Thomas Negel

Introduction- If there is such a thing as reason, it has to be universal.

Reason must reflect objective principles whose validity is independent of
our point of view--principles that anyone with enough intelligence ought
to be able to recognize as correct. But this generality of reason is what
relativists and subjectivists deny in ever-increasing numbers. And such
subjectivism is not just an inconsequential intellectual flourish or badge
of theoretical chic. It is exploited to deflect argument and to belittle
the pretensions of the arguments of others. The continuing spread of this
relativistic way of thinking threatens to make public discourse
increasingly difficult and to exacerbate the deep divisions of our society.
In The Last Word , Thomas Nagel, one of the most influential philosophers
writing in English, presents a sustained defense of reason against the
attacks of subjectivism, delivering systematic rebuttals of relativistic
claims with respect to language, logic, science, and ethics.
He shows that the last word in disputes about the objective validity of
any form of thought must lie in some unqualified thoughts about how things
are--thoughts that we cannot regard from outside as mere psychological
dispositions.
Attack on relativism
the substance of works by Thomas Nagel is always matter which matters. This latest book is a
sustained polemic against subjectivist relativism: a disastrous doctrine nowadays so widely accepted
that “Claims that something is, without relativistic qualification, true or false, right or wrong, good or
bad, risk being derided as expressions of a parochial perspective or form of life …” It is derided “not
as a preliminary to showing that they are mistaken whereas something else is right, but as a way of
showing that nothing is right, and that instead we are all expressing our personal or cultural points of
view.”

He starts his introduction by talking about the issue of where understanding and justification come to
an end. Do they come to an end with objectives principles whose validity in not dependent on anyone
point of view or within our point of view (individual or shared) so that the most objective universal
principles derive their validity from perspective and practice of those who follow it ?
He here aims to defend a rationalist answer to the question against a subjectivist one. Reason he says
has the appeal against not only the opinions and habits of our community but also the peculiarities of
our personal perspective. Reason has both universal authority and something that every individual
finds within themselves. Reason he says also provides us with the mystery to distance oneself from
common opinion and received practices, this does not lead an elevation of individuality. Whoever
appeals to reason pretends to discover a source of authority that is universal and that also persuades
others who are willing to listen.

He then moves on to say that these descriptions sound platonic or even Cartesian, though they might
be ancient but they are fully alive today, partly because of the prevalence of forms of skepticism about
reason. He then goes on to question how humans with accidental existence have access to universally
valid methods of thought.
He then goes ahead and talks about crude subjectivism- the relativistic qualifier for me or for us has
become like a reflex with some vague philosophical support is then generalized into an interpretation
of deep disagreements of belief or method because of different frames of reference, forms of practice
or thought or forms of life.

The idea of reason then refers to nonlocal and nonrelative methods of justification, methods that aim
to reach the truth in a nonrelative sense. But this is their aim even though they may fail, and rational
justification cannot come to an end with the qualifier of “for me”

The most essential character of reason is its generality, that is my reasons for something should be
similar to anyone else’s reason as well. But any claim like what is a reason for me may not for another
person then should be backed by further reasons that are themselves general. The generality of
reason then is to show that they apply not only in identical circumstances but in relevantly similar
circumstances.

To reason then is to think systemically about something that anyone else would also find as correct, it
is this generality that relativist and subjectivists deny. He says that subjectivism is an inconsequential
intellectual flourish but it is also used to deflect argument. To claim that something is without a
relativistic qualification true or false is at risk of being mocked at as expressions of parochial
perspective

He says that the actual result of this has led to the growth in the already extreme intellectual laziness
of contemporary culture, collapse of serious arguments. Many forms of relativism and subjectivism he
says collapse into self-contradiction because they end up claiming that nothing is the case or they lack
thought because they come down to assertions that anything we say or believe is something we say
or believe. Rest general subjectivism that does not fail in in either of the above two things are mostly
false.

Negel then goes ahead and talks about his own opinion that there is a category of thought as reason
that in theory and practice both can lead to the formation of desires. Intentions and decisions.

He then asks the question – how can one repair the unqualifies character of the results we find by
reasoning with the fact that is something that we just do ?

He believes that eveyr major philosopher has had something to do with it. he here lies with Descartes
and ferege, while attempting to counter the limitation of reach of human reasonthat can be found in
different ways in the treatment of kant, hume and wittgenstien. He here presents us his idea in the
book which is arguing not against the positions of philosophers but against the general tendency to
reduce objective pretentions of reason. Subjectivism which he believes can sometimes seem to be
the only possible account of the subject given that we are who we are but it cannot be furnished as
intelligible.
In the second part of the introduction-

In order for reason to have the authority it claims it must be a form or category of thought from which
there is no appeal beyond to itself, because its validity is unconditional. This also does not mean that
there is no help against the results of any particular exercise of reason, because it is easy to make
mistakes in reasoning, or be not aware of the conclusions it permits us to make. But these corrections
or doubts then should come from further application of reason.
If reasoning is what is happening then its mistakes are also universal. Whenever we challenge any
conclusion about a logical or an arithmetic failure we are confined to the territory of rational justification
and criticism and do not cast doubt on whether our interlocuter is using a genrally valid method for
reaching the objective truth. This internal form of criticsm imports according to negel nothing
subjective. But rather the external form of criticism, which undermines the conclusion by questioning
the objectivity of its grounds. One important way of challenging from outside, is to say that it is not the
result of reasnonig (valid or invalid) but rather expression of a personal or cultural perspective of less
then universal validity. He says at times one can challenege a piece of seemingly reasonable thing
without implying a doubt on the possibility of reason of that type.
The ordinary charge of rationalization does not question the claim of reason rather it presupposes it.
it contrasts the sources of belief in this case with an alternative type of ground that would justify them.
If the aim is to show that the reasoning is the wrong method to arrive at or backing the conclusion then
one would describe calling it as a reason as misinterpretation. This strategy plays a role in attack of
the reason as part of the basis of ethics, when the aim is to reveal the true ground of these ethics.

These diagnosis can also be called as reductive interpretations of what reason really is, a contingent
though basic feature of a particular culture or form of life.

He then talks about the usual set of moves of realism, skepticism and reductionism occurs here, :
Reductionism (a subjective or relativist reinterpretation of reason) seems to offer a refuge from skepticism
if realism (the strongly universalist position) seems too hard to sustain. Being a realist about reason himself
he regard these reductive "rescues" as equivalent to skepticism; that is, they are forms of skepticism about
the reality of what he himself take reason to be.