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This second edition of An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy presents a

comprehensive introduction to key ideas and arguments in early Chinese
philosophy. Written in clear, accessible language, it explores philosophical
traditions including Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism and Chinese
Buddhism and how they have shaped Chinese thought. Drawing on the key
classical texts as well as up-to-date scholarship, the discussions range across
ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, while also bringing out distinctive
elements in Chinese philosophy that fall between the gaps in these
disciplinary divisions, thereby challenging some prevailing assumptions of
Western philosophy. Topics include: human nature, selfhood and agency;
emotions and behaviour; the place of language in the world; knowledge and
action; and social and political responsibility. This second edition
incorporates new ideas and approaches from some recently excavated texts
that change the landscape of Chinese intellectual history.
KARYN L. LAI is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New

South Wales in Sydney, Australia. Her publications include An Introduction to
Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008), Learning from Chinese
Philosophies (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) and numerous research articles in
peer-reviewed journals.
Second Edition
KARYN L. LAI
University of New South Wales, Australia
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It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107103986
© Karyn Lai 2017
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2017
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data
Names: Lai, Karyn, 1964– author.
Title: An introduction to Chinese philosophy / Karyn L. Lai, University of
New South Wales, Australia.
Description: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2016. | Originally
published: 2008. | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016023149| ISBN 9781107103986 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781107504097 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Philosophy, Chinese.
Classification: LCC B5231 .L34 2016 | DDC 181/.11–dc23 LC record available at
https://lccn.loc.gov/2016023149
ISBN 978-1-107-10398-6 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-107-50409-7 Paperback
Additional resources for this publication at www.cambridge.org/9781107103986
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in
this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is,
or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
Preface page ix
Chronology xi
1 Chinese Philosophy 1
Thinkers, Texts and Traditions 2
Features of Chinese Philosophy 6
Self-Cultivation 6
Relationships and Contexts 9
Harmony 11
Change 13
Thinking Philosophically 16
Suggestions for Further Reading 19
2 Confucius and the Analects 20

Reading the Analects 21
Ren: Humaneness 23
Ren as General Concern for Humanity 24
Ren, the Confucian Golden Rule 25
Ren and the Cultivation of Particular Relationships 26
Ren as Practical Wisdom 27
Li: Behavioural Propriety 28
Ren and Li 30
Ren Is Fundamental 31
Li is Fundamental 33
Ren and Li are Interdependent Concepts 33
Self-Cultivation and Exemplary Personhood in Contemporary
Philosophical Debates 34
v
vi Contents
3 Human Nature and Cultivation in Confucian Philosophy: Mencius

and Xunzi 41
Mencius: Nurturing Goodness 42
Morality Is Not a Naturally Given Aspect of Human Nature 44
Human Nature Is Not Naturally Inclined towards Goodness 49
Not All Humans Are Naturally Inclined towards Goodness 53
Xunzi: Shaping Humanity 55
Regulating Names, Practising Propriety and Transforming
Human Nature 59
The Way of Tian and the Ways of Humanity 64
4 Early Mohist Philosophy 73

The Ten Doctrines 75
Maximising Collective Welfare 78
Working with Standards 84
5 Daoism and the Daodejing 92

The Philosophy and Practice of the Daojia 93
Huang-Lao Daoism 94
Lao-Zhuang or “Philosophical Daoism” 95
Dao and De in the Daodejing 97
Dao: Reality or Cosmic Vision 100
De: Potency 105
Dao: A Way 109
Wuwei and Ziran in the Daodejing 115
Wuwei 115
Ziran: Nature 117
Ziran: Self-So-Ness 121
6 The Mingjia and the Later Mohists 130

The Mingjia 133
Hui Shi 134
Gongsun Long 138
Later Mohist Thought 144
Making Distinctions and Recognising Similarities 147
Names, Propositions and Knowledge 150
Scientific Discussions 155
The Practice of Jianai: Utilitarian Morality 158
Contents vii
Argumentation in Warring States China 159

7 Legalist Philosophy 163

Three Basic Themes: Penal Law, Technique and Power 165
Fa: Standards and Penal Law 166
Shu: Techniques for Managing the Bureaucracy 169
Shi: Power 173
Han Fei, the “Great Synthesiser” 175
Debates in Legalist Philosophy 178
Human Nature 178
The Common People 179
Best Man or Best System? 181
Bureaucracy 183
Secrecy, Power and the Control of Knowledge 185
Government and Human Well-Being 186
8 The Zhuangzi 188

Zhuangzi’s Scepticism 193
Epistemological Questions 198
Cultivation and Mastery 207
Spirituality 208
Participation in Political Life 213
Mastery 216
The Implications of the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi 221
9 The Yijing and Its Place in Chinese Philosophy 224

Synthesis and the Intellectual Foundations of Empire 233
Correlative Thinking 238
Yin-yang, Wuxing and Qi 239
The Natural, Religious and Human Worlds 241
The Spirit of the Yijing 247
The Primacy of Observation 247
A Holistic, All-Encompassing Perspective 248
A Dialectical and Complementary Approach to Dualisms 250
Correlative Thinking and Resonance 252
An Interpretive Approach to the Meanings of the Hexagrams and
Correspondences 253
viii Contents
Timeliness and Practical Wisdom 255

The Impact of the Yijing 261
10 Chinese Buddhism 265

Basic Tenets of Indian Buddhist Thought 266
The Early Period of Buddhism in China 272
Chinese Buddhist Doctrines 281
San Lun (Three Treatise) Buddhism 283
Wei Shi (Consciousness-Only) Buddhism 284
Tian Tai (Heavenly Terrace) Buddhism 286
Hua Yan (Flower Garland) Buddhism 289
Chan Buddhism 294
Chinese Buddhist Philosophy 301
Glossary 305
Bibliography 321
Index 349
Preface
This book covers major philosophical traditions in early Chinese philosophy,

focusing especially on its foundational period, prior to 200 BCE. It discusses
on concepts, themes, reasoning and argumentative methods in Chinese
philosophy, introducing readers to fundamental ideas in the different trad-
itions, debates among thinkers, cross-influences between traditions, as well
as interpretive theories about these ideas, including views expressed in
contemporary scholarship. The chapters are organised partly on the basis
of thematic coherence and continuity and loosely according to chronological
order. A Chronology is provided at the outset, placing key thinkers in rela-
tion to one another. This list is selective and brief, situating only those
thinkers and periods that are discussed in the book. The at-a-glance table
should help the reader locate thinkers in their historical context in relation
to other thinkers. Dates are also included in the text in places where they are
integral to the specific point being made.
In a number of chapters, a section discussing textual matters is included.
These cover, for example, details of different versions of texts, connections
between text and thinker, or the dating of texts, where relevant. Some of this
material is quite technical, though readers should find the information
helpful in understanding how Chinese intellectual history shapes our grasp
of Chinese philosophy.
For the sake of consistency, within citations, English transliterations of
Chinese concepts, and names of thinkers and texts, have been modified to
the standard Pinyin system. However, the names of modern and contempor-
ary scholars (e.g. Fung, Yu-lan) have been retained so as not to confuse
bibliographic data. A short list of Suggestions for Further Reading, of pri-
mary and secondary sources, is provided at the end of each chapter. A more
ix
x Preface
extended Bibliography is included at the end of the book. Two separate lists,
Primary Texts (listed alphabetically by title) and Secondary Sources (listed
alphabetically by author), provide more extensive reading suggestions. Ref-
erences to primary texts follow this format: Graham, Chuang-Tzu, 2001; and
secondary sources are listed in this way: Fingarette, 1983. The Glossary at the
end of the book is set out in three sections, comprising texts and sections of
texts, names and proper nouns and concepts and themes. The lists are
alphabetically arranged in Pinyin transliteration, and, where possible, an
English translation is provided.
Finally, it is advisable to read the chapters in the order in which they
appear, as each chapter builds upon the preceding ones. Chapter 1 is import-
ant as it presents key themes and argumentative methods in Chinese phil-
osophy, developed in subsequent chapters. Readers might find it beneficial to
revisit some of the discussions in Chapter 1 at appropriate points.
Chronology
Periods in Chinese History Thinkers Dates

Xia dynasty c. 2070 BCE–c.1600 BCE
Shang dynasty c. 1600 BCE–c.1046 BCE
Zhou dynasty 1122 BCE–221 BCE
Spring and Autumn period 722 BCE–476 BCE
(Chunqiu)
Guan Zhong d. 645 BCE
Confucius (Kongzi) 551 BCE–479 BCE
Deng Xi d. 501 BCE
Zisi c. 483 BCE–c. 402 BCE
Mozi c. 480 BCE–c. 390 BCE
Warring States period 475 BCE–221 BCE
(Zhanguo)
Gaozi c. 420 BCE–350 BCE
Zhuangzi c. 399 BCE–295 BCE
Mencius c. 385 BCE–c. 312 BCE
Gongsun Long b. c. 380 BCE
Hui Shi c. 370 BCE–c. 310 BCE
Yang Zhu c. 350 BCE
Shang Yang d. 338 BCE
Shen Dao c. 350 BCE–275 BCE
Shen Buhai d. 337 BCE
Xunzi c. 310 BCE–c. 219 BCE
Zou Yan c. 305 BCE–c. 240 BCE
Lü Buwei c. 291 BCE–235 BCE
Han Fei c. 280 BCE–233 BCE
Li Si c. 280 BCE–c. 208 BCE
Qin dynasty 221 BCE–206 BCE
Han dynasty 206 BCE–220 CE
xi
xii Chronology

Lu Jia ?–170 BCE
Jia Yi 201 BCE–c. 168 BCE
Dong Zhongshu c. 195 BCE–c. 115 BCE
Liu An c. 180 BCE–122 BCE
Sima Tan d. 110 BCE
Sima Qian c. 145 BCE–c. 86 BCE
Liu Xiang 79 BCE–8 BCE
Yang Xiong 53 BCE–18 CE
Ban Biao 3–54
Wang Chong 27–97
Ban Gu 32–92
Ban Zhao 35–100
Xu Gan 170–217
Wei dynasty 220–265
He Yan 195-249
Wang Su 195–256
Wang Bi 226–249
Jin dynasty 265–420
Guo Xiang d. 312
Dao-an 312–385
Hui Yuan 334–416
Kumarajiva 344–413
(Jiumoluoshi)
Dao Sheng c. 360–434
Fa Xian c. 337–422
Northern Wei dynasty 386–534
Sengzhao 394–414
Southern and Northern 420–589
dynasties
Bodhidharma 470–543
Zhi Yi 538–597
Ji Zang 540–623
Du Shun 557–640
Chronology xiii

Sui dynasty 581–618
Xuan Zang 602–664
Hong Ren 601–674
Shen Xiu c. 605–706
Tang dynasty 618–907
Hui Neng 638–713
Fa Zang 643–712
Shen Hui 670–762
Han Yu 768–824
Li Ao d. c. 844
Linji Yixuan d. 866
Five dynasties and Ten 907–960
Kingdoms
Song dynasty 960–1260
Zhu Xi 1130–1200
Yuan dynasty 1271–1368
Ming dynasty 1368–1644
Wang Yang Ming 1472–1529
Qing dynasty 1644–1911
1 Chinese Philosophy
Over the last two decades, interest in Chinese philosophy has grown signifi-
cantly among Anglophone scholars, students and interested lay public: more
excellent translations of original texts have been produced; scholarly jour-
nals highlighting the field established; successful international conferences
organised; and monographs and anthologies published. The field has
broadened in its engagement across disciplinary boundaries, in studies that
bring together philosophical perspectives with historical, archaeological,
religious or anthropological approaches. Just as important, dialogue across
Western and Chinese philosophical traditions is burgeoning, fuelled in part
by the conviction that Chinese philosophy can make significant and insight-
ful contributions to contemporary debates.
An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy examines major philosophical con-
cepts, themes and texts in early Chinese philosophy, paying special attention
to the period between the fifth and the second centuries BCE, the earliest
time from which we have a substantial collection of texts expressing a
plethora of views. We may think of this period as one where we begin to
see the origins of Chinese philosophy. The extant texts from this period
incorporate key elements of philosophy: presentation of and reflection on
worldviews, unmasking of assumptions, argumentation and justification of
ideas and debates on values and ideals. The primary aim of this book is to
introduce a representative overview of key philosophical ideas and debates
proposed by thinkers of the time and which continue to be relevant today.
Some attempt is made to compare the features of Chinese philosophy with
parallel aspects of Western philosophy. However, the aim of such compari-
sons is to elucidate the characteristics of Chinese philosophy rather than to
present and account for differences in the two fields.
This book is introductory in a few ways. First, it covers representative ideas,
themes and debates so that these fundamental aspects of Chinese philosophy
1
2 An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy
may inform further investigations into more complex and lesser-known areas.
Second, it seeks to capture the spirit of the classical Chinese texts, but it
cannot replace close reading of these texts. Good translations are available of
many texts and recommendations are included in the list of suggested read-
ings at the end of each chapter. If it is not possible to read more complete
translations of the texts, readers should at least obtain a reliable compendium
of primary sources such as William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom’s
Sources of Chinese Tradition (vol. 1: 1999). Finally, the discussions here focus on
the foundational elements of Chinese philosophy, that is, from a period where
there is a reasonable volume of texts up to and including ideas from Chinese
Buddhism. Buddhist ideas and practices were introduced into China in the
first century CE and Buddhism was established only from the sixth century as
a distinctive tradition (i.e. different from its Indian origins and not simply
fitted within what the Chinese traditions had to offer). Therefore, it is import-
ant to include it in this introduction to the field, especially as it shaped the
subsequent development of Chinese intellectual history.
The book attempts to achieve a balance between articulating the general
spirit and approach of Chinese philosophy as a disciplinary field and identifying
the more distinctive features of each of the traditions within the field. Confu-
cian, Mohist, Daoist, Legalist and Buddhist traditions feature in our discussions.
It will also examine parallels and divergences across traditions, at times
focusing on disagreements between certain representative figures. Understand-
ing the disagreements is at least as important as recognising the distinctive
ideas of each tradition; this approach draws attention to both contrasts and
common elements of those traditions as they evolved alongside others.
Thinkers, Texts and Traditions
Prolonged unrest in China during the Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu) period
(722–476 BCE) and the Warring States (Zhanguo) period (475–221 BCE) brought
an end to the Zhou dynasty (1122–221 BCE). During this extended period of
turmoil, many men who had previously lived in privileged circumstances were
forced to seek alternative means of living. These men had views about the
causes of the unrest and proposed solutions for rectifying it. Confucius and
many of his followers, sometimes described as scholar-officials (shi), competed
with others for the ear of those in power (Hsu 1965: 34–7). The urgency of the
political and social unrest shaped the views of this period; many of the
Chinese Philosophy 3
discussions focused on morality, political society and good governance. The

Zhuangzi, a Daoist text composed between the fourth and third centuries BCE,
describes the proliferation of ideas at that time:
The empire is in utter confusion, sagehood and excellence are not clarified, we
do not have the one Way and Power . . . There is an analogy in the ears, eyes,
nose and mouth; all have something they illuminate but they cannot
exchange their functions, just as the various specialities of the Hundred
Schools all have their strong points and at times turn out useful. However,
they are not inclusive, not comprehensive; these are men each of whom has
his own little corner. (chapter 33, trans. Graham, Chuang-Tzu, 2001: 275)
Scholars have adopted the phrase baijia zhi xue (“Hundred Schools of Learning”)
to characterise the diversity of ideas and the spirit of debate of the time (e.g.
Fung 1952: 132–69). The term “jia” (literally “house”; meaning “group”)
referred to the doctrinal groups the early thinkers were associated with. We
need to be wary of how the “groups” are classified. Approximately two centur-
ies after the Warring States period, Sima Tan (d. 110 BCE), a historian of the Han
court, categorised the different lines of thought into six groups, often translated
as the “six schools of thought.”1 This classification in the Shiji (Records of the
Grand Historian) proved to be extremely influential, dominating the study of
Chinese thought for centuries to come. The six groups (liu jia) were:
(1) Yin-Yang school: grounded in a belief in two major principles yin (female)
and yang (male) and applied in particular to cosmology;
(2) Ru school: the school of the literati, the scholars. Confucians were
included in this group;
(3) Mo school: the Mohist school, a close-knit organisation of soldiers and
craftsmen with strict discipline, founded by Mozi;
(4) Ming school: the Mingjia (Disputers concerned with names). Thinkers
categorised in this group discussed topics relating to the
correspondence between language and reality;
(5) Fa school: comprised by the Legalists, who emphasised penal law (fa) as a
primary instrument of social control;
1
Sima Tan had started on the project to compile a chronicle of Chinese history. He did not
complete the project, although his son, Sima Qian (c. 145 BCE–c.86 BCE) did. Entitled Shiji
(Records of the Grand Historian), the work covers over two thousand years of Chinese history
up until the rule of Emperor Wu (156–87 BCE) in the Han dynasty.
(6) Dao-De school: comprised by thinkers who emphasised the way (dao) and
power (de) in debates in metaphysics and political and social philosophy
as well as in practice. (Fung 1948: 30–1)
Sima Tan’s classification of the six schools of thought was haphazard. He

identified three of them (yin-yang, fa and dao-de) according to their doctrinal
commitments, one according to the social profile of its adherents (Ru, the
literati), one according to the name the group had given itself (Mo, following
the name of their founder) and one according to the area of inquiry (ming:
names). These six categories are not merely descriptive. For Sima, each of the
first five groups is deficient in some way, with the dao-de group being at the
apex, espousing exemplary doctrine and practice. It is clear that this classifi-
cation was driven by his own beliefs.
Understanding this classification helps to demonstrate how there is no
straightforward way to make the connections between thinkers, texts and
traditions. In Sima Tan’s case, his polemical stance had been transmitted
through the centuries as an authoritative, historical account of debates
during the Warring States period, perhaps because it received official
sanction, and perhaps its title contains the words “Records” and “History,”
amongst other reasons.
Quite a few of the texts discussed in this book bear the name of the alleged
founder of a particular tradition, but this should not be taken as an indication
of any of the following: that the text was authored by the founder, that the
named founder was actually the person who initiated the tradition, or that
participants in a tradition, as we know of them today, promoted their ideas in
the belief that they were proponents of that tradition. Some of the texts, such
as the Analects of Confucius and the Daoist Daodejing, are compiled collections
written by different hands. Some others, such as the Zhuangzi, were heavily
edited after their composition or compilation. Many were lost or destroyed
during the period of unrest leading up to the establishment of the first empire,
the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), and during the reign of its emperor, Qin
Shihuang (259–210 BCE). During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), official
court-sponsored histories were written and existing texts classified, compiled
and edited. The Han rewriting of many pre-Qin texts gives us reason to pause
when attributing ideas to particular pre-Qin thinkers.
Another factor that complicates our discussion of Chinese philosophy is
the commentarial tradition in Chinese intellectual history. Commentators
would provide comments on and interpretations of the ideas and topics in

texts. The comments are extensive, often offering a passage-by-passage com-
mentary and exceeding the length of the original text. For complex reasons
which varied from text to text, particular commentaries came to dominate
the interpretation of the text, hence becoming the orthodox view of how the
text was to be read and understood. One example of this is the commentary
on the Analects written by Zhu Xi (1130–1200), a thinker whose ideas signifi-
cantly shaped the neo-Confucian tradition. Zhu Xi’s commentary on the
Analects was so influential that it overshadowed a much earlier, important
commentary by He Yan (195–249). Similarly, Wang Bi’s (226–49) commen-
tary on the Daodejing and Guo Xiang’s (d. 312) commentary on the Zhuangzi
dominated the understanding of these two texts, respectively. Indeed, there
are questions on how much of the extant Zhuangzi text has been edited and
reorganised by Guo Xiang.
The discovery of texts in unearthed tombs further compounds the diffi-
culty of making thinker–text–tradition connections. Some collections of
texts have been dated to parallel periods as those in our study, including
the Mawangdui silk manuscripts in 1973, from a tomb sealed in 168 BCE
(which includes a version of the Yijing and a set of known but unseen Daoist
texts such as the Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons); Guodian bamboo strips in
1993, dated to approximately 300 BCE (including many Confucian texts as
well as versions of the Daodejing); and those held at the Shanghai Metropol-
itan Museum, dated to approximately 300 BCE (comprising primarily Confu-
cian texts, including the Yijing). Together with other caches of unearthed
texts, these collections, containing previously unknown or unseen texts as
well as versions of extant texts, present fresh angles and approaches (as in
the Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons and the Guodian Xing Zi Ming Chu, for
instance), casting new light on existing issues and debates. They have also
challenged our understanding of Chinese philosophy in a major way: for
example, the Guodian corpus contains texts aligned with both Confucian and
Daoist traditions. This collection of texts has prompted the question of why
they would be part of the same “library” if, as we have come to understand,
there is longstanding hostility between proponents of the Confucian and
Daoist traditions. Of course, its owner could have been interested in learning
broadly. However, the Guodian’s Daodejing (Laozi C) does not seem to reject
values associated with the Confucians, in the way the received version does.
Was the Confucian-Daoist hostility a later development or fabrication? If so,
how should we think about what has been until now the basic categorisations
of “Confucianism” and “Daoism”? The ideas of lineages, traditions and
Chinese intellectual history more broadly must now be approached with
greater caution.
We should keep these cautionary notes in mind as we work through this
book. There are, however, a couple of caveats. For stylistic reasons, the
discussions in the book sometimes associate particular thinkers with specific
ideas. Readers should assume that phrases such as “Mencius believed that x”
indicate that the source of the idea is to be found in the Mencius, where
Mencius is sometimes presented as the spokesperson for the idea. There is no
suggestion that Mencius was without doubt the author of the text. Second, in
spite of the concerns about traditional categories such as “Confucianism”
and “Daoism,” the chapter divisions in the book are made primarily on the
basis of doctrinal affiliation, for reasons of accessibility. The discussions in
the chapters will indicate, where appropriate, gaps created by the use of
these categories, so that readers are aware of their limitations.
We turn our attention next to a number of prominent features of Chinese
philosophy.
Features of Chinese Philosophy
Self-Cultivation
The early Chinese thinkers believed that the transformation of the self was
the answer to the unrest of the time. They discussed different methods of
self-cultivation (xiushen) in relation to their respective visions of ideal society.
The Confucians believed that cultivation involved discipline and rigour in
both reflection and practice. It was believed that, in the process of cultiva-
tion, a person would learn from the past, observe human behaviour, reflect
on his or her interactions with others and provide and gain mutual support
from those who are like-minded. These practices would enable him or her
gradually to develop an appreciation of relational attachment, obligations
and responsibilities that arise from his or her particular place or roles in
society; and understand the importance of taking a stance on matters,
whether in relation to one’s superior or against the sway of the common
people. There were differences among the various Confucian thinkers con-
cerning the resources that were available to humanity: were humans born
with moral sensibilities and capabilities? What kinds of social structures

would best engender self-cultivation?
In the Mohist text, the Mozi, there is an entire chapter devoted to self-
cultivation. There, its author discusses the cultivation of a commitment to
benefit the world (Schwartz 1985: 158). The Mohist standard of benefit –
improvement of collective welfare – was sometimes understood as antithetical
to the Confucian vision due to its (perceived) lack of interest in close relational
ties. Texts of the Daoist tradition such as the Daodejing, Zhuangzi and Liezi
advocated intuitive and experiential grasp of dao, as opposed to life submerged
within conventional practices, beliefs and expectations. The instruments of
acculturation, including norms and prohibitions, as well as language itself, are
held suspect. Self-cultivation in this tradition involves undoing many of the
effects of socialisation and nurturing one’s life according to the axioms of
nonconditioned action (wuwei) and self-so-ness (ziran). The Zhuangzi, for
example, provides many images of skilled craftsmen – among them wheel-
makers and cicada-catchers – who have rejected conventional forms of learn-
ing and pursuits and who exhibit delightful mastery of their craft. There were
also religious Daoists for whom xiushen involved esoteric practices, rigorous
discipline of the body and explorations in the use of alchemy (Kohn 1993;
Robinet 1997). Yang Zhu (c. 350 BCE), who Mencius described as an egoist, was
said to have promoted a philosophy of “each for himself” (weiwo). His idea of
nurturing the self, which included attention to the body, was to keep it
unadulterated from corrupting influences in society (Graham 1989: 53–64).2
Even the Legalists, who were concerned about the maintenance of the power
of the ruler, gave cultivation a central place in their program. For them, it was
critical for the ruler to develop strategies and skills especially to manage the
officials on whom the ruler was dependent.
For the early Chinese thinkers, cultivation was necessary because it
equipped individuals with the skills and capabilities to deal with situations
as they arose. It seems that they were deeply aware of the need to be
responsive and were therefore focused on the practicalities of life. As we will
see in the following chapters, in the early Chinese texts, considerations about
how best to resolve a situation may differ from one individual to another, or
2
Mencius (a Confucian thinker) was a harsh critic of Yang Zhu, noting the latter’s unwill-
ingness to shoulder social and civic responsibilities. See the discussion in Graham 1989:
53–64.
according to the situation, or they might take into account the particular
people one happens to be interacting with. This may help explain why not
many of the thinkers justified their claims primarily through the use of
principles. Here, the suggestion is not that these thinkers did not consider
theoretical or conceptual issues; there was much speculative thought,
including the contemplation of logical puzzles (especially by the Mingjia),
as well as the use of metaphors, analogies and suggestive imagery. Nor was it
the case, more specifically, that ethical principles did not figure in their
thinking about moral issues. Rather, their discussions tend to focus on
concrete events, and it could be that Immanuel Kant, having noticed this
feature of their discussions, disparaged them as mere “examples”:
Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient . . . Their teacher Confucius

teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed for the
princes . . . and offers examples of former Chinese princes . . . But a concept of
virtue and morality never entered the heads of the Chinese . . . In order to
arrive at an idea . . . of the good [certain] studies would be required, of which
[the Chinese] know nothing.3
Kant’s observations (that the Confucian texts offer many examples) are right,
although his conclusion is questionable. He assumes that there is only one
approach to moral deliberation, which necessarily begins with the determin-
ation of “an idea of the good.” For the early Chinese thinkers, the differences
from one situation to another mattered, and the examples demonstrated a
range of possible and alternative ways to handle a situation. Familiarity with
existing norms and possibilities, understanding limits and constraints and
practising one’s responses in different situations – elements of cultivation –
helped a person to understand the alternatives available to him or her in
light of his or her capabilities. From this point of view, simply to know moral
principles or even to be committed to them was practically inert. As the Mozi
tells us, even if a blind person can articulate the difference between black
and white, he does not know black, because he cannot select black objects
from white ones.
3
Helmuth von Glasenapp, Kant und die Religionen des Osten. Beihefte zum Jahrbuch der
Albertus-Universität, Königsberg/Pr. (Kitzingen-Main: Holzner Verlag, 1954), pp. 104,
translated by Julia Ching (1978: 169). Ching focuses on fundamental differences in the
structures and dynamics of early Chinese philosophy and Kantian philosophy.
Relationships and Contexts
In the texts we examine, an individual is conceived of essentially in relational

terms and as a situated being. An individual’s uniqueness rests only partly in
the individual’s possession of those characteristics which set him or her
apart from other individuals. It also derives from the individual’s place
within the contextual environment and the relationships the individual
has therein. The resulting picture of self is complex, with many factors
shaping it, including its relationships with significant others and its experi-
ences within its historical, cultural, social and political contexts. In ethical
terms, rarely, if ever, is an individual expected to act as an independent,
detached moral agent, or judged according to an idealised paradigm of
independent selfhood. This has important implications for how we under-
stand decision-making processes, choice and responsibility.
In the different traditions in Chinese philosophy, this view of self is
expressed in a range of ways. Confucian and Mohist debates focused primar-
ily on human relationships in the sociopolitical context. They disagreed on
whether close affective ties should occupy a central place in social life, with
the Mohists being particularly mindful of the implications of such an
arrangement. Both Mohists and Confucians also appealed to heaven (tian),
sometimes as the ground of human morality and sometimes simply to set
out the way things naturally were. Especially during the Han period and
beyond, Confucian discourse incorporated a tripartite relationship between
heaven (tian), earth (di) and humanity. This encompassing vision placed
humanity in a position of responsibility, that is, to realise the dictates of
heaven on earth.
Daoist thinkers looked beyond human relationships in their consideration
of dao. Discussions in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi drew on analogies between
the human and natural worlds. The texts emphasise the importance of
understanding all entities, processes, events, causes and energies in their
contexts. In the Han dynasty, cosmological thinking, which holds that there
are connections between the cosmic and human realms, was a popular
theme expounded on by both Confucians and Daoists as well as in
syncretic texts such as the Huainanzi. The Book of Changes (Yijing), a text used
for divination, was reinterpreted during this time to reinforce claims about
continuities and correspondences in the human, natural and cosmic worlds
(Schwartz 1985: 358–70). From around the fifth century, some strands of
Chinese Buddhist philosophy developed a distinctive view of an individual

self as “empty” (kong). Yet, paradoxically because the self is empty, its
distinctiveness arises as a result of its interdependent relationships with
other entities. These traditions offer different views of what was “out there,”
the world as we know it, and how individuals should orientate themselves in
the world. In these accounts, metaphysical, epistemological and ethical
elements are integrated. As we will see, the pictures of self-realisation in
the different philosophies are dramatically different and often the cause of
deep disagreement.
From a contemporary perspective, the concept of self as primarily related
to others and embedded in its environment raises concerns about the status
of the individual. For instance, within the human sphere, would a self
conceived in this way be overwhelmed by its relationships? Might the aim
in one’s life be an unbearable juggling task of being a mother, a daughter, an
employee, a teacher, an aunt, a niece and a wife? This is a picture of self,
created and determined almost entirely by its roles (see Tu 1985: 51–66).
Similar concerns have been raised in conjunction with Confucian or Chinese
societies embodying a collectivist outlook, as contrasted with societies that
place more weight on the individual and which allow for and encourage
responsibility, creativity and other expressions of the self (see de Bary 1991;
Tu 1972: 192–3). There is some basis for the concern that Chinese philosophy
in general tends to focus on collective interests rather than individual inter-
ests, although we must resist the tendency to characterise the conception of
relational and situated self simply as collectivist. It is inaccurate to say that
the different Chinese traditions do not attend to matters relating to the
interests of individuals. They do consider details pertaining to particular
individuals and events, but there is often a sense that it is exceedingly
difficult to isolate matters that pertain only to an individual or to draw clear
lines of responsibility on that basis.
We will see in the discussions that follow that instead of being “collectiv-
ist,” Chinese philosophy tends to assume interdependence between entities
or individuals. There are many discussions about the overlaps between indi-
vidual interests and common interests, reminding us that it is artificial to
think solely in terms of either self-interest or servitude to others. This applies
to relationships among humans, human relationships with natural entities, as
well as the place of humanity in its social and natural environments. It is
not that Chinese philosophy does not have a conception of individual
achievement. Rather, an individual’s achievements, ingenuity and resource-

fulness, as well as his or her deficiencies and failures, are properly understood
only in light of a person’s place in the world. On the one hand, although an
individual may be constrained by aspects of his or her environment, on the
other, the individual’s potency and the reach of his or her actions extend
beyond the isolated self. In this light, the use of the individualist-collectivist
dichotomy to characterise the Chinese view of self is noticeably simplistic.
Harmony
Harmony and stability were critical issues for the early thinkers in China.
The period of the “Hundred Schools” was one of great upheaval. Thinkers
deliberated on the institutions, methods and processes that could help
establish a more stable and peaceful existence. The Confucian vision of an
ideal society saw good relationships as fundamental to social stability. The
family was a microcosm of the state, the latter being sustained by edifying
human relationships, with institutions established according to the
wisdom of a benevolent (ren) sage king. The Mohists disagreed with the
Confucian vision. They argued that, from the state’s point of view, it was
necessary to engender inclusive concern of each person for everyone else.
The Confucian approach, which advocated the cultivation of special rela-
tionships, was effectively a system that fostered particular loyalties.
According to the Mohists, the outcome of the Confucian plan, writ large,
is war between families and states. The Mohists were convinced that the
means to achieve harmony was through standardisation. They believed
that it was important to have standards (fa) in order to ensure consistency
in the way people were treated. In other words, standards were important
institutions that contributed to sociopolitical stability. Legalists shared
these views about standards, although they had very different ideas about
their purpose and implementation. While the Mohists sought to “standard-
ise” or normalise altruism, Legalists devised penal law as the standard with
which to control the people. Their ultimate concern was to maintain the
power of the ruler. Uniformity was also important in the project of the
Mingjia, who believed that the root cause of unrest lay in the lack of clarity
in the connections between words and what they denoted, bringing about
confusion and disagreement. As a result, they sought to establish consistent
connections between words and their referents.
Among the early thinkers, the Daoists stand apart in their hesitancy about
social order and uniformity. Daoist philosophy embraces multiplicity and
plurality, drawing examples from entities, beings and events in the natural
world, to cast doubt on anthropocentric and reductive interpretations of life
and world. The Daoist texts dwell on the chaotic unpredictability in natural
events; these occurrences defy attempts by humans to classify, control and
manipulate them. The Zhuangzi even celebrates the messy cacophony of
differences between individual views. Daoist philosophy upholds a different
conception of harmony from the other traditions that seek to establish
standards. It does not believe that the elimination of differences is a pre-
requisite for harmony. According to the Daoist picture, attempts by other
thinkers to systematise and unify difference actually caused fragmentation
and dislocation. Daoist philosophy in fact overturns conventional expect-
ations about harmony. To borrow another metaphor from music, the har-
mony sought by thinkers intent on standardising aspects of life is, in effect, a
performance in unison; we see this in the Mohist and Legalist proposals for
conformity. The Confucian picture is more nuanced. It takes into account
some individual differences in its idea of reciprocity in roles and relation-
ships. Even so, Daoist harmony stands out because it encourages plurality,
enjoying the harmonies produced by different voices. This offers a robust
account of variations within the whole.
There is another way in which harmony is expressed in the Chinese
traditions. This concerns how individuals bring together different elements
or domains in their lives to achieve a satisfying equilibrium. In the Analects,
equanimity is an enviable feature of the life of the exemplary person, in
contrast to one who is often in a quandary. The Zhuangzi’s skill masters
embody a similar composure in their actions, sometimes seemingly to a
degree of recklessness, as in the case of the diver who jumped into the
cascades. Chinese Buddhist thought offers a more developed account of
harmony in the life of the individual. The Buddhist argument is one that
first unsettles, with its emphasis that conventional life is illusory. A few of
the Chinese Buddhist schools (such as the San Lun and Tian Tai schools)
developed a distinctive middle-path approach that bridged the gap between
life as it is known and life as it should be. Harmony is found neither in the
illusory nor in the enlightened, but in the space between the two. Within
this space, equilibrium is achieved not by bringing together elements of
illusory and enlightened lives, but in rejecting each of them.
This brief sketch outlines how harmony in the Chinese traditions is

manifest in a variety of ways, in individual and social lives: conformity, unity
in purpose, cooperation, integration, composure, order and stability.
Change
Chinese philosophy posits continuities and correspondences between individ-

ual entities and across different domains. This feature is articulated to differ-
ent extents within the different traditions. It was developed much further
during the late Warring States and Han dynasties, when effort was put into
setting out systems of correspondences between cosmic and natural events
(such as eclipses, earthquakes, positions of the planets, climate, weather and
seasons), and events in the human world, including those relating to health,
social institutions and political leadership. Some thinkers turned their atten-
tion to the Yijing, a text used in divination, to examine its assumptions about
(anticipating) change and its effects. The text attends to change and its impact,
so as to minimise harms, if not to maximise benefits. The anticipation of
change was the motivation for divination. Given that individuals are exposed
to many things beyond their control, it is important for them to understand
how change comes about, and how they might be affected. The idea of mutual
resonance, ganying, crystallises the concept of interdependent selfhood. It
captures the susceptibility of individuals to factors external to their being
and beyond their immediate control. But the apparent fragility of the individ-
ual must not be interpreted solely in negative terms. Effects of change may
also be positive. Moreover, because of the innumerable possibilities in mutual
transformation, individuals should not seek only what is in their self-interest.
It is assumed that the welfare of others and the robustness of their wider
environment will directly or indirectly affect an individual’s well-being.
The Yijing embodies the practical orientation of Chinese philosophy. Not
all of the text is philosophical in nature. Its oldest sections, from around the
ninth century BCE, were intended for divination, though they did not also set
out the rationale for understanding its practices and processes. Yet what is
interesting about this text are its implicit assumptions about the world, the
connections across its different domains, the relationships between entities,
the complexity of causes and effects, the place of humanity in a constantly
transforming world, and the importance of individual actions and responses.
The Warring States and Han commentaries on the Yijing were deeply
introspective about its project, methods and applications. The text and
commentaries are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9, with particular
focus on the development of Chinese philosophy during the Han period. It is
important here to highlight some of the Yijing’s themes for two reasons:
these themes are manifest more broadly across the range of Chinese philo-
sophical views, and they help to bring out what is distinctive in Chinese
philosophy, especially in its thinking about change. The six features dis-
cussed here are mirrored in Chapter 9.
1. The primacy of observation. The Yijing emphasises observation as a critical

element in reflective thinking, and procedurally prior to it. The predictions
and prescriptions in the text are grounded in observations (guan) of
connections, movements and transformations in the world. From these
observations, one perceives patterns, regularities and correlations. In an
approach similar to that articulated in the Yijing, thinkers of different
persuasions began by observing human behaviour. Their deliberations on
social, political and ethical life reflect their observations on corruption and
selfishness, as well as compassion and altruism, in society. Daoist and
Mohist thinkers, in particular, were struck by the plurality they observed.
For example, in their ruminations about language and its connections with
reality, the Later Mohists were preoccupied with the question of how
language could fulfil both the aims of efficient communication, on the one
hand, and accurate representation of the plural and diverse world, on the
other. It seems that, being led by their observations of plurality in the world,
they were unable to make the kinds of abstractions required in order to
reflect on structure in language. In this and other areas of concern, early
Chinese philosophy has a palpably empirical character.
2. A holistic, all-encompassing perspective. The Yijing divination
statements place specific events within a larger environmental context
in order to understand more fully the factors and agents of change. There
is attention to the locus within which individuals or events are situated,
be it human society, dao, heaven and earth, or the cosmos. In Chinese
philosophy, while it is recognised that individuals are the subjects of their
experiences, the experiences are fully understood only within a context.
As we have noted previously, for example, Confucian philosophy sees the
self as a contextually embedded being, constituted in part by elements of
its specific cultural and historical tradition. Even the concept dao,
sometimes described as transcendent, is not discontinuous from or

independent of life in the world.
3. A dialectical and complementary approach to dualisms. The Yijing sets
up complementary opposites in its conceptual framework using contrastive
concepts such as high and low, action and repose and hard and soft. These
paired concepts are part of the explanatory framework of change, perhaps
in seasonal or cyclic fashion, one phase replacing another and being
replaced by it in due course. This binary complementation is most
pronounced in, though not restricted to, Daoist philosophy. (e.g.
Confucianism emphasises reciprocity in relationships.) Daoist philosophy
casts doubt on conventional markers of success and well-being by
challenging the monolithic structure of values. Binary complementation
also figures significantly in the Daoist approach to argumentation,
especially in Zhuangzi‘s disagreements with the Disputers (Bianzhe)4,
who sought to settle disputes by fixing names to their referents (objects
and events) in the real world. Zhuangzi rejected their logic that things had
to be either so or not-so, suggesting that more could be gained from a
dialectical approach that valued contrasts between perspectives.
4. Correlative thinking and resonance. Correlative thinking is, broadly
speaking, the view that events and situations in one realm are parallel
to, or help to explain, those in another. An example from early Chinese
philosophy is the correlation between a dysfunctional state and a diseased
body, both lacking in alignment between parts and hence disharmonious.
The theme of resonance posits tighter causal relations between two events
or objects, including responsiveness, whether of one to the other or
mutually between the two. Both these themes are integral features of
Han thought. Yet there are suggestions of correlative thinking before this
period, as, for instance, in the cooperation, collusion or simpler
correspondences between the natural world, on the one hand, and the
sociopolitical realm, on the other. We also know that beliefs in
correspondences between cosmic phenomena and human well-being
were widespread during the Warring States period as Xunzi felt the
need to dispel superstitious beliefs in cosmic phenomena, such as
eclipses, as portents of forthcoming events in the human domain. These
beliefs are also documented in the unearthed “Daybooks” (Rishu).
4
Their philosophy is discussed in Chapter 6.
5. An interpretive approach to the meanings of the hexagrams and

correspondences. The use of the Yijing involved interpreting particular
hexagrams to articulate its relevance to specific matters. We can see the
dominance of the interpretive approach in Chinese philosophy more
generally, where abstract, universally applicable axioms only have
prima facie status. They are open to modification according to relevant
circumstantial factors. The use of interpretation figures prominently in
the commentarial tradition in Chinese intellectual history, whereby
thinkers would focus on a particular idea or element in a classic so as to
draw out its insights on a topic or debate.
6. Timeliness and practical wisdom. The Yijing dwelt on matters in the
wider environment, including the weather, seasons and climate, in
order to provide a comprehensive and inclusive picture of the
environment within which humans had to situate themselves. In its
discussions, issues related to metaphysics, epistemology and ethics are
not clearly delineated; understanding the environment was critical for the
orientation of the self. Watchfulness was required as imminent changes
in the natural and social worlds were expected. The Yijing embodies an
attitude that is expectant of change and that seeks to prepare for it and
deal with it. With this as a fundamental viewpoint, the early thinkers
worked with possibilities rather than certainties, thinking about whether
some intended course of action was possible (ke), and whether, on a
particular occasion, a certain action could proceed (xing). Recognition of
change as a fundamental feature of existence prompted them especially to
concentrate on the cultivation of skills associated with awareness of and
sensitivity to one’s surrounds. This was the best guarantee of appropriate
and timely action when the situation arose.
We now turn our attention to a number of features of philosophical thinking

in the Chinese tradition.
Thinking Philosophically
Debate and argumentation are prominent features of Chinese philosophy.

From the Spring and Autumn period, thinkers have had to grapple with a
plurality of viewpoints. John J. Clarke, who investigated the reception and
interpretation of Daoist ideas through periods in Western intellectual
history, argued that this context of plurality, and its implications, should not
go unnoticed:
Such debates must . . . be seen in the wider environment of an attitude of

toleration and pluralism that has long been endemic at certain levels of
Chinese cultural life, a cultural attitude which has not until relatively recently
become acceptable in the West. (Clarke 2000: 27)
Clarke is referring to debates between rival Daoist and Buddhist thinkers

from the fourth century CE. But there were earlier debates between Confu-
cians, Daoists and Mohists, with each set of thinkers rejecting the doctrines
of others. There is some evidence that, during the fourth century BCE, an
assembly of thinkers of different persuasions were gathered under the aus-
pices of Jixia, the Ji Gate in the capital of Qi during the Warring States period,
under the direction of King Wei of Qi (357–320 BCE).5 A situation like this
could help explain the development of the syncretic method, a significant
feature of debates in Chinese philosophy. The method involves drawing
views from (seemingly) incompatible doctrines and integrating them into a
viable theory. The syncretic approach is markedly different from analysis,
which involves exposing the assumptions that lie behind particular theories
and scrutinising the justification of basic concepts and ideas. While analysis
seeks to identify and isolate basic components of an argument, the syncretic
approach integrates ideas from doctrines that seem to be at odds with each
other. As a result of the widespread application of syncretic thinking, many
Chinese philosophies have come to include elements from traditions other
than their own. Thomé Fang, a Chinese philosopher, captured the syncretic
spirit in this way: “I am a Confucian by family tradition; a Daoist by tem-
perament; a Buddhist by religion and inspiration” (Fang 1981: 525).
Because of the syncretic element in Chinese philosophy, it is important to
acquire a sense of intellectual history in order to grasp the influences across
the different traditions. This engenders an appreciation of how ideas are
5
There is some debate, however, regarding the organisation at Jixia. Some scholars, such
as David Nivison, believe that Jixia was an institution (1999: 769–70). They also hold
that many influential thinkers including Xunzi (310?–219? BCE) and Shen Dao (350?–
275 BCE) were at this Academy. Nivison also notes that the scholars at the Academy
were forbidden to take on political roles; they held only advisory capacities. However,
Nathan Sivin argues that evidence on Jixia as a formally organised academy is very thin
(1995b: 19–26).
built upon, reinterpreted, appropriated and applied to different debates. The

effect of the syncretic approach is an ongoing layering of themes, concepts
and ideas. It is therefore immensely difficult clearly to distinguish specific
characteristics of each of the “original” schools of thought associated with its
founding thinker or thinkers. Thus, it makes more sense to speak of the
different philosophical traditions rather than the philosophy of each specific
“school” as a distinctive and coherent stream of ideas.
Another prominent feature of argumentation in Chinese philosophy is its
preference for suggestive and evocative imagery, examples, analogies, meta-
phors and illustrations. The use of suggestive and illustrative tools in argumen-
tation reflects a concern to illuminate ideas, explore their implications and
ascertain their applications. This issue of argumentative methods is integrally
connected to the purpose of inquiry, as perceived by the early thinkers. The
frequent use of suggestive methods points to an approach that places the onus
of interpretation and understanding on the reader. Without doubt, readers will
bring their perspectives to bear on their reading of texts in general. But there is
an encouragement of, and perhaps even a requirement for, personal reflection
when the text engages in metaphors, analogies and the like. It is therefore
unsurprising when readers of the Zhuangzi comment on the power of the text to
draw its readers into its discussions and to encourage reflective thinking. But it
is not only the Daoist texts that embody this feature. The Confucian Analects also
prompts readers to ask questions, consider different approaches, imagine the
contexts of the conversations and reflect on reasons for action. Reading these
texts is primarily a reflective activity for the reader.
This is not to say that the articulation of theoretical foundations or
philosophical truth is not a concern in Chinese philosophy. However, it
was not the only concern in the Chinese intellectual traditions, and not an
important objective in some of them. The first chapter of the Zhuangzi, for
example, is entitled “Going rambling without a destination” (Graham,
Chuang-Tzu, 2001: 43–7). It communicates a belief in the value of reflective
activity – of contemplation and reflection – as an end-in-itself. It is noncom-
mittal about its destination, if there is one.6 That reflective activity is valued
6
This may be attributed to lack of interest in metaphysical issues, namely, those matters
pertaining to an underlying truth or reality. Alternatively, the reason may be an epi-
stemological one, that even if there were an underlying reality, it is impossible to know
what it is like.
as an end rather than simply a means to truth, generates important ques-

tions about the nature of philosophical thinking and the place of philosophy
in human life. In this spirit, the reader is encouraged to reflect on the
elements of Chinese philosophy and, in the style of Chinese philosophy, to
use them to acquire a deeper understanding of both Chinese philosophy and
his or her own personal beliefs and commitments.
Suggestions for Further Reading
de Bary, Theodore, and Bloom, Irene (eds.) (1999) Sources of Chinese Tradition: From
Earliest Times to 1600, vol. 1, 2nd edn., New York: Columbia University Press.
Defoort, Carine (2001) “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments
of an Implicit Debate,” Philosophy East and West, 51.3: 393–413.
Denecke, Wiebke (2011) The Dynamics of Masters Literature: Early Chinese Thought
from Confucius to Han Feizi, Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series 74.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fang, Thomé H. (1981) Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development, 2nd edn.,
Taipei: Linking Publishing.
Fung, Yu-Lan (1947) The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, trans. E. R. Hughes, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hsu, Cho-Yun (1999) “The Spring and Autumn Period,” in Michael Loewe and
Edward Shaughnessy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the
Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 545–86.
Nivison, David (1999) “The Classical Philosophical Writings,” in Michael Loewe
and Edward Shaughnessy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From
the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 745–812.
Shaughnessy, Edward L. (2006) Rewriting Early Chinese Texts, Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press.
Twitchett, Denis, and Loewe, Michael (eds.) (1986) The Cambridge History of China,
vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
2 Confucius and the Analects
Troubled by the unrest of the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius

(Kongzi) (551–479 BCE) proposed the ethical reform of society. His proposal
involved the elimination of the power-mongering and exploitative
behaviours of those in power. The process was to be initiated by exemplary
court officials, men of broad education and committed to beneficent
government.
As the instigator of these ideas, Confucius is recognised as belonging
to a group known as the Ru (Literati).1 The Ru were learned men who
sought to share and realise their insights on the ethical administration of
government.2 However, the nature of the connection between the Ru and
the Confucians depicted in the Analects – the Conversations – is quite
unclear (Zufferey 2014).
Ruist education consisted in the cultivation of an ethically and ritually
disciplined life. As some Ru extended the rigours of ceremonial court ritual
to the social and domestic arenas, Confucians have sometimes been thought
of as traditionalists. It is interesting that in the Analects (7:1), Confucius is
noted to have said that he is a transmitter, not a creator. Did he see himself
primarily as a proponent of a traditional way?
1
Details of Confucius’ life are patchy, as the key sources date from a period sometime after
his death. Refer to the discussions by Eno (2014) and Riegel (2013).
2
The social mobility of a group of scholar-officials, the shi, rapidly increased during the
Warring States period. Particularly during 512–464 BCE, the shi, having established
themselves in their learning, began to play more active roles than rulers (Hsu 1965: 8).
It has been suggested that Confucius and many of his pupils belonged to this shi class (Hsu
1965: 34–7). Competition between the many warring states necessitated the selection of
capable functionaries by those in power (Hsu 1999: 572–83).
20
Confucius and the Analects 21
Reading the Analects
Textual The key text for Confucius’ ideas is The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu).
matters The text comprises conversations Confucius was meant to have
had with his followers. The extant text provides an unreliable
picture of Confucius as it was compiled during the Western Han
(206 BCE–9 CE), at least two and a half centuries after Confucius’
death.3 More recently, two unearthed versions of the text, believed
to pre-date the received version, have received some scholarly
attention.4 In spite of the evidence that suggests multiple versions
of the Analects were in circulation around the Western Han period,
some scholars have attempted to date the received text’s sections.5
How might the text be read? The 499 short passages in the Analects
are not systematically organised and repetitions and
inconsistencies are common. Because the extant text is composite,
it is not surprising to find that a term or concept may have several
different meanings in its conversations. The reader will not find
clearly articulated doctrines or justified points of view, even
though it is sometimes possible to construct a plausible account of
3
The extant text is based on He Yan’s (195–249) Collected Explanations of the Analects. He
Yan’s version draws in large part from an earlier version of the text, edited by Zhang Yu
(d. 5 BCE) during a time when there were three recensions of the text: the Gu Lun, Qi Lun
and the Lu Lun (Makeham 2003a: 363–77).
4
In 1973, a collection of bamboo slips, including sections of what is believed to be the
earliest known version of the Analects, was unearthed in Dingzhou, Hebei Province. The
tomb was believed to have been sealed at around 55 BCE. The tomb’s contents, including
the Dingzhou Analects, have been bedevilled by a series of unfortunate events including a
tomb robbery and fire that destroyed many of the bamboo slips, and an earthquake in
1976 that caused further damage. Scholarly attention on the Dingzhou Analects has been
somewhat limited because of the damaged slips, together with other reasons (van Els
2009). The other discovery, the P’yŏngyang Analects (also known as Lelang Analects), is
thought to have been roughly contemporaneous with the Dingzhou Analects. The former
was discovered in a tomb in the early 1990s in North Korea (Csikszentmihalyi and Kim
2014: 32).
5
Refer to Csikszentmihalyi and Kim 2014 for a discussion of the formulation and circula-
tion of different versions of the text during the Han period. On the issue of dating the
sections of the Analects, the most prominent study is by Brooks and Brooks (Original
Analects, 1998), who align sections of the text with certain events in the lives of the early
Confucian followers.
the rationale for the conversations and some key themes.

Such work may involve the study of texts of the same period,
philological study and analysis of historical data, including
examination of artefacts of the period. The text remains valuable
as a repository of insights into the intellectual history of
Confucianism and of China more generally. At another level,
a good number of contemporary scholars – philosophers in
particular – take the Analects as a text that is open-ended. These
scholars propose contemporary applications of ideas in the
Analects, as discussed below.
Confucius emerges from the Analects as a committed and conscientious

thinker. In many passages a range of people, including his followers, dukes
and governors of villages, consult him on issues relating to good government
and, more broadly, a good life. Details in some of the passages intend to show
how Confucius takes various factors into consideration to arrive at a deci-
sion. Yet, many first-time readers of the Analects are struck by the lack of
basic normative principles or criteria upon which Confucius bases his deci-
sions. For instance, in 13:18, he expects sons and fathers to cover up for each
other’s misdeeds:
The Governor of She in conversation with Confucius said, “In our village there
is someone called ‘True Person.’ When his father took a sheep on the sly, he
reported him to the authorities.”
Confucius replied, “Those who are true in my village conduct themselves
differently. A father covers for his son, and a son covers for his father. And
being true lies in this.” (trans. Ames and Rosemont, Analects, 1998: 166–7)
Some are surprised that Confucius, known widely as the founder of Confu-
cian ethics, could make such immoral prescriptions as lying or, worse still,
encourage nepotism. But if we continue to reflect on this conversation, there
are more questions we want to ask. These include, What were the
punishments, if any, for theft? What was the worth of a sheep? How was
the neighbour affected? What are the consequences for the child, if he were
to reveal his father’s theft and, alternatively, if he doesn’t? The situation of
this child is a uniquely difficult one and presents no easy solution whether in
Confucius’ time or ours. We may simply decide that it is morally unaccept-
able at any place and time to recommend covering up, or we might focus on
the conversation’s contextual details, which may have a bearing on Confu-

cius’ remarks. These details include the place of family and loyalty in ethical
life, the ethical significance of relationships, the requirement to cover up for
another, Confucius’ method of moral deliberation and the criteria he
uses here.
If we understand Confucius’ comments as normative prescriptions, it
would be difficult to see how what Confucius said to a duke about running
a state, or how Confucius seats himself while eating, has relevance for us
today. Perhaps we should not expect the Analects to provide normative
answers to our ethical dilemmas. Instead, we might read it in order to
understand the complexities associated with the processes of moral
reasoning as the early Confucians understood it. In this light, I suggest that
the Analects be read as if it is a collection of diary entries of practice and
beliefs associated with the Confucian tradition rather than a book of authori-
tative sayings or a comprehensive and systematic philosophical treatise. It
can be read as a manual on how Confucius and others handled situations and
responded to others in context, that is, as a repository of insights to generate
and encourage reflective thinking about our own actions and commitments.
With this methodology in mind, let us proceed to examine two founda-
tional concepts in the Analects, ren (humaneness) and li (behavioural propri-
ety). Together, they express facets of cultivated humanism in the Confucian
tradition. A fuller understanding of Confucian philosophy rests in part on
how we understand these two concepts and the interplay between them.
Ren: Humaneness
Ren is mentioned only occasionally in texts pre-dating Confucius.6 In its

earlier usage, the term referred to some manly or virile quality. For example,
in two hunting poems in the Book of Poetry (Shi Jing), two huntsmen are
referred to as “handsome and ren” (Schwartz 1985: 51). In the Book of History
(Shu Jing), ren refers to the benevolent attitude of the ruler to his subjects. In
the hands of the Confucians, however, the term denoted a moral quality
characteristic of humanity. Hence, it is not surprising to find some variation
in its use in the Analects, for example, to refer to humanity in general,
6
Wing-tsit Chan presents a comprehensive discussion of the pre-Confucian usage of ren
(1955: 295–319).
humaneness as a distinguishing characteristic of humanity, compassion as

the primary virtue, or the compassionate character of a community (McLeod
2012). In broad terms, ren in the Analects captures the idea of a distinctively
human need and disposition for relationality, manifest in an exemplary life
within a socio-political context. The meaning of the term is also revealed in
its Chinese character: ren (仁) is comprised of two characters, the left signify-
ing humanity (人) and the right, the number two (二). This suggests that the
term pertains to human relatedness. Hence, it has been variously translated
into English as benevolence, love, humaneness, humanity, human-
heartedness, compassion and sympathy.7 Its meaning in the Analects is
multifaceted, and some more recent translations of ren avoid identifying it
with any one English term as that may change the meanings and scope of the
term. Aspects of ren are considered in the following sections.
Ren as General Concern for Humanity
Ren is “to love all humanity” (ai ren), says Confucius in 12:22 (adapted from
the translation by Legge, Chinese Classics, 1991, vol. 1: 261). This anecdote
identifies ren with a general, indiscriminating love. However, in 4:3, it is said
that “only the man of ren knows to like and dislike others” (trans. author),
which suggests that the person of ren is discriminating in his assessment of
others. How is it possible both to “love” all humanity and yet to dislike some
people? Analects 4:3 uses the phrase “hao ren” which means to like someone
rather than to love them (ai ren). We should also keep in mind that the
phrase “to love all humanity” in 12:22 was typically used in relation to those
in positions of power, suggesting a ruler’s general concern for all his people.
Hence, “to love all humanity” is not to demonstrate attentiveness marked by
affection. It is possible both to hold a general concern for the populace and,
at the same time, to exercise one’s judgment about individuals. In 17:24,
Confucius is explicit about the kinds of people he dislikes, including slander-
ers and gossip-mongers. This is consistent with the importance of “knowing
men” (zhiren), also described in 12:22; it was critical for those in positions of
power to understand individuals well so as to employ them optimally in
office (see also 20:3).
7
Wing-tsit Chan suggests that Confucius was the first to have conceived of ren as the
general virtue (1975: 107).
There is also a sense of judgemental sternness in Confucius’ statement

that ill will should be requited with uprightness, not kindness:
Someone said, “To repay ill will with goodwill – what do you think of that?”
The Master said, “And what will you repay goodwill with? Rather repay ill
will with uprightness, and goodwill with goodwill.” (14:34; trans. author)
This unambiguous statement brings out an even-handed approach to what is

just or right. James Legge (1815–97), a Christian missionary in China and an
early translator of the classical Chinese texts into English, points out the
incompatibility of this proposal with Christian love. Legge states, “How far
the ethics of Confucius fall below the Christian standard is evident from this
chapter” (Chinese Classics, 1991, vol. 1: 288, n. 86.2). It may well be that the
authors of these passages did not have the equivalent of Christian love in
mind. We have seen that “to love all humanity,” as well as liking and
disliking some people, are context-specific terms. The idea of ren as general
concern for all humanity applies to those in power, who are also expected to
critically assess officials’ actions and moral qualities.
Ren, the Confucian Golden Rule
The golden rule takes the morally aware person as its starting point. It
operates on the assumption that there is general agreement between people
about their desires and interests. The Analects presents a version of the
golden rule: “do not do to others what you do not wish to be done to
yourself” (12:2; 15:24). This negative formulation of the golden rule is
sometimes dubbed the “silver rule” because it is seen to promote a more
passive approach. On this view, the silver rule requires not good or moral
actions but only ones that do not bring about harm (Allinson 1985). Con-
ceptually, the silver rule highlights the nature of relationships in Confu-
cian thought. It requires each person to exercise moral imagination, not
necessarily to put themselves in the other’s shoes, but by imagining that
the other is like them in what they seek to avoid. The silver rule is not as
“passive” as it seems; it requires a person not to impose what is undesirable
upon someone else. This, in turn, involves close scrutiny of one’s own
actions and their potential impact on others.
In the Analects, the term shu, translated as reciprocity or mutuality, accen-
tuates the give-and-take in relationships (15:24). Relationships often involve
power and hierarchy, but the focus here is on the responsibility of the self
not to exploit the other. Therefore, close examination of one’s deeds is
required on a daily basis (1:4), placing the onus of responsibility on the self.
In 4:15, shu is also accorded fundamental significance, this time in conjunc-
tion with another concept, zhong:
The Master said, “Zeng, my friend! My way (dao 道) is bound together with one
continuous strand.” . . .
Master Zeng said, “The way of the Master is doing one’s utmost (zhong 忠)
and putting oneself in the other’s place (shu 恕), nothing more.” (trans. Ames
and Rosemont, Analects, 1998: 92)
Zhong is commonly translated as “conscientiousness” or “doing one’s best.”

However, these translations do not help us understand why zhong should be
coupled with shu. Perhaps a translation of zhong in terms not of action (doing
one’s best) but of commitment (being one’s best) will help us see their
correlation better. In a nutshell, to be one’s best (zhong) – to optimise one’s
achievements – involves fostering mutually benefiting relationships (shu).
Collective welfare in Confucian thought is conceived in this way: a person’s
well-being is enhanced if others around her are enriched by her actions
(6:30). In this light, zhong and shu may be understood as two dimensions of
the same process. To be one’s best is to benefit the other. Therefore, being
one’s best and fostering mutually benefiting relationships constitute “one
continuous strand” (yiguan).
Ren and the Cultivation of Particular Relationships
The cultivation of ren begins with the development of family relationships

with their attendant emotions and special obligations. In other words, one
first learns about human attachment through interaction with family
members. Hence it is said that filial piety (xiao) and brotherly respect (di)
are the root of ren (1:2). This characterisation of ren in this passage, which
emphasises different emotional attachments, is sharply distinguished from
ren as generalised concern, as discussed previously.
We might pause at this point to question the meaning of the “root” of ren.
It may mean that caring affection – especially the kinds of emotional attach-
ment we have to family members – is a basic, defining trait of all humanity.
This interpretation takes filial piety and, by extension, other familial ties as a
primary fact of human existence. Alternatively, “root” may indicate that the
family context is the initial environment for moral development. Within this
environment, one learns to empathise, negotiate, love, care for, gain sym-
pathy, express regret, balance competing loyalties and prioritise obligations
(4:18). The skills learnt in the family environment are vital for a person’s
interactions with others in later life.
These two meanings of the “root” of ren – the first emphasising feelings
for others, and the second, family context – are not mutually exclusive. Basic
feelings such as affection are a central part of human life. They are estab-
lished, in the first instance, in the bond between parent and child. Ideally,
family contexts are positive and nurturing, giving children emotional stabil-
ity and confidence. If the Analects is correct that family relationships play a
dominant role in one’s formative years – that they shape the person in many
important and subtle ways – we should examine the text to uncover its
reflections on the place of primary relationships in moral life.
Ren as Practical Wisdom
The Analects offers many examples of how ren is manifest in the life of the
Confucian paradigmatic individual. For example, it is associated with five
attitudes: deference, tolerance, making good on one’s word, diligence and
generosity (17:6). It is realised in both domestic and public contexts (13:19).
One’s commitment to ren is not simply a commitment to see things a
particular way. It is realised only in practice, especially in one’s interaction
with others. Therefore, a person must learn broadly, from a range of sources,
so as to familiarise oneself with possibilities for action in different contexts
(19:6; see also 2:11). The exercise of practical wisdom involves drawing on
ideas and experiences (of others’ and one’s own) in order to enlighten one’s
own situation, and to apply these reflections to one’s actions. The person of
ren is confident in his interactions:
The Master said, “A wise person (zhi) is not perplexed (huo); a ren-person is not
anxious (you); a courageous person is not timid.” (9:29; trans. author)
The simplicity of the statement highlights the calmness of the ren-person, in

contrast to a person who is anxious. It is interesting that this passage draws
together wisdom, ren and courage. Confucian scholar Antonio Cua aptly
describes the enviable disposition of the man of ren: “His easeful life is more a
matter of attitude and confidence in his ability to deal with difficult and
varying situations, rather than an exemplification of his infallible judgement
and authority” (Cua 1971: 47). Ren is practically oriented; the primary ques-
tion in the Analects concerns how it is optimally realised in a person’s actions
and undertakings (Lai 2012). We now turn to explore another major term in
the Analects, li (behavioural propriety) before investigating its connections
with ren in practice.
Li: Behavioural Propriety
The concept li also has considerable elasticity. In pre–Warring States (prior to

the fifth century BCE) texts, the term referred to religious ritual for harvest
and thanksgiving conducted by the emperor, also referred to as the “Son of
Heaven.” Through the Western Zhou period (1045–771 BCE), rituals were part
of courtly life; some of them involved magnificent, multi-faceted displays
involving music and musical rhythm, dance, speech and comportment (Kern
2009: 153–4). During the Spring and Autumn, and Warring States periods,
ceremonial ritual was carried out in the petty courts as well (Dubs 1966: 116).
Rituals were also practiced more widely to induce supernatural protection and
a wide range of blessings, including for one’s material welfare (Poo 1998).
We can detect some of these features of li in the Analects. Here, li may refer
to religious ritual (3:17), the comportment of the cultivated person (12:1) and
behavioural propriety in the ordinary interactions of the common people
(2:3). Partly because of its association with ancient ritual, li sometimes evokes
a sense of conformity and conservatism. However, its employment in the
Analects is not always consistent. At some points it appears to be rather
inflexible, as, for instance, when Confucius insisted on following through
with ritual practice rather than sparing the sheep (3:17). Yet, on occasions,
Confucius suggests it is permissible to deviate from accepted practice if
sound reasons have been provided as, for instance, when he chooses to bow
before, rather than after, ascending the steps to the hall (9:3). In some of its
conversations, the Analects makes room for flexibility in the exercise of
discretion. In Analects 4:10, Confucius purportedly said, “In dealing with
matters in the world, an exemplary person is not for or against anything.
He follows what is appropriate” (trans. author). Here, the term “appropriate”
(yi) brings out how the exemplary person needs to do the right thing in
context. On the basis of our discussions so far, we may envisage li, ren and
yi as engaged in a three-way relation. Ren pertains to human affect, li to the

received ways of expressing that affect, and yi to enacting ren in light of what
is right in a particular situation.8
In the Analects, standards of behavioural propriety served as guides for
correct behaviour in a range of relational contexts: between children and
parents (2:5), subject and ruler (3:18) and prince and minister (3:19). Li mapped
out different requirements for appropriate behaviour according to one’s place
in a particular relationship. In addition, li also has an aesthetic dimension as it
incorporates decorum in a person’s interactions with others (8:2). The assump-
tion here is that through their own performances (as well as observing those of
others), individuals will gradually grasp the different obligations, appropriate
emotions and motivational reasons that properly underlie li-practices. Ideally,
ongoing li-practice fosters a deeper appreciation of human relationships. We
should also note the anti-conformism which comes across in 2:3:
The Master said, “Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng 政)
and keep them orderly with penal law (xing 刑), and they will avoid
punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence
(de 德) and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety (li 禮) and
they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.”
(trans. Ames and Rosemont, Analects, 1998: 76)
This passage draws a sharp contrast between li, and punishments as instru-
ments with which to regulate behaviour. It is undesirable for people simply
to comply with regulations in order to avoid punishment. The culture of
punishments made people “clever” and glib in order to evade punishment.9
In contrast, Confucian li is not concerned with avoidance but seeks to
incorporate moral reasons in action (1:3; 4:24; 14:20; 14:27). Added to these
concerns was the issue of penal law being overly general, universalising over
persons and situations.10
8
Yi figures in a few conversations in the Analects. However, it has a number of different
meanings in the conversations in this text. The term has more developed and defined
meanings in the Mencius and Xunzi. We will devote more attention to yi in the following
chapter, when we discuss those two texts.
9
Hansen convincingly juxtaposes punishment as self-preserving, against li as other-regarding.
Hansen provides an insightful analysis of the role of words in litigation (1992: 64–5).
10
The theme that relational attachment must be recognised in legal institutions has
persisted through Chinese history, even up until the Ming (1368–1644) and Qin
(1644–1911) dynasties; some scholars dub this phenomenon the “Confucianisation of
law.” Refer to Ch’u (1965: 267–79).
A number of the passages in the Analects emphasise that li-practices are

expressions of reverence (3:26; 17:21). In 17:11, the practice of both li and
music is grounded in the sincere intentions and emotions, of the gift-giver
and the performer, respectively:
The Master said, “Surely when one says ‘The rites, the rites,’ it is not enough
merely to mean presents of jade and silk. Surely when one says ‘Music, music,’
it is not enough merely to mean bells and drums.” (trans. Lau, Confucius,
1979a: 145)
The presentation of gifts – even expensive ones such as jade and silk – is an
act devoid of significance if it is not accompanied by the appropriate under-
lying emotions. The analogy with music is informative too: clanging bells
and beating drums do not constitute music. Meaningful performances of
music are always accompanied by appropriate emotions. Here, the emotion
and its correct or optimal expression are irreducible, each to the other. Both
are critical: the expression is the manifestation of the emotion, and emotions
unexpressed are not realised. But what is the place of emotions in the
Analects? Are they a component of ren?
Many of the passages in the Analects suggest a deep connection between ren
and li: one’s concern for humanity, ren, must be expressed intelligibly in lived
contexts. In the words of Tu Weiming, Confucian self-cultivation is about
“Learning to be Human” (1985: 51–66). Here, it is important to reflect on the
normative force of li: might li stifle individuality, or might it inhibit emotions?
Is there room in Confucian philosophy for the individual to challenge the status
quo? This depends in part on how the relation between ren and li is understood,
and which of the two concepts is thought to have precedence.
Ren and Li
The conversations in the Analects are divided on the relative priority of ren
and li. Those associated with the disciples Zi You and Zi Xia seem to empha-
sise the greater significance of li, while those involving Zeng Zi, Zi Zhang and
Yan Hui show a greater commitment to ren (Schwartz 1985: 130–4). This
disagreement was later characterised as the “nei-wai” (inner-outer) debate.
Within this debate, the “nei” position refers to the internal, perhaps innate,
moral sense of humanity as the core idea of ren. By contrast, the “wai” stance
centres on the spirit of li, the externally imposed, socially constructed norms
Another random document with
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In studying the work of a young etcher—and Mr. Webster is still
young as an etcher—it is almost always possible to trace certain
influences which, quite legitimately, have acted upon his choice of
subject and his technique. In one of his first etchings, The Court,
Bourron, the Whistler influence is frankly apparent. Les
Blanchisseuses is in no sense an imitative plate, but I should have
said it was the work of a man who knew Whistler’s Unsafe Tenement
by heart. And there comes in the critic’s danger of leaping to rash
conclusions, for Mr. Webster tells me he never saw that print by
Whistler till long after his etching was made. For the Meryon
influence, which is clearly apparent in much of his work, Mr. Webster
makes no apology. Nor need he do so; for if he reminds us, here a
little of Whistler, there a little of Meryon, there is always a large
measure of himself besides. The true artist lights his torch from that
of his predecessors: it is his business to carry on great traditions. “I
have done my best simply to learn from him, not to steal” —that is
Mr. Webster’s own expressive way of putting it.
Webster. Notre Dame des Andelys
“The ordinary observer will delight in Notre Dame des Andelys
for its beautiful rendering of a noble fragment of architecture.
Those who have real knowledge of etching will appreciate it
still more for its clever biting and for its subtle delicacy of line
so cunningly used for the indication of stone, glass, and
woodwork with their different surfaces and textures.”
Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 11 × 7⅛ inches
Webster. Porte des Marmousets, St. Ouen, Rouen
“Gothic canopies and tracery are drawn with loving care in
the Porte des Marmousets, St. Ouen, Rouen, but here again
it is the mystery of shadow in the deep porch that supplies
the true theme.” Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 10⅛ × 7 inches
Mr. Webster has not learned from Meryon at the cost of his own
individuality, and one reason for the freshness that characterizes his
work is that he is one of those who like to transfer their first
impressions of nature direct to the plate in the open air. With very
few exceptions, that is how his etchings have been made. A certain
amount of work is necessarily done afterward in the retirement of the
studio, but the straightforward method of rendering nature gives a
vividness and spontaneity that careful work from intermediate
studies in pencil or color can rarely produce. This spontaneity is the
very essence of good etching, for with etching, as with water-color,
its highest charm is inevitably troubled by mechanical labor; it is
essentially a method of which one feels that “if ’twere done, ’twere
well done quickly.” The etcher should no more be able to stay the
quick gliding of his needle in the middle of a line than the skater to
stand still upon the outside edge. And I think that the etcher who
works straight from nature is more apt to search out the notes and
accents of character and to seize upon those structural lines which
are a fundamental necessity to his work.
Another chief excellence in Mr. Webster’s work lies in the fact that
from the first he has been his own printer. He is no believer in the
principle followed by many other etchers of biting their plate and
leaving it to some one “with the palm of a duchess” to do the rest.
Patient acquisition of craftsmanship is bound to tell, for the paid
printer, be he never so skilled, cannot hope to understand an artist’s
intentions quite so well as the artist himself. Mr. Webster, however,
has no need of any artifice; there is no trace in his etchings of the
meretricious printing which Whistler condemned as “treacly.” Light
and shade enter into charming alliance in his prints, but line is
always of the confederacy, and it is to purity of line that the shadows
which tell so strongly owe their strength. In the very depths of them
there is always a luminous gloom, never a trace of the harshness
and opacity that come from slurred workmanship and reliance upon
printer’s ink.
Perhaps I have said too much already, for Mr. Webster’s work is well
able to speak for itself. But there is one noteworthy feature, common
to all his plates, that claims attention, and that is his power of
rendering sunlight. If he loves dark and dingy thoroughfares with
dilapidated roofs and moldering plaster, it is for the sake of those
quaint shadows that peep from their recesses and climb the high
walls, and still more for the patches of brilliant, quivering sunlight to
which the shadows give so full a value. He seems to hear, like Corot,
the actual crash of the sun upon the wall—“l’éclat du soleil qui
frappe.”
Part II
It is difficult to clothe one’s speech in the detached terms of a
catalogue when writing of an artist whose work always kindles fresh
enthusiasm. And so I may perhaps be pardoned if, in adding
something to a previous essay upon the etchings of Herman A.
Webster, I venture to strike a more personal note.
Webster. Vieilles Maisons, Rue Hautefeuille, Paris
“He loves dark and dingy thoroughfares with dilapidated roofs
and moldering plaster, ... for the patches of brilliant, quivering
sunlight to which the shadows give so full a value.”
Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 11¼ × 5⅞ inches
Webster. La Route de Louviers

“In landscape, as in his architectural work, Webster sets his
theme upon the plate with fine skill of arrangement and with
exquisite draughtsmanship.” Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 6 × 8¼ inches
There can be few men to whom art is more of a religion than to
Webster. On two occasions when I saw him during his hurried visits
to London in the spring of 1910, he spoke of his art with all the zeal
of a missionary and the fervor of a convert. He seemed to be
laboring in a slough of despond, beset with a feeling that his past
work was something worthless, to be thrown aside like Christian’s
bundle. He appeared to be torn in sunder by divers doctrines, telling
me of the constant ebb and flow of argument in the Paris cafés and
studios between the parti métier and the parti âme—those who
maintained that finished technique, the “cuisine” of the French
student, was the final aim, and those who held that the artist’s own
emotion, howsoever it might find expression, was the greatest thing
of all. Webster felt—and it was a fact, indeed, at which I hinted in
writing of his work before—that he was sacrificing something of the
âme to the métier; and his own realization of that is already
becoming apparent in his outlook and his style. Then, too, his talk
was all of the attainment and suggestion of light as the supreme
quality in an etching; and here I could reassure him, for few have
ever preached the gospel of light with more truth and earnestness
than Webster himself in the Quai Montebello and many other plates.
Still, there matters stood more than a year ago, and the plates that
Webster had etched at Marseilles and elsewhere lay rejected and
unbitten in his studio. Then he set out to America, where he spent
the summer of 1910, and, like Mr. Pennell, fell a victim to the sky-
scrapers of New York. “They are the most marvelous things,” he
wrote, “on the face of Mother Earth to-day. It took me two months to
begin to see them, but then they began to glow, to take shape, and
to grow. Perhaps no work of human hands in all the world offers
such a stupendous picture as New York seen from almost anywhere
within the down-town district, or from the river or the bay. There are
cliffs and cañons where sun and shadow work the weirdest miracles,
and soaring above them, between forty and fifty stories from the
ground, rise arched roofs and pointed ones, gray and gold and
brown, that one must see with one’s own eyes to have the faintest
conception of. From across the Hudson in the afternoon when the
sun goes down you can watch the shadows creep up the sides of
these mountains of brick and stone until you’d swear you were
looking out on some gigantic fairyland.”
His admiration of those sky-scrapers found expression in a series of
drawings made on behalf of The Century Magazine, and in, at any
rate, one etching—the Cortlandt Street, New York. The subject will
appeal most, perhaps, to those who live beneath the familiar shade
of these monstrous habitations, with their hundreds of staring eyes;
but the ordinary man, though he may find it strangely uninspiring and
unromantic, will at any rate admire the firm decision of the drawing
and welcome the slender filaments and trembling gray spirals of
smoke—so difficult to express in line with a point of steel—that cast
a veil over the sordid reality of the scene. Though Webster carried
that one plate to a finish, he was still obsessed by all sorts of doubts.
Many drawings were torn up, and many plates that he etched were
wilfully destroyed. Just as the golfer falls victim to too much reading
of theoretical works, so for Webster his eager indulgence in theory
and science put him “off his game.” I say all this to account for what
must seem a small output during two years for a man whose sole
work is etching. It is all to the artist’s credit; but, none the less, we
have suffered, nous autres, for his convictions. Now, however,
Richard is himself again. A month or more spent in Frankfort this
summer has produced a series of pencil-drawings and etchings
which should bring satisfaction and content both to the artist and to
all who admire his work.
Webster. Bendergasse, Frankfort
“Then there are the Street of the Three Kings, the
Bendergasse, and Sixteenth Century Houses, all of them
felicitous in charm of theme, in play of light and shade, and
in the suggestion of life given by the animated figures.”
Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 8 × 5¼ inches
Webster. Cortlandt Street
Size of the original etching, 12⅞ × 7½ inches
Before speaking of the Frankfort series of etchings, a word may be
said about Webster’s pencil-drawings. I know of no other artist, save
perhaps Mr. Muirhead Bone, who can use the pencil-point with such
exquisite fineness and precision in the production of an architectural
drawing that, with all its accuracy, still retains the freshness of a
sketch. Finding in a portfolio a drawing of Cortlandt Street and
several others that repeated the subjects of the Frankfort etchings, I
felt curious as to the exact relationship between these drawings and
the work on the copperplate. This interest was largely, perhaps, that
of a fellow-etcher, keen to see “how the wheels go round,” but
Webster’s reply to a question on this subject may interest others as
well. “I determine my composition,” he wrote, “in outline first. This
outline I transfer to the plate. Then I go out and carefully study in
pencil, on the original outline sketch, the subject I want to do, so as
to ‘get acquainted’ with it before beginning the more exacting work
upon the copperplate. I never use a drawing to work from except
sometimes as an extra guide in the biting, where a careful study can
be very useful.” They are beautiful things, these pencil-drawings of
New York and Frankfort, but there can be only one of each. The
etchings, fortunately, can be shared and enjoyed by many
possessors.
Frankfort has grown to be a large and very modern town with broad
thoroughfares and palatial buildings; but it has its old quarter as well,
and among the houses that nestle in narrow streets round the
cathedral, Webster has found the same kind of subject that
fascinated him before in Bruges and Marseilles and Paris. A brilliant
draughtsman, he never seems to hesitate or lose his way among the
manifold intricacies of the old-world buildings that he depicts. He
aims always at knitting his subjects into fine unity of composition by
broad massing of light and shade. “In the last few months,” he writes,
“I have grown never to make an etching for etching’s sake, but for
the means it gives of studying closely the play of light across my
subject.” That is his main theme: the light that travels now with cold
curiosity as it did centuries ago, glancing into open windows,
throwing into relief a corbel or a crocket, casting a shadow under
eave or window ledge, revealing, like a patch in some tattered
garment, the cracks and seams in moldering plaster or time-worn
timber. In depicting these storehouses of human joys and
aspirations, hopes and despairs, he has none of Meryon’s gloom
and morbidness. It is true that behind many of the windows in these
poor homes of his pictures some Marie Claire may be toiling in sad-
eyed poverty; yet for Webster the outside shall be sunny, little white
curtains shall veil the gloom, and flowers shall blossom on the
window ledge, though the sad worker may have watered them with
her tears. And if sunshine is still potent in these new plates, there is
also a fresh and joyous note of life and movement in the streets. The
introduction of figures, well placed and full of character, is a new
development in Webster’s art. Bustling workers, or happy groups of
gossiping women, or the dark mass of a distant crowd, are
introduced with consummate skill, and the picturesqueness of the old
streets gains new value from the suggestion of this living stream of
human traffic. The presence of modern life enhances the gray and
wrinkled age of the buildings which have watched so many
generations come and go.
Webster. Lowenplätzchen, Frankfort
Size of the original etching, 8 × 6⁵⁄₁₆ inches
Webster. Der Langer Franz, Frankfort
“Der Langer Franz, a view of the Rathaus tower that took its
nickname from a tall burgomaster of the town, is a little gem,
brilliant with light and rich in the mystery of shadow.”
Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching. 4⅞ × 3⅜ inches
Among the new plates are four that deal with street scenes in the Alt
Stadt of Frankfort. Der Langer Franz, a view of the Rathaus tower
that took its nickname from a tall burgomaster of the town, is the
smallest of all, but a little gem, brilliant with light and rich in the
mystery of shadow. Then there are the Street of the Three Kings, the
Bendergasse, and Sixteenth-century Houses, all of them felicitous in
charm of theme, in play of light and shade, and in the suggestion of
life given by the animated figures. There are admirable figures again
in An Old Court, one of the plates that the collector of future days will
most desire to possess. There is less in it of obvious labor than in
the street scenes; the etcher has overcome a natural fear of blank
spaces; and his reticence and more summary execution have lent to
this plate much of the unconscious and unpremeditated charm that is
one of the finest qualities which an etching can possess.
Two etchings of old bridges over the Main at Frankfort must rank
among the best work that Webster has yet produced. One is a small
and spirited plate showing the tower of the cathedral and a row of
houses, most delicately drawn, rising with a beautiful sky-line above
the solid mass of the shadowed bridge with its heavy buttresses. The
other shows the old bridge that spans the Main between Frankfort
and Sachsenhausen. Legend tells that in compensation for finishing
the building within a certain time the architect made a vow to
sacrifice to the devil the first living being that crossed the bridge.
Then, when the fatal day arrived, he drove a cock across, and so
cheated the devil of his due. Much the same story of outwitting the
devil is told about the building of the cathedral at Aix-la-Chapelle.
Whether Webster ventured upon any compact I do not know; but this
plate, in its building, in its well-constructed composition, in its
splendid effect of brilliant sunshine, is one of the most successful
tasks he has ever accomplished. The group of figures on the near
bank, happily placed like those in Vermeer’s famous View of Delft,
adds no little to the charm of the scene. I would set this plate beside
Les Blanchisseuses and the Quai Montebello, which Mr. Wedmore
has found “modestly perfect,” as representing the very summit of
Webster’s art.
Webster. The Old Bridge, Frankfort
This old bridge spans the river Main between Frankfort and Sachsenhausen
“I would set this plate beside Les Blanchisseuses and Quai
Montebello, which Mr. Wedmore has found ‘modestly perfect,’
as representing the very summit of Webster’s art.” Martin
Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 5½ × 8½ inches
Webster. La Rue St. Jacques, Paris
“... One of the best etchings he has ever made.... It is not
merely fine in its pattern of light and shade, but it has a
direct force and simplification that are rich with promise for
the future.” Martin Hardie.
Size of the original etching, 8⅝ × 5⅞ inches
While he has surrendered for the time being to the charm of
Frankfort, Webster has not been unfaithful to the Paris of his early
love. Of Paris he might say, like Montaigne, “That city has ever had
my heart; and it has fallen out to me, as of excellent things, that the
more of other fine cities I have seen since, the more the beauty of
this gains on my affections. I love it tenderly, even with all its warts
and blemishes.” All the more for the warts and blemishes of its old
buildings Webster loves it, too; and while working on his Frankfort
plates he has completed another of La Rue St. Jacques, Paris,
which, I think, is one of the best etchings he has ever made. At
times, even in his Frankfort plates, one still feels that his superb
draughtsmanship and his love of detail—ce superflu, si nécessaire—
have led him to a uniformity of finish that is almost too “icily regular.”
I do not mean that Webster’s elaboration is the cold, almost
meaningless, elaboration of the line-engraver; nor do I forget that the
technique of Meryon, one of the greatest masters of etchings, was,
in Mr. Wedmore’s happy phrasing, “one of unfaltering firmness and
regularity, one of undeterred deliberation.” All the same, one wishes
that Meryon had done a few more things like the Rue des Mauvais
Garçons, and wishes that Webster also, in a similar way, were now
and then less sure of himself, were held sometimes by a trembling
hesitancy, or driven sometimes by the passion of the moment to
allow room for fortunate accident and rapid suggestion. For that
reason I welcome his Rue St. Jacques. It is not merely fine in its
pattern of light and shade, but it has a direct force and simplification
that are rich with promise for the future.
Since writing the above, I have seen working-proofs of two new
etchings of landscape. And here, too, there is high promise. They
show, at least, that Webster is not going to remain a man of one
subject; that he is opening his heart to the beauty and romance of
simple nature. He has sought his first themes in that pleasant
countryside where, between tall poplars, you get peeps of Château
Gaillard, nobly set upon its hill. In landscape, as in his architectural
work, Webster sets his theme upon the plate with fine skill of
arrangement and with exquisite draughtsmanship. These two plates,
Château Gaillard and La Route de Louviers, are exhilarating in their
feeling of sunshine, and they please by their absolute simplicity of

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An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy

2nd Edition Karyn L. Lai

An Introduction to chinese philosophy 2nd Edition Karyn

Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy:

An Introduction to Moral Philosophy 2nd Edition

An Introduction to Political Philosophy 2nd Edition

The Philosophy of Happiness An Interdisciplinary

Ethical Choices: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy

Basic Mandarin Chinese - Reading & Writing Textbook :

Quine’s Philosophy: An Introduction 2nd Edition Gary

This second edition of An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy presents a

KARYN L. LAI is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

2 Confucius and the Analects 20

3 Human Nature and Cultivation in Confucian Philosophy: Mencius

4 Early Mohist Philosophy 73

5 Daoism and the Daodejing 92

6 The Mingjia and the Later Mohists 130

Argumentation in Warring States China 159

7 Legalist Philosophy 163

8 The Zhuangzi 188

9 The Yijing and Its Place in Chinese Philosophy 224

Timeliness and Practical Wisdom 255

10 Chinese Buddhism 265

This book covers major philosophical traditions in early Chinese philosophy,

Periods in Chinese History Thinkers Dates

Periods in Chinese History Thinkers Dates

Periods in Chinese History Thinkers Dates

Thinkers, Texts and Traditions

discussions focused on morality, political society and good governance. The

Sima Tan’s classiﬁcation of the six schools of thought was haphazard. He

would provide comments on and interpretations of the ideas and topics in

Features of Chinese Philosophy

with moral sensibilities and capabilities? What kinds of social structures

Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient . . . Their teacher Confucius

Relationships and Contexts

In the texts we examine, an individual is conceived of essentially in relational

Chinese Buddhist philosophy developed a distinctive view of an individual

achievement. Rather, an individual’s achievements, ingenuity and resource-

This brief sketch outlines how harmony in the Chinese traditions is

Chinese philosophy posits continuities and correspondences between individ-

1. The primacy of observation. The Yijing emphasises observation as a critical

sometimes described as transcendent, is not discontinuous from or

5. An interpretive approach to the meanings of the hexagrams and

We now turn our attention to a number of features of philosophical thinking

Debate and argumentation are prominent features of Chinese philosophy.

Such debates must . . . be seen in the wider environment of an attitude of

Clarke is referring to debates between rival Daoist and Buddhist thinkers

built upon, reinterpreted, appropriated and applied to different debates. The

as an end rather than simply a means to truth, generates important ques-

Suggestions for Further Reading

Troubled by the unrest of the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius

Reading the Analects

the rationale for the conversations and some key themes.

Confucius emerges from the Analects as a committed and conscientious

the conversation’s contextual details, which may have a bearing on Confu-

Ren is mentioned only occasionally in texts pre-dating Confucius.6 In its

humaneness as a distinguishing characteristic of humanity, compassion as

Ren as General Concern for Humanity

There is also a sense of judgemental sternness in Confucius’ statement

This unambiguous statement brings out an even-handed approach to what is

Ren, the Confucian Golden Rule

Zhong is commonly translated as “conscientiousness” or “doing one’s best.”