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A Research Agenda for Environmental Geopolitics
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SHANNON O’LEAR
University of Kansas, USA
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Index 167
Leslie Acton is Assistant Professor in the Division of Coastal Sciences in the School
of Ocean Science and Engineering at the University of Southern Mississippi, USA.
Her research focuses on oceans governance and human–ocean relationships; key
themes of her work include power, territory, perceptions, institutional change, and
ocean materiality. She draws on human geography, political ecology, and common-
pool resource theory to examine how coastal and ocean policy is negotiated and
how it impacts stakeholders and communities across space, scale, and time.
Brendon Blue is Research Fellow in Geography, part of the School of Environment/
Te Kura Taiao at the University of Auckland, New Zealand/Te Whare Wānanga o
Tāmaki Makaurau, Aotearoa. An environmental geographer, Brendon studies the
landscapes, knowledges and practices of environmental intervention. He has pub-
lished on the politics of river restoration science, critical physical geography, fluvial
geomorphology in China, and coastal geomorphology in New Zealand.
Lisa M. Campbell is the Rachel Carson Professor of Marine Affairs and Policy in
the Nicholas School of Environment, Duke University, based at the marine labora-
tory in Beaufort, North Carolina, USA. A political ecologist, she studies oceans
governance at a variety of scales, focusing on how science and non-state actors
inform governance processes and outcomes. She has published on these themes in
relation to protected species, fisheries, marine spatial planning, marine protected
areas, and tourism.
Simon Dalby is Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies at Wilfrid
Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, where he teaches in the Balsillie
School of International Affairs. He is coeditor of Achieving the Sustainable
Development Goals (2019) and author of Anthropocene Geopolitics (2020). He has
active research interests in contemporary climate change discourse as well as the
burgeoning debate about the Anthropocene and its implications for politics and
policy formulation.
Olivier Evrard is a social anthropologist at the French Research Institute for
Sustainable Development in France. He has conducted extensive periods of field-
work since the mid-1990s mostly with Mon-Khmer- and Tai-speaking popula-
tions in Laos and Thailand. His work focuses on ethnicity, mobility, and history of
interethnic relationships particularly as they intersect with environmental issues.
Coleen A. Fox is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography and the
Environmental Studies Program at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, USA. Her
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water, the role of experts in shaping New Zealand water policy implementation,
and critical physical geography.
Pierre-Louis Têtu is an experienced part-time teacher with a demonstrated history
of working in the higher-education industry. Skilled in ArcGIS Products; Arctic,
Ocean Transportation, Training Facilitation; and International Relations, he has a
PhD from Laval University in Quebec, Canada focusing on Arctic Shipping. He was
granted a postdoctoral fellowship by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council (SSHRC) of Canada to work on risks associated with marine tourism in the
Arctic, at the Environment, Society and Policy Group (ESPG) of the Department of
Geography of the University of Ottawa.
Stacy D. VanDeveer is Professor of Global Governance and Human Security at
University of Massachusetts John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and
Global Studies, USA. His research interests include European Union environmen-
tal and energy politics, global environmental policymaking and institutions, com-
parative environmental politics, connections between environmental and security
issues, the roles of expertise in policymaking, and the global politics of extractive
resources and material consumption. In addition to authoring and co-authoring
over 100 articles, book chapters, working papers, and reports, he has co-edited or
co-authored ten books.
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Shannon O’Lear
Introduction
Most people have a sense of what the field of geopolitics is: it has something to do
with how place intertwines with power being exercised or challenged. Geopolitics
is related to how decisions are made with a particular, place-related outcome or
vision in mind: overcoming a boundary, expanding territory, or making sure that
someone or something else does not threaten a boundary or a territory. Geopolitics
might most easily be associated with states or countries and how they relate to
each other over spatial issues such as the control of boundaries and territory. Yet
there are other actors or interest groups beyond states, and there are spaces and
places that are beyond, within, and between the spaces claimed by states. The field
of geopolitics, then, considers far more than how states make place-related and
spatial decisions and actions. It encompasses many kinds of struggle to control
places and place-related activities – What kinds of things can happen here? Who
is allowed to be here? Who gets to make those decisions? – and considers different
actors, interest groups, voices, and perspectives on spatial activities and processes.
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Both geographical knowledge and environmental knowledge come into play when
environmental features are entangled in geopolitical issues: climate change and
human migration; armed conflict related to environmental resources; management
of endangered species, water scarcity, and forest fires; environmental degradation
and food supply distribution; environmental impacts of energy generation and
consumption; and the list goes on. These entanglements of geopolitical and envi-
ronmental processes have multiple dimensions, and they are frequently portrayed
to highlight some aspects over others. Often, it is possible to find a political agenda
underlying any particular story or narrative about the environment. That in itself is
not a bad thing, and it can be valuable to see what kinds of agendas are drawing on
environmental features and processes. This kind of consideration is useful because
it can demonstrate how a portrayal of the environment is limited either intention-
ally or inadvertently to achieve a desired outcome.
The following section of this chapter provides a brief overview of geopolitics and
makes the case for examining different forms of geopolitical discourse: narrative
or text, practice, materiality, identity, or embodiment. Next, this chapter intro-
duces three themes of environmental geopolitics and discusses each theme as a
useful point of entry to analyze environmental geopolitical discourses. Finally, this
c hapter includes an overview of the chapters in this book and how each one dem-
onstrates environmental geopolitical analysis. The conclusion provides a summary
of key themes of the chapters and looks ahead to possible pathways forward in
environmental geopolitics research.
Geopolitics
are examples of materialities that say something about who is in power and how
power is being exercised. Practices are things that we do or that we avoid doing.
Examples of practices include how we make consumption decisions, how society
adapts or does not adapt to new information and ideas, or how we adjust our
behaviors with the introduction of new technologies. A fourth form of discourse is
identity or embodiment. How we label ourselves or label and group other people
is informed by our perspective and understanding of the world. All four forms
of discourse reflect ways that power shapes our relationship with environmental
features and provide rich avenues for analysis. Broadening the scope of analysis to
include these different but sometimes overlapping forms of discourse encourages a
creative, multi-textured investigation of geopolitical claims involving environmen-
tal features.
These three entry points help to disentangle elements of geopolitical claims related
to environmental features, and they can contribute to a more balanced under-
standing of environmental processes, political agendas, and the value of seeing
contributing factors to these relationships at multiple, simultaneous spatial scales.
Consider each observation in turn.
Take for instance global data on temperature. A global data set would seem to be
as comprehensive and complete as it can get. Yet, there is not such a thing as a
global thermometer to measure global temperature. Instead, global temperature
– or any kind of global – data are generated by stitching together many local data
sets usually through the use of complex computer algorithms (Edwards 2010). It
is only through the use of high-speed computers that this sort of global view of
temperature or ocean movement or weather systems is visible. Even then, there
are limits to what the data reveal about conditions locally, globally, or any scale
in between. How often were temperature readings taken and under what kinds
of conditions? What can consistency or changes in temperature indicate on their
own, or how are they used to generate models or more complex pictures of the
environment when combined with other sorts of locally gathered but globally
integrated data on, for instance, rainfall, ecosystem change, or other environmen-
tal processes? Clearly, even a global data set about the environment is partial and
incomplete.
Despite the apparent certainty of this graphic, there are actually quite a few
unknowns related to oil productivity that render this graphic an unreliable repre-
sentation of geological reality (Bridge 2010). Not only has the timing of the peak
of oil production been debated (Hubbard predicted it would happen in the 1970s),
there are different factors determining how much of the oil underground can realis-
tically be extracted. Technology is one of those determining factors, and economics
is another. At what price per barrel is oil worth recovering given current technol-
ogy, demand, refining and transportation requirements, and so on? Politics are also
involved; think about interstate relations, sanctions on oil sales from particular
states, and different kinds of power that oil wealth can generate. More recently,
climate justice advocates around the world have called for leaving oil in the ground
as a way to limit the greenhouse gas-trapping capacity of an atmosphere with
growing levels of fossil fuel remnants. Yet despite these factors that influence oil
production and complicate questions of how much, when, and even whether or not
oil is extracted from the earth’s subsurface, the graphic of Peak Oil, as it is widely
known, is still used to represent the reality of oil production. Although this graphic,
with references to proven reserves and future discoveries, may seem to explain a
lot about oil as an environmental feature, upon closer examination it actually raises
more questions than it addresses.
2. Inquire into how human agency, and particularly uneven power relationships,
is portrayed or obscured in geopolitical claims about environmental issues
Oftentimes, narratives about environmental and political entanglements begin with
a particular, natural resource that seems to set the stage: diamond mines in Sierra
Leone are leading to armed conflict; transboundary water supplies can lead to ten-
sions between states; food shortages can lead to price spikes and social unrest; climate
change-induced ice melt in Arctic waters will lead to increased shipping and fishing
in the Arctic Ocean; and so on. The resource in question may be either abundant (dia-
monds, newly available ocean routes) or the resource may be scarce (food and water
shortages); either way, these kinds of narratives can be compelling because they seem
clear in cause and effect. These kinds of narratives all fall into a category of resource
determinism. Resource determinism focuses on a natural resource or environmen-
tal feature to explain some social, political, or economic outcome. Yet this kind of
argument is flawed because it glosses over the human systems and human agency
that are involved in these situations. Environmental resources, themselves, do not
cause conflict or stability, but they can exacerbate tensions in social, economic, and
political systems. So, diamonds do not cause conflict, but the demand for diamonds
and the way they have been marketed as a rare commodity make them valuable. It is
this value that makes diamonds attractive as a means for financing armed conflict in
some places that do not have political stability. Similarly, food shortages can certainly
contribute to social tension, but underlying any food shortage are questions about
who is in control of food prices, decisions about what kinds of crops are grown, and
how food is distributed among a population.
This second entry point to examine environmental geopolitics takes that idea of
questioning simplified arguments about the role of natural resources or environ-
mental features in geopolitical narratives. It is a reminder that human agency in
the form of social, economic, and political systems shapes how resources are used,
extracted, transported, refined, distributed, priced, studied, managed, promoted,
discouraged, and otherwise valued or devalued by societies. Bringing these kinds
of elements of human–environment relations to the fore supports a better under-
standing of how or why a given geopolitical narrative portrays a situation from a
selective perspective to promote a particular outcome.
Most of the chapters in this book address one or more of these key themes or points
of entry to environmental geopolitics, and the chapters are arranged loosely around
these themes. Several chapters go beyond the organizational structure of the book
to address issues related to this subfield such as methodology, policy implications,
and possible areas for future work.
may be selectively used to generate and perpetuate one view over another. Blue and
Tadaki consider how measurements are valuable only insofar as they are accepted
and agreed upon by scientific practice. In this way, measurements of the physical
world are also social phenomena and constructs. As critical geopolitics seeks to
question how power is maintained or challenged through the production of geo-
graphical knowledge, this chapter considers the role of scientific measurement in
struggles over power and the representation of place, nature, and, in this case, the
meaning of swimmable rivers.
Noella J. Gray, Leslie Acton and Lisa M. Campbell consider the intersection of sci-
ence and ocean geopolitics in their chapter, “Science, territory, and the geopolitics
of high seas conservation.” They examine how the deployment of certain forms
of measurement serves to reinforce practices of territorialization and the control
over spatial representation. They draw on two case studies: international efforts
to promote conservation on the high seas through the identification of marine
protected areas, and challenges to conservation efforts focused on the inherently
and spatially dynamic Sargasso Sea. Biologically significant ecosystems on the high
seas lie beyond national jurisdiction, so efforts to protect these areas of biological
diversity must somehow be made amenable to the spatial logics of sovereign states
and territorial definitions and management. Similarly, the Sargasso Sea is an ever-
changing and always moving mass of aquatic life, and it, too, challenges traditional
approaches to conservation efforts that tend to identify protected phenomena as
something that may be clearly defined and spatially bounded. In both cases, these
authors consider practices of territoriality as reflective of contested ways of know-
ing and interpreting the world.
In the third chapter in this section on interpreting and measuring the environment,
Birgit Schneider and Lynda Olman assess the Global Forest Watch platform, which
purportedly aims to monitor forest-related human activity and invites local input
and feedback into its larger-scale view. In “The geopolitics of environmental global
mapping services: an analysis of Global Forest Watch”, these authors consider how
this top-down representation of forests establishes a geopolitical framework in
which certain political perspectives are embedded. Those perspectives are often at
odds with local, situated perspectives and forms of engagement with the platform.
In other words, they demonstrate how what appears to be a multi-scale system for
monitoring forests is actually pre-structured to validate a technocratic approach to
forest management and less of a means to support small-scale activism. How forests
are defined, measured, and monitored reflects struggles over different understand-
ings of the value and meaning of forests.
in these human systems. The chapters in this section highlight how power takes
many forms and is reflected not only in text and narratives, but also in materialities,
practices, and identities – all of which provide promising avenues for analysis.
This section begins with Philippe Le Billon and Lauren Shykora’s chapter, “Conflicts,
commodities and the environmental geopolitics of supply chains.” These authors
step away from resource determinism’s focus on either the absence or presence of
resources and environmental conditions to draw attention to transnational flows of
commodities. The supply chains for various commodities, themselves, are geopolit-
ical constructs portrayed to consumers, selectively, as contributing to conflict or to
peaceful conditions in particular places. Le Billon and Shykora look at three com-
modities associated with conflict or environmental degradation – oil, diamonds,
and palm oil, and they also look at quinoa as an example of a commodity that is
idealized as contributing to positive outcomes in both source locations as well as
sites of consumption. Across all of these supply chains, particular interests and
forms of power are reinforced through selective portrayals of material connections.
In his chapter “Underground geopolitics: science, race, and territory in Peru during
the late nineteenth century”, Matthew Himley provides a historical analysis of how
geographical knowledge of subsurface earth science was intertwined with social
geographies of economic development, race, and power in Peru. He demonstrates
the importance of understanding how physical, subsurface features were studied
and portrayed in ways that contributed to above-ground geographies of power and
discrimination. Far from being objective facts about nature, science and scientific
endeavors are shown to be extensions of geopolitics playing out on the earth’s
surface and used in selective ways to benefit some groups of people and processes
over others.
Coleen A. Fox and Christopher Sneddon highlight different knowledges and expe-
riences in their chapter “Local knowledges and environmental governance: making
space for alternative futures in the Arctic circumpolar region and the Mekong
River Basin.” Drawing examples from the Mekong River Basin and from Arctic
locations, they highlight local perceptions of environmental features and processes
and how those understandings come into tension with knowledges and processes
at larger spatial scales. In these places, communities that are dependent on local
resources are affected by priorities and decisions made at national and regional
levels. The interests and knowledges of these communities are often overlooked
by these larger-scale geopolitical processes. In the Arctic, climate change-induced
melting ice is shifting traditional patterns of livelihoods while simultaneously
attracting new actors interested in other forms of resource development. In the
Mekong River Basin, upstream decisions to construct dams for hydroelectric power
development serve the interests of powerful actors who do not take into account
localized effects of dams on downstream communities. The chapter emphasizes
not only the multiplicity of knowledges surrounding any particular environmental
context, but also how the selective use of knowledge serves certain interests and
reinforces power imbalances.
industrial interests, and local perceptions of mining’s costs and benefits. Different
actor groups create different spatial framings of environmental features and mining
practices depending on how that group perceives and portrays advantages or nega-
tive impacts of these practices. Swann-Quinn looks at how these spatial scales are
constructed differently by different interest groups associated with mining, yet
these spatial framings of the mining industry do not fit neatly into discrete spatial
scales or boxes. Instead, Swann-Quinn’s analysis shows how political practices
operate simultaneously at multiple spatial scales. The spatial dimensions of these
different political pursuits reflect the geopolitical landscape of mining in Georgia.
The final chapter of this volume summarizes how each chapter contributes not
only to the three key themes or entry point of environmental geopolitics but to
the subfield of environmental geopolitics. The chapter also initiates a conversation
among scholars in this field about how we might usefully move forward to generate
meaningful questions about environmental geopolitics and address them in useful
and creative ways. Of particular interest are dominant discourses about environ-
mental features and their relationship to human systems and interests. Whether
the topic is energy consumption, food riots, sustainable cities, disease vectors, land
use change, conflict related to resources, logistics and environmental management,
environmental measures and assessment, thinking globally or acting locally in a
context of Anthropocenic change, environmental geopolitics encourages the care-
ful examination of dominant discourses and the geographic and environmental
knowledge and representations embedded in them. What kinds of material reali-
ties, identities, and practices do these dominant ways of thinking promote as valu-
able and important, and what kinds of material realities, identities, and practices
are minimalized, overlooked, or obscured by these same ways of thinking? How
do policymakers, public figures, popular culture, and people as citizens and as
consumers perpetuate or potentially challenge dominant or mainstream narratives
that shape how we understand, discuss, and engage with environmental features?
These are key questions underlying environmental geopolitics, and the chapters in
this book provide examples of how scholars and researchers are creatively address-
ing those questions.
References
Asdal, Kristin, Tone Druglitro, and Steve Hinchliffe (eds) (2016), Humans, Animals and Biopolitics: The
More-Than-Human Condition, London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge.
Bridge, G. (2010), “Geographies of peak oil: The other carbon problem,” Geoforum, 41(4), 523–30.
Edwards, Paul N. (2010), A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global
Warming, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Goeminne, G. (2010), “Climate policy is dead, long live climate politics!,” Ethics, Place & Environment: A
Journal of Philosophy & Geography, 13(2), 207–14.
Hemmingsen, E. (2010), “At the base of Hubbert’s Peak: grounding the debate on petroleum scarcity,”
Geoforum, 41(4), 531–40.
O’Lear, Shannon (2018), Environmental Geopolitics, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
Scanlan, S. J. (2013), “Feeding the planet or feeding us a line? Agribusiness, ‘grainwashing’ and hunger in
the world food system,” International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food, (3), 357–82.
Swyngeouw, Erik (2010), “Trouble with nature: ‘ecology as the new opium for the masses,’” in Jean
Hillier and Patsy Healy (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Planning Theory: Conceptual
Challenges for Spatial Planning, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 299–318.
Zizek, Slavoj (1991), Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Introduction
Critical geopolitical enquiry traditionally emphasizes the role that ideas about the
world play in reproducing power relations between groups of people (Dodds 2001;
O’Lear 2018). As in other critical social sciences, this focus on discursive construc-
tion represents a desire to identify possibilities for making the world differently.
If phenomena that were hitherto taken for granted as fundamental or essential
might in fact be social constructs, the argument goes, they could be remade in
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ways that are fairer, more just and less violent. Yet, while discourse shapes people’s
understandings and actions, environmental problems are also constituted and con-
strained by material realities (see Dalby 2014). As a powerful means for represent-
ing and changing these realities, and as a practice that is both distinctively social
and distinctively more-than-social, measurement provides a valuable window into
the geopolitics of contemporary environmental problems.
Since the late 1980s, the cornerstone ideals and assumptions of conservation
ecology have come under attack on a combination of philosophical, ethical and
scientific fronts (see Callicott and Nelson 1998). The notion of a pristine pre-
human wilderness as a naturally stable state, threatened by human interference and
destruction, had been a linchpin of Western conservation movements in the early
twentieth century. By representing nature as separate from people, unable to coex-
ist with human development, this ideal encouraged conservation efforts focused
on preserving notionally pristine landscapes by excluding people from them. The
burden of these efforts was disproportionately felt by indigenous people, who were
dispossessed of their land on the premise of protecting it (Spence 2000), and by
those in economically poorer countries containing the bulk of the world’s less
developed land (Guha 1989). Alongside these considerations of justice, insights
emerging from the environmental sciences showed that the landscapes and eco-
systems humans had come to assume were in ‘climax’ or ‘equilibrium’ states simply
represent a point in time rather than a stable reference from which to evaluate
human intervention (Perry 2002). In the face of these developments it has become
increasingly difficult to sustain the notion that conservation is simply a matter of
preserving and restoring unspoilt wilderness.
The IBIs developed by Karr and various colleagues present a multi-metric approach
to river health that utilizes benthic community structure and composition data
to infer the extent to which a waterway has been impacted by human activity (see
Kerans and Karr 1994). These metrics, which have been shown through field testing
to correspond with qualitative assessments of human-induced disturbance, include
the in-stream presence of particular insect larvae species such as Ephemeroptera
(mayflies) and Trichoptera (caddisflies), along with the existence of higher-order
predators and species deemed intolerant of disturbance. Calibrated against a ‘refer-
ence condition’ representing a ‘normal’, undisturbed state, these species are proxies
for the extent to which a waterway has been negatively impacted by human activity:
in Karr’s understanding, become less healthy. While exact definitions and uses of
reference condition can vary (Stoddard et al. 2006) they are a common feature of
river restoration theory and practice, integrated for example into the European
Water Framework Directive (Bouleau and Pont 2015). For Karr, an unmodified
reference condition is intended to provide an objective but flexible standard for
assessing waterways. By asking how a stream’s ecological composition differs from
what might be anticipated given its biophysical context, we might gain a sense of
the extent and magnitude of human impacts on that river.
This approach to measuring river health offers a fairly traditional model of conser-
vation, aimed at protecting and restoring the ‘correct’ assemblage of species for a
particular place. The reliance on reference condition, however, produces a rather
circular logic. While the indicators included have undergone rigorous testing to
demonstrate that they are associated with rivers in subjectively ‘good’ condition, we
only know that those rivers are in good condition because they have been deemed
to be so. In other words: we can tell that a stream is healthy because it seems less
impacted by humans, and because it seems less impacted by humans we can tell
that it is healthy. This becomes a particular problem when using reference condi-
tion to assess streams in places such as Europe where long, ubiquitous histories of
human modification leave no clear analogue for an ‘undisturbed’ condition, even
if such states were indisputably desirable (Dufour and Piégay 2009). Managing
towards an apparently undisturbed reference condition in such landscapes can
entrench limited and unrealistic ideals of pristine wilderness, with little relation to
the places they are intended to describe.
The approach of Costanza and colleagues, on the other hand, is much less concerned
with what ‘should’ comprise a given ecosystem than with the work that ecosystem
does. Their focus on ecosystem vigour, organization and resilience has little regard
for which species live in a river – least of all their endemic or exotic status – as long
as they sustain an ecosystem that is diverse, productive and capable of recovering
quickly after disturbance. Applied to freshwater, their model describes how human-
induced stresses such as reduced water quality and overfishing can decrease ecosys-
tem productivity through infertility and loss of breeding-age individuals, modifying
community structure as particular species become dominant and rendering ecosys-
tems more vulnerable to sudden, drastic change (Rapport et al. 1998).
The models of river health advocated by Karr and Costanza differ not only in their
understandings of what good condition for freshwater is, but in who should be
responsible for achieving those outcomes. Karr’s more conventional understanding
of river condition implicitly assumes that the state should be the primary actor
responsible for environmental protection and restoration. As a monitoring tool,
IBIs are intended to allow ‘Biologists, managers, regulators, and decision makers’
to regulate against environmental damage and to prioritize public river-restoration
funding for the public good (Karr 1999, p. 232). Costanza’s approach, on the other
Despite their differences, these two models for environmental advocacy share a
commitment to, and reliance on, the creation of putatively objective facts regard-
ing the environment. Both Costanza and Karr present a series of case studies and
examples to demonstrate the reliability and relevance of their assessment regimes.
Despite this shared commitment to the material, however, these approaches rep-
resent rather different understandings of how people should live with and inter-
vene in contemporary ecosystems. By contrasting Karr’s relatively conventional
approach to river health with Costanza’s modernist understanding that places no
particular value on past or present ecosystem states, we can see how the creation of
measures such as these is not simply a scientific act, but also a deeply political one.
Upon scrutiny, though, this target is not as straightforward as it first appears. For
a start, the ability to swim in a river is only one of a wide set of concerns, values
To calculate which rivers across the country were or could be swimmable, the
Ministry for the Environment (MfE) first needed to determine what counted as
a river. To do this, MfE applied the crude qualitative tool of stream order (see
Strahler 1952) to existing maps and geographical data layers, including only water-
ways of fourth order and above. As a result, when the government’s target of 90%
swimmable rivers was announced, accompanying maps only included the largest
waterways. Within weeks, environmentalists had roundly criticized the proposals.
The environmental non-governmental organization Forest & Bird, for example,
responded by publishing maps of all streams in New Zealand. These maps, which
included smaller first-, second- and third-order streams, revealed that ‘There are
450,000kms of mapped streams and rivers in New Zealand, but only 45,000kms
(just 10%) of them are covered by the Government’s proposed new National Policy
Statement on Freshwater’ (Forest & Bird 2017).
By including only the largest streams, some 90% of New Zealand’s waterways had
been excluded from the new requirements to report upon and improve swimmabil-
ity. The MfE justified this by claiming that ‘Around 90 percent of New Zealand’s
catchments flow into rivers that are fourth order or bigger’, and would therefore
be addressed indirectly (emphasis added, Ministry for the Environment 2017).
Environment Minister Nick Smith added that it is ‘not practical’ to protect small
waterways through national regulation, but accepted that they should nevertheless
be looked after by local authorities (Smith 2017b).
Depending on one’s perspective, 90% of New Zealand’s rivers were therefore either
included in, or excluded from, the new swimmability policy. Both of these posi-
tions can be defended with environmental measures. The MfE’s statement did not
deny that all streams that are third order and smaller would be excluded from
the new criteria, but implied that they would also be targeted for improvement
due to their status as tributaries to streams covered directly by new regulations.
Environmental advocates, meanwhile, raised awareness of the limited scope of the
policy by compiling lists of well-known streams excluded from the new targets
(Forest & Bird 2017). Any aspirations people have to swim in first-, second- and
third-order streams would be neglected due to the stream order threshold.
The second step in making New Zealand’s rivers swimmable again involved defining
what, exactly, swimmability is. Does it require water of a certain depth, water clar-
ity, lack of algae, or safe water speed? Does swimmability require particular mor-
phological characteristics, such as the presence of swimming holes (deep pools)?
Must a stream be swimmable at all times, as would be expected in a public pool, or
should swimmers take personal responsibility for checking conditions beforehand?
Does swimmability require actual swimming to take place, or need it merely exist in
potentia? These are all important questions that are answered – either explicitly or
through neglect – through the creation of metrics for swimmability.
The answer was found in a single metric: E. coli bacteria counts. Water quality had
long been a major concern for many rivers in New Zealand, and river management
was intended to address this in terms of both human recreation and ecosystem
condition. Reflecting this, in 2014 standards for freshwater were introduced incor-
porating a range of attributes including nitrate, periphyton, ammonia and dis-
solved oxygen alongside E. coli (New Zealand Government 2014). In 2017, the new
freshwater policy proposed to strengthen only swimmability above the previous
levels, which for rivers would be assessed through E. coli counts as a proxy for faecal
contamination.
Immediately upon release, the revised standards were met with widespread criti-
cism from environmentalists and some prominent scientists. This criticism did not,
however, point out the narrow scope of the additional standards, which focused
only on E. coli instead of the more balanced treatment of ecological and recrea-
tional objectives in the 2014 policy. Rather, attention turned to what the new limits
were for E. coli.
On the face of it, the requirement that 90% of rivers be swimmable by 2040 rep-
resented a considerable improvement upon the 2014 standards, which required
only that all rivers be safe for wading. The meaning of swimmability, however, had
changed. Whereas the 2014 standards defined a B as the minimum swimmable
grade, in 2017 a C was now deemed safe for swimming. Grade boundaries were
also defined differently: whereas the 2014 grades relied only on 95th percentile (P95)
E. coli counts, meaning that 95% of water samples taken each year must fall below
the relevant limit, the 2017 scheme relaxed these criteria and introduced a new,
lower annual median threshold (Table 2.1). In effect, this change tolerated short-
term peaks of E. coli in favour of a lower annual average.
Focusing on the newly relaxed allowable peak E. coli counts, the environmen-
tal group Choose Clean Water ran a prominent billboard in the nation’s capital
in March 2017 claiming ‘The government thinks you won’t notice more poo in
your water’ (Cann 2017). Environment Minister Smith (2017c) published a press
release titled ‘Claims of lower water standards wrong’, emphasizing that time-based
exceedances acknowledged that rivers experience raised bacterial levels during rain
and storm events and that this should not unduly affect people’s perceptions of a
river’s general level of swimmability. Despite these attempts at explanation, envi-
ronmental activists and Green Party politicians accused the government of ‘shifting
the goalposts’ of New Zealand’s environmental status and aspirations by redefining
swimmability more permissively (see Small and Mitchell 2017).
To formally refute these accusations, the Ministry for the Environment contracted
scientists from the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA)
Table 2.1 Swimmability grades in the 2014 and 2017 New Zealand National Policy
Statements for Freshwater Management
to independently compare the 2014 and 2017 grading systems. When their report
was published alongside further technical explanation from the MfE, Minister
Smith claimed vindication:
These reports . . . confirm that the changes to the National Policy Statement in moving from
a wadeable standard of a median 1000 E. coli/100ml to swimmable with a median of 130
E. coli/100ml for 90 per cent of waterways provides for a significant improvement in the
microbiological water quality in our waterways. (Smith 2017a)
This statement is not untrue. The 2014 policy set a very weak standard for occa-
sional immersion (for example: wading, not swimming), using an annual median of
1000 E. coli/100ml, tolerating a high risk (>5%) of infection. The new swimmability
targets for A, B and C grades are based upon total immersion (i.e. swimming),
requiring annual medians of ≤130 E. coli/100ml for 90% of monitored waterways
by 2040 in addition to the amended time-bound statistical criteria contained in
Table 2.1. Comparing the 2014 ‘national bottom line’ (median 1000 E. coli/100ml)
against the new equivalent statistic (≤130 E. coli/100ml) indeed generates a positive
evaluation of the new policy: the 2014 allowable median was less stringent than the
2017 one.
Yet Minister Smith’s take on the report’s conclusions presents a selective sample.
At stake was whether the 2017 classifications of swimmable rivers were more
permissive than the 2014 system, which measured swimmability but did not
directly require it. Applying both grading systems to all available data for rivers (of
all sizes), the NIWA scientists found that while only 30% of rivers were swimmable
under the 2014 system, the 2017 grading scheme classified 43% of New Zealand’s
rivers as currently swimmable: the new swimmability regime was therefore more
permissive (McBride and Soller 2017). Of fourth-order-and-larger streams, 31%
were swimmable under the 2014 scheme and 46% under the 2017 scheme. By
redefining thresholds of E. coli, the government had effectively turned 13% of New
Zealand’s rivers swimmable overnight.
Of all the rivers that could be monitored for swimmability, only the largest were
included. Of all the ways that swimmability could be defined, E. coli became the
single determining measure. Of all the ways that E. coli could relate to the desired
outcome of ‘swimmability’, only a limited set of statistical measures were chosen.
These selections made specific realities of rivers visible to the New Zealand public,
enabling E. coli measures to be seen at the national scale and compared across
rivers. These metrics directed the focus of public expectation towards a narrow set
of biophysical parameters, telling us which rivers to care about, which threats to be
wary of, and what improvement and decline looked like.
Concluding discussion
Measurement is not just a way of describing the world, but a means for changing
it. In offering specific ways of measuring river health, ecologists have shaped not
only our understandings of how rivers are but also what they can and should
become. Similarly, by institutionalizing selective measures of swimmability into
policy, politicians in New Zealand narrowed not only the definition of what mat-
ters for freshwater – that able-bodied people can immerse themselves in it with
a reasonable expectation of avoiding infection by faecal pathogens – but also of
which rivers that matters for. As our ability to quantitatively characterize the bio-
physical world continues to improve, and as regimes of ecological measurement
are ever more enmeshed within systems of environmental governance around the
The politics of environmental measures can be examined from at least two entry
points. Looking inside the measures themselves, as we have with river health, allows
us to account for the ways that ‘what is desirable’ is quietly prefigured by scientific
conceptions of the environment. Measures contain politics, even before politicians
or other political actors draw upon them. Whether river health is measured by
alignment with a reference condition, by its ecological functions or by some other
standard is a choice that bears significant consequences. In an urban context, for
example, it could tip the balance between management efforts that ‘turn back the
clock’ on environmental change versus strategies that attempt to optimize and
enhance stream functions that have already been fundamentally altered. Measures
of river health therefore both contain, and conceal, specific answers to deeply
political questions about how and for whom ecosystems should be altered.
In addition to looking inside such measures, geopolitical analysis can also look at
how they are selected, deployed and contested by political actors. As we explored
in the context of New Zealand’s swimmability debates, geopolitical claims-making
takes place with and through environmental measures. Political actors select meas-
ures from the world and enrol them into the stories they tell about themselves, the
environment and their actions. By selecting specific E. coli measures and packaging
these into a story about swimmable rivers, Minister Smith used a ‘90% swimmable’
aspiration to enlist the support of the New Zealand public while simultaneously
putting a positive spin on his government’s environmental record. E. coli measures
that were aimed at the future were also about changing a sense of the present
and the past. But measures are not simply determined by the utterances of the
powerful; their unique biophysical and scientific construction renders them open
to contestation in ways that other geopolitical claims are not. In our example, the
material environment provided the grounds for environmental groups to contest
swimmability metrics by producing maps of streams excluded from the policy.
Swimmability metrics also rely upon the authority of science and scientists, who,
in our case, found that the 2017 grades were in fact more permissive than the
2014 grading scheme. As such, environmental measures present a unique type of
geopolitical text whose validity is determined by both the material world and by the
social norms, communities and institutions of scientists.
In the introduction to this book (Chapter 1), Shannon O’Lear outlines three persis-
tent characteristics of geopolitical claims-making: that they tend to selectively por-
tray and represent what the environment is, that they tend to overlook or obscure
human agency, and that they tend to overlook the nuances of place and context in
human–environment interactions. A methodological focus on measurement pro-
vides unique insight into how arguments regarding what the environment is, and
what people’s relationship with it should be, are made, maintained and potentially
challenged.
Finally, quantification has long been associated with forms of explanation that
emphasize universal principles over nuanced accounts of particular places (Porter
1995). Attempts to produce general laws of explanation, or to articulate generic
values, are inevitably abstractions that paper over local differences. Costanza’s
attempt to provide a universal framework for ecosystem health makes little conces-
sion to non-economic values of ecosystems, for example, while Karr’s focus on
indicators for naturalness fails to account for the often substantial value to be found
even in highly modified landscapes. Such measures can neglect long histories of
entanglement between people and the environment, while at the same time sup-
porting very particular visions of how those relationships should look in the future.
The politically inflected values embedded within these arguments are increasingly
re-examined by postcolonial scholarship from New Zealand, as indigenous possi-
bilities for understanding and relating to the environment are considered alongside
and in conversation with conventional Western science (see Clapcott et al. 2018;
Parsons et al. 2019; Ruru 2018; Te Aho 2018).
This chapter has explored how measurement acts as a tool through which specific
visions of the environment both manifest and find support. When we disagree
with these visions, it can be tempting to blame this dynamic on the inherently
reductionist act of rendering a landscape into a small set of variables that can only
ever provide a partial account of the environment. Certainly, measures often act as
discursive resources that are selectively mobilized by political actors to craft and
promote particular, ideological visions of social and environmental justice. Unlike
some other geopolitical discursive resources, however, the credibility of ecological
measures is not simply determined by the power of those wielding them. Rather,
measures can be interpreted, reinterpreted, debated and potentially rejected based
on scientific norms that usually lie outside the direct reach of political actors.
Consider, for example, that the NIWA scientists employed to authoritatively dis-
prove environmentalists’ criticisms of the new swimmability targets ultimately
concluded that the new standards were numerically more permissive: the criticisms
were, in fact, deemed valid. NIWA scientists’ statistical measures were accountable
to the data set from which they derived, and the statistical norms governing their
analysis, as much as – if not more than – the political needs of a government under
fire.
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Introduction
In some ways, these examples represent traditional concerns with oceanic geo-
politics – with the oceans as a stage for the unfolding of geopolitical dramas cen-
tered on military conflict and capitalist expansion, and the inter-relations among
them (Greenberg 2013). Marine resources (for example fish, minerals), and the
competition for control over their extraction, continue to dominate geopolitical
attention, while changing geopolitical relations influence resource extraction and
management regimes. Ocean space and resources continue to play a central role
in inter-state relations, increasingly defining state identities and territorial claims,
such as in the case of Small Island Developing States identifying as ‘large ocean
states’ (Chan 2018). However, these examples also challenge traditional distinc-
tions between land and sea (and sea and ice), state and non-state, and cooperation
and conflict. They point to the ways in which ocean governance is challenged by
the dynamic materiality of oceans, the mobility of both marine resources and the
capital and technologies associated with marine extraction, conflicting interests
in and understandings of ocean space, and the persistent tension between rapidly
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In this chapter, we examine two recent efforts to territorialize the oceans for
conservation, demonstrating that the ways in which ocean science – observation,
measurement, interpretation – is translated into calculable objects of governance,
playing a critical role in defining geopolitical interactions, both challenging and
reinforcing conventional ideas of territory and space. While marine conservation is
clearly tied to territorial and geopolitical projects within states’ exclusive economic
zones (Chan 2018; Gruby et al. 2017), we focus here specifically on efforts to terri-
torialize the high seas, those areas beyond national jurisdiction. We summarize and
bring together two related projects: (1) a study of long-term international efforts
to advance biodiversity conservation on the high seas, drawing on the results of
five collaborative event ethnographies (Gray 2018); and (2) research on a regional
conservation initiative in the Sargasso Sea, drawing on document analysis and
semi-structured interviews (Acton et al. 2019).1
Together, these two cases illustrate the intertwining of science and ocean geo-
politics, demonstrating that who deploys science – and how – has important impli-
cations for territorialization practices on the high seas. As novel scientific and
technological knowledge and representations of the ocean emerge, they simultane-
ously enable and constrain ocean governance innovation and geopolitical strate-
gies. The chapter considers three challenges associated with the science–territory
nexus in ocean space. First, new scientific representations of ocean space reproduce
a seemingly objective and complete ‘view from nowhere’ (Lehman 2017), belying
the always incomplete, fragmented, and situated nature of ocean knowledge. As
territorial claims are advanced for high seas conservation, it is essential to interro-
gate the knowledge underpinning these claims. Second, high seas territorialization
processes highlight the privileging of certain kinds of knowledge and knowledge-
making processes, which largely ignore or oversimplify human activities and
relations to ocean space. Finally, the production of fixed, simplified scientific rep-
resentations for conservation policymaking demonstrates the limits of traditional
understandings of space and territory when applied to oceans, while also pointing
to ways in which territorial strategies may evolve moving forward.
While marine territorialization takes many forms, marine protected areas (MPAs)
play a central role in international marine biodiversity conservation efforts
1 This chapter adapts and reprints material from Gray (2018), with the permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd, and
Acton et al. (2019), with permission from Elsevier. For further details on both projects, please refer to the original
papers.
(Campbell et al. 2016; Campbell and Gray 2019; Gray et al. 2014). The IUCN defines
protected areas, including MPAs, as any “clearly defined geographical space, recog-
nized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the
long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural
values” (Dudley 2008, p. 8). The Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
set a target of 10% of global oceans protected within MPAs by 2020 (CBD 2010a),
a target that is also integrated into the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goal 14 for the Oceans. Marine protected areas currently cover 6.97% of the global
ocean; this includes coverage of 16.03% of coastal and marine areas within national
jurisdiction, but only 1.18% of areas beyond national jurisdiction (the high seas)
(UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 2018). Of the currently listed 15,604 MPAs in the World
Database on Protected Areas, only nine sites are on the high seas (UNEP-WCMC
and IUCN 2018). While biodiversity conservation on some parts of the high seas
is possible using existing sectoral and regional agreements, scholars and conser-
vationists argue there is a need for a more cooperative, integrated, multi-sectoral
approach (Gjerde et al. 2016).
However, the overarching legal framework for the oceans – the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – does not currently provide a legal
mechanism for establishing marine protected areas or otherwise ensuring marine
biodiversity conservation in areas beyond national jurisdiction. With a few excep-
tions, MPAs lack institutional and legal support to function as objects of govern-
ance for the high seas. As “Earth’s last conservation frontier” (Gjerde et al. 2016,
p. 56), the high seas offer an unparalleled conservation opportunity (Campbell and
Gray 2019). To seize this opportunity, countries began negotiations in 2018 for a
new Implementing Agreement to UNCLOS, in order to better enable biodiversity
conservation in areas beyond national jurisdiction (UN 2018). The draft text of this
agreement identifies a “package” of issues, including MPAs and other area-based
management tools (see also Gjerde et al. 2016; UN 2018). If adopted, it will be the
culmination of a long-term, organized effort to advance biodiversity conservation
on the high seas, which has included more than two decades of advocacy work,
informal and formal UN processes, and legal and biophysical research.
Understanding this effort to advance high seas conservation using MPAs requires
an analysis of territory and territoriality at sea. Territory is conventionally under-
stood as a bounded space, within which a particular actor or group, typically a state,
exercises control (Elden 2010). Territoriality refers to the continual reproduction
of relations of control and/or authority in relation to bounded spaces (Elden 2010;
Steinberg 2009). The high seas are, by definition, beyond national jurisdiction and
therefore challenge the traditional association of MPAs with territorial state sov-
ereignty (Scott 2012). However, as Steinberg (2009, p. 472) argues, “geographies of
territoriality must examine not just the . . . space constructed inside the territories
of sovereign states but also the spaces on the outside that are designated as not
being amenable to this organization of space.” In this chapter, we examine efforts to
make “unamenable space” (the high seas) amenable to the spatial logic and ideas of
control and management associated with the concept of territory.
„Liebe Mutter. Jetzt kann ich Dir endlich berichten, daß ich
glücklich und wohl in Italien angekommen bin, und daß es mir
in jeder Hinsicht gut geht, sowie —“ Der Rest des Bogens war
mit Vokabeln bedeckt. Bei den Verben standen zugleich die
Deklinationen. Auch am Rande des Buches standen
Vokabeln — ganz dicht, an dem tragisch frohen
Karnevalsgedicht entlang. „Wie schön ist die Jugend, die so
schnell entflieht“.