Jagirdari Crisis

• The crisis of the jagirdari system had both an administrative and a social
basis.
• The success of the jagirdari system depended on the ability of the holder of
the jagir getting sufficient resources for living in the style he was
accustomed to or expected, and maintaining a sufficient quota of troops for
the service of the state.
• The jagirdari system implied giving the jagirdars or nobles a vested interest
in collecting land-revenue from the zamindars in the tract of land assigned
to them as jagir.
• Thus, the co-relation between the jama (assessed income) and the hasil
(income) depended not only upon the realistic nature of revenue assignment
and its income but also on the ability of the jagirdar with the help of the
faujdar, to overawe and compel the zamindars who were armed, and often
associated closely with the owner-cultivators on a caste and kinship basis,
to pay the assessed land-revenue.
• Thus, the jagir system was based on the specific social system prevailing in
the country.
• Due to a variety of factors, the Mughals were, by and large, able to
“persuade” the zamindars of north India, except those living in remote and
inaccessible areas, to cooperate in paying the assessed land-revenue.
• In fact, more and more of them were converted from peshkash paying
zamindars to kharaj (land-revenue) collecting agents, receiving, in turn a
definite share in the proceeds as nankar.
• Due to the rapid expansion of the number of mansabdars, there was an
apparent mismatch between the available resources, and the demands of
salaries by the mansabdars and their contingents.
• This was met by reducing salaries and the number of troops and horses a
mansabdar was required to maintain.
• This also implied that a mansabdar became even more dependent on the
support of the local faujdar for over-awing the local zamindar when
necessary.
• The attempt to Import this system into the Deccan where conditions were
vastly different, and where there was an endemic warfare which local
zamindars were fully prepared to utilize for their own purposes, was the
real basis of the crisis of the jagirdari system.
• The working of the administrative system worsened the situation.
• The most paying (sair hasil) jagirs were reserved for the khalisa to meet the
cost of the war.
• In consequence, the jagirdars were given jagirs in the areas called zor-talab,
i.e. where it was difficult to realize land-revenue on account of the
entrenched power of the zamindars and the land-owning community.
• This was generally in the areas outside the old Golconda and Bijapuri
kingdoms.
• When the jagirdars were unable to produce for dagh the requisite number of
sawars and horses of the requisite quality, their jagirs were confiscated, and
included in the pai-baqi (land meant for assignment).
• The struggle for sair-hasil jagirs thus became a matter of life and death for
mansabdars, and allowed the royal mutasaddis (lower officials) the
opportunity of indulging in all kinds of corrupt practices, including frequent
transfers of which Bhimsen complains bitterly.
• In this situation, the smaller mansabdars were the worst hit.
• The growing disfunctionality of the jagirdari system was aggravated by the
problem of be-jagiri or lack of sufficient jagirs for assignment.
• Khafi Khan, says that on account of the inadequacy of pai baqi, or lands
meant for assignment in jagirs, and the appointment of innumerable
mansabdars especially large numbers of Deccanis and Marathas, sons of old
nobles or khanazads were not able to get jagirs for four or five years. This
was in the year 1691-92.
• The situation seems to have worsened because, anxious not to allow the
number of mansabdars to exceed the resources after the conquest of Bijapur
and Golconda, Aurangzeb put a virtual ban on the recruitment of new
nobles.
• He repeatedly declared that he did not need any new servants, and desired
that no papers (misls) for new entrants be put up to him.
• For some time the Imperial Bakhshi, Ruhullah Khan, under the pressure of
nobles, continued to put fresh cases before the Emperor, on the plea that the
Empire consisted of seven Sultanats (presumably the five Deccani Sultanats
and Malwa and Gujarat), i.e. it was vast, and the Emperor alone could say
yes or no to the large number of needy khanazads.
• After the death of Ruhullah Khan (1692), Aurangzeb angrily turned down
all the requests of the new Bakhshi, Mukhlis Khan.
• Khafi Khan says that this led to great lamentation in the camp among those
who had waited for an appointment for years.
• Thus, imperial signature i.e. grant of a jagir became like one pomegranate
among a hundred sick!
• It is hardly necessary to bring together more information on the subject.
• The question of frequent transfers, especially of smaller mansabdars, asking
a lump sum of payment (qabz) before the jagir was handed over to the
 agent of the new jagirdar, demanding money for the up keep of the royal
animals even before possession of the jagirs etc. were abuses in the working
of the system.
• Failure to meet the expectations of the khanazads, i.e. those who had served
the Empire for generations, and whose loyalty and support were important
for the Empire, was something completely different.
• It undermined the loyalty of the old nobles, and as the system deteriorated,
made them look to opportunities for carving out their own spheres of
domination.
• Both Asad Khan the wazir, and his son, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, and the leading
noble, Ghaziuddin Firuz Jung were suspected of harbouring such
ambitions.
• It has been argued that there was no jagirdari crisis because after the
annexation of the two Decanni kingdoms, the jama of the empire rose by 23
per cent or Rs. 5.3 crores annually, whereas the numbers of mansabdars was
kept within that limit.
• It has also been argued that there was no shortage of pai baqi, according to
a Mughal revenue document of 1689.
• However, two aspects need to be kept in mind.
• The jama in the Deccan had been grossly inflated from the time of Akbar.
• Hence, what the nobles received for meeting their claims (talab) was a
fraction of the real income (hasil), leading to an acute struggle for more
paying sair hasil jagirs.
• Also, later documents suggest that large areas were kept in pai bagi.
• However, most of the pai bagi lands were in the Karnataka which had not
yet been brought under control.
• The nobles were not prepared to accept jagirs in this areas, called mulk-i-
jadid or the newly conquered area.
• The existence of large pai bagi lands in this area thus did not mitigate the
shortage of jagirs elsewhere.
• There has been a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the precise
extent of the growth of the number of mansabdars under Aurangzeb.
• Unlike Shah Jahan, there is no official history of Aurangzeb after the tenth
year, so that it is difficult to know the precise number of mansabdars.
• However, on the basis of a careful study, Athar Ali has shown that the total
number of mansabdars holding zat ranks of 1000 zat and above increased
• We had hinted in the section dealing with the reigns of Jahangir and Shah
Jahan, that with the introduction of the rule of one-fourth and the month
scale, the Mughal mansabdari system was no more the efficient machine for
fighting and collection of land-revenue it once was.
 • As it was, development of military technology elsewhere showed the need
of a stronger, more efficient and mobile force of field-gunners, and the
growing importance of infantrymen armed with flint guns.
• These, in turn, necessitated a larger standing army, paid for centrally.
• The need to capture and hold large numbers of Maratha forts also needed
larger infantry forces, whereas the forces led by the nobles remained
predominantly cavalry forces.
• The hardships faced by these forces, and the growing disgruntlement of the
nobles is described graphically by the contemporary, Bhimsen.
• Thus, the jagirdari crisis was part of a growing social, administrative and
military crisis compounded by the long drawn- out and unprofitable war in
the Deccan which was the result of Aurangzeb’s lack of political flexibility,
his arrogant and suspicious nature and his over-dependence on military
force as the arbiter of difficult political problems.

Agrarian Crisis

• In the first half of the 18th century, the Mughal Empire began to face a
strong opposition from numerous castes like Jats, Satnamis, Sikhs and
Marathas.
• The imperialist and early nationalist scholars like Jadunath Sarkar
interpreted these challenges to Mughal authority as Hindu reaction
against the Muslim orthodoxy and oppression.
• Subsequent theories of 'national awakening', 'jagirdari crisis' and 'lower
class uprisings have also tried to explain the esoteric phenomenon.
• Irfan Habib
⎯ He delineated the issue in his The Agrarian Causes for the fall of
the Mughal Empire.
⎯ According to him, these revolts never exhibited a Hindu reaction
to Muslim authority, were seldom organized on the caste lines,
but represented a combined attack of zamindars and peasants to
the Mughal oppressive authority.
⎯ His argument can be summarized in a following way: "The rising of
the oppressed thus became inseparable from the conflict between
two oppressing classes."
• Moreland:
⎯ was one of the earliest scholars to provide an economic theory for
the Mughal decline.
 ⎯ Although Habib draws his thesis from Moreland's, the difference
between the two
⎯ while Moreland portrayed revolts through Oriental Despotism,
Habib categorized them as class-based exploitation.
• Chetan Singh, in The Mughal State:
⎯ The magnificent structure of the Mughal state and the continued
dominance of its ruling elite rested upon the state's ability to
appropriate a major part of the surplus generated by this
agrarian society
• The land revenue or mal demanded on behalf of the state formed the
largest portion of its income
⎯ while in Akbar's reign the land revenue collected under zabt system
was 1/3 of the total produce of the peasant,
⎯ under Aurangzeb it soared to become half of the total produce.
⎯ Reports that by 1655, the total produce realized from the peasants
under the batai system was 65% and under the zabt system was 52%
of the gross produce.
⎯ Indeed, as Irfan Habib remarks, Mughal India served not merely as
the protective arm of the exploiting classes, but was itself the
principal instrument of exploitation.
• Satish Chandra:
⎯ His tripolar relationship might serve as a better explanation here.
⎯ Mughal Empire rested on three poles:
→ peasantry or raiyat,
→ zamindars and
→ jagirdars (including mansabdars).
• The task of collecting revenue was assigned to the jagirdars, whose agents
were often in conflict with zamindars, also revenue collectors but different
from jagirdars.
• In return, jagirdars received a certain portion of the collected land-revenue
and a jagir.
• Since the jagirdars were frequently transferred, generally every 3-4 years,
they began to collect as much revenue as possible without caring for the
plight of peasantry or agriculture.
• The practice of transfers of jagirs aggravated during the Aurangzeb's reign.
• Since the Mughal land-revenue was already set at the highest level possible,
leaving the peasantry with mere subsistence income, the added pressure
from jagirdars was to have undesirable consequences not only for the
peasantry but also for the Mughal Empire.
• As Irfan Habib argues, the increasing jama figures do not indicate any
development in the cultivation of the period since these are nullified by
secular increase in price rise.
• Instead, the increasing in assessment and extortion while collection had
made impossible any prospect for agrarian development.
• Owing to the high land revenue demand and subsequent extortion by the
collectors, there are reports that when the 'peasants cannot pay the
revenue, they are beaten mercilessly and maltreated.’
• As Manucci reports, frequently, the peasants were compelled to sell their
women, children and cattle in order to meet the revenue demand.
• Consequently, the peasants are reported to have absconded their lands as is
witnessed in the famous 'Karori experiment".
• Throughout the reigns of Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb's reigns, the
flight of peasants became a common phenomenon.
• Irfan Habib notes:
⎯ although the classic act of defiance on the part of the peasants
was the refusal to pay the land revenue, many warlike peasants
were goaded into rebellion [Manucci].
⎯ Thus, villages which refused to pay taxes or went into rebellion
came to be known as malwas or zor-talab, as opposed to the
revenue-paying villages called raiyati.
⎯ Usually, the villages which were protected by ravines or forests or
hills, were more likely to defy the authorities than those situated in
open plains.
⎯ Until the reign of Aurangzeb, these conflicts generally appeared as
local and isolated incidents.
⎯ Importantly, upper strata khudkashts were less affected by the
system of oppression and the real victims were the lower strata
pahis, gaveti-palti (belonged to Jats, Gurjars, Ahirs), gharuhalas and
rezariaya and balahars.
• Two factors played crucial role in uniting the peasants:
⎯ caste and influence by monotheistic sects.
⎯ Although caste factors were crucial in the Jat revolts as well as in
lawless activities of Mewatis, Wattus and Dogars,
⎯ the Satnami opposition was based much on the radical ideas of the
monotheistic movements.
• The main point of conflict between the imperial authorities and the
zamindars was the size of the latter's share in the land revenue or in the
surplus produce.
• Primary zamindars were merely treated as tax-gatherers, on behalf of the
state and the assignees.
• As Irfan Habib notes, their exactions from the peasants were restricted
not only by formal regulations, but much more by the high pitch of the
revenue demand which left little with the peasants to be taken by
 anyone else. Autonomous chiefs also were fed up from the threat of
annexation.
• Irfan Habib in his The Agrarian System of Mughal India notes that it was
their position in this unequal contest and their contacts with peasantry
that led many zamindars to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the
peasants, whose support would have been indispensible to them for
defence as well as in flight. The united front posed a serious challenge to
the invincibility of Mughal cavalry. By Aurangzeb's reign, the struggle took
a shift from defensive to aggressive stance.
• The peasant distress was at the root of these rebellions that shook the
Mughal Empire to its foundations
• It has been argued that growing financial pressure of the state led to a
growing agrarian crisis.
• The Frenchman, Bernier, who was in India during the last years of Shah
Jahan’s reign says that the exploitation of the cultivators had reached such a
level that many of them fled to the territories of neighbouring rajas.
• He links the high revenue demand to the “Mogol” owning all the land, and
the absence of a hereditary nobility which could act as a check on royal
despotism.
• A number of modern historians have largely based themselves on Bernier’s
theories.
• However, it may be pointed out that Bernier had little practical knowledge
about rural conditions in India, and he wrote more for effect in France.
• There was a hereditary nobility in Rajasthan, but there is no evidence that it
was more concerned with agrarian development than jagirdars who were
transferable but who under royal pressure, and for their own benefit tried to
expand and improve cultivation.
• It was, also, wrong for Bernier to think that the “Mogol” owned all the
land. There is plenty of evidence of sale and purchase of land in the
villages.
• Abul Fazl makes it clear that the resident cultivator was the malik-i-zamin
or owner of the land he cultivated and could bequeath or alienate it.
• However, for alienation, the approval of village elders was sometimes
called for. Land was also purchased for construction of houses in towns.
• Regarding flight of peasants, this could be caused by famines or local
oppression.
• There was also a constant movement of peasants from one zamindari tract
to another in search for better conditions.
• Such peasants were called pahis. Whether the movement of pahis increased
during the 17th century is not known.
• In areas such as Rajasthan, and parts of Maharashtra ruled over by
autonomous rajas, the land revenue demand appears to be similar to the
Mughal revenue demand.
• There were, of course, cases of over-exploitation by individual jagirdars
and state officials, despite the state machinery which had been devised to
check such situations.
• Thus, there was widespread resentment of the Jats of the Agra-Mathura
region, and of the Satnamis of Narnaul against agrarian abuses, as we have
noted.
• But these cannot be regarded as evidence of a widespread agrarian crisis
leading to decline of cultivation.
• Recent studies show that in North India generally, gross cropped area
expanded during the 17th century at the rate of 0.23 per cent which was
higher than the population growth of 0.21 per cent for the period 1601-
1871.
• This further mitigates the theory of an agrarian crisis.
• That the growth of agricultural production remained slow may be assigned
to absence of new technologies in the field of agriculture during that period.