substantive policy outcomes in normative
(self-actional) and inter-actional perspectives on the policy
process154
Table 10.1 Comparing inter-actional and trans-actional orientations in
the analysis of the policy process 268
Table 13.1 Healthcare spending 2020 349
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: A Relational Approach

to Governing Wicked Problems
At the core of this book sits the endeavor to make the transition from the
more common sense understanding of the world to the (processual-)rela-
tional perspective we are proposing more intuitive. To start, let us point
out that our spontaneous view of the world is substantialist, the opposite
of relational: in our language, we express the world as being composed of
substances, rather than of emerging, unfolding processes and relations.
However, as we argue, we should be relational when we think about social
phenomena that we call wicked problems. Yet spontaneously, we presume
a world of substances (“things,” “objects,” “subjects”) that have proper-
ties (“tall,” “heavy,” “red”) and are engaged in activities (“running,”
“standing,” “walking”). Even though our everyday language is substan-
tialist, there are some phenomena that we tend to take spontaneously as
relations rather than bundles of things with properties. Take, for instance,
“distance.” The distance between two trucks is definitely a relation
between them, not a thing, property, or even action of either of them.
Distance has various features that make it easier to illustrate several crucial
points about relational approaches. For instance, distance is always sym-
metric: A’s distance from B is also B’s distance from A. Thus, you cannot
be simply an A that “has” a distance; A needs at least some B to “have” any
distance. This means, in turn, that the distance between A and B is not
reducible to either A or B. Moreover, while the distance is not reducible
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
P. Selg et al., A Relational Approach to Governing Wicked Problems,
Palgrave Studies in Relational Sociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24034-8_1
2 P. SELG ET AL.
to A or B, it is always between them and not conceivable as a separate

“entity” that could be made sense of without those very As and Bs. Thus,
“distance” seems to be a thoroughly relational concept in that it refers to
a phenomenon that can only be understood as a relation.
However, there are still certain limitations to sticking to the figure or
metaphor of distance when rendering the relational approaches we put
forth in this book. Namely, “distance” is not a concept that captures
dynamic, unfolding, processual relations between As and Bs that are not
only irreducible to and reciprocal between As and Bs, but are also constitu-
tive of those As and Bs. It is precisely these kinds of relations that
processual-relational scholars are talking about when they are thinking
about the nature of reality in general. When it comes to social reality or to
social phenomena more specifically, they presume that not only are the
relations between As and Bs incomprehensible without those As and Bs
(as is the case with distance), but those As and Bs, in turn, are not com-
prehensible without the relations between them. This is where the figure
of distance becomes limiting. For instance, we do not tend to think that
moving one truck away from another truck somehow alters the character
or “essence” of either of those trucks. If we want to get a spontaneous
insight to what is called “deep” relational thinking (see Dépelteau, 2013;
Selg, 2016b), or processual relationalism (Selg & Ventsel, 2020; Selg
et al., 2022) then we need different metaphors than distance for bringing
this point home smoothly. This is where the concept of “sense of humor”
becomes useful, as argued by one of us before (Selg, 2018).
What is so significant about the sense of humor, is that in our common
sense language, we tend to treat it as a property or capacity that people
“have” (or “have” not). It is not even treated as something people “do.”
We do not regard utterances like “She has a sense of humor” as utterly
nonsensical as we would view enunciations like “She has a distance.” But
the more you think about it, the less it makes sense to treat a sense of
humor as a property of people. If we truly understood sense of humor as
a property, then there would not be any crucial difference between the
first-person form and other forms of description of this phenomenon. But
there is. What we mean is the following: There is a multitude of “things”
like pieces of furniture or parts of the body that can be spoken about in the
first-person form without losing much accuracy: there does not seem to be
anything wrong if someone utters “I have a hammer” or “I have two
eyes.” Those statements seem to be at least prima facie evidence that
somebody has a hammer or two eyes. But think about the sentence “I
1 INTRODUCTION: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO GOVERNING WICKED… 3
have a sense of humor.” Leaving aside the fact that it makes sense gram-
matically, we could ask: is this sentence evidence—even prima facie evi-
dence—of someone having a sense of humor? There are various grounds
for saying no.
For instance, people who say that they have a sense of humor usually
do not have it. The reason is not so much related to the issues of proper
humility or improper arrogance, but to the fact that A’s sense of humor
is a relation rather than a property, capacity, or resource of someone.
That is why we intuitively tend to regard the first-person description as
bizarre, at least when it comes to sense of humor. We tend to acknowl-
edge that a self (A) cannot “have” a sense of humor without some rela-
tion to an other (B). In that sense “distance” and “sense of humor” are
similar. They are relational concepts, even intuitively: they refer to recip-
rocal relations (although distance seems to be referring not to just recip-
rocal, but symmetrical relations—an issue that does not have relevance
yet). But they part company in one important respect: unlike with dis-
tance, it is up to the other, at least to a certain extent, to attribute a sense
of humor to the self. In that sense, unlike distance, sense of humor is an
action-concept: an other (a B) has to do something in order for a self (an
A) to “have” a sense of humor. But does it mean that, unlike distance,
someone’s sense of humor is reducible to the other or the action of the
other? No. And the reason is that not every other is equally adequate to
perform the attribution of sense of humor to a self. Consider this: if
James is some random stranger who just pops in and says “John has a
sense of humor” about a particular John, then we spontaneously regard
this utterance as less credible than we would regard the same sentence
coming from a Mary, who is a close friend of John. And the reason is that
not only is it up to the other to attribute sense of humor to a self, but it
is also up to the self to position the other as the one who is able to attri-
bute this sense of humor to him/herself. The colloquial term for this
positioning is joking. But again, minimally speaking John’s joking
becomes John’s joking only when Mary gets his joke(s). However, Mary
can get the joke only if John is, in fact, joking, and in that sense, John is
positioning Mary to get the joke, which in turn becomes a joke only if
Mary does get the joke as a joke and so on. It can get very messy! It
could be that Mary reacts to John’s dead serious talk as if he was joking.
Can we say that John has made a joke anyway? Probably not. How many
jokes does John have to make and Mary (or Jane or Jim etc.) have to get
for John to have a sense of humor? This cannot be settled here in our
4 P. SELG ET AL.
theoretical reflection. It is very much context dependent. But what is

certain is that someone’s sense of humor is not only a relation between
a self and an other, but also a dynamic process in which various actors are
inextricably linked to each other and constituted as elements of the very
dynamic relations of which they are part (as jokers, receivers of jokes,
audience, laughers etc.). And it is these kinds of dynamic processual
complexes that the processual relationalists presume to be the primary
unit of sociological analysis, not those Johns, Marys, and other “ele-
ments” (with their properties, etc.) themselves.
Overall, three different research strategies can be used for studying
sense of humor:
1. If we were to analyze sense of humor from our spontaneous substan-

tialist point of view as being analogous to an object (like a hammer
or a chair) or property (like hair color) then we would be interested
in questions such as: What features of A form A’s sense of humor?
2. If we treated sense of humor as being basically analogous to “dis-
tance”—reciprocal, but not dynamic and constitutive relation—then
we would be interested in questions such as: Which As are regarded
as having sense of humor by which Bs and based on which
actions of As?
3. The final research strategy for studying sense of humor would focus
on the network of dynamic relations through which certain actions
by the As emerge as jokes through meeting certain reactions of the
Bs, and through which As and Bs are constituted as jokers, laughers,
and so on and are in a constant process of mutual (re)constitution,
elements of which can be considered separately, but not as being
separate. What the third research strategy wants to bring to the fore
is actually very intuitive: we cannot say that a person who has never
made anyone laugh has a sense of humor, which would be possible
from the viewpoint of the first strategy, that would treat a person’s
sense of humor as a property or capacity of that person. This would
be analogous to analyzing causes without effects or, more techni-
cally speaking: claiming causation without correlation. Similarly, we
cannot say that a person who has never intended to make any joke
has a sense of humor even if she has made somebody laugh, which
would be possible from the viewpoint of the second research strat-
egy, since it would be up to the other to attribute the sense of humor
to the self: it would be a situation where the A would be deadly seri-
ous, but nevertheless, B would act as if A were joking. This would

be analogous to a situation where there are effects without causes or
correlation without causation.
In the third strategy, thus, sense of humor is treated as an unfolding,

dynamic, and constitutive relation, whose elements can be considered sep-
arately, but not as being separate. This rules out such extreme cases as
reducing sense of humor to the intentions of the joker (action) or those of
the laugher (reaction): sense of humor is neither action, nor a combina-
tion (sum) of actions and reactions, but an emerging phenomenon that is
always in the making and unmaking. It is a process that is not “owned” by
anyone—at least not exclusively—or, we could even put it more strangely:
nobody “has” a sense of humor. Does that make sense? If it does, then we
have been able to convince the reader that it is worth a while to approach
at least some phenomena around us as if they were bundles of unfolding
relations and processes rather than things someone “has.” The reader has
doubts, we are sure, whether “things” like hammers are in need to be
treated this way.—“I have a hammer—see!”—“Ok, I see it.” This substan-
tialist dialogue makes sense. But there seems to be something disturb-
ing—we hope the reader is with us on that—when it comes to an analogous
dialogue:—“I have a sense of humor—see!”—“Ok, I see it.” What is the
disturbance here? One of the prominent representatives of relational soci-
ology, Norbert Elias, has reflected on that in terms of “process-reduction”
that takes place in our everyday (substantialist) language: “We say, ‘The
wind is blowing,’ as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a
given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if wind could
exist which did not blow” (1978, p. 112). In other words, we talk about
wind as if it wasn’t an emerging process but a subject engaged in an action
(“blowing”). Similarly, “standing by a river we see the perpetual flowing
of the water. But to grasp it conceptually, and communicate it to others,
we do not think and say, ‘Look at the perpetual flowing of the water’; we
say ‘Look how fast the river is flowing’” (ibid.). He points out that such
“reduction of processes to static conditions, which we shall call ‘process-
reduction’ for short, appears self-explanatory to people who have grown
up with such languages” (ibid., pp. 111–112). We leave aside here the
question of why our languages are substantialist and process reducing in
that sense, but it is hard to deny that they often are. Let us instead ask a
different question: what would a worldview look like according to which
not some, but all phenomena should be treated as bundles of unfolding
6 P. SELG ET AL.
relations and processes? This would be a worldview in which not only the
second dialogue about sense of humor would be weird, but also the first
one about hammer. It would recognize that
What a hammer is, is defined relationally. Qua physical object or body, a

hammer does not even exist. A thing is not a hammer unless and until it is
used as a hammer, which is to say, put to human uses (driving nails, building
shelters, etc.) by human beings (carpenters). A hammer is what it is by virtue
of its being a constitutive element in an ensemble of relations, and not merely
by virtue of its size, shape, weight, or other physical characteristics. (Ball,
1978, p. 105, italics added)
In view of this, saying “I have a hammer” makes very little sense because
this is the worldview that sees reality in terms of un-owned processes. This
is quite counterintuitive. In its extreme form, it amounts to saying that
nobody “has” hammers. This worldview is defensible, and the entire
movement of processual thinking since Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, and
Bentley (or Heraclitus, for that matter), and others have been trying to
articulate it (see Abbott, 2016; Dépelteau, 2018a, b; Morgner, 2020;
Raud, 2021 for recent works on that) and with good reasons. We can take
it as a given that such a worldview is defensible. However, we ask, is it
always sensible? By that, we mean roughly the following: is it always sen-
sible to treat hammers as un-owned processes, as something nobody has?
In a more technical parlance of Elias: is it always sensible to avoid process-
reduction? We do not think it is. In many practical contexts, process-
reduction is a sensible thing to do. Although it is defensible that a hammer
or a chair “is not an individuated object, but a relation which is viewed
abstractly, i.e. one-sidedly” (Ball, 1978, p. 104), it is nonetheless sensible
to ignore this when someone asks you to hand her the hammer on the
table, so she could use it for driving a nail to the wall. This is because the
problem of driving a nail to the wall is an example of what we would call
simple problems: it has a clear formulation and a clear solution (also clear
criteria for judging whether progress has been made in solving it). There
is no need to understand the relations and processes (or relations as pro-
cesses) such as the capitalist mode of production, gravity, evolution, civili-
zation, etc. constituting the hammer, the wall, the nail, and the need to
have a nail on the wall etc. to address the problem. There is no sensible
contestation among affected parties regarding the problem or its solution.
But what we also argue in this book, is that it is not sensible either to view
phenomena like the Covid-19 or Climate Crisis “abstractly, i.e. one-sid-

edly.” This would be a form of process-reduction we call “de-
problematization” and we argue that it is the primary reason for failure in
governing such problems. This is because the Climate Crisis constitutes
for humankind a problem that is not simple, but wicked.
The notion of wicked problems emerged in the late 1960s, and was
made famous by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber in their seminal article
“Dilemmas in general theory of planning” (1973). We argue that reduc-
ing wicked problems to “objects” that can be owned or even processes
that can be owned is not sensible, we argue. It is more reasonable to see
them as un-owned processes, the handling of which should avoid process-
reduction. What such handling means is the crucial topic of the current
book. But to use the analogy with humor here, like wicked problems,
humor is not a regional category. We cannot say that humor is a certain
domain of human relations or society; rather, in principle, all human forms
of life can be conceived to be relevant for one’s “having” a sense of humor.
To get properly attuned to this insight, the readers should just visualize for
a moment the best comedians they know. These comedians definitely
“have” a sense of humor (from the readers’ point of view, at least). Now,
can the reader honestly say that this is because they are specialists in a cer-
tain field called “making jokes” in a manner that one can be a specialist in
using hammers or tables? Probably not. The thing is that it is likely that
their jokes are never about jokes, but “stuff” like “economic processes,”
“knowledge relationships,” “sexual relations,” and so on. In that sense,
jokes are immanent to them. At the same time, all those different relation-
ships and processes are immanent to the jokes. The point is actually very
simple if we express it in non-technical terms: understanding a sex joke
presumes that the audience understands something about sex, not only
about jokes; and similar logic is, of course, involved in understanding an
economics joke, knowledge joke etc. In other words, there is no “sense of
humor” as such that can be put to use or not; someone’s sense of humor
is a process that emerges from a multiplicity of practices that constitute its
participants as jokers, laughers, audience, successful and failed jokes,
and so on.
People who “have” a great sense of humor (think of comedians who are
very widely admired) usually “have” it through relations with very differ-
ent audiences and by having created very different jokes. It is hard to
imagine a popular comedian telling similar jokes over time; and it is impos-
sible to imagine a comedian using the same joke over time. Therefore, one
8 P. SELG ET AL.
of the inevitable conclusions of this is that it is impossible to locate the

sources of sense of humor. They can potentially be found everywhere and
derived from everywhere. This is because a sense of humor is an unowned
process that is not reducible to any “doers” in the final analysis. And
exactly this is what, in our view, needs to be kept in mind when addressing
wicked problems. But are all processes unowned? Well, yes and no: it is
defensible to treat them as if they were, but in many practical contexts it is
not sensible to do that. Are all problems wicked? Again, the same answer.
What is at stake in these answers is the topic of this book. Even more so,
the topic of the book is the interdependence of these answers. We claim
that although wicked problems cannot be made sense without processual-
relational approaches, nevertheless, many problems can (and have been)
grasped through substantialist approaches reasonably enough. But why
should this matter in the first place? Well, here we point to Brian Head, a
prominent researcher of wicked problems, who mapped 45 years of
research on the topic and conceded: “The literature on ‘wicked problems’
since 1973 has grown exponentially, but often in ways that disconnect
discussion from the insights available in the fields of policy studies and
public management, not to mention the broader social sciences” (Head,
2019, p. 4). We are taking Head’s cue and bring in the “broader social
sciences” into the conceptualizing of wicked problems. This leads us to
ask: how to govern wicked problems? We claim that a certain form of gov-
ernance is better suited for wicked problems than other available forms,
both in theory and practice. But first, we need to answer the question:
what is governance?
In most general terms governance can still be defined as “the process of
making and implementing collective decisions for a society” (Pierre &
Peter, 2005, 133). The character of this “making and implementing” (and
their mutual relationship) is changing, though. This change stems from
the fact that governance needs to address wicked problems (Rittel &
Webber, 1973; Roberts, 2000; Conklin, 2005; Camillus, 2008; Grint,
2010; Head & Alford, 2015), such as climate change, pandemic diseases,
global economic crises, etc. The latter can be seen to “challenge a linear,
scale-free, and static worldview that has guided large parts of the scientific
study of society and politics” (Duit & Galas, 2008, 311). At the same
time, it was more than 20 years ago when “Manifesto for a Relational
Sociology” was published (Emirbayer, 1997), declaring exactly what is at
stake in this challenge: “Sociologists today are faced with a fundamental
dilemma: whether to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily in
substances or in processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, unfolding rela-

tions” (p. 281). It is the second, processual view, preoccupied primarily
with dynamic unfolding relations that is at the core of “relational think-
ing.” Two decades later, theoretical and methodological discussions of the
“relational turn” thrive in disciplines as diverse as geography (Jones,
2009), sociology (Dépelteau, 2013, 2018b; Prandini, 2015; Crossley,
2010), political science (Selg, 2016a, 2016b), international relations
(McCourt, 2016; Pratt, 2019), leadership (Uhl-Bien & Ospina, 2012), or
psychoanalysis (Carmeli & Blass, 2010). Only very recently, a “relational
turn” has also entered into the discussions in public administration (see
Bartels & Turnbull, 2019). We argue that this “turn” needs to be taken
from theoretical/methodological discussions to its normative/policy
implications since relational thinking is most pertinent when it comes to
wicked problems. Wicked problems are problems that are not only unsolv-
able but are at the same time in urgent need of solutions, entailing that
decision-makers have no option to ignore them. In addition, they are
problems that are processual all the way down, so much so that they refuse
to remain identical to themselves, being in constant change and this way
making struggle over their definition part of their very constitution. In
that sense they can be seen as akin to complex adaptive systems “whose
constituent entities change qualitatively overtime—new types of entities
come into being, and existing types disappear” (Richardson, 2007, 202;
see also Waddock et al., 2015; Duit & Galas, 2008; Wagenaar, 2007). But
they are complex adaptive systems with a vengeance, since “[t]he planner
has no right to be wrong”: as Rittel and Webber say (1973, p. 166). This
is why, wicked problems, unlike philosophical problems—that are also
unsolvable—are different: one has to take action, one has to “solve” them.
But these problems change into something else whenever someone tries
to put forth a solution.
Thus, for instance, what has become known as “the European migra-
tion crisis” was only very briefly an issue of an overflow of migrants to
Europe and the humanitarian crisis related to that. Already several years
ago, it was conceptualized as a “‘wicked problem’—one characterized by:
(1) multiple, potentially conflicting values, (2) strong political passions on
different sides of the issue, (3) substantive uncertainty on how best to
solve the problem, and (4) multiple independent arenas for social delibera-
tion and action” (Geuijen et al., 2017, 622). This is because the European
Migrant Crisis is
10 P. SELG ET AL.
a problem that could be seen simultaneously as: a humanitarian crisis based

in the suffering of individuals who had abandoned their homes; a geopoliti-
cal conflict ranging across countries and continents; a security threat for both
receiving and transit countries; a potentially heavy financial burden on
already overtaxed states; and the breakdown of collaboration in the network
of EU member states. (Geuijen et al., 2017: 622, italics added)
This recent example points to a general challenge of governing wicked

problems: it needs to take into account that wicked problems are dynamic
unfolding processes whose constituent elements cannot be grasped sepa-
rately from the flows of relations within which they are embedded and vice
versa. This is exactly what the tradition of “relational sociology” has been
proposing as a general view on social reality with the corresponding per-
spective on social research (e.g., Elias, 1978; Somers, 1994; Emirbayer,
1997; Tilly, 2000; Mische, 2011; Dépelteau, 2008; Erikson, 2013;
Donati, 2010; Crossley, 2010; Fuhse, 2009; Mützel, 2009; Dépelteau &
Powell, 2013; Powell & Dépelteau, 2013; Dépelteau, 2018a; Selg, 2018).
It is, therefore, quite remarkable that virtually no one has linked govern-
ing wicked problems to relational sociology. This book aims at doing
exactly that.
In Chap. 2, we address the constructive/destructive critiques of the
concept of wicked problems and discuss whether we should have an onto-
logical notion of wicked problems in the first place. Among other things,
we distinguish between simple, complex, wicked, and de-problematized
problems along two crucial axes: whether there is an agreement on the
definition of problems and their solutions among the affected parties. This
establishes that (1) simple problems are such that all the parties agree on
the definition and the solution; (2) that in case of complex problems there
is an agreement on the definition of the problem at hand, but no agree-
ment on its solution; (3) that wicked problems are problems in which
there is no agreement among parties on neither the problem’s definition
nor its solution; (4) and that de-problematization is a process through
which a ready-made ideological or ritual “solution” is offered to problems
whose definition is not agreed upon. This is often a very compelling way
of “addressing” problems in politics.
In Chap. 3, we outline the difference between substantialist and rela-
tional understanding of social processes by utilizing the distinction
between self-action, inter-action, and trans-action as it was put forth by
John Dewey and Arthur Bentley already in 1949 and used by many since
Emirbayer’s classic “Manifesto for a relational sociology” in 1997. We

distinguish between three understandings of social processes. First, the
form of process-reduction of self-actionalism, which reduces processes to
their instigators. Second, the form of process-reduction of inter-actionalism
that reifies processes to “things” or “variables.” Third, the processual-
relational approach of trans-actionalism which aims to avoid process-
reduction as far as possible and sees social processes as constitutive relations
among elements. Then we move to the problem of governing wicked
problems from the processual-relationalist point of view by analyzing its
opposite: the de-problematization of wicked problems, which is, in
essence, reducing them to their instigators or just measurable variables
(including timelines, implementation plans, development plans, etc.). We
also discuss the notion of depoliticization found in governance literature
and put forth an essentially semiotic or discursive approach to problemati-
zation and de-problematization of wicked problems. Finally, we propose
two ideal-typical forms of governance as de-problematization, what we
call self-active and inter-active governance.
In Chap. 4, we outline the form of governance that, we argue, should
be the preferred form of governing wicked problems: trans-active gover-
nance as politics of problematization, which would be governing without
process-reduction, and treating them as un-owned processes. This leads us
to discussing the contingency of the socio-political world and the role of
failure in governance. Consequently, we put forth an approach that we call
“failure governance,” which would not see governance failure as an aber-
ration, but as something to be presumed from the beginning and gov-
erned through self-reflective irony, requisite variety of responses and
reflexive orientation. Here we draw heavily on Bob Jessop’s notion of
metagovernance. Finally, we discuss why governance failure goes hand in
hand with managing wicked problems. This is the concluding chapter of
Part I of the book, whose aim was to set the stage for a relational under-
standing of wicked problems.
In Part II, we present a genealogical “history of the present” of policy
theories and trace the increasing realization of the contingency of the
social and the inevitability of failure in policy-making by these theories.
This is not a historical overview but a conceptual analysis that utilizes the
distinctions of self-actional, inter-actional, and trans-actional understand-
ings of the social world as outlined in Part I. In Chap. 5, we start the
genealogy of self-active governance by analyzing the “policy orientation”
going back to Harold Laswell in the early 1950s. This is the so-called
12 P. SELG ET AL.
normative or textbook model of policy process, which sees policy as find-

ing solutions to problems; policy as a decision-making process; and policy
as causal chains of functionally linked activities. We also analyze the discur-
sive context for the emergence of policy orientation.
In Chap. 6, we zoom in on the very meaning of (policy) problems and
on three understandings of dealing with problems: their solution, their
resolution, and their dissolution. We then move away from the presump-
tion that problems are somehow pre-given to the policy process and that
policy is a problem-solving activity. We do this by taking steps toward
understanding policy as design, toward seeing problem structuring as an
analytical strategy to view policy in the context of contingency and chaos.
Consequently, in this chapter, we start moving from self-actionalism to
inter-actionalism in policy theories by increasingly recognizing the contin-
gency of the socio-political world of both problems and their governance.
In Chap. 7, we move even further away from self-actualism, by deepen-
ing the grasp of contingency in the theories of the policy process. We look
at attempts to bring an understanding of the political constitution of pol-
icy problems back into the theories of the policy process, by looking at
different interpretations of policy implementation ranging from the con-
cepts of “street-level bureaucrats” to those of “backward mapping.” Then
we move to four basic patterns in theorizing policy as a contingent pro-
cess: the theory of policy streams; the theory of advocacy coalitions;
“thick” institutionalism in rational choice theory; and the theory of
“attention shifts.” This provides the basis for making sense of the emer-
gence of theories of policy networks and the notion of governance as gov-
erning through networks. We discuss various additional roots of the notion
of governance, such as new-institutionalism, new public management,
organization studies and political science, and multi-level governance
and/as network governance.
In Chap. 8, we pose the more existential question regarding policy
analysis: can we speak “truth to power” as the famous slogan reads already
since the eighteenth century, or are knowledge and rationality in policy-
making constituted politically? We move away from the representationalist
understanding of knowledge—the notion that knowledge represents real-
ity—to an understanding of knowledge as an active ordering of reality. For
this, we have to take a closer look at the contributions of two great social/
political thinkers: Herbert Simon, who introduced the concept of bounded
rationality, and Charles Lindblom’s work against the so-called Professional
Social Inquiry where he proposed that policy process is “muddling
through” the plurality of policy-relevant knowledge. We also introduce

the “the argumentative turn” in policy analysis, to be unfolded in more
detail in the next chapter, and reflect on changing understanding of the
relationship between knowledge, truth, and experts.
In Chap. 9, we take the final steps toward process-relational approaches
to theories of the policy process by first moving beyond the politics/policy
dualism in them. Next, we analyze the institutionalization of politics in
policy networks and the political constitution of policy through issue
framing. We conclude our discussion with the notion of politics of critical
dialogue, which we see as most consistent with the trans-actionalist
approach we are proposing in this book. This is the concluding chapter of
Part II, whose aim was to take stock of the “history of the present” (in
Foucault’s sense) of policy theories to formulate the model of governance
as a multidimensional process of interdependence problematization and
de-problematization.
Chapter 10 proposes the model just mentioned. Yet it starts by summa-
rizing the main differences between inter-actionalist and trans-actionalist
understandings of the policy process. Furthermore, a political semiotics
understanding of governance is proposed that distinguishes six interdepen-
dent forms of governance based on the semiotic model of communication
of Roman Jakobson, the cultural semiotics of Juri Lotman, and the Essex
school of post-structuralist political theory of hegemony (Ernesto Laclau,
Chantal Mouffe, and others): governance as threat, governance as stoicism,
governance as cynicism, governance as hierarchy, deliberative governance,
and metagovernance. Also, the methodological consequences of the politi-
cal semiotic theory of governance are spelled out, and a dialogical under-
standing of theory in case study research is proposed for the three case
studies of failure governance and governance failure that follow in Chaps.
11, 12, and 13. All of them are related to the governance of the COVID-19
crisis of 2020–2022 which could be seen as a wicked problem.
In Chap. 11, the case of Taiwan is explored. Taiwan could be seen as
the epitome of success of pandemic management. Based on various
resources, we found over 100 measures in place against the pandemic, and
we can call Taiwan the whole-of-nation-failure-governance. We also dis-
cuss the poor performance of Taiwan at the beginning of the vaccination
phase of the crisis and bring in the changing situation where the country
had to deal with, instead of domestic politics of containing the virus, with
a geopolitical crisis related to vaccine supply (and the intervention of
mainland China).
14 P. SELG ET AL.
In Chap. 12, the case of the USA under the Trump administration is
analyzed. The country can be considered an epitome of failure, with more
than a million COVID-19 deaths in less than three years. Often the expla-
nations proposed for such a huge failure are structuralist/institutionalist,
pointing to the neoliberalization of health care or the New Federalism that
has made it very difficult to coordinate the country with its 50 states. We,
however, propose to focus on Trump’s governance and analyze how his
politics of de-problematization of the health crisis through stoic and cyni-
cal governance that often engaged in discrediting expertise and science has
led to the disastrous outcome.
In Chap. 13, we explain Germany’s path from failure governance to
governance failure when it comes to the COVID-19 crisis. During the first
one and a half years of the crisis, the country was quite successful in gov-
erning it. Various strategies of failure governance were adopted that we
could conceptualize in terms of self-reflective irony, reflexive orientation,
and requisite variety of responses to constantly changing circumstances.
However, when it came to the vaccination phase of the crisis, the country
was surprisingly poor in its performance. Various aspects could be seen as
contributing to such changes: the stoic refusal to take tough measures
against COVID in view of the federal elections in September 2021, the
mixed messages regarding vaccines and the ignoring of scientific expertise,
to name a few here. We look at both German leadership as well as the
institutional build-up of the country in our explanation.
In our concluding remarks (Chap. 14), instead of just reiterating our
basic findings in this book, we take our discussion to the next level and
reflect on the lessons learned from failure governance and governance fail-
ure in view of the biggest wicked problem that our planet is facing: the
climate crisis. We also discuss the role of scientific and, especially social-
scientific knowledge and education in the face of the world where more
and more policy-problems—locally and globally—are wicked, and how to
deal with the haunting temptation to de-problematize them.
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PART I
A Relational Definition of Wicked

Problems of Governance
CHAPTER 2
Aren’t All Problems Wicked? Addressing

the Constructive and Destructive Critiques
of the Concept of Wicked Problems
Much has been written about wicked problems since Rittel and Webber’s
classical piece (1973) that set the discourse in motion (e.g., Grint, 2010;
Roberts, 2000; Van Bueren et al., 2003; Verweij & Thompson, 2006;
Head, 2022). Despite the contested nature of the concept, we believe it is
possible to put forth an analytic definition of it (see also Selg et al., 2022).
A useful starting point is the descriptive summary of the ten features of
wicked problems that travel from one account to another since Rittel
and Webber:
1. Wicked problems are difficult to define. There is no definite

formulation.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false but good or bad.
4. There is no immediate or ultimate test for solutions.
5. All attempts to solutions have effects that may not be reversible or
forgettable.
6. These problems have no clear solution, and perhaps not even a set
of possible solutions.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem may be a symptom of another problem.
9. There are multiple explanations for the wicked problem.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2023
P. Selg et al., A Relational Approach to Governing Wicked Problems,
Palgrave Studies in Relational Sociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24034-8_2
22 P. SELG ET AL.
10. The planner (policy-maker) has no right to be wrong. (Peters,

2017, p. 388; cf. Rittel & Webber, 1973, pp. 161–173; Head,
2022, pp. 26–27)
Moving from a descriptive presentation to an analytical one involves

two major steps: comparing them, first, with other problems discussed in
governance literature and, second, considering the underlying ontological
commitments regarding social processes they tacitly presume. In this
chapter, we take up the first step. However, before we can embark on even
this task, we should seriously ask the question that has informed several
prominent analyses of the concept in recent years: should we have an
ontological concept of “wicked problems” in the first place?
2.1 Should We Have an Ontological Notion

of Wicked Problems in the First Place?
Various constructive and destructive criticisms of the notion of wicked

problems exist (e.g., Peters, 2017; Turnbull & Hoppe, 2019; Alford &
Head, 2017). In this section we will look at only a couple of them to illus-
trate certain contours of this critical discourse rather than to give a litera-
ture review. In one way or another, they touch on the ontological status of
“wicked problems,” which provides us with a platform to argue for the
need to formulate the ontological commitments of our approach (a task
which we start in the concluding section of this chapter and develop more
fully in the next chapter).
2.1.1 Some Constructive and Destructive Criticisms

of the Notion of Wicked Problems
For Alford and Head, “the term ‘wicked problem’ has become inflated
and over-used” (2017, p. 398). They point to other terms that have been
put forth for the same concept (ibid., p. 401) such as “messy” policy prob-
lems (Ackoff, 1974), “ill-structured” problems (Simon, 1973), “intracta-
ble controversies” (Schön & Rein, 1994), “unstructured” or “incorrigible”
problems (Hisschemoller & Hoppe, 1995; Hoppe, 2010), “tangled prob-
lems” (Dawes et al., 2009); “complex problems” (May et al., 2013). The
notion of wicked problems is supposed to have various unfortunate conse-
quences. The first is what they call “totalization.” It refers to “regarding
2 AREN’T ALL PROBLEMS WICKED? ADDRESSING THE CONSTRUCTIVE… 23
the problems as intractable masses of complexity, so conflict-prone and/or

knotty that they defy definition and solution” only to lend “comfort to
those who wish to avoid grappling with such problems” (Alford & Head,
2017, p. 399). Related to this totalization is presuming that
‘wicked problems’ require transformational responses. This apocalyptic style

of analysis describes big, fast-moving problems that require big, fast-moving
solutions. There is pressure to get it right, with little time to ‘slow-cook’
small interventions. Its proponents seek a dramatic transformative interven-
tion that settles things decisively. (Ibid.)
This might lead to the cult of unsuccess or to “invoke[ing] a concep-

tion of ‘success’ which is almost impossible to achieve” (ibid.). It is sup-
posedly an all or nothing approach or
a binary choice between either transformative success or ongoing defeat.

Because a wicked problem is seen as a tangled, tightly knit cluster of phe-
nomena, dealing with any part of it is seen to require somehow dealing with
its other parts at the same time, as a knot or a mass of difficulty. (Ibid., p. 400)
This seems to undermine small-wins tactics or the understanding that

“[w]e do not so much solve wicked problems as make progress towards
improving them or towards better managing them” (ibid.). For Alford
and Head, it is also problematic that the level, degree, or rate of wicked-
ness is not discussed, and that “each situation has been seen in binary
terms as either wicked or tame. But the fact that proponents of this generic
framework refer to ‘tame’ problems as the obverse of wicked ones suggests
that there may be mixed situations between these two extremes” (ibid.).
Related to that is the lack of attention to “analysing what might be the
constituent elements of these problems, into which they might be decom-
posed for more fruitful analysis. Rather, the wicked problem remains as
one big complex entity—a ‘black box’ whose inner mechanisms constitute
a mystery” (ibid.). Let’s try to open up this “black box,” using Head’s
own understanding of Rittel and Webber.
For the latter, according to Head, “even the best available policy
responses are highly provisional rather than enduring” (2019, p. 182).
They draw attention “to the inherently political and conflictual dimen-
sions of how enduring problems are defined and scoped” and “to the
limits of scientific expertise in shaping appropriate policy responses to
24 P. SELG ET AL.
contested social issues” (Head, 2019, p. 182). So the first component of

the “black box” seems to be “the political”: enduring policy problems are
constituted politically. This is one of the reasons why hard science seems
to be quite helpless in tackling wicked problems:
As distinguished from problems in the natural sciences, which are definable

and separable and may have solutions that are findable, the problems of
governmental planning—and especially those of social or policy planning—
are ill-defined; and they rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution.
(Not “solution.” Social problems are never solved. At best they are only
re-solved—over and over again.) (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160)
For Rittel and Webber wicked problems “include nearly all public pol-
icy issues—whether the question concerns the location of a freeway, the
adjustment of a tax rate, the modification of school curricula, or the con-
frontation of crime” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160). In that sense they
presume the primacy of the political—reliance “upon elusive political
judgment”—in thinking about policy issues. The political is not some
sphere or realm of society—it penetrates and permeates it whenever there
is a question of organizing society. To make further sense of it, let’s look
at Rittel and Webber’s distinction between tame and wicked problems:
The problems that scientists and engineers have usually focused upon are
mostly “tame” or “benign” ones. As an example, consider a problem of
mathematics, such as solving an equation; or the task of an organic chemist
in analyzing the structure of some unknown compound; or that of the
chessplayer attempting to accomplish checkmate in five moves. For each the
mission is clear. It is clear, in turn, whether or not the problems have been
solved. (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160)
Rittel and Webber intended their figure of “wickedness” to evoke cer-

tain connotations:
we are calling them “wicked” not because these properties are themselves
ethically deplorable. We use the term “wicked” in a meaning akin to that of
“malignant” (in contrast to “benign”) or “vicious” (like a circle) or “tricky”
(like a leprechaun) or “aggressive” (like a lion, in contrast to the docility of
a lamb). (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160)
So, there is no mission to be accomplished that can be imagined from

scratch. As Head summarizes it:
The attraction of the ‘wicked problem’ concept is that it seems to provide

additional insights concerning why many policies and programs generate
controversy, fail to achieve their stated goals, cause unforeseen effects, or are
impossibly difficult to coordinate and monitor. (Head, 2008, p. 103)
The other “black box” component is clustered under the keyword “val-
ues.” Something that tends to be forgotten in various technocratic
approaches to society is that values cannot be adjudicated through “doing
more science,” but “value differences need to be managed through broad
processes of argumentation and conflict resolution among stakeholders”
(Head, 2019, p. 182). Thus, there is little room for “technical approaches”
that “are bound to overlook the values, perspectives and lived experience
of the stakeholders and citizens who are directly or indirectly assisted or
involved in these interventions” (Head, 2008, p. 102). The notion of
wicked problems brings to prominence the fact that “the growth of scien-
tific and technical expertise alone cannot resolve difficult policy problems”
(ibid.).
Another intervention is framed by Alford and Head (2017). They do
not propose doing away with the notion of wicked problems altogether
but suggest to elaborate it into a more continuous framework that would
take into account various degrees and sources of “wickedness” (see
also below).
Peters seems to have a similar attitude in his “rather skeptical discussion
of the concept of wicked problems [which] should not be seen as a com-
plete dismissal of this idea” (2017, p. 393). His worry is mainly that “[t]he
existence of difficult problems should not… become an excuse to stretch
the concept of wicked problems to the point that for analytic reasons it
becomes almost meaningless” (ibid., p. 395)—something particularly
handy for policy-makers of Western countries that are most interested in
securing short-term power gains.
We move to much more destructive criticism of the notion when we
look at Nick Turnbull and Robert Hoppe’s recent intervention (2019).
For them, “wicked” is just “a rhetorical term (similar to ‘fuzzy’, ‘messy’
and even ‘complex’, but with additional rhetorical force in persuasively
garnering attention), both in practice and in scholarship” (2019, p. 325).
Their argument deconstructs the ontological basis of Rittel and Webber:
26 P. SELG ET AL.
Contrary to what is presupposed in much of the subsequent literature, Rittel

and Webber’s wicked/tame problem distinction does not, in fact, aim to
distinguish different types of policy problems. In actuality, they use the dis-
tinction to differentiate between societal problems and those of the natural
sciences. (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2019, p. 318)
They refer to Rittel and Webber’s point that in the case of social plan-
ning “the expert is also the player in a political game, seeking to promote
his private vision of goodness over others. Planning is a component of
politics” (1973, p. 169). Turnbull and Hoppe conclude that “the wicked/
tame problem distinction is simply the old false distinction between social and
natural sciences, rewritten in the language of policy and planning” (2019,
p. 318). They have a harsh diagnosis for “the subsequent effort by scholars
to delineate which societal problems are wicked, or even to what degree
they are wicked”; for them, it is just a
pursuit of a definition never intended by Rittel and Webber, given that they
argue all societal problems, including those of planning and policy, fall into
the wicked category. It is unsurprising that scholars have been unable to put
their finger on wickedness as a category that varies within an ontological
subset of policy problems. (Ibid.)
They strengthen this claim by pointing to prominent works in the soci-

ology of science and technology which claim that “strict, ontological
demarcation of wicked and tame problems according to the branches of
science is a serious misconception, and as such very misleading” (ibid.).
Turnbull and Hoppe, go further by arguing that non-social problems can
also be wicked.
The pollution and other material externalities crises in, for example, agricul-
ture and food, health, forestry, water and climate of the late 20th and early
21st centuries broadened the circle of ‘wicked’ problems to ‘environmen-
tal’, ‘technological’ and ‘ecological’. But what is overlooked by most schol-
ars is that, for Rittel and Webber’s problem distinction, this has devastating
consequences. If not only social problems can be wicked, but problems
deeply involving the natural sciences as well, then the distinction between
the ‘ill-defined’ problems of the social sciences and the ‘well-defined’ or
‘tame’ problems of science (i.e. logic, mathematics and the sciences of the
non-human world, especially physics) and engineering is also obsolete.
(Ibid., p. 319)
This, however, seems to be a misfire in their criticism. For instance,

global warming might only be understood as a wicked problem insofar as
it has consequences for humanity or societies (and many other species on
the planet—but we leave that aside for now). From a geological or plane-
tary point of view, this is a routine process, and planet Earth has endured
larger climate changes than the current one. If we add here that the change
is overwhelmingly caused by human beings themselves and that there
might be a chance to at least slow down the change if those same beings
would alter something in their conduct—then we have some ground for
talking about wickedness in the first place. Our planet does not need sav-
ing—it has been in way worse conditions and still survived, as natural sci-
ences can tell us. It is ourselves who need saving. It does not get more
“social” than that. In addition, we argue that what Rittel and Webber are
quarrelling about in their classical paper is not natural sciences per se—the
term occurs only once in this piece—but the discourse of “professional-
ism” and (social) “engineering” when it comes to social planning. The
latter two topics are all over this little paper of just 15 pages, the research
problem of which is captured in the concluding paragraph of their open-
ing section
Professionalism has been understood to be one of the major instruments for

perfectability, an agent sustaining the traditional American optimism. Based
in modern science, each of the professions has been conceived as the medium
through which the knowledge of science is applied. In effect, each profes-
sion has been seen as a subset of engineering. Planning and the emerging
policy sciences are among the more optimistic of those professions. Their
representatives refuse to believe that planning for betterment is impossible,
however grave their misgivings about the appropriateness of past and pres-
ent modes of planning. They have not abandoned the hope that the instru-
ments of perfectability can be perfected. It is that view that we want to
examine, in an effort to ask whether the social professions are equipped to
do what they are expected to do. (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 158)
Nevertheless, in view of their criticism, Turnbull and Hoppe’s recom-

mendation is: let’ us not play a “scientific language game” when it comes
to wicked problems:
generations of scholars have followed in playing a scientific language game

of essentializing and ontologizing ‘wicked’ problems via attempts at classify-
ing them by looking for the (variable) presence of their properties. … In
28 P. SELG ET AL.
their unstoppable taste for innovation, they have recently “discovered” the
properties of “super-wicked” problems. (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2019, p. 319)
From what they call “ontological reading of wicked problems” follows

another issue: the
presumption … that problems can be analysed from above, as though onto-

logically distinctive and autonomous from social activity around those prob-
lems. That is, the problem ‘as such’ is assumed to have an autonomous,
unique nature of its own … which can be discovered, much like bacteria
observed by a scientist through a microscope. But this isolates the problem
itself from the surrounding context, including from the theory-dependence
of the observer. (Ibid., p. 320)
They conclude: “This analytical ontology [can there be a non-analytical

ontology?] combines reductionist thinking about problems with the
decontextualization of policy analysis via this ‘view from nowhere’” (ibid.).
Against such “views from nowhere,” they make a quite self-evident point,
at least from the relational perspective:
All problems are only problems for those involved in experiencing or treat-
ing them, which means they are inevitably viewed from somewhere, such
that bound up in their viewpoints are innumerable interpretations, perspec-
tives and social relations with other interested actors. (Turnbull & Hoppe,
2019, p. 321)
This is exactly what we meant when we said that our planet is not in
need of saving, but we are. That is why environmental changes are never
problems “as such,” wicked or not. They are always relations. Even more
so, they are constitutive relations, entailing, among other things, that
problems “become” problems given the solutions they are approached
with. This retroactive logic where solutions make up problems they are
supposed to solve makes perfect sense from the relational point of view.
Turnbull and Hoppe actually seem to be presuming the same logic when
they suggest reframing wickedness “in terms of practice, i.e. how it is
experienced in the context of practical action around policy problems,
faced by policy workers” (2019, p. 322). But, they see it as “an alternative
framework for understanding policymaking, which is not ontological but
based on questioning, thus allowing each element—problem, solution,
process—to maintain its problematic qualities” (ibid., italics added). In
the next chapter we untangle the italicized part of this quote—the “onto-
logical”—and show that what they propose to understand as ontology
“defining any general properties of wicked problems” is only one possible
understanding of the concept of ontology (self-actionalism) and that what
they propose as alternative to “ontological” framework is, in fact quite
consistent with the relational ontological commitments we offer for better
grasping wicked problems. Indeed, we argue in the next section that there
cannot be any sensible research program with no ontological commit-
ments. Thus Turnbull and Hoppe are in fact, “doing” ontology when they
claim that they “have a better, alternative conception of a higher/lower
degree of problematicity or structuredness of problems, which is not onto-
logical but lies along a continuum from unstructured to structured”
(2019, p. 333). They have an ontology or ontological commitments that
conceptualize the political world as a continuous flow. This is different
from the ontology of discrete entities with their bounded properties—
entailing that problems are either wicked or tame—which they attribute to
Rittel and Webber and their followers (not entirely fairly). But to say that
their framework is not ontological, makes little sense. Every methodology
presumes ontological commitments—no matter how tacit and unexam-
ined by the researcher they are. Thus, the question of what are methodol-
ogy and ontology and how to justify choices between varying alternatives
of them needs to be addressed briefly.
2.1.2 What Are Methodology and Ontology, and How

to Justify Them?
By methodology, we do not mean any specific methods as in the “meth-
odology” sections of most (neo)positivist research papers in the social sci-
ences. For us, to quote Hay (2006),
[m]ethodology relates to the choice of analytical strategy and research

design which underpins substantive research. Although methodology
establishes the principles which might guide the choice of method, it should
not be confused with the methods and techniques of research them-
selves. (p. 83)
However, a take on ontological issues is unavoidable since they are

“antecedent to epistemological and methodological choices…[which]
cannot be fully appreciated in the absence of sustained ontological
30 P. SELG ET AL.
reflection and debate” (Hay, 2006, p. 79). In other words, methodologi-

cal and ontological debates are not only mutually complementing each
other, but methodology is always based on ontological presumptions or,
“ontological commitments” as they are often referred to after Quine
(1951, 1953, pp. 1–19). The Quinean notion of ontological commitment
is summarized in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, one of the
most prestigious sourcebooks of philosophy: “The ontological commit-
ments of a theory are, roughly, what the theory says exists; a theory is
ontologically committed to electrons, for example, if the truth of the the-
ory requires that there be electrons” (Bricker, 2016). It is clear that there
cannot be any methodology without ontological commitments. This
holds even if some particular researchers do not make those commitments
explicit. But the question that might arise is: how can one justify particular
choices of ontology? The frontlines in these debates have been relatively
crystallized in the developments in analytic philosophy over the past
75 years.
A straightforward attempt at empirical falsification of whichever ontol-
ogy cannot possibly suffice, as it is precisely the categories we would appeal
to in empirical research that are under question in the first place. Or, as
Hay (2006, pp. 87–88) puts it, our ontology preinforms what is “seen” in
any observation, and thus, there can be no empirical license for ontologi-
cal claims and assumptions. This points toward what Carnap distinguished
as the difference between internal questions about the existence of entities
within a given framework and external questions about the existence of
the frameworks themselves. Answers to the latter would be, for Carnap, a
“pseudo-statement without any cognitive content” (1956, p. 206).
Following Carnap, we hold that external questions about the reality of
ontological frameworks are a dead-end and—at the very least—can be
bracketed within the context of this book without anything of note
being lost.
If there are no criteria for establishing a correspondence to reality that
could adjudicate between ontological frameworks, then we must appeal to
some different principle. Here we find common ground with the neo-
pragmatist philosophers such as Richard Rorty, who reiterates a similar
point: “there is no such thing as ‘the best explanation’ of anything; there
is just the explanation which best suits the purpose of some given explainer”
(2006, p. 60). This quote points us toward an alternative justification for
our ontological commitments—one based on practical purposes, or, bor-

rowing from Dewey, “its functional or instrumental use in effecting the
transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated
one” (Dewey, 2012, p. 75). Some ontological frameworks may simply
work better in making sense of what is happening to us or what we hope
to do, but as our purposes vary, so can our underlying assumptions. Notice
that according to this Deweyan approach to inquiry, there is only a modest
demand for a relative integration of experience rather than for absolute
knowledge.
We are thus led to embrace a (meta)ontological pluralism which entails
pragmatic accommodation toward various ontological frameworks with
different conditions of veridiction—as there is no “God’s eye” view to
judge whether the ontology presupposed by a theoretical framework cor-
responds to the way things “really are,” our ontologies are justified by
their use. We can shift between ontological frameworks depending on our
particular aims without ever being forced (or able) to appeal to a metalan-
guage to adjudicate how well any of them represents reality.
Hence, the following sections and chapters can be seen as justifying a
particular set of ontology and their methodological consequences. This
justification is pragmatist at its core, entailing that this book should not be
seen as giving a “True” representation of the reality of wicked problems,
but as proposing a new relational framework for speaking about wicked
problems that, we claim, allows us to do it more conceptually than we can
within conventional (substantialist) frameworks.
Our general point is that although ontologically speaking one can con-
sider the “simplest” of governance problems (e.g., organizing the paving
of one street in a small municipality) as wicked problems, it would, how-
ever, seldom make sense both theoretically and methodologically on the one
hand (when it comes to their research), and practically on the other hand
(when it comes to their governance). Therefore, we state that it makes
sense to distinguish between different problems or, as we later discuss in
more detail—between different forms of problematizations and de-
problematizations. But what kind of distinctions are there available
between different problems of governance and policy? We will consider
some of them before we move to our own distinctions.
32 P. SELG ET AL.
2.2 How to Understand Problems: Alternative

Typologies and Frameworks
2.2.1 Alford and Head’s Contingency Framework

According to Alford and Head, “understanding a wicked problem entails
a reflexive or iterative analysis” (2017, p. 403). They put forth a toolbox
for such an analysis, which they call “the contingency framework.” For
them, it is a movement “from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model to one where the
choice of intervention type depends on and fits with the circumstances”
(ibid., p. 407). A starting point for such a framework is “[t]he broad
matrix [with] two dimensions, one relating to the problem itself, the other
to the people involved. These dimensions constitute merely scaffolding for
ordering the more detailed dimensions. They are not meant to offer any
particular insights in themselves” (ibid., italics added). From there, two
major research questions for further investigation emerge. First: what is
the nature of the problem or “its level of intractability in itself” (ibid.)?
They argue that “in themselves” problems are either tame, analytically
complex, or cognitively complex. Tame problems are such that “the nature
of the problem and the solution may be clear to the decision-makers in
question. This can encompass even issues that seem at first sight to be
quite complicated, such as the technical and planning challenges under-
pinning the construction of the Channel Tunnel between France and
England” (ibid., p. 403). Analytically Complex problems, in turn, are
problems whose “nature and causes… may be known, but the solution is
not—and indeed, it is difficult to find a sound solution owing to analytical
or political complexities” (ibid.). In case of cognitively complex problems
“[n]either the problem itself nor the possible effective solutions are clearly
known to the decision-makers in question” (ibid.). Overall, the variable of
the “level of intractability of the problem itself” is presumed to have three
truth values: low, medium, and high.
The second research question emerging from their framework is: what
people are involved in (in terms of their knowledge, conflicting interests,
and relative power)? Here the essential consideration “is the propensity or
otherwise of those involved to enable the problem to be properly
addressed” (ibid.). Considering “the people involved” requires thus
reviewing (a) “the locus of important knowledge about the problem” and
“whether it rests substantially with the policy manager in question or is
fragmented and held by multiple stakeholders” (Alford & Head, 2017,
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Failure to Thrive and Malnutrition A Practical Evidence

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In this book, we argue that moving from a substantialist to a relational

propose normative guidelines for how to have a great sense of humor.

Tallinn, Estonia Peeter Selg

Part I A Relational Definition of Wicked Problems of

Part II The History of the Present of the Theories of the

Part III Theory and Practice of Failure Governance and

11 The Whole-of-Nation-Failure-Governance: Taiwan’s

Part IV Concluding Remarks 363

Fig. 2.1 Alternative types of complex problems. (Source: Alford &

Table 2.1 Three types of problems of governance 36

Introduction: A Relational Approach

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

to A or B, it is always between them and not conceivable as a separate

theoretical reflection. It is very much context dependent. But what is

1. If we were to analyze sense of humor from our spontaneous substan-

ous, but nevertheless, B would act as if A were joking. This would

In the third strategy, thus, sense of humor is treated as an unfolding,

What a hammer is, is defined relationally. Qua physical object or body, a

phenomena like the Covid-19 or Climate Crisis “abstractly, i.e. one-sid-

of the inevitable conclusions of this is that it is impossible to locate the

substances or in processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, unfolding rela-

a problem that could be seen simultaneously as: a humanitarian crisis based

This recent example points to a general challenge of governing wicked

Emirbayer’s classic “Manifesto for a relational sociology” in 1997. We

normative or textbook model of policy process, which sees policy as find-

through” the plurality of policy-relevant knowledge. We also introduce

Camillus, J. (2008). Strategy as a wicked problem. Harvard Business Review,

Jones, M. (2009). Phase space: Geography, relational thinking, and beyond.

Somers, M. (1994). The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and net-

A Relational Definition of Wicked

Aren’t All Problems Wicked? Addressing

1. Wicked problems are difficult to define. There is no definite

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

10. The planner (policy-maker) has no right to be wrong. (Peters,

Moving from a descriptive presentation to an analytical one involves

2.1 Should We Have an Ontological Notion

Various constructive and destructive criticisms of the notion of wicked

2.1.1 Some Constructive and Destructive Criticisms

the problems as intractable masses of complexity, so conflict-prone and/or

‘wicked problems’ require transformational responses. This apocalyptic style

This might lead to the cult of unsuccess or to “invoke[ing] a concep-

a binary choice between either transformative success or ongoing defeat.

This seems to undermine small-wins tactics or the understanding that

contested social issues” (Head, 2019, p. 182). So the first component of

As distinguished from problems in the natural sciences, which are definable

Tallinn, Estonia Peeter Selg

Part I A Relational Definition of Wicked Problems of

Part II The History of the Present of the Theories of the

Part III Theory and Practice of Failure Governance and

11 The Whole-of-Nation-Failure-Governance: Taiwan’s

Part IV Concluding Remarks 363

Table 2.1 Three types of problems of governance 36