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“This is a well-written, comprehensive volume by Dr. Mayil and his colleagues
that takes stock of the varied issues in the 27 years of India–ASEAN ties. The
book covers topics across security, connectivity, trade, culture and people-to-
people dimensions, all written by a fine group of young scholars from India and
Vietnam, which will make it appealing not only to area studies experts but also to
the general audience. Highly recommended.”
– Dr. Dharish David, Associate Faculty, University of
London—SIM-Global Education, Singapore

“This is not only a timely but also a relevant contribution to Indo-ASEAN rela-
tions amidst Covid-19 and the global power transition. ASEAN and India–ASEAN
Relations: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics sheds light on strategic and security
affairs with a specific focus. This volume is crafted to be a spellbound reading as
it reveals unique insights on soft-balancing to maintain security, peace, stability
and prosperity in ASEAN region as well as in the Indo-Pacific region at large. Dr.
Mayil, one of the well-known scholars on strategic and security affairs related to
India and its neighbourhood, empowers a young and experienced group of ana-
lysts to know more on ‘Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art
of the next best’!”
– Mr. Khin Maung Soe, Advisor, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and
International Studies, Yangon, Myanmar

“An extremely insightful work on the evolving dynamics and changing con-
tours of India’s relations with the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).
An indispensable work for a better understanding of the shifting geopolitics and
emerging security architecture in the Asian region.”
– Prof. Jatswan S. Sidhu, Executive Director, Asia-Europe Institute (AEI),
Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya
ASEAN and India–ASEAN Relations

This book analyses the nearly 30 years of India–ASEAN relations from a

contemporary perspective, identifies the reasons for India’s vibrant and significant
relation with ASEAN and examines the cultural, economic, political and strategic
linkages between India and ASEAN.
The book projects the future of India–ASEAN relations in the face of the
changing Indo-Pacific geopolitics and explores potential policies which could
enhance the connection between India and Southeast Asian countries. Arguing
that ASEAN is of primary importance to India, the book suggests that any
successful outing in the Indo-Pacific would need a strong partnership with India.
The book demonstrates how external powers influence ASEAN, with many of
them supporting the centrality of ASEAN and its regional architecture in the
broader Indo-Pacific. Chapters by experts in their fields present thematically
specific analyses of political, defence, maritime and cultural aspects as well as the
position of Northeast India in the India–ASEAN relations and assess the success
and challenges of India’s ties with ASEAN in the context of the Look East and
the Act East Policies.
A reassessment of ASEAN–India relations past and present, this book will be
of interest to academics and policy makers working in the field of International
Relations, Asian Politics and South Asian Politics, in particular India’s Foreign
Policy and Southeast Asian Politics.

M. Mayilvaganan is Associate Professor at the International Strategic and

Security Studies Programme (ISSSP), School of Conflict and Security Studies
(SCSS), National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) and Indian Institute of
Science (IISc) Campus in Bangalore, India, where he leads the NIAS ISSSP Indo-
Pacific Research Studies.
Routledge Studies on Think Asia
Edited by Jagannath P. Panda, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
India

This series addresses the current strategic complexities of Asia and forecasts how
these current complexities will shape Asia’s future. Bringing together empirical
and conceptual analysis, the series examines critical aspects of Asian politics, with
a particular focus on the current security and strategic complexities. The series
includes academic studies from universities, research institutes and think-tanks
and policy-oriented studies. Focusing on security and strategic analysis on Asia’s
current and future trajectory, this series welcomes submissions on relationship
patterns (bilateral, trilateral and multilateral) in Indo-Pacific, regional and sub-
regional institutions and mechanisms, corridors and connectivity, maritime
security, infrastructure politics, trade and economic models and critical frontiers
(boundaries, borders, bordering provinces) that are crucial to Asia’s future.
URL: https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-on-Think-Asia/book-se
ries/TA

7. Japan’s Evolving Security Policy

Militarisation within a Pacifist Tradition
Kyoko Hatakeyama

8. India and the Arab Unrest

Challenges, Dilemmas and Engagements
Prashanta Kumar Pradhan

9. The Future of the Korean Peninsula

Korea 2032 and Beyond
Edited by Mason Richey, Jagannath P. Panda and David A. Tizzard

10. Mongolia and Northeast Asian Security

Nuclear Proliferation, Environment, and Civilisational Confrontations
Edited by Alicia J. Campi and Jagannath P. Panda

11. Asian Geopolitics and the US-China Rivalry

Edited by Felix Heiduk

12. ASEAN and India–ASEAN Relations

Navigating Shifting Geopolitics
Edited by M. Mayilvaganan
ASEAN and India–ASEAN
Relations
Navigating Shifting Geopolitics

Edited by M. Mayilvaganan
First published 2022
by Routledge
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by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents

List of illustrations ix
List of contributors xii
Foreword xiii
Preface xvi
Acknowledgement xix

1 Introduction: ASEAN and India: navigating shifting geopolitics 1

M. MAYILVAGANAN

PART I
ASEAN and the emerging security architecture 15

2 ASEAN at 50: External actors and its relevance 17

SUBHADEEP BHATTACHARYA

3 ASEAN and the emerging contest over natural resources 35

NITIN AGARWALA

4 ASEAN-led regional security architecture: Prospects and

challenges 61
UDAI BHANU SINGH

PART II
ASEAN and India: Political and strategic links 75

5 The US, India and ASEAN: Convergences and challenges 77

VIVEK MISHRA

6 ASEAN in India’s Act East Policy 91

GITANJALI SINHA ROY
viii Contents
7 ASEAN and Northeast India: Through the panorama of “Look
East” and “Act East” 107
MOHOR CHAKRABORTY

8 India’s defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Exploring new

avenues 124
PANKAJ K. JHA

9 India–ASEAN maritime cooperation: Need for a proactive

approach 142
JOSHY M. PAUL

PART III
ASEAN and India: Culture, commerce and connectivity links 159

10 Culture and connectivity: The salience of 2Cs in India–ASEAN

relations 161
M. MAYILVAGANAN

11 ASEAN–India trade and commerce ties: Issues, prospects and

challenges 181
SHELLY GUPTA

12 India’s engagement with its diaspora in Southeast Asia:

A neglected diaspora? 209
S. Y. SURENDRA KUMAR

13 ASEAN–India relations: A soft power approach 224

DOAN TRUONG THU

PART IV
Future of ASEAN and India–ASEAN ties 241

14 Future of ASEAN and India–ASEAN relations 243

QUACH THI HUE

15 Engaging ASEAN: India’s strategic and policy options 260

GAUTAM MUKHOPADHAYA

Index 273
Illustrations

Figures
3.1 A bar chart that shows the observed and envisaged extinction
of species in Southeast Asia as studied by Sodhi et al 43
3.2 A bar chart that shows the changing trend of trading in
Myanmar as seen between 2000 and 2009. One notices that
over the years, Myanmar’s export trade has moved from
agricultural commodities to manufacturing industries and petroleum 44
3.3 A bar chart that shows the overall trade of ASEAN with China,
the US, the EU and Japan. While exports have increased with
the US and the EU, imports have seen an increase with China
and Japan, with China being the main trading partner of ASEAN 44
3.4 A line chart that shows the trend in the trade of ASEAN with
countries of the region. While trade with Japan and South
Korea continues to reduce, that with China has continued to increase 45
11.1 A line chart showing the cumulative number of Free Trade
Agreements signed by India with different countries on the
y-axis increasing as the year of enactment increases from 1970
to 2010 on the x-axis, peaking at nineteen in 2010 182
11.2 A timeline showing the evolution of India–ASEAN relations,
from “Look East Policy” in 1991 to “signing of ASEAN–India
Trade in Services and Investment Agreement in 2015.” 183
11.3 A combination bar graph and a line chart showing the BOT in
goods between India and ASEAN quoted in US dollars on the
y-axis, increasing with time on the x-axis from 2000–01 to
2017–18 185
11.4 A clustered column chart showing the simple average applied
tariff rates in percentage by the ASEAN member countries on
agricultural, non-agriculture and all products in 2006 186
11.5 A clustered column chart showing edible oil production and
consumption in Southeast Asia in 1,000 metric tonnes on the
y-axis increasing with time from 2000–01 onwards to 2019–20
on the x-axis with a dip in production in 2015–16 188
x Illustrations
11.6 A clustered column chart showing the production and
consumption of edible oil in India in 1,000 metric tonnes on
the y-axis with consumption increasing rapidly and production
near stagnant with time on the x-axis from 2000–01 to 2019–20 189
11.7 A line chart showing the unit price of imports of edible oil in
US dollars (CIF/Tonne) by Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina,
Brazil, Ukraine and the USA on the x-axis showing time
period from 2000–01 to 2019–20 189
11.8 A combination chart of stacked columns showing imports of
edible oil from the world and ASEAN in lakh tonnes on the
y-axis and stacked line showing percentage share of imports
from ASEAN on the secondary y-axis during the time 2000–01
to 2019–20 on the x-axis 190
11.9 A 100% stacked column chart showing the composition of
India’s edible oils, including coconut oil, cottonseed oil, palm
oil, peanut oil, rapeseed oil, soybean oil and sunflower seed oil
on the y-axis over the period 1975–76 to 2019–20 on the x-axis 191
11.10 A line chart showing average retail prices of packed oils in
India, including groundnut oil, mustard oil, sunflower oil, soya
oil, and palm oil in rupees per kg on the y-axis over the period
2009 to 2019 on the x-axis 191
11.11 A line chart showing the production of Indonesia’s export in
1,000 metric tonnes on the y-axis over the period 2000–20 on
the x-axis 193
11.12 A three-panel pie chart showing the share of soybean oil,
palm oil, sunflower oil, and other oils in imports in 2011–12,
2015–16, and 2019–20 194
11.13 A line chart showing unit import prices of soya bean crude oil
w/n degummed, RPO and its fractions, CPO and its fractions,
and crude oil of sunflower and safflower seed in US dollars
(CIF/Tonne) on the y-axis with time on the x-axis from
2000–01 to 2019–20 195
11.14 A line chart showing tariff values of crude palm oil, refined
palm oil, and soybean oil in CIF US dollars on the y-axis with
time from 2005–06 to 2019–20 on the x-axis, registering an
increase in the tariff values for all three from 2011–12 196
11.15 A line chart showing India’s effectively applied tariff rates
on crude soybean oil, crude palm oil, refined palm oil and
sunflower oil on the y-axis with time from 2000 to 2019 on the
x-axis 199
11.16 A line chart showing final unit import prices inclusive of tariffs
of soya bean crude oil w/n degummed, refined palm oil and
its fractions, crude palm oil and its fractions, and crude oil of
sunflower and safflower seed in US dollars (CIF/Tonne) on the
y-axis with time on the x-axis from 2000–01 to 2019–20 200
 Illustrations xi
11.17 A two-panel pie chart showing the share of commercial
services exports and imports in Asia-Pacific economies in 2017 202
11.18 A pie chart showing the contribution of Asia-Pacific economies
in services trade growth in 2018 203
11.19 A stacked column chart showing India and ASEAN’s FDI
flows in a million US dollars on the y-axis during 2009–18 on
the x-axis 204

Tables
3.1 Territorial Claims in the Spratly Islands 47
6.1 Assam Government’s Projects under the India–ASEAN Connectivity 95
10.1 Maritime Profiles of ASEAN Countries and India 167
10.2 Passengers from ASEAN by ASEAN Airlines to India 168
10.3 Passengers from India to ASEAN through ASEAN Airlines 168
10.4 Airlines Operating between India and ASEAN Countries 169
10.5 Weekly Frequency and Mode of Flights between India and
ASEAN Countries 171
10.6 Foreign Tourist Arrivals from ASEAN Countries to India (2016–18) 172
10.7 Indian Nationals Departure to ASEAN Countries 173
10.8 Country-wise (ASEAN) Foreign Nationals Studying in India 174
10.9 Number of Indian Students Pursuing Studies in ASEAN Countries 175
11.1 Summary of Progress in ASEAN–India Relations 184
11.2 AIFTA Preferential Tariff Rates on Crude Palm Oil and Refined
Palm Oil 187
11.3 India’s Import of Major Edible Oils, 2011–20 (lakh tonnes) 193
11.4 Production Statistics of Soybean Oil (in 1,000 MT) by Major
Producers, 2010–20 197
A.1 ASEAN–India Trade ($Billions) 205
A.2 India’s Imports from World and ASEAN (qty. in thousands) 206
A.3 Edible Oil Imports (in lakh tonnes) 206
A.4 Crude Palm Oil and Refined Palm Oil Statistics 207
12.1 Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia (as of December 2018) 213

Map
3.1 A map that shows the spread of the Indo-Pacific extending from
the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the Americas 37
Contributors

Captain (Dr.) Nitin Agarwala, Visiting Faculty, Naval War College, Verem,
Goa, India.
Subhadeep Bhattacharya, Research Scholar, University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India.
Mohor Chakraborty, Assistant Professor in Political Science, South Calcutta
Girls’ College (Calcutta University), Kolkata, India.
Shelly Gupta, Research Scholar, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning,
School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
Quach Thi Hue, Lecturer, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, Hanoi,
Vietnam.
Pankaj K. Jha, Associate Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA),
O P Jindal University, Sonipat, India.
S. Y. Surendra Kumar, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,
Bangalore University, Bengaluru, India.
M. Mayilvaganan, Associate Professor, International Strategic and Security
Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, India.
Vivek Mishra, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi,
India, and Deputy Director, Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies,
Bhubaneswar, India.
Gautam Mukhopadhaya, Indian Foreign Service (Retd), Former Indian
Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar.
Joshy M. Paul, Research Fellow, Centre for Airpower Studies, New Delhi, India.
Gitanjali Sinha Roy, Research Assistant, the Centre for Land Warfare Studies,
New Delhi, India, and Research Scholar at the Department of East Asian
Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi, India.
Udai Bhanu Singh, Senior Research Associate and Coordinator, Southeast
Asia and Oceania Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India.
Doan Truong Thu, Senior Lecturer, Hochiminh National Academy of Politics
(HCMA), Hanoi, Vietnam.
Foreword

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967,

but India’s multi-dimensional relationship with the region is far older. It goes
back to at least two millennia. It has been moulded by a unique blend of civilisa-
tional commonalities, trade, culture and belief, arts, literature and music, besides
geographic proximity and ethnic affinity. Even after the emergence of ASEAN,
relations with its ten member states have been managed not only at the regional
plane but also at bilateral, sub-regional and extra-regional levels. Nevertheless,
the success of ASEAN as a premier inter-governmental institution in Asia, with
extensive connections with major and middle powers and its much-talked-about
“centrality,” makes the association a subject of immense interest to students and
observers of international relations. This applies especially to those in India, given
the long and rich history of India–Southeast Asia relations.
In this broad context, the book in your hand—ASEAN and India–ASEAN
Relations: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics, edited by Dr. M. Mayilvaganan—
is an excellent study on the subject from multiple angles. While the volume is
divided into four parts and 15 chapters, it tackles two principal themes in depth:
ASEAN with reference to the emerging security architecture of the region and
the India–ASEAN relationship. The book’s structure has been designed thought-
fully, and content-wise it offers a rich fare. In essence, what is presented here is
a contemporary perspective by mostly young Indian authors and two Vietnamese
scholars on the selected theme and its relevant facets.
The short, two-page Bangkok Declaration, issued on 8 August 1967, cre-
ated an entity that began with small steps in its journey towards bigger goals.
Voluntary and informal arrangements led, in course of time, to a plethora of
inter-state networks. ASEAN is an inter-governmental institution, not a supra-
national body like the European Union. Among regional groupings of its kind, it
has been rated a success. It experienced decades of peace and economic develop-
ment, partly because it benefitted from years of stability in the equation between
the US and China, the two key players in the region. Besides, ASEAN devel-
oped its own tools of consultations and consensus to manage tensions and dif-
ferences among its member states. Critics often noted that ASEAN talked more
than it delivered, but objectively speaking, its achievements have been fairly
impressive. Its community-building, centred on the pillars of political-security,
xiv Foreword
economic and socio-cultural cooperation, offers a nice model for other regions
to emulate.
In analysing the strategic environment in which ASEAN has had to evolve in
the past five decades, the book offers an extensive narrative, stretching from the
Cold War to the present day. The region witnessed changes from the time when
major powers—the US, Soviet Union, China—and their regional allies were
engaged in military conflict in the 1960s and later, through the rise of unipolar-
ity since the early 1990s, to the post-2008–2009 era that marked the spectacular
rise of China. Expanded economic footprint, growing assertiveness in policy and
action and a noted disdain for international norms marked Chinese behaviour,
generating serious consequences not only for its ASEAN neighbours but also for
the other powers. This is the backdrop on which the concept, vision and strategy
of the Indo-Pacific were developed in recent years and it happened in the teeth of
opposition by China.
Caught in a dilemma, ASEAN took its time before announcing its “outlook”
on what the Indo-Pacific signified to it. ASEAN stressed the “inclusiveness” of
the Indo-Pacific, a code word for rejecting the exclusion of China and a con-
frontational approach favoured by the US under the Trump administration. But
recent developments, especially after the outbreak of Covid-19 in early 2020,
imparted traction to the quadrilateral strategic partnership or the Quad, com-
posed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. It adopted a “Quad Plus” approach
in an attempt to broaden its political and diplomatic outreach. All this marked
a new phase in the region’s polarisation, causing deep concern to ASEAN and
pressuring its members to choose sides. In January 2021, as the new administra-
tion under President Joe Biden began its innings in the US, the entire region
seemed set to watch anxiously how America’s Asia policy and China policy
would evolve, attempting to reconcile seemingly conflicting impulses and inter-
ests in the future.
The other main theme—ASEAN–India relations—has been dissected from
many angles such as strategic, political, diplomatic, economic and people-cen-
tred cooperation. The relationship riding on the back of India’s Act East Policy
and its calibrated turn towards the Indo-Pacific progressed well during the period
since 2014. However, New Delhi’s conscious decision to stay out of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has been viewed as a setback in
several ASEAN capitals and by a section of Indian experts. The pandemic too
slowed down economic interactions. To combat the coronavirus, it seemed that
the region turned more to other partners than India (until New Delhi’s proactive
vaccine diplomacy began in January 2021). Continuing delays in the completion
of long-pending connectivity projects proved to be another discouraging factor.
Yet regular interactions at high political and diplomatic levels continued.
The action plan for multi-sectoral cooperation stayed on track. Endeavours to
strengthen ties at the people’s level were expected to receive a fillip as the pan-
demic’s effects subsided. Overall, the impression that emerged was that the rela-
tionship was performing well, but both ASEAN and India would need to strive
harder to add more substance and energy to it.
 Foreword xv
Southeast Asia is a vital subset of the larger Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN’s
institutions, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), offer opportunities to utilise
the institutional tools for advancing the cause of security and stability, peace and
prosperity for all, but this goal looks difficult to attain because the geopolitical
divide and resultant tensions have been on the increase. The crucial question the
scholars address here is: Will the natural instincts for cooperation prevail over or
yield to the impulses for domination and confrontation?
In this regard, the last chapter by Ambassador Gautam Mukhopadhyay outlin-
ing policy options for India makes an interesting read. He frankly notes a shared
perception of disappointment on both sides—ASEAN and India—that their mutual
relationship has not fully lived up to the expectations. In order to deal with a China
whose military and economic power as well as aggressive intent are on the rise,
ASEAN and India need to think beyond a purely military and political approach
and craft “a strategic economic partnership,” drawing in much of East Asia into
it. In the new RCEP era (where ASEAN is in and India is out), the author’s—and,
therefore, the book’s—recommendations deserve critical attention.
The editor and all the contributing authors deserve our appreciation for giving
us a fine volume, the result of sound scholarship. I am confident that it will be a
valuable instrument for deepening our understanding of this complex and multi-
faceted subject.
Rajiv Bhatia
Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House
Former Ambassador to Myanmar
Preface

ASEAN, a regional conglomeration of ten separate nation-states in Southeast

Asia, has evolved as an important and indispensable player in global geopolitics
by persevering and prospering through consultation and consensus over the past
50-plus years to become a major contributor to amity, security and prosperity in
Southeast Asia and beyond. Importantly, it stood united and stayed on the course
to weather the changing tide of complicated regional and global developments.
Ever since its founding, the regional grouping, apart from driving the regional
conversations forward around multiple regional and global subjects in a more
orderly and well-defined fashion, has injected a sense of predictability and pattern
to the way regional multilateralism is conducted in this part of the world. In fact,
in time, it has evolved as the most institutionalised regional association in Asia.
As a collective identity, ASEAN has not only addressed a welter of issues within
the grouping but projected a more potent force for action and bargaining when
dealing with players and institutions exogenous to the region.
In some ways, it may well be argued that the enduring and lasting success of
ASEAN as a regional institution has been the primary reason why other regional
entities like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have not quite
proved to be as promising and as fulfilling as the Southeast Asian grouping, not-
withstanding the different contexts and purposes for which they were founded in
the first place. Perhaps it has something to do with the characteristic resilience
of ASEAN as an organisation. When it started out, the Bangkok Declaration of
1967 chiefly had “economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administra-
tive fields” in mind apparently even as the underlying motive and the context may
have been altogether different. Then the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) in 1971 had reflected the shifting great power balance in wider Asia.
Hallmark of a cautious and thinking institution, it had taken no less than almost
a decade for ASEAN to meet at a summit level in 1976 when it accomplished the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)
with the latter formalising the core principle of non-interference as underpinning
the terms of engagement among member states. Buoyed by their individual eco-
nomic successes in the 1970s and 1980s, the ASEAN 6 had taken their economic
agenda to a new level when they decided to establish ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) in 1992. Today, ASEAN is a fast expanding trade bloc with an enormous
 Preface xvii
economic clout. It is already the seventh-largest economy in the world and pro-
jected to be the fourth largest by 2050.
As Cold War eventually wound up, ASEAN’s more formal initiative on
regional security fructifying in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) had once
more been clearly demonstrative of the organisation’s innate ability to reinvent
itself and retain its leadership role as the foremost ideologue of regional mul-
tilateralism. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis had scarred virtually all of
ASEAN’s economies, the overtures to the three East Asian nations and shap-
ing up of ASEAN+3 (APT) was an exercise emblematic of making a virtue out
of adversity. From shaping the contours of ASEAN+3 to being at the core of
the East Asia Summit, ASEAN has not only retained the reins of regionalism in
its own hands but has also expanded its diplomatic weight and footprints from
Southeast Asia to the broader East Asia and Asia-Pacific. The 2007 Charter
besides bestowing on the institution a legal personality also set it well on course
to truly become an economic (AEC), political-security (APSC) and socio-cultural
(ASCC) community.
Given this background, India as a close friend and partner is equally affected by
the developments in its extended eastern neighbourhood. Rooted in deeper histor-
ical and civilisational ties, India augmented its ties with ASEAN since 1991 with
its Look East Policy. Notably, ASEAN has been the primary focus of “Look East
Policy” and “Act East Policy.” In fact, India places ASEAN at the heart of its
“Act East Policy” and centre of its dream of an “Asian Century.” When ASEAN
celebrated 50 years of its existence in 2017, India also celebrated 25 years of
India–ASEAN Dialogue Partnership. India graduated from just a dialogue partner
to summit-level interactions and finally to strategic partnership in recent times,
thereby learning lessons of deeper economic integration and comprehensive
engagement with Southeast Asian neighbours. Significantly, the ASEAN–India
partnership brought political-economic gains to India. Without doubt, ASEAN
provided India the much-needed economic alignment and opportunity to diversify
its strategic interest. No wonder, in a splendid run of over 25 years of partnership,
the iconic group provided India with much-needed power balance and geostrate-
gic benefits in the Indo-Pacific. Importantly, India’s current strategic relationship
with ASEAN has multifaceted future potential for mutually beneficial growth and
diplomatic engagement in the changing geopolitics of Indo-Pacific.
As European Union increasingly gets weighed down by the post-BREXIT
tremors, globalisation pushes back in the reverse the re-examination of ASEAN
and how its partnership with India deems momentous. Thus, our book takes stock
of the 50-plus years of the ASEAN existence and 27 years of India–ASEAN ties
and focuses on where both ASEAN and India stand today and how they have
navigated their partnership amidst the changing Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynam-
ics. Particularly, the volume ventures into the multi-dimensional nature of the
ASEAN–India relationship at large. Further, the book assesses the role of external
powers’ conflict over natural resources when high demand for energy is occur-
ring alongside simmering maritime disputes that have both security and energy
resources undertones.
xviii Preface
This volume is partially an outcome of a dialogue involving scholars from
India and ASEAN that the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) along
with the Southeast Asia Research Group of the Department of Political Science at
University of Delhi, and India Foundation and the Embassy of Indonesia organ-
ised in Bangalore, India, in December 2017. As a natural corollary of vigorous
effort undertaken at NIAS on Indo-Pacific region, this publication from some of
the papers presented at the conference along with the in-house research examines
contemporary political, economic, strategic and security aspects of India–ASEAN
relations. The idea was to examine how ASEAN that commemorated 50 years
recently and its 25 years of partnership with India in particular have navigated in
the shifting geopolitics. It is hoped that this book would serve as a useful reference
for all those interested in an analytical review of the ASEAN–India partnership. I
also take this opportunity to express our thanks to all those who have collaborated
with us in our endeavour to enrich the discourse on promoting ASEAN–India ties
which has received an added thrust with India’s “Act East Policy.”
M. Mayilvaganan
Bengaluru, India
Acknowledgement

A deep sense of gratitude overwhelms my memory of the time when this book
on ASEAN and ASEAN–India relations was conceived and prepared for publica-
tion. Shared ideas, active collaboration and support from many people and institu-
tions made possible the work, which fits in more with the perception of “putting
together” than with the “idealistic notion of authorship.” My foremost gratitude
goes to my friend Dr. Sonu Trivedi of the Southeast Asia Research Group of the
Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi. Her warm friendship
and common academic interest helped to put together some young and experi-
enced scholars for this edited volume. Without her partnership, this edited volume
would not have been possible. Special thanks are due to the India Foundation and
the Embassy of Indonesia at New Delhi for their immense support provided dur-
ing the dialogue on the subject that was held at NIAS, Bengaluru, India.
I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to all the authors for
their scholarly contribution to this volume; without their timely support it would
have been impossible to imagine the publication of this volume. I am happy that
Routledge agreed to publish this book. Special thanks to Dr. Jagannath Panda,
Series Editor, Routledge Studies on Think Asia and Ms. Dorothea Schaefter,
Senior Editor, Asian Studies, for taking an active interest in this work as well
coordinated the production of this book from Routledge. I must also thank Ms.
Alexandra de Brauw and other members of Routledge publication for the timely
support and coordination.
I am deeply indebted to NIAS—my institution—for allowing me to take up
a sabbatical that helped in finalising the manuscript. Particularly, I am grateful
to the director of NIAS, Dr. Shailesh Nayak and Prof. Rajit Mazumder of De
Paul University at Chicago (for providing an affiliation during my stay in the
US) for their timely support. The NIAS and De Paul University’s support was
fundamental in the successful completion of this book. Thanks are also due to
my ISSSP faculty colleagues for their encouragement and in particular to Prof.
Rajaram Nagappa, the former Head of ISSSP, NIAS, for his intellectual guidance
and support.
I am profoundly grateful to Shri Rajiv Bhatia, former ambassador of India to
Myanmar, Prof. Jatswan S. Sidhu, executive director of Asia-Europe Institute (AEI)
in the University of Malaya, Malaysia, Mr. Khin Maung Soe, advisor, Myanmar
xx Acknowledgement
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Myanmar, and Dr. Dharish David,
associate faculty, University of London-SIM-Global Education, Singapore, for
their kind espousal. My sincere thanks also goes to Nasima Khatoon, Kannan
Nair, Revathy K. J. and Angelin Archana for their timely research assistance.
Finally, I offer gratitude to my family members, particularly Amudha, Deekshi,
Muthulakshmi, Senthil, Priya, Thanvanthi and Tharaneesan, for their support and
understanding while I was finalising the manuscript. My thanks to all the friends
in NIAS and elsewhere for extending moral support throughout the writing and
editing of this book.
M. Mayilvaganan
Bengaluru, India
1 Introduction
ASEAN and India: navigating shifting
geopolitics
M. Mayilvaganan

ASEAN—navigating shifting geopolitics

The ASEAN and its role as a foremost regional group in the changing global geo-
politics is an unquestionable reality which cannot be overlooked in Indo-Pacific—
the term from maritime outlook—or Asia-Pacific—the term from a land border
perspective. World War II and the contestation for supremacy over Southeast
Asia between the British and Japan brought strategic importance to the region,
first through the Cold War geopolitics and subsequently resulting in the American
alliance system (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)), establishing
bases of United States (US) forces in the region.1 Through this, importantly, the
US replaced the UK as a security guarantor.2
While the prominence of the region caught the attention of the external players
who were weighing to establish influence, it forced the regional countries to take
sides for their own security needs. In this setting, a regional grouping, ASEAN,
was formed 53 years ago. According to Kishore Mahbubani,3 fear of commu-
nism and its expansion brought Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and
the Philippines together, spearheaded by strong leaders such as President Suharto
of Indonesia, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Prime Minister
Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia, who he thinks were able to rise above short-
term interests and focus on the long-term value of regional cooperation.4
Since then, ASEAN has navigated the shifting regional geopolitics of
Southeast and East Asia amidst the Vietnam War,5 Cambodia crisis6 and the rise
of an aggressive and strong China. Particularly, the existence and relevance of
ASEAN through the tense Cold War geopolitics and the ensuing post–Cold War
period are significant.
While American supremacy in the post–World War period brought a sea of
change in the region and its stability, the situation following China’s communist
revolutionary ideas, its involvement in the Vietnam conflict and present activi-
ties in the South China Sea (SCS) has brought ripples of uneasiness among the
countries in the region. Amidst this, since the end of World War II some Southeast
Asian countries have sought to form a regional grouping in order to address the
internal challenges arising from ethnic problems, the growing communist rebel-
lions and the increasing role of external actors, as well as aiming to strengthen

DOI: 10.4324/9781003177173-1
2 M. Mayilvaganan
the economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.7 The formation of the Association of
Southeast Asia (ASA) on 31 July 1961 made up of Malaya, the Philippines and
Thailand and of MAPHILINDO with Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia
were the first attempts by the countries in the region to have their own mechanism
for cooperation and for resolving conflict. While many viewed the ASA as subor-
dinate to the American interests in the Southeast Asian region, the ASA members
were intending to build an independent association, free from any external influ-
ence, with the single focus of economic cooperation among the member states as
a way to counter the communist subversion activities in the region.8
The formation of ASEAN during the Cold War and its existence as a relevant
and powerful regional grouping at the moment is indeed the result of an endeav-
our for regional resilience in spite of many crises. While ASEAN kept its focus
on economic integration and avoided taking stands on political issues like the
Cambodian crisis, it, in fact, put pressure on the regional groupings. Notably,
the post–Cold War geopolitical scenario saw the rise of Chinese assertiveness
in the SCS, where Beijing ventured into the waters of neighbouring countries
of the SCS region. Chinese occupation of the Mischief Reef in 1996 not only
exposed the powerlessness of ASEAN but also gradually brought fissure in the
grouping. Hence, the constant changing geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia
required ASEAN to adapt to the contemporary conditions and engage most of the
external powers, including the US, China and India, in the regional affairs. Since
the 1992 Singapore–ASEAN Summit,9 it has become the strategy of ASEAN to
embrace as many outsiders as possible to balance any threat arising from one sin-
gle power. Through this cooperative security mechanism, ASEAN has managed
to stay a relevant regional group, thereby offering mutual economic benefits for
ASEAN countries.

ASEAN and India–ASEAN relations

amidst changing geopolitics
Historically and culturally, Southeast Asia, now known as the ASEAN region—
comprising Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam,
Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei—has remained part of India’s external out-
reach for over 2,000 years, with trade having been carried out since ancient times
between India and ASEAN countries such as Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia in the region. Also, the strategic location of the ASEAN region has
made it a crucial region, with which both ancient Indian kingdoms and subsequent
colonial powers have maintained ties from time to time. Historical sites such as
the Angkor Temple Complex near Siem Reap in Cambodia, the ancient candis in
Kedah in Malaysia and the Borobudur and Prambanan temples near Yogyakarta
in Indonesia are, in fact, evidence of India’s early linkages and its influence on
Southeast Asian cultures, traditions and languages.
Buddhism, indeed, remains a strong connection, and today in Southeast Asia it
is the state religion in Cambodia, with 96.9% of the total population practising the
religion,10 93.2% in Thailand, 80.1% in Myanmar, 33.9% in Singapore, 17.7% in
 Introduction 3
Malaysia and 16.4% in Vietnam.11 Other than Buddhism, Indonesia and Malaysia
have 87% and 61% of Muslim population, respectively, with cultural roots in
Indian traditions.
Tamil language inscriptions as well Sanskrit inscriptions found on the east-
ern borderlines of the Indian Ocean, from Myanmar to Sumatra, are bilingual
inscriptions that were either donations or gifts made to religious centres such as
monasteries and Vishnu and Siva temples in the region, a description of ancient
Indian trade links.12 Particularly, the Tamil language inscriptions on a potsherd
found at Phu Khao Thong in south Thailand bearing the word turavon, meaning
ascetic, is considered to be one of the oldest inscriptions in the Tamil language in
Southeast Asia, dating back to the 2nd or 3rd century AD,13 and another inscrip-
tion at the Khau Pra Narai hill on the Takuapa river on the west coast of Thailand,
as Nilakanta Sastri suggests that the Pallava king Nandivarman III, who ruled at
Kanchipuram in South India commended the digging of the tank during the mid-
9th century.14 Furthermore, the Nalanda inscription of ad 860 shows a Buddhist
foundation was funded by a Sumatran ruler, a king of Suvarnadvipa (Sumatra),15
evidence of ancient Indian connection with Southeast Asia.
In addition, the Hindu religious remains found at Angkor, near Siem Riep,
Cambodia, and at Borobodur, Java, Indonesia,16 and the spread of Buddhism
from India to Southeast Asia are proof of India’s ancient connection to the
region. Further, the influence of Hinduism can still be found in the region,
as great Indian literary epics like the Ramayana and the Mahabharata have
been adopted into many local Southeast Asian cultures. For instance, in the
Philippines, the Maranao version called Maharadia lawana or Maharaja Ravana
is the local rendition of the Indian epic Ramayana17 and some verses of Hudhud
chants of the Ifugao community are the local adoption of the Ramayana and the
Mahabharata.18
Also, evidence of Indian emigration to and trade with the Indonesian archi-
pelago and other surrounding islands through the Bay of Bengal is documented
by maritime historians like R. C. Majumdar19 and George Coedes.20 For instance,
there is proof of close contact existing between the Sailendras, the Kingdoms of
the Andhra and Odisha coasts and the Palas of Bengal, who had active links with
the Hindu rulers of Malaya Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago, as early
as ad 75. The Kalinga dynasty too had an important role in promoting people-to-
people contact with the region, particularly to Java. Historian Fernand Braudel
refers to India and East Asia as the “greatest talks of all world economies”21 of
the pre-industrial, pre-capitalist era. Notably, the 7th and the 8th century ad wit-
nessed an increase in the volume of sea trade from the Javanese State of Ho-ling
and Malacca Straits to the eastern coast of India, including the Pallava States
in South India,22 and subsequently, the expanding Chola Empire in the early
10th and early 13th centuries saw a boom in maritime voyages and trade with
Southeast Asia.23
Later, British India, with the expansion of their authority till Malaya, i.e. pre-
sent-day Malaysia, strengthened these historical and cultural networks by bring-
ing the regions under colonial rule, thanks to the intense trade and commerce
4 M. Mayilvaganan
opportunities they presented. Also, with the British expansion and the Indian
National Army (INA) campaign under its leader Subhas Chandra Bose in
Malaya,24 Indian migration and settlement in the Malay Peninsula thrived, which
led to the large Indian diaspora in the region. Today, according to the Ministry of
External Affairs of the Government of India, there are 7,600 Indians in Brunei,
55,000 in Indonesia, 1.67 million in Malaysia, about 2.9 million in Myanmar,
38,500 in the Philippines, 307,000 in Singapore and 85,000 in Thailand and a
smaller number in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.25
Following independence, India under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,
revitalised its relations with Southeast Asia through the First Asian Relations
Conference at New Delhi in 1947, and subsequently the First Asian African
Conference at Bandung in 1955. These conferences were undoubtedly signifi-
cant landmarks in redefining post-Independence India’s relations with Southeast
Asia or the ASEAN countries. Particularly, under the Nonalignment Movement
(NAM), Indonesia took centre-stage in India’s foreign policy. India’s public sup-
port to the Indonesian struggle for independence in the 1950s and then its involve-
ment in the Indochina crisis in the 1960s are cases in point. Gradually, the signing
of friendship treaties with Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines aided India
in consolidating its bilateral and diplomatic relations with the regional littorals.
But despite these, bonding between India and Southeast Asia began to fade in
the 1960s, when Southeast Asian states, one after another on attaining independ-
ence, began drifting from their own foreign policy priorities under the Cold War
politics. Some of the countries became members of the newly formed Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), forming an alliance with America to address
their security needs. India, on the other hand, distanced itself from American
undersigned treaties and instead formed close ties with the Soviet Union.
The formation of ASEAN on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with
the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand,26 took place while India was
focused on its bilateral problems with Pakistan and China. Meanwhile, in August
1971, India signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and
pro-American countries of ASEAN like Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were
apprehensive of India’s drift towards the Soviet Union as they felt this would aid
Moscow in advancing its interest beyond South Asia,27 given the Cold War geo-
politics. Incidentally, they were also worried about communist Vietnam and its
potential threat to the region.
On the other hand, the general pro-Western orientation of the members of
ASEAN compelled India to distance itself from the US. Yet, India was not hostile
to ASEAN unlike China and some other powers. As a result, India–Southeast Asia
relations experienced a straight break off, with both travelling in different direc-
tions with differing strategic interests. Consequently, India’s diplomatic interac-
tion was limited to individual countries in the bloc rather than with ASEAN as a
whole. Even India stayed away from the Kuala Lumpur meeting of the ASEAN
foreign ministers in June 1980 when ASEAN suspended India’s already approved
request for a dialogue partnership of May 1980 on the issue of India’s recognition
 Introduction 5
of the Vietnam-backed Cambodian regime in July 1980, while ASEAN, along
with the US and China, was opposed to the Heng Samrin regime over fear that
Vietnam was establishing its hegemonic power in the region with the support of
the Soviet Union.28
Gradually, the impressive growth and performance of ASEAN in terms of eco-
nomic and human development in the 1980s, popularly known as “Asian or East
Asian economic miracle,” brought a change in India’s ASEAN outlook. As a result,
former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s regime sent then Secretary of the Ministry
of External Affairs Eric Gonsalves, on a tour to Burma, Thailand, the Philippines,
Singapore and Malaysia in May 1980 in an effort to mend ties with ASEAN nations.29
Subsequently, India’s Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao made an official visit
to Malaysia in October 1981. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the
Philippines and Indonesia in October 1981, where in her speech in Manila on 9
October 1981 she emphasised the vital need for close cooperation between India
and the five-member ASEAN group in the interests of world peace and stability.
In the meantime, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War, India too was forced to re-orient its foreign policy priorities as the fiscal
imbalances and the subsequent economic crisis resulted in the depletion of India’s
foreign reserves.30 The Indian government under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha
Rao adopted the New Economic Policy in 1991, with liberalisation, globalisa-
tion and privatisation as its policy, and this changed India’s economic policy
towards ASEAN. Integrating the Indian economy with the booming Southeast
Asian economies31 was one of the stated objectives. While former Indian Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao was credited importantly for India’s strategic initiative
to re-establish closer ties with ASEAN, the geopolitics that prevailed at the time
too played a part in bringing a gradual convergence of interests between India and
ASEAN, both in economic and strategic terms, which motivated and underpinned
India’s “Look East” outlook.

ASEAN and India’s Look East

India’s Look East Policy (LEP) helped in reviving its economic relations with
Southeast Asia or ASEAN. Owing to the intense historical ties and the presence
of a vast Indian diaspora in the region, it was considered worthwhile to unveil the
new “Look East” Policy in the1990s. Evidently, the policy of Look East formu-
lated by the Narasimha Rao government was to renew India’s political ties with
the ASEAN member nations, besides enhancing economic interaction, trade and
investments and forging science and technology and institutional engagements
with it.32 With the Soviet Union collapsing, European powers facing economic
instability and West Asia facing turmoil, the flourishing ASEAN economy and
the region was regarded as the best bet by the Indian government. Thus, closer
engagement with ASEAN was considered wise, which would provide important
access to its blooming market.
Interestingly, India’s growing economy in Asia and its emerging military and
technological power made ASEAN realise India’s potential and significance for
6 M. Mayilvaganan
its political and economic future. And India believed ASEAN plus East Asia was
critical to India’s own sustained economic growth. The increasing harmony led to
the acceptance of India as ASEAN’s sectoral partner—a country enjoying rights
on a particular sector of common interest such as trade, science and technology in
an organisation without being a member—in early 1992 and as its full dialogue
partner—an individual sovereign state that is not a member of an organisation
but has common interest in contributing to the organisation enjoying consultative
rights—in July 1996.33
Since then, India–ASEAN relations have progressed steadily. Notably, the
volume of India’s trade with ASEAN too improved significantly, with Singapore
and Malaysia accounting for over 80% of India’s imports from ASEAN countries
and absorbing more than 60% of India’s exports to ASEAN countries.34 Besides,
keeping in mind the need for economic linkages, India along with Thailand, an
ASEAN member, initiated BIMST–EC35 in 1997. Likewise, India set up the
Mekong Ganga Cooperation Project in 2000 along with five ASEAN countries,
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand.
Moving forward, through the first ASEAN–India Summit that was held on
5 November 2002 at Phnom Penh, India became a summit-level partner—enjoy-
ing rights to attend organisation summits—and saw to the institutionalisation
of ASEAN–India relations. India also signed two important agreements with
ASEAN, the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
for the establishment of an ASEAN–India Regional Trade and Investment Area,
including the conclusion of an ASEAN–India Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and
a joint declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism at the sec-
ond ASEAN–India Summit in Bali in October 2003 that aided in scaling up trade
and investment.
The FTA was seen as an important foreign policy tool to forge new strate-
gic economic alliances with the region. Then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, who was personally present at the 2nd ASEAN–India Summit in Bali
in 2003, proposed the idea of establishing an Asian Economic Community (AEC)
to promote overall economic competitiveness and create a new engine of growth
for the entire region,36 apart from an impromptu offer, known as the Bali Offer,
where the airlines of ASEAN can operate daily flights to four Indian cities—
Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata—as well as unrestricted flight services to
18 secondary cities in India.37 India also acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation to signal its peaceful intentions as an ASEAN partner.
Meanwhile, the presence of India at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in December
2005 in Kuala Lumpur and its inclusion in the East Asia Community (EAC) has
further augmented synergies between the two. Notably, the summit marked the
formal inclusion of India into the regional architecture of Southeast Asia,38 which
in the larger sense is the consolidation of India and ASEAN ties.
The new United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government headed by
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that came to power in May 2004 in India added
emphasis on the science and technology component along with strengthening eco-
nomic linkages. In the words of then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the aim
 Introduction 7
of the “Look East” Policy was to deepen India’s economic integration through
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA), both with ASEAN
as a whole and with individual countries of the region.39
With enhanced synergy and sustained focus, India initiated several schemes
to forge closer links with ASEAN, such as an open skies policy—an agreement
between two countries or entities that allows airlines to fly from either of them
without much restrictions—that was proposed by the Singapore prime minister at
the 2nd ASEAN–India Summit in 2006, operationalisation of an India–ASEAN
Science and Technology Fund (for further collaborative R&D), annual training
courses for ASEAN diplomats and special tourism campaigns in both India and
ASEAN.
India’s strategic perspective vis-à-vis ASEAN was based on two fundamental
principles, according to the statement of then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee
at the 5th India–ASEAN Summit held in Cebu in January 2007:40 the mainte-
nance of an equitable strategic balance and prevention of regional rivalries from
destabilising the region and, more importantly, engaging all the countries both
bilaterally and collectively through institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF). Thus, largely, there was a component of definite geopolitical and maritime
consideration.41
In 2012, ASEAN and India had commemorated their 20 years of dialogue
partnership and 10 years of summit-level partnership under the theme “ASEAN–
India Partnership for Peace and Shared Prosperity” in New Delhi. Notably, the
Commemorative Summit endorsed elevating their partnership to a “Strategic
Partnership”42 with the growing Chinese dominance. Conversely, domestically
with the Look East Policy, the importance of the “neglected” Northeast India
region got the focus by taking into “account the dynamism of this region.”43

ASEAN and India’s Act East Policy

The India–ASEAN relationship has grown from being fundamentally economic to
strategic partnership today, with India being a member of over 30 dialogue mecha-
nisms, including the annual summits. In this context, the Indian government under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who came to power in 2014, rephrased India’s
Look East Policy to “Act East Policy” (AEP) at the 12th ASEAN–India Summit
in 2014 held in Nay Pyi Taw in Myanmar. According to Prime Minister Modi,
“a new era of economic development, industrialisation and trade have begun in
India. Externally, India’s ‘Look East Policy’ has become ‘Act East Policy.’”44
In a sense, first, the nomenclature change aimed at indirectly sending out a
message that India not only was looking at the region from a critic’s perspective
but was starting to act on its promises and was taking the projects with ASEAN
countries seriously. Second, emphasis was given to foster greater links with the
states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), which had appar-
ently been less focused upon in the LEP. Finally, the AEP is a comprehensive
policy that looks beyond ASEAN to include countries in East Asia and the West
Pacific, i.e. the Indo-Pacific region. In the words of Prime Minister Modi during
8 M. Mayilvaganan
his address at the 16th India–ASEAN Summit, “India’s Act East policy is an
important part of our Indo-Pacific vision and ASEAN lies at the core of it.”45
Importantly, India–ASEAN shares a principle of regional architecture that is
open, inclusive, sustainable, transparent and rule based.
Further, political-security, economic and socio-cultural aspects were identified
as three priority areas for cooperation in August 2015 under the ASEAN–India
Plan of Action for the period 2016–2020. Enhancing strategic ties with the vibrant
ASEAN—India’s 4th largest trading partner—region through trade, investment,
education and culture is considered a critical aspect of India’s AEP.46 Bilateral
trade between India and ASEAN too grew from $12 billion in 200347 to $142 bil-
lion in 2018.48
Incidentally, India also hosted the leaders of all ten member states of ASEAN
at India’s Republic Day parade on 26 January 2018, to mark 25 years of the
ASEAN–India Dialogue Partnership, which demonstrates the growing impor-
tance that India accords to ASEAN. Also, India hosted a two-day Summit in New
Delhi in January 2018 to commemorate the 25th Anniversary of the ASEAN–
India Dialogue Relations, under the theme of “Shared Values, Common Destiny.”
In short, ASEAN–India relations have come a long way, navigating through
shifting geopolitics in spite of their differing strategic priorities through the Cold
War era until today. Fundamentally, ASEAN is “one of the focal points of India’s
foreign policy, strategic concerns and economic interests.”49 In addition, there is
a realisation of India’s strategic capabilities within ASEAN and it is believed that
the former can play a stabilising role in the region in the long run amidst the grow-
ing Chinese aggressive posture. Thus, both enjoy multifaceted cooperation in the
political, security, defence, strategic, economic and socio-cultural arena.

The core of the book—the subject focus

The ASEAN–India relationship in the Indo-Pacific is as dynamic as it is evolving
in nature. India–ASEAN ties have accelerated gradually from being sectoral to
dialogue partnership to summit-level partnership. This edited volume explores
how both ASEAN and India–ASEAN have navigated amidst changing geopoliti-
cal dynamics.
The objective of this edited volume is to give a contemporary analysis of
50 years of ASEAN and 25 years of ASEAN–India relationship. The book seeks
to examine the relevance of ASEAN and the role of external powers, the regional
security architecture and the various facets of India–ASEAN relationship. In par-
ticular, the chapters in this volume explore the history, political, economic, socio-
culture and connectivity aspects of the India–ASEAN ties.
ASEAN, in fact, since its establishment in 1967, has emerged as a highly suc-
cessful regional institution, serving as a platform for dialogue, political coopera-
tion and economic integration among the Southeast Asian communities, what is
lauded as an “ASEAN Way.” In the five decades of its existence, ASEAN has
many achievements to its credit: economic success, particularly intra-regional
trade, contribution to regional security and political architecture and connectivity.
 Introduction 9
Its three “C” formula—Consultation, Compromise and Consensus—has paved
the way for its remarkable success.
India, in the aftermath of its 1991 New Economic Policy of liberalisation, glo-
balisation and privation, felt the need for synchronisation with ASEAN, an eco-
nomic powerhouse. This volume tries to take a critical look at how much India
achieved in integrating with ASEAN and what is the level of linkage between the
two. Also, the volume explores the transition that has taken place from the 1990s
up to now. In a sense, the edition brings out the contemporary perspective of the
India–ASEAN relationship.

What are the chapters all about?

The broad objective of the book is to examine the contemporary perspective of
ASEAN and India–ASEAN relations in the changing geopolitical scenario. The
chapters in this edited volume try to capture the salient features of the histori-
cal and contemporary issues and attempt to draw some policy implications and
available options to further strengthen the ties between the two. Following the
Introduction, it has 14 chapters, each dealing with cross-cutting issues relating to
ASEAN and the India–ASEAN relationship.
The volume could be broadly divided into four sections. Chapter 1 by M.
Mayilvaganan looks at how and why ASEAN remains an important focal point
in India’s foreign policy from a historical analysis and how the nature of engage-
ment changes with the shifting global geopolitical dynamics. The chapter also
examines the 53 years of ASEAN’s existence as a regional organisation and its
role. It also provides a summary of the subsequent chapters.
The volume comprises four parts, in which Part 1, “ASEAN and the Emerging
Security Architecture,” consists of four chapters. Chapter 2, titled “ASEAN at
50: External Actors and Its Relevance,” by Subhadeep Bhattacharya examines
the ASEAN–external power dynamics, especially when the regional geopolitics
of Southeast and East Asia are taking a new turn today amidst the rise of China
and its impact on the regional geopolitics. Given that the external actors’ roles
and relations with Southeast Asia have always been complementary, given the
dependence on security guarantee of the external actors, the author explores why
ASEAN does not want any single-power domination in the region and why it is
unable to stand against the growing “Chinese challenge,” forcing its members to
the external group.
Chapter 3 by Nitin Agarwala is on “ASEAN and the Emerging Contest over
Natural Resources,” which identifies and examines the cause and consequences of
a contest for “marine” natural resources, keeping in mind the changing geopoliti-
cal dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region while discussing what is being done and
can be done by ASEAN and the individual states to preserve the marine natural
resources of this region. The author points out that the conflict among the ASEAN
nations is centred on the use, control and disposition of these resources.
Chapter 4 by Udai Bhanu Singh, titled “ASEAN-led Regional Security
Architecture,” inspects ASEAN-led regional architectures such as the ASEAN
10 M. Mayilvaganan
Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) and how India perceives itself in shaping the security
architecture in the region. As security in the larger Indo-Pacific region was seen
as resting on the twin pillars of the US-based bilateral alliance system or the
ASEAN-based multilateral institution, the author argues that in order for ASEAN
to remain relevant in shaping the emerging security architecture, it would need to
fashion suitable responses to the rise of China. Whether ASEAN would be able to
prevent strategic rivalry is a question that the author attempts to examine.
Chapter 5 by Vivek Mishra on “The US, India and ASEAN: Convergences
and Challenges” presents the major overlaps between the US, India and ASEAN
in their goals and objectives. As the convergences between the US, India and
ASEAN have grown tremendously over the past two decades, the avenues of
engagement between the three entities stand as a palpable opportunity for all the
countries involved in the trans-regional assemblage straddling the Pacific and the
Indian Oceans. As such, this chapter seeks to probe the extent to which ASEAN
has emerged as a domain of converging interest for both the US and India.
Furthermore, it examines how the emerging Indo-Pacific consensus between New
Delhi and Washington will play out apropos their interests in and relationship
with ASEAN.
Part II of the book focuses on “ASEAN and India: Political and Strategic
Links” that consists of four chapters. Chapter 6 on “ASEAN in India’s Act East
Policy” by Gitanjali Sinha Roy evaluates ASEAN’s importance in India’s Act
East Policy and how ASEAN’s centrality is essential for India’s Indo-Pacific
vision. The author argues that there is an urgent need to counter China in the
Southeast Asian region and the Indo-Pacific, and therefore, a “US led-balanced
coalition of Quad+ countries Axis” is the exigency of the hour.
Chapter 7 by Mohor Chakraborty on “ASEAN and Northeast India: Through
the Panorama of ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’” investigates how the “LEP,” and
the redefined “Act East” Policy (AEP), and underscores and rejuvenates India’s
northeast. The author is of the view that under the LEP, India’s northeast had
received rudimentary emphasis but this has emerged as a major thrust area in
the Act East Policy, bolstered by a conscious and proactive effort to harness the
immense natural potential of this region.
Chapter 8 on “India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Exploring New
Avenues” by Pankaj K. Jha attempts to shed light on India’s defence diplomacy
that has a multifaceted component involving training, maintenance and spares
with the ASEAN countries. The chapter examines India’s new defence export
policy, which is in drafting stages, that looks for markets to export “Make in
India” defence equipment and Southeast Asia remaining as a promising destina-
tion for such exports. With India’s defence cooperation agreement with ASEAN,
the chapter highlights how India’s defence diplomacy in the region will configure
in near future.
Chapter 9 on “India–ASEAN Maritime Cooperation: Need for a Proactive
Approach” by Joshy M. Paul argues that with the “America first” policy priorities
under Trump and China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS, ASEAN’s centrality
 Introduction 11
in regional multilateral institutional mechanisms is diminishing. The chapter con-
cludes that enhancing maritime cooperation with the regional countries with more
security-oriented policy objectives will aid India’s national interest in the region.
Part III of the book deals with “ASEAN and India: Culture, Commerce
and Connectivity Links” and has four chapters. Chapter 10 on “Culture
and Connectivity: The Salience of 2Cs in India–ASEAN Relations” by M.
Mayilvaganan examines how India and ASEAN are focused on connectivity and
culture—2Cs—as the future areas of cooperation and discusses the challenges
that both are facing in this regard. The author argues that though the people-
to-people interactions and exchanges existing so far are appreciable, the lack of
robust physical connectivity and cultivation of the local constituency through cul-
tural and diaspora links is trivial in achieving India’s objective of AEP.
Chapter 11 by Shelly Gupta, titled “ASEAN–India Trade and Commerce Ties:
Issues, Prospects and Challenges,” analyses the Free Trade Agreement between
ASEAN and India by highlighting the various issues which were expected before
the signing of the agreement and the challenges that have started to gain impor-
tance thereafter. Specifically, the chapter examines the case of edible oil deal in
the ASEAN–India FTA as it was the most sensitive sector expected to be affected
by the agreement, but the results obtained were in complete contrast to the expec-
tations. The chapter tries to explore the reasons behind the paradoxical result and
then highlight the prospects and challenges that lie ahead especially with the mul-
tiplicity of trade agreements in place.
Chapter 12 written by S. Y. Surendra Kumar, titled “India’s Engagement with
Its Diaspora in Southeast Asia: A Neglected Diaspora?” examines, in the era of
global interdependence, how diaspora has gained immense strategic importance,
and particularly how India began to realise its diaspora as a strategic asset. Given
the millions of overseas Indians across the continents, whose remittances are esti-
mated to be around 3.7% of India’s GDP, of late India began to target the diaspora
in order to capitalise on achieving India’s economic growth and development. In
this context, the chapter critically examines India’s policy towards its diaspora in
Southeast Asia in comparison and contrast to China’s engagement with its dias-
pora in the region.
Chapter 13 on “ASEAN–India Relations: A Soft Power Approach” by Doan
Truong Thu explores ASEAN–India relations within the wider gamut of soft
power approach between ASEAN and India. The author traces the close diplo-
matic relationship between ASEAN and India that was created on the basis of
proximity to the geography, and therefore, the closeness of the way of awareness
and exchange, propagation of cultural, religious and economic values, etc. The
chapter concludes that soft power should be considered as an approach, a tool
to create peace, as well as a way to influence and contribute value to the global
development today.
Part IV focuses on the “Future of ASEAN and India–ASEAN Ties” and is
in a way a conclusion to the book, where one chapter looks into the future of
ASEAN and the India–ASEAN relations while another examines the options
available before India in engaging ASEAN. Chapter 14, titled “Future of ASEAN
12 M. Mayilvaganan
and India–ASEAN Relations,” by Quach Thi Hue, assesses ASEAN coopera-
tion with India, which is based on the solid foundation of sharing the land border
and sea and ocean areas, apart from cultural, historical and religious values. The
author points out that India and ASEAN ties in the context of the growing chal-
lenges of traditional and non-traditional security will have a great impact on the
economic development, national defence and security of the region as well as on
the regional order.
The final chapter, titled “Engaging ASEAN: India’s Strategic and Policy
Options,” by Gautam Mukhopadhaya explores questions such as, what are the
diplomatic, economic, strategic and military instruments available to the interna-
tional community and the region to deal with a potentially changing geopolitics
in Indo-Pacific? And particularly, what are the strategies and policy options avail-
able to India, in particular, in augmenting its ties with ASEAN and dealing with
China in the region?

Notes
1 Refer Tarling, Southeast Asia and the Great Powers, London and New York, Routledge,
2010, p. 143.
2 Chintamani Mahapatra, American Role in the Origin and Growth of ASEAN, New
Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1990, p. 20.
3 https://nuspress.nus.edu.sg/products/the-asean-miracle-a-catalyst-for-peace.
4 Advait Rao Palepu, “The Cultural Base of 9 ASEAN States is Indian,” Rediff​.com​,
26 January 2018, https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/the-cultural-base-of-9-asean
-states-is-indian/20180126.htm.
5 See “Vietnam War,” at https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-histo
ry; also see Christian G. Appy, “What Was the Vietnam War About?,” The New York
Times, 26 March 2018 at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/opinion/what-was-the
-vietnam-war-about.html.
6 See https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia/Civil-war; also see UNICEF, “The
Crisis in Kampuchea,” at https://www.unicef.org/about/history/files/Child-Nation-M
-Black-Ch16-p378-407-crisis-kampucea.pdf.
7 Refer Vincent K. Pollard, “ASA and ASEAN, 1961–1967,” Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No.
3, March 1970, at www.jstor.org/stable/2642577
8 Ibid, p. 246.
9 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues,
Singapore, Viva Books PVT. Ltd., 2005, p. 170.
10 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html.
11 PEW, Global Religious Landscape – Religious Composition by Country, https://we
b.archive.org/web/20160310101254/https://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/12/glob
alReligion-tables.pdf.
12 Jan Wisseman Christie, “The Medieval Tamil-Language Inscriptions in Southeast Asia
and China,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, September 1998, p.
251, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20072045.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Abcd0bcdc
bf9d2d77297d44335c81ba7e.
13 Iravatham Mahadevan, “An Epigraphic Perspective on the Antiquity of Tamil,” The
Hindu, 24 June 2010 at https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/An-epigraphic-pe
rspective-on-the-antiquity-of-Tamil/article16265606.ece.
14 See Jan Wisseman Christie, “The Medieval Tamil-Language Inscriptions in Southeast
Asia and China,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, September 1998,
 Introduction 13
p. 251 at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20072045.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad7b
32165b237c6d488af21002f3b7707
15 Ibid.
16 Cindy Kleinmeyer, “Religions of Southeast Asia,” Northern Illinois University, June
2004 at https://www.niu.edu/clas/cseas/_pdf/lesson-plans/k-12/origins-religion.pdf
17 UNIPRO, “Hudhud and Darangen: Voices From Pre-Colonial Philippines,” 23 July
2015 at https://www.unipronow.org/oldblog/hudhud-darangen-voices-pre-colonial-
philippines.
18 Santanam Swaminathan, “Philippines-A Tamil Hindu Colony?,” Speakingtree, 27 January
2013, https://www.speakingtree.in/blog/philippines-a-tamil-hindu-colony.
19 For instance, some of his works established Indian connection like “Champa, Ancient
Indian Colonies in the Far East,” Vol. I, Lahore, 1927 and “Suvarnadvipa, Ancient
Indian Colonies in the Far East,” Vol. II, Calcutta.
20 George Coedes, Walter F. Vella (ed.) The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, trans.
Susan Brown cowing, University of Hawaii Press, 1968.
21 Refer Sanjaya Baru, India and ASEAN: The Emerging Economic Relationship towards
a Bay of Bengal Community, ICRIER Working Paper, No. 61, February 2001, p. 4 at
https://icrier.org/pdf/baru61.pdf.
22 Jan Wisseman Christie, “Javanese Markets and the Asian Sea Trade Boom of the Tenth
to Thirteenth Centuries A.D.,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1998, p. 367, at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3632418.pdf?
refreqid=excelsior%3A6997b2f45b4a2facdffbea22b0992427.
23 K. M. Panikkar, India​and​the​Indian​Ocean:​An​Essay​on​the​Influence​of​Sea​Power​
on Indian History, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1945.
24 For details see A. Mani and P. Ramasamy, “Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian
National Army: A Southeast Asian Perspective,” Ritsumeikan​ Journal​ of​ Asia​ Pacific​
Studies, at https://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/journal/RJAPS
_V22_Mani_Ramasamy.pdf
25 http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/1-executive-summary.pdf
26 India-ASEAN Cooperation, Public Diplomacy, Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, 2012, at https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19952/
IndiaASEAN+Cooperation.
27 Tan Tai Yong and See Chak Mun, “The Evolution of India–ASEAN Relations,” Journal
India Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
14736480802665170?scroll=top&needAccess=true.
28 S. D. Muni and See Chak Mun, “Asean-India Relations: Future Directions,” ISAS Special
Reports, 25 May 2012, pp. 8–9 at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/143456/ISAS_Special_
Report_05__-Asean-India_Relations_-_Future_Directions_New_25052012172612.pdf.
29 S. D. Muni and Rahul Mishra, India’s Eastward Engagement: From Antiquity to Act
East Policy, SAGE Publications India, 2019.
30 The break up of Soviet bloc, the Gulf crisis (Iran-Kuwait war) and internal political
instability are few that eventually resulted in fiscal indiscipline and rise in external debt
worldwide.
31 Refer Sanjaya Baru, India and ASEAN: The Emerging Economic Relationship towards
a Bay of Bengal Community, ICRIER, February 2000.
32 Mohammad Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies,
London, Routledge, 1990.
33 Ministry of External Affairs, India-ASEAN Relations, Government of India, https://me
a.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm.
34 Zhao Hong, “India and China: Rivals or Partners in Southeast Asia?,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 1, April 2007, p. 142.
35 Acronym represents the initials of the names of the original members, namely,
Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and subsequently Nepal and
Bhutan were added.
14 M. Mayilvaganan
36 Refer Statement to the India Media by Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee
at the conclusion of his visit to Bali and Thailand, Prime Minister’s Office,
12 October, 2003, at http://pibarchive.nic.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/roct2003
/12102003/r121020032.html.
37 Tan Tai Yong and See Chak Mun, “The Evolution of India–ASEAN Relations,” Journal
India Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
14736480802665170?scroll=top&needAccess=true.
38 Rajiv Sikri, India’s “Look East” Policy, Asia-Pacific​ Review, 23 June 2009, at https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13439000902957624.
39 Dr. Manmohan Singh Speech, at https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/content_
print.php?nodeid=441&nodetype=2.
40 Tan Tai Yong and See Chak Mun, n. 39.
41 Syed Hamid Albar, “ASEAN-India Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges,”
in India-ASEAN Partnership in an Era of Globalization. New Delhi: Research and
Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, 2002.
42 www.asean.org.
43 Thongkholal Haokip, India’s Look East Policy and the Northeast, SAGE Publications
India, 2015, p. 30.
44 Ministry of External Affairs, “Opening Statement by Prime Minister of India at the 12th
India-ASEAN Summit at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar,” 12 November 2014, Government
of India, at http://mea.gov.in/aseanindia/SpeechStatementASEM.htm?dtl/22566/Ope
ning+Statement+by+Prime+Minister+at+the+12th+IndiaASEAN+Summit+Nay+Pyi
+Taw+Myanmar.
45 Asian News International, “ASEAN Lies at Core of India’s Act East Policy, says PM
Modi,” India Today, 3 November 2019, at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/asean
-narendra-modi-1615308-2019-11-03.
46 Press Trust of India, “Swaraj’s 3-C Formula for Ties with ASEAN: Culture, Commerce,
Connectivity,” Business Standard, 6 January 2018, at https://www.business-standard.
com/article/current-affairs/swaraj-s-3-c-formula-for-ties-with-asean-culture-com
merce-connectivity-118010600452_1.html.
47 ASEAN-India, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Overview ASEAN-India
Dialogue Relations, November 2015, at http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/
images/2015/November/asean-india/Overview%20ASEAN-India%20Dialogue%20R
elations%20-%20November%202015.pdf.
48 “India-ASEAN Bilateral Trade May Double by 2025 to $300 Billion: Study,” Business
Standard, 12 November 2019, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/india-asean-bilateral-trade-may-double-by-2025-to300-billion-study-119111
200547_1.html.
49 Ministry of External Affairs, “Remarks by External Affairs Minister at Delhi Dialogue
X,” Government of India, 19 July 2018 at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statemen
ts.htm?dtl/30138/Remarks_by_External_Affairs_Minister_at_Delhi_Dialogue_X_J
uly_19_2018#:~:text=%22ASEAN%20is%20one%20of%20the,strategic%20concern
s%20and%20economic%20interests%E2%80%9D.
Part I

ASEAN and the emerging

security architecture
2 ASEAN at 50
External actors and its relevance
Subhadeep Bhattacharya

Introduction
In November 2020, the Philippines decided to extend the suspension period
of the proposed abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the
United States (US) by another six months so as to create a more enhanced, mutu-
ally beneficial, mutually agreeable and more effective and lasting arrangement.1
Announcing the decision, the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary T. Locsin also prayed
for the long life of the Philippines–US friendship and alliance.2 This announce-
ment holds immense significance in the context of the Philippine government’s
decision to terminate the VFA with the US in February 2020.3 However, in June
2020 the plan was suspended till November 2020.4 This episode establishes the
fact that traditional allies of the US in Southeast Asia still depend on the super
power’s protection against aggression. This decision is also significant in the con-
text of China’s appeal to neighbouring countries back in July 2017 to say “no”
to outside forces who attempt to interfere in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute.5
And Manila’s decision to continue the VFA with the US comes in the backdrop
of the growing alleged Chinese aggression in the SCS against which Manila has
erupted in protest.6
Vietnam, another major contender of China in the SCS region, has shared in
her defence white paper a desire to pursue stronger military ties with other coun-
tries. The National Defence Paper released in November 2019 said that “Vietnam
will consider developing necessary, appropriate defense and military relations
with other countries … for mutual benefits and common interests of the region
and international community.”7 Apart from this, the participation of Vietnam in
the Quad8 meeting in March 2020 to discuss the Covid-19 pandemic situation9
triggered analyses about possible “Quad Plus” security architecture against China
in the Indo-Pacific region.10
The US changed the name of Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command
in May 2018, thereby expanding the US security cover “from west coast of
the United States to western shores of India.”11 This change has integrated the
ASEAN region within the grand Indo-Pacific security architecture of the US. To
commensurate with this development, ASEAN issued its “Indo-Pacific Outlook”

DOI: 10.4324/9781003177173-3
18 Subhadeep Bhattacharya
in 2019 to “provide guidance to ASEAN engaging in Asia-Pacific and Indian
Ocean region (IOR).”12
The abovementioned developments in Southeast Asia in the last one-and-a-half
years underline the growing importance of an external actor (US in this case) in
the region lately, which is consistent with the geopolitical history of the ASEAN
region since 1947. Historically, external powers, or precisely former colonisers,
have kept the Southeast Asian region under their umbrella of protection. The
chapter looks at the history of such an involvement and attempts to analyse it in
the current context amidst the growing geopolitical rivalry between the dominant
power, the US, and the emerging power, China, in East Asia, 50 years after the
foundation ASEAN.
The 31st ASEAN Chairman Statement, released after the ASEAN meeting in
Manila on 13 November 2017, read: “We stressed the importance of maintain-
ing ASEAN Centrality and unity in our engagement with external parties and
in responding to regional security challenges.”13 The centrality of this Southeast
Asian organisation to the regional geopolitics of East Asia is most visible today
in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), each of which centres on
ASEAN. The significance of ASEAN in East Asian geopolitics is an undeniable
fact today. However, the external players’ presence in the regional geopolitics
has been consistent throughout the Cold War era given the dependence of the
local weak states on these external powers for security. Still, some regional states
attempted to develop an independent path to resolve local problems locally, result-
ing in the foundation of ASEAN more than 50 years ago. Now it is important to
review the ASEAN–outsider relations, especially when the regional geopolitics of
Southeast and East Asia is taking a new turn today amidst the rise of China and its
impact on the regional geopolitics.
ASEAN was founded amidst the tense climate prevailing in the Cold War
era. The fall of Beijing to the communist forces and the inconclusive end of the
Korean crisis drew the outside powers to the Southeast Asian region to suppress
“communist menace” in the region. The ensuing period saw the Southeast Asian
geopolitics strongly intertwined with Cold War rivalry, where local politics was
reflecting the global trend. The situation following the Maoist subversive strategy
of “People’s War”14 left the neighbourhood jittery, creating a surge both in internal
chaos and in external involvement in the region. During the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1976), China developed ties with the communist insurgent groups of
Thailand, Malaysia, Burma (today’s Myanmar), Indonesia and the Philippines,
frequently providing them with material support and setting up clandestine radio
stations on Chinese territory.15 ASEAN was founded in this tense environment.
Amitav Acharya has given an intriguing explanation of the foundation of
ASEAN. He argues that the failure of the great powers of Asian international
relations—Japan, China, India and also the US—“to create and shape a last-
ing regional organization” has led the weaker states of the region to promote
Asian regionalism in the form of ASEAN.16 He further argues that the reason
behind this collective action for security by these weaker Asian powers is the
 ASEAN at 50 19
capability–legitimacy gap among the great powers. According to Acharya, Asian
great powers like India, which initiated the process of Asian collective action
through Asian Relations Conference (1947) and the Bandung Conference (1955),
lacked the capability to sustain the leadership role due to limited resources.
Besides, weak Asian states like Burma (modern-day Myanmar) were anxious to
avoid being ruled by a big Asian power like India or China.17 On the other hand,
the US had the capability to lead but lacked legitimacy since the US-sponsored
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was suspected by the Asian coun-
tries of being created and dominated by a foreign super power. Similarly, Japan’s
Pacific Community idea of the 1960s and 1970s initially remained limited to the
advanced industrial countries of the Pacific like Japan, Australia, the US and
Canada, expanding in the ASEAN region only later, in the form of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, for the sake of legitimacy and
viability.18

The ASA and the SEATO

It is pertinent to mention here that ASEAN was not the first local initiative. Prior
to ASEAN, there were attempts made in the form of the Association of Southeast
Asia (ASA) and the MAPHILINDO, which consisted of Malaysia, the Philippines
and Indonesia, which can be termed as predecessors of ASEAN. The ASA, com-
posed of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, was founded on 31 July 1961 with
the objective of real economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Bangkok
Declaration, which founded the ASA, read that the association would be a “viable
economic alliance” amidst the Cold War tension, with renewed armed struggle
in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. It is worth mentioning here that
the members of the ASA, the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand, were having
the highest growth rates in Southeast Asia during the inception of the associa-
tion.19 However, the ASA was viewed as subordinate to American interests in the
Southeast Asian region. An American political commentator thus opined:

They have taken another first vital step toward the consolidation of all the
defence arrangements of the Far East, from Japan to New Zealand, into a sin-
gle sort of Pacific NATO, able to concert its defence efforts effectively. Such
consolidation could be the greatest victory for freedom since the creation of
NATO back in 1949.20

The founding members of the ASA were, however, keen to project the independ-
ent nature of their association, free from any external influence. The Philippines
was eager to brush off her tag as the “Asian subsidiary” of the US, due to the pres-
ence of American troops and military establishment in her territory.21 Therefore,
there was an urge in the ASA to be identified as an exclusively Southeast Asian
regional entity and its prime mission was economic cooperation, since this was
the way, the leaders concluded, the menace of communist subversion could be
countered.
20 Subhadeep Bhattacharya
Although initially uninterested in the ASA, in 1966 the US Secretary of State
Dean Rusk projected the body as a tool to share the US burden in the region.22 This
underlines the fact that the ASA was forwarding the anti-communist policy of
the US, which was further endorsed by Filipino Congressman Cornelio Villareal,
who described the ASA’s role as an extension of the SEATO.23 Therefore, it is
undeniable that the ASA, although projected as a regional initiative to handle
regional issues, was a local initiative complementary to the anti-communist mis-
sion of an external actor, the US.

Interest of external actors, the US and the UK

The US retained military and naval bases in East Asia even after World War II
and concluded the Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines in 1951. The main
reason behind the growing interest of the US in Southeast Asia was its intention
to thwart the growing communist influence in the region following the foundation
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet
treaty in 1950. According to the US National Security Council study of 1949, the
fall of Southeast Asia to communist forces would trigger “major political rout of
repercussions” from the Middle East to Australia.24 The famous Domino Theory
of President Eisenhower is also worth mentioning here. The “hub and spoke”
system integrated many anti-communist countries of East Asia with US security
architecture, resulting in the stationing of US bases in the Pacific region. The
Vietnam fiasco served to modify the US policy in the region, but it did not result
in the complete withdrawal of US forces from the ASEAN area as American pres-
ence continued in the Philippines.
British interest in post-war Southeast Asia, on the other hand, was rooted
in its own economic recovery and expansion of commercial linkages after the
war, where the area east of Suez was indispensable, and the Malayan rub-
ber and tin supply was an important economic source in the sterling area.25
Moreover, London shared the concern of the US regarding the communist
threat which it had to confront and suppress in Malaya. Eventually, however,
Britain decided to withdraw from the Southeast Asian scene through its East of
Suez policy by the end of 1971. By then the US had emerged as a major secu-
rity guarantor to the anti-communist regimes of the region through bilateral
as well as multilateral treaties formed in the 1950s, like the Mutual Defence
Treaty with Thailand and the Philippines and the ANZUS (Australia–New
Zealand–US) treaty and the SEATO, of which the UK also became a partner.
In fact, the UK was confident that the US would take up the responsibility of
defending Southeast Asia from the communist menace and protect the inter-
ests of the “free world,” including that of the UK.26

External factors in the founding of ASEAN

The foundation of ASEAN in this tense geopolitical climate was a significant
step made by the local powers. ASEAN can be termed as an attempt at regional
 ASEAN at 50 21
resilience against the local tensions fuelled by external interference. The purpose
of the foundation of ASEAN was to stabilise the Southeast Asian region following
Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia and the Malaysia–Philippines
dispute over the territory of Sabah.27 The prime objective of the ASEAN founder
members was to limit the external interference in the local affairs, like in Vietnam.
Scholars like Chintamani Mahapatra, however, argue that the foundation of
ASEAN was propelled by the changing mindset of the founder member regimes
towards the West, such as Indonesia’s wish to lessen its dependence on foreign
(Western) economic aid and to embolden its national economy, which Jakarta
hoped could be done via ASEAN.28 Thailand wanted to ensure that its foreign
policy did not become “unidirectional” towards Washington. The same concern
worked with the Philippines as well, which did not want to put all its “foreign
policy eggs in American basket.”29 Malaysia and Singapore had concerns of nor-
malising relations with Indonesia and the Philippines and of promoting regional
economic cooperation.30 However, the external factors that aided the foundation
of the association cannot be ruled out.
Professor Chintamani Mahapatra, questioning the apparent “politically neu-
tral” and “purely indigenous” character of the association, opines that “After all
the United States was already deeply involved in the Indochina imbroglio, and
it is doubtful if it kept its hands off events that led to the origin of ASEAN.”31
Presumably, he is implying the influence of the US behind the foundation
of ASEAN, given, in his opinion, the ASEAN countries’ association with the
US-dominated world economic system and the US security guarantee to these
non-communist regimes.32 Certainly, since the fall of Soekarno and the advent
of the Suharto era in Indonesia, the US–Indonesia relations developed amidst the
strong anti-communist policy of Suharto regime. Thailand and the Philippines
were treaty allies of the US, which guaranteed them physical security. Malaysia
and Singapore were under the British protection and pursued anti-communist pol-
icies internally. Moreover, Kuala Lumpur tacitly supported the Vietnam policy of
the US and provided counter-insurgency training to (South) Vietnamese military
and police personnel and a “modest amount of military supplies and equipment”
to Vietnam since 1964.33 Singapore, on the other hand, concluded an agreement
with the US under which it allowed its territory as a rest and recuperation centre
for Vietnam-based military forces and ships of the Seventh Fleet.34 Therefore,
ASEAN was a pro-West club promoting the “contain the communists” policy of
the non-communist external actors.

FPDA
A British analysis of the geostrategic map of the Southeast Asian region of the
late 1960s drew a grim picture. Nearly all the countries of the region seemed
to be “vulnerable to outside influence in one form or the other” due to prob-
lems ranging from minority issues in Burma and Malaysia, hostility from neigh-
bour in Malaysia and South Vietnam, political and economic mismanagement
in Indonesia and the fear of communist takeover in almost all the countries.35 In
22 Subhadeep Bhattacharya
that situation, the British unravelling plan of the late 1960s was partial since it
could not escape its defence liability towards the region completely. The absence
of British air defence was a matter of concern for the former British colonies,
Malaysia and Singapore, and the two British dominions, Australia and New
Zealand. Each of these countries had its own fear factor; Malaysia and Singapore
were interested in remaining under the British security umbrella, following the
confrontationist policy of Indonesia (although the Suharto regime had ended
the policy of Soekarno by then), while Australia and New Zealand considered
Indonesia a major security threat.36 The later conservative government (which
was voted to power in June 1970) in London modified the proposal of complete
withdrawal of forces from the region and decided to maintain “modest military
presence in the Far East.”37
By 1976, however, both the UK and Australia withdrew forces from Singapore.
This gradual British military unravelling from the region forced Malaysia and
Singapore to look towards the US as a security guarantee.38 The foundation of the
Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA) in 1971, bringing together Malaysia,
Singapore, Australia and New Zealand along with the UK, was in a way a British
assurance to the local powers which had enjoyed British security guarantee so
far. However, the relevance of the FPDA remains even today in the form of
the Asian Security Conference, commonly known as the Shangri-La Dialogue,
organised annually since 2001 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies
(IISS) in Singapore. But the importance of the FPDA gradually got diminished,
according to Damon Bristow, “by the strength of US commitments” since the
arrangements overlap with bilateral alliances, exercises and programmes (of
the US).39 However, the Shangri-La Dialogue has emerged as a major consulta-
tive forum, attracting external actors to share their views on the regional secu-
rity architecture of the Asia-Pacific region with the local players, including the
ASEAN members.
Therefore, ASEAN survived and sustained with an external protection guar-
antee. However, the desire for an exclusive role for local actors in handling
local affairs was genuine among the Southeast Asian leaders, and thus then
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik wanted an early stabilisation of the
region that “would not be exclusive ‘diktat’ of the major powers and insisted
on the Southeast Asian nations taking more responsibility in the maintenance
of the security of the area which should be acknowledged by the big powers.”40
Presumably, he implied that the external powers should recognise the respon-
sibility of the regional states regarding regional security. This sense of respon-
sibility was first reflected when ASEAN adopted the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace
Freedom and Neutrality) in 1971, which set the association’s relations with the
external actors. The ZOPFAN was the result of the Western unravelling policy
in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s which increased the possibility of Soviet and
Chinese assertion in the region.41 However, the effectiveness of the ZOPFAN
was minimal in the Southeast Asian region since it could hardly limit the grow-
ing involvement of Soviet Union, as was reflected in the Cambodian crisis,
especially after the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979.
 ASEAN at 50 23
Cambodian crisis, external actors and the relevance of ASEAN
The anti-Soviet policy of ASEAN reached its climax during the Cambodian crisis
when Vietnam, with tacit support from Moscow, replaced the barbaric Pol Pot
regime in Cambodia with the Heng Semrin administration. On the other hand, the
Soviet presence in the region grew in the late 1970s, after the Sino-Vietnam War
of 1979.42 ASEAN could hardly thwart the presence of the Soviet fleet in the SCS
during this time.
ASEAN, however, kept on pushing for the resolution of the Cambodian cri-
sis, but it was not until Moscow decided to withdraw from Southeast Asia that
ASEAN had a chance to play a role in resolving the Cambodian crisis. What is
noteworthy here is that the Cambodian crisis was resolved not by ASEAN but
by the USSR’s withdrawal. Even Vietnam’s ultimate withdrawal of forces from
Cambodia was the result of Moscow’s pressure rather than ASEAN’s demand. As
opined by Alan Collins, “Southeast Asian stability was achieved by external pow-
ers.”43 However, then Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda visited Moscow in
1988 and urged the Soviet leadership to convince Vietnam to soften its stand on
the Cambodian issue.44 Undoubtedly, without Soviet help the Cambodian crisis
could not have been resolved.

ASEAN, external actors in the post–Cold War period

The end of the Cold War led to the withdrawal of Soviet fleet from Vietnam,
which was followed by the withdrawal of the US forces from the Philippines
following the disapproval of the US–Philippines agreement to extend the US
naval presence in the Subic Bay in 1991 by the Philippine Senate. Thus, Manila
was interested in continuing the US security arrangement even after the end of
Soviet threat. Manila was not alone. Singapore also concluded a Memorandum of
Understanding with the US in 1990 to offer US aircraft and personnel its territory.
Not only this, following the US withdrawal from Subic Bay, Singapore agreed
to the relocation of logistics from the Philippines to Singapore in 1992.45 It is to
be noted here that since its foundation as a sovereign country in 1965, Singapore
has always opted for external protection to counter local threats. The first country
Singapore sought support from was India. Its leader, Lee Kuan Yew, wrote to then
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri for military support amidst the tense climate
during Singapore’s separation from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, but the
Indian government was unresponsive.46
The post–Cold War geopolitical scenario in Southeast Asia took a new turn
with the growing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS region. The growing impor-
tance of sea lanes for Chinese trade as well as its need for natural resources found
in the SCS region forced China to venture into the disputed waters of the SCS,
where Beijing is in dispute with many ASEAN members. The changing geopoliti-
cal map of Southeast Asia, with the rise of China in the post–Cold War period,
forced ASEAN to formally adopt a policy to engage the external forces, espe-
cially the US, in the regional affairs. This decision was formalised at the ASEAN
24 Subhadeep Bhattacharya
Summit in 1992 in Singapore.47 Since the early 1990s, ASEAN adopted a policy
of embracing as many outsiders as possible to balance any threat arising from
the local power, China. This was a cooperative security mechanism which also
included China, since Chinese economic potential could hardly be overlooked and
offered mutual economic benefits for the ASEAN countries.

ASEAN’s “omni-enmeshment” policy in the new century

“Enmeshment” is the process of deeply engaging or involving an actor in order
to integrate it with the system, in such a way that the actor’s interests, or even
identity, become integral to the order of the system.48 This strategy of the ASEAN
members is an attempt to ensure order in the ASEAN region, and beyond in the
whole Asia-Pacific region. And in today’s scenario when the rising China and
the dominant US are projected as rivals in the emerging 21st-century East Asian
geopolitics, ASEAN seems to be involved in a delicate balancing act. As Amitav
Acharya opines,

ASEAN is pursuing “double binding.” This involves a conscious effort by

ASEAN to enmesh both China and the United States in regional interde-
pendence and institutions so as to induce moderation on the part of China
and increase the cost of Chinese use of force. At the same time it would
discourage the United States from pursuing strategies of containment, which
ASEAN sees as dangerous and counterproductive.49

Given the traditional complex character of East Asian geopolitics, involving

both external and local powers, the responsibility of ASEAN as the guarantor of
tranquillity and stability is increasing in the present century. For this, an order-
based regional system is required, which ASEAN is attempting to formulate.
Thanat Khoman, former Thai foreign minister and one of the founder members
of ASEAN, said,

ASEAN cannot be contained within its narrow frame. World leaders,

impressed by its measured, effective and cool-headed manner of dealing
successfully with explosive problems, began to cultivate relationship with
ASEAN and gave it valuable support in its endeavours to maintain and
preserve peace and stability with its own indigenous resources, in a region
racked by, territorial, ideological and hegemonistic ambitions.50

Khoman had realised the growing importance of the regional body to the external
actors in the twilight of the Cold War era.
This realisation of the association was well reflected through its “omni-enmesh-
ment” strategy in the post–Cold War period. The foundation of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005) and ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+, 2010) are such attempts to “enmesh”
external actors with the regional order to ensure that dialogue is chosen over duel.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 — Ah, ça ! dis donc, j’espère que… hein ?… Ah ! mais non !…
Mauvaise affaire, crois-moi !… Et ça me ferait une peine !… Car,
vois-tu, n’oublie jamais ça : On se plaît mieux avec les mauvaises
femmes, mais, au fond, on préfère les bonnes… Qu’est-ce que c’est
que ce monsieur-là ?
— Ça, lui dit-elle, ça, Théramène, c’est le comte Paul
d’Aiguebelle, — mon futur !
Le vieux cabot, arrondissant largement le bras, porta sa main
droite sur le bord gauche de son feutre crasseux, et l’ayant soulevé
à la Frédérick-Lemaître, il prit la voix de Jean Hiroux pour dire, en la
saluant : « Peste, ma fille ! tu te mets bien ! » Puis, de sa voix
naturelle, la mieux cherchée, à la moderne, cette fois : « Mes
félicitations, comtesse ! » Style Bressant. Enfin, à la Mounet, il se
redressa, drapé dans une cape imaginaire, campa son feutre sur sa
tête, l’assura d’un coup de poing, et s’écria :

… Couvrons-nous, grands d’Espagne ! Oui, nos têtes, ô Roi,

Ont le droit de tomber couvertes devant toi !
Je suis Jean d’Aragon, rois, princes et valets !
… Et si vos échafauds sont petits, — changez-les !

— Et maintenant, acheva-t-il…, à la Tour de Nesle !… Je veux

dire : chez le charcutier…
Il sortit. Elle riait comme une folle :
— Rapporte-moi quelques saphirs ! lui cria-t-elle bêtement,
poussée par ce désir, qui ne la quittait jamais, d’opposer à sa misère
présente la fortune qu’elle appelait… Et elle riait, de son rire sans
joie.
 IV

Dans la soirée, quand le comte Paul et sa mère furent seuls tous

deux :
— Eh bien, mon fils, es-tu content de moi ?
— Toujours, je suis toujours content de vous, quand vous me
faites la grâce d’être en bonne santé.
— Oh ! ma santé ! ne parlons pas de ça. Que rien ne s’aggrave,
c’est le mieux qui puisse m’arriver… Vous savez, Monsieur,
poursuivit-elle avec enjoûment, que vous compromettez les jeunes
filles ?… On vous a vu seul, ce soir, dans votre coupé, avec une
charmante personne…
— Que vous êtes bonne, ma mère !…
Il lui prit les mains et les baisa doucement :
— Tout est donc changé, maman ? Expliquez-moi maintenant les
raisons de votre longue hésitation ? Je vous avoue que je ne jouis
pas encore du bonheur qui m’arrive… Qu’y avait-il donc ?
— Il n’y avait pas grand’chose. J’hésitais, c’est vrai… Je
doutais !… Je me donnais d’excellentes raisons pour retarder ton
mariage. Au fond, — eh bien oui, j’en conviens, — peut-être un peu
de jalousie ! C’est bien naturel. Nous en sommes toutes là : nous
aimons trop nos enfants… Figure-toi ! on vous fait grands, on vous
a, vous êtes à nous — et puis tout à coup on vous donne à des
inconnus, hommes ou femmes. Vraiment, c’est un peu dur… Tu ne
comprends pas ? Mon Dieu ! tu vas rire, mais rappelle-toi Perdreau,
ton braque allemand… (c’est pour te faire comprendre)… une bête,
ce n’était qu’une bête… Eh bien ! tu y tenais tant, tu l’aimais tant,
que tu n’aurais pu supporter l’idée de le voir à un autre. Est-ce
vrai ?… C’est comme ça !… Te rappelles-tu le jour où le
commandant Fournier l’emmena à la chasse sans ta permission ?…
Tu étais furieux ! On ne veut pas se l’avouer, mais on a de ces
mauvais sentiments sourds, tout au fond de soi… C’est l’abbé qui
m’a fait voir ça. Nous avons reparlé de Mlle Déperrier. Il l’a revue. Il
n’en peut dire que du bien. Certainement il y a autour d’elle quelques
relations qu’il faudra lui faire oublier — mais tu seras le maître… et
un maître si agréable à servir ! Tu auras la main ferme, et si légère !
Tu feras ce que tu voudras, sans effort, sans à-coups… Alors, l’abbé
m’a dit : « Méfiez-vous. Les raisons que vous me donnez n’en sont
pas… méfiez-vous de vous-même, de la jalousie maternelle. » — Et
puis, d’un autre côté, il s’en rapporte à ton sens, à ton jugement… Il
a raison. Il connaît si bien son élève !
— Et… serait-il indiscret de vous demander, ma mère, quels
motifs vous aviez d’abord invoqués contre mes projets ?
— Ça n’est pas indiscret, mais… j’aimerais mieux ne pas dire…
Tu te moqueras de moi, et quand tu t’y mets, tu es mordant, avec ton
esprit du diable !… Non, j’ai trop peur de mon fils !
Elle lui souriait, — et elle reprit :
— Parlons de Marie, toujours d’elle, tant qu’il te plaira, —
maintenant.
— Maintenant, c’est donc, pour vous aussi, très différent d’hier ?
Dites-moi ce que je vous ai demandé… Pourquoi vous déplaisait-
elle ?
— Tu y tiens beaucoup, entêté ?
— Beaucoup plus que je ne peux dire ! on s’exagère la valeur
d’une objection qu’on ignore… Répondez-moi, j’ai besoin de savoir.
Je serais trop tourmenté !
— Alors, je te le dis, soupira-t-elle… quoique cela me contrarie !
Il se mit à ses pieds, bien gentiment, prit de nouveau les deux
mains fluettes de sa mère dans les deux siennes, et lui dit, en la
couvrant d’un regard d’admiration :
— Ne le dites donc pas !… J’ai si peur de la moindre contrariété
pour vous ! Vous êtes une chose si adorée… et si fragile… maman !
 Elle dégagea une de ses mains et, lui frappant doucement la
joue :
— Câlin !… Mais si tu leur parles ainsi, tu les rendras toutes
folles, — les femmes ! Heureusement vous voilà fixé, mon chevalier
errant !… On vous a promis le bonheur… Qu’exigez-vous encore ?
— Rien, décidément, dit-il.
A travers son sourire, il laissa voir quelque peine.
— Mon Dieu ! que sais-je ! Tu es tourmentant ! Si je me tais, c’est
vrai, je te connais bien ! tu vas te faire des idées… Tu as une
imagination !… A quoi bon, pourtant, parler de cela, puisque c’est
passé, fini, enterré ?
— Justement !… Vous ne risquez plus de me désoler !
— Il faudra faire comme il veut ! Eh bien, je me croyais…
(sottement !) avertie par un instinct… J’étais même très fière de ma
faculté de pénétration !… L’abbé m’a reproché d’être superstitieuse,
et d’attacher trop d’importance à de certains détails…
— Vous me faites mourir d’impatience, dit Paul.
Elle voulait le contenter et ne savait plus de quelles précautions
entourer l’aveu demandé… Elle se débattait dans les incidentes,
dans les parenthèses, et n’en sortait plus.
« C’est donc bien effrayant ! » songeait-il.
— Jamais, bien entendu, poursuivit la comtesse, elle n’a dit ni fait
en ma présence une chose que j’aie pu lui reprocher… Et
cependant, j’étais contre elle, invinciblement… Enfin, puisque tu le
veux… Mais tu vas te moquer, et, encore une fois, j’ai très peur de
tes moqueries… Je t’assure !
— J’écoute, fit-il d’un air grave.
— Je peux bien te le dire, à présent que l’impression est
entièrement dissipée…
Elle soupira…
Tous ces retards, toutes ces réticences, exaspéraient l’attention
de Paul, lui en faisaient une douleur… Qu’allait-elle donc prononcer
d’effrayant, sa mère ? En croyant atténuer l’effet de ce qu’elle avait à
dire, elle le lui rendait redoutable, au contraire, et inoubliable !…
C’est que, sincèrement, elle se repentait de son erreur. Elle eut
préféré la cacher.
Elle reprit, tout d’une haleine, cette fois, et très vite :
— Après tout, cela est si absurde que cela tombe de soi-même…
Comment ai-je pu trouver important un détail si puéril ?…
Lui, il se sentait le cœur bondissant d’impatience…
— Quel détail ? dit-il.
— Eh bien ! mon ami, — quelquefois… pas toujours…
Elle s’arrêta, et, haussant les épaules, laissa tomber
négligemment cette phrase courte :
— Son rire me déplaisait !
Il y eut entre eux une gêne, et un silence bizarres.
Il croyait avoir mal compris. Ces mots n’éveillaient rien dans son
souvenir, rien ! Il se rappelait l’avoir vue rire… avec quelle grâce
jeune ! Il ne se rappelait pas l’avoir entendue…
Hélas ! un peu de pitié tendre lui vint pour la femme vieillissante,
si nerveuse, qui pouvait retarder le bonheur d’un fils parce qu’elle
n’aimait pas entendre rire la femme choisie par lui ! Il demeurait
interloqué, — comme un homme qui, s’attendant à rencontrer un
obstacle sérieux, et s’étant préparé, lancé même pour la résistance,
ne trouve rien devant lui.
— Ah ! dit-il, décontenancé… Son rire ? C’est tout à fait
curieux !… Et vous avez pu attacher à la tonalité d’un éclat de rire,
c’est-à-dire à la qualité d’un son qui est mécaniquement produit, et
où l’on ne met ni volonté, ni sens, — une importance décisive ?… Je
comprendrais à la rigueur qu’on eût de l’antipathie pour le timbre
d’une voix… quoique à la vérité on puisse avoir une vilaine voix
comme un vilain nez, sans que cela corresponde à une tare morale !
Il était bien trop amoureux pour entendre de sang-froid une
critique, même abolie, sur l’ensorceleuse. Il sentait même un peu de
colère. Sa voix tremblait légèrement.
 La comtesse fronça le sourcil :
— Ne vas-tu pas me gronder ?… Voyez-vous cela ! C’est toi qui
as exigé que je m’explique : j’ai obéi !… Et tu vois bien que c’étaient
là des folies, des visions de vieille femme !… Mais je me suis jugée
— et condamnée… C’est égal, tu dois quelque chose à l’abbé, je
t’assure !… Une tabatière, par exemple, le jour de ton mariage…
Allons, tu me l’amèneras demain, ta fiancée !… que je vous bénisse
de ces vieilles mains, qui auraient bonne envie de te battre !
Il se leva, dans un éblouissement de joie…
— Ah ! ma mère ! ah ! maman ! Voilà ce que j’attendais pour être
heureux tout à fait ! Voilà ce qui me manquait ! Votre bénédiction sur
elle, votre confiance en elle !… Ah ! que je suis content !
Elle s’était levée aussi, gaîment, toute vivante de la joie de son
fils, délivrée de toute arrière-pensée, changée, heureuse en lui !
— Ah ! maman ! C’est le bonheur ! c’est la joie ! Bonne nuit, ma
mère… chère maman ! Bonne nuit.
Il la quitta, et s’en fut tout courant réveiller Annette comme il
faisait quand elle était enfant… « Elle doit dormir comme un plomb !
Ça ne fait rien… Elle sera si contente de mon bonheur. » Mais il
n’était que dix heures du soir, et la petite masque veillait dans sa
chambre. Quand son frère entra, elle serra vivement un joli cahier à
fermoir où elle était en train d’écrire… à Albert — des choses
destinées à rester inconnues de tout le monde, même de lui, à
moins que… un jour…
— Petite sœur ! petite sœur ! Tu ne sais pas ! Je me marie !
On eût dit vraiment qu’il allait partir de ce pas pour la mairie
voisine.
— Maman veut bien ! Ah ! que je suis heureux !… Tu auras une
bonne et jolie sœur. Tu l’aimeras aussi, toi ? Tu me reprochais hier
d’être devenu silencieux ; pardonne-moi ; j’étais absorbé, inquiet.
Mais c’est fini. Je te conterai tout ça… Tu peux tout dire à Pauline…
Tout dire à Pauline !… Elle savait déjà son malheur, Pauline. Elle
l’avait deviné. Elle l’avait toujours pressenti. Sous prétexte de tenir
compagnie à sa mère infirme, elle vivait depuis quelque temps
presque confinée chez elle, repliée dans l’attente du mariage fatal.
Elle avait jugé Mademoiselle Déperrier une de ces charmeuses
contre lesquelles les simples bonnes filles ne peuvent pas lutter et
elle n’avait pas même essayé.
Annette, sa fine tête dans sa main, le coude appuyé sur le joli
cahier à fermoir, regardait son frère aller et venir par la chambre
comme un vrai fou. Au hasard de la rencontre, il déplaçait çà et là un
bibelot sur une étagère. Il dérangeait les chaises pour passer là où il
n’avait que faire. Il détruisait la belle ordonnance des petits cadres
dressés sur le guéridon. Il s’écriait : « C’est fragile, ça ? » et jonglait
avec ça, qui était fragile. C’était un flacon de jade ou quelque
mignonne boîte d’écaille… Et elle, toujours accoudée sur son livre
de confidences, heureuse du bonheur d’enfant que montrait son
frère, songeait : « Ah ! si Albert, un jour, pouvait m’aimer comme
ça ! »
 V

Mademoiselle Déperrier prit, dès le lendemain, avec Madame

d’Aiguebelle, l’attitude d’une personne qui n’aura jamais la sottise de
se targuer de ses avantages. Elle attendit toutes les avances. Elles
lui furent faites par cette mère qui se croyait menacée d’une mort
prochaine, et qui voulait assurer, avant de mourir, le bonheur de ses
enfants.
La petite Annette fut gentille, encourageante. Dans son cœur
tendre, délicat, formé par une telle mère, il y avait place pour cette
pensée que Mademoiselle Déperrier, devant se juger dans une
situation inférieure, était en droit d’attendre qu’on vînt à elle.
Çà et là Marie plaçait une phrase, apprise dans les livres ou au
théâtre, sur les vertus des conditions humbles, sur les énergies que
suscite la pauvreté ; et, sans affectation, rarement, mais d’un air
convaincu, parlait de Dieu, consolation suprême, — suprême
espérance.
Madame d’Aiguebelle, toujours, malgré elle, en observation, se
rassura bientôt, s’endormit dans sa confiance en Dieu, et dans
l’espérance d’un bonheur bien mérité par son fils. Elle le loua
chaque jour davantage, à la grande satisfaction de l’abbé, d’avoir
choisi une fille pauvre.
Le comte Paul confia un jour à Marie toutes les émotions, qu’il
avait éprouvées depuis leur première rencontre.
— Sans la crainte de n’être pas en parfait accord avec ma mère,
je vous aurais, dit-il, avoué beaucoup plus vite mes sentiments.
Il ajouta gentiment :
— Vous aurez toujours une rivale dans mon cœur ; c’est ma
mère. Ce ne sera jamais qu’elle. Vous n’en serez pas jalouse,
j’espère ?
Il souriait, plein de confiance. Elle lui rendit son sourire, le même,
très bien copié, avec une fidélité de miroir. Il lui dit alors et sa
tendresse pour la mère adorée, et les inquiétudes que leur donnait à
tous cette chère santé…
— Heureusement, avec ces maladies de cœur, on peut vivre très
vieux.
— Oui, dit-elle, distraite, on en meurt à cent ans…
Et trahissant aussitôt sa légitime préoccupation :
— Je n’ai donc pas eu le bonheur de plaire tout de suite à votre
chère maman ?
Elle savait fort bien à quoi s’en tenir. Mais elle voulait se montrer
d’abord incapable de ces divinations, étonnée ensuite d’une si
injuste méfiance. Elle aurait voulu, de plus, se faire renseigner sur ce
qui, en elle même, avait paru inquiétant aux yeux de la mère. Mais il
se contenta de lui dire :
— Je l’avoue, ma chère Marie, vous ne lui plaisiez pas tout
d’abord autant qu’aujourd’hui… Pourquoi, je l’ignore. — Ce sont là
de ces sentiments sans raison, inexplicables… des impressions de
malade, peut-être ! Mais vous l’avez conquise aujourd’hui,
entièrement conquise, — comme vous savez !
L’idée qu’avait eue sa mère, au sujet du rire de Marie, le fit rire
lui-même à ce moment.
Elle, ne riait pas. Elle réfléchissait, avec le sourcil un peu froncé.
Elle riait rarement devant lui, d’ailleurs, voulant se montrer très
noble, très digne.
Elle se rendait très bien compte de tout ce qui, en sa personne,
devait déplaire à la comtesse, qu’elle appelait, un peu tôt : « la
vieille ! » Elle trouvait que la « vieille » n’avait pas tort, au fond !
Cependant elle lui en voulait… Il y a dans la cervelle des êtres
mauvais ce jugement double : ils admirent et dénigrent l’esprit de
justice qui les blâme ou les condamne. S’ils le haïssent, ce n’est pas
seulement parce qu’il entrave leur course vers les buts rêvés, c’est
aussi parce que, en secret, ils le sentent et le confessent supérieur.
Tous les démons des légendes sont envieux des anges.
Il y a, en outre, dans l’acharnement que mettent les coquins à
accuser les honnêtes gens des pires vilenies, une affirmation de
l’idée de mal qui est une condamnation du mal trop peu remarquée.
Le pervers méprise hautement dans tous les autres hommes ses
propres défauts, ses propres vices, qu’il leur prête largement…
Donc, ce sont là choses méprisables.
Donc, le monde a raison de le mépriser, lui.
Ce retour de son propre mépris contre lui-même, c’est bien ce
qui l’irrite le plus, ce qui, par-dessus tout, l’exaspère, le rend
implacable.
Marie pensait deux choses de la mère de Paul. Premièrement :
« Qui sait ce qu’elle a bien pu faire, en sa jeunesse, cette vieille
collet monté ? » Deuxièmement : « Je la déteste, parce qu’elle a eu
raison de se méfier de moi !… Mais le temps viendra, je pense, où je
serai, chez elle, plus maîtresse qu’elle ! »
Elle répondit au comte Paul qu’elle sentait bien qu’aujourd’hui
Madame d’Aiguebelle n’avait plus aucune prévention contre elle.
— Vous pouvez en être sûre, ma chère Marie. S’il en était
autrement, je ne pourrais pas vous montrer mon amour avec cette
joie, avec cet abandon. Ma mère est et restera la grande
préoccupation de ma vie. Vous avez l’âme assez haute pour vouloir
qu’il en soit ainsi. Et c’est pourquoi je vous aime tant !
Hélas ! il excitait ce cœur aigri à détester ce que, lui, il aimait le
plus au monde !
— Que vous êtes heureux d’avoir une telle mère !
— Mais la vôtre ?
Elle soupira.
— N’en parlons pas ! J’ai eu tant à souffrir par elle ! — Elle n’est
pas méchante, certes ! Mais elle n’est pas caressante ; elle ne m’a
jamais été douce… Elle n’a pas touché à mon cœur d’enfant avec
les délicatesses qui font les cœurs de femme vraiment tendres,
vraiment bons, vraiment purs de toute mauvaise pensée. Elle m’a
inspiré quelquefois de ces rages, de ces colères qui diminuent un
caractère… Je ne suis pas aussi bonne que vous le pensez !
C’était vrai, qu’elle avait souffert par sa mère ; mais en le disant,
elle pensait à la pitié que cet aveu devait attirer sur elle ; elle
apportait une excuse touchante à tel défaut d’éducation qu’avait pu
lui reprocher la comtesse ; elle atténuait l’effet que la découverte du
caractère de Madame Déperrier devait faire un jour, fatalement, sur
son fiancé. Enfin, en révélant à quel point elle avait souffert par elle,
elle repoussait toute solidarité avec sa propre mère que, malgré tout,
elle couvrait généreusement de sa piété filiale ! Ainsi, sans cesse,
des calculs compliqués précédaient et guidaient ses paroles en
apparence les plus simples. Aucune spontanéité ne lui était possible.
Peu de temps après, — le mariage du comte Paul d’Aiguebelle
avec Mademoiselle Marie Déperrier était décidé. Madame
d’Aiguebelle avait parlé d’abord à Madame Déperrier. Il n’y eut pas
de demande solennelle. Les choses semblèrent, tout de suite,
arrangées depuis très longtemps.
Restait à fixer la date. On parla de la fin de janvier. Il fut convenu
que, en octobre, Mademoiselle Déperrier irait passer quelques
semaines au château d’Aiguebelle. Paul, pendant ce temps,
habiterait un cottage qu’il avait, à un quart de lieue d’Aiguebelle, sur
le bord de la mer. Comme il allait être heureux de pouvoir lui faire
visiter ce domaine d’Aiguebelle, avec ses grands bois de pins qui
dévalent en bataillons serrés, jusqu’à la mer, du flanc des collines
aux pentes légères. Ils se promèneraient ensemble, les heureux
fiancés, sur les plages de sable, à l’ombre des pins-parasols, sous
les mimosas, dans les lauriers-roses. Comme elle l’aimerait,
maintenant, ce Midi glorieux, fait pour servir de cadre à tous les
bonheurs rêvés ! Comme elle l’aimait déjà !
Les d’Aiguebelle quittèrent Paris vers le milieu du mois de juillet.
Deux mois plus tard, Marie leur annonçait la mort subite de sa mère.
La marquise de Jousseran, toujours bonne pour elle, lui proposait de
l’emmener à Hyères. Elles habiteraient la villa que venait d’acheter
cette aimable dame. Toutes deux partiraient bientôt, dans huit ou dix
jours.
On comprend qu’il ne pouvait plus être question, pour le moment,
d’aller, au château d’Aiguebelle, jouer les fiancées heureuses.
Marie écrivit toutes ces grosses nouvelles à la comtesse.
Elle ne pouvait s’empêcher de voir que la mort de sa mère ne
nuisait nullement à ses intérêts ; au contraire. Il n’y a pas de
malheur, si grand soit-il, qui ne contienne une part de bien, ou en lui-
même ou dans ses conséquences. Madame Déperrier était vraiment
gênante, parce qu’elle trahissait, plus que sa fille, la vulgarité de leur
race, les trivialités cachées de leur genre de vie. Dieu l’avait
rappelée à lui. Qu’y faire ? Il faut vouloir ce qu’on ne peut empêcher !
Mademoiselle Déperrier ne se désola pas longtemps. Cependant la
mort de sa mère lui interdisait la gaieté : Madame d’Aiguebelle, qui
ne la revit pourtant que huit mois plus tard, ne devait plus l’entendre
rire aux éclats. Ce fut un avantage dont Marie ne se douta point, et
ce fut le plus grand service que lui rendit jamais sa pauvre mère.
 VI

Avant de quitter Paris, pour aller passer le temps de son deuil

non pas à Hyères, comme celle l’avait voulu d’abord, mais dans un
couvent, à Lyon, Mlle Déperrier ne prit congé que de trois
personnes : sa sœur Madeleine le professeur, — son amie de
pension, Berthe de Ruynet, mariée à un marquis de boulevard et de
trottoir, — et Pinchard, le pauvre Pinchard, le père Théramène.
Avec sa sœur, elle avait eu une conversation froide, dans
laquelle elle lui avait fait comprendre, d’un ton sans réplique, que,
n’ayant pas, comme elle, un de ces bons métiers qui assurent
l’existence, elle garderait, jusqu’à nouvel ordre, les revenus de leur
mère… Elle était encore bien honnête, affirma-t-elle, car tous les
titres étant au porteur, il n’aurait tenu qu’à elle de les faire disparaître
sans même lui en parler… Enfin, elle espérait faire bientôt un beau
mariage ; elle récompenserait alors sa sœur de son dévouement.
Madeleine Déperrier se laissa imposer l’obligation de montrer ce
dévouement-là. Habituée dès l’enfance à se voir préférer sa petite
sœur, à se voir dépouiller pour elle de ses poupées et de ses
chiffons, elle la considérait tout de bon comme une de ces créatures
supérieures devant lesquelles on est contraint, par la destinée, de
s’effacer en toute occasion, à qui on ne peut, sans injustice,
appliquer la commune mesure.
Elle, Madeleine, n’était pas de celles qui se révoltent, mais bien
de celles qui se résignent. Le moyen, d’ailleurs, de résister, elle ne
l’avait pas eu toute petite. Maintenant le pli était pris. C’était une
écrasée. Elle essuya le verre de ses lunettes, terni par ses larmes,
et retourna à ses élèves.
Quant à Berthe, c’était le type banal de la mondaine évaporée.
Expérimentée toutefois, elle était de bon conseil dans les choses de
galanterie. Personne ne savait mieux qu’elle ce qu’une fille ou une
femme doit livrer pour assurer son triomphe sur les hommes, et doit
réserver pour n’être pas perdue. Avec toutes ses légèretés de
conduite, celle se maintenait dans un monde honorable par un
prodige de légèreté d’esprit, par une incomparable souplesse de
mouvements. — Était-elle ceci ou cela ? Ou, seulement, en avait-elle
l’air ?… Si c’était ça, elle aurait assez d’esprit pour se cacher…
« Non, ce n’est qu’une étourdie ! Et puis, elle est si amusante ! »
Sur ce dernier mot, on lui pardonnait tout. Berthe consultée à
fond une première fois, avait déclaré :
— Tes d’Aiguebelle ? Attends un peu… J’ai entendu parler de
ça… Ça fait partie de droit, même sans en être, de ces ligues qu’on
appelle : le Relèvement des âmes ou : la Morale reconstituée. Il y a
un fond de pasteur protestant, dans ces catholiques-là ! C’est
embêtant comme tout, mais ça se sauve par la campagne. Si tu
aimes les champs, ma chère, tu seras heureuse, je ne te dis que ça !
Si tu aimes le Midi, alors c’est un miracle : tu seras supra-heureuse.
Ils doivent y aller dans l’été, — quand les autres vont en Suisse, —
sous prétexte que les pays chauds paraissent mieux à leur avantage
pendant la canicule. Eh bien ! crois-moi, ne les contrarie pas, parce
que vois-tu, l’hiver ailleurs qu’à Paris, il n’en faut pas. En as-tu tâté ?
Non. Eh bien ! crois m’en sur parole, et fais tes conditions avant le
mariage !
Quand Marie, après la mort de sa mère, alla prendre congé de
Berthe et lui demander de nouveaux conseils, la sémillante petite
dame vit d’un coup d’œil instantané toute la gravité de la situation
nouvelle :
— Sac à papier ! la principale difficulté, — pas mince ! — c’est
que la noble mère de ton grave fiancé voudra te voir pleurer la
tienne. Prends garde à ça. C’est un retard d’un an. Ton écueil, c’est
le deuil… (Tiens ! des vers !) Si tu as l’air de désirer le mariage
malgré ton deuil… non, hein, là, vrai, tu sens que ça n’est pas
possible, avec leurs idées d’empotés !… Alors, que vas-tu faire ? Tes
gestes, tes paroles vont être épiés, pesés, ma chère, dans des
balances de bijouterie ! A ta place, je prendrais un parti crâne : au
couvent ! comme dans toutes les histoires écrites. Au bout de deux
mois, ton fiancé se sentira devenir fou, parce que l’absence, le
silence, ça nous embellit et ça les irrite… Il s’exalte. Il maigrit…
Cette fringale, non ! tu vois ça d’ici, et il t’enlève ! La mère, touchée,
vous bénit… car elle vous bénira, souviens-toi de ce que je dis. C’est
dans leur note. C’est inévitable… Et voilà mon ordonnance : au
couvent ! Fais-en ce que tu voudras. Quant à accepter l’offre de la
marquise de Jousseran, c’est fini, ça. Plus possible. N’y pense
même pas. Trouve un prétexte, — diable !
— Alors le couvent, tu crois ? dit Marie.
— Dame ! c’est au moins une idée à creuser. Creuse, ma chère.
Creusons ensemble. Mais à vue de nez, c’est ça… Voyons, ne
comprends-tu pas que tu te mets à l’abri de tout, dans un couvent ?
Tu as un rôle difficile à jouer, n’est-ce pas ? et devant des
connaisseurs sévères ?… Eh bien, disparais !… Et puisqu’en restant
muette dans la coulisse tu es sûre du grand succès, — n’hésite pas !
Le banquier Larrieu, qui rôdait sans cesse autour de Marie
Déperrier et venait à son jour, l’avocat Goiran, le baron Lagrène et
quelques autres, — elle ne les avertit pas plus de son départ, que
les bohèmes oubliés.
Elle demanda seulement à Berthe des nouvelles du petit Machin.
— Qui ça ?
— Eh bien donc, Lérin de La Berne, que nous appelions l’Écrin
de La Perle.
— Ah ! lui ? il t’aime toujours, pardi ! Seulement, si tu voulais, toi,
— pourrait-il, lui ? Voilà la question : Être ou n’être pas !… Mais il est
à garder, dans la collection. Un polichinelle de plus dans un guignol
complet, c’est toujours drôle. Il y a des moments où il me fait pitié, à
moi, et où j’aurais envie de l’essayer, pour lui complaire… et aussi
pour savoir… Non, il est tortillant ! Allons, adieu, ma chérie. Tu vas
m’oublier ? Non, hein ? Pense à moi, dans tous les moments
graves… Ne cède rien jamais avant de tenir tout… Comment dit
Méphisto, ce bon Méphisto, qui est un diable pour rire ? Il n’a pas
tort tout de même, quand il nous chante :
 N’ouvre ta porte, ma belle,
Que la bague au doigt,
Que la bague au doigt !

Elles s’embrassèrent, — se quittèrent, se reprirent, échangèrent

un dernier compliment :
— Tu es toujours plus jolie !
— Toi aussi. — Et Berthe sortit sur un dernier papotage :
— Le noir te va bien, tu sais ? C’est une veine pour toi, d’être en
noir ! Et puis, c’est romantique ; il y a des hommes que ça monte !
J’en ai connu un, moi, qui ne pouvait aimer que des veuves, — en
costume. Prends note encore de ça. S’il n’est qu’amoureux, ton
bonhomme, il va devenir fou, et s’il est fou, il va falloir l’attacher…
Allons, au couvent ! comme dit Hamlet ! Au couvent, ma chérie !…
Tu verras l’effet !… Et joue serré. L’enjeu en vaut la peine, —
comtesse !
Berthe, sur ce mot qu’elle prononça pompeusement, exécuta
avec ostentation une révérence selon la formule.
Marie voulut voir Pinchard et le fit demander. Il n’avait plus paru
depuis quinze jours ou trois semaines. Elle s’en étonnait. Il fit
répondre qu’il était malade. Elle alla le voir chez lui.
Elle ne s’expliqua pas quel sentiment la poussait. C’est que, dans
ce cœur desséché, tous les bons germes n’étaient pas encore tout à
fait morts. Elle avait une inconsciente reconnaissance pour ce
pauvre diable. C’était celui qui demandait le moins, autour d’elle.
Dans la façon dont elle traitait tous les hommes, il y avait un mépris,
certain, du mobile qui les attirait autour d’elle. C’était l’excuse à sa
sécheresse de cœur. Tous étaient les intéressés de la galanterie.
Elle ne connaissait de l’amour que cet âpre élément : le désir des
hommes, tantôt brutal, tantôt insinuant, toujours égoïste. Elle se
vengeait. Qui sait ce qu’eût fait d’elle une tendresse vraie, une
sollicitude attentive qui aurait veillé sur son enfance ? Son père avait
été trop occupé, sa mère lui avait appris à dédaigner le père et à le
maltraiter souvent en paroles. A cause de cela même, elle avait
méprisé sa mère, tout en lui obéissant. Elle ne s’était attachée à
personne. Même son inclination pour Léon Terral était mêlée de
révolte. Elle eût voulu le confondre avec les autres et elle y tâchait ;
mais quelque chose de plus fort que la vie et que la mort, que la
vengeance et la haine, parlait en elle dès qu’elle le nommait. De
mystérieuses affinités correspondaient d’elle à lui. Nul n’a jamais su
dire les secrets de philtre qui font de l’amour physique lui-même un
mystère d’âme.
Quant à ce pauvre Théramène qui, si ingénument, disait :
« Déjeunerai-je encore, ma fille ? » il était pareil à ces vieux chiens
fidèles qui viennent au maître pour la pâtée d’abord, — c’est
entendu, — mais qui, à force d’être reconnaissants parce qu’ils ont
été bien nourris, sont capables de quitter le meilleur os de poulet
pour suivre leur maître aussi affamé qu’eux. Le vieux Pinchard fut
touché aux larmes de la voir arriver chez lui :
— Te voilà, princesse ? Et ton mariage ?
Brièvement, elle lui conta tout. Il frappa dans ses mains, joyeux :

— Paraissez, Navarrois, Maures et Castillans !

Il aurait voulu avoir à la défendre contre quelqu’un. Il avait pris un

mauvais rhume. Il toussaillait et déclamait d’une voix rauque. Il était
vêtu d’un costume étonnant, noir et pourpre, velours et soie. Il avait
une chemise sale avec des manchettes très longues.
— As-tu vu mon palais ? Examine, petite Rita… Quatre murs. Un
lit. Tout ce qu’il faut pour crever. Mais, sur les murs, l’art et la gloire !
Contemple-moi ça !
Il y avait sur les murs des journaux illustrés, fixés par quatre
épingles, représentant des scènes de théâtre.
— Ça, c’est moi dans Hernani, à la Comédie française, 1869, la
grrande reprrise ! Je jouais un des muets, au quatrième acte. J’étais
en nègre, comme Kean dans Othello !
— Et ça ?
 — Ça, c’est Mounet-Sully dans Hamlet… Il y a une dédicace ; lis
donc.
Le grand tragédien avait gentiment écrit une dédicace, au dos de
son portrait ; l’aumône d’une miette de considération au pauvre
affamé de gloire : A notre vieux camarade Pinchard, Mounet-Sully.
Et, autour des photographies d’acteurs illustres, flottaient
quelques rubans flétris, hommages d’un soir que Pinchard avait
gardés en souvenir de ses triomphes dans toutes les sous-
préfectures.
— Nous ne nous verrons pas de longtemps, mon vieux
Théramène. Je quitte Paris… Je suis venue te voir. Tu as toujours
été bon pour moi. Tu n’as pas voulu nous quitter, quand je t’ai donné
ton congé… Et puis — je ne sais pas — tu me rappelles maman !
Elle ne savait pas, en effet, ce qu’elle éprouvait. Malgré tout, une
émotion sourde lui venait au nom de sa mère. Quelque chose
d’inutilement bon était au fond de son cœur, comme un germe
impuissant mais animé encore. Même quand l’arbre est tout à fait
mort, il garde quelquefois, dans ses racines les plus profondes, un
désir souterrain, un peu de vie obscure, persistante, qui regrette la
belle lumière, et qui l’aime sans effet.
Théramène se répandit en expressions de reconnaissance.
— Ça me fera un gros vide, de ne plus t’avoir à Paris. Enfin, c’est
ton bonheur… Tant mieux. Et puis, tu sais, rappelle-toi que tu as un
ami, et qu’au besoin, si tu l’appelais, le père Théramène arriverait
toujours, comme un bon toutou de berger… C’est dit, hein ?
Il déclama :

— On a souvent besoin d’un plus petit que soi.

Tiens ! c’était vrai, cela. Depuis un instant, elle n’y pensait plus ;
mais, au fond, elle était venue lui demander ça. Qui peut prévoir
l’avenir ? La vie est si bizarre !
 Il voulut l’embrasser. Elle lui tendit ses deux joues, — et quand
elle le quitta sur l’étroit palier, elle vit dans ses yeux tout
tremblotants, un luisant de larmes qui la troubla. Il lui semblait qu’elle
prenait congé, pour toujours, d’un passé où, en somme tout n’avait
pas été malheureux. Elle mourait à quelque chose qui avait été sa
vie libre, quasiment sincère. Elle entrait dans son avenir, dès
aujourd’hui, dans l’inconnu effrayant ; elle entrait, comme masquée,
dans un mensonge sans fin. Elle dépouillait sa personne la plus
naturelle. La vraie comédie allait commencer et il faudrait jouer tous
les jours !… Ah ! tous les cabotins ne sont pas au théâtre !
— Est-ce bête ! voilà que je pleure !… Adieu, père Théramène.
— Bonne chance ! lui dit naïvement le pauvre professeur de
diction et de maintien.
Quatre jours plus tard, une lettre d’elle apprenait à la comtesse
Louis d’Aiguebelle son intention arrêtée d’aller passer dans un
couvent, à Lyon, le temps de son deuil.
« Est-ce que c’est vrai ce que m’annonce madame de Ruynet, lui
écrivit Léon Terral, — que vous allez vous marier ? »
Elle lui répondit du couvent : « C’est vrai. »
 VII

Elle y était, au couvent. Et même, bien vite, dès le soir de son

arrivée, elle fut prise d’une folle envie d’en sortir, d’une haine pleine
d’horreur pour les murailles hautes et paisibles du grand parc, pour
la blancheur froide des corridors et de sa chambre, pour l’austérité
de la chapelle. Mais, qui veut la fin veut les moyens.
Elle se roidit de toutes ses forces contre la terreur et la
répugnance que lui inspira ce lieu de paix, — contre l’agitation
nerveuse dont elle se sentit saisie tout d’abord dans ce grand calme
effrayant.
Ce milieu de prière, de silence, de tranquillité, de piété, la
repoussait d’une force étrange, qu’elle éprouva cruellement. Mais
elle avait un but à atteindre, au dehors, dans le monde. Cela exigeait
qu’elle sût souffrir quelque temps ici, dans cette prison. Elle donna
l’ordre à tout son être révolté d’obéir.
Elle avait, pour le mal, les mêmes patiences héroïques que les
martyrs ont pour le bien.
Elle pensa que ce serait l’affaire des premiers jours, cette
souffrance de prisonnière ; que l’accoutumance viendrait vite. Elle se
mit à lire des livres de piété, machinalement, pour faire quelque
chose, mais la pensée de ses intérêts, de l’avenir convoité, dominait
en elle toutes les autres, comme un son strident de clairon domine
un grand tumulte. Et elle ne pensait qu’à cela, à cet heureux moment
où, mariée enfin, elle tiendrait son espérance réalisée. Elle se voyait
au jour du mariage, triomphante comme une reine, — puis installée
dans la résidence d’été du comte Paul, puis dans leur hôtel de la rue
Saint-Dominique. Ces chimères lui semblaient des réalités
présentes. Son livre, ouvert sur ses genoux, glissait parfois,
lentement, jusqu’à terre, sans qu’elle s’en aperçût ; et elle avait,