Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ebook Al Muhajiroun A Case Study in Contemporary Islamic Activism 1St Edition Douglas Weeks Online PDF All Chapter
Ebook Al Muhajiroun A Case Study in Contemporary Islamic Activism 1St Edition Douglas Weeks Online PDF All Chapter
https://ebookmeta.com/product/al-muhajiroun-a-case-study-in-
contemporary-islamic-activism-1st-edition-douglas-weeks/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/the-world-in-a-book-al-nuwayri-and-
the-islamic-encyclopedic-tradition-2nd-edition-elias-muhanna/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/companies-in-peace-processes-a-
guatemalan-case-study-ulrike-joras/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/nitrogen-assessment-pakistan-as-a-
case-study-1st-edition/
Avicenna s Al Shif■ Oriental Philosophy Routledge
Studies in Islamic Philosophy 1st Edition Sari
Nusseibeh
https://ebookmeta.com/product/avicenna-s-al-shifa-oriental-
philosophy-routledge-studies-in-islamic-philosophy-1st-edition-
sari-nusseibeh/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/electromyography-in-clinical-
practice-a-case-study-approach-3rd-edition-bashar-katirji/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/a-case-study-of-a-soviet-
republic-1st-edition-tonu-parmin/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/man-and-the-universe-an-islamic-
perspective-mostafa-al-badawi/
https://ebookmeta.com/product/business-innovation-a-case-study-
approach-1st-edition-vijay-pandiarajan/
Al Muhajiroun
A Case Study in
Contemporary Islamic
Activism
d ougl a s w e e k s
Al Muhajiroun
“This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about the nature of
Islamist movements, and explores them in a detailed manner that hasn’t previously
been explored at an anthropological level. Douglas Weeks analyses al Muhajiroun’s
claims to theological authenticity whilst avoiding clichés. This book questions
many assumptions made by government and commentators trying to connect the
likes of al-Muhajiroun and its sister groups to terror today. A must read for every-
one involved at an academic or professional level.”
—Rashad Ali, Resident Senior Fellow, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, UK
Al Muhajiroun
A Case Study in Contemporary Islamic Activism
Douglas Weeks
School of Criminology, Criminal Justice
and Emergency Management
California State University, Long Beach
Long Beach, CA, USA
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To Mom…It’s finally done!
Acknowledgements
There are literally hundreds of men and women that selflessly gave up their
time to help me understand this movement. The range spans those that
were my earliest international law and fire service contacts in London, my
supervisors at the University of St Andrews, those in the UK police and
probation services, Home Office and local government personnel, current
and former Hizb ut Tahrir leaders, government approved intervention
providers, religious leaders, the enduring support of my family, and of
course the activists themselves who decided to take a chance and allow me
into their world. I owe a debt of gratitude to all of them and attempting
to name anyone would only come at the expense of those that would not
be named. Thus, I will simply say that without the help that all of you
provided, this book would not have been possible. Thank you! You know
who you are.
vii
Contents
ix
x Contents
Selected Bibliography349
Index367
Al Muhajiroun: A Case Study
in Contemporary Islamic Activism
xi
Preface
xiii
xiv Preface
bombs, blowing them up, and then then doing the post blast investiga-
tion. In all honesty, it was great fun.
When 9/11 happened, the threat picture escalated exponentially. The
Second Intifada was also in full swing in Israel/Palestine and suicide
bombings were quickly rising to the top of the threat profile. After a
chance meeting with a chief fire officer from Israel at a conference in Los
Angeles, I received what would become several state sponsored invitations
to travel to Israel to learn bomb response protocol from the Israeli’s. I
spent considerable time with the police (especially the Jerusalem Bomb
Squad), fire, emergency medical, religious leaders, and military groups
there. I received similar invitations from the Police and Fire Services in
Northern Ireland and made trips there as well.
The more I saw, the more I realized that it was not just about response.
There was a need to understand what the issues were that drove those
conflicts through the human perspective. I also realized that I was only
receiving the government sanctioned assessment of the threat. In response,
during my trips overseas, I began to venture more and more into the
neighborhoods and speak with people who offered alternative views.
Whether in Northern Ireland or Israel, wandering into the wrong
neighborhood or pub was dangerous, but I quickly realized that as soon
as individuals heard my American accent, the threat to me was immedi-
ately reduced. In fact, I found that people were generally eager to engage
and offer their perspectives on ‘The Troubles’ or ‘the occupation.’
After sustaining a career ending on the job injury, I was forced to retire
from the fire service in late 2009. I decided to leverage my ethnographic
experiences and do a PhD at the University of St Andrews which is where
the genesis for this book began.
When I first started interacting with the activists, I found they were not
only the largest proscribed group operating in the UK, but also the most
accessible, and an excellent example of what constitutes contemporary
Islamic activism in a Western setting. Moreover, they make an excellent
case study of how radicalism actually happens. As will be discussed, radi-
calisation is first and foremost a social problem that is rooted in identity. It
is not the convenient rhetoric that government uses to pejoratively label
people it doesn’t like nor is it rooted in ideology, although it is exacer-
bated by ideology. It is about how individuals give meaning to their lives,
vent their frustration, bond with others, and establish the role they want
to play in society.
Preface xv
Introduction
Fig. 1.1 Omar Bakri Mohammed in his living room. Tripoli, Lebanon, April
2012. (Photograph by Douglas Weeks)
The contemporary world is obsessed with the images of conflict and espe-
cially with those of terrorism. Whether the threat originates from a radical-
ized Islamist group or a radicalized white nationalist, seemingly not a day
passes without some reporting of an individual or group advocating that
radical change is needed. Unfortunately, all too often that message is
underscored by the violence of an actual attack. In response, governments
have gone on the offensive. Police led counter-terrorism raids, military
operations in foreign countries, more stringent border checks, and signifi-
cant increases in digital monitoring are now common practice.
The threat is further solidified through the media and government,
who bombard us with the idea that additional security measures are needed
because there are radicalized individuals within and outside our borders
with ill intent. Ingrained in that reporting is the notion that ‘we’ collec-
tively represent ‘civil society’ and those that are arrested or commit the
atrocities are the ‘terrorists.’
Although the pejorative labeling of radicals, extremists, and terrorists
has many purposes, understanding why such individuals and groups think
the way they think, and do the things they do is important. Groups and
movements vary widely and although government and academics conve-
niently label them as Salafi jihadist, white nationalist, eco-terrorist, or any
number of other categories, effective management of such groups requires
a more thorough understanding. When groups are shoehorned into pre-
conceived categories without a comprehensive understanding, ineffective
policy results. In some instances, that can even undermine the very secu-
rity that government is attempting to provide.
In the United Kingdom (UK), one of the largest sources of terrorist
threat is believed to come from al Muhajiroun (ALM).1 Although ALM
(The Emigrants) no longer exists, those that continue to follow its ideol-
ogy represent the most enduring and publicly recognized radicalized
Islamic extremist group in the country. Their message is confrontational,
ultra conservative, and rooted in conservative Salafi based Islam. They
have revered individuals like Osama bin Laden (OBL) and Anwar Awlaki,
called the UK and US Governments terrorists, and openly promoted the
Khilafah (Caliphate)2 system of governance.
Many of its followers, including key leaders, have been linked and/or
convicted and imprisoned for a wide range of offenses. Those convictions,
the group’s open support for other radical groups, and other criminal
cases that directly or indirectly ‘link’ back to the group led the UK
Government to conclude that it is an organization involved in terrorism
1 RESEARCHING THE ACTIVISTS: UNDERSTANDING METHODS, DATA… 3
and take punitive action. Despite significant efforts to suppress the group,
government efforts have had limited effect.
Following the Islamic State’s (IS) declaration that the Caliphate had
been re-established in 2014, the group was buzzing, and the UK
Government concluded that ALM was ‘re-energized in the UK.’3
In 2016, two of the group’s key leaders, Anjem Choudary and Mizanur
Rahman were convicted for lending support to the IS and both received
5½ year prison sentences. As is customary in the UK, they were released
in October 2018 to serve out the remainder of their time on license. Many
have since concluded that they are reconstituting their activities.
Despite gaining significant attention by government, academics, and
the media, much of what has been written about the group is derived from
limited access, secondary sources, or drawing conclusions based on piece-
mealing bits of information together. The result is that much of what is
known about the group is not actually correct and/or fails to appropri-
ately contextualize the group’s history, beliefs, practices, methods, and
threat in a way that facilitates a comprehensive understanding and effective
management.
This book provides a more thorough understanding about the group
and corrects much of the misinformation that exists. It charts its historical
development, delves deeply into the group’s ideology, provides a compre-
hensive understanding of its ideological relationship with groups like al
Qaeda (AQ) and the IS, explains why so many of its followers immigrated
to the IS, and provides a realistic threat assessment. In doing so, it corrects
fundamental attribution errors that currently exist such as: because the
group subscribes to a jihadi Salafist ideology, they have the same beliefs as
AQ or the IS; that the group remains as a clandestine organization and has
simply created spin off groups to avoid government suppression; that the
goal of the group is to turn Britain into a Muslim country; that group
leaders encouraged those within the movement to emigrate to the IS; that
the group is responsible for the vast majority of terror activity in the UK
and abroad; or that the group headed a vast network of extremist groups
across Europe, just to name a few. What follows is based on 9 years of
ethnographic research and close personalized interaction with those within
the group.
My research began in 2010 by making several exploratory trips to
London to establish key contacts.4 Although I had been doing background
research and tuning into the nightly Paltalk sessions for some time, on 06
4 D. WEEKS
with group leaders. The rationale behind that approach comes from tradi-
tional ethnographic research methodology which advocates that if you
want to truly understand a group or culture, the way to do that is to
engage with group leaders and key actors.8 Interacting with others might
provide additional context or provide insights as to how people assimilate
into activism, but deeper knowledge comes from interacting with group
leaders and key actors. Thus, although the following chapters include ref-
erences from rank and file activists, the core aspects of this book are based
on my interaction with group leaders.
What follows is their story.
proselytize their message. Halaqah (study) sessions were held every week
so individuals could learn the religious and methodological principles of
the group. They also had a vibrant online presence where members, other
like-minded individuals, or people curious about their message could
check in and interact with ALM leadership, receive religious clarification
and guidance, and find out what the hot topics were that were affecting
Muslims around the globe.
ALM functioned openly as a legal organization until 2004 when it vol-
untarily disbanded. Almost immediately, former ALM members began
new organizations with the same ideological orientation which former
ALM members and others naturally flocked to. In, 2006, the government
took adverse action against the group and proscribed them.14 Since that
time, the group has continued to function but is better conceptualized as
a radical Islamist movement rather than an organizational body. That
change has significantly and continually challenged the UK Government
for more than decade.
Although the government can easily make it unlawful for a group such
as ALM to exist, it has no control over the way people think. In Britain,
the concept of free speech and protest has been practiced by its subjects/
citizens for centuries, and continues to be a coveted and enduring right.
Thus, although the government has taken numerous steps to eliminate or
at least silence the group, the group and their ideas remain steadfast and
their activism continues.
wearing a skull cap, a tunic, and with mal intent hidden behind dark
glaring eyes. In short, the conceptual nature of radicals and radicalization
has been hypersensitized and politicized. Moreover, it forgoes the reality
that few radicals engage in violence or that not everyone who engages in
terrorist violence is radical.29
In the UK, policy and strategy documents have closely associated radi-
calism and the threat of terrorism with Islamic extremism. Beginning with
the first publicly available version of CONTEST (the UK’s counter-
terrorism strategy) in 2006, the term ‘radicalized’ became a common
means of referencing its perception of threat, saying unambiguously that
“The principal current terrorist threat is from radicalised individuals who
are using a distorted and unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to
justify violence.”30
The 2006 version of CONTEST further characterizes what radicaliza-
tion is, and what radicals are, saying “It is also important to see this as a
two-stage process. An alienated individual who has become highly radi-
calised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny minority of radicalised
individuals actually cross over to become terrorists.”31
Despite the extensive use of the terms radicalized, radicalism, and radi-
calization throughout the 2006 version of CONTEST and the Prevent
Strategy released in 2007, it wasn’t until the 2009 version of CONTEST
that radicalization was actually defined by the UK Government. The gov-
ernment assessed that radicalization was one of the four strategic drivers of
terrorism and defined it as “the process by which people come to support
violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups.”32 When the
CONTEST strategy was updated in 2011 its definition was changed
slightly but remained no less pejorative; “Radicalisation refers to the pro-
cess by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extrem-
ism leading to terrorism.”33 Despite a new Counter-Extremism Strategy
being released in 2015 and a new CONTEST Strategy being released in
2018, the UK Government has continued to use its established definitions
which link radicalization to violence.
The UK Government’s view of radicalism is not significantly different
than Silber and Bhatt’s infamous NYPD report in which they theorized a
four-step process to radicalization which directly or indirectly culminates
in violence.34 Although Silber later modified his position,35 the original
Silber and Bhatt report stated that “Entering the process does not mean
one will progress through all four stages and become a terrorist. However,
…[they] may serve as mentors and agents of influence to those who might
become the terrorists of tomorrow.”36
10 D. WEEKS
extremists argue that one does not preclude the other, the role of cogni-
tive radicalization in behavioral radicalization is situational at best, and
that context matters significantly.
Notwithstanding the arguments above, the idea that radicals (noun) go
through a process of radicalization (verb), there is arguably a loss of logic
in the UK Government’s definitions of radicalism and extremism which
detracts from understanding radicals and what it means to be extreme in
more useful ways. Intuitively, if individuals progress through different
phases of cognitive radicalization, each becoming more extreme until
behavioral radicalization (violence) is adopted, then radicalization would
represent a continuum. At one end of the spectrum there would be the
initial stages of non-violent but radical thought and at the other end of the
spectrum there would be violent action. Logically, as more and more radi-
cal beliefs are internalized, the person would progress from simply having
radical beliefs to someone whose beliefs were assessed to be extreme.
However, the UK Government’s definitions don’t support that intuitive
and logical progression.
Despite academic assessments to the contrary, the UK Government
continues to use the 2011 definition which establishes a clear link between
radicalization and violent action, yet within its definition of extremism,
one could be extreme and not engage in violence.
Extremism is defined as-
Setting aside the last sentence which appears to be an awkward and last
minute add on that advocates the death of those in the armed forces,
which all except for a very small minority would agree represents extrem-
ism, the definition above is a juxtaposition of conceptual ideas and intui-
tive logic about what it means to be radical or extreme. In other words, to
be radical, as the definition confirms, one must ultimately support or be
explicitly involved in violence. However, to be extreme, one must simply
adopt and vocalize a belief that embraces a different set of values, respect,
and/or another form of governance. Using the example of highly conser-
vative but non-violent Salafis (quietist Salafis), the UK definitions would
categorize them as extremists but not radical.
12 D. WEEKS
that they profess to have expertise about. However, that is clearly not the
case. The continued lack of primary data on radicalism, terrorists, and ter-
rorist groups remains well documented in the literature.62 This reality is
not new either as Crenshaw noted two decades ago saying “The study of
terrorism still lacks the foundation of extensive primary data based on
interviews and life histories of individuals involved in terrorism.”63
Underscoring that little has changed, Ranstorp recently concluded that
“Far too much terrorism research is based on secondary sources which
contribute to systematic bias and circular analytical loops.”64 He goes on
to say “Field research is essential in verifying ‘circular truth,’ debunking
myths and information, and unlocking new perspectives into the specific
research issue.”65
Another uncomfortable truth is that not only do most terrorism
researchers not speak to the people they write about, some view not talk-
ing to terrorists as a means of establishing their own scholarly credibility
because it avoids giving publicity to and/or legitimizing the actions of
the extremists.66 Similarly, Dershowitz argues that addressing the griev-
ances of terrorists gives efficacy to their cause. As a result, he argues, that
we should do exactly the opposite—“never try to understand or eliminate
its alleged root causes.”67 Regardless of the motivations, Dolnik’s assess-
ment is that the continued lack of primary data, creates a ‘closed and
circular research system’ where fundamental errors are repeated, and that
much of the research is approached from a government perspective
whereby inherent biases, including the conveyor belt theory, continue to
be reinforced.68
Perhaps the most uncomfortable of these realities is that radicalized
extremists and those that engage in violent action are often willing to tell
their side of the story if one is willing to take the initiative to engage with
them.69 Thus, for those willing to go out into the field to engage with the
people they claim to have expertise about, the possibilities are endless and
often leads to new insights, understandings, and high-quality publish-
able research.
This book does not propose to answer all the questions that exist about
radicalization, extremist groups, or terrorism, nor is it generalizable to
every group, every individual, or every cause. It does offer what is hoped
to be valuable insight on what I refer to as contemporary radicalized
Islamic activism in Britain and specifically, the ALM/ASWJ movement. It
provides an up close and personal assessment that the group is in fact a
radical social movement rather than a terrorist entity as they are commonly
16 D. WEEKS
pressure to publish does not adversely affect the data. For instance, Silke,
has argued that research was essentially about the creation of knowledge
through exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory methods, and assessed
that the majority of research was either too exploratory or too descriptive
and the data was not rigorous enough to allow for explanatory or predic-
tive assessment.72 In support of his assessment he concluded that “In only
one percent of reports are interviews conducted in a systematic and struc-
tured manner.”73 Silke further assessed that they were ad hoc, opportunis-
tic, or semi-structured at best.74
Similar to Silke’s concerns, Horgan stated that many of the interviews
conducted by academics with ‘an actual terrorist’ amount to nothing more
than what he described as “a personal or journalistic account, and at worse
an unfettered ego trip.”75 Advocating that greater rigor needs to be
brought to terrorism research, Horgan argues that terrorism researchers
should structure their interviews more rigidly and he makes suggestions
on the kinds of questions that should be asked.76 Although Silke and
Horgan make a viable argument in some regards, the reality is that groups
and the individuals that make them up vary widely. Interviews have to be
tailored to the group, the moment, and the individual being interviewed.
That reality is supported by Dolnik who acknowledges that “Most inter-
views in the terrorism studies field are unstructured, using open-ended
questions in order to allow for greater breadth of data.”77 Thus, while
certain kinds of questions and structure might be preferred for some
researchers, I rejected following too rigid a model as it would significantly
limit the ability to understand a group like the ALM/ASWJ movement.
Sageman has also argued that “the rush of newcomers into the field had
a deleterious effect on [terrorism] research.”78 The result being that “The
same worn-out questions are raised over and over again, and we still have
no compelling answers.”79 He goes on to criticize several quarters before
eventually focusing his frustration on the gulf that exists between the
intelligence and academic communities ultimately assessing that “intelli-
gence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while academics
understand everything but know nothing.”80 Sageman concludes his cri-
tique arguing that the problem could be solved if there was closer
interaction between the intelligence community and a small cadre of capa-
ble academics (presumably himself included). Although the UK intelli-
gence community may be critical of my assessments regarding ALM/
ASWJ and academics such as Horgan, Sageman, and others may be critical
of the methodology used in this book, there are arguably multiple paths
18 D. WEEKS
have a full appreciation for the ‘lived experience and experiential world’ of
those individuals.83 Thus, for me, the only way to gain full appreciation of
the ‘lived experience’ was to engage with those individuals through close
personal and repeated contact. That is not to say that I didn’t also engage
in desk-based research. Rather I used my personal interaction with those
considered extremists and terrorists to contextualize, substantiate, and in
some cases refute my desk-based understanding. When I began my
research on ALM/ASWJ, I used that same approach.
Ethnography can mean different things to different people but is tradi-
tionally considered an art and a science to describe a group or culture
through thick description.84 Specifically, thick description refers to provid-
ing firsthand knowledge of cultural contexts and meanings of individual
and group beliefs and actions so that people outside the group can make
sense of their behavior.85
As a research methodology, ethnography is particularly well-suited to
study a group like ALM/ASWJ because it provides “a descriptive account
of social life and culture in a particular social system, based on detailed
observations of what people actually do…especially in relation to groups,
organizations, and communities that are part of larger and more complex
societies.”86 It does not attempt to prove and disprove a deductive hypoth-
esis, nor does it attempt to develop any theories beyond that which can be
applied to the group. It simply tells a story with the ability to position that
story within a larger and more complex social and political structure.
One of the disadvantages of ethnography is that you can only tell the
story based on what you observe or your interactions when you are there.
In the case of ALM/ASWJ, one could argue that the movement actually
started in 1984 when OBM came to Britain, or perhaps even earlier when
he was in Saudi Arabia. Because I did not begin interacting with the group
until 2011, their early history had to be first gleaned from media reports
and other academic works. In order to substantiate, contextualize, and in
some cases refute what was reported, interviews were conducted with
those in the movement during that time. Thus, the early chapters are
based on key interviews with OBM and a few others whereas later chapters
draw on a wider group of interviews, events, and more ethnographic
accounts. To that end, this book relies on my firsthand ethnographic expe-
riences with the ALM/ASWJ movement and further supplements that
with traditional academic research, and personal interviews in order to tell
the history of ALM/ASWJ and establish a comprehensive description and
understanding of the movement.
20 D. WEEKS
There are some limitations to SMT however. The first is that while
there is no established number to define when a group becomes a social
movement, social movements are generally conceived to have a certain
mass behind them. Even at the height of the ALM organization, the
group’s members numbered in the hundreds, not the thousands. As such,
depending on how one conceives what a social movement is, there is a
certain risk of conflating the group beyond its actual influence. That said,
while the core ALM/ASWJ group constitutes a small radical group within
the UK with a small number of ‘affiliates’ in Europe and North America,
it is simultaneously part of the larger global Islamist movement. Moreover,
groups like AQ and IS have had significant influences on ALM/ASWJ and
thus, it needs to be understood against the backdrop of the wider global
movements and influences.
Another limitation is that while SMT is well suited to conceptually
explain movements, it is limited in its explanation of individuals. Although
this book remains broadly focused on understanding the history, activities,
interactions with government, ideology of the ALM/ASWJ movement as
a whole, one cannot understand the group without understanding some
of the individual dynamics of the group’s leaders. As such, there is some
use of Tajfel and Turner’s SIT to help explain some of the individuals,
their actions, as well as group and intergroup conflict.95
SIT is also very helpful in explaining the conflict between dominate and
subordinate groups, and how individual and group identity is formed. The
relationship between the British Government and ALM/ASWJ fits well
within the notion of in-group and out-group relationships with the former
doing all it can to maintain the status quo while the latter strives to develop
a strong group identity where positions are hardened, the ‘other’ is deval-
ued, and moral superiority is claimed by both sides.96
Last, while SMT and SIT are useful in explaining the group, its indi-
viduals, and their relationship with government, one must accept that the
ontological realities of both government and ALM/ASWJ are fiercely tied
to their epistemological experiences. In many ways, the organizational cul-
ture of government and that of ALM/ASWJ is just as insular. To appreci-
ate the social and political processes that drive the beliefs and action of
both groups, this book appreciates that social constructivism defines how
both groups interpret one another through their own relativism.97 As
Borum notes, people see the world based their own “…internal map of
reality, not reality itself.”98
22 D. WEEKS
that government had regarding such groups and individuals, and how I
saw that manifest as ill-conceived policy, ineffective strategy, and poor tac-
tical decision making.
As mentioned, one does not simply show up and start trolling for data
with a group like ALM. To gain access, I first read everything that was
published about them and then began attending their protests. I simulta-
neously pumped as much background information as I could out of my
law enforcement contacts which, as it turned out, was quite limited. It
soon became apparent that because I was engaging with the group, some
of my law enforcement contacts wanted to use me for intelligence gather-
ing purposes, offering that if I told them what I was finding out about the
group, they would do the same. That was not ethically possible and I was
forced to limit my contact with them.
Once I began attending the protests, my presence started to become
familiar to the activists and two things happened very early on. The first is
that the activists became curious and approached me to find out who I was,
what I was doing there, and why I had interest in them. I responded hon-
estly, explained my research, and the reasons for it. The second thing that
happened is that some of the group’s leaders immediately labeled me as a
spy. To them, I was either working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or some other agency, but
either way, I was a spy. My American accent, age, short hair, demeanor, and
general ‘government’ looking appearance made me an easy target for
such labeling.
Despite the limiting stereotype, the more protests I attended, human
nature gradually took over, and the more people began to interact. All
were guarded and many skeptical, but simultaneously curious. It was not
uncommon in the first year to be approached and the conversation to
begin with ‘so, what’s new with the CIA this week?’ However, bit by bit,
they began to accept my presence and eventually me. It wasn’t long before
people began acknowledging my presence with a friendly hello.
I also ran into some brick walls, although ironically, more so with those
who had left the movement years before than the activists themselves. A
case in point is Chap. 3 which documents some of the historical aspects of
ALM (1996–2004). In preparation for my interview with OBM, a year by
year media search (1996–2004) was conducted in order to establish some
of ALM’s history. During my interviews with OBM, we explored several
of these areas and in some cases, I was able to get confirmation of the
events from other sources. However, when I attempted to confirm OBM’s
24 D. WEEKS
recollection of the events, with others that were in leadership roles at that
time but had since left the movement, I was shut down.
In one case I made contact with a senior leader through Facebook and
was soon ignored. In another case I met a senior leader who first agreed to
help but then refused to provide any comments. In yet another case, a
trusted intermediary helped facilitate some dialogue with another senior
leader but the former ALM leader changed his mind at the last minute,
choosing instead to send an article as his response. The article was titled
‘The Science of Spying: How the CIA Secretly recruits Academics.’
Ironically, in all three cases, the individuals belonged to ALM when it
operated as a legal entity and left once it was proscribed.
As an ethnographer, it is important to remember that you are in it for
the long haul, not to grab a bit of data here, a sound bite there, and return
to wherever home base is. As such, the importance of patience, presence,
and sincerity cannot be overstated. As Dolnik writes, “interviews with ter-
rorists almost never yield any groundbreaking information, especially when
this is the first encounter between the researcher and interviewee.”100 I
found this to be incredibly true when interacting with ALM/ASWJ follow-
ers and leadership. Although trust was built over time, it took several
months of listening patiently to the evils of the West, the supremacy of
divine law, the impacts that the war on terrorism has had on Muslims
around the globe, and the oppression that the activists endured from the
British Government and elsewhere before any meaningful dialog took place.
One of the things that is decidedly true is that the activists have mas-
tered the language of rhetoric; they know the issues and are quick to use
them when speaking to the media and those they do not know or trust.
Moreover, each time that I engaged with someone new, the entire process
of listening to the evils of the West, divine law, etc. started all over again.
Although it took time, trust was established, and real conversations with-
out the sound bites and rhetoric began to take place. Depending on which
individual was being engaged, there was, and still is a stratification of
openness and dialog that continues to this day. However, many of the
leaders eventually accepted that I wasn’t there to spy on them or deride
them, I simply wanted to learn, and that is when the real interaction began.
As mentioned, much of what is currently understood about the ALM/
ASWJ movement is derived from limited access, secondary sources, or
conclusions drawn by piecemealing bits of information together. This
book serves to correct those areas of misunderstanding and contextualize
what is known about the group more comprehensively. To do so, this
book engages in several areas of inquiry.
1 RESEARCHING THE ACTIVISTS: UNDERSTANDING METHODS, DATA… 25
The data obtained for this book is a mixture of primary and secondary
sources. Some historical accounts had to be derived from media reports
and other academic sources, but they are further contextualized by data
obtained from interviews, observing the activists in their ‘natural setting,’
and prolonged personal interaction. Consistent with ethnographic meth-
ods, the data is nearly all qualitative.
As mentioned, the data collection for this book took place over a 9-year
period between 2011 and 2019. In sum, I conducted 257 interviews with
118 different individuals. The interviews are broken down as follows: 148
interviews with 51 current and former ALM/ASWJ activists (primarily
group leaders) and their families, 36 interviews with 14 law enforcement
and probation officers, 30 interviews with 20 citizens and community
activists, 13 interviews with 7 mosque and religious leaders, 13 interviews
with 11 intervention providers (mentors); 9 interviews with academics,
researchers, and think tanks, 2 interviews with 2 local government repre-
sentatives, 2 interviews with 2 elected officials, 3 interviews were con-
ducted with current or past HT leaders, and 1 interview was conducted
with a leading radical preacher who was deported from Britain and now
26 D. WEEKS
lives in Jordan. Although there was some engagement and interviews were
conducted with female family members of the activists, nearly all of the
activist interviews were with males. To engage with ultra conservative
Muslim females would in most cases require a male to be present, thus
making the data somewhat questionable because of the reflexive influences
involved. As such, the females within the movement were largely avoided.
Most of the interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2016 (see
Appendix 1). The reason for that is that the movement scaled back consid-
erably on their protest, halaqah, and dawah, activities following the
imprisonment of Anjem Choudary and Mizanur Rahman in 2016. Placing
four of the movement’s other leaders on Terrorism Prevention and
Investigation Measure (TPIM)101 that same year further limited the move-
ment’s activities. Interviews still took place after 2016 but were more lim-
ited in number and focused on the other key ideologues such as Abu
Qatada, the family members of the activists, and the remaining leaders.
In additional to the interviews, I attended 29 protests, interacted
nightly with the group online, sat in on 20 closed halaqah (study) ses-
sions, was present at three trials, and conducted participant observation at
8 dawah stalls. My access is best described as a combination of opportu-
nity sampling and the use of snowballing techniques102 which then led to
more trusted one on one engagement with group leaders.
Nearly all of the interviews were semi-structured, while others were
done on the fly at protests, dawah stalls, before and after halaqah sessions,
and at courthouses. Some were relatively brief lasting just a few minutes
while others lasted for hours or even days. For instance, when I inter-
viewed OBM at his home in Tripoli, Lebanon, the interview consisted of
approximately 18 hours of discussion over a three-day period. Repeated
interviews/discussions/meetings with group leaders also resulted in
countless hours of one on one engagement that added understanding to
not only their beliefs, but also context to the back story of certain events,
protests, and individuals.
A small number of interviews were recorded (28) but most were cap-
tured using field notes. Generally speaking, people are reticent about
being tape recorded so field notes were the norm. Most fieldnotes were
re-written as soon as possible in electronic format for easier saving and
thematic analysis. When observing the protests and dawah stalls, field
notes and pictures were taken to document my observations then re-
written and contextualized once the opportunity was available.
1 RESEARCHING THE ACTIVISTS: UNDERSTANDING METHODS, DATA… 27
Chapter Outlines
As has been discussed, Chap. 1 introduces the ALM/ASWJ movement.
There is also discussion on where this book sits in relation to broader ter-
rorism studies, explains the ethnographic approach, establishes the theo-
retical perspectives that will be used to explain/understand the ALM/
ASWJ movement, and discusses the methods and opportunities that were
used to conduct this research. Chapter 1 also establishes what this book
seeks to answer, profiles some of the other scholarly work done on ALM/
ASWJ and provides a primer on understanding radicalization and extremism.
Chapter 2 is an introductory chapter to contemporary radicalism in the
UK. To understand ALM/ASWJ, one has to have some appreciation for
the environment and the other radical preachers that were in Britain at the
time. A basic profile of OBM, his upbringing, his life in Lebanon, his
activities in Saudi Arabia, why he came to the UK, what led to his exile,
and his current imprisonment in Lebanon are discussed. The bulk of this
chapter charts OBM’s rise to power in HT until his departure in 1996. It
discusses his activities, his relationship with HT leadership, and the rea-
sons for his departure. It also discusses how he learned to stay within the
law while simultaneously remaining highly controversial and offensive,
and why he embraced and cultivated that controversy.
Chapter 3 discusses the formation of ALM from its British incarnation
in 1996. It includes a profile of ALM activities and the reaction of govern-
ment. The discussion includes the influences that AQ was having on the
group and the increasing pressure that government was applying. Chapter
3 also outlines the organizational structure of ALM, the methods of
recruitment used, and the events that led to its disbandment in 2004.
30 D. WEEKS
Conclusion
The core premise of the book is to explain the history, activities and beliefs
of the ALM/ASWJ movement, its relationship to government, and to
document the ‘irreducibility of the human experience’ though the day to
day lived experience of the individuals involved.114 In a Habermasian
sense, this book defines and explains two contentious overlapping spheres;
mainstream society and radical Islamic activism. There are no hypotheses
to test or theories to posit beyond its conclusions because that is not what
ethnography is about. That said, some will undoubtedly take issue with
the structure of the book because it challenges some of the conventional
understandings of radicalism, extremism, and Islamic activism. Others
may be critical simply because opinions vary widely in this environment.
Last, some may be critical simply because it does not fit their preferred
approach to research. To that end, I stand by my assessments.
Disclosures
This research was 100% self-funded. The author is a retired fire officer
from southern California who for 14 years served in a counter-terrorism
capacity interacting with other governments, those considered radicalized
extremists/terrorists, religious leaders, law, fire, and emergency medical
service providers, and the military. During the course of this research, he
32 D. WEEKS
Notes
1. Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering
Terrorism, Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST 2018),
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2006), 19.
2. Khilafah refers to an Islamic form of governance whereby the shariah is
implemented and various recognized governmental entities (courts, gov-
ernors, social provisions, etc.) exist under a functioning governing body
headed by a Caliph (Khalifah).
3. Home Office, CONTEST, 2018, 19.
4. The exploratory trips took place on 6 through 12 June, 27 June through
2 July, 19 through 20 July, and 28 November through 1 December,
2010. Contacts were made with the police and religious leaders.
5. Takbir is an invocation that elicits the response Allah hu Akbar (God is
greatest).
6. Field notes 06 May 2011.
7. Field notes 06 May 2011.
8. Fetterman, David M, “Ethnography,” In The SAGE Handbook of Applied
Social Research Methods, Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog (eds.), (Sage:
Thousand Oaks, CA, 2009), 18.
9. Gillan, Audrey and Duncan Campbell, “Many Faces of Bakri: Enemy of
West, Press Bogeyman, and Scholar,” The Guardian, London, 13 August
2005. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/
13/terrorism.syria1. [Accessed 12 June 2017].
10. O’Neill, Sean, “Magnificent 19 Praised by Muslim Extremist,” The
Telegraph, London, 12 September 2003. Available at http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/uknews/1441270/Magnificent-19-praised-by-
Muslim-extremists.html. [Accessed 12 June 2017].
11. Morgan, Tom, “Bin Laden Supporters Clash with EDL,” The Independent,
London, 6 June 2011. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/home-news/bin-laden-supporters-clash-with-edl-2280160.
html. [Accessed 12 June 2017].
1 RESEARCHING THE ACTIVISTS: UNDERSTANDING METHODS, DATA… 33
[1141] No. 27 in the list given for ch. x. Father Christmas says
‘Here comes in “The Feast of Fools.”’
[1142] Cf. the further account of these post-Nativity feasts in
ch. xv.
[1143] The C. of Paris in 1212 (p. 279) forbids the Feast of
Fools in religious houses. But that in the Franciscan
convent at Antibes is the only actual instance I have come
across.
[1144] There were canonici presbiteri, diaconi, subdiaconi and
even pueri at Salisbury (W. H. Frere, Use of Sarum, i. 51).
[1145] On the nature and growth of vicars choral, cf. Cutts,
341; W. H. Frere, Use of Sarum, i. xvii; Lincoln Statutes,
passim; A. R. Maddison, Vicars Choral of Lincoln (1878);
H. E. Reynolds, Wells Cathedral, xxix, cvii, clxx. Vicars
choral make their appearance in the eleventh century as
choir substitutes for non-resident canons. At Lincoln they
got benefactions from about 1190, and in the thirteenth
century formed a regularly organized communitas. The
vicarii were often at the same time capellani or chantry-
priests. On chantries see Cutts, 438.
[1146] The Lincoln vicars chose two Provosts yearly
(Maddison, op. cit.); the Wells vicars two Principals
(Reynolds, op. cit. clxxi).
[1147] Reynolds, op. cit., gives numerous and interesting
notices of chapter discipline from the Wells Liber Ruber.
[1148] In Leber, ix. 379, 407, is described a curious way of
raising funds for choir suppers, known at Auxerre and in
Auvergne, and not quite extinct in the eighteenth century. It
has a certain analogy to the Deposuit. From Christmas to
Epiphany the Psalm Memento was sung at Vespers, and
the anthem De fructu ventris inserted in it. When this began
the ruler of the choir advanced and presented a bouquet to
some canon or bourgeois as a sign that the choir would
sup with him. This was called ‘annonce en forme
d’antienne,’ and the suppers defructus. The C. of Narbonne
(1551), c. 47, forbade ‘parochis ... ne ... ad
commessationes quas defructus appellant, ullo modo
parochianos suos admittant, nec permittant quempiam
canere ut dicunt: Memento, Domine, David sans truffe, &c.
Nec alia huiusmodi ridenda, quae in contemptum divini
officii ac in dedecus et probrum totius cleri et fiunt et
cantantur.’
[1149] When, however, Ducange says that the feast was not
called Subdiaconorum, because the sub-deacons held it,
but rather as being ‘ebriorum Clericorum seu Diaconorum:
id enim evincit vox Soudiacres, id est, ad litteram, Saturi
Diaconi, quasi Diacres Saouls,’ we must take it for a ‘sole
joke of Thucydides.’ I believe there is also a joke
somewhere in Liddell and Scott.
[1150] Cf. p. 60; Gautier, Les Tropaires, i. 186; and C. of
Treves in 1227 (J. F. Schannat, Conc. Germ. iii. 532)
‘praecipimus ut omnes Sacerdotes non permittant
trutannos et alios vagos scolares aut goliardos cantare
versus super Sanctus et Agnus Dei.’
[1151] The ‘abbot’ appears to have been sometimes charged
with choir discipline throughout the year, and at Vienne and
Viviers exists side by side with another dominus festi.
Similarly at St. Omer there was a ‘dean’ as well as a
‘bishop.’ The vicars of Lincoln and Wells also chose two
officers.
[1152] I suppose that ‘portetur in rost’ at Vienne means that the
victims were roasted like the fags in Tom Brown.
[1153] Ducange, s. v. Kalendae.
[1154] Gibbon-Bury, v. 201. The Byzantine authorities are
Genesius, iv. p. 49 B (Corp. Hist. Byz. xi. 2. 102);
Paphlagon (Migne, P. G. cv. 527); Theophanes
Continuatus, iv. 38 (Corp. Hist. Byz. xxii. 200); Symeon
Magister, p. 437 D (Corp. Hist. Byz. xxii. 661), on all of
whom see Bury, App. I to tom. cit.
[1155] C. of Constantinople (869-70), c. 16 (Mansi, xvi. 169, ex
versione Latina, abest in Graeca) ‘fuisse quosdam laicos,
qui secundum diversam imperatoriam dignitatem
videbantur capillorum comam circumplexam involvere
atque reponere, et gradum quasi sacerdotalem per
quaedam inducia et vestimenta sacerdotalia sumere, et, ut
putabatur, episcopos constituere, superhumeralibus, id est,
palliis, circumamictos, et omnem aliam Pontificalem
indutos stolam, qui etiam proprium patriarcham
adscribentes eum qui in adinventionibus risum moventibus
praelatus et princeps erat, et insultabant et illudebant
quibusque divinis, modo quidem electiones, promotiones et
consecrationes, modo autem acute calumnias,
damnationes et depositiones episcoporum quasi ab
invicem et per invicem miserabiliter et praevaricatorie
agentes et patientes. Talis autem actio nec apud gentes a
saeculo unquam audita est.’
[1156] Cedrenus, Historiarum Compendium, p. 639 B (ed.
Bekker, in Corp. Hist. Byz. xxiv. 2. 333), follows verbatim
the still unprinted eleventh-century John Scylitzes (Gibbon-
Bury, v. 508). Theophylactus was Patriarch from 933 to
956.
[1157] Theodorus Balsamon, In Can. lxii Conc. in Trullo (P. G.
cxxxvii. 727) Σημείωσαι τὸν παρόντα κανόνα, καὶ ζήτησον
διόρθωσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις παρὰ τῶν κληρικῶν εἰς τήν
ἑορτὴν ἐπὶ τῆς γεννήσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῶν
Φώτων [Luminarium, Candlemas] ὑπεναντίως τούτῳ· καὶ
μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ἁγιωτάτην Μεγάλην ἐκκλησίαν ... ἀλλὰ καί
τινες κληρικοὶ κατά τινας ἑορτὰς πρὸς διάφορα
μετασχηματίζονται προσωπεῖα. καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ξιφήρεις ἐν τῷ
μεσονάω τῆς ἐκκλησίας μετὰ στρατιωτικῶν ἀμφίων
εἰσέρχονται, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ὡς μοναχοὶ προοδεύουσιν, ἢ καὶ
ὡς ζῶα τετράποδα. ἐρωτήσας οὖν ὅπως ταῦτα
παρεχωρήθησαν γίνεσθαι, οὐδέν τε ἕτερον ἤκουσα ἀλλ’ ἢ
ἐκ μακρᾶς συνθείας ταῦτα τελεῖσθαι. τοιαῦτά εἰσιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, καὶ τὰ παρά τινων δομεστικευόντων ἐν κλήρῳ
γινόμενα, τὸν ἀέρα τοῖς δακτύλοις κατὰ ἡνιόχους
τυπτόντων, καὶ φύκη ταῖς γνάθοις δῆθεν περιτιθεμένων καὶ
ὑπορρινομένων ἔργα τινὰ γυναικεῖα, καὶ ἕτερα ἀπρεπῆ, ἵνα
πρὸς γελωτα τοὺς βλέποντας μετακινήσωσι. τὸ δὲ γελᾶν
τοὺς ἀγρότας ἐγχεομένους τοῦ οἴνου τοῖς πίθοις, ὡσεί τι
παρεπόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ τοῖς ληνοβατοισιν· εἰ μήτις
εἴπη τὴν σατανικὴν ταύτην ἐργασίαν καταργεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ
λέγειν τοὺς ἀγρότας συχνότερον ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ μέτρῳ σχεδὸν
τό, Κύριε ἐλέησον. τὰ μέντοι ποτὲ γινόμενα ἀπρεπῆ παρὰ
τῶν νοταρίων παιδοδιδασκάλων κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῶν
ἁγίων νοταρίων, μετὰ προσωπείων σκηνικῶν διερχομένων
τὴν ἀγοράν, πρὸ χρόνων τινῶν κατηργήθησαν, καθ’
ὁρισμὸν τοῦ ἁγιωτάτου ἐκείνου πατριάρχου κυρίου Λουκᾶ.
[1158] Belethus, c. 120, compares the ecclesiastical ball-play
at Easter to the libertas Decembrica. He is not speaking
here of the Feast of Fools.
[1159] e.g. Du Tilliot, 2.
[1160] S. R. Maitland, The Dark Ages, 141, tilts at the
Protestant historian Robertson’s History of Charles V, as
do F. Clément, 159, and A. Walter, Das Eselsfest in
Caecilien-Kalender (1885), 75, at Dulaure, Hist. des
Environs de Paris, iii. 509, and other ‘Voltairiens.’
[1161] Chérest, 81.
[1162] J. Bujeaud, Chants et Chansons populaires des
Provinces de l’Ouest, i. 63. The ronde is known in Poitou,
Aunis, Angoumois. P. Tarbé, Romancero de Champagne
(2e partie), 257, gives a variant. Bujeaud, i. 61, gives
another ronde, the Testament de l’Âne, in which the ass
has fallen into a ditch, and amongst other legacies leaves
his tail to the curé for an aspersoir. This is known in Poitou,
Angoumois, Franche-Comté. He also says that he has
heard children of Poitou and Angoumois go through a
mock catechism, giving an ecclesiastical significance to
each part of the ass. The tail is the goupillon, and so forth.
Fournier-Verneuil, Paris, Tableau moral et philosophique
(1826), 522, with the Beauvais Officium in his mind, says
‘Voulez-vous qu’au lieu de dire, Ite, missa est, le prêtre se
mette à braire trois fois de toute sa force, et que le peuple
réponde en chœur, comme je l’ai vu faire en 1788, dans
l’église de Bellaigues, en Périgord?’
[1163] Cf. ch. xx. Gasté, 20, considers the Rouen Festum
Asinorum ‘l’origine de toutes les Fêtes de l’Âne qui se
célébraient dans d’autres diocèses’: but the Rouen MS. in
which it occurs is only of the fourteenth century, and the
Balaam episode does not occur at all in the more primitive
forms of the Prophetae, while the Sens Feast of Fools is
called the festa asinaria in the Officium of the early
thirteenth century.
[1164] Tille, D. W. 31. In Madrid an ass was led in procession
on Jan. 17, with anthems on the Balaam legend (Clément,
181).
[1165] Clément, 182; Didron, Annales archéologiques, xv. 384.
[1166] Dulaure, Hist. des Environs de Paris, iii. 509, quotes a
legend to the effect that the very ass ridden by Christ came
ultimately to Verona, died there, was buried in a wooden
effigy at Sta-Maria in Organo, and honoured by a yearly
procession. He guesses at this as the origin of the
Beauvais and other fêtes. Didron, Annales arch. xv. 377,
xvi. 33, found that nothing was known of this legend at
Verona, though such a statue group as is described above
apparently existed in the church named. Dulaure gives as
his authorities F. M. Misson, Nouveau Voyage d’ Italie
(1731), i. 164; Dict. de l’ Italie, i. 56. Misson’s visit to
Verona was in 1687, although the passage was not printed
in the first edition (1691) of his book. It is in the English
translation of 1714 (i. 198). His authority was a French
merchant (M. Montel) living in Verona, who had often seen
the procession. In Cenni intorno all’ origine e descrizione
della Festa che annualmente si celebra in Verona l’ ultimo
Venerdì del Carnovale, comunamente denominata
Gnoccolare (1818), 75, is a mention of the ‘asinello del
vecchio padre Sileno’ which served as a mount for the
‘Capo de’ Maccheroni.’ This is probably Misson’s
procession, but there is no mention of the legend in any of
the eighteenth-century accounts quoted in the pamphlet.
Rienzi was likened to an ‘Abbate Asinino’ (Gibbon, vii.
269).
[1167] Ducange, s. v. Festum Asinorum; cf. Leber, ix. 270;
Molanus, de Hist. SS. Imaginum et Picturarum (1594), iv.
18.
[1168] T. Naogeorgus (Kirchmeyer), The Popish Kingdom, iv.
443 (1553, transl. Barnabe Googe, 1570, in New
Shakspere Society edition of Stubbes, Anatomy of Abuses,
i. 332); cf. Beehive of the Roman Church, 199. The earliest
notice is in Gerardus, Leben St. Ulrichs von Augsburg (ob.
973), c. 4. E. Bishop, in Dublin Review, cxxiii. 405, traces
the custom in a Prague fourteenth-century Missal and
sixteenth-century Breviary; also in the modern Greek
Church at Moscow where until recently the Czar held the
bridle. But there is no ass, as he says, in the Palm Sunday
ceremony described in the Peregrinatio Silviae (Duchesne,
486).
[1169] A peeress of the realm lately stated that this custom
had been introduced in recent years into the Anglican
church. Denials were to hand, and an amazing conflict of
evidence resulted. Is there any proof that the Palmesel was
ever an English ceremony at all? The Hereford riding of
1706 (cf. Representations) was not in the church. Brand, i.
73, quotes A Dialogue: the Pilgremage of Pure Devotyon
(1551?), ‘Upon Palme Sondaye they play the foles sadely,
drawynge after them an Asse in a rope, when they be not
moche distante from the Woden Asse that they drawe.’
Clearly this, like Googe’s translation of Naogeorgus, is a
description of contemporary continental Papistry. W. Fulke,
The Text of the New Testament (ed. 1633), 76 (ad Marc. xi.
8) quotes a note of the Rheims translation to the effect that
in memory of the entry into Jerusalem is a procession on
Palm Sunday ‘with the blessed Sacrament reverently
carried as it were Christ upon the Asse,’ and comments,
‘But it is pretty sport, that you make the Priest that carrieth
the idoll, to supply the roome of the Asse on which Christ
did ride.... Thus you turn the holy mysterie of Christ’s riding
to Jerusalem to a May-game and Pageant-play.’ Fulke,
who lived 1538-89, is evidently unaware that there was an
ass, as well as the priest, in the procession, from which I
infer that the custom was not known in England. Not that
this consideration would weigh with the mediaevally-
minded curate, who is as a rule only too ready to make up
by the ceremonial inaccuracy of his mummeries for the
offence which they cause to his congregation.
[1170] Marquardt-Mommsen, vi. 191; Jevons, Plutarch’s
Romane Questions, 134; Fowler, 304, 322; Ovid, Fasti, ii.
531: