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Artefacts of Writing: Ideas of The State and Communities of Letters From Matthew Arnold To Xu Bing 1st Edition Peter D. Mcdonald
Artefacts of Writing: Ideas of The State and Communities of Letters From Matthew Arnold To Xu Bing 1st Edition Peter D. Mcdonald
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A RT E FA C T S O F W R I T I N G
Artefacts of Writing
Ideas of the State and Communities of Letters
from Matthew Arnold to Xu Bing
PETER D. McDONALD
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
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© Peter D. McDonald 2017
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2017
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017935543
ISBN 978–0–19–872515–2 (hbk.)
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Picture to yourself this universe of script and print and inscription. Does it not
seem as if man had added a new realm to nature? Everyone that has eyes can see
this language, and few suspect their liability to confound it with anything else.
Andrew Ingraham, 1903
Because we have failed to see the great character of India in relation to the
world as a whole, we have been inclined in our thoughts and actions to follow
a much-diminished idea of it, an idea bred of our calculating minds that casts
no light. Nothing great ever comes of this kind of thinking.
Rabindranath Tagore, 1921
List of Illustrations ix
Note to the Reader xi
Introduction 1
PA RT I : 1 8 6 7 – 1 9 4 5
1. Oxford at the Crossroads: England and the world beyond 35
‘Dead languages (laughter), talk of culture’ 35
Foreign words 39
The Law of National Character 49
A League of Minds 59
PA RT I I : 1 9 4 6 – 2 0 1 4
Prologue: The ‘C’ in UNESCO: A very short introduction153
Notes 273
Acknowledgements 305
Select Bibliography 307
Index 321
List of Illustrations
I.1. Map showing some of the literary geographies traced in this book. 29
1.1. Photograph of Matthew Arnold’s ‘dreaming spires’ from Henry W. Taunt,
The Oxford Poems of Matthew Arnold (Oxford: Henry W. Taunt, 1911), 74. 36
1.2. James Murray’s diagram of the English language from ‘General Explanations’,
A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, vol. 1 (1884), xvii. 45
1.3. Still from Mary Field (dir.), ‘History of the English Language’ (1943)
illustrating that the English word ‘plunder’ is borrowed from German.
© British Council Film Collection. 48
1.4. Anon., ‘The Dublin Orator’ (c. 1759), showing Thomas Sheridan addressing
the scholars of Oxford about the importance of studying English. © The
Trustees of the British Museum. 50
3.1. Portrait of the artist as a young anarcho-socialist: photograph of James Joyce
by Camille Ruf, Zurich, c. 1918. The Poetry Collection of the University
Libraries, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York. 124
3.2. Final page of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939), by permission
of Faber and Faber. 149
A.1. UNESCO’s neoclassical logo, by permission of UNESCO. 157
4.1. Front cover of Mphahlele’s newsletter The Voice of Africa (December 1950). 174
4.2. Front cover of the UNESCO Courier (December 1961) commemorating the
centenary of Tagore’s birth. 177
5.1. Front cover of the school edition of F. A. Venter’s Swart Pelgrim (1961),
highlighting the story’s rural and ethnic preoccupations. Reproduced by
permission of NB Publishers. 193
5.2. Front covers of J. M. Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K (1983),
Ravan Press: Johannesburg and Foe (1986), Ravan Press: Johannesburg,
in their first South African editions, drawing attention to K’s minimalist
identity and the question of the English writing system. The British
publishers used the same designs. By permission of Pan Macmillan SA. 201
6.1. Inside page of Antjie Krog’s Lady Anne (1989) with quotations from various
sources, including the extract from Contending Ideologies in South Africa
(1986). Reproduced by permission of NB Publishers. 213
6.2. Title page of Antjie Krog’s Lady Anne (1989) showing one variety of
‘tongvis’. Reproduced by permission of NB Publishers. 215
7.1. Title page of Arvind Krishna Mehrotra’s little magazine damn you 6
(1968), by permission of Arvind Krishna Mehrotra. The Rare and
Manuscript Collections Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University,
New York. 228
x List of Illustrations
7.2. Front and back covers of Arun Kolatkar’s Jejuri (1976) juxtaposing the
religious and the secular. By permission of Adil Jussawalla. 242
8.1. Marginal notes on Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988) faxed
around the world by the UK-based Islamic Foundation. Western Cape
Provincial Archives and Records, Cape Town. 245
8.2. F. N. Souza’s self-portrait ‘Ulysses’ (1988) that provided part of the
inspiration for Amit Chaudhuri’s Odysseus Abroad. By permission of
Amit Chaudhuri. 257
P.1. Xu Bing’s 天书/Tiānshū or Book from the Sky (1987–91) showing
Buddhist sutras or scrolls hanging from the ceiling, traditional
paper-bound and thread-stitched books set out across the gallery floor,
and modern poster-style newspapers covering the walls. Installation view at
‘Crossings’, National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa, 1998. © Xu Bing Studio. 264
P.2. Close-up of one book from Xu Bing’s 天书/Tiānshū or Book from the Sky
(1987–91) showing the pseudo-characters. © Xu Bing Studio. 266
P.3. Interior pages of Xu Bing’s Book from the Ground (2012).
© Xu Bing Studio. 269
P.4. Front cover of Xu Bing’s Book from the Ground (2012), highlighting
the figure of ‘Mr Black’. © Xu Bing Studio. 271
Note to the Reader
I use two styles of referencing in this book. To refer to most printed, archival, and digital
sources I use Arabic numeral endnotes in the conventional way. For any additional infor-
mation, I use webnotes cued by lower-case Roman letters that refer you to the supplemen-
tary website for this book. By incorporating a diverse range of primary materials, including
images, interviews, and music, the website also uses the Internet’s multimedia capacities to
think beyond the relatively static medium of the book, extending its scope and replaying its
major themes in a different key.
The site can be found at <http://www.artefactsofwriting.com>.
Introduction
‘A RT E FAC T S O F W R I T I N G’
This book is about the challenges some forms of literary writing pose to the way
states and multistate bodies have conceptualized language, culture, and commu-
nity since the 1860s. The fact that it is also about the way you might at this point
be looking at its main title needs some preliminary explanation. The epigraph from
Andrew Ingraham, the nineteenth-century American educationalist, and accom-
plished dabbler in philology and philosophy, sets the scene. ‘Everyone that has eyes
can see this language’, he remarked in one of his Swain School Lectures (1903), but
few stop to consider ‘its origin, its changes, its relation to other phenomena both
in and out of language’ and ‘few suspect their liability to confound it with anything
else’.1 Why is this? And why should we care? But first of all, why did Ingraham care
more than a century ago?
Ingraham would in all likelihood have disappeared from history had I. A. Richards
and C. K. Ogden not made a passing reference to him in The Meaning of Meaning
(1923) where he appears as a ‘little-known’ exponent of linguistic scepticism.2 To
illustrate his thinking, they quoted the following nonce-English sentence from
another of his Swain School Lectures: ‘The gostak distims the doshes’.3 The sentence is
obviously nonsensical, since no one knows what the three pseudo-words mean,
but, given the conventionality of its underlying syntax—in this case, the simple
subject-verb-object structure—it nonetheless conjures up a world about which
certain claims can be made. ‘We know that the doshes are distimmed by the gostak’,
Ingraham noted, and that at least ‘one distimmer of doshes is a gostak’. ‘And so we
may go on’, he commented, ‘and so we often do go on, not employing the words
to stand for things, or to call up thoughts in our minds, but to replace things, to
be substitutes for thought’ (154). In the same lecture series, he showed how we
often ‘go on’ in much the same freewheeling way about everyday words and phrases
such as ‘Europe’, ‘the English Constitution’, and ‘the English language’, conjuring
up more proxy things, other ersatz thoughts (148).
Given their own concerns about the ‘hypnotic influences’ of what they called
‘word magic’, Ogden and Richards recognized the force of Ingraham’s scepticism
and its wider significance in the new era of mass democracy.4 At a time ‘when new
millions of participants in the control of general affairs must now attempt to form
personal opinions upon matters which were once left to a few’, they observed,
there was a need not just for linguists and philosophers but for ‘practical persons’
to reflect on the ‘profound influence of superstitions concerning words’.5 They also
2 Introduction
believed it was necessary to ‘examine critically the most important of all the instru-
ments of civilization’ because language constitutes ‘the most conservative force in
our life’.6 Following the Polish anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski, whose study
of the oral culture of the Trobriand Islanders in New Guinea appeared as a supple-
ment to The Meaning of Meaning, they accepted that these ‘superstitions’ could be
traced back to ‘the linguistic illusions of primitive man’ who believed in the efficacy
of verbal ‘spells’.7 Yet, in their view, such beliefs persisted at all levels of contemporary
literate society as well—‘throughout the whole religious world’, in the daily press,
which threatened democracy ‘by the dissemination and reiteration of clichés’, and
‘in the work of the profoundest thinkers’.8 They were especially critical of ‘modern
Platonists’—notably nineteenth-century German idealists—who believed in ‘the
doctrine of the Logos, variously conceived as the supreme reality, the divine
soul-substance, as the “Meaning” or reason of everything, and as the “Meaning” or
essence of a name’.9 As they saw it, however, the answer to all this mystification lay
not in Ingraham’s scepticism, which they felt tended towards ‘linguistic nihilism’,
but in a new positivistic ‘science of Symbolism’ that promised not just to dispel
‘verbal superstitions’ by clarifying the relations among words, thoughts, and things,
but to put knowledge, and indeed democracy, on a more secure footing.10
Ingraham was not the first and he was certainly not the last exponent of linguis-
tic scepticism. And, at one level, there was nothing very original about the critique
of language he proposed which owed much to a well-established tradition of anti-
Platonic nominalism. Explaining his wariness about the way ‘the English language’
is commonly conceptualized, for instance, he argued that if we think the phrase
refers to some ‘ideal’ or ‘abstract’ entity, then we have to conclude that ‘what we
call English does not exist at all’ (137–8). To demonstrate this, he showed how
even a simple question like ‘Where is the English Language?’ turns out to be far
more challenging than it seems when posed philosophically. He was not asking ‘in
what localities on earth speakers of English are found?’, a relatively straightforward
matter of geography, but in what ‘states’ the language could be said to exist, a much
trickier problem of ontology (121, 127). ‘All I can find is a scrap here, a bit there’,
he wrote, ‘and the English language I fear I shall never get to hear or to see or to know’
(138). So far, so familiar. What gave his nominalism a degree of originality was the
radical conception of difference that underpinned it—his taxonomy of six distinct
linguistic ‘states’. Clarifying the ontological challenge as he saw it, he distinguished
‘sight-English’ (writing), ‘sound-English’ (speech), ‘vibration-English’ (sound waves),
‘movement-English’ (expressed, for instance, by the mouth and larynx), ‘nerve-
English’ (neural activity in the brain), and ‘thought-English’ (the language of inner
reflection) (139). The marks made ‘on the cylinder of the phonograph’ constituted
a further state and he would no doubt say the same about the coded form of the
language recorded in binary on computer files today (127). His main point was to
show how each ‘state’ constitutes a unique world of its own. Given the physiology
of ‘nerve-English’, for instance, he believed ‘sight-English’ had to be sharply distin-
guished from ‘sound-English’ since ‘no physiologist doubts that something differ-
ent is going on in the brain when one writes and when one speaks, when one hears
and when one reads’ (130). He consequently agreed with the nineteenth-century
Introduction 3
German linguist Friedrich Techmer who recommended ‘the separate and distinct
learning of the spoken and the written language’, so that young readers learn to
link ‘the spoken word with the meaning, the written word with the meaning’ with-
out ‘as is usually the case in schools’ associating ‘the spoken and the written’ (131).
As we shall see, this is not a view that finds much favour among contemporary
cognitive neuroscientists.
Ingraham’s other reasons for insisting on the sight–sound distinction are less
controversial. Even though the English writing system is conventionally considered
phonetic, or sound-based, it is, in his view, best thought of as a distinct cultural
artefact—a ‘universe’ of its own ‘as if man had added a new realm to nature’ (122).
Commenting on the notorious opacity of its orthography, which has long exer-
cised spelling reformers, he observed: ‘Here a character that stands for a single
sound, and again for a group of sounds, and here one that represents a whole word
or sentence; and another that does not stand for a sound at all, but for some idea;
here again characters that have ceased to stand for anything, and there others that
never did stand for anything’ (122–3). The main title of this book bears out his
observations, particularly if we compare the three words, or eighteen substantive
characters, in their conventional orthography to two other notations—the
International Phonetic Alphabet and the Oxford English Dictionary’s (OED) own
less technical phonetic rendering. In each case, the transcription attempts to
capture what the lexicographers take to be a standard British pronunciation:
Artefacts of Writing
/ˈɑːtᵻfakts/ /ɒv/ /ˈrʌɪtɪŋ/
ah - t - i - f - a - kts / o - v / r - eye - t - i - ng11
The dual task the letter ‘i’ performs in ‘writing’, standing both for the long /ʌɪ/ (as
in ‘fly’) and the short /ɪ/ (as in ‘pit’), which is further complicated by the ‘e’ in ‘arte-
facts’ (comparable to the /ᵻ/ sound in ‘business’); the silent ‘W’; the non-phonetic
markers, including the uppercase letters and the italics that follow the printing con-
ventions for book titles—these are just some of the more conspicuous points at
which the written characters and spoken sounds diverge, giving the lie to the adage
about things being ‘as easy as ABC’. This is even more obvious if we recall that the
sounds articulated as /rʌɪt/ (‘r - eye - t’) can be written as ‘write’, ‘right’, ‘wright’, or
‘rite’. Ingraham’s argument is more difficult to sustain in the case of other languages
based on the Latin alphabet, some of which, like Italian, are far more transparent,
but, as these title words show, he had good reasons for distinguishing the two key
‘states’ of English or, at least, for questioning our ‘liability to confound’ them.
Having appealed to physiology and orthography, he then turned to history. The
quirks of the ‘seen language’ arose, he noted, because it had ‘for more than 800
years’ been ‘shading off in place and time into other languages without number; so
that it is hard to say where the English language ends, and where something else
begins—some language that is not English’ (121–2). This long, ongoing, and end-
lessly protean history, which predated the Norman Conquest of England in the
eleventh century—the transformative event Ingraham highlighted—is also present
in the title of this book. According to the OED, the word ‘artefact’, meaning ‘an
4 Introduction
I D E A S O F T H E S TAT E
‘in the direction of intensifying the sort of homeostatic conservation found in non-
literate cultures’ (337). This pattern repeated across other areas of cultural life as
well. Whereas the Chinese writing system reflected the ‘concreteness of Chinese
thought’ as well as its ‘primary concentration on social action and traditional
norms’, once again making it ‘an articulate expression of what happens in an oral
culture’, the Greek system gave rise to a ‘new kind of logical method’, identified
with the syllogism, and ‘our accepted categories in the fields of knowledge’—
‘theology, physics, biology and so forth’ (330, 337). For Goody and Watt, these
various intellectual script-effects, which, to use Ingraham’s formulation, could be
considered to reside in language, extended beyond language as well. Because ‘the
alphabet makes it possible to write easily and read unambiguously about anything
which the society can talk about’, ancient Greece created the first ‘really literate
society’, laying the foundations for ‘democracy as we know it’ (332). In ‘the
Hellenic world’, they claimed, developing a stock historical genealogy John Dunn
rightly rejects, ‘diverse people and countries were given a common administrative
system and a unifying cultural heritage through the written word’ that was accessible
to ‘a majority of free citizens’ (332).23 By contrast, taking their cue in part from
Gelb’s Study of Writing, the Chinese system fostered ‘a literate elite of religious,
administrative and commercial experts’ that ‘maintained itself as a centralised gov-
erning bureaucracy’ (314). Importantly, these conservative political consequences
arose not just because it is difficult to learn thousands of individual characters—a
point few Chinese readers would deny today—but because ‘pictographic and logo-
graphic systems are alike in their tendency to reify the objects of the natural and
social order; by so doing they register, record, make permanent the existing social
and ideological picture’ (314–15). Again, this propensity to reinforce a traditional
‘collective attitude’ at the expense of innovative ‘individual thought’ was also a
hallmark of West African oral cultures (315). As this summary account shows,
their analysis of such ‘intrinsic differences’ presupposed a familiar story of progres-
sive modernization at every point.
Recognizing the potentially controversial nature of their central thesis, Goody
and Watt were keen not to overstate their case. They noted that literacy had long
been under suspicion in the Western tradition itself, dating back at least to Plato,
and they took issue with some nineteenth-century liberal reformers, like James
Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, who made large claims about the beneficial
effects of literacy on democracy. They were also careful to distance themselves from
early anthropologists, like Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who made ‘categorical distinctions
between the thinking of “primitive” and “civilised” peoples’ (344). Yet they were
uneasy about the prevailing ‘reaction’ these earlier ways of thinking provoked
because it disavowed ‘some of the most basic problems of human history’ in the
name of ‘diffuse relativism’ or ‘sentimental egalitarianism’ (344). These disavowals
had not only been ‘pushed too far’; they were needless because a new generation
of early twentieth-century anthropologists, among whom they included Franz
Boas, Edward Sapir, Bronisław Malinowski, Benjamin Lee Whorf, and Claude
Lévi-Strauss, had already developed new approaches to the question of ‘intrinsic
differences’ based not on discredited ideas of race or dubious cultural hierarchies
Introduction 9
but on the manifest diversity of languages. The trouble was these language-centred
anthropologists had underplayed, if not ignored, the effects of writing. While
‘Whorf and other anthropological linguists have noted these differences between
European institutions and categories on the one hand and those of societies like
the Trobriands [Malinowski] and the Hopi [Whorf ] on the other, they have tended
to relate these variations to the languages themselves, giving little weight to the
influence of the mode of communication as such, to the intrinsic social conse-
quences of literacy’ (342). Or, again, Whorf acknowledged that ‘Newtonian space,
time and matter, for example, are directly derived from SAE [“standard average
European”] culture and language’—a central premise of what came to be known as
the linguistic relativity thesis—but he failed to show how these were also ‘charac-
teristic of societies with easy and widespread systems of writing’—the foundation
of Goody and Watt’s own media relativity thesis (341).
Whorf had a special significance because he shared their opposition to philo-
sophical idealism. As Underhill notes, Whorf ’s own thinking was ‘forged from the
materialist mechanics and dynamics of cause and effect common to most nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century positivist thought’.24 From him they took the idea of
‘SAE culture and language’, which suited their own generalized notion of ‘phonetic
writing’, and the German-word Weltanschauung (usually translated as ‘world-view’),
which underpinned their own version of the relativity thesis. The ‘most significant
elements of any human culture’, they observed, ‘are undoubtedly channelled
through words’, which encompass ‘such items as ideas of space and time, general-
ised goals and aspirations, in short the weltanschauung of every social group’ (305).
Whorf himself tended to use this term as a synonym for ‘world-view’ or ‘thought
world’ by which he meant ‘more than simply language, i.e. than the linguistic pat-
terns themselves. I include all the analogical and suggestive value of the patterns
(e.g. our “imaginary space” and its distant implications), and all the give-and-take
between language and culture as a whole, wherein is a vast amount that is not lin-
guistic but yet shows the shaping influence of language.’25 With some justice,
Whorf has gone down in history as the most dogmatic of linguistic relativists, but,
as this formulation suggests, he does not always fit the caricature. The phrases ‘shap-
ing influence’ and ‘analogical and suggestive’ are not easy to reconcile with a model
of strict linguistic determinism, nor is his claim that a Weltanschauung emerges out
of a complex ‘give-and-take between language and culture as a whole’. It is also
worth noting that, given his interest in specifically linguistic communities, rather
than ‘social groups’, a world-view is for him a phenomenon in and of language not
external to it. Goody and Watt’s corrective version of the relativity thesis, by con-
trast, reinforces all the worst aspects of the caricature. On their account, the SAE
Weltanschauung, which they construe as a distinct way of thinking (Whorf ’s pri-
mary concern) and as an integrated system of collective values, cultural institutions,
and political arrangements, derives directly from ‘phonetic writing’ which consti-
tutes its ‘essential basis’. Given the level of abstraction at which they pitched their
analysis, it is difficult to see this as much of an advance on the idealists’ airy invoca-
tions of the ‘Greek genius’. Their analysis can be distinguished from Whorf ’s in one
other respect as well. As their implicit narrative of modernization reveals—from
10 Introduction
oral to proto-literate to literate—their relativism, like Whorf ’s, was neither diffuse
nor egalitarian. Yet, while Whorf often ridiculed ‘our vaunted English’, extolling the
conceptual subtleties of Hopi instead, Goody and Watt had few doubts about the
superiority of SAE ‘phonetic writing’ and all it magically conjured into existence.26
Read alongside ‘The Consequences of Literacy’ Marshall McLuhan’s The
Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), which appeared a year earlier, seems like an uncannily
pre-emptive rebuke. For one thing, McLuhan rejected the idea that oral cultures
show no ‘capacity or opportunity for independent and original thought’; for
another, he saw the advent of ‘phonetic writing’ as a cultural catastrophe.27 ‘Literate
man, when we meet him in the Greek world’, he insisted, ‘is a split man, a schizo-
phrenic, as all literate men have been since the invention of the phonetic alphabet’
(26). He did not use the word ‘schizophrenic’ lightly or entirely metaphorically.
‘Only the phonetic alphabet makes a break between eye and ear, between semantic
meaning and visual code’, thereby instituting a wholly new set of ‘ratios or propor-
tions among the senses’, rupturing the primal integrity of the ‘human sensorium’
(31, 41). As we have seen, given the evidence for the ongoing interconnectedness
of the phonological, the orthographic, and the lexical in the literate brain, this
sensory-cognitive version of the Judeo-Christian Fall narrative makes no sense in
contemporary neuroscientific terms, though for McLuhan it was central. The
dissociation the Greeks effected was not just psychic, however: it was cultural,
since ‘only phonetic writing has the power to translate man from the tribal to the
civilized sphere’ (31). In McLuhan’s primitivist lexicon ‘civilized’ was synonymous
with ‘schizophrenic’, ‘abstract’, and ‘visual’, whereas ‘tribal’ signified ‘wholeness’,
‘concreteness’, and the ‘audile-tactile’, associative patterns he had no hesitation in
projecting onto his own idiosyncratic cultural map of the world. While ‘areas
like China and India are all still audile-tactile in the main’, he claimed, ‘Africa’
epitomized ‘the implicit, magical world of the resonant oral word’ (22, 25). In the
end, however, McLuhan’s analysis was less an anticipatory repudiation of the world
according to Goody and Watt, than a direct inversion of it. Like them, he saw
Greek ‘phonetic writing’ as an exclusively ‘visual code for speech’, but he recast
their positive account of its transformative effects in starkly negative terms (53). In
his view, the future lay in the new ‘post-literate’ media of the ‘electronic age’—
notably the telegraph, radio, film, and television—that promised to overcome ‘the
detribalizing power of the phonetic alphabet’, cure Western ‘schizophrenia’ by
reclaiming the repressed ‘Africa within’, and unite ‘the entire human family into
a single global tribe’—hence his utopian vision of the ‘global village’ to come
(3, 9, 26, 36, italics added).a
There was, however, one key respect in which McLuhan reinforced Goody and
Watt’s corrective version of the relativity thesis. Like them, he insisted that ‘the
medium is the message’, as his most famous catchphrase had it; or, in other words,
that the language-centred relativity thesis had to be extended to writing and the
other modes of communication as well.28 Yet, here too, there was a difference.
Though McLuhan made much of the disastrous consequences of Greek phonetic
writing, his primary target, as his title indicated, was the ‘Gutenberg revolution’
which not only inaugurated the era of print in fifteenth-century Europe but
Introduction 11
A few sentences earlier, Humboldt had written ‘there resides in every language a
characteristic world-view [Weltansicht, not Weltanschauung by which he meant
something different]’.29 Again, like Whorf, Humboldt saw this as a phenomenon
in and of language; whereas McLuhan, like Goody and Watt, believed that the
effects of print were social and political as well as cognitive. If the ‘Gutenberg revo-
lution’ instituted the ‘fixed point of view’ characteristic of nationalist thinking, it
also fostered the centralizing modern state and a new idea of community as a uni-
form nation with a single standardized language (250). McLuhan, it should be
said, did not appeal to Humboldt merely as an exemplar of nation-centred linguis-
tic relativity. In keeping with his utopian vision, he saw the passage from the
Diversity of Human Language as an endorsement of his own ambition to ‘transcend
the limitations of our own assumptions by a critique of them’ (36). Humboldt’s
relativism, as he saw it, was fundamentally emancipatory, since he showed ‘we can
now live, not just amphibiously in divided and distinguished worlds, but pluralis-
tically in many worlds and cultures simultaneously’ (36). For him, the ‘global village’
to come was, in other words, not just post-literate but post-national. Like many
commentators, he ignored the fact that Humboldt, for all his relativism, always
insisted on seeing languages as open-ended rather than ‘closed systems’, the expres-
sive potential of which is endlessly extendable, a point I return to on a n umber of
occasions throughout this book.30
Unlike Goody and Watt’s idea of Europe or the West as a product of phonetic
writing, McLuhan’s idea of the modern nation-state as an artefact of print had a
long and influential afterlife. In the early 1980s, the political scientist Benedict
Anderson gave it a Marxist inflection, turning McLuhan’s ‘print culture’ into
‘print-capitalism’, in an effort to understand why socialist internationalism seemed
consistently to lose out against nationalism in the worldwide anti-colonial struggle.31
‘Nationality’, ‘nation-ness’, and ‘nationalism’ were, he argued, ‘cultural artefacts of
a particular kind’—he called them ‘imagined communities’—the ‘obscure genesis’
12 Introduction
consensus among particular parties at a given historical juncture. For the Indian
poet-philosopher Rabindranath Tagore, from whom I have taken the second epi-
graph to this book, constitutions also tend to reflect a certain ‘kind of thinking’—a
product of what he called ‘our calculating minds’—that is in itself always open to
question. Tagore did not have an existing state or document in mind. He was criti-
cizing the ‘diminished idea’ of India’s ‘great character’ to which he believed Indian
nationalists of the 1920s had dedicated themselves in their struggle against British
rule. Yet his scepticism about what he took to be their consensus, which began to
dominate his own thinking after he withdrew from the campaign against the
British partition of Bengal in 1907, has, as we shall see, a bearing on some of the
most basic principles of modern constitutionalism. As I consider the details of his
thinking at various points throughout this book, I shall focus here on its general
implications for constitution-making as such, particularly in relation to the ques-
tion of cultural diversity which was among Tagore’s greatest concerns. It also lies at
the heart of my own larger argument.
Tagore died in 1941 and so did not live to see the terms in which the Constitution
of India was eventually framed, first during the Constituent Assembly debates,
which ran from 1946 to 1949, and then in the final document, which was enacted
on 26 November 1949. Had he done so there is no doubt that he would have
admired many aspects of it, including the fact that it embodies what Granville
Austin, the American constitutional historian, called ‘the principle of accommoda-
tion’, that is, ‘the ability to reconcile, to harmonize, and to make work without
changing their content, apparently incompatible concepts—at least concepts that
appear conflicting to the non-Indian, and especially to the European or American
observer’.39 Austin regarded this as one of India’s most original contributions to
the history of constitution-making, attributing it to the ‘absorbtive and syncretistic
features of Hinduism’.40 As he noted, the constitution accommodates ‘federal and
unitary systems of government’ as well as ‘republicanism and monarchy’—the
latter because independent India, though a republic, chose to remain a member of
the Commonwealth, unlike Ireland which formally broke its last remaining ties to
the British monarchy and the Commonwealth of Nations in 1949.41 The same
principle informs the constitution’s approach to cultural diversity and the conflict-
ing demands of tradition and modernity. These tensions permeate the document
as a whole, but they emerge most clearly in the section detailing the ‘Fundamental
Duties’ of every citizen (Section 51A), three of which stand out: every Indian citi-
zen is bound ‘to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture’, ‘to
develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform’, and
‘to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people
of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to
renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women’.42 These contending and
converging duties reflect what Jacobsohn aptly calls India’s constitutional trad-
ition of ‘ameliorative secularism’ which commits the state and its citizens to fos-
tering, rather than simply tolerating, diverse linguistic, cultural, and religious
traditions, on the one hand, and to promoting modernization and reform, on the
other.43 I return to the distinctive aspects of this tradition in Chapter 8. No doubt
Introduction 15
Yet, as Tagore’s own language indicates, his scepticism was at least as philosoph-
ical or even poetic as it was political. Though he sounded at times more like an
anarchist than a liberal, his target was not just modern constitutionalism, or the
rhetoric of anti-colonial state-building, but the forms of thought he took them to
exemplify. Here, too, his concerns centred on the question of cultural diversity.
India, he wrote in 1917, was right to revere what the constitution came to call
‘our composite culture’, but ‘what she failed to realize was that in human beings
differences are not like the physical barriers of mountains, fixed forever—they are
fluid with life’s flow, they are changing their courses and their shapes and vol-
ume’, always part of a ‘world-game of infinite permutations and combinations’.51
Given the philosophical foundations on which the sovereign, self-determining,
Europeanized modern state rested, and the fact that it concerns itself only with
‘the aspect of a whole people as an organized power’—recall Parekh’s description
of the constitution as ‘a collectively agreed structure of authority’ that ‘stabilizes
the wider political process’—Tagore believed this labile, unpredictable aspect of
diversity would always elude its grasp.52 He was, in this respect, closer to Pierre
Bourdieu, from whom I have taken the third epigraph for this book, who believed
that ‘when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough’, than to James Tully,
who argues that contemporary constitutions can be redesigned to ‘preserve legal,
political and cultural plurality rather than impose uniformity and regularity’.53
For Tully, constitutions should be understood as ‘continual negotiations’, not as
‘fixed and unchangeable agreements reached at some foundational moment’.54
Yet, as his own language suggests, this is easier thought than said or written.
Describing his own intercultural ideals, he finds the allure of a reifying metaphor
irresistible: ‘the strength of the constitutional fabric’, he claims, ‘consists in the
interweaving of different threads.’55 I return to the questions this kind of language
raises in Chapters 3 and 6.
Given his doubts about the state and the mono-, multi, or intercultural ideals
expressed in constitutions, Tagore put his faith in civil society and the very differ-
ent ‘ideals that strive to take form in social institutions’.56 As an educationalist who
founded an alternative school and university in Bengal, he chose to express his own
ideals institutionally through centres of learning committed to creative expression
and to particular forms of intercultural exchange that would not only open Indian
civilization to the world but enable it to cast its own light abroad.b Visva-Bharati,
which he founded in 1921 as a counter to the European idea of the university, spe-
cifically to Calcutta University which the British established in 1857, was dedi-
cated to upholding ‘India’s obligation to offer to others the hospitality of her best
culture and India’s right to accept from others their best’.57 Unlike Calcutta
University, which he believed was given over to ‘book-learning’, even ‘intellectual
infanticide’, and to turning Bengali into an ‘artificial language’ wholly devoid
of ‘creative vitality’, it was committed to ‘the creation of new thought by new
combinations of truths’ and to using the ‘shock’ of the ‘foreign’ to strengthen ‘the
vitality of our intellect’—here again the ‘our’ referred to India as a civilization.58
On this Tagorean model of the intercultural, which balances obligations and rights,
the indigenous and the foreign, and puts the emphasis on the vitalizing effects of
Introduction 17
democratic citizenship (see Chapter 6). To mitigate this, Alexander believed it was
essential to reconceptualize diversity. Having rejected the reifying language ‘favoured
by the dominant classes, who prefer a universe that is perceived to be stable and
static’, he argued that ‘our goal, if I may paraphrase Bertolt Brecht, should be the
depiction of the world as changing and changeable’.66 Tagore would have approved,
though he would probably have questioned Alexander’s Brechtian idea that ‘the
dominant classes’ have a monopoly on the language of reification. Alexander
repeated his call for reconceptualization during a UNESCO debate about diversity
in 2007 (see Prologue to Part II).
There is one final observation I should make at this point about the links
between these three constitutions, given my own larger argument. As artefacts of
writing, all three are not only instances of ‘sight English’, to recall Ingraham’s
taxonomy, they were all, like UNESCO’s founding constitution, originally framed
and drafted in English. In the Irish and Indian cases this was not fortuitous.
Having taken advice from de Valera, who told him that the Irish constitution-
makers had found Gaelic ‘hard going’, Jawaharlal Nehru successfully argued dur-
ing the heated Constituent Assembly debates about language that the original
English version had initially to be given priority over any translations, notably
into Hindi.67 Nonetheless, given the painful legacies of colonialism, all the parties
to the various negotiations, whether in Ireland in the 1930s, India in the 1940s,
or South Africa in the 1990s, were acutely conscious of the language question
which, as Gandhi remarked in 1918, lay at the heart of any project to reclaim the
dignity of a colonized people and build a viable post-colonial state. ‘It is my hum-
ble but firm opinion’, he wrote, ‘that unless we give Hindi its national status and
the provincial languages their due place in the life of the people, all talk of Swaraj
[“self-rule”] is useless.’68 During a political speech defending Gaelic in 1937, de
Valera put it more philosophically. Recalling one of the central tenets of the lin-
guistic relativity thesis, he argued that ‘the best way to preserve the philosophy of
life, to preserve the distinctive and spiritual and cultural life, of the people is the
language’.69 Given the particularities of their respective colonial pasts, each group
of constitution-makers addressed the challenge of linguistic recuperation and the
question of the future legal status of English differently. While the Irish recog-
nized Gaelic as ‘the national language’ and ‘the first official language’, making
English the second, the South Africans granted it equal ‘official’ status alongside
ten others, ranging from Afrikaans to isiZulu, none of which is designated
‘national’. Partly because of the pressures from Hindu nationalists, partly because
the debates were overtaken by the trauma of Partition, and partly because of the
complexities of India’s multilingual polity which are never purely linguistic—they
involve multiple scripts and numerical systems as well—the Indian constitution-
makers were eventually obliged to abandon their favoured ‘principle of accommo-
dation’ and to settle for what Austin called a ‘half-hearted compromise’.70
While they declared ‘Hindi in the Devanagari script’ to be ‘the official language
of the Union’, deliberately setting it apart from Urdu while at the same time
avoiding Gandhi’s incendiary word ‘national’, they authorized the continued use
of English in parliament and the courts for a period of fifteen years when its status
Introduction 19
COMMUNITIES OF LETTERS
most learned, the most generous and the best’, the inscription reads, while the
statue shows James ‘presenting copies of his published works to female figures
representing Fame and the university’.77 The most epochal of these works was the
‘King James’ Bible (1611) to which Oxford scholars contributed, marking the
university’s slow, often grudging adjustment to the rise of the vernacular lan-
guages in the world of learning and beyond. Oxford University Press went on to
publish what became the standard edition in 1769. At the point at which I take
up the story of Oxford’s many entanglements a century later, the university was a
very different place in a very different Europe. Yet, since it is in the nature of
enduring institutions for their legacies to become embedded not just in stone
statues and inscriptions but in everyday practices and ways of thinking, the
emblematic juxtaposition of monarchical power and scholarly republicanism in
the Bodleian’s quadrangle, which reflects Oxford’s own customary ‘principle of
accommodation’, remains as pertinent today as it was in the early seventeenth
century and the late nineteenth.
Under pressure from some members of its own community who deplored its
‘idolatry of dead forms’, to recall Tagore’s phrase, and from the British state, now
in the guise of a democratic government elected on a limited male franchise, the
university began an extensive programme of modernization in the mid-nineteenth
century that eventually led to its formally supporting the study of modern
European languages and to the establishment of the School of English in 1894. At
around the same time, the academic Delegates of the University Press agreed to
underwrite what became the Oxford English Dictionary, the largest and most costly
lexicographical project ever undertaken. As I show in Chapter 1, these develop-
ments provoked intense quarrels not just about the intricacies of university politics
and the protocols of disciplinary knowledge in the late-nineteenth century, but
about the identity of the English language, the university’s historic role as a guard-
ian of classical humanistic values (or European ‘civilization’), and its new responsi-
bilities as a curator of the nation’s vernacular literary heritage (or ‘national
character’). These debates were, of course, nothing new, and they were not peculiar
to Oxford. When it came to the study of English literature, Edinburgh University
led the way in the 1760s, with the Indian-founded Hindu College in Calcutta
following in the 1810s, London in the 1830s, and Trinity College Dublin in the
1860s.d Though Cambridge began to debate the question of modern languages at
around the same time as Oxford, it created its own Faculty of English only in
1919. I focus on Oxford for two main reasons: first because the OED turned it into
a globally iconic guardian of the language, and second because the university had
a disproportionate influence on the tradition of cultural internationalism developed
within the League of Nations, and, indirectly, within the very different tradition
that took shape under the auspices of the UN. Referring to the emergence of the
new world order after 1945, the political historian Mark Mazower notes: ‘If the
failed Versailles order had been the work of a generation of Oxbridge classicists,
perhaps now American social science, as handmaiden to enlightened statesman-
ship, could take over and help find a solution to the European Malthusian
nightmare.’78 One of the most influential figures among these ‘Oxbridge classicists’
22 Introduction
was, as we shall see, Gilbert Murray, Professor of Greek at Oxford in the first decades
of the twentieth century.
For Tagore, the challenge diversity poses for any modern society is as intellectual
as it is institutional, since the two are mutually influential. Centres of learning like
Visva-Bharati had, in his view, not just to be autonomous; they had to promote
vitalizing modes of creative expression as a counter to the reifying thought of the
state—hence the provocative force of the equation he drew between academic pro-
fessionalism and nationalism. As commentators have long observed, this has a
special pertinence in the case of vernacular literary studies which allied themselves
to the nation-state from their inception, institutionalizing the idea of a national
literature in university and school curricula. Yet, for Tagore, this was only part of a
larger and more worrying problem. As he saw it, academic literary critics were all
too often driven by the same territorial imperatives as nationalists, and, worse still,
the critical ethos and language they favoured, far from countering official thinking,
only reinforced it. ‘Worthy critics have a pair of scales at their disposal’, he wrote
with mock reverence in an essay of 1894. ‘They have worked out a fixed weight and
number of set formulations for literature: whatever composition is placed before
them, they can confidently stamp it on the back with the appropriate number and
seal.’79 This figure of the critic as assured dealer in cultural goods and guardian of
the canon, for whom literature is a reified commodity that can be known in
advance and valued precisely, cast a shadow over the first half of the twentieth
century when criticism, like many other emergent fields in the humanities,
attempted to establish its academic credentials by modelling itself on the natural
sciences. This was the burden of Richards’s Principles of Literary Criticism (1924)
and René Wellek and Austin Warren’s Theory of Literature (1949)—to name only
two conspicuous examples—but, as we have seen, the same ambitions informed
Ogden and Richards’s project to found a ‘science of Symbolism’ and Gelb’s ‘science
of writing’.80 For Tagore, this made criticism little more than an exercise in label-
ling and categorization which has nothing to do with literature as a vitalizing
mode of creative thought and everything to do with the critic’s own ‘calculating
mind’. Given his irritation at various Marxist and materialist attempts to write
him off as a bourgeois idealist in the interwar years, it is likely he would have been
as dismayed by the turn against criticism’s early scientific pretensions in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century when, as Rita Felski notes, academic critics
became wedded to a new professional ethos which she calls ‘critique’.81 In this
guise, the critic is no longer the assured masculine dealer in cultural goods but, in
Felski’s colourful formulation, the anti- or counter-canonical feminized ‘scholar-
turned-sleuth’ who ‘broods over matters of fault and complicity; she pieces
together a causal sequence that allows her to identify a crime, impute a motive,
interpret clues, and track down the guilty party’.82 For this kind of critic, it is as
if one never doubts enough when it comes to literature, rather than the state. For
all its antagonism to the earlier models, this alternative, which drew heavily on
the social and political rather than the natural sciences, has as little time for criti-
cism as ‘a coproduction between actors [“reader” and “text”] that brings new
things to light’, as Felski put it.83
Introduction 23
like Joyce, to create different spaces for themselves and their work. For them, writ-
ing, and by extension reading, is not a supplementary act or event of incorporation
but a singular act or event of disincorporation, particularly vis-à-vis state-spon-
sored ideas of community whether monocultural, multicultural, intercultural, or
something else. Following his early nationalist phase, this, as I have suggested, was
true of Tagore as well. Does this mean these writers have an alternative vision of
community we might identify with a single name? Some negative possibilities have
been suggested, especially in the French philosophical tradition. After Jean-Luc
Nancy proposed the Tagorean idea of an ‘inoperative’, ‘goalless’, or ‘unorganized’
(désouvreé ) community in the late 1980s, Maurice Blanchot countered with the
more emphatically negative Beckettian adjective ‘unavowable’ or ‘unnameable’
(inavouable).92 Yet, since each writer, indeed each work, articulates this seemingly
impossible sense of community differently as a literary experience rather than as an
idea, it is sufficient, for my purposes, to call their alternative anti- or simply
non-statist. All the more positive terms—‘universal’, ‘international’, ‘cosmopolitan’,
‘world’, ‘global’, ‘transnational’, even Tagore’s ‘civilizational’—are either too gener-
alized, too liable to conceptual reification, or too freighted with their own ques-
tionable histories, though if I had to settle for a single affirmative term Joyce’s
Wake-word ‘everintermutuomergent’ seems more fitting than most.93 I return to
the question of reading and disincorporation in Chapter 3 in relation to Joyce, and
across all the chapters in Part II, each of which links a writer or group of writers
active in the period after 1945 to particular policy debates and ways of thinking
about community within UNESCO, focusing on questions of cultural and lin-
guistic diversity as well as a range of normative ideals and concepts, including
humanism, translation, indigenous knowledge, universalism, and relativism.
The second way in which the experience of reading Finnegans Wake has been
pivotal for this book can best be summarized by rephrasing Attridge’s language-
centred characterization of literature as an experiential event: ‘A work of literature
as constituted within a given cultural context would be an artefact of writing that,
when read in the appropriate way, yields a literary experience.’ Among the many
explicit and admonitory reading lessons the notoriously unreadable and unread
Wake offers is that, from the very beginning, we learn to read in an inappropriate
way because we are habituated, through the schooling system and its processes of
incorporation, to look through rather than at writing (see Chapters 5 and 6). To
follow Joyce’s own provocative figure for this, which centres on the impulsive
desires of a heterosexual male voyeur, we strip away the writing, whether as so-called
‘ordinary’ orthographic readers, for whom the meaning is all, or as professional
literary critics, for whom the ‘set formulations for literature’ or the ‘linguistic text’
or the ‘guilty’ subtext is all. At one level, the Wake is a compendium of puzzles
designed to frustrate this culturally acquired desire. Like some elaborate neurosci-
entific experiment, it probes the limits of literacy, interfering with our orthographic
expertise by confronting us with unfamiliar pseudo-words (‘shuit’), new coinages
(‘mutuomorphomutation’), plays on word separation (‘bi tso fb rok engl a ssan
dspl itch ina’), and by insisting, like Ingraham, on the uniquely visual qualities
of the English writing system.94 The latter are conspicuously displayed in its
26 Introduction
unpunctuated title which can be made to mean very different things with no
change to the words or letters understood as graphemes representing phonemes—
compare Finnegan’s Wake to Finnegans, Wake! Moreover, again like Ingraham, Joyce
insists, partly through his ubiquitous use of puns, on a categorical distinction
between what might be called ‘sight-Wakese’ and ‘sound-Wakese’.
At another level, however, the Wake is rather more than an overly long experi-
mental word-game. As an Irish writer born in 1882, Joyce confronted the chal-
lenge of writing in what was, for Ireland, an imposed foreign language in various
ways throughout his career, but when he began the Wake in the early 1920s, soon
after the publication of Ulysses and the founding of the Irish Free State in 1922, he
chose neither to recuperate Gaelic in the interests of reclaiming the dignity of the
Irish people, nor to remake colonial English by indigenizing it as an independent
Ireland’s second official language—the Free State constitution prefigured the
language provisions of 1937. Rather, he decided to disintegrate and re-foreignize
it, partly through his signature device of the interlingual portmanteau, while
simultaneously extending its expressive potential, thereby disabling its capacity to
be the bearer of any one culture, idealized ‘national character’, or reified
Weltanschauung. In Chapter 3, I focus on the implications this has for literature as a
vitalizing mode of thought and on the extreme literary experience it affords which,
to recall Tagore’s ambitions for the kind of education he hoped Visva-Bharati would
offer its students, centres on the transformative shock of the foreign. Across the book
as a whole, I reflect on the consequences of this not just for how we look at the
English language and its writing system but for how we think about culture and
community outside the reifying terms of the state. In Part II, I also consider the
longer-term significance of Joyce’s re-foreignizing strategies for writers from beyond
the Euro-American Anglosphere who chose English as a literary medium after 1945.
F RO M M AT T H E W A R N O L D TO X U B I N G
This book was written mostly in 2015, exactly fifty years after the conference, held
in the Iraqi city of Basra, which marked a turning point in the emergence of the
‘World State’—at least according to The Shape of Things to Come, the fictional
‘history of the future’ H. G. Wells published in 1933.95 Written out of his sense of
outrage at the horrors of nationalism and empire and his exasperation at the fail-
ures of the two dominant forms of early-twentieth-century internationalism—the
League of Nations and the Communist International—the story envisages an
alternative future, confidently dividing history into a series of epochs, the most
recent of which it calls the ‘Era of European Predominance’ or the ‘Era of National
Sovereignty’ which it dates from the Treaty of Westphalia to the First World War (27).
As this suggests, Wells, like many of his generation, associated nationalism with
state-sponsored violence, not with popular emancipation. According to his epochal
model, the end of the war also marks the beginning of the ‘Era of the Modern
State’, though he identifies the chaotic years from 1919 to 2059 as a sub-epoch,
calling it the ‘Age of Frustration’ (27). The 1965 Basra conference signals a new phase
Introduction 27
he imagined it might in the year Hitler rose to power. While a total of 63 countries
became members of the League of Nations between 1920 and 1939, famously
excluding the US, the United Nations now boasts an overall membership of 193.
As Damrosch observes, rehearsing the familiar McLuhanite consensus Apter
rightly challenges, the world may be ‘growing smaller’ as ‘people and products
surge across borders in the process known as globalization’ but there are no signs of
Wells’s ‘Era of National Sovereignty’ coming to an end.103 If anything, it has become
more entrenched not just because nation-states (and national loyalties) have prolif-
erated, in some cases gaining an uncertain new strength (think of Trump’s US and
May’s more fragile UK), but because they remain the cornerstone of the contem-
porary international (e.g. United Nations) and supranational (e.g. European Union)
order, whether real or virtual.
Anglophone literary studies have for the most part abandoned statist histories
more readily than they have geographies, despite the resilience of some historical
categories, ‘Victorian’ being among the most tenacious. As Jonathan Bate remarks
in his General Editor’s Preface to the multivolume Oxford English Literary History
(2002–), which is intended in part to ‘undertake a critical investigation of the very
notion of a national literary heritage’, ‘literary history is distinct from political
history’, and, as he rightly cautions with regard to the twentieth century, ‘to propose
a single break at, say, 1945’—as I have done in the two-part structure of this
book—‘would be to fall in with the false assumption that literature moves strictly
in tandem with events’.104 Yet, having said this, he then adds that ‘a historical
understanding of literature cannot be divorced from cultural and intellectual
revolutions or the effects of social change and the upheaval of war’.105 This goes
some way to explaining why the series divides the century and a half I cover in this
book across six volumes in the way it does: The Victorians, 1830–1880; From
‘Victorian’ to ‘Edwardian’, 1870–1914; The Modern Movement, 1910–1940;
Literature among the Wars, 1930–1970; The Last of England?, 1960–2000; and The
Internationalization of English Literature, 1948–2000. As the guarded quotation
and question marks in some of these titles indicate, all such classifications and
boundaries will always be debated—does internationalization start only after
1948, for instance?—though, for something like the Oxford English Literary
History, the primary purpose of which is curatorial—hence Bate’s phrase ‘historical
understanding’—these periodizations are as good as many others and certainly
better than the neat epochal model on which Wells relied to project his ‘history of
the future’ in The Shape of Things to Come.
As I have already indicated with reference to Joyce’s figure of the ‘envelope’ and
the ‘letter’, however, my own aims are not primarily curatorial. Rather, taking the
literary works I have selected as my starting point, or the experiences they yield as
artefacts of writing that open up ways of thinking outside the reifying terms of the
state, I follow their lead not just into the cunning passages of literary, linguistic, and
orthographic history, which has always been supra- or non-national, but into the
intersecting histories of thought, institutions, and modern constitutionalism and
into a tangled archive of repeatedly sifted, recycled, and adapted inheritances.106
Here, too, the unpredictability of the chronologies and interconnections is central.
Introduction 31
In Chapter 4, to cite just one example, I follow the threads that lead from Es’kia
Mphahlele, the most eminent black South African writer of the apartheid years, to
Tagore and then from Tagore to the 500-year old oral tradition of the Bāul singers
of Bengal, a labyrinthine history that raises new questions about UNESCO’s
understanding of humanism and the ideals of interculturality it began to promote
at the turn of the millennium. Equally, across the book as a whole, I consider how
the radical legacies of Tagore and Joyce, and, indeed, the traditionalist conservative
legacy of T. S. Eliot, speak to our own ongoing, and, in principle, unending, struggle
to come to terms with linguistic and cultural diversity.
Another random document with
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gobbling season, and the Stag in autumn, may also be drawn within
shot by the same means. I once “tolled” two Loons with my hat from
a distance of nearly half a mile, and although they were at one time
so near to me that I could clearly perceive the colour of their eyes, I
had no sure opportunity of firing at them, as it was in the pairing
season, and they never once dived, or raised their wings to flap
them, so that, knowing the extreme agility with which they disappear
when they have seen a gun snap, I judged it useless to shoot. Until
my visit to Labrador I had supposed, agreeably to the common
belief, that the Loons always repose at night on the water, which,
however, I have since assured myself they rarely if ever do.
Colonel Montagu, than whom none has written more correctly on
the habits of the birds of Great Britain, having procured a wounded
Loon, placed it in a pond, and observed the manner in which it made
its way under the surface of the water. “In swimming and diving,” he
remarks, “only the legs are used and not the wings, as in the
Guillemot and Auk tribes, and by their position so far behind, and
their little deviation from the line of the body, the bird is enabled to
propel itself in the water with great velocity, in a straight line, as well
as turn with astonishing quickness.” This I have no doubt was the
case with the individual observed; but that this is not the usual mode
of proceeding of the species is equally true. Having myself seen
Loons pass and repass under boats, at the distance of several feet
from the surface, and propel themselves both with their feet, and
their half-extended wings, I am inclined to believe that when not
wounded, and when pursuing their prey, they usually employ all the
limbs.
My friend Thomas Nuttall, who kept one for some time, gives the
following account of its manners while in his possession. “A young
bird of this kind which I obtained in the Salt Marsh at Chelsea Beach,
and transferred to a fish-pond, made a good deal of plaint, and
would sometimes wander out of his more natural element, and hide
and bask in the grass. On these occasions he lay very still until
nearly approached, and then slid into the pond and uttered his usual
plaint. When out at a distance he made the same cautious efforts to
hide, and would commonly defend himself in great anger, by darting
at the intruder, and striking powerfully with his dagger-like bill. This
bird, with a pink-coloured iris-like albinos, appeared to suffer from
the glare of broad day-light, and was inclined to hide from its effects,
but became very active towards the dusk of the evening. The pupil of
the eye in this individual, like that of nocturnal animals, appeared
indeed dilatable; and the one in question often put down his head
and eyes into the water to observe the situation of his prey. This bird
was a most expert and indefatigable diver, and remained down
sometimes for several minutes, often swimming under water, and as
it were flying with the velocity of an arrow in the air. Though at length
inclining to become docile, and shewing no alarm when visited, it
constantly betrayed its wandering habits, and every night was found
to have waddled to some hiding place, where it seemed to prefer
hunger to the loss of liberty, and never could be restrained from
exercising its instinct to move onwards to some secure or more
suitable asylum.”
The same valued friend has corroborated the result of my
observations respecting the number of eggs usually laid by this
species, by stating as follows: “About the 11th of June, through the
kindness of Dr J. W. Harris, I received three eggs, which had been
taken from the nest of a Loon, made in a hummock, or elevated
grassy hillock, at Sebago Pond, in New Hampshire.”
The range of this species is immense. It occurs on the waters that
fall into the Pacific Ocean, and has been observed on the Columbia
River. In the Fur Countries it is plentiful; and, as I have already
stated, it breeds in many parts of the United States. It is found
equally in Europe, and the northern parts of Asia. In all these
countries it moves southward on the approach of winter, and returns
when the mild weather commences in spring.
Unlike the Cormorant, the Loon usually swallows its food under the
water, unless when it happens to bring up a shell-fish or a
crustaceous animal, which it munches for a while before it swallows
it. Fishes of numerous kinds, aquatic insects, water-lizards, frogs,
and leeches, have been found by me in its stomach, in which there is
also generally much coarse gravel, and sometimes the roots of
fresh-water plants.
Although the flesh of the Loon is not very palatable, being tough,
rank, and dark coloured, I have seen it much relished by many lovers
of good-living, especially at Boston, where it was not unfrequently
served almost raw at the table of the house where I boarded.
A female bird particularly examined by me presented the following
appearances. From the point of the bill to the end of the tail it
measured 34 inches; to the claws 41; the extended wings were 71;
the bill measured 5 inches along the gape; the breadth of the body
was 8 inches, its depth only four; the wings were 2 inches shorter
than the tail; and the weight was 10 lb. 11 oz. avoirdupois. The first
primary was longest. The trachea, which was even and flattened,
being in diameter about 5/8 of an inch by 1/2 inch, was 16 inches
long. The eggs were numerous. The gizzard was moderate, and
contained many large pebbles. The intestines were 7 feet long, and
about the same size as a Swan’s quill. Every bone and sinew was
strong and tough. The tongue resembled in shape and size that of
the Ivory-billed Woodpecker. The bones of the wing and leg were
almost solid, the cavity for the marrow being very small. All the
bones of this specimen were presented to Mr Thomas Allis, of the
Friend’s Retreat, near York.
My friend Captain James Clark Ross, of the Royal Navy of
England, once placed at my disposal a specimen of the Loon
procured in a very high latitude, and which, having closely inspected
it, I found to differ from the one represented in the plate, only in
having the point of the bill slightly elevated or recurved, and of a fine
yellow tint. Dr Richardson informed me that, on one of his arduous
northern journeys, he saw a very large and handsomely crested
Diver, which, although somewhat prematurely, I propose honouring
with the name of Colymbus Richardsoni.
Colymbus glacialis, Linn. Syst. Nat. vol. i. p. 221. Adult.—Lath. Ind. Ornith.
p. 799.
Colymbus Immer, Linn. Syst. Nat. vol. i. p. 222. Young.—Lath. Ind. Ornith. p.
800.
Colymbus glacialis, Ch. Bonaparte, Synopsis of Birds of United States, p.
420.
Great Northern Diver or Loon, Wils. Amer. Ornith. vol. ix. pl. 74, fig. 3.
Colymbus glacialis, Richards. and Swains. Fauna Bor. Amer. vol. ii. p. 474.
Loon, or Great Northern Diver, Nuttall, Manual, vol. ii. p. 513.
Ardea cœrulea, Linn. Syst. Nat. vol. 1. p. 238.—Lath. Ind. Ornith. vol. ii. p.
689.
Ardea cœrulea, Ch. Bonaparte, Synopsis, p. 300.
Blue Heron, Ardea cœrulea, Wils. Amer. Ornith. vol. vii. p. 117. pl. 62. fig.
3. Adult.
Blue Heron, Nuttall, Manual, vol. ii. p. 58.
In November, when the moult is advanced. The bill is black, dull blue
at the base. The feet are nearly black, as are the claws. The occipital
feathers are now two inches and a half in length, and some of the
dorsal feathers extend as far as the tips of the wings; those of the
lower part of the neck have also a length of about three inches. The
general colour of the plumage is white; the upper part of the head,
the hind neck, back, anterior edge of the wing, and outer primaries at
the end, of a faint bluish-grey tint; some of the elongated feathers of
the back darker.
Length to end of tail 22 inches; to end of claws 29 1/2; bill 3; wing
from flexure 11 1/4.
A year old. Bill nearly as in the adult; feet bluish-black, the plumage
is white, with the upper parts pale greyish-blue as in November, but
the whole interspersed with numerous feathers of a deep greyish-
blue, similar to that of the adult; the primaries and tail being still
white.
Length to end of tail 23 1/4; extent of wings 32 1/2; bill 3 1/8. Weight 9
oz.