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Africa-China
Cooperation
Towards an African Policy on China?
Edited by Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera

International Political Economy Series
Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw
Emeritus Professor
University of Massachusetts Boston
Boston, MA, USA
University of London
London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades.
It has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South
increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also
reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on
indebted Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable
resource for scholars and researchers, the series examines a variety of capi-
talisms and connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies
and sectors, debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities as
the established trans-Atlantic North declines and ‘the rest’, especially the
BRICS, rise.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/13996
Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera
Editors
Africa-China
Cooperation
Towards an African Policy on China?
Editors
Philani Mthembu Faith Mabera
Institute for Global Dialogue, Institute for Global Dialogue,
Associated with UNISA Associated with UNISA
Pretoria, South Africa Pretoria, South Africa
ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-030-53038-9 ISBN 978-3-030-53039-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
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Cover credit: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African

Policy on China? 1
Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera
2 A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards

China 11
Bob Wekesa
3 Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement:

Kagame and Overcoming the ‘One and the Many’
Paradigm 31
Francis A. Kornegay Jr.
4 The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards

China: A Decolonial Afrocentric Perspective 57
Siphamandla Zondi
5 Pan-African Perspectives on International

Relations—Africa and China 83
Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah
v
vi CONTENTS
6 The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa:

Towards Enhancing African Agency? 107
Philani Mthembu
7 China’s Evolving Approach to the African

Peace and Security Agenda: Rationale, Trends
and Implications 135
Faith Mabera
8 Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement

with China 163
Paul Zilungisele Tembe
9 One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its

Impact on an African Policy Towards China 189
Yu-Shan Wu
10 The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model

for the Future of Africa–China Relations? 215
John Kotsopoulos
Index 235
List of Contributors
Francis A. Kornegay Jr. Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with

UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa
John Kotsopoulos Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation,
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Faith Mabera Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA,
Pretoria, South Africa
Philani Mthembu Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with
UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa
Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah Department of History, East
China Normal University, Shanghai, China
Paul Zilungisele Tembe Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute,
Bob Wekesa University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South
Africa
Yu-Shan Wu Africa-China Reporting Project, University of the Witwa-
tersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Siphamandla Zondi Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, South Africa
vii
List of Figures
Fig. 7.1 China’s contribution to UNPKO (2007–2017) (Source

United Nations peacekeeping, ‘contributions by country’,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contri
butors) 136
Fig. 7.2 Assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping (Permanent
UNSC members) (Source United Nations peacekeeping,
‘How we are funded’, Effective rates of assessment for
peacekeeping operations, 1 January 2016–31 December
2018, UNGA A/70/331/Add.1, https://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/331/Add.1) 136
ix
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic

importance 115
Table 6.2 Ranking of African nation states based on their human
development index (HDI) scores 119
Table 6.3 Material capabilities vs human development 123
Table 6.4 Official financial resources available to African countries
from China 125
Table 7.1 China’s current peacekeeping deployments in Africa
(June 2017) 147
Table 8.1 Forms of dualism as represented by Western and Chinese
cultures 169
xi
CHAPTER 1
Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards

an African Policy on China?
Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera
Africa’s Engagement with External Powers

Recent years have seen a greater focus on the African continent from
external powers for various geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. While
the continent has consistently been home to six or seven of the fastest
growing economies in the world in the last two decades, it is also home
to significant demographic and technological changes that promise to
propel it towards greater strategic importance in global politics. Indeed
the population of the continent is set to grow towards two billion people
by the year 2050, making it central to some of the relocation of produc-
tion centres taking place in the global economy. Various countries have
stepped up their engagements with the continent through both bilat-
eral relations and through the now fashionable ‘Africa summits’. China,
P. Mthembu (B) · F. Mabera

Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: philani@igd.org.za
F. Mabera
e-mail: faith@igd.org.za
© The Author(s) 2021 1

P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation,
International Political Economy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_1
2 P. MTHEMBU AND F. MABERA
India, Turkey, Japan, the EU and South Korea are just some of the global
actors courting the continent through Africa summits. The summits cover
a range of issue areas from the economy, international politics, migration,
climate change, development finance, peace and security, and enhancing
cultural and people to people exchanges. This phenomenon has thus
caused many on the continent to question their utility, and whether
African counterparts have actively used the summits to advance their
strategic interests and priorities.
While focused on Africa’s relations with China, the following book
is just as relevant for Africa’s engagement with other external powers
in a changing geopolitical environment. The often simplistic view of
China’s influence on the African continent often downplays the influence
of the United States and European powers on the continent, which have
maintained deep economic, political and cultural relations with African
countries after the colonial period. In an evolving multipolar world order
that is still taking shape, most African countries do not have the luxury
of choosing which relations to have, instead relying on cooperation with
countries in the global North and South (Mthembu 2020: 3). It is thus
ultimately up to African countries and institutions to use their relations
with the world to advance their development aspirations as captured in
documents such as Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (AU Commission
2015).
As a continent playing host to the largest number of individual coun-
tries, most of which are landlocked, the question of Africa’s relations with
external powers will remain important in the years to come. While bilat-
eral relations will remain a key element of Africa’s relations with external
powers, it is important to reflect on the various possibilities available for
engaging with external powers in order to enhance African priorities as
agreed to by the various regional economic communities (RECs) and
the African Union (AU). It is argued that African countries and pan-
African institutions could use the various Africa summits to coordinate
their positions and development priorities in order to support regional
continental and maritime interconnectivity projects on the continent, thus
further catalysing regional interconnectivity and integration on the conti-
nent. The Africa summits should thus be used to enhance agreed upon
priorities articulated by the regional economic communities (RECs) and
the African Union (AU). The increased coordination would assist in
enhancing African agency and build capacity for implementing regional
1 AFRICA’S CHANGING GEOPOLITICS: TOWARDS AN AFRICAN POLICY … 3
infrastructure projects as seen through Agenda 2063 and the twelve flag-
ship projects of the AU. The first mid-year coordination meeting of the
African Union and the Regional Economic Communities was held in
July 2019 in Niger, in a move that aims to build greater cohesion and
coordination across the continent (Mthembu 2020: 2).
While the contributors to this publication do not advocate for any
singular approach or policy to govern Africa’s engagement with external
powers, they do agree on the utility of enhanced coordination between
the individual nation-states, regional economic communities and the
African Union when it comes to the continent’s relations with external
powers in an evolving multipolar world order. They also agree that greater
coordination will enhance Africa’s agency in global politics, ensuring
that the various summits converge around the implementation of Africa’s
outlined development priorities. Various authors do however disagree on
the degree to which nation-states, regional economic communities or the
African Union should take the lead. Indeed instead of embarking on a
path towards an Africa wide policy or strategy, some would prefer to see
common positions on specific issue areas or to rather see sub-regional
strategies at the level of the regional economic communities. There is also
an important debate about the role of larger African economies, and to
what extent they should be leading efforts towards continental autonomy
and better coordination. This is a healthy conversation, and one that
should involve not only the scholarly community, but also include the
various diplomatic tracks involved in Africa’s international relations.
Why the Rise of China Matters

for Africa’s Changing Geopolitics
The contemporary rise of China to assume a geopolitical position more
in line with its strong historical role in global politics and the global
economy is significant for the African continent given the exponential
growth in Africa’s relations with China on all the various diplomatic
tracks in recent decades. This is especially significant given the different
manner in which China has established and deepened relations with its
African counterparts, putting forward the mantra of win-win partnerships,
mutual benefit and the respect for principles such as sovereignty and the
non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries, which was
welcomed on the continent (Mthembu 2018, 2020).
At a time when much of the Western world looked at Africa through

the lens of official development assistance (ODA), thus mostly relating
to it through a donor–recipient type of relationship, the Chinese state
was rolling out the red carpet for African leaders in the establishment of
the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing in the year 2000.
This Forum was also clearly not just about development cooperation,
but about cooperation at multilateral fora, peace and security, trade and
investment, and about encouraging Chinese state and non-state enter-
prises to move beyond the border of China to seek trade and investment
opportunities on the African continent in their efforts to become not
only Chinese enterprises, but global enterprises. China thus saw various
economic and political opportunities despite the known challenges that
plagued the continent. The ascendance of China in Africa’s international
relations thus forced Western countries to refocus their gaze on Africa
since they immediately became worried about being displaced on the
continent they had long dominated (Mthembu 2018, 2020). Indeed
China’s growing role in Africa can be seen as an important factor in
providing more options for African stakeholders in their engagements
with external powers. Rather than replacing or displacing Africa’s rela-
tions with the West, it has arguably forced Western partners to think
about ways in which they can also intensify their engagements with the
continent through various economic and political tools.
China’s prominence in global affairs and the extensive reach of its polit-
ical and economic footprint reinforces its status as a global power in the
international arena. At the core of global China is a comprehensive grand
strategy that frames its economic, foreign policy and military strategies in
pursuit of great power status, as well as the advancement of national inter-
ests across a range of strategic domains. China views Africa as a pivotal
partner in the realisation of its grand strategy goals, in alignment with its
peaceful rise and proclaimed orientation as a responsible power.
A growing amount of scholarly analysis on China’s strategic thinking
highlights the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centrepiece of
China’s foreign policy, a transcontinental endeavour to enhance connec-
tivity across Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The
implementation of the BRI has seen the development of hard and soft
infrastructure, expansion of investment and promotion of cross-cultural
ties. Africa stands to benefit from the BRI given the glaring need for
infrastructure development, development cooperation, increased trade
and improved competitiveness across the continent. For China, Africa’s
geostrategic importance translates into access to the continent’s vast

natural resources and mineral wealth and harnessing opportunities for
further projection of its soft power.
China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative is set to connect over 65
countries at a cost of approximately $1 trillion, with the aim of improving
the connectivity between China, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa
in a process closely linked with the domestic changes in the Chinese
economy. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the initiative is devel-
oping a vast network of railroads and shipping lanes between China and
countries along the continental belt and maritime road (Mthembu 2020:
2). Robyn Xing, Morgan Stanley’s Chief China Economist argues that
investments in belt and road countries will increase by 14 percent annu-
ally in the period 2019–2020, with the total investment amount likely to
double to $1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027 (Xing 2018). While the onset of a
global pandemic in the form of COVID-19 has certainly impacted these
projections negatively, the medium to long term trajectory remains valid.
Since inception in 2013, the BRI has continued to receive the support
of a growing number of countries across the world, with China having
already signed 174 cooperation documents with 126 countries and having
now invested more than $90 billion (R1.3 trillion) in related projects.
During his address at a BRI seminar at the Chinese Embassy, China’s
former ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Lin Songtian, said the response
to the Second BRI Forum in Beijing, which was attended by 5000
delegates, including 37 heads of state, guests from more than 150 coun-
tries and over 90 international organisations, showed that despite some
reservations and scepticism towards the initiative, the confidence of the
international community had been growing (Boje 2019). The Ambas-
sador acknowledged that South Africa was the first African country to
sign a BRI memorandum of understanding with China, and that China
was committed to being its ‘most reliable and important cooperative part-
ner’ in achieving socio-economic transformation and development (Boje
2019).
Much of the funding for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) comes
from policy lenders, whose lending decisions are responsive to the
Chinese government’s geostrategic preferences. The more prominent
policy banks include the likes of the China Development Bank and the
Export–Import Bank of China (Exim Bank), which have committed over
$1 trillion. There is also a Silk Road Fund, which holds $40 billion in
investment funds and is supervised by China’s Central Bank. The Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank is also an important player and has a

capital base of $100 billion. Additional funds can also be made available
through China’s foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth fund,
which hold $3.7 trillion and $220 billion, respectively (Nantulya 2019).
This presents opportunities for African stakeholders, who can tap into the
opportunities presented by the BRI and FOCAC in order to advance the
continents strategic priorities.
The BRI is also increasingly seen as a catalyst for African regional
economic integration and competitiveness as seen in research funded by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which found that
East Africa’s exports could increase by as much as $192 million annually
if new BRI projects are used diligently (Nantulya 2019). Others caution
against what has been referred to as debt trap diplomacy, warning Africans
to not borrow from China lest their strategic assets be seized, with the
case of the port in Sri Lanka often used as an example of what may happen
to countries not able to pay their debts (Nantulya 2019).
However, it is difficult to make that argument on a continent that is
clearly in need of more infrastructure development and limited resources
to fund this much-needed priority area. The World Bank estimates that
Africa needs up to $170 billion in investment a year for 10 years to
meet its infrastructure requirements. The African Development Bank has
posited that if Africa positions itself well, it can source some of this
from the BRI and channel it to the African Union’s infrastructure master
plan, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)
(Nantulya 2019).
The FOCAC is the main multilateral forum for China–Africa rela-
tions. Since its establishment in 2000, FOCAC has driven strategic
engagement between China and Africa on the basis of mutual trust, win-
win cooperation, equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs.
In spite of positive reviews of China–Africa cooperation over the years, the
dynamics of the relationship have been the subject of a range of critiques,
including oft-cited allegations of China’s neoimperialist designs, the lop-
sided nature of the relationship in favour of China and concerns of the
impact of debt trap diplomacy in Africa which has exposed a number of
countries to debt distress.
Nonetheless, the evolution of institutionalised China–Africa engage-
ment in the course of almost two decades warrants a critical analysis of
the constellation of interests, ideas and strategies that continue to shape
the trajectory of relations and the implications for the politics of cooper-
ation. In an attempt to address a number of defining issues pertinent to
China–Africa relations, this volume grapples specifically with the issue of
agency, partly in response to the clarion call for enhanced African agency
in the gamut of its strategic partnerships with a growing number of global
actors.
With the African Union Representative Office in Beijing now opera-
tional, the continent has added another important layer of coordination
in Africa’s relations with China that will become of greater importance
in years to come. The importance of this was made clear during the 8th
China–Africa Think Tanks Forum in 2019 as part of the process of imple-
menting the FOCAC Action Plan adopted in 2018. This is important
given the July 2019 coordination meeting of the African Union and the
Regional Economic Communities, a first of its kind and an important nod
towards greater coordination efforts on the continent. The debate over
the need for a more common and coordinated approach towards Africa’s
international relations is thus as important as ever in a changing geopo-
litical landscape where the continent must safeguard its continental and
sub-regional autonomy.
Chapter Outline
Following the opening chapter of the volume, Bob Wekesa makes the
case for a coherent African policy framework towards China based on the
historical context of Africa–China relations and the asymmetrical nature of
the partnership given Africa’s ambiguity and ambivalence since the onset
of revamped engagement in the twenty-first century. It is suggested that
Africa can enhance its agency in relations with China by following up
on the strategic fit with existing continental policies such as the African
Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and alignment of partnership initiatives with
economic, security and developmental priorities.
Francis Kornegay puts forward ‘the one and many’ paradigm in Africa’s
external relations as a key enabler of its subordinate relations with external
powers. In the context of a raft of institutional reforms under the guid-
ance of the Kagame report, Kornegay argues for reorientation of the
forces of continentalism and regionalism in favour of a proactive African
FOCAC diplomacy while strengthening the ‘common position approach’
central to Africa’s engagement with an array of strategic partners. In
Kornegay’s view, the regional economic communities of the AU have a
central role to play in regionalising Sino-African diplomatic engagement

while enhancing a distinct pan-African agency.
Siphamandla Zondi draws on a decolonial perspective to analyse
Africa–China cooperation, proposing the political idea of collective self-
reliance and the political dialogue that underpins FOCAC as useful tools
to shape the trajectory of Africa’s relations with China. By emphasising
the strategic issues of convergence between China and Africa, including
the push for global reforms, the focus on development, prioritisation
of infrastructure development and cultural dialogue, African countries
can ensure alignment with their development priorities at the national,
regional and eventually build up to a continental common African
position on cooperation with China.
Kwesi Djapong Prah weighs the possibility of ‘national extinction’
of the African state against the background of asymmetrical China–
Africa relations, considering how concepts such as national sovereignty,
national self-interest and self-determination could define a re-imagined
Africa–China partnership. He calls for a broad-based reconsideration of
pan-African identity and the overhaul of political efforts focused on
building pan-African unity.
Reflecting on China’s development finance towards Africa, Philani
Mthembu argues that the concessional and non-concessional finance
offered by China to African countries, not only offers alternative financing
pathways for development cooperation, but also opens up space for
enhanced African agency in view of the new multipolarity in development
cooperation. For Africa this would mean optimising the opportunities and
shared benefits of the FOCAC framework in a coordinated manner and
in alignment with continental development priorities.
Faith Mabera contextualises China’s emerging profile as a peace and
security actor in Africa, premised on pragmatic reorientation and reassess-
ment of its strategic peace and security objectives, in line with its
global power profile and aspirations. She asserts that China’s increased
contribution to UN peacekeeping, both in terms of troop and finan-
cial contributions, and the establishment of the China–Africa Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and Security within the FOCAC framework, are
indicative of a deepening of Chinese engagement on the African peace
and security landscape. The multi-tracked nature of China–Africa security
cooperation presents opportunities for African states, RECs and the AU
to harmonise their engagement strategies with China while leveraging the

partnership in addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats.
In calling for greater understanding of Chinese cultural concepts that
inform daily life and practices, Paul Tembe maintains that improved
African understanding of the roles of habitus in cultural practice, civiliza-
tional and cultural continuities could assist in eliminating blind spots in
Africa–China relations, as well as enhancing strategic equality in Africa’s
external partnerships with other external actors. Tembe cautions against
formulating an African policy on China based on rhetorical perspectives
such as the parallel narrative of anti-colonial struggles by the African
and Chinese people and the Western-driven anti-China rhetoric, urging
instead for a graduated differentiated but coherent regionalised strategy
vis-à-vis China.
Yu-Shan Wu explores how China’s public diplomacy, oriented towards
building a positive image of China abroad and projecting its soft power,
offers crucial insights into the complexity of crafting an African policy
on China. She maintains that in view of the heterogeneity of African
countries in terms of interests and identities, and the dual-track Chinese
engagement at both bilateral and multilateral levels, a more pragmatic
approach for the benefit of African agency would be the formulation of
several common continental and regional positions on issues of common
interest, rather than an overarching African policy on China.
Finally, by contrasting China–Africa relations and EU–Africa rela-
tions, John Kotsopoulos presents how different conceptions of African
agency have emerged within the ambit of the two cooperation models.
He argues that the FOCAC framework has played out more as quasi-
interregionalism with demonstrative preference for China’s bilateral
engagement with African states. This is in stark difference to the EU–
Africa partnership which privileges an AU lead-role as continental repre-
sentative and chief negotiator, thereby allowing more room for African
agency.
Future Research
While the research and analysis contained in this volume is primarily
focused on Africa’s relations with China, it should be seen more broadly
as related to the continent’s broader engagement with external powers in
an evolving international landscape. It should thus serve as a catalyst for
further research and dialogue on Africa’s role in a changing geopolitical

landscape, and how the continent can use its engagements with strategic
partners to advance its development priorities.
The volume should thus encourage other scholars to do more compar-
ative studies on the various Africa summits, analysing what are the
concrete deliverables and the different modalities of summit diplomacy
best suited to advance African strategic interests. This will remain impor-
tant at a time where the AU and regional economic communities are
looking to increase their level of coordination. It is thus encouraging to
see the publication of new scholarly work on Africa’s changing geopolitics
such as Africa and the World: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics co-edited
by Philani Mthembu and Francis Kornegay (2020). Unlike much of the
literature, it places Africa squarely at the centre, looking at the changing
geopolitical environment from an African vantage point. This volume also
places Africa at the centre, seeking ways to advance the individual and
collective agency of African state and non-state actors in their relations
with an important strategic partner in the form of China.
References
African Union Commission (AUC). 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want: A
Shared Strategic Framework for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development.
Boje, V. 26 April 2019. ‘Belt and Road Initiative a Win-Win for
Global Development’, https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/belt-and-road-
initiative-a-win-win-for-global-development-21976871, accessed 1 May 2019.
Mthembu, P. 2018. China and India’s Development Cooperation in Africa: The
Rise of Southern Powers. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mthembu, P. 2020. China’s Belt & Road Initiative: How Can Africa
Advance Its Strategic Priorities? MISTRA Working Paper [Available
online], https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Chpt-6_fina
lised-for-layout.pdf, accessed 27 January 2020.
Nantulya, P. 22 March 2019. ‘Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt
One Road Strategy’, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-afr
ica-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/, accessed 3 May 2019.
Xing, R. 14 March 2018. ‘Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road’,
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/china-belt-and-road, accessed 1 May
2019.
CHAPTER 2
A Call for an African Policy Framework

Towards China
Bob Wekesa
Context
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Africa and China have intensi-
fied engagements, triggering an avalanche of perspectives on the impli-
cations of the relations for Africa, China and the world. Over this
short period, commentators have taken stock of multiple discrepancies
undergirding the relations. Trade and economic imbalances are largely
in favour of China, notwithstanding the benefits accruing to Africa.
China is more or less a homogenous entity (although not in perfect
harmony) against Africa’s heterogeneity borne of its 55-nation nature
not to mention internal variances. Soft power instruments and cultural
flows largely commence in China and terminate in Africa rather than the
other way round, cases in point being the establishment of Confucius
Institutes, university scholarships, launching of media outlets, people-to-
people exchanges, to mention but a few. By contrast, save for some muted
South African soft power in China such as the presence of Brand South
Africa in Beijing, state-led African soft power in China is largely absent.
B. Wekesa (B)
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_2
12 B. WEKESA
On the global stage, China, one of the five permanent members of

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), largely sets the agenda
with regards to Africa–China engagements with actors such as Western
powers, the UN system and in such East Asian matters as the Republic
of China (Taiwan), Tibet and the South China Sea. Indeed, one of
Africa’s historically significant allies of China, the late Tanzanian President
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, contemplated the various layers of asymmetry
and concluded that Africa–China engagements were the “most unequal
of equal relationships” (Alden and Large 2011: 30). This assertion is as
true today as it was in the Africa-China relations of the 60s and 70s.
The rather straightforward question that academics and policymakers
and indeed African people should ask themselves is: why has the Africa–
China relationship maintained a lopsided career over the last nearly
two-decades of revamped engagement? Many thinkers have proffered
responses of varying rationality to explain the slanted balance of power,
among the more dubious ones being that China is a pernicious actor
calculating to rip off Africa through a neo-imperial agenda. The current
chapter argues that the asymmetry in the relations traversing political,
economic and cultural spheres is a reflection of Africa’s lack of a coherent
policy framework towards China while China is guided by a policy archi-
tecture that charts its highly successful strategy in and with Africa. Even
in instances where aspects of an African policy towards China can be read
in broader policies such as the Agenda 2063, Africa’s capacity for imple-
mentation is wanting. In both academic and popular narratives, one sees a
preponderance of perspectives labelled as “China’s Africa policy” but very
little on the reverse, namely, “Africa’s China policy”. If one searches for
the keywords “Africa’s policy towards China” in online search engines,
what comes up instead is, “China’s policy towards Africa”.
The pole position of academic and intellectual analyzes focused on
China’s policy towards Africa rather than the reverse merely reflects the
fact that China not only has a policy framework for engagement with
Africa, but is tangibly implementing the policy with Africa largely on the
receiving end. Even the so-called “Look East” policy said to be practiced
by African countries has been found to be nothing less that knee jerk
sloganeering rather than a well thought set of policy objectives (Zhang
Chun 2014: 22). As such, the imbalance in the relations stems from the
fact that China knows and has planned for what it wants in the relations
while Africa is beset by ambiguity and ambivalence.
2 A CALL FOR AN AFRICAN POLICY FRAMEWORK TOWARDS CHINA 13
Devolving from the problem of multifaceted imbalances between

Africa and China as emanating from a policy gap on the African end,
a key pursuit of this chapter is to argue the case for an African policy
framework towards China. However, at the outset, one must step back
and pose the question: does Africa really need a policy framework towards
China? As soon as this question is posed, the answer becomes affirmative.
For, a negative answer would suggest that Africa is satisfied with a situ-
ation in which China sets out the terms of reference in an engagement
often characterized as mutual. From the foreign policy analysis field, we
learn that foreign policy is a goal-directed action aimed at achieving the
interests of one state in another state in the international system. Thus,
since China has a documented policy framework towards Africa, it is much
more lucid on pursuing its interests in comparison to an Africa that has
no policy framework towards China.
A key point of contestation in debates about an African policy towards
China is whether Africa needs a collective policy framework towards
China or “whether individual African states should draw their indepen-
dent China policy based on their own priorities”, a split in opinion that
was on display at a recent symposium on the matter (Wits Africa China
Reporting Project 2017). A short response, fleshed out in intervening
sections of this chapter is that Africa needs, in fact, not just continent-
wide and country-level frameworks of engagement with China but also
policies from its eight official Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
(African Union Commission 2017: 128). In other words, the develop-
ment of policy at the supra-continental level should not preclude similar
initiatives at regional and national levels. Indeed, policy at the continental,
regional and national levels can be developed in tandem, drawing on each
other in a back and forth and mutually reinforcing way. This is the kind
of agency that can inspire the beginnings of strategies that would help
redress not only the Africa–China imbalance but indeed even out Africa’s
relations with other residual and emerging powers.
A caveat is worthwhile here. This chapter should not be seen as a call
to war by Africa against China. Rather, it proceeds from a gap identified
in the imbalanced nature of the relations to call for the filling of the gap
with the ultimate goal of enhancing the beneficiation of both parties.
14 B. WEKESA
African Agency and Agenda 2063

As a concept, African agency, is gaining traction as a means of advo-
cating an Afro-centric approach to understanding and advocating African
issues. In some quarters, it is seen by turns as a complimentary and
successor concept to the ideas of Pan-Africanism and African renaissance
that underpin intellectual discussions on and about Africa (for instance
Murithi 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014: 21; Tieku 2014). Its key argu-
ment is that Africa is and should be an actor rather than being acted on
in the international system (Brown and Harman 2013). It argues the case
for African solutions for African problems away from Euro-centricity, Pax
Americana or orientalism (Brown and Harman 2013; Murithi 2014). It
seeks bottom-up rather than top-down, inside-out rather than outside-
in approaches in opposition to the much-lamented ramming down the
continent’s throat of policy interventions generated from developed and
emerging economies. African agency hedges against the supposition that
Africa is a peripheral region only dictated to by powerful global actors
without a cause–effect response. Where African agency in global affairs
has failed, the concept calls for proactivity; where African agency has
succeeded it calls for enhancement, in other words, Afro-optimism rather
than Afro-pessimism.
In its conceptual and pragmatic definitions, African agency calls for
“strategic actions” from an African viewpoint and can thus function as
an African starting point in the development of an African policy frame-
work towards China. Fortuitously, Africa has a policy framework internal
to the continent, namely, the African Union’s Agenda 2063. While the
agenda is not specific to China in its foreign policy dimensions, Agenda
2063 can serve as a starting point in fashioning engagements with China.
Indeed the launch of the Agenda 2063 by African leaders in 2013 is
demonstration of some form of African agency especially considering that
it has been widely accepted as the continent’s blueprint for short, medium
and long term prosperity. As such Africa ought not to start from scratch
when formulating a policy framework towards China. While an African
agency-based policy towards China would inform the policymaking and
implementation “ground”, African agency, with Agenda 2063 at the
centre can be leveraged to the analytical processes leading to the frame-
work. African agency can provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that
can be leveraged to placing African interests at the heart of the Africa–
China engagements. In other words, as a continental roadmap, Agenda
2063 constitutes African agency in the continent’s global developmental

policy and practice arena to which any other plans are and should be
subordinated and co-opted.
It is a demonstration of agency that Africa has extracted as such bene-
fits from China as; funding for projects as alternative to Western sources,
numerous scholarships for African students, greater presence on the inter-
national stage where China has lobbied for African positions (for instance
at the G20 and in the United Nations Security Council), Chinese peace-
keeping forces in turbulent regions and others (on African agency, see
Wekesa 2017: 149; Mohan and Lampert 2012: 109–110; Chege 2008:
19). The development of an African policy framework towards China
would help enhance the power of agency building on the gains already
made. For instance, the AU established a diplomatic mission in Beijing in
2018. It would be a great case of agency if there was a policy and strategy
towards China that would guide the mission’s work.
Having argued the case for African agency and the Agenda 2063 as the
starting point in the development of an African policy framework towards
China, the next step is to firstly consider the historical Africa–China
dynamics that inform the relations, secondly, to analyze the key Chinese
policy set up as a means of exploring African agency-based policy formu-
lation pathways. A review of both China’s African policy and the FOCAC
mechanism,1 which are the key sites of Chinese policy and indeed strategy
towards Africa, is imperative if we are to develop a coherent African policy
framework. However while China’s Africa policy is the “real” policy,
FOCAC is much more established and elaborate as a strategy. I therefore
briefly discuss China’s Africa policies of 2006 and 2015 before delving
more into FOCAC. But first, the historical dimensions.
Historical Perspectives
If nothing else, and at the expense of seeming reactionary, Africa needs a
policy framework towards China because China has for a long time had
frameworks guiding its engagement with Africa. China’s present policy
framework draws immensely on history with the oft-cited aphorism being
that China has a long memory. Because of the rapid expansion in Africa–
China relations in the twenty-first century, it is often forgotten that the
relations are not just historical but actually ancient. Trawling through the
literature indicates that China has always had plans of engagement with
Africa even though some of these plans may not have been captured in
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formal documents. China made contact with Africa in the Tang Dynasty
(618–609) with further contacts made between the seventh and eleventh
centuries BC. The most cited instance of contact is the Zheng He voyages
to East Africa during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). One notices that
apart from the Moroccan traveler/scholar Ibn Battuta’s travels to China
around 1345 also during the Ming Dynasty (Chibundu 2000: 2; Li 2005:
60) the trajectory of contact has always been a case of China coming to
Africa rather than the other way round.
In modern times, China’s interest in Africa was kindled after the
triumph of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and establishment of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 with founding father of
modern China, Chairman Mao Zedong commissioning in 1961 studies
on African history (Li 2005). Founding Chinese premier Zhou Enlai
made the now-iconic visit to nine African countries between December
1963 and February 1964 and this was seen to have “consolidated” rela-
tions but more importantly, introduced China’s “five principles governing
the development of relations with African countries” and “eight principles
for economic aid and technical assistance to other countries” (Hanauer
and Morris 2014: 19; Alden 2007: 10). The Chinese foreign policy enun-
ciated by Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s is still very much in vogue, primed
with succulent symbolism today as is reference to the Chinese voyages of
the fifteenth century. Fast forward to the 1990s: when former Chinese
President Jiang Zemin visited six African countries in 1996, he summoned
rubrics of historical contacts as a means of resetting the relations, leading
to the inauguration of FOCAC in 2000 (Alden 2007: 15; Fernando 2007:
369; African Union Commission 2010; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010:
4; Li et al. 2012: 13; Wekesa 2014).
The key take away from these abbreviated historical tropes is that China
had sufficient interests in Africa to fashion physical reach out to the conti-
nent while Africa—at least from the evidence that we have on record
presently—was merely on the receiving end. Equally importantly as back
up for the need for an African policy towards China, the historical contacts
and ties have been recast anew as source of raison d’être for Africa–China
relations but largely from the Chinese end towards Africa. Because the arc
in the summoning or invoking of history (Alden 2007: 17–18; Gazibo
and Mbabia 2012: 63) for present purposes bends towards Africa from
China, Africa has an opportunity to equally respond in its own interest
with a coherent “going-towards-China” framework, drawing on its rich
history.
From an African agency starting point, the question can be posed:

how can Africa summon its own history in fashioning a policy framework
towards China? Just as Chinese leaders have in the past commissioned
researches to unravel historical aspects of the relations, African leaders
can also do so, at the supra-continental level (under the AU) as well
as the national and RECs levels. Just as Chinese leaders and scholars
have pointed out Chinese assistance to Africa, African leaders can also
pinpoint instances in which the continent assisted China in one way or
another, one among many examples being Africa’s diplomatic assistance
in voting in the People’s Republic of China to replace Taiwan at the UN
in 1971. Indeed, the vast tomes of material in African museums, univer-
sities, libraries, government repositories, parliamentary records and other
places can be scoured in understanding African historical perspectives on
China.
China’s Africa Policy One to Two

If the historical dimensions in support for the need for an African policy
towards China may seem vague on account of being dated, bringing the
discussion up to speed by looking at China’s Africa policy documents can
persuade us on the need for an African policy framework towards China
in the immediate.
China announced its first Africa policy in 2006 and its second policy
in 2015. Africa has had no policy towards China over this period giving
rise to the view that the continent is lagging behind China for nearly
two decades as of 2019, a case of failure of African agency. An overall
observation is that China had a lot more to say to Africa in its 2015 policy
than in its 2006 policy. The 2006 policy is just over 3000 words while
the 2015 one is 8000-plus words. The new, 2015 policy is much more
detailed and elaborate, so much so that it begins to lose a strict policy
feel and reads like a strategy as it draws on and incorporates elements of
the FOCAC declarations and action plans. The upshot is that China has a
detailed plan towards Africa while Africa largely has none. This may in part
explain why the FOCAC mechanism is indeed “a veritable extension of
China’s Africa Policy” (Wekesa 2014: 66) rather than being a completely
equal mechanism.
China’s first policy coincided with the first FOCAC Summit in Beijing
in October 2006 while the second policy coincided with the Johannes-
burg Summit of December 2015, roughly a decade in between. Notably,
18 B. WEKESA
no major and overarching policy promulgations were made during the

seventh FOCAC conference in 2018. Rather, the decisions of the 2015
policy were affirmed and an implantation scorecard issued. To understand
the significance of the two policies, we need to consider the fact that both
were announced at heads of state and government summits rather than
at “ordinary” triennial ministers meetings or conferences. It would thus
appear that a tradition has been established where China symbolically
articulates its broad guiding principles towards Africa at “extraordinary”
heads of state and government conclaves, i.e. FOCAC summits, rather
than “ordinary” triennial ministerial FOCAC conferences. If this is the
case, it can be speculated that the next China policy on Africa will be
announced at the 2024 or 2027 conferences, which, again speculatively,
are likely to be heads of state summits. African agency would demand
that at that point in time, a firm African policy document would have
been developed.
The new, 2015 document articulates “China’s Africa policy under the
new circumstances”, just as the 2006 paper also talked of “new circum-
stances”. In 2015, China had clearly learned certain facts about engaging
with Africa over the previous fifteen years and concluded that relations
required re-engineering. Yet new circumstances would also account for
the changes in China, Africa and globally that motivated tinkering with
the original policy. So what are these changes and “new circumstances”?
It is important to understand that China has done introspection and
strategized on what it wants from Africa and what it wants to do with
Africa in the global system. For one, the Chinese economy had dramat-
ically changed over the period as witness the slowdown in its economic
growth rates from double to single digits. In another example, China’s
engagements with the United States of America had become fraught with
near Cold War rivalry. In all these and more, China was seeking alliance,
perhaps even allegiance from Africa. By contrast, it is safe to conclude
that Africa as a whole has not gone to the drawing board to explic-
itly formulate and structure what it needs from China in view of the
many dynamics inside and outside the continent. It may be argued that
individual African countries may have developed policies towards China,
but even on this score evidence is scant beyond the bilateral agreements.
What would Africa seek from China in view of the roll-out of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2019?
While rhetorical statements framed as developing nation solidarity
between China and Africa as well as China’s “five principles of peaceful
co-existence” were captured in the 2006 policy, they are curiously absent
in the 2015 document. While the first policy referred often to the “long
history” of engagements, the second policy at best only alludes to this.
Nonetheless, China’s charm offensive towards Africa is as palpable as ever.
China and Africa are “good friends who stand together through thick and
thin, good partners who share weal and woe, and good brothers who fully
trust each other”. The new policy clarifies the values-laden rhetoric that
has been the mainstay of its official communication towards Africa by
explaining what is meant by “sincerity, practical results, affinity and good
faith”. Still, discourse analysis can separate the tangible economic, political
and cultural interests from the euphemism, in a manner to suggest that
the chummy language is a means to an end. As I argue in the intervening
section of this chapter, African agency in the formulation of an African
policy towards China would have to pay close attention to the deploy-
ment of linguistic devices such as metaphors and catchphrases. After all,
language is not value-neutral.
The core of the 2015 policy lies in the elevation of Africa in China’s
foreign policy pecking order. From the “new type of strategic partner-
ship” status of 2006, relations were kicked a notch higher as “compre-
hensive strategic and cooperative partnership”. Like any other country
China has foreign policy priorities. Some scholars have argued that Africa
ranks very low in China’s global foreign policy calculations faring only
better than Latin America (Yun Sun 2014: 15). Of foremost importance
to China are the “big powers”, considered “key” to Chinese foreign
policy; followed by nations in China’s periphery (East and Southeast
Asia), considered “priority”; and then Africa and other regions consid-
ered the “foundation”, interpreted to mean that Africa poses little of a
headache to Beijing’s global policy (Yun Sun 2014: 14).
What does this loaded yet seemingly amorphous phase, “comprehen-
sive strategic and cooperative partnership”, as captured in the 2015 policy
document mean? To better appreciate the import of this phrase, we can
recall former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s words at the launch of the
Sino-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2004 (Feng Zhongping
and Huang Jing 2014).
By ‘comprehensive’, it means that the cooperation should be all-

dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered. It covers economic, scientific,
technological, political and cultural fields, contains both bilateral and
20 B. WEKESA
multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments and non-

governmental groups. By ‘strategic’, it means that the cooperation should
be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of China-EU rela-
tions. It transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is not
subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to time.
By ‘partnership’, it means that the cooperation should be equal-footed,
mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides should base themselves on
mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavour to expand converging interests
and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences
on the minor ones.
Given that the relations were framed as “strategic” without being “com-
prehensive” in the 2006 policy, Africa–China observers would do well to
consider ways in which “all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered”
aspects will be implemented. One way to look at this question is to
consider China’s designation of relations with African countries. Most
African countries seem to fall either in the “partnership” and “strategic
partnership” category while a few, such as Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and
South Africa, fall under “comprehensive strategic partnership”. This cate-
gorization seems based on the level of economic significance of an African
country to China. The upshot is that Africa as a continent now has the
same strategic value and status as the likes of Egypt, Kenya and South
Africa, at least on paper. Although Africa has long been of strategic impor-
tance to China, the 2015 policy framing suggested that the relations
would go a notch higher still and begin approaching the importance of
the big powers (the United States and Europe) and South East Asia in
China’s foreign policy. African policymakers would need to study China’s
partnership with these powers to gain insights that can be adapted to the
Africa–China relationship.
The 2015 policy captured China’s “centenary goals”, i.e. the “Chi-
nese Dream” and building a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021.
Broadly, this is what China wants Africa to help it achieve. But in a
win-win, mutually beneficial fashion, China would reciprocate and help
Africa achieve its own long-term goals embedded in the AU’s Agenda
2063. The fact that the new policy takes cognizance of Agenda 2063
suggests that Chinese policymakers have taken careful note of it. An
African policy framework towards China would have to be feature state-
ments on how China can help Africa achieve its long term goal of “an
integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens,
representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. It would have
to link Chinese interests closely to Agenda 2063’s seven aspirations:

sustainable growth, Pan-African integration, good governance, peace and
security, African identity, people-centredness and global influence (African
Union Commission 2015).
Agenda 2063 is big on the integration of the continent politically and
economically, advocating as it does, cross-border infrastructural develop-
ment as a facilitator for the movement of people, goods and services.
Despite the Agenda talking of achieving Africa’s goals with internally
generated funding, the continent may look to China to leverage its policy
proposals which include (as stated in the policy), “comparative advantages
in development experience, applied technology, funds and market … [to
address] backward infrastructure … inadequate professional and skilled
personnel, [and to] translate its natural and human resources advantages
and potential … speeding up industrialization and agricultural modern-
ization”. All these are captured in Agenda 2063 and it is safe to say
China realizes the importance of reinforcing the African policy, seeing
Africa holistically while at the same time differentiating on a country basis;
and thus the designation “comprehensive strategic and cooperative part-
nership”. Indeed China established a mission at the AU headquarters in
Addis Ababa in 2015, and invited Africa to reciprocate, an offer that the
AU seems not to have taken up. Yet it is important to remember that
China is guided by its own interests in the face of the new circumstances,
seeking to attain the two centenary goals and dealing with “new normal”
economics.
While the 2015 policy taps opportunities in Agenda 2063, there are
instances where it somewhat diverges from it. A reading of the document
indicates that continental integration with cross-border transport infras-
tructure at the top of the agenda, while China’s new policy seems to
prioritize industrialization. It is notable that in the 2015 policy, indus-
trialization is placed at the top of the section dealing with economic and
trade matters. This prioritization speaks to China’s intent on moving some
of its over-capacity manufacturing to Africa in the “new normal” circum-
stances. The policy speaks for itself: “China will make prioritizing support
for Africa’s industrialization a key area and a main focus in its cooperation
with Africa in the new era”.
Although Agenda 2063 is bigger on cross-border infrastructure devel-
opment than it is on industrialization, China’s 2015 policy places infras-
tructure development at the third tier of importance after agriculture and
industrialization. This can be seen in the structure of the 2015 FOCAC
22 B. WEKESA
document where agriculture comes first, followed by industrialization

and then infrastructure. Space does not allow for a full-fledged discus-
sion of the sectoral prioritization but I’m convinced that the ordering of
these sectors is not accidental but based on priorities envisioned by the
Chinese framers of the policy. In a manner of speaking, China has its
eyes set on Africa’s industrialization while Africa has its eyes set on trans-
port infrastructure development—at least based on prioritization in the
AU’s Agenda 2063 and China’s Africa Policy 2015 as seen in the order
in which they appear. If the AU is to draw on its Agenda 2063 strategy
in developing a policy or engagement strategy towards China, it would
perhaps have to negotiate for the centrality of infrastructure with linkages
to industrialization, agriculture, trade and investment, human resource
development, peace and security, etc. After all, these productive sectors
are not mutually exclusive; as the Chinese saying goes, “if you want to
get rich, build a road”.
Having analyzed China’s Africa policy from an African agency perspec-
tive, the next step is to apply the same African agency analytical framework
to FOCAC, which, as earlier explained, is both a policy mechanism as well
as an implementation plan or strategy.
The FOCAC Context

In configuring an African policy framework towards China, probably the
first point of consideration is its origins as a mechanism bringing together
the continent and China (Wekesa 2014; Hanauer and Morris 2014: 20;
Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 57). Wekesa (2014) traces the beginnings
of FOCAC to President Jiang Zemin’s historic visit to Africa in 1996.
Back up for Jiang’s 1996 visit as a marker for the movement towards
the FOCAC era is provided by Li et al. (2012: 14). There have been
counter positions on the creation of FOCAC: whether it was created at
the request of Africans, if it was the result of Chinese competition with
a similar Africa–US initiative or if it squarely is a Chinese creation (see
Li et al. 2012: 30; 2012: 16). Specifically the Africa–China relations took
shape from October 2000 when the inaugural FOCAC conference was
held in Beijing. As of this writing, the mechanism has been in place for
eighteen years. Coincidentally, at the time of the FOCAC launch, Africa’s
new direction was at its embryonic stages with the AU being established
in 2002 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
An African agency route to the mooting of an African policy framework
towards China would have to appraise the performance of the AU vis-

à-vis FOCAC as a means of introspection on the successes and failure,
particularly of AU’s initiatives.
In principle, two documents that speak to FOCAC as a policy mech-
anism are, the “declaration”, and the “plan of action”. These documents
were released at FOCAC conferences, namely, 2000 Beijing, 2003 Addis
Ababa, 2006 Beijing, 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh, 2012 Beijing, 2015 Johan-
nesburg and 2018 Beijing. The FOCAC mechanism remains the fulcrum
of the relations (Shelton and Paruk 2008: 2) although there is contesta-
tion as to whether the mechanism was the initiative or agency of Chinese
or African actors (Wekesa 2014: 60).
FOCAC documents are crafted in a language of altruism and prag-
matism. However, an independent analysis reveals the underlying reasons
informing its formation. For starters, FOCAC came into being in 2000
smack on the turn of the millennium. The term “globalization” (which
is replete in FOCAC documents) was omnipresent at this point in time
with some suggesting it was a replacement of the Cold War geopolitics.
FOCAC can thus be seen as China’s (and secondarily Africa’s) response
to the tectonic changes in the world—real and anticipated.
If the inaugural FOCAC seemed to test the waters, the second event,
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003 bore confidence in
the emerging form and substance of the mechanism. The holding of the
conference on the African continent went to demonstrate the joint owner-
ship of FOCAC. In addition Addis Ababa is the seat of the African Union
and thus holding the conference there was full of symbolism. By the time
of the second FOCAC, the mechanism had established an action point
development tradition that has become its hallmark.
The 2006 FOCAC summit established a new tradition—that of the
holding heads of state summits rather than ministerial meetings. This
tradition was confirmed with the elevation of the FOCAC ministerial
meeting in Johannesburg in 2015 to heads of state summit. Observers will
have to wait and see if a tradition of holding heads of state summits after
every decade is codified into FOCAC norms. Moreover, China pledge of
$5 billion in loans established another trend in which monies allocated to
Africa are doubled at subsequent conferences (thus, $10 billion in 2009,
$20 billion in 2012 and $60 billion in 2015). This tradition seems to
have been abandoned as the 2018 financial pledges remained at the 2015
levels ($60 billion) rather a doubling to $120 billion. An important point
to note is that Agenda 2063 was captured in FOCAC VI. This is indeed
24 B. WEKESA
an instance of African agency as it speaks to African actors ensuring that

Chinese agenda embedded in FOCAC take cognizance of the continent’s
developmental roadmap.
While FOCAC is an overarching mechanism, its triennial cycle is
nuanced on the Chinese end, at the operational levels, broken down
into sub forums representing narrower interests that then interlock
with African counterparts. Its structures and processes comprise the
Chinese follow-up action committee, the line ministries (foreign affairs,
commerce and finance), auxiliary ministries, government agencies, non-
governmental agencies among others (Li et al. 2012: 20–30).
The above discussion is convincing enough about FOCAC being either
a joint mechanism between Africa and China or being more a Chinese
than African mechanism. African agency would demand that Africa creates
its own independent policy framework towards China while not aban-
doning FOCAC. In the next section, I offer some initial suggestions on
some of the pathways towards establishing an independent African policy
towards China.
Pathways for African Policy Towards China

As discussed earlier, African agency should guide the African policy
towards China agenda. The key policy site for the development of
an African policy towards China is the Agenda 2063 (African Union
Commission 2015) and its offshoot documents, especially the “first ten-
year implementation plan 2014-2023” (The African Union Commission
2015). The Agenda 2063 envisions a continent “representing a dynamic
force in the international arena” (African Union Commission 2015: 1).
In using the African policy architecture to develop an African policy
towards China, the policy community need not start from scratch. China
has reached agreements with African Union (AU), the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) while at the same time entering specific agreements
with individual nations (Li et al. 2012: 12; CCS 2010: 16; Gazibo and
Mbabia 2012: 59; Alden 2007: 32). An African policy framework should
take cognizance of the duality of multilateral Pan-African engagements,
relations at the RECs level and the national level. In so doing, the consti-
tutive documents of the AU and the RECs such as their charter and
overarching plans such as the Agenda 2063 can provide pathways for an
African policy towards China. Notably, the AU was formally incorporated
into the FOCAC mechanism at the Johannesburg summit and this is an

instance of African agency that can be built on.
Africa aspires to be “an equal participant in global affairs [and]
multilateral institutions…” (African Union Commission 2015: 10). The
theme of an Africa with a strong and united voice on the global stage
is reflected in the ten-year implementation plan for the period 2014–
2023. Indeed, scholars have long taken cognizance of the multilateral
and international politics dimension of the engagements (for instance
Alden 2007: 27; Shelton and Paruk 2008; Gazibo and Mbabia 2012:
52). In developing an African policy towards China, Africa should
identify the priorities that can help it to raise its voice and participa-
tion in international affairs. An area in which Africa and China have
expressed mutual agreement as seen in FOCAC documents is that Africa
should have a permanent slot in the United Nations Security Council
under the rubric of the reformation of the United Nations. To my
mind this is a crucial aspiration that should be prioritized in the policy
framework as it would help “correct the historical injustice of Africa not
being represented on the Council by a permanent seat” (African Union
Commission 2015: 10). This particular aspect could be crafted in the
policy framework in such a way that China prioritizes the entry of Africa
in the United Nations Security Council within a set period of time.
Rather than being static, FOCAC is quite dynamic. In what could
amount to Deng Xiaoping’s “cross the river while feeling the stones”
aphorism, China experimented with FOCAC between its establishment
in 2000 and sometime after the second FOCAC conference of 2003.
Having gained confidence about FOCAC, the Chinese side organized the
mega event that was FOCAC III in Beijing, an event that was converted
from a mere conference to a summit. From afar, FOCAC may seem like a
mechanism that came ready-made and one that has remained fixed. Closer
examination reveals that it has been changing giving vent to anticipa-
tion of further changes going forward (Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 55; Li
et al. 2012: 32; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010: 15). An African policy
framework towards China would have to review and understand changes
in the FOCAC set up and mechanisms as well as anticipate and influ-
ence future changes. For instance, Chinese leaders are currently focused
on promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, a major geopolitical plan in
which Africa features. Notably, the Belt and Road Initiative did not make
it into FOCAC VI documents but featured at the 2018 conference. In
Africa itself, the Agenda 2063 and its first ten-year plan as well as the
26 B. WEKESA
report by President Paul Kagame (2017) on the proposed institutional

reform of the AU speak to the kind of dynamism in Africa that should
inform an African policy framework towards China.
In developing an African policy towards China, African intellectuals
and policymakers need to take stock of the “soft power” language
deployed in FOCAC and respond appropriately. Where the language bears
hallmarks of Chinese thinking, there would be a need for an African
rhetoric based on the concepts of Pan-Africanism and African renais-
sance as used in the African Union’s constitutive documents including the
Agenda 2063 document. Indeed, borrowing from the fact that FOCAC
heavily draws on Chinese philosophy, history and foreign policy, an
African policy framework towards China can equally draw on African
thoughts such as African socialism and Ubuntuism. An authentic African
language in the framing of an African policy towards China would indeed
signal negotiation based on African and Chinese worldviews.
What can be gained from Africa’s relations with supranational organi-
zations such as UN to the benefit of FOCAC? For instance, how can
the policy framework be constructed in such a way that Africa bene-
fits from China’s involvement with the UN’s Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs)? What would be the guiding principles for Africa’s engage-
ment with China in a multipolar world in which global powers such as
the USA, EU, Japan and Russia remain hugely influential? How should
Africa’s relations be configured in such a way that the continent’s prox-
imity to China does not harm relations with emerging powers such as
India, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea and others? Can China really help
Africa to attain the longstanding clamour for a United Nations Security
Council seat as well as a greater voice in the international sphere? All these
inquisitions would guide the framing of the African policy towards China.
Conclusion
In conclusion and to re-emphasize earlier points, the absence of an African
policy speaks to the slanted nature of the relations, a fact that should
inspire corrective action. Developing an African policy should however
not be an emotional and reactive undertaking, but one that is delib-
erate and well thought. It would be important for a select team of
African scholars and intellectuals to come together to spearhead this policy
agenda before the next FOCAC conference. One of the major tasks of
the proposed African policy development group would be to undertake a
deep reflection on Africa–China engagements in the FOCAC era. This can

be done via thoroughgoing longitudinal and comparative review of official
documents, both African and Chinese. Some of the pertinent questions
leading to the formulation of an African document on China can revolve
around FOCAC: what is it in relation to Africa? What do we learn from
its language? What do it’s continental versus country-level perspectives
tell us? What impact does it have on Africa’s relations with other parts of
the world?
Note
1. China’s Africa policiesand the FOCAC documents are available at www.foc
ac.org.
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on the Eve of the Fourth Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC
IV), The Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission, South African Institute of
International Affairs.
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Ababa, Ethiopia.
African Union Commission. 2017. African Union Handbook 2017: A Guide for
Those Working with and Within the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Alden, C. 2007. China in Africa, Zed Books, London/New York.
Alden, C and Large, D. 2011. China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of
Delivering Difference in Africa, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 20, no.
68, pp. 21–38.
Brown, W and Harman, S. 2013. African Agency in International Politics, Rout-
ledge Studies on African Politics and International Relations, Routledge 2013,
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Studies Prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation, January 2010.
Chege, M. (2008). Economic Relations Between Kenya and China, 1963–
2007. In Cook, J., (ed.), US and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects
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Agenda, Working Paper, Centre for International Politics, Manchester Univer-
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Affairs.
CHAPTER 3
Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic

Engagement: Kagame and Overcoming
the ‘One and the Many’ Paradigm
Francis A. Kornegay Jr.
Introduction
At the beginning of 2017 The Conversation ran a short analysis on ‘How
the African Union’s planned overhaul may affect its ties with China’,
by Yu-Shan Wu1 (italics added). Her article referenced: The Imperative
to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for
the Institutional Report of the African Union, 29 January 2017 .2 Known
less cumbersomely as ‘The Kagame Report’, Wu speculated on how the
report’s recommendations would impact partnership summits like the
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and Africa’s external rela-
tions more generally with a ‘less is more’ emphasis on divisions of labour
in inter-African governance and diplomacy. The reforms, if implemented,
carry potentially major implications for regionalizing continental diplo-
macy with Africa’s major development partners. In the process, this would
F. A. Kornegay Jr. (B)

Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_3
32 F. A. KORNEGAY JR.
move Africa away from the ‘one and the many’ paradigm in its relations
with external powers, not just China. This is the main theme of focus in
this FOCAC chapter.
However, a fitting caveat in The Conversation piece, ‘may affect’ was an
appropriate caution; that is, given past history of unimplemented reform
plans of action emanating from Addis.3 Speculation in this article on how
these latest reform proposals will affect FOCAC will be revisited more
fully later in this chapter. For now, the structural defects in Africa’s inter-
national relations are focused on in terms of the Kagame report’s findings
as prelude to honing in on the specifically FOCAC dimension in as much
as FOCAC reflects a much broader and more fundamental set of concerns
extending beyond Africa–China relations.
The Kagame report, emphasizing as it does much-needed institu-
tional consolidation at continental and regional levels, provides the point
of departure for updating a much earlier critique by this author of
Sino-African asymmetries appearing in the 2008 Stellenbosch Univer-
sity Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) collection New Impulses From the
South: China’s Engagement of Africa.4 This monograph was compiled
and co-edited by Hanna Edinger with Hayley Herman and Johanna
Jansson. Under the heading ‘Africa’s Strategic Diplomatic Engagement
with China’ this author analysed the essentially unequally reactive African
interaction with China.5
By honing in on FOCAC, this chapter updates the CCS contribution.
It explores how, aspirationally, continentalism and regionalism illuminate
the challenge of Africa arriving at ‘common positions’ as one aspect of
the more fundamental challenge of pan-African agency. In this vein, it
bears pointing out that ever since Chris Landsberg and this author penned
‘Engaging emerging powers: Africa’s search for a “common position”’,
April 2009 in Politikon, much has changed while remaining the same.6
Indeed, this predicament defines the conundrum confronting the
Kagame report. It addresses, at its heart, ‘the one and many’ paradigm
in Africa’s external relations with development partners wherein FOCAC
is emblematic in problematizing the China–Africa equation.
As such, the challenge confronting ‘common positions’ can be
approached as an aspect of more fundamental challenges confronting
regional and continental integration as this relates to institutional consol-
idation—in other words, overcoming the OAU foundational legacy of
institutionalizing the fragmenting Berlin partitioning of the continent.
This is at the heart of concerns that motivated the Kagame report. Tabled
3 REGIONALIZING SINO-AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT … 33
at the beginning of 2017, this report is only the latest in a succession of

such tomes on continental governance reform to have been tabled, only
to have been left to gather dust. As such, its fate is awaited with baited
breath!
As for how this relates to emerging powers between 2009 and 2017,
what obtains in terms of Sino-African relations via FOCAC, pretty
much holds for other emerging powers as well. However, because of
Beijing’s dominance relative to other external actors on the continent,
developed and developing alike, the FOCAC relationship provides a
fitting case-study in how a genuinely strategic diplomatic engagement
with external powers has and continues to elude Africa. Why this is so
speaks volumes on the debilitating impact of the continent’s fragmen-
tation within a governing superstructure comprising the African Union
(AU), regional economic communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms
(RMs), all virtually devoid of meaningful leverage over 55 heads-of-state
jealously guarding their ‘national sovereignty’ in their own personal power
interests.
This chapter seeks to critically examine FOCAC as an unequal part-
nership between Africa and China based on how it reflects ‘the one and
the many’ paradigm of Africa’s subordinate international relations with
external powers. It is argued that overcoming this predicament towards
the continent’s empowerment is contingent on advancing the very AU
continentalism via its regional pillars, the RECs, and regional mecha-
nisms as outlined in the Kagame report on institutional consolidation.
This is where The Conversation brief is instructive on its implications for
the FOCAC future.
For Africa to mount strategic diplomatic engagement with China, a
clearly delineated African strategic approach must be outlined not only
in relation to China, but traditional and other emerging powers as well.
However, with FOCAC as its focus, this treatise attempts to address
Africa’s strategic strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis China and how these
might inform a strategic diplomatic approach towards Beijing.
One of the enduring aspects of the debate concerning China’s involve-
ment in Africa has been Africa’s virtual invisibility as a proactive actor
and the almost incidental manner in which the continent figures in this
debate. It has been a discourse focused mainly on western concerns about
Sino-African relations as reflecting the global rise of China. Mainstream
media commentary and policy discourse on ‘China–Africa’ has invariably
emphasized how China’s behaviour on the continent may or may not gain
favour in the West. Consequently, there has been an obliviousness to the

African voice regarding how opinion in the continent views Africa’s rela-
tions with China accompanied by critical appraisals of the Sino-African
relationship in terms of how it serves or compromises Africa’s interests.
Restructuring the AU
Multi-bilateral Partnership System
To a large extent, the manner in which the China–Africa debate has been
framed reflects as much, if not more on the seeming absence of strate-
gically pro-active African diplomacy as it has on non-African perceptions.
Here, one can venture this is a predicament embedded in Africa’s frag-
mented political map with all the disadvantages it imposes on Africa’s
international relations in coherent continental governance terms; that is,
the fact that in the European debate on how much ‘Europe’ in relation to
European Union (EU) member states is optimum in carrying forward the
EU’s agenda, the same applies to Africa and the AU—the fact that there
simply is not nearly enough Africa viz-a-viz each of 55 sovereign inde-
pendent AU member states to enable Africa to proactively overcome the
continent’s reactive ‘one and the many’ asymmetry in its external relations
with the world’s major powers.
It is this predicament that the Kagame report is intended to redress
in tandem with efforts aimed at enabling the AU to lessen depen-
dency on the external financing of its operations. This latest continental
blueprint and the extent to which it is implemented holds important
implications in how Sino-African relations are conducted within the multi-
bilateral framework of FOCAC; this is in as much as the aim of Kagame
is to substantially redress the asymmetry in this framework by intro-
ducing more ‘Africa’ and less individual AU member state bilateralism
in Sino-African equations.
While FOCAC no longer remains outside the AU official partnership
framework, the Kagame report would further elevate the role of the AU
and it’s regional economic communities as the mediating institutional
layer in the overall partnership system.7 All external actors, including
China, would have to engage the continental African agenda via the
RECs. Here, it is instructive to revisit the earlier critique of the Sino-
African relationship by this author under the subheading, ‘Fashioning an
AU Strategy: In search of African unity and unity of approach’.8
3 REGIONALIZING SINO-AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT … 35
This section served as the departure point for exploring AU–REC rela-
tions in navigating Sino-African relations. This was based on reporting
on a conference jointly organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)
and the Consumer Unity Trust Society with the coordination and liaison
manager of the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It
emerged from these discussions that the AU had been directed by its
Summit to play a bigger role in Africa’s relations with India, Brazil
and Turkey besides China, although the Sino-African dimension was the
conference focus.9
It was pointed out that a coordinating role for the AU would be in
the interest of ‘not only African countries but also China’, and would
provide for a ‘greater opportunity for a more focused and better orga-
nized engagement with China’,10 Of particular importance in light of
the AU’s ninth summit’s ‘US of Africa’ decision in 2007 to strengthen
and rationalize the REC pillars of the AU, was the continental body’s
stated intent to ‘co-ordinate and guide Africa’s regional economic blocs
and member states in coming up with a multilateral approach to doing
business with the main emerging world powers’.11
This prospect posed a question: if such a joint AU–REC coordinating
framework for engaging China and other emerging powers was to inform
a new African diplomacy, how might such a framework be structured?
Here, the article did not spell out such details as may have emerged
from the conference. However, the fact that the conference involved
FES as a major German donor was seen at the time as indicative of the
EU’s concern about emerging power involvement in the continent rather
than how Africa itself engages with already established developed Western
powers like Germany. However, as the AU/DTI approach to coordi-
nating Africa’s international economic relations was going to be crafted,
it would have to address developed and developing world partners alike.
Under the subheading ‘Regionalizing Sino-African diplomatic Engage-
ment’ an illustrative architecture for coordinating multilateral engagement
was suggested as a strategy that future African summits might adopt. This
would call for FOCAC to be broken down into joint AU–REC summits
with FOCAC along such lines as: AU/SADC-FOCAC; AU/ECOWAS-
FOCAC; AU/EAC-FOCAC, etc. Alternatively, these might, in ‘bottom-
up’ fashion, serve as preparatory AU–REC consultations feeding into
a smaller delegation of REC representivity at the FOCAC partnership
summit level.12
Hence, for example, a SADC-FOCAC forum (or an ECOWAS-

FOCAC Forum, etc.) involving the facilitating coordination of the AU’s
DTI might allow for sub-regional engagements with China at the REC
level or as in preparatory prelude to the actual summit. In this manner,
more regionally focused and relevant Sino-African economic relations
would inform the FOCAC agenda.
Continental Regionalism in Limbo

I: The Missing REC Pillar
These could be capped off by periodic Africa-wide AU-FOCAC summits.
The fact that the grand Beijing summit of FOCAC on 4 November 2006,
with all of Africa’s leaders apparently did not feature a central coordi-
nating role for the AU was seen as indicative of what has been lacking
in terms of strategic equality between China and Africa. This principle
mandates the central role that should be played by the AU in conjunc-
tion with the RECs involving all such summits. Whereas, at the time, the
AU was side-lined from its rightful coordinating role, this arrangement
allowed for non-AU member Morocco to participate in FOCAC.
This concession essentially disrespected the AU in deference to
Morocco. Rabat had withdrawn from the body over the unresolved
issue of Western Sahara. Though this issue remains unresolved Morocco
returned to the AU fold in 2017, thereby changing the circumstances
marginalizing the AU in China’s FOCAC calculus.
Yet Beijing rigidly mandates a ‘One China’ conditionality in all its
diplomatic relations without exception. Moreover, joint AU–REC diplo-
macy towards China and other major powers, including the developed
countries, would add a crucial dimension and incentive for the AU to
begin, in earnest, the difficult and complicated but necessary rationaliza-
tion of the multiplicity of RECs into the AU’s five regions.
Africa was, at the time, already under pressure in this regard in terms
of implementing the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
wherein the regional/sub-regional boundaries of such agreements needed
to be delineated. At a July 2007 conference in Cape Town, then South
African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel warned that Africa had to be in
the driver’s seat in determining such boundaries.13
Here was an excellent example of why AU/REC diplomacy regarding
China and other major powers needed to factor in the EU and, at the
time, and the G8 generally. For a regionally-based AU/REC strategy
Another random document with
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Que savait-il de sa mère morte en couches, de son père qui n’avait
survécu que trois ans à sa femme? Il se les imaginait par des photographies,
par les bibelots de leurs chambres, par quelques anecdotes, quelques lettres
retrouvées, mais cela était si peu de chose, et ce peu si peu vivant! Rentrant
à Villedon, il ne rentrait pas chez lui.
Paris lui donnait d’autres plaisirs très appréciables, mais Paris ne le
contentait guère. S’il avait jeté sa gourme avec toute l’ardeur d’un jeune
cheval échappé, Mathieu se doutait bien que cela ne durerait pas. Ses
compagnons de noce, ses camarades, les demoiselles de music-hall et les
dames trop poudrées, témoins de son plaisir, lui paraissaient former une
troupe d’esclaves évoquée autour de lui à seule fin de le satisfaire. Il en
arrivait presque à les plaindre.
«Moi seul, je m’amuse librement. Les autres, vous par exemple, ma
chère, travaillez à m’amuser.»
Ainsi parla-t-il à Gaby Lesurques (charmant visage, intelligence bornée)
qui, pour toute réponse, murmura d’une pauvre voix mince:
«Ben vrai, Mathieu, tu en dis des choses!»
Et vida d’un trait son cocktail.
Quelques incursions dans d’autres mondes lui donnèrent de l’ennui; la
préparation de deux examens utiles l’absorba insuffisamment. Pourtant, son
année de service militaire lui fut d’un réel bénéfice. Il acceptait une
discipline aussi ouvertement affichée; sa liberté n’en souffrait pas. Il se plut
à cette tâche qui l’occupait d’une façon nouvelle et la ville de province qui
l’accueillit faisait un bien joli cadre. Mais ces haltes n’ont qu’un temps...
Un jour, on s’en va... Dès lors, il semble que les belles heures soient passées
où l’on se sentait l’âme libre et légère.
«D’ailleurs, expliquait-il, cela eût duré un mois de plus que je me serais
ennuyé à périr... ou jusqu’à tout casser.»
Mathieu a-t-il si peu changé depuis le collège?
Rentré à Paris, il s’aperçoit que les sorties nocturnes le tentent moins.

Des projets d’avenir se précisent en lui. Bientôt, il partira; il s’installera
pour quelques années dans une colonie lointaine... laquelle? il ne sait
encore, mais de ce choix il s’occupe avec application.
Un soir d’hiver où la pluie tombe dru et que Mathieu étudie, dans un
gros livre, l’agrément et les inconvénients de vivre en Indo-Chine, on sonne
à sa porte. Il ouvre et reçoit des mains du télégraphiste ruisselant un papier
bleu. Persuadé que ce sont là des nouvelles de sa jeune amie du jour qui
soigne au soleil de Nice un rhume de cerveau, il déchire la feuille sans hâte,
mais ce papier bleu lui vaut une surprise, car il lit:
Votre oncle succombé ce matin à une attaque de goutte. Funérailles
lundi midi. Sincères condoléances, affections. Jérôme Hourgues.
«Il convient donc que je parte au plus tôt,» se dit Mathieu.
Ayant consulté l’indicateur, il sonna la femme de chambre et lui annonça
qu’il prendrait le train de 8 h. 12, le lendemain, dimanche.
«L’oncle est mort...»
Nulle émotion ne naissait. Il se fût étonné d’en ressentir une très vive,
mais ce vieillard qu’il n’aimait pas, qu’il n’admirait pas, dont il estimait peu
la vie d’égoïste brutal, cynique, parfois cruel, vivant seul et sans amis,
depuis que sa santé l’obligeait au repos des champs, ce vieillard ne
représentait pas moins quelque chose: tout ce qui restait de famille à
Mathieu Delannes... Mathieu serait plus seul encore.
«Et, se disait-il en regardant la cheminée où s’alignaient des
photographies souriantes, je ne lui ai même pas fait tenir les portraits de
petites femmes qu’il me réclamait un jour. Pourtant, c’eût été charitable et
l’eût amusé... Tant pis... Trop tard!»
Il se coucha peu après et prit, le lendemain, à 8 h. 12, le train pour
Villedon.
V
M. Jacques Mesnard dormait son dernier sommeil, sous une plaque de
marbre gris, dans un cimetière qui n’avait rien de la grâce du cimetière de
village, tel qu’on se l’imagine volontiers. Monsieur le Maire le déclarait
hygiénique et moderne; c’est tout dire en deux mots. D’ailleurs, Mathieu
n’avait pu s’empêcher de penser que ce petit enclos, sec, propret, fermé de
murs blancs dont le faîte se défendait de l’escalade par des tessons
agressifs, convenait fort bien au vieillard défunt.
Nulle occupation pressante ne le rappelant, Mathieu ne rentra pas
aussitôt à Paris. La lourde chute de neige de la veille et, sur ce linceul, un
soleil radieux, le dessin net et nu des bois qu’il revoyait encore vêtus de vert
ou de roux, la mer d’une teinte si fine et quelque chose de léger qui flottait
dans l’air froid, donnaient au paysage un attrait nouveau qui faisait oublier
Paris battu par les averses.
«Je ne l’aimais pas, vous le saviez, mon ami. Pour quelle raison l’aurais-
je aimé? Cependant je perds avec lui tout ce que d’autres appellent leur
famille. Me voilà tout seul. Ma famille, c’est vous qui me la ferez, vous et
les vôtres... J’y compte.
—Avec raison, répondit Jérôme Hourgues, mais n’oubliez pas que lui
vous aimait bien, à sa façon, sans doute, qui était contrainte et désagréable
(comme il pouvait aimer), sincère néanmoins. Il tenait à vous savoir très
entouré, chéri de tous, heureux de vivre, heureux par l’ambition et le
succès, heureux par l’amour.»
Et comme Mathieu l’interrompait, Hourgues reprit:
«Pas explicitement, non; il ne se fût pas permis d’être explicite et il lui
déplaisait de parler longtemps de quelqu’un qui lui était cher. Ses phrases
confuses me semblaient parfois d’une insupportable amertume... Un homme
dur, je l’accorde, mais si perspicace! Se rendant compte de son aridité, de sa
solitude de vieil arbre tordu, de sa stérilité, il vous souhaitait une vie
abondante et féconde.
—Voyons, Hourgues! répondit Mathieu, d’une voix assez coupante, il est
mort: n’en profitez pas pour le glorifier tout de suite, comme font les
bourgeois.
—Je vais croire, dit Hourgues, que vous le regrettez vraiment.»
Ils parlèrent d’autre chose.
«Et quels sont vos projets pour l’avenir? demandait Hourgues.

—Oh! je ne sais pas encore. Aller aux colonies, peut-être; y travailler.
Là-bas, on trouve à s’occuper de tous côtés et de mille manières.
—C’est choisir une villégiature bien lointaine, lorsque, ici où nous
sommes, vous en avez une sous la main.
—Vous voulez dire que mon oncle...
—Il m’en a fait part lui-même. Je me souviens de ses paroles: «Puisqu’il
tient tant à être libre, ce gaillard, au moins que je lui en procure les
moyens!» M. Mesnard vous a donc laissé Villedon et toute sa considérable
fortune... Le bout du monde, c’est loin, mon cher Mathieu, le climat y fût-il
incomparable... Installez-vous dans votre famille, car je n’oublie pas votre
affectueux propos; installez-vous à Villedon.
—Afin d’y mener la vie de son dernier propriétaire? Ah! non, par
exemple! Vous continuerez à gérer cette terre que vous aimez, n’est-ce pas,
Hourgues? ainsi tout sera pour le mieux, et le Tonkin, le Tchad ou Tahiti
sont des lieux d’exil d’où l’on revient sans peine.
—Je serai toujours votre gérant, Mathieu, puisque vous m’en priez. J’ai
succédé à mon père dans cet emploi et vous remercie de m’y maintenir,
mais je vous assure qu’il y a du travail, et de reste, du travail pour plus
d’un, si l’on veut faire rendre à Villedon tout ce qu’il peut donner.
—Nous en recauserons,» dit Mathieu.
La dernière phrase de Hourgues l’avait surpris.
VI
A cette proposition toute simple, si particulière néanmoins, bien
raisonnable, mais décevante en ce qu’elle détruisait un beau rêve d’exil,
Mathieu songeait encore, le lendemain, après qu’il fut allé présenter au curé
du village ses devoirs et remerciements. Le brave homme lui avait dit
d’excellentes choses, de façon trop soutenue. L’ayant quitté sur la fin d’un
résumé vraiment touchant des vertus de M. Jacques Mesnard et las de ce
ronron louangeur, il entra dans un petit café où quelques habitués fumaient
la pipe. Atmosphère moins pure mais plus chaude qu’au dehors; de temps
en temps, contre le plancher, un bruit de souliers lourds: l’arrivée d’un
client précédé d’une douche horizontale d’air glacé; des paroles d’accueil,
sonores, bien timbrées. Tout cela, Mathieu le connaissait de longue date.
Assis devant un verre de café noir, il s’occupait de lui-même, se répétant,
examinant, pesant ce que Jérôme Hourgues lui disait, la veille.
Bientôt, il leva la tête: quelqu’un s’installait à côté de lui, un grand et
gros homme brun, moustachu, mal rasé, dont les cheveux passés à la
pommade dessinaient sur le front bas une plaque en accroche-cœur. Il
retenait au coin de sa bouche grasse un mégot éteint. Son costume, fait pour
attirer l’œil, se composait d’un audacieux complet marron, d’une chemise
de couleur que fermait une cravate à pois et, retournée sur le dossier de la
chaise, d’une très ample, très sérieuse peau de bique.
Pour commander son absinthe, il parla fort; sa voix était cuivrée,
retentissante; il prétendait à beaucoup d’importance, il prenait beaucoup de
place et ses larges mains poilues aux ongles sales furent d’une abjecte
majesté quand il les colla sur la table, les doigts ouverts, afin que l’on vît
mieux le travail barbare de deux bagues d’or.
Et puis Mathieu s’aperçut que ce personnage n’était pas seul: une toute
petite femme l’accompagnait, si petite qu’elle semblait moins femme que
poupée. De beaux yeux sombres, un nez lourd, des lèvres sèches, marquées
de fard, des cheveux roux, très abondants, dont la frisure bouffante
débordait un chapeau modeste, sans garniture; une poitrine triste, plate,
ornée d’un collier d’ambre, des bras maigres, à faire pitié, des mains aux
ongles vernis, à la peau travaillée, amollie et poudrée, et beaucoup de
bagues à ces mains. L’ensemble donnait une image surprenante que la robe
noire, étriquée, ascétique, mal portée, accentuait encore. Elle parla, en
réponse à un appel du gros homme, et ce fut, auprès d’un bruit généreux de
fanfare, la mélodie dépouillée d’une clarinette.
Intrigué par ce couple étrange, Mathieu, sans bouger, l’observa, écouta.
«Tu n’as pas froid, Octave?
—Ici, pas trop, répondit l’homme, mais pour un sale pays, c’est un sale
pays!
—Nous serons rentrés demain; il faudra écrire à Randal, ce soir, pour lui
envoyer la liste et les renseignements.
—Les renseignements! comment veux-tu que je les trouve? C’est tout
des jésuites dans le patelin: on demande quelque chose, le bonhomme
répond à côté ou pas.
—Nous ne sommes plus à Toulouse!» dit la petite personne avec une
mine dégoûtée.
Puis, à mi-voix:
«Qu’y a-t-il sur la liste? demanda-t-elle.
—Rien de très gras: le colosse, mais on l’a déjà vu; l’homme
caoutchouc, une bonne affaire, celui-là; le cul-de-jatte casseur d’assiettes
qui ne plaira pas à Randal (ces protestants, ça a des idées!) d’ailleurs, j’ai
pas signé; et puis ceux de la foire de Hambourg que tu connais: le nabot est
crevé, ils sont encore sept.
—C’est pas mal, Octave; c’est un joli groupe... Alors, tu reviendras pour
les renseignements?
—Oui, dans six semaines. Je verrai le notaire. Il y a de belles prairies qui
feraient tout à fait l’affaire. Tu m’accompagneras: j’aurai besoin de toi.
—Y penses-tu, Octave! Mme Salomon m’en voudra beaucoup si je la
quitte si tôt. Elle n’a confiance qu’en moi... cette rougeur la défigure. Mme
Salomon est une cliente merveilleuse.
—Ma bonne Rachel, il y a plus de galette à prendre chez Randal qu’en
t’éreintant à graisser des vieilles dames.
—Tais-toi, Octave! tu me fais honte!... Et n’oublie pas de laisser notre
adresse.
—T’as raison, ma poule!»
Il se tourna vers le tenancier du café:
«Brave homme! voici nos cartes. S’il venait des lettres pour ma femme
ou pour moi, vous seriez bien obligeant de les faire suivre.»
Il posa deux cartons sur la table, y jeta une pièce de cent sous et se leva.
«Non, non, Rachel! dit-il à sa femme qui attendait la monnaie, il faut
avoir la main large. Partons.»
Et, cueillant sa peau de bique, il s’en vêtit.
«Drôles de gens!» dit le tenancier, quand ils eurent quitté la salle.

Il y eut un murmure d’approbation chez les habitués du café.
«Qui est-ce? demanda Delannes.
—Dieu sait, monsieur Mathieu! moi, je ne sais pas. J’en avais jamais vu
comme ça. Je ne comprends même pas leur métier. Tenez...»
Il tendit les deux cartons où Mathieu put lire:
Octave Boucbélère
Courtier en Singularités
Madame Rachel
Masseuse-Manucure
«Manucure! s’écriait le tenancier en riant de bon cœur, c’est pas un
métier de chrétien, manucure! c’est quoi?»
VII
Rentré dans sa garçonnière, il arriva bien à Mathieu Delannes de penser
quelquefois à ces deux personnages rencontrés par hasard, mais des
réflexions plus personnelles, plus graves, l’occupaient, et bientôt M. et
Mme Boucbélère s’en furent rejoindre au fond de son souvenir d’autres
fantoches passagers qui l’avaient amusé un instant.
Six mois plus tard, il se décida... Durant ces six mois, Mathieu, sans
parvenir à rien préciser, tritura des projets multiples. Tout cela restait
confus, épais, quand une lettre de sa jeune amie encore absente lui annonça
un prochain retour. L’enveloppe du mauve le plus galant, le papier trop
parfumé, l’encre trop verte lui déplurent et aussi la façon fleurie dont
l’épistolière, qui s’ennuyait sur la côte, l’assurait d’une tendresse
renouvelée. Cette lettre joua le rôle de la goutte adventice dont la chute
clarifie soudain un mélange obscur. Il imagina la vie qu’il serait forcé de
mener: promenades au Bois, soirées au théâtre, soupers, et tout ce
bavardage auquel on n’échappe pas! et tout le temps perdu!
Sa résolution était prise; l’exil, avec ses belles promesses, ne s’offrait
plus à lui sous les mêmes couleurs; l’installation à Villedon, chez lui,
paraissait plus simple, plus efficace, d’un rendement plus sûr; il trouverait à
s’employer là, tout aussi bien qu’autre part. Hourgues lui avait souvent
écrit, mais ne tâchait pas de le convaincre, et d’ailleurs Mathieu lisait ses
lettres distraitement, voulant se décider seul. La chose était faite. Sans plus
tarder, il envoya à Jérôme Hourgues un télégramme lui annonçant son
arrivée immédiate et s’occupa des quelques problèmes ménagers que posait
un si brusque départ.
Le dimanche soir, il trouva son ami qui l’attendait; sa joie était
manifeste. Ils dînèrent ensemble et l’on dut avouer qu’à passer du service
de l’oncle à celui du neveu, la cuisinière ne perdait rien de sa délectable
maîtrise. Delannes ne tarda pas à monter dans sa chambre, plus fatigué
peut-être que de raison, légèrement grisé par le choix qu’il venait de faire
(le choix de sa vie, en somme), et par la subtile influence de certain
sauterne réputé dont Jérôme Hourgues, pour fêter ce beau jour, était allé
cueillir à la cave, de ses mains pieuses, deux des six bouteilles restantes.
Le lendemain, il se réveilla dans une vaste chambre grise où filtrait la
lumière du petit matin, et, tout de suite, il n’eut aucune envie de se
rendormir. D’abord, il resta immobile, charmé par un silence que seul, de
temps à autre, trouait le chant des coqs. Il songea aux bruits de ce même
petit matin à Paris; la comparaison l’amusa; puis il sauta du lit, voulant voir
le paysage à la fois bien connu et nouveau que dominaient ses fenêtres. Il
les ouvrit et s’assit dans une embrasure où, sommairement vêtu, il se livra,
fumant une cigarette, au si doux plaisir de contempler.
La vaste prairie descendait vers une plage de galets ocre et jaune; plus
loin, la marée, basse à cette heure, découvrait du sable, et, plus loin encore,
c’était la mer, sous un voile de brumes épaisses à l’horizon, légères sur le
bord. A droite, à gauche de la prairie, des bois s’étendaient, d’une verdure
neuve et tendre. Tout se présentait ainsi en teintes délicates qu’un peu de
vapeur unissait. Le soleil, enveloppé à l’orient, avait encore des lueurs
assourdies, sans éclat, sans chaleur, qui paraissaient parfois, écartant la buée
d’alentour, en reflets de nacre et d’opale. Un souffle de brise naissante
animait l’air, faisait bruire la cime des arbres, effilochait une traîne de buée
sur la prairie, apportait des parfums, des rumeurs, un oiseau.
Mathieu laissait errer son regard. Ce spectacle le ravissait secrètement,
l’enchantait peu à peu. Un grand repos se répandait en lui, de cette sorte qui
permet le rêve. Il sourit, pensant aux tons crus, aux ardeurs, aux violences
des pays qu’il avait voulu visiter, de l’autre côté de la terre. Là-bas, durant
ses heures de loisir, il aurait admiré mille choses brillantes, étincelantes,
inattendues, mais, ici même, ne pouvait-il imaginer mieux? Les fruits à
portée de sa main ne valaient-ils pas la mangue ou le letchi?
«Mes beaux projets, se dit Delannes, malgré toutes leurs précisions,
étaient encore gâtés par trop de littérature... Romantisme déplorable! Au
panier! Je crois que je finirai par me plaire à Villedon, par m’y faire une vie,
et vraiment, ce matin, j’ai ouvert mes fenêtres sur un bien aimable décor.»
Mathieu contemple les nuées grises, lentement mouvantes, les verdures
claires au léger friselis, le ciel où naissent des teintes roses, cette prairie...
Soudain, une touche de couleur vive sollicite son regard; il prend une
lorgnette pour mieux l’examiner: à la plus haute branche d’un arbre du bois
de droite, flotte une flamme triangulaire, mi-partie verte et jaune.
Pourquoi cette flamme? il ne devine pas et, bientôt, pense à autre chose,
car le soleil se révèle, frappant la rosée de l’herbe d’un rayon d’or
éblouissant. L’impression est saisissante, magique; Mathieu ne quitte plus
des yeux ce tapis de lumière tendu sur la prairie... Oui, tout à fait magique...
Et voici qu’il entend un cri joyeux, une clameur simple et forte, l’appel,
dirait-on, d’une jeune voix humaine... D’où vient cet appel et qui le lance?
Du seuil de la maison jusqu’à la mer, personne. Mathieu reprend sa
lorgnette. Rien entre les deux bois, rien sur l’herbe au précieux tapis et
cependant...
Un second appel, plus formé... Celui-là jaillit à coup sûr du bois de
droite, mais Mathieu s’étonne encore davantage, s’étonne éperdument,
quand, de ce bois, il voit sortir, image effarante, par trop imprévisible, un
grand cheval, blanc de neige, qu’enfourche un enfant nu. La bête à la robe
sans tache, baignée de soleil, s’encapuchonne en galopant; son mince
cavalier qui semble monté à cru la conduit au bridon. Maintenant, elle
s’éloigne, elle tourne, elle revient, elle s’éloigne encore, foulant lourdement
l’herbe lumineuse, et Mathieu, transporté d’il ne sait quelle curiosité dont
déborde son cœur, possédé d’une étrange jubilation, a tout juste le temps de
chausser des sandales pour se précipiter comme un fou, vêtu de son seul
pyjama de toile, dans l’escalier, puis au dehors.
Il n’a pas interrogé le vieux domestique tôt levé qui balayait
l’antichambre et s’émeut de ce brusque passage: il veut voir, il veut savoir...
Il se rappelle qu’il était bon coureur, jadis; il retrouve son élan, son allure,
son haleine; il descend la prairie en pente douce, comme par jeu, sans nul
effort. Voilà le cheval blanc! Mathieu se hâte. C’est bien un cheval blanc;
c’est bien un enfant nu qui le monte. Mathieu se rapproche, bondissant sur
l’herbe humide. Le voici tout près; le voici tout contre. Il touche le cheval
blanc; il fait halte... Le jeune cavalier saute à terre, d’un geste souple et
facile, salue de la tête, et souriant, riant plutôt, s’écrie:
«Vous avez du souffle, Monsieur!»
VIII
«Mon cher Mathieu, je vous l’ai répété vingt fois: votre mémoire se gâte,
se perd. Est-ce en souvenir de votre oncle que vous fumez trop?...»
Quelques semaines auparavant, par une lettre fort explicite, Hourgues,
semblait-il, avait correctement demandé à Delannes l’autorisation de louer
une partie de la propriété (le bois Martin et les deux prairies attenantes) à un
certain James Randal au sujet duquel il avait obtenu les meilleurs
renseignements. Que le papier fût parvenu entre les mains de Mathieu, une
réponse le certifiait; qu’il en eût pris connaissance autrement que d’un œil
distrait, on pouvait en douter puisqu’il ignorait tout de cette affaire. Elle
paraissait bonne. Hourgues avait signé. Il hésitait d’abord, l’intermédiaire
lui ayant déplu, mais il reprit confiance dès qu’il put traiter avec Randal lui-
même.
Il le décrivait de façon intéressante. Le premier abord ne laissait pas de
surprendre: une figure de cinquantenaire que l’austérité ravage, des traits
taillés à coups de serpe, un regard fermé, une bouche close, aux lèvres
dures, nulle bonhomie, mais de la bonté s’exprimant par des actes, jamais
par des phrases.
«Il me tarde que vous le voyiez; vous l’apprécierez, j’en suis sûr. Son
entourage le respecte, le vénère. A moi, il me fait presque peur et Lucie va
plus loin: elle avoue naïvement qu’il l’épouvante. Certes, on l’imagine
mieux à la tête d’une troupe de moines guerriers que dirigeant un cirque,
mais il y a des vocations inattendues, d’étranges rencontres et, somme
toute, James Randal est bien à sa place.»
Cela réveillait en Mathieu un vague souvenir: le cirque Randal, une
troupe organisée à l’américaine avec de puissants capitaux. Elle parcourait
le monde de bout en bout, se faisant précéder par des fanfares sonores et
une escouade de colleurs d’affiches qui recouvraient les murs des villes et
des villages de placards annonciateurs devant lesquels le passant interdit,
bientôt émerveillé, stationnait longtemps. Mais pourquoi le cirque Randal
se trouvait-il à Villedon?
Hourgues le lui expliqua.
«Randal vient d’accomplir en Europe une magnifique tournée dont les
résultats furent excellents. Il a dû s’arrêter, beaucoup de chevaux ayant eu la
morve. D’autres viendront d’Amérique, dans quelques semaines; encore
faudra-t-il les dresser, ce qui n’est pas une besogne facile. Pour le moment,
on se repose ou l’on fait en Bretagne, en Normandie, de petites expéditions
à frais réduits, sans importance... Et voilà pourquoi, cher ami, vos terres
sont occupées, présentement, par cette horde nomade.»
Il rassura Mathieu sur les inconvénients possibles.
«L’affaire est bonne, je vous l’ai dit: ils paient bien. J’ai obtenu, dans
notre bail, qu’ils ne mettent aucune affiche dans les villages d’alentour,
aucun placard en pleins champs; ce sont d’effroyables choses qui offensent
le regard. Vous en avez vu, n’est-ce pas, de ces rectangles flamboyants,
verts et rouges, coupés d’une croix blanche et portant le nom du cirque en
lettres démesurées? Je n’ai permis aucun signe extérieur, chez vous, certain
que vous en seriez horripilé, sauf une flamme bien modeste sur un des
arbres du bois Martin. Elle ne vous gênera guère.»
Hourgues donna ensuite de la troupe une description détaillée. Il
commençait à la connaître et, chaque jour, y découvrait un aspect nouveau,
un trait de mœurs surprenant. S’il n’avait fait qu’entrevoir Mme Randal, la
femme du chef, du moins causait-il souvent avec le jeune cavalier dont
l’apparition subite fut si fantastique, le matin même, et cela l’amusait de
penser qu’une scène des mille et une nuits s’offrait tout de suite, dès l’aube,
en Normandie, à Mathieu qui, récemment, songeait à la chercher, cette
scène, au cours de voyages difficiles, en quelque pays lointain.
Avery Leslie n’était d’ailleurs pas écuyer de son métier, mais, pour se
distraire, il menait parfois les bêtes à l’eau. Il lui plaisait de se baigner
comme un centaure. Sa profession? danseur de corde; un vrai artiste dans sa
partie. Il donnait le vertige à Hourgues et à Lucie par ses audaces
d’équilibre. Lui aussi valait la peine qu’on le fréquentât, n’étant point de
qualité ordinaire ni de commerce banal.
Du bruyant Boucbélère qu’il avait vu de près, lors des premières
tractations avec Randal, il parlait sans estime.
«Heureusement, ni ce monsieur, ni l’ineffable Mme Rachel, sa
compagne, ne sont souvent avec nous. Son métier de courtier oblige
Boucbélère à de fréquents voyages: il va chercher à Vienne, à
Constantinople, à Anvers, à Hambourg, partout où l’on en trouve, des
monstres, des singularités, comme il dit, monstre étant, à son avis, un
vocable vulgaire... Ah! les pauvres gens! ce sont pourtant bien des
monstres! Ils forment ici une classe à part, qui dort à part, qui mange à part.
Si jamais vous tenez à vous assurer une mauvaise nuit, Mathieu, passez
quelques instants en leur compagnie.»
Les autres, les normaux ayant un rôle actif, formaient une réunion peu
commune de cent cinquante individus: pour la plupart des Américains du
Nord; cependant Boucbélère avait vu le jour à Toulouse, et la troupe
comptait aussi un Portugais, une famille japonaise, deux Italiens, un
Chinois, d’autres encore. Leurs emplois étaient strictement délimités, avec
une rigueur qui donnait à rêver. Randal jouait le rôle du grand chef, du
grand maître; cela se comprenait qu’une troupe de ce genre eût besoin
d’être dirigée sans faiblesse. Randal ne plaisantait pas, mettant une pareille
conscience, la même application sérieuse, à régler les détails d’une parade
comique de trois clowns, qu’à décider, étape par étape, un itinéraire à
travers l’Europe, ou à s’engager dans une affaire de plusieurs centaines de
mille francs. Il s’occupait aussi de l’éducation morale de ses hommes et leur
faisait des conférences qui, souvent, prenaient tournure de prêche.
«Vous trouverez chez ces gens plus d’un sujet d’étude et beaucoup de
délassement; ils ne sont point ennuyeux: vous vous divertirez en leur
compagnie, je le gage, car ils vous paraîtront vivants et c’est une qualité que
vous prisez. Leurs chevaux sont à notre disposition, bien entendu; ils ne
furent pas tous contaminés. Je vous signale mon ami Sam Harland,
merveilleux écuyer et brave homme. Il connaît à fond les écuries et saura
choisir un poney qui vous convienne. Tout ce petit monde forme un
ensemble qui, d’abord, surprend un peu, mais que j’ai fini par aimer. Vous
ferez de même et votre science de l’anglais vous servira. Pour ma part, j’ai
dû perdre toute pudeur et baragouiner honteusement, afin de me faire
entendre. Les Boucbélère sont français, hélas! mais de quoi parler avec
Mme Rachel sinon de massage, d’onguents, de pâtes et de crèmes, tous
sujets où je ne brille pas? et que dire à Boucbélère?... l’écouter, parfois,
suffit à soulever le cœur! Mme Randal aussi est française, m’a-t-on dit,
mais le hasard a fait que je n’ai presque jamais causé avec cette belle
personne d’expression bizarre. Randal a quelque teinture de notre langue,
Avery Leslie se perfectionne chaque jour, mais le reste de la troupe sait tout
juste les mots cidre et tabac. Il m’a donc fallu me procurer un précis de
grammaire anglaise avec son vocabulaire; je l’étudie tous les soirs et vous
aurez beau jeu à vous moquer de mes honnêtes efforts.
—J’admire tout au contraire, mon cher Hourgues, le scrupule que vous
mettez dans vos moindres actions! Pour mieux gérer la propriété d’un ami,
occupée par une horde barbare, devenir polyglotte, cela touche au sublime!
—A propos de barbares, dit Hourgues afin de couper court, je ne vous ai
pas encore parlé de nos peaux-rouges, car nous avons ici des Indiens peaux-
rouges. Ils n’ont pas rang de citoyens; comme les nègres, ils vivent
ensemble et, comme les monstres, on les fréquente peu. Ils se saoulent, ils
sentent mauvais, ils chapardent, mais la police est bien faite; nous n’avons
pas encore eu le moindre ennui. Je les voyais selon l’image que m’en
donnait jadis Fenimore Cooper: vaillance, noblesse de cœur, loyauté... Il
faut en rabattre: des sauvages de décadence; c’est à pleurer! et même le type
se perd, s’avilit.
«Voilà de quoi vous occuper, Mathieu, quand vous sentirez l’ennui venir
et que les travaux campagnards vous rebuteront. Un cirque... peut-on même
l’appeler un cirque? On y joint un music-hall démontable et un cinéma... Le
music-hall réunira sur son programme des numéros rigoureusement inédits
ou très célèbres (croyez bien que Randal ne me paye pas pour faire de la
réclame!) quant au cinéma, il nous réserve des surprises: ses films feront
courir le monde! Tout cela, mon ami! tout cela pour distraire Monsieur!...
—Hourgues, je vous rends grâces de m’avoir assuré tant de plaisirs. J’y
goûterai.»
IX
«Je voudrais parler à M. Randal,» dit Mathieu.
Il s’adressait à un nègre géant qui faisait les cent pas, un cigare à la
bouche, devant une grille de fortune, peinte en vert. Le nègre émit un
grognement, poussa la grille et indiqua du doigt une tente auprès de laquelle
deux autres colosses noirs montaient la garde.
«Je voudrais parler à M. Randal.»
Mathieu donna son nom et fut introduit.
«Soyez bienvenu, dit M. Randal; prenez un siège et parlons... Je dois

établir beaucoup de questions avec vous.»
Cela fut dit lentement, par un homme de belle allure dont le visage
sévère semblait, en effet, taillé dans du bois. Les joues, les lèvres étaient
rasées; une mince et longue barbiche grise apportait quelque chose de
caricatural à cette noble face, mais les yeux très clairs émouvaient aussitôt;
ce n’était point là le regard fermé dont parlait Hourgues, il se trompait: ces
yeux bleus, ces yeux liquides, ne cachaient rien. La bouche, d’un dessin
sévère, se courbait en un sourire sans ironie, quelque peu désabusé. Cet
homme osseux, à la peau tannée par le grand air, donnait une impression de
force réservée, de calme voulu. L’ensemble imposait. Comme il cherchait
évidemment ses mots, Mathieu l’interrompit et le pria de poursuivre en
anglais. Ce fut donc en anglais que se fit le reste de la conversation.
«Merci: pour discuter de façon claire, je me sens plus à l’aise, mais mon
ignorance est néanmoins trop honteuse; il convient que j’apprenne votre
langue; croyez que je n’y manquerai pas, car un interprète trahit toujours: il
ne sait pas être précis ou bien il fausse l’expression d’un sentiment...
J’espère que notre présence dans vos bois et vos champs ne vous
incommode pas exagérément. Jusqu’à présent j’ai traité toutes ces affaires
avec votre gérant, M. Hourgues, un homme de premier ordre; il faut
cependant que je vous les résume et vous demande quelques signatures
indispensables. Comptez-vous faire à Villedon un séjour prolongé?»
Ils causèrent pendant près d’une heure.
«Enfin, dit James Randal, pour présenter le sujet dans sa vraie lumière,
qui me vient d’en haut, et pour vous permettre de bien comprendre, je dois
expliquer le caractère de mon entreprise.»
Il regardait au delà de son interlocuteur; ses yeux si clairs, si purs, se
fixaient sur un point très lointain et sa parole se ralentit...
«Je sais... directeur de cirque, ce n’est pas un très beau métier, et vous
jugez durement, je pense, l’homme qui gagne de l’argent en montrant à ses
semblables des acrobates, des clowns, des malheureux que Dieu a mis sur
terre défigurés, des cavaliers qui poussent des cris en maîtrisant leurs
chevaux difficiles, et qui tirent des coups de revolver ou lancent le lasso,
des équilibristes et des danseurs de corde, et d’autres danseurs sur une
scène, et des histoires sur un écran... (non, monsieur Delannes, laissez-moi
parler: ne soyez pas poli, puisque je suis sincère)... tout ce monde que je
traîne à ma suite, d’Amérique en Europe, que je traînerai plus loin encore.
Et puis, vous ne devez pas aimer les moyens pratiques de l’entreprise: je
veux dire les affiches de toutes les couleurs; les drapeaux agités, les
fanfares, les discours qui servent à retenir, à rassembler, et les annonces qui
occupent une page entière des journaux, comme pour célébrer une eau
purgative, des pilules hépatiques ou un cirage nouveau, tous les procédés de
propagande, de diffusion, d’écriture dans la mémoire de la troupe James
Randal, du «Randal Circus», avec ses deux initiales qui se retrouvent dans
les villes, dans les champs, le long des chemins de fer, dans les gares, les
omnibus, les tramways et le métropolitain de Paris: R. C., en rouge, en vert,
en bleu, en noir, sur tous les murs... R. C. pour qu’on nous attende
impatiemment... R. C. pour qu’on se souvienne de nous, pour qu’on nous
regrette, R. C. partout! Oui, cela ne peut que vous déplaire, et quand vous
songez, ensuite, que le long de cette voie, j’amasse une fortune, vous
protestez en votre cœur.
—Si je protestais comme vous le dites, interjeta Mathieu, vous aurais-je
loué mes terres?
—Oui, quand même, je crois, car vous ne jugez pas mes manières d’agir
déshonorantes, elles vous sont simplement désagréables. Pourquoi manquer
une affaire, une bonne affaire, parce que l’homme qui vous la propose
s’habille, se présente d’autre façon que vous?... Laissons cela. J’ai voulu me
placer à votre point de vue; maintenant, permettez que je définisse le mien.
—Parlez, monsieur Randal.»
Mathieu, surpris par ce discours, le fut encore plus quand, pour achever
ce qu’il avait à dire, James Randal se leva. Il marchait avec lenteur, de long
en large de la tente, sa voix grave tremblait d’émotion... peu de gestes, mais
ceux-là notifiaient bien sa pensée; une grande autorité, sûre d’elle-même, et
toujours un regard obstinément perdu, éclairé peut-être par cette lumière
venue d’en haut.
«Écoutez... Je suis un meneur d’hommes; ma mission, ici-bas, est de
mener des hommes; ils m’écoutent de préférence à tout autre; ils me
suivent, ils m’obéissent. En temps de guerre, j’aurais commandé des
soldats... Dieu m’a épargné cet affreux devoir: je ne mène pas mes hommes
à la mort, je les mène à la vie, à la vie complète; je les mène à se connaître...
Une nuit, il y a très longtemps, un ami m’invita à l’accompagner dans un
lieu public où l’on jouait, où l’on buvait, où des femmes dansaient
impudiquement, sous le rayon des réflecteurs, où des acrobates faisaient
frémir le peuple assemblé pour les voir, où des clowns leur succédaient afin
de faire rire, et c’était le vice, alentour, l’ivresse, la luxure, et les hommes et
les femmes semblaient des bêtes, et le mal régnait sur eux, mais aucun
d’eux n’en avait conscience... Ils étaient perdus...
«Et alors, subitement, l’idée me vint de les sauver; l’idée, reçue ainsi par
grâce, descendit en moi, s’approfondit en moi, me pénétra tout entier... Je
me sentais devenu un être nouveau; ma vie se traçait devant moi comme un
chemin difficile, très caillouteux, possible cependant, où il fallait être
fortement chaussé, mais qui, je le savais, conduisait droit où je devais me
rendre.
«Les malheureux!... ah! quelle pitié! voués à la mort de l’âme, plongés
dans le vice et ne comprenant pas qu’ils s’y noyaient! Ils avaient presque
disparu; l’eau sale où ils se plaisaient leur emplissait la bouche, leur fermait
les yeux, pesait sur leurs oreilles. Comment auraient-ils crié, la bouche
pleine? comment auraient-ils vu de leurs yeux aveugles, entendu de leurs
oreilles sourdes?... Ils flottaient encore, pas pour longtemps, à coup sûr!...
Je me penchai sur l’eau fétide dont la puanteur m’étouffait, je me penchai
jusqu’à la limite extrême de mon équilibre, et, résolument, je les tirai par les
cheveux!
«Ce premier geste, ce premier effort, non, il ne me sera pas compté: il
était trop facile. On fait cela de tout son cœur, on y met toute sa vigueur...
ensuite vient la tâche vraiment ardue. Ah! monsieur Delannes! réunir les
éléments d’un music-hall modèle, d’un cirque gigantesque, original, bien
ordonné, luxueux, qui fasse oublier les autres, qui forme le public, qui le
blase, au besoin; entraîner cette tribu sur la vaste terre, la nettoyer de ses
souillures dans le vent du voyage, la rajeunir, la maintenir au même point de
haute moralité, de perfection technique, afin de décourager toute
concurrence, cela figure un grand rêve, d’abord, puis un grand projet, mais
qui suppose un robuste capital «argent» pour étayer le capital «volonté».
J’étais pauvre, j’ai dû m’enrichir; le moyen, je l’ai cherché, je l’ai trouvé,
enfin! dix ans de travail obstiné, assidu, régulier... Aujourd’hui, je touche au
but, au seul but humain, car le but divin brille devant moi, très loin, comme
une radieuse aurore. Je marche vers cette aurore, suivi de ceux-là qui me
sont chers, qui sont les miens.
«Oui, nous passons par un monde où le vice règne en maître, or il ne faut
jamais ignorer le maître, il faut l’avoir vu de près, à l’œuvre, dans son
abjecte gloire. Puisque le mal se retrouve en tous lieux, pourquoi le fuir? où
le fuirait-on? Résignons-nous plutôt à vivre avec lui, en gardant bien notre
âme. Ainsi, ce temps d’épreuves, nous le vivrons, mêlés au mal, mais
qu’importe à un cœur pur! Seul périra d’une mort honteuse celui qui eut le
courage abominable d’avoir pleine conscience du mal et de s’y employer
néanmoins; seul connaîtra l’enfer, sur terre et au delà, celui dont la
conscience fut mise en éveil, et qui se jette dans le mal par plaisir
diabolique et pour y chercher sa perdition...»
Il annonçait, il prophétisait; son dur visage exprimait une certitude

sereine, incluse au tréfonds de l’être, et l’on comprenait, à cet instant, que
Jérôme Hourgues eût parlé d’un regard fermé.
Des pas, au dehors, interrompirent le singulier discours, puis une voix
impatiente cria:
«James! avez-vous bientôt fini?
—Entrez,» dit-il.
Comme se relevait le rideau de la tente, il ajouta, en français:
«Ceci, monsieur Delannes, est ma femme, une compatriote de vous.»
X
«Je crains qu’il ne vous ait infligé sa conférence de propagande, disait
Mme Randal en sortant de la tente, une demi-heure plus tard. Il vous a rasé,
monsieur Delannes, avouez-le!
—Mais, non, Madame, pas du tout. Il m’a étonné d’abord: je ne
m’attendais guère à ce ton presque religieux, à tant de noblesse alliée à tant
de précision. Cela n’a rien d’ennuyeux, au contraire.
—Voyez-vous, mon mari est un type, un brave homme aussi. Vous vous
habituerez à lui. Ses discours, ses sermons... il n’y a qu’à le laisser dire, à ne
pas l’écouter. Ça vient par crises. En affaires, il est remarquable. Oh! oui,
un drôle de mélange et, je le répète, le brave homme reparaît toujours.
—Je n’en doute pas... Votre troupe m’intéresse déjà prodigieusement,
Madame; je voudrais l’étudier de près.
—Vous y trouverez de quoi vous amuser. Tenez, promenons-nous un
peu. Je vous servirai de guide. Saviez-vous que j’étais française?... C’est
bon de se sentir en France, d’y rester quelques mois, sans bouger... Si
longtemps que je n’y étais revenue! Ça console de l’Amérique.
—M. Randal semble doué d’un rare instinct d’organisation; mon gérant
m’a donné certains détails vraiment surprenants.
—Une grosse boîte... Si James n’était pas là pour diriger, pour surveiller,
elle crèverait de partout... J’ai entrevu M. Hourgues; sa fillette est bien
gentille.
—Charmante; sa femme aussi.
—Attention! voilà un de nos courtiers: M. Boucbélère... Bonjour,
Boucbélère! Vous désirez parler à mon mari? Je devine à votre figure que
vous apportez du nouveau...»
Et, s’adressant à Mathieu:
«Quand Boucbélère fait une découverte, il prend l’expression accablée
qui convient: son trésor est trop lourd. Comme dit James, sans rire: il arrive
chargé des péchés du monde.
—Salut, Madame! ah!... bonjour, Monsieur! je crois vous avoir déjà
rencontré au café. Du nouveau? non, Madame, rien de nouveau, mais je
voudrais montrer à M. Randal l’intérêt qu’il aurait à changer d’avis à
propos du cul-de-jatte de Bordeaux: le bonhomme est libre depuis hier, je
me charge de l’engager à des conditions excellentes... un numéro inédit et
qui rapportera. Que M. Randal se montre moins intransigeant, et je
télégraphie à Bordeaux, ce soir.
—Faire changer James d’avis! ah! Boucbélère, vous y perdrez votre
accent toulousain! Comment va Rachel?
—Elle n’est pas à prendre avec des pincettes: graissée jusqu’au bout des
doigts et de très mauvaise humeur, elle invente une pommade extraordinaire
que nous lancerons un jour: «la bélériane». Les boîtes porteront sur le
couvercle un bouc qui, si j’ose dire, aura «bel air»... Des bêtises! Tout de
même, je vais voir le patron.
—Comme il vous plaira.
—Mais je tiens à rectifier quelque chose: M. Randal dit que je rentre
chargé de toute l’horreur du monde et non pas de tous les péchés... C’est
très différent.
—Évidemment! Pardon, Boucbélère; bonne chance.
—Au revoir, Madame; salut, Monsieur.»
Il rétablit du doigt l’ordonnance de ses cheveux luisants, s’inclina, sourit,
boutonna son veston pour avantager sa taille et se dirigea vers la tente du
chef.
«Je vous prie de croire que nous n’en comptons pas beaucoup de ce
calibre, dit Mme Randal.
—Boucbélère est à tout le moins singulier.
—Oui, mais un, ça suffit. J’aurai mieux à vous montrer, plus tard. Celui-
là, je le trouve abject. Vous savez, sans doute, qu’il nous procure nos
monstres. J’avoue qu’il y met une habileté consommée: il a le flair du chien
de chasse, dès qu’il s’agit de dénicher un être anormal, épouvantable,
étonnant par sa taille, ou son poids, ou ses traits. Et comment expliquer?... il
les aime d’un amour paternel et bizarre; il les soigne, il les protège avec une
tendresse qui donne froid dans le dos. Au demeurant, cet affreux individu
est honnête... Quant à sa femme, Rachel, on ne peut lui reprocher de gagner
sa vie en confectionnant des pommades, des lotions, des crèmes et des
poudres... Elle n’appartient pas officiellement à la troupe.
—Je l’ai vue.

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Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an

African Policy on China? Philani

U S Security Cooperation with Africa Political and

New Directions in Africa China Studies 1st Edition

Digital Technologies and the Evolving African Newsroom

Routledge Handbook of Environmental Policy in China 1st

Deng Xiaoping and China s Foreign Policy 1st Edition

The Foreign Trade of China Policy Law and Practice Gene

Covered Bridges in China China Highway And

Urban Inequality and Segregation in Europe and China

Edited by Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera

More information about this series at

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

Cover credit: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com

1 Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African

2 A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards

3 Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement:

4 The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards

5 Pan-African Perspectives on International

6 The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa:

7 China’s Evolving Approach to the African

8 Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement

9 One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its

10 The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model

Francis A. Kornegay Jr. Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with

Fig. 7.1 China’s contribution to UNPKO (2007–2017) (Source

Table 6.1 Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic

Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards

Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera

Africa’s Engagement with External Powers

P. Mthembu (B) · F. Mabera

© The Author(s) 2021 1

Why the Rise of China Matters

At a time when much of the Western world looked at Africa through

geostrategic importance translates into access to the continent’s vast

Infrastructure Investment Bank is also an important player and has a

central role to play in regionalising Sino-African diplomatic engagement

to harmonise their engagement strategies with China while leveraging the

further research and dialogue on Africa’s role in a changing geopolitical

A Call for an African Policy Framework

© The Author(s) 2021 11

On the global stage, China, one of the five permanent members of

Devolving from the problem of multifaceted imbalances between

African Agency and Agenda 2063

2063 constitutes African agency in the continent’s global developmental

From an African agency starting point, the question can be posed:

China’s Africa Policy One to Two

no major and overarching policy promulgations were made during the

By ‘comprehensive’, it means that the cooperation should be all-

multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments and non-

to link Chinese interests closely to Agenda 2063’s seven aspirations:

document where agriculture comes first, followed by industrialization

The FOCAC Context

towards China would have to appraise the performance of the AU vis-

an instance of African agency as it speaks to African actors ensuring that

Pathways for African Policy Towards China

into the FOCAC mechanism at the Johannesburg summit and this is an

report by President Paul Kagame (2017) on the proposed institutional