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“Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches brings together
10 new essays by prominent philosophers on the hitherto unexam-
ined yet patent interconnection of relational autonomy and rela-
tional equality. The volume breaks new ground and constitutes an
invaluable contribution to social and political philosophy.”
– Marina Oshana,
Professor Emerita,
University of California,
Davis, USA.
Autonomy and Equality
This book draws connections and explores important questions at the

intersection of the debates about relational autonomy and relational
equality. Although these two research areas share several common
assumptions and concerns, their connections have not been systemati-
cally explored.
The essays in this volume address theoretical questions at the intersec-
tion of relational theories of autonomy and equality and also consider
how these theoretical considerations play out in real-world contexts.
Several chapters explore possible conceptual links between relational
autonomy and equality by considering the role of values—such as agency,
non-domination, and self-respect—to which both relational autonomy
theorists and relational egalitarians are committed. Others reflect on
how debates about autonomy and equality can clarify our thinking
about oppression based on race and gender, and how such oppression
affects interpersonal relationships.
Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches is the first book to
specifically address the relationship between these two research areas.
It will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in social
and political philosophy, moral philosophy, and feminist philosophy.
Natalie Stoljar is Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, jointly

appointed in the Institute for Health and Social Policy. She is co-editor,
with Catriona Mackenzie, of Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspec-
tives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (2000).
Kristin Voigt is an Associate Professor at McGill University, jointly

appointed in the Institute for Health and Social Policy and the Depart-
ment of Philosophy.
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
Green Leviathan or the Poetics of Political Liberty

Navigating Freedom in the Age of Climate Change and Artificial
Intelligence
Mark Coeckelbergh
The Social Institution of Discursive Norms

Historical, Naturalistic, and Pragmatic Perspectives
Edited by Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall, and Hans Bernard Schmid
Epistemic Uses of Imagination

Edited by Christopher Badura and Amy Kind
Political Philosophy from an Intercultural Perspective

Power Relations in a Global World
Edited by Blanca Boteva-Richter, Sarhan Dhouib, and James Garrison
The Single-Minded Animal

Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive
Cognition
Preston Stovall

Relational Approaches
Edited by Natalie Stoljar and Kristin Voigt
Contractarianism, Role Obligations, and Political Morality

Benjamin Sachs
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.

routledge.com / Routledge-Studies-in-Contemporary-Philosophy/
book-series/SE0720
Relational Approaches
Edited by Natalie Stoljar

and Kristin Voigt
First published 2022
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DOI: 10.4324/9780367823344
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Table of Contents
Preface and Acknowledgmentsix
1. Introduction: A Relational Turn in Political Philosophy 1

NATALIE STOLJAR AND KRISTIN VOIGT
2. Relational Equality and the Debate Between Externalist and

Internalist Theories of Relational Autonomy 32
CATRIONA MACKENZIE
3. Could Friends of Relational Autonomy be Relational

Sufficientarians Rather than Relational Egalitarians? 57
KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN
4. The Wrongs of Relational Inequalities 80

ÉLIOT LITALIEN
5. Relational Autonomy, Equality, and Self-Respect 103

CHRISTIAN SCHEMMEL
6. Autonomy, Relational Egalitarianism, and Indignation 125

REBEKAH JOHNSTON
7. Regarding Oneself as an Equal 145

NATALIE STOLJAR AND KRISTIN VOIGT
8. How Being Better Off Is Bad for You: Implications for

Distribution, Relational Equality, and an Egalitarian Ethos 169
CARINA FOURIE
viii Table of Contents
9. Microaggressions: A Relational Analysis of Harm 195
NABINA LIEBOW
10. Musical Performance as a Route to Relational Autonomy

and Social Equality 220
JONATHAN WOLFF
Contributors 239
Index 240
Preface and Acknowledgments
This collection brings together philosophers working on relational auton-

omy and relational equality. The idea for a research project on this topic
arose due to the realization that, although the literatures on relational
autonomy and relational equality share many concerns and both aim
to provide a relational articulation of a fundamental value of political
philosophy, there had been no joint treatment of the two frameworks.
We are indebted to a diverse group of institutions and individuals
without whom the project would not have come to fruition. First, the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided
a grant (SSHRC Insight Development 430-2016-01205) that supported
our initial research and provided funding for a workshop held at McGill
University in April 2019. Our then McGill PhD student, Éliot Litalien,
participated in regular meetings of our research group and offered
thoughtful and constructive input that was invaluable in formulating
our ideas. The papers presented at the workshop and the ensuing dis-
cussions enriched our thinking and helped to move the project forward.
We particularly acknowledge the workshop papers presented by Erin
Beeghly, Robin Dillon, and Marina Oshana, who were unable to con-
tribute to the collection.
The Institute for Health and Social Policy and the Department of
Philosophy at McGill University provided the workshop venue and other
support. We are grateful to Sonia Bichler, Anaik Fortier, and Hosanna
Galea for their wonderful work on the poster, publicity, and other
aspects of organization that ensured the smooth running of the work-
shop. The interuniversity Centre de Recherche en Éthique (funded by the
Fonds de Recherche du Québec - Societé et Culture) and our individual
SSHRC Insight grants provided some additional funds during the editing
process.
The revisions of the papers for the collection took place during a period
starting in March 2020 that no one will ever forget – the period of an
unforeseen once-in-a-century global pandemic. We are deeply grateful
to all our collaborators who persisted, despite the upheaval of COVID-19,
to turn their draft papers into the articles published here.
x Preface and Acknowledgments
Finally, our editing task was made infinitely easier, and the quality of
the collection has been much improved, due to the meticulous copyedit-
ing of Wendy Carlton and her insightful comments on each contribution.
We are indebted to her input.
Natalie Stoljar and Kristin Voigt

Montreal, April 2021
1 Introduction
A Relational Turn in
Political Philosophy
Natalie Stoljar and Kristin Voigt
The notions of relational autonomy and relational equality have become

prominent in recent debates in moral and political philosophy, and both
are regarded as examples of what has been called “relational theory”
(Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000; Downie & Llewellyn 2011; Nedelsky 2012).
Yet, the precise connections between them have not been systematically
explored. The chapters in this book aim to elaborate these connections.
There are several parallels between the relational equality and rela-
tional autonomy frameworks. First, they share a conviction that philo-
sophical theories, in particular theories of justice, should take the fact
of people’s social embeddedness as their starting point. People’s equality
and autonomy are affected by interpersonal relationships within families
and cultural or religious communities as well as by their social position in
broader structures, such as those of class, gender, or race. Second, there
is no single notion of either relational autonomy or relational equality—
they are both umbrella terms that encompass different conceptions of
the way in which social conditions should be included in an analysis of
autonomy or equality. Third, each literature critiques a dominant view
precisely on the grounds that it gives insufficient weight to the effects
of social-relational conditions on individuals. According to relational
approaches, dominant views of equality and autonomy are problematic
because they do not adequately articulate how injustice, namely inequal-
ity and impoverished autonomy, arises as a result of people’s social rela-
tionships and social situation broadly. Finally, each literature grapples
with normative issues of political philosophy, for instance, how to justify
fundamental values and whether, or how, to avoid problematic forms of
perfectionism.
This introduction sets the stage by outlining the two relational frame-
works and their overlapping themes. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 elaborate the
different conceptual positions within these now growing literatures. In
Section 1.1, we survey different conceptions of relational autonomy, and
in Section 1.2, we outline the conceptual issues implicit in the relational
equality debate. Section 1.3 focuses on three specific overlapping themes:
many relational approaches are examples of nonideal theory in political
DOI: 10.4324/9780367823344-1
2 Natalie Stoljar and Kristin Voigt
philosophy, they often emphasize the various ways in which oppression
(institutional, structural, or interpersonal) is inimical to autonomy and
equality, and both frameworks raise the question of how unequal social
conditions undermine people’s self-regarding attitudes, namely their
self-respect, self-trust, and self-esteem. In Section 1.4, we turn to some
unresolved normative issues that are common to both literatures. These
include the normative “point” or justification of autonomy and equality,
whether relational approaches are committed to a problematic form of
perfectionism, and lastly the question of the relationship between the
two values. Section 1.5 sets out how each chapter contributes to the dif-
ferent themes described above.
1.1 Relational Autonomy

Autonomy—self-governance or self-rule—is a concept that appears
in many different philosophical literatures. In moral psychology for
instance, autonomy is a normative feature of personhood to be distin-
guished from related concepts such as self-control or integrity. In medi-
cal ethics, the principle of “respect for autonomy,” which is taken to be
secured through informed consent, ensures that clinical decisions and
health research are conducted in a morally permissible manner. In this
book, we aim to explore the notion of autonomy in political philosophy,
namely, autonomy as a valuable kind of individual freedom that political
arrangements ought to promote. Although the term “autonomy” can
indicate personal sovereignty (e.g., Enoch 2017, 31–32), we use it here to
refer to the freedom that Isaiah Berlin (2002, 53, 178) termed “self-deter-
mination” or “being one’s own master.” Later authors, notably Charles
Taylor, refer to this “positive” freedom as authenticity: “autonomy still
finds its core meaning in the idea of being one’s own person, directed by
considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are…part of
what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self” (Christman &
Anderson 2005, 3; also see Taylor 1985b; Christman 2009).
Autonomy as “being one’s own person” and as making decisions that
issue from “one’s authentic self” is articulated in recent literature to
require both competency and authenticity conditions (Christman 2009;
Mackenzie 2008). Rational competency corresponds to a capacity for
critical reflection that is free from certain undermining influences, such
as hypnotic suggestion, manipulation, and coercive persuasion (Dworkin
1988, 18), and not “being denied minimal education and exposure to
alternatives” (Christman 2009, 147 and 155). Authenticity is articulated
in terms of endorsement (Dworkin 1988) or the weaker condition of
non-alienation (Christman 2009). John Christman proposes that an agent
is authentic with respect to a particular preference or commitment if, after
critical reflection on the historical processes leading to the formation of
the preference or commitment, she is not (or would not be) alienated from
Introduction 3
it (Christman 2009, 155–6). Alienation is a “combination of judgment
and affective reaction. To be alienated is to feel negative affect, to feel
repudiation and resistance…” (Christman 2009, 144). Thus, these influ-
ential notions of autonomy as authenticity treat autonomy as largely psy-
chological or “internalist:” autonomy requires mental competency that
delivers a psychological state of endorsement or non-alienation.
Christman acknowledges the influence of social and historical cir-
cumstances on authenticity (2009). People could be inauthentic and
hence non-autonomous if they “are unable to see themselves (without
alienation) as even part author of the social narrative of which they
are a part” (2009, 172). However, for Christman, “It is not social con-
nectedness as such or even … hierarchical or unequal social relations
that disturb autonomy” (2009, 172). Relational conceptions of auton-
omy challenge this conclusion. In this section, we illustrate the different
conceptions that fall under the umbrella of relational autonomy, which
we divide into two broad categories. The first accepts that authentic-
ity is necessary for autonomy but characterizes authenticity itself as
social-relational. The second argues that authenticity is the wrong cri-
terion; rather, what matters for autonomy are interpersonal and exter-
nal conditions—such as the provision of morally adequate options and
the absence of external social control—that allow self-determination to
flourish.
1.1.1 Authenticity as Social-Relational

Charles Taylor claims that positive freedom can be impaired “through
fear, inauthentically internalized standards, or false consciousness
[all of which will act] to thwart your self-realization”(1985b, 215–6).
Relational autonomy scholars agree that such psychological “distor-
tions” are potentially problematic for self-realization or authenticity.
However, they propose that the notion of authenticity itself is social-re-
lational and hence can be undermined by a person’s social and interper-
sonal context. One possible approach advocates that preferences with
certain immoral or autonomy-unfavorable contents are ipso facto inau-
thentic and non-autonomous.1 For instance, preferences to be enslaved,
or preferences based on “false” oppressive norms, might be “inauthen-
tically internalized” and incompatible with autonomy due to their con-
tents (cf. Stoljar 2000). More commonly, relational theorists argue that
the development of the critical reflection required to constitute one’s
authentic self is itself vulnerable to social conditions. For instance,
Diana Tietjens Meyers claims that a person is authentic or has “auton-
omy competency” when she exercises a “repertoire of skills” of critical
reflection to engage in “self-discovery, self-definition and self-direc-
tion” (e.g., Meyers 2005, 49). These skills include introspection, imag-
ination, communication, and memory (e.g., Meyers 2002, 20). Social
conditions, particularly lack of education or oppressive socialization,
can affect whether or not such skills develop in the first place, erode
them even if they do develop, or fail to promote a person’s exercise of
these skills. For instance, gendered expectations might deter the devel-
opment or exercise of autonomy skills in girls but promote it in boys.
Boys are more likely to be encouraged to debate their points of view
or “imagine themselves otherwise” (Mackenzie 2000), that is, to hone
the skills required for authenticity. Thus, although Meyers agrees that
authenticity is required for autonomy, she argues that certain social con-
ditions are necessary to the cultivation of the deliberation required for
authenticity. When the capacity for deliberation is stunted (for instance,
by oppressive social relationships or conditions), an authentic self will
not emerge.
It has been suggested, however, that deliberation and critical reflection
are not on their own sufficient to secure authenticity. Certain attitudes
to oneself, such as self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem, may also be
required. For instance, Trudy Govier refers to women who were victims
of rape or incest: these women “tended to blame themselves, de-value
themselves, and to have a diminished sense of their own competence
and judgment after the sexual assaults…” (Govier 1993, 101). Govier
concludes that “reliance [on one’s own critical reflection and judgment]
is possible only if one has, and can maintain against criticism, a sense of
one’s own basic competence and worth” (1993, 103–4). Along the same
lines, Catriona Mackenzie proposes that autonomy requires “normative
authority,” namely that people are self-authorizing, “behind” their own
decisions and regard themselves “as the legitimate source of the authority,
as able and authorized to speak for [one]self” (2008, 514). 2 This in turn
requires a sense of confidence or self-trust in their own decision-making
processes, as well as a reasonable level of self-respect. Mackenzie argues
that the healthy attitudes of self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem that
are required for authenticity are social-relational because they depend
on “relations of intersubjective recognition” (2008, 514).
Andrea Westlund agrees that critical reflection is insufficient for
authenticity. However, whereas Govier and Mackenzie emphasize self-re-
garding attitudes, Westlund focuses on the observation that authenticity
involves “speaking for oneself” and “maintaining [one’s commitments]
against criticism.” Consider a well-known example of servility, that of
the Deferential Wife (Hill 1991). She is
a woman who is utterly devoted to serving her husband … [who]

believes that the proper role for a woman is to serve her family …
[M]uch of her happiness derives from her belief that she fulfils this
role very well. No one is trampling on her rights, she says; for she is
quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband as she does
(Hill 1991, 5–6).3
Introduction 5
Westlund notes the wholeheartedness of the wife’s deference to her hus-
band. Her critical reflection and even self-trust seem to be intact; indeed,
she “is remarkable in part because she seems so unambivalent about her
subservient role” (Westlund 2003, 491). Westlund argues that “[b]eing
impervious to critical challenge … is an excellent candidate for what
it is to be gripped by an action-guiding commitment … as opposed to
governing it” (2009, 34). Hence, the commitments of people like the
Deferential Wife are authentic and truly “speak for” them only if they
have a disposition to answerability, that is, a disposition to provide a
justification of their commitments to interlocutors who challenge them
to do so.
These debates raise a number of conceptual questions that we can only
briefly address here. First, how precisely does autonomy intersect with
social-relational conditions? As Marilyn Friedman asks: “[I]s auton-
omy merely the (nonsocial) result of certain other social conditions or
is it inherently social in its very nature?” (Friedman 2003, 96). She and
Meyers both advocate a procedural account on which locally autono-
mous decisions are the outcomes of a process of authentic critical reflec-
tion. A decision is autonomous on Meyers’ account when it is the product
of exercising autonomy skills, and on Friedman’s when it is delivered by
a deliberative process that critically affirms and reaffirms one’s “wants
and values” (Friedman 2003, 6). These accounts imply that social con-
ditions are “necessary” for autonomy only in the sense of being “causal
conditions that are necessary to bring [it] about … rather like sunshine
causing plants to grow” (Friedman 2003, 96). On the other hand, the
necessary condition of autonomy advanced by Westlund—a disposition
to answerability—is “constitutively relational” because it is dialogical
and “[points] beyond itself, to the position the agent occupies as one
reflective, responsible self among many” (2009, 35-6). On constitutively
relational accounts, just as being a friend requires being in a particular
kind of interpersonal relationship, being autonomous requires standing
in the right relations with the social world (Johnston, this volume, 134).
Social conditions are hence necessary “defining conditions” of auton-
omy (Christman 2004, 147). A second issue is the extent to which auton-
omy is a moralized concept. It has been suggested that conceptions that
employ self-regarding attitudes like self-respect or self-trust are “weakly
substantive” because these attitudes assume that certain moral condi-
tions are in place (Benson 2005a; Mackenzie 2008). If Westlund’s dis-
position to answerability cannot be maintained without self-trust, and
the latter itself is a moralized concept, her approach would be weakly
substantive.4 However, Westlund’s dispositional account, and the pro-
cedural views advanced by Friedman and Meyers, are content-neutral
even if they are not all morally neutral. That is, being autonomous is in
principle compatible with having commitments that are immoral, bad
for the agent, or themselves inimical to autonomy.
1.1.2 Externalist Conceptions
The last section identified relational approaches that accept that authen-
ticity of some form is the key to autonomy but refigure it in social-rela-
tional terms. A second category of relational views rejects the claim that
authenticity is necessary for autonomy. It is not inauthenticity per se
that interferes with autonomy but rather hostile interpersonal attitudes
or constraining external conditions. On these approaches, autonomy is
both constitutively relational and morally substantive because the inter-
personal and external conditions that are necessary for autonomy must
meet certain normative standards. For instance, Paul Benson argues that
autonomy requires “taking ownership” of one’s commitments and activ-
ities. Although taking ownership “concerns agents’ position to speak for
their actions in the face of potential criticisms” (Benson 2005b, 102),
on Benson’s view, this is not a psychological disposition that manifests
authenticity. Rather, the ability to take ownership depends on occupy-
ing a social position in which one is regarded as a full participant in a
normative community and hence entitled to speak on one’s own behalf.
Certain social contexts render taking ownership and hence autonomy
impossible. For instance, people subject to Jim Crow laws or other forms
of racist oppression can rightly see themselves as socially invisible or
social non-persons and hence as not having the social status to take
ownership of their normative commitments in public domains (Benson
2005b, 113). People who take ownership can lack authenticity and peo-
ple who fail to take ownership due to their social position may never-
theless be authentic with respect to their normative commitments (cf.
Stoljar 2018).5 Thus, on Benson’s view, authenticity is neither necessary
nor sufficient for autonomy.
Other externalist theories treat certain external conditions as directly
incompatible with autonomy. Joseph Raz proposes that external options
that are trivial and of insufficient variety—and hence morally unaccept-
able—render autonomy impossible (Raz 1986, 373–374). Consider his
example of a Hounded Woman who is by herself on an island, pursued
by a carnivorous wild animal that is hunting her down, and whose every
move is determined by the need to protect herself from the beast. Even
if the woman is fully rationally competent, self-authorizing, and has
authentic values and commitments, her autonomy is narrowed because
her feasible options render her wholly focused on her own daily sur-
vival. Marina Oshana also advocates a social-relational analysis. On
her account, autonomy requires that people have “practical control”
over their daily lives (Oshana 2006). Practical control is incompatible
with de jure and de facto social situations in which people are subject to
arbitrary social control or domination (cf. Pettit 1997). Oshana writes
of the Deferential Wife that “she fails to be autonomous—not because
she wants to be subservient, but because she is subservient. Her lack of
Introduction 7
autonomy is due to her personal relations with others” (Oshana 2006,
62). In other words, the interpersonal relations in which she finds herself
are (intentionally or not) dominating and incompatible with her being
autonomous. Similarly, members of racialized minorities who are subject
to racial profiling or stop-and-search policies have diminished auton-
omy. They suffer arbitrary social control because of their increased vul-
nerability to being stopped relative to their white counterparts. They
become accustomed to exercising “constant vigilance,” for example by
avoiding areas in which it is unusual to see Black drivers (Oshana 2006,
88). Thus, such policies constitute significant burdens on self-determi-
nation in addition to causing other well-recognized harms to the tar-
geted groups. Importantly, as relational theorists point out, burdens on
self-determination can be generated by structural injustices as well as
intentional social policies. Oppressive stereotypes and social scripts also
require members of the affected groups to exercise vigilance and con-
stantly accommodate themselves to the script (Stoljar 2015).
1.2 Relational Equality

Like relational autonomy theorists, relational egalitarians are respond-
ing to what they regard as a highly problematic dominant view of equal-
ity. While they often refer to a history of political thought that views
equality in relational terms (see, e.g., Schemmel 2021, Chapter 1), the
relational conception of equality re-emerged in the contemporary debate
as a critique of (what is now called) luck egalitarianism.6 The latter
assumes that equality is fundamentally about distributions of a particu-
lar equalisandum, such as opportunity, resources, or wellbeing. Unequal
distributions “are just if and only if certain facts about responsibility
obtain with respect to those inequalities” (Cohen 2008, 300). That is,
when considering whether or not a particular inequality is problematic,
we must ask whether those who are (dis)advantaged are responsible, or
should be held responsible, for the inequality.7
In response to this distributive understanding, relational egalitarians
argue that equality is about how members of a political community regard
and treat one another: what matters is not that individuals have equal
amounts of a particular equalisandum but that they regard and treat
each other as equals. They advocate that egalitarians’ focus should be
on what they call “social equality” (Fourie 2011, Miller 1997, Scheffler
2003), “equality of status” (Miller 1997), “a society of equals” (Scheffler
2003, 2005), or “democratic equality” (Anderson 1999). Relational
egalitarians have also suggested that the pursuit of a distribution that
is fair, by luck egalitarian standards, could conflict with requirements
of relational equality. For example, Jonathan Wolff (1998) has argued
that to ensure that those who are not responsible for their disadvantage
be compensated, individuals may be asked to reveal information about
themselves that they find shameful (e.g., that they have no talents and
therefore it is not their fault that they are unemployed). This objection to
luck egalitarianism therefore draws on relational considerations, such as
questions of equal respect and self-respect.8 Indeed, for relational egal-
itarians, the focus of egalitarian concern includes phenomena such as
disrespect as well as status inequalities and oppression.9
As with “relational autonomy,” “relational equality” is an umbrella
term and various conceptions of relational equality have been advanced—
though these divergences and the reasons underlying them are typically
not identified as clearly as they are in the relational autonomy literature.
The remainder of this section identifies central conceptual questions
within the relational equality debate.
1.2.1 Scope and Locus of Relational Equality

Particularly relevant is where the requirements of equality are taken to
apply. For many relational egalitarians, the primary concern is how indi-
viduals relate to one another: do they have the right attitudes towards
each other, do they treat each other as equals? While the relevant individ-
uals are usually taken to be members of the same political communities,
requirements of relational equality could also apply beyond co-citizens,
perhaps even globally (Lippert-Rasmussen 2018, 146–153). Other rela-
tional egalitarians start their analysis from institutions: what does it
mean for the state and its institutions to relate to citizens as equals? The
concern for institutions could be either instrumental, such that the focus
is on determining which institutional arrangements are most conducive
to egalitarian relationships between citizens (e.g., Viehoff 2014), or insti-
tutions could be seen as a collective agent to whom the requirements of
relational equality apply directly (e.g., Schemmel 2012).
1.2.2 Hierarchies
Once relational egalitarians have settled the question of where their
requirements apply, they need to specify what precisely it means to
relate as equals. In particular, what does relational equality imply for
different kinds of hierarchies? Some relational egalitarians allow that
hierarchies are not always problematic. For example, David Miller sug-
gests that relational equality does not require that power, prestige, or
wealth be equal across individuals; rather, hierarchies are problematic
if they “serve to construct a social hierarchy in which A can unequiv-
ocally be ranked as B’s superior” (Miller 1997, 232; see also Fourie
2011). Elizabeth Anderson (2012) focuses on hierarchies that have been
the target of egalitarian movements, such as those based on racism or
sexism. She defines social hierarchies as “durable group inequalities that
Introduction 9
are systematically sustained by laws, norms, or habits…and…are typi-
cally based on ascriptive group identities such as race, ethnicity, caste,
class, gender, religion, language, citizenship status, marital status, age,
and sexuality” (Anderson 2012, 42). On all these accounts, the focus is
on social groups, whereas personal relationships that are hierarchical,
such as those between student and professor, or between child and par-
ent, are not necessarily inconsistent with relational equality. In contrast,
Samuel Scheffler offers an interpersonal analysis, maintaining that rela-
tional equality requires “human relationships that are, in certain crucial
respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power or status”
(Scheffler 2005, 17). This would suggest a more demanding approach
to hierarchies than is the case for Miller or Anderson. However, he
also notes that some hierarchical relationships may be valuable despite
being inegalitarian. This echoes Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s (2018, 53)
suggestion that the most plausible response to the issue of hierarchies
is a pluralist one, which allows that some relationships, such as those
between parents and their children, can be valuable even though they
do not meet requirements of relational equality.
1.2.3 Treatment, Attitudes, and the Expression of Attitudes

Another conceptual issue involves the relationship between egalitarian
treatment, egalitarian attitudes, and the expression of egalitarian atti-
tudes. Relational egalitarians typically seem to assume that both behavior
and attitudes are necessary for relational equality to obtain (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2018). The idea is reflected in many descriptions of relational
equality, such as that equality requires “a society in which people regard
and treat one another as equals” (Miller 1997, 224). The importance of
behavior and attitudes is also implicit in Anderson’s distinction between
hierarchies of esteem, domination, and standing (2012). Hierarchies of
esteem, in which those on the lower rungs are stigmatized and subject to
denigrating stereotypes, are a matter of attitudes, whereas hierarchies of
domination and standing exemplify unequal treatment. The behavioral
and attitudinal components of relational equality do not necessarily go
together. Someone can treat another person as an equal without regard-
ing that person as an equal, and someone can regard another person as
an equal but fail to treat them as an equal (see also Cohen 2014; Lippert-
Rasmussen 2018, 70–71). It is also possible for individuals to regard
as equal someone whom they are not in a position to treat as equal or
unequal (Lippert-Rasmussen 2018, 73).
What is required to treat someone as an equal? This is a pressing
question for relational egalitarians. For example, if relational equality
requires egalitarian interpersonal treatment, does this have implica-
tions for how we should reason and deliberate with each other? Perhaps
most prominently, Scheffler has proposed that one aspect of a society
of equals is that its members abide by what he calls the “deliberative
constraint,” which requires that “each member accepts that every other
member’s equally important interests should play an equally significant
role in influencing decisions made on behalf of the society as a whole”
(2015, 35). Anderson, too, thinks of relational equality as having impli-
cations for our deliberations with others. For equality to obtain, she
notes, “others [must] recognize an obligation to listen respectfully and
respond to one’s arguments” (Anderson 1999, 313).
Similarly, the requirement of equal regard could encompass a num-
ber of different kinds of attitudes. For some egalitarians, the attitudes
involved in “equal regard” have an affective component: John Baker
(2015) argues that relating to others as equals may require attitudes of
care and solidarity. Others envisage a society characterized by relations
of “fraternity” or civic friendship (Mason 2015), and suggest that part
of what it means to be a society of equals is for citizens to see them-
selves as being “in the same boat” (Fourie 2016, 200). Further, debates
outside the relational equality literature may be relevant to specifying
the content of egalitarian attitudes. A form of epistemic injustice that
Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice” (Fricker 2007)—a hear-
er’s failure to give due credibility to a speaker because of prejudice in
the hearer’s mind—could be described as a failure on the part of the
hearer to recognize the speaker as an equal. Regarding someone as an
equal may thus require that we have unprejudiced attitudes to their
testimony.10 Attitudes may also include beliefs; for instance, it has been
suggested that certain beliefs, such as beliefs that are racist or preju-
diced, wrong their targets (e.g., Basu 2019). Relational egalitarians (at
least those who view relational equality as a deontic requirement; see
Section 1.4.1) may want to capture such concerns as inimical to rela-
tional equality.
In addition to questions about the attitudes that individuals must
have if they are to regard others as equals, some relational egalitarians
also suggest that relational equality has implications for the attitudes
that are expressed, by institutions, individuals, or both. Perhaps most
explicitly, Anderson notes that “the most fundamental test any egalitar-
ian theory must meet” is “that its principles express equal respect and
concern for all citizens” and she describes her own account of equality
as capturing “the expressive demands of equal respect” (1999, 289).
Agents can express different mental states, such as beliefs or attitudes,
through their actions. For example, an anti-war protestor may burn a
flag to express opposition to a government policy, or a sneer may be
used to express contempt for an interlocutor (Anderson & Pildes 2000,
1506). Because people’s actions can express attitudes they do not have,
and they can have attitudes without expressing them, this expressive
requirement is distinct from the attitudinal implications of relational
equality discussed above.
Introduction 11
Of course, the expressive “meaning” of both institutional and inter-
personal actions is shaped by contextual and historical factors (Anderson
& Pildes 2000; Schemmel 2012; Voigt 2018). Anderson emphasizes that
social norms play an important role in facilitating appropriate expressions;
in the absence of appropriate social norms, it may not be possible for egal-
itarian attitudes to be expressed (1993). For example, in the context of
romantic, heterosexual relationships, existing norms, such as that a man
expresses affection for a female partner by wrapping his arm around her,
express a status hierarchy in which the man is the protector and

leader, the woman the dependent follower…Until alternative norms
for expressing heterosexual affection can be instituted, egalitarian
couples will not be able to express fully and adequately the kind of
love they have for each other
(Anderson 1993, 18–19).
This suggests that relational egalitarians may have to make social norms
an explicit aspect of their analysis. We return to this issue in Section
1.3.2 below.
1.3 Overlapping Themes

Even though the relational autonomy and relational equality literatures
have parallel themes and concerns, there has been little contact between
them. An important goal of this collection is to highlight the connections
between the debates and identify ways in which they can be brought to
bear on each other. In this section, we identify three particularly sali-
ent areas of concern to both relational autonomy and relational equal-
ity. Both approaches are congenial to what have been called “nonideal”
approaches to political philosophy; they both emphasize the impact of
different forms of oppression on autonomy or equality; and they both
explore how the attitudes that agents have to themselves—such as
self-respect, self-esteem, and self-trust—affect autonomy and equality.
1.3.1 The Ideal/Nonideal Debate

Ideal theory can be characterized either as a necessary methodological
strategy or as a methodology that is problematic due to its substantive
idealizing assumptions. On John Rawls’ conception, ideal theory is a
necessary methodological strategy. It is a “prerequisite for nonideal the-
ory” (Stemplowska & Swift 2012, 377), which means that identifying
the principles of justice that would apply in a society operating under
idealized conditions is a necessary first step in articulating how actual
nonideal conditions fall short of social justice. However, in his critique
of ideal theory, Charles Mills articulates ideal theory as what he calls
“ideal as model” (2005, 166). He argues that in ethics and political phi-
losophy, the ideal as model comprises certain problematic assumptions
such as idealized social ontology, idealized capacities, or an idealized
cognitive sphere (Mills 2005, 168–169). Because these assumptions are
false, ideal theory operates as an “ideology” or a “distortional complex
of ideas, values and norms” that obscures the goals political philoso-
phers ought to be engaged in, most importantly that of addressing the
social injustice suffered by historically marginalized groups, especially
the victims of racial subordination (Mills 2005, 172). Mills claims that
hence ideal theory should be abandoned. His conclusion is controver-
sial however (Stemplowska & Swift 2012; Shelby 2013). For instance,
Tommie Shelby thinks that Rawls’ ideal theory is helpful to address
racial oppression because it “offers a specific set of normative principles
that…can be usefully applied to racial subordination” (2013, 146). It
might be preferable therefore to take Mills’ argument as a plea for a shift
of emphasis rather than a repudiation of ideal theory.
Questions about which level of ideal/nonideal theorizing is appro-
priate affect the equality literature, for instance around luck egalitar-
ianism. A problem with the relational critique of luck egalitarianism is
precisely that critics such as Anderson (1999) assume that luck egali-
tarianism has direct and clear implications for the real world whereas
luck egalitarians assume a much more ideal level of theorizing that does
not permit straightforward conclusions about real-world cases (Swift
2008). For Anderson, egalitarian theorizing is valuable only if it is not
too far removed from the real world (e.g., Anderson 1999). Other rela-
tional egalitarians proceed from different points on the ideal/nonideal
spectrum. Jonathan Wolff rejects the methodological claim that ideal
theory is a prerequisite for nonideal theory. He endorses the critique of
Rawlsian ideal theory advocated by Amartya Sen, namely, that the study
of social justice should focus on real-world inequality, such as “hunger,
illiteracy, torture [and] arbitrary incarceration,” not “spotless justice”
(Sen 2006, 218–220). Hence, Wolff (2015a) explicitly questions whether
we should be engaged in ideal theory about social equality at all. He
argues that, instead of trying to specify a positive account of relational
equality, we should allow that “a range of different and incompatible
models can each be seen as exemplifying social equality” (Wolff 2015a,
221; see also Wolff, this volume). From this perspective, the focus of
egalitarianism should be on identifying political and social conditions
that are clearly inconsistent with relational equality rather than trying to
determine what a perfectly egalitarian society would look like.
There are also relational egalitarians who set themselves a task that
appears closer to ideal theory. Some advance an ideal of social equal-
ity by looking—not at abstract individuals—but at concrete paradigms
of egalitarian interpersonal relationships. Scheffler bases his “deliber-
ative constraint” (discussed above) on what would be required for an
Introduction 13
egalitarian relationship between romantic partners; he claims that this
constraint also applies to members of political communities (Scheffler
2015). G. A. Cohen, whose work on what he calls “community” is often
considered an example of a relational theory of equality, starts from the
characteristics of a camping trip (Cohen 2009). Such accounts can be
helpful because some form of ideal theory may be necessary due to its
“target” role—it “tells us where we are trying to get to in the long run”
(Stemplowska & Swift 2012, 379). It is plausible that, even if we reject
abstract or transcendental commitments, we need to identify normative
ideals against which to measure real-world injustices.11
Relational autonomy theorists too have questioned whether the
abstractions implicit in ideal theory, like that of Rawls, are appropri-
ate methodological starting points. As is well known, Rawls’ principles
of justice presupposed an idealized social ontology: principles of jus-
tice are formulated by agents from behind a “veil of ignorance,” that
is, from a position in which agents are making decisions about how a
society will function before they know who they will turn out to be
in the society. Such agents are abstract and “atomistic”—they are not
influenced by the particular desires and preferences that are contingent
on being embedded in an actual situation and do not know their social
status, natural abilities, or conceptions of the good (Rawls 1999, 118).
Although the relational autonomy literature does not take an explicit
stand on the ideal/nonideal debate, it argues that theorizing should start
from what people are actually like rather than from the abstractions of
idealized social ontology or idealized capacities. It thus rejects atomistic
social ontology as a methodological starting point, claiming rather that
theories of social justice should assume a conception of agents situated
in networks of social relations and relationships. This parallels Charles
Taylor’s communitarian rejection of atomism: “Atomism affirms the
self-sufficiency of the individual … [but] outside society … our distinc-
tive human capacities could not develop” (Taylor 1985b, 190–191).
Similarly, Anderson argues that the focus of ideal theory on individu-
als is misleading because “the most profound and systematic inequalities
track [social group] identities such as gender, class, race, caste, ethnicity,
national citizenship, sexual orientation and religion” (2009, 133). She
claims that the hierarchies of standing, command and esteem that are
of most concern to egalitarians are those “propagated through ... social
interaction between … groups” (Anderson 2009, 132, emphasis added).
Focusing on individuals rather than groups is therefore an “epistemically
defective method for political philosophy” (Anderson 2009, 133). It
should be noted, however, that this does not imply a rejection of norma-
tive individualism. Unlike some communitarians, relational autonomy
theorists and relational egalitarians both embrace the normative claim
that “individuals are what ultimately matter—their freedom, dignity,
and welfare” (Anderson 2009, 132).
1.3.2 Oppression
The second area of overlap between the two relational frameworks is
their focus on oppression as a particularly egregious form of injustice
that undermines both autonomy and equality. Oppression is distinctive
because it is a “harm perpetrated on groups by other groups by direct
and indirect material and psychological forces that violate justice” (Cudd
2006, 26). Paradigmatic examples of oppression are systematic injustices
suffered by groups whose members share social identities, for instance
those of class, gender, race, sexuality, or disability. For example, racial
segregation in the United States is a material and economic injustice that
victimizes Black Americans as a group. The group suffers systematic
disadvantage through residential, job and school segregation, and indi-
viduals who are Black are harmed in virtue of their group membership:
they are prevented from attending better schools, doing better jobs, and
living in the more affluent areas. Similarly, the unjust stereotyping of a
whole social group can cause members of the group to suffer psycholog-
ical harms like humiliation and shame. Oppression can be intentionally
perpetrated by individual or collective agents. However, it is also often
structural: oppressive social systems such as patriarchy or white suprem-
acy are generated and maintained by social practices, habits of behavior,
norms, stereotypes and attitudes and therefore do not require that iden-
tifiable individuals or institutions intentionally perpetrate the oppression
of gendered or racialized groups (Young 1990; Haslanger 2004).
Many relational egalitarians have made structural oppression central
to their analyses. For instance, Anderson writes that relational equal-
ity is incompatible with “what Iris Young has identified as the faces of
[structural] oppression: marginalization, status hierarchy, domination,
exploitation, and cultural imperialism” (1999, 312). She observes that
egalitarian political movements, in asserting the equal moral worth of
persons, oppose oppressive social hierarchies and “inegalitarian ideolo-
gies of racism, sexism, nationalism, caste, class, and eugenics” (Anderson
1999, 312). Emily McTernan argues explicitly that relational egalitarians
must move beyond a purely institutional focus and instead concern them-
selves with social norms and social practices, as these can lead to unjust
and inegalitarian interpersonal relationships (2018). These claims imply
that relational equality and structural oppression are incompatible. They
therefore raise the question of the extent to which relational egalitarian-
ism must reject a Rawlsian approach that focuses exclusively on the role
of institutions in promoting social equality. Rawls’ theory delivers the
principles of justice that should govern the political institutions and legal
system of a liberal society. These institutions comprise what he calls the
“basic structure” of the society (Rawls 1999, 6–7). However, Young’s
analysis of structural oppression implies that even a just basic structure
will be insufficient to secure social equality—a much more significant
Introduction 15
overhaul of interpersonal attitudes and relations, including eliminating
entrenched gender and race hierarchies, will be necessary.
For some relational egalitarians, there is a natural connection between
these two “sites” of egalitarian requirements. For instance, Anderson
notes that “the democratic state is nothing more than citizens acting
collectively” (1999, 314). Similarly, Gheaus describes the “relational fea-
tures of a society” as “how its members treat each other as citizens,
either directly in personal interactions or through the mediation of
social institutions” (2016, 55). While, as we saw, Schemmel’s analysis
of the requirements of relational equality focuses on institutions, he
also recognizes the importance of social norms in ensuring an “ethos of
non-domination” (Schemmel 2021, 118). For him, the basic structure is
not purely institutional; rather, it must contain “at least some important
and reasonably general informal social norms” (Schemmel 2021, 120).
Relational autonomy theorists also focus on structural oppression.
They argue that autonomy is called into question when people who are
oppressed internalize oppressive norms, or when oppression severely
limits the range of options that people take as feasible for them. For
instance, the preferences of the Deferential Wife suggest that she has
internalized traditional forms of femininity in which wives are expected
to always put a husband’s needs above their own. Her preferences seem
contrary to the preferences that women (as competent and authentic
agents) would be expected to have in the absence of the patriarchal
hierarchy in which they are systematically attributed second class sta-
tus. Ann Cudd describes such preferences as “indirect” psychological
harms of oppression. Because they originate within the psychology of
the oppressed themselves, they can be mistaken for “legitimate expres-
sions of individual differences in taste” when in reality they are “formed
by processes that are coercive: indoctrination, manipulation and adap-
tation to unfair social circumstances” (Cudd 2006, 183). Even when
members of oppressed groups have not internalized oppressive norms,
their options can be constrained due to what they consider feasible in the
light of their social circumstances. For instance, members of groups that
have suffered economic, racial, or gender oppression not only have less
access to high quality schooling but often also come from backgrounds
that historically have not valued professional career paths that require a
university education. As a result, certain career choices, even if they are
in principle available, may not be treated as feasible options by members
of these groups, and their autonomy will be undermined.
1.3.3 Self-Regarding Attitudes

As we saw in Section 1.1, relational autonomy theorists argue that intel-
lectual competencies are not always sufficient for autonomy. Shame, loss
of self-esteem, self-doubt, and loss of self-confidence or self-trust can
damage autonomy even if a person’s capacities for critical reflection are
fully intact. Taylor points out that these “subject-referring” emotions
are dependent on how people are perceived by others: “The shameful or
humiliating is subject-referring, because something is only humiliating
for me by virtue of the way I understand myself – or better … because
of the way I see myself and aspire to be in public space” (1985a, 57-59).
Similarly, some relational egalitarians emphasize that self-respect is
dependent on respectful attitudes and treatment (by both institutions
and other people) and that both are necessary to social equality. David
Miller claims that “equality of status obtains when each member of soci-
ety regards him- or herself as fundamentally the equal of all others and
is regarded by others as fundamentally their equal” (Miller 1997, 199).
Wolff notes that “social inequality is, at least in part, constituted by the
attitudes people have to others and to themselves” (Wolff 2015b, 24).
Perhaps most explicitly, Schemmel sees relational equality as ultimately
grounded in a commitment to individual self-respect: “Relational egali-
tarians… put forward a particular model of social and political relation-
ships as required by justice on grounds of self-respect” (Schemmel 2011,
366)—though he has also argued that a concern for self-respect may not
issue the kind of demanding egalitarian requirements that the literature
assumes (Schemmel 2019; this volume).
Rawls includes the social bases of self-respect in the primary goods
which should be delivered by the institutions of a just society. On his
account, self-respect “includes a person’s sense of his own value, his
secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is
worth carrying out” (Rawls 1999, 386). This general description encom-
passes (at least) two senses of self-respect: the first, “standing self-re-
spect,” is a matter of “moral convictions about one’s status”; and the
second, “standards” or “appraisal” self-respect, corresponds to a posi-
tive evaluation of one’s skills or characteristics in the light of one’s values
or standards (Schemmel 2019, 631; cf. Darwall 1977). Standards self-re-
spect is perhaps closer to self-esteem (Moody-Adams 1992–93, 254).
Michele Moody-Adams adds a motivational dimension to self-respect,
that is, a “willingness to do whatever is within one’s power to enhance
one’s abilities and talents” (1992–93, 252). This dimension is connected
to self-trust. Moody-Adams points out that a person whose social cir-
cumstances constantly hamper her attempts to pursue her talents may
come to mistrust her ability to do so and associate the attempt to pursue
her talents with frustration and disappointment. If so, exercising her
abilities may seem “antithetical to self-preservation” (Moody-Adams
1992–93, 253).
The emphasis on self-regarding attitudes raises a number of issues.
First, to what extent are self-respect, self-esteem, or self-trust consti-
tuted by interpersonal and social conditions? Moody-Adams argues that
Introduction 17
self-respect is “socially constructed” and can be damaged when people
are subjected to discrimination and oppression. For instance, racist expec-
tations and stereotypes undermine the self-respect of Black children who
“gradually lower their expectations of themselves, until they effectively
relinquish any ambitions of academic success” (Moody-Adams 1992–93,
262). Similarly, Robin Dillon advocates a “sociopolitical” conception of
self-respect: self-respect corresponds to a fundamental “valuing of our-
selves” that is “a function of social relationships and the structure and
function of the social institutions among which we live” (Dillon 1997,
244). People can fail to develop self-respect when they occupy subordi-
nated positions in (for instance) gender or race hierarchies, because the
messages they receive through the “invisible lens” of their experience is
incompatible with having a sense of their own equal worth (Dillon 1997,
241). These views suggest that self-respect and social inequality are often
incompatible. Schemmel makes a contrasting proposal: what we value
is robust self-respect, namely a resilient psychological state or sense of
one’s own worthiness that, once developed, can withstand even a high
degree of social inequality (Schemmel 2019). A second, related question
concerns the political arrangements required to secure the social bases of
self-respect. Schemmel argues for a limited position on which egalitar-
ian institutions and legal protections are sufficient (2019; this volume).
Other relational egalitarians propose that structural social equality—
including the eradication of disrespectful interpersonal treatment and
attitudes—is also necessary to secure self-respect (for discussion, see
Stoljar & Voigt, this volume).
1.4 Normative Issues

Sections 1.1 and 1.2 outlined conceptual issues in the relational equality
and autonomy debates, and Section 1.3 identified overlapping themes.
In addition to the parallels we have already identified, the two debates
grapple with the same normative issues of political philosophy. Both
debates raise questions of how fundamental values should be justified
and whether political philosophy should be committed to Rawlsian
political liberalism or alternatively to some form of perfectionism. In
this section, we consider possible justifications of autonomy and equal-
ity, the question of whether either concept implies problematic perfec-
tionism, and finally the issue of the relation between the two values.
1.4.1 The Justification of Autonomy and Equality

In her critique of distributive equality, Anderson famously asked about
the “point” of the notion of equality (1999). The autonomy literature
presupposes that autonomy is a value of liberal political philosophy yet
has been less concerned with autonomy’s point. It contains little detailed
discussion of why autonomy has fundamental normative status. There
are, however, brief discussions of the point of autonomy and implicit
answers to the question of normative justification. On Christman’s
theory, autonomy functions in political philosophy to define the sub-
jects to whom “political participation in democratic society extends”
(Christman 2009, 173); it functions as a “status marker of an independ-
ent citizen” (Christman 2004, 157). A conception of autonomy also has
to be compatible with the Rawlsian political liberalism that Christman
espouses. Hence, despite advocating an authenticity condition of auton-
omy, Christman’s conception is non-demanding, aiming to exclude as few
people as possible from the category of citizen.12 It is also non-moralized
to avoid perfectionist commitments. But, as Suzy Killmister observes,
there is an alternative account of the “point” of autonomy that is implicit
in feminist discussions of autonomy. The latter presume that autonomy
is “a tool in the fight against social oppression” and if so, “it would be
appropriate to view it as a valuable good for individuals, which justifies
an obligation on the part of the state to ensure that [it is] realised for all
citizens” (Killmister 2013, 356–357).13 These different conceptions of the
point of autonomy may have implications for its justification.
Indeed, Christman’s claim that autonomy functions as a marker of
democratic inclusion implies a possible conception of the value of auton-
omy, namely that autonomy is valuable because it is a core feature of
personhood or agency. Since personhood itself is valuable, autonomy is
valuable as a necessary component of personhood. It would follow that
to attribute non-autonomy would be in effect to claim that someone
lacks the moral status of full personhood. This conclusion may seem to
generate a dilemma for relational theorists (Khader 2011, 30). On the
one hand, oppression is claimed to undermine autonomy; on the other,
describing people living in circumstances of oppression as non-autono-
mous implies that they are not full persons. This disrespects their agency,
thereby compounding the problem of oppression. Autonomy theorists
have responded in various ways to this suggested dilemma, for instance
by arguing that autonomy is conceptually distinct from agency, and that
individuals can be both moral agents and moral persons (and worthy of
respect on that basis) even if social conditions undermine their autonomy
(Stoljar 2014, 2018; Mackenzie 2015). If this is right, autonomy does not
derive its value from being an essential component of personhood.
A second suggestion is implicit in Taylor’s politics of recognition.
As we saw above, autonomy is often analyzed as authenticity. Taylor
argues that authenticity—the unique and distinct sense of identity of a
person or group—is itself valuable: “[W]hen this distinctness … has been
ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant majority identity … this
assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity” (Taylor
1994, 38). Thus, on Taylor’s view, living according to one’s distinct
social and cultural identity (living authentically and autonomously) is
Introduction 19
a fundamental value that can be secured by interpersonal conditions,
particularly that of recognition. The claim that oppressed people are
not living authentically and autonomously therefore does not deny their
moral status, but rather implies that the social recognition required for
them to do so is absent. If we are to promote the value of authenticity,
failures of social recognition should be rectified.
A third suggestion is that autonomy is instrumentally valuable to
achieve human flourishing. Raz’s well-known examples of the Man in
the Pit and the Hounded Woman are meant to show that people who
lack autonomy also lack human flourishing (1986, 373–374). The Man
in the Pit can make choices such as when to move around in the pit, what
time to wake up and go to sleep, and so forth—but these are trivial. The
Hounded Woman is being pursued by a wild animal. She has options,
including nontrivial ones, but she is consumed by the need to protect
herself from the beast, and hence lacks a sufficiently diverse range of fea-
sible options. Although by hypothesis these individuals’ basic needs are
met (they have shelter, enough to eat, and can exercise their intellectual
capacities), neither is able to flourish. The explanation for their lack of
flourishing is that their circumstances deprive them of the minimal level
of meaningful options that is required for autonomy. This analysis—
namely, that autonomy is valuable because it promotes flourishing—is
congenial to the claim that the notion of autonomy is useful as a “tool
in the fight against social oppression.” Like the Man in the Pit and the
Hounded Woman, people in circumstances of oppression lack the mor-
ally adequate options required for autonomy and hence fail to flourish
even if otherwise their needs are met.
Turning now to the justification of the concept of equality, in the
relational equality literature, different reasons for valuing equality can
also be distinguished.14 First, we might think that relational equality
has intrinsic, impersonal value: relational equality, from this perspec-
tive, is a good, independent of its effects on individuals: “the world
is a better place if people relate as equals” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2018,
269). While this view is not frequently endorsed, at least one relational
egalitarian appears committed to it (O’Neill 2008). Schemmel rejects
this view because he thinks it is not consistent with liberal neutrality
(see Section 4.2 in Litalien, this volume). Second, unequal relationships
might be problematic because of their effects on individuals. For exam-
ple, Scheffler notes that “inegalitarian societies compromise human
flourishing; they limit personal freedom, corrupt human relationships,
undermine self-respect, and inhibit truthful living” (Scheffler 2005, 19,
emphasis added). Conversely, a society of equals “supports the mutual
respect and the self-respect of its members, encourages freedom of inter-
personal exchange, and places no special obstacles in the way of self-
understanding or truthful relations among people” (Scheffler 2005, 19).15
Anderson also emphasizes that equality is crucial for individual freedom:
“[d]emocratic equality guarantees all law-abiding citizens effective
access to the social conditions of their freedom at all times” (Anderson
1999, 289). These remarks focus on the instrumental value of relational
equality: it is a means to securing more fundamental values, such as
individual freedom, flourishing or self-respect. But, if the concern is not
ultimately with egalitarian relationships themselves, but with the things
these relationships are meant to secure, then we need further argument
to establish the importance of egalitarian relationships for promoting
these other goals.
In addition to its instrumental value, relational egalitarians often
regard relational equality as expressing a deontic requirement: because
individuals are equals, they must relate to each other in certain ways.
From this perspective, relational equality is typically interpreted as a
constraint that must be respected rather than a value that must be pro-
moted. In the literature, this position is adopted by Schemmel (2011),
who emphasizes that relational inequality involves an unjust, not merely
(or necessarily) damaging, way of treating or relating to others. For
example, Schemmel explains that while unequal status norms often lead
to feelings of shame and resignation among the worse off, “such norms
are a problem of justice even where they happen to fail to produce such
feelings—for example, among those of the worse off that have a par-
ticularly robust, or impervious, psychological constitution” (Schemmel
2011, 383). Seeing relational equality as a deontic requirement allows
inegalitarian relationships to be identified as problematic in and of them-
selves, irrespective of whether or not they have any negative effects.
1.4.2 Perfectionism?
Some theorists of relational autonomy and relational equality face con-
cerns about whether the concepts they advocate presuppose a form of
perfectionism and hence whether the need to avoid perfectionism might
speak against their specific interpretations. Christman has argued that
morally substantive conceptions of autonomy imply a problematic form
of perfectionism (2004; 2009). For instance, Oshana’s notion of auton-
omy (autonomy as practical control) is incompatible with individuals
being subject to forms of external social control, such as domination.
Thus, on her view, even if people prefer to live under inegalitarian polit-
ical arrangements, they are nevertheless non-autonomous. Christman
claims that this conclusion delegitimizes people’s choices because it
would permit overriding their voluntarily formed conceptions of the
good in the name of promoting their autonomy (Christman 2009, 170–
173). It also appears to be incompatible with Rawlsian political liber-
alism on which political arrangements should remain neutral between
“reasonable” conceptions of the good, because reasonable conceptions
might include those endorsing political structures, such as patriarchy,
Introduction 21
that are themselves incompatible with substantive relational autonomy.
Relational theorists have responded to these charges by questioning the
implication from relational autonomy to perfectionism, or claiming that
even if the implication holds, the ensuing perfectionism is not morally
problematic (Mackenzie 2008; Stoljar 2017).
The issue of perfectionism also arises for relational equality. Some
relational egalitarians seem to advocate anti-perfectionism, or, more
positively, liberal neutrality. For example, Anderson expresses her com-
mitment to liberal neutrality and takes her version of relational egali-
tarianism—“democratic equality”—as consistent with that requirement
(Anderson 1999, 330).16 Schemmel explicitly considers the question of
perfectionism and its implications for how we ought to interpret the
requirements of relational equality. His conception of relational equality
focuses on institutions and the attitudes they express towards individu-
als. Institutions must ensure that everyone has access to political deci-
sion-making, but this is not because such access is objectively good for
people:
no such perfectionist claims are necessary to account for the intrin-

sic importance of access to political institutions: by granting such
access, institutions are merely expressing proper respect for those
subject to their power, whether such access is also intrinsically good
for people in any more substantive sense or not.
(Schemmel 2012, 141)
In other work, Schemmel (2015) defends what he calls “justice-based

relational egalitarianism” and argues that one advantage of this
approach over its rival—pluralist social egalitarianism—is precisely
its take on perfectionism. For Schemmel, therefore, a commitment to
anti-perfectionism affects the specific interpretation of relational equal-
ity he adopts. His account does not require any substantive judgements
that equality makes people’s lives better in an objective sense; and he
does not rely on the idea that egalitarian relations are an objective good.
He claims that liberal egalitarians “stress respect for individual auton-
omy, and accordingly seek to secure for individuals equal opportunity
to pursue the widest possible array of different conceptions of the good”
(Schemmel 2015, 163).
1.4.3 Relationship Between the Two Values

It is striking that relational egalitarians often endorse both instrumental
and deontic interpretations of the value of equality. One implication of
this is that it is not clear which value is fundamental: equality—properly
understood—or the values that equality promotes. Relational egalitarians
often propose that equality has instrumental value because it promotes
individual freedom. Scheffler says that inegalitarian societies “limit per-
sonal freedom” (Scheffler 2005, 18); Anderson claims that “[d]emocratic
equality guarantees all law-abiding citizens effective access to the social
conditions of their freedom at all times” (Anderson 1999, 289); and Fabian
Schuppert argues that the main distinction between hierarchies that are
problematic and those that are not is whether they undermine rather than
leave intact each individual’s “free and responsible agency” (Schuppert
2015, 108). These comments raise the question of whether the freedom or
free agency that relational egalitarians have in mind is freedom qua rela-
tional autonomy, and if so whether relational equality is instrumentally
valuable precisely because it promotes relational autonomy.
The connections between relational equality and relational auton-
omy are less tight than they might seem to be at first glance (cf. Lippert-
Rasmussen, this volume). Consider first Oshana’s position that social
control or domination is incompatible with autonomy. Since domination
is a form of unequal treatment, Oshana’s view implies that one form of
social equality (non-domination) is indeed valuable because it secures
autonomy (cf. Litalien, this volume). Other forms of social inequality,
especially those deriving from attitudes rather than treatment (such as
the hierarchies of esteem identified by Anderson), may however not be
incompatible with autonomy, even on Oshana’s account. Hence, Oshana’s
conception of autonomy does not vindicate a general conclusion that rela-
tional equality is valuable because it promotes autonomy. On other con-
ceptions of autonomy, the connection to relational equality is even weaker.
For instance, on Raz’s account, autonomy is secured only if people have
options that meet a threshold of minimal moral adequacy. On this view,
the availability of valuable options is important to autonomy, not the
eradication of oppression or structural inequality (or even of unequal dis-
tributions). Similarly, the social conditions that are causally necessary for
the development of deliberative skills, self-regarding attitudes, or a dispo-
sition to answerability, might not correspond to those of social equality.
These conditions would include access to adequate education and certain
forms of supportive interpersonal treatment. While some relational theo-
rists argue that unequal relationships or disrespectful interpersonal atti-
tudes are likely to undermine the self-trust and self-respect that in turn are
necessary for autonomy, others have suggested that the social conditions
required to produce robust autonomy skills and self-regarding attitudes
fall short of those recommended by relational egalitarians (for more dis-
cussion, see Johnston, Schemmel, and Stoljar & Voigt, this volume.)
1.5 Chapter Summaries

As mentioned above, there has been little contact between the litera-
tures on relational equality and relational autonomy. A main goal of this
collection, therefore, is to reflect on how these approaches potentially
Introduction 23
inform and enrich each other. The contributors to the collection are phi-
losophers who are working on relational autonomy or relational equality.
Their contributions constitute a joint effort to articulate shared concerns
and to begin to address the questions we have outlined in this introduc-
tion. The first chapter, by Catriona Mackenzie, identifies a number of
fundamental questions about the relationship between autonomy and
equality, understood from a relational perspective. She outlines her own,
three-dimensional, conception of autonomy, according to which auton-
omy involves three axes: self-determination, self-authorization, and
self-governance. Self-authorization, Mackenzie argues, is an aspect of
autonomy that has been central not only to the debate about relational
autonomy, but also underlies the concerns that relational egalitarians
articulate. They are both concerned with how certain social arrange-
ments undermine individuals in their capacities as self-authorizing
agents. Understanding the role of relational equality, Mackenzie argues,
is also at the core of the debate between internalist and externalist the-
ories of autonomy.
One reason for thinking about the connection between relational
autonomy and relational equality is that equality may be necessary for
individual autonomy. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen considers what he calls
the “strong connection claim” in his chapter: the idea that agents can be
autonomous only if their community meets requirements of relational
equality. Lippert-Rasmussen concludes that what is required for individ-
ual autonomy is not relational equality but what he calls relational suf-
ficiency: individuals treating each other as sufficiently equal. Relational
sufficiency, Lippert-Rasmussen explains, is compatible with phenomena
that fall short of the requirements of relational equality. For example,
a society may consider as equally important each group’s most impor-
tant interests (in this sense, it is “sufficiently equal”) but may not weigh
entirely equally the weak interests of different groups. Although it falls
short of relational equality, relational sufficiency can secure individ-
ual autonomy. This suggests a different, less close connection between
autonomy and equality than is often assumed in the literature.
As described earlier in this introduction, relational egalitarians have
proposed different reasons for valuing equality. In Chapter 4, Éliot
Litalien critically assesses three different views on how equality should
be valued—intrinsically, as a deontic constraint, or instrumentally—and
highlights problems that each of these views needs to tackle. The most
promising, for Litalien, is the instrumental value view, according to
which equality is valuable because it helps us secure other important val-
ues. While relational egalitarians such as Anderson have suggested that
relational equality is valuable because it secures individuals’ freedom,
Litalien proposes that the value that relational equality helps us secure is
agency: this is consonant with some of the ideas Anderson has proposed
but offers a more detailed account.
One value that animates discussions of both relational autonomy
and relational equality is that of self-respect: individuals’ sense of their
own worth as equal to others. While relational egalitarians frequently
mention self-respect as one of the values that equality helps us secure,
Christian Schemmel (2019) calls into question the idea that self-respect
requires substantive relational equality. He argues that the requirements
of self-respect are much more minimal than is often assumed: self-respect,
properly conceived, must be robust—that is, it must be able to withstand
a certain amount of inequality. Thus, self-respect does not require the
absence of all inequality. Schemmel’s contribution to this volume revisits
this argument and elaborates some of its central points. The robustness
of self-respect that is central to his analysis requires certain supportive
social relationships that confirm to individuals their equal moral worth;
in this sense, self-respect is constitutively social even if it does not require
fully egalitarian social conditions.
Our own contribution seeks to defend the opposite conclusion: that
self-respect requires substantive relational equality, not just at the insti-
tutional level but also in informal, interpersonal interaction. Self-respect,
properly understood, is not only an intellectual understanding of one’s
equal worth but also has an emotional, non-cognitive dimension: we
must feel that we have equal worth. Building on work by Robin Dillon,
we argue that for this emotional dimension of self-respect to develop,
individuals must in fact be treated as equals. Being treated as less than
equal undermines the “experiential knowledge” that one is an equal,
irrespective of one’s intellectual beliefs about one’s worth.
Drawing on Mackenzie’s three-dimensional account of autonomy,
Rebekah Johnston’s chapter also focuses on self-respect in examining
the relationship between autonomy and equality. Johnston emphasizes
that self-respect is crucial for autonomy, particularly when it comes to
self-authorization. The fact that people can feel indignation about injus-
tices they experience indicates that self-respect can be maintained in
contexts of social inequality because to feel indignation about how one
is treated requires a recognition that one is an equal. However, while
self-respect and therefore the self-authorization dimension of autonomy
are left intact, the experience of inequality and injustice, and the indig-
nation it engenders, threatens autonomy in a different way. Indignation
is a painful feeling, and often amounts to a fruitless anger about unjust
circumstances that one cannot change. This experience can take an
emotional toll that undermines the self-determination dimension of
autonomy. Conversely, when individuals attempt to lessen their feelings
of indignation, this can damage the self-authorization dimension of
autonomy.
How might questions of relational autonomy and relational equality
become relevant for the real world? This is taken up by the final three
contributions to the volume. Nabina Liebow’s chapter focuses on a
Introduction 25
particularly pernicious aspect of how interpersonal interactions can go
wrong—the problem of microaggression. Microaggressions, Liebow
argues, are best understood as “an interpersonal behavior that implic-
itly signals (viz. suggests that there is a very high probability) that the
microaggressor has attitudes—implicit or explicit emotions, values, and/
or beliefs—that support a larger pattern of oppression in the broader
social context” (this volume, 199, emphasis in original). Crucial to micro-
aggressions and their effects is the uncertainty they create in the mind of
the target, in particular about whether or not the microaggressor does
indeed have the attitudes that are signaled by their behavior. Liebow out-
lines how this uncertainty undermines individuals’ self-trust and agency,
as well as the relationship between microaggressors and microaggressees.
Carina Fourie’s contribution examines the relationship between
“privilege” and relational equality. Injustice leaves some individuals or
groups better off than others or positioned higher up than others in the
social hierarchy; we often call this group “the privileged.” However, this
does not mean that the privileged are not harmed by injustice. Fourie
identifies six different kinds of impairments to which the privileged are
susceptible, many of which play an important role in maintaining and
reproducing unjust social structures. Fourie argues that, while attempt-
ing to analyze these impairments from the perspective of distributive
theories of equality has counterintuitive implications, relational egali-
tarians can offer a more appropriate diagnosis of the impairments of
privilege. What is more, the analysis of privilege through the lens of
relational equality also offers insights into how we can move closer to a
society of equals.
Jonathan Wolff’s chapter, too, examines the question of how we can
move our societies closer to the relational-egalitarian ideal. Wolff’s anal-
ysis focuses on individuals with cognitive impairments and those facing
mental health issues. Wolff describes how music therapy can benefit such
individuals. In particular, such therapy can enhance their autonomy,
thereby reducing the social exclusion and other kinds of relational
inequality to which they are subjected.17
Notes
1. Paul Benson calls these approaches “strongly substantive” conceptions of
autonomy (Benson 2005a).
2. Normative authority (self-authorization) is here considered a neces-
sary condition of self-government or autonomy. In more recent work,
Mackenzie argues that self-authorization is a distinct “dimension” of
autonomy: the concept of autonomy encompasses three distinct but
causally interconnected axes of self-determination, self-governance, and
self-authorization (e.g., Mackenzie 2014). For discussion of the different
dimensions of autonomy, see Mackenzie, this volume, and Johnston, this
volume.
3. For discussion of the Deferential Wife example, see Lippert-Rasmussen,
this volume.
4. We are grateful to Marina Oshana for this suggestion. See McLeod (2002)
for an argument that self-trust is a moralized concept.
5. Benson claims for instance that authenticity is not necessary for autonomy
because people routinely engage in trivial acts that are autonomous yet are
not manifestations of their deeply held values or commitments (2005b,
104–105). David Velleman (2006) and Marina Oshana (2007) point out
that authenticity in the sense of non-alienation is not necessary for auton-
omy. Velleman’s example is that of D.W. Winnicott’s “False Self,” some-
one who is so concerned to please others that he “laughs at what he thinks
he is supposed to find amusing, shows concern for what he thinks he is
supposed to care about, and in general conforms himself to the demands
and expectations of others” (Velleman 2006, 338). Velleman suggests that
although the False Self is a classic case of alienation, he is self-directed in
a way that is sufficient for autonomy.
6. First articulations of this view can be found in Cohen (1989) and Arneson
(1989).
7. For overviews of the luck egalitarian debate, see, for example, Arneson
(2011), Knight (2013), Lippert-Rasmussen (2015). For discussion of the
distinction between relational and distributive conceptions of equality, see,
for example, Elford (2017), Lippert-Rasmussen (2015, ch. 7). While Ander-
son (2010b) argues that relational and distributive views are incompati-
ble, this idea has been challenged in the literature (e.g. Lippert-Rasmussen
2018, Miklosi 2018, Moles and Parr 2019).
8. The force of this objection to the luck egalitarian approach has been called
into question; see, for example, Firth (2013).
9. Despite their opposition to distributive theories of equality, relational
egalitarians are not indifferent to distributive inequality. While from the
relational perspective, distributive inequalities are not problematic in
themselves, they become a matter of concern when they affect aspects of
relational equality. For some relational egalitarians (e.g., Schemmel 2011),
this means that relational equality has demanding implications when it
comes to the distribution of income and wealth. In her earlier work, Ander-
son sees relational equality as having fairly modest requirements when it
comes to distributions (e.g., Anderson 2008); her later work (e.g., Ander-
son 2010a) suggests a more demanding set of distributive requirements.
10. On the connection between relational equality and epistemic injustice, see
also Schuppert (2015) and Lippert-Rasmussen (2018, 64).
11. Both Anderson and Mills seem to agree with this. Mills says that normative
ethics involves an appeal to values and ideals and is ideal in an uncontro-
versial and “generic” sense (2005, 166) and Anderson claims that nonideal
theory does not imply the rejection of all normative ideals (2009, 135).
12. Even Christman’s account may not be inclusive enough. Killmister points
out that his criterion of autonomy would exclude from democratic par-
ticipation people who are inauthentic because their “basic motivational
attitudes are the result of socialisation into patriarchal norms that [they]
would be alienated from were they to reflect on their origin” (2013, 359).
13. Killmister aims to reconcile these two theoretical roles of autonomy (2013,
258).
14. For more detailed discussion of these distinctions and possible problems
with specific ways of valuing relational equality, see Elford (2017),
Lippert-Rasmussen (2018), Miklosi (2018), Tomlin (2014), and Litalien,
this volume.
Introduction 27
15. The issue of self-respect and its relationship to relational equality is
addressed in several papers in this volume; see contributions by Johnston,
Schemmel, and Stoljar & Voigt.
16. However, as noted in Section 1.3.2, Anderson draws on Young’s notion of
structural oppression to identify problematic relational inequalities. This
seems to imply that oppression is incompatible with relational equality
which in turn suggests that Anderson is committed to a form of perfec-
tionism. Hence, there is a possible inconsistency in Anderson’s approach
that we do not have time to develop here.
17. We are grateful to Wendy Carlton, Éliot Litalien, and Marina Oshana for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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by Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, 107–127.
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Sen, Amartya. 2006. “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?” Journal of
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Shelby, Tommie. 2013. “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to
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Stemplowska, Zofia, and Adam Swift. 2012. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.” In The
Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, edited by David Estlund, 373–392.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, Natalie. 2000. “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition.” In Relational
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Introduction 31
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2 Relational Equality and the
Debate Between Externalist
and Internalist Theories of
Relational Autonomy
Catriona Mackenzie
2.1 Introduction
One of the fault lines to have emerged in debates about relational auton-
omy over the last two decades is that between internalist and externalist
theories.1 This dispute centers on whether the necessary and sufficient
conditions for autonomy, and the social dimensions of autonomy, can be
adequately explained solely with reference to the internal structure of an
agent’s will, motivational set, or self-affective attitudes. Internalists, as the
name suggests, specify conditions for autonomy, whether procedural or
substantive, that are wholly internal to agents’ psychologies. Externalists,
in contrast, argue that internal conditions are insufficient to explain either
the sense in which autonomy is social or the autonomy-impairing effects
of social oppression. Autonomy requires, in addition, the presence (or
absence) of certain external social and political conditions. Social rela-
tions and institutional structures that provide limited opportunities to
members of subordinated or marginalized social groups, that are char-
acterized by domination, oppression, and status inequality, and that
convey messages of disrespect and inferiority, impair the autonomy of
individual members of those groups. Externalist theories thus seem to
be appealing to relational egalitarian intuitions. However, the debate
between internalist and externalist theories of relational autonomy has
proceeded without much reference to the literature in normative political
philosophy on relational equality.
My aim in this chapter is to argue that the debate between internalists
and externalists turns fundamentally on the question: What role should
the concept of (relational) equality play in a theory of relational auton-
omy? To develop this argument, I begin in Section 2.2 by outlining what
is at stake in the debate between internalist and externalist theories,
and propose that a multidimensional analysis of autonomy can help to
resolve, or at least clarify, the points of tension in this debate. Then,
in Section 2.3, I explore some of the conceptual connections between
theories of relational autonomy and theories of relational egalitarian-
ism. This exercise in conceptual mapping reveals the extent to which
DOI: 10.4324/9780367823344-2
Externalist and Internalist Theories 33
relational egalitarians seem to be in implicit agreement with external-
ist relational autonomy theorists that autonomy requires the presence (or at
least the absence) of certain social and political conditions. In Section 2.4,
I respond to the criticism that externalist theories set the bar for auton-
omy too high, and hence risk disrespecting the agency of persons sub-
ject to social oppression and opening the door to paternalistic forms of
intervention. I argue that a multidimensional analysis shows why this
criticism is mistaken. What motivates externalism, I suggest, is the con-
viction that the values of (relational) autonomy and (relational) equality
are closely intertwined.
2.2 Internalist and Externalist Theories

of Relational Autonomy
Relational theories of autonomy are committed to a form of normative
individualism, insofar as they regard individual autonomy as an impor-
tant value that should be protected and promoted. However, these theo-
ries claim that individual autonomy is “relational” in several connected
senses. Relational theories reject social atomism and substantively indi-
vidualist conceptions of autonomy. An adequate conception of autonomy
must be responsive to the facts of human relationality, vulnerability, and
dependency, and must be consistent with social relations of care. Further,
relational theories are premised on the view that individual identity and
agency is embodied, and shaped by intersecting social, cultural, and
political determinants. Thus, autonomy is relational because persons
are causally and constitutively relational and social beings. Autonomy is
also relational in the sense that it is a socially constituted capacity, and
its development and exercise need to be scaffolded by the right kinds of
interpersonal relationships and social environments. Thus, according to
relational theories, our capacities for autonomy as well as our status as
autonomous agents are vulnerable to the character of our social relation-
ships and the broader social and political environment. Relational theo-
ries seek to explain how oppressive social relationships and unjust social
structures can impair individuals’ capacities to lead autonomous lives
and can also result in misrecognition of individuals’ status as autono-
mous agents. In the following section, I will show that this concern with
the wrongs of status inequality and misrecognition, and the effects of
such inequality on individuals’ capacities to lead autonomous lives, is a
fertile point of connection between relational autonomy and relational
egalitarian theory.
Like relational egalitarianism, however, relational autonomy is an
“umbrella term” (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 4). There has been sub-
stantial debate among relational theorists about the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for autonomous agency, about whether autonomy is
causally or constitutively relational, whether it should be understood
34 Catriona Mackenzie
locally or globally, and about the adequacy of rival accounts to explain
the autonomy-impairing effects of social oppression.2 Elsewhere I have
argued that one source of confusion in these debates is that autonomy
is a complex and multidimensional concept, rather than a univocal con-
cept (see e.g., Mackenzie 2014, 2017). I have also proposed that a mul-
tidimensional analysis can help to clarify some of the complex questions
about autonomy that arise in practical contexts and in social contexts
marked by structural injustice and inequality.
In brief, my proposal is that the concept of autonomy encompasses
three distinct but causally interconnected dimensions: self-governance,
self-authorization, and self-determination. To be self-governing is to
exercise the reflective and agential capacities required to define and act
on the basis of one’s own values and commitments. To be self-author-
izing is to hold appropriate self-affective attitudes of self-respect, self-
trust, and self-esteem, and to regard oneself as normatively authorized
to take responsibility for one’s life. To be self-determining is to have
the freedom and opportunities necessary to exercise control over and
determine the direction of one’s life. Each dimension thus involves dif-
ferent conditions and each dimension is a matter of degree: a person
can be self-governing, self-authorizing, and self-determining to differing
degrees, both at a time and in different domains her life. In Mackenzie
(2014), I elaborate the distinct conditions of each dimension. In brief,
the conditions for self-governance are authenticity and competence;
the conditions for self-authorization include holding appropriate self-
affective attitudes and having a sense of one’s normative authority as an
agent; the conditions for self-determination are freedom (understood as
non-domination) and opportunities (understood as significant options
or capabilities).
In what follows, I first outline some of the central positions in the
debate between internalist and externalist theories and suggest that what
is at stake in this debate turns on the question of what role the concept
of (relational) equality should play in a theory of relational autonomy. I
then explain the conceptual and methodological advantages of a multi-
dimensional analysis for elucidating the conflicting intuitions underlying
this debate. In brief, the multidimensional analysis explains these intui-
tions as responsive to different dimensions of autonomy. Thus, instead of
viewing these theories as rivals, the multidimensional analysis seeks to
explicate how internalism and externalism illuminate different dimen-
sions of autonomy.
Autonomy is typically understood in terms of self-governing agency.
In the mainstream literature, self-governance is understood in volitional
terms: agents are self-governing to the extent that they have the will
that they want. To have the will that one wants is to be able to make
choices and act in accordance with one’s reflective preferences, val-
ues, and commitments. Hierarchical theories (see e.g., Dworkin 1988;
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE

KANSAS UNIVERSITY SCIENCE BULLETIN, VOL. I, NO. 6,
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THE
KANSAS UNIVERSITY SCIENCE
BULLETIN.
Vol. I, No. 6—September 1902.
(Whole Series, Vol. XI, No. 6.)

CONTENTS:
I.—New Fossils from the Upper Carboniferous of Kansas, J.

W. Beede.
II.—Variation of the Spiralia in Seminula Argentia (Shepard)

Hall, J. W. Beede.
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY,

Lawrence, Kan.
Price of this number, 15 cents.
Entered at the post-office in Lawrence as second-class matter.

Kansas University Science
Bulletin.
Vol. I, No. 6. SEPTEMBER, 1902. { Whole Series,

{ Vol. XI, No. 6.
NEW FOSSILS FROM THE UPPER
CARBONIFEROUS OF KANSAS.
BY J. W. BEEDE.
With Plate V.
The following will be of interest and value in completing the faunal

succession of the uppermost part of the Carboniferous, as well as for
the biologic interest of one of them.
Ceriocrinus harshbargeri, n. sp. Plate V, figs.

1–1c.
The distinctive features of this species are: Surface ornamented
with both pustules and granules, large interradial supporting plate
above calyx, ten short, massive arms.
Description: Calyx basin-shaped, shallow, quite concave below.
Infrabasals partly covered, but located entirely within the body
cavity. Stem small and apparently round. The five basals are large,
recurved below the middle, concave in the center of the more
depressed part, four apparently hexagonal and one heptagonal, and
larger than the others supporting the interradial; all higher than
wide, sutures not much depressed. There are five large, massive
radials a trifle more than twice as wide as high, well beveled, faceted,
and apparently sagging a little on the upper articular surface.
Interradial large, fully half within the calyx, higher than broad, and
the upper portion very strongly curved inward. This plate supports
another entirely without the calyx, which is comparatively large and
appears to be pentagonal when seen from without, the two upper
sides being much longer than the rest, making the plate appear
triangular at first sight, fitting closely between the arms on either
side. The five brachial plates are large, contiguous save on the
posterior side, and produced into an obtuse spinous process. Much
of the upper surface of these processes is faceted, supporting the
costals, and in this manner giving the animal its greater lateral
diameter above the calyx, and affording more room for the massive
arms which, when closed, form a box around the inner part. The
costals are ten in number, two to each brachial, large, nearly three
times as broad as high, and convex. The distichals are sometimes
present and sometimes wanting, very broad and thin when present.
Arms ten, broad, outer surface of each nearly flat massive, composed
of two series of interlocking plates, each one of which bears a
pinnule. Pinnulæ long and narrow. The articular surface of the arm
plates is minutely crenulated. These plates decrease in length though
but little in height as they approach the tips of the arms. The surface
of almost the entire animal was ornamented with granules, and the
lower part with both granules and pustules.
Measurements: height. breadth. length.

Calyx 11 mm. 30 mm.
Basals (vertical) 5½ „ 12 „
Radials 9 „ 18+ „
Brachials 7 „ 17 „ 8 mm. beyond calyx.
Costals 4 „ 9 to 11 mm.
Distichals 2 „ 9 „
Arm plates 2 „ 3 to 5 „
Interradial 7 „ 6 „
Aside from the markings mentioned, the calyx is also ornamented

with depressions which look at first like borings of some kind, but
which have the same granular character as the rest of the surface.
Position and locality: Carboniferous, Upper Coal Measures,
Topeka, Kan., from the Osage City shales, over the Osage coal.
The type was collected by Prof. W. A. Harshbarger, in honor of
whom it is named. Type now in the collection of Washburn College.
In general appearance this species is strikingly like C. craigii
Worthen, but differs in the following respects: The body is not
smooth but highly ornamented, and the anal piece is much larger. In
all specimens of C. craigii that I have seen the body is smooth and
glossy, and shows (even when apparently unworn) no indications of
former surface-markings, while this species possesses both pustules
and granules, the latter covering about the entire specimen. In
mature individuals the interradial is much larger. Two smaller
specimens, probably younger ones of this species, are figured in the
accompanying plate, showing the relative growth of the calyx and
interradial. In both the ornamentation is the same as described in
this species. C. monticulatus Beede is from the same locality and
horizon, but has long, slender arms, brachials not spinous, and the
calyx is deeper. The most fundamental difference, however, is the
number of arms possessed by the latter species, the number being
sixteen or eighteen, while the one here described has but ten.
C. nodulifera Butts differs from this species in having a node at the
upper part of each basal and also on the radials. It also has more
acute and apparently longer spines. Mr. Butts makes no mention of
finer surface-markings. The Topeka specimen is from a much higher
horizon.
Aviculopecten subequivalvus, n. sp. Plate V,
figs. 3, 3a.
Shell thick, moderately large, subequivalvular, rather convex, quite
oblique, ears well developed. The hinge is nearly straight, the beak
does not project, the angle of divergence of its sides is about eighty to
ninety degrees. The left valve, exclusive of the ears, is ovate; anterior
ear well developed, obtusely angular, marked only by strong lines of
growth; the rise from the ear to the body of the shell is abrupt; the
marginal sinus separating the ear from the rest of the shell broad,
shallow, and ill-defined. The posterior ear is unknown. The anterior
margin below the ear forms an ovate curve, which is probably
continued on the ventral and postero-ventral margins. The surface of
this valve is apparently marked only by stronger and fainter
concentric lines except on the front and back sides, where there are
radiating rows of vaulted lamellæ. It is entirely probable that these
marks once extended over the entire surface, but have been worn off
from the more convex portions. Judging from another specimen, the
right valve is somewhat flatter than the left and quite as oblique.
Posterior ear very small and obtuse; anterior ear quite large, marked
by obscure, large, radiating ribs and probably vaulted lamellæ, as
well as strong concentric markings; separated from the shell by a
deep sulcus. Margin from the beak around the posterior to near the
middle of the shell is a regular ovate curve, antero-ventral margin
somewhat produced but rounded, extending obliquely toward the
beak until the deep byssal sinus is reached. Ornamentation as in the
other valve. In this specimen it seems that the radiating rows of
scales covered the entire surface before being worn away. Length, 36
mm.; height, 32 mm.; hinge, 17 mm.; thickness, about 5 mm.
Position and locality: Thin limestone, south of Dover, Kan., in
Upper Coal Measures. Type in author’s collection.
This shell may prove to be a Pseudomonotis, as the critical
characters are not well known. It is not liable to be confused with any
other shell from the Coal Measures.
Pinna lata, n. sp. Plate V, fig. 4.
Shell small for this genus, not very convex, probably plain except
the usual growth marks, acutely pointed at the beaks, which are
terminal. The angle of divergence of the shell is thirty degrees. This
species is based on three casts. The type is not distorted, but the
posterior end is broken away. There are two other specimens from
the same locality, but compressed dorso-ventrically, which show the
same characters as the type. The size is about that of Aviculopinna
americana Meek, but the form and markings as shown on the cast
are very different, and the beaks are terminal. Length of type along
hinge, 27 mm.; height (20 mm. back of beak), 11 mm.
Position and locality: Carboniferous, Upper Coal Measures,
Howard limestone, Topeka, Kan.
The small size, great angle of divergence at the beak and sharp-
pointed beaks easily distinguish this species from other members of
the genus from the Coal Measures.
Pleurophorus whitei, n. sp. Plate V, figs. 5, 5b.
Pleurophorus —? White, Bull. U. S. Geol. Surv. 77, p. 27, pl. iv, figs.
5–10.
Shell of medium to large size, transversely ovate, with the depth of
the shell greater at the anterior than at the posterior end. Beaks
moderately prominent, subterminal; umbonal ridge prominent,
extending obliquely to postero-ventral margin. Hinge straight or
arcuate, usually about three-fourths the length of the specimen. The
right posterior lamina is well shown on good casts. The anterior
adductor impression is usually prominent, being set apart by the
depression produced by the ridge behind it. The impression of the
two cardinal teeth is also visible. The anterior margin drops
obliquely downward from the beak nearly to the middle of the shell,
when it rounds, rapidly at first, into the ventral margin, which may
be straight, somewhat sinuous or even convex on approaching the
postero-ventral region: at the end of the umbonal ridge it rounds
rapidly into the posterior, oblique truncation, reaching the hinge at
an oblique angle. The lines formed by the hinge and ventral margins
converge toward the posterior, thus leaving the greatest depth of the
shell in front. Above the umbonal ridge the shell is obliquely
flattened to the hinge. The surface, as shown in excellent molds, is
ornamented only by fine lines of growth, which are sometimes a little
stronger beneath the beak than elsewhere, and weaken on and above
the umbonal slope.
Position and locality: This species is found in the Upper Coal
Measures, upper Wabaunsee stage, east of Barrett, Kan. This is the
only locality known to the writer where this shell, abundant in the
Permian, is found below the Wreford limestone. Types from Permian
west of Stockdale, Kan., “about 100 feet above Cottonwood
limestone.” Collected by Prof. E. A. Popenoe.
This species is extremely variable, as shown in Professor White’s
figures, above cited. The short shell with the posterior shallower than
the anterior end is in sharp contrast to most of the species of the
genus. In surface ornamentation it resembles P. tropidophorus more
closely than any other species. It is distinguished from P.
subcuneatus Meek by its short, thick form and larger size. This
species is the more abundant of the two in the Permian rocks of the
Big Blue series, while P. subcuneata only has been identified from
the Cimarron series.
Allorisma kansasensis, n. sp. Plate V, figs. 6,
6d.
Shell small, rather gibbous, transversely subovate. Beaks
prominent, incurved, approximate, located about one-third the
length of the shell from the anterior end. Anterior outline descending
obliquely from the beaks nearly to the ventral margin, where it turns
rather abruptly backward along the nearly straight basal edge to the
posterior extremity, where it rounds off regularly upward and then
forward to meet the hinge. The hinge is apparently straight and more
than half as long as the shell. The umbonal ridge is prominent,
rounded, ill-defined, fading away at the extremity of the shell. Above
this ridge is a depression which, with the smooth, elevated hinge,
would cause a strong keel on the shell back of the beaks. The
concentric ribs are prominent, fading out at the upper part of the
umbonal ridge and near the anterior border. These ribs are quite as
prominent on the casts as on the shell itself. On the central and
postero-central regions are the characteristic distant, radiating rows
of fine, closely set granules. The shell is less convex below and back
of the beak than on either side of this region, though it is not
concave. The length varies from 1.7 to 1.4 the height.
Position and locality: Upper Coal Measures, Howard limestone,
Topeka, Kan.
This species is very closely related to A. curta Swallow, but differs
from it in having a straighter hinge and a more remote beak. It is
from a lower horizon. In the latter respect it differs from
McChesney’s species also.
Paleontological Laboratory, Indiana University,

May 22, 1902.
Explanation of Plate V.
All figures about natural size. Drawings by C. McK. Beede.
Ceriocrinus harshbargeri.
Fig. 1. Right posterior view of type.

Fig. 1a. Diagram of anal plates of same.
Fig. 1b. Surface detail enlarged.
Fig. 1c. Diagram of basal view.
Fig. 2. Calyx of another specimen, probably of this species.
Fig. 2a. Diagram of a portion of posterior view of another slightly
smaller specimen, showing variation in size of anal
plate.
Aviculopecten subequivalvus.
Fig. 3. View of type. One side incomplete.

Fig. 3a. Opposite valve of another specimen.
Pinna lata.
Fig. 4. View of type, a left valve.

Pleurophorus whitei.
Fig. 5. Type specimen; cast of a left valve on the same slab as

the two following and the cephalothorax of a large
limuloid.
Fig. 5a. Cast off a broken specimen, showing the anterior
muscular impressions.
Fig. 5b. Specimen of different outline.
Allorisma kansasensis.
Fig. 6. Imperfect cast, showing strong concentric undulations

impressed upon it.
Fig. 6a. Lateral view of type. Shell exfoliated in front.
PLATE V.
VARIATION OF THE SPIRALIA IN
SEMINULA ARGENTIA
(Shepard) Hall.
BY J. W. BEEDE.
With Plate VI.
Owing to the systematic importance and the rarity of good

material of the brachial framework of the brachiopods, any light on
the extent of individual variation of these parts is of considerable
importance. In the spring of 1899 the University of Kansas received
from Prof. C. N. Gould a set of ten specimens of Seminula argentia
(Shepard) Hall that show the position of the spires. These specimens
were all from the same horizon in the Lower Permian. The University
also had another specimen showing these characters, as did a
specimen in the writer’s collection. Recently the study of these
specimens was taken up and some remarkable results developed.
Both valves of this species are quite convex and not infrequently as
broad as long. The older specimens are quite ventricose. However,
the shell is subject to a considerable variation in form. Four of the
twelve specimens studied were somewhat compressed, but it so
happens that three of these approach the normal type very closely,
while the fourth does not vary from it greatly. Those showing
greatest variation have not been subject to any visible external
deformation. The specimens under discussion are of about the
average size and form.
The normal position of the spire is with its apex pointing to the
side, near the line where the valves meet, at, or a little in front of, the
middle of the shell, which is also the widest point. In the central part
of the shell cavity the edges of the spires nearly meet. In front they
flare apart, leaving a large, subcircular opening. For convenience, in
this paper, this opening will be spoken of as the frontal aperture of
the spiralia. It will also be necessary to orient the specimens so that
definite positions may be referred to. For this purpose we will
consider the specimens as front toward (back away from) the
observer, with the brachial valve uppermost.
A specimen from the Topeka limestone, Upper Coal Measures, at
Topeka, Kan., shows the spires with the apex of one of them pointing
almost directly forward toward the anterior end of the shell, turned
through a horizontal angle of about ninety degrees from its normal
position, while, as nearly as may be determined from the specimen
as cut, the apex of the other one is directed toward the median line of
the pedicle valve just in front of the hinge. This specimen was
selected to be ground, because it was a good specimen, of normal
form. Another specimen (No. 3), from the Permian of Cowley county,
Kansas, has the apices of the spires turned at an angle of about forty-
five degrees or more in a vertical direction, causing the point of the
spire to be located near the middle of the right side of the brachial
valve, while the other points to the opposite of the pedicle valve. The
spire is quite flattened, approaching disk shape, with the apex quite
obtuse and the frontal aperture very narrow and almost slit-like (this
may be partially due to a very slight compression, but the
compression, if present, is so slight as to modify it very little), owing
to the position of the spires in the shell, which prevents their flaring
much at the front. The shell is not an old one, and, for this reason, is
somewhat less ventricose than many adults. The young specimens
are much flatter than the old ones in this species.
The spiralia of No. 10 are turned in a similar manner, but through
a much smaller angle. The frontal aperture is typical, as is also the
general form of the shell. The spiralia are conical, and the tips
probably acute. In No. 6 the position of the spiralia, their form and
that of the aperture are normal. Nos. 6 and 9 show spines on the
spires. The spines are closely set, thick, blunt, and nearly twice as
long as broad. In fact, some appear to be nearly as large at the tips as
at the base. In No. 9 the spires are normal, except that, instead of
being flaring conical, they are more in the shape of a folded shield
shape with acute apex. In other words, the frontal aperture is
produced by the dorso-ventral compression of the entire cone rather
than the flaring of the frontal portion. The apex of the left spire is
bent somewhat downward. The position of the spiralia in No. 7 is
about normal, the tips obtuse, the spires almost perfectly depressed
conical, frontal aperture only slightly wider than the space farther
back on the side next the brachial valve. No. 5 has apparently been
compressed laterally, through this compression did not affect the
positions of the spiralia, for they are normal. They appear to have
been of the typical form in every respect. In No. 8 the spires seem to
have been turned through a slight vertical angle, though the
incompleteness of the specimen prevents a close study of position.
The form was apparently normal, except that the lower edges may
have been somewhat pressed inward. Nos. 1 and 4 are about normal
throughout. No. 2 is normal as far as can be seen, except that the
apices are turned through a small vertical angle. The anterior portion
of the pedicle valve is crushed in. No. 12 is normal throughout.
It is unfortunate that none of the specimens show the crural
attachment of the spiralia. Such structures must certainly vary in
order to support the spires in their various positions.
The above facts would seem to indicate the following conclusions:
First, in those spire-bearing brachiopods in which the form of the
shell does not govern the position of the spires, the Athyridæ in
particular, the spires may be subject to a considerable variation in
both position and form. Second, that the crural supports are
probably so modified as to accommodate the spires in their various
positions.
In the light of the foregoing, it will be seen that in the future it will
be necessary to study the structure of several specimens before using
small variations of internal structure in these shells as bases for
group divisions.
One might expect greater individual variation among the Flint
Hills specimens, owing to the physical changes that were taking place
during the close of the Carboniferous and the early Permian; changes
which soon caused this species, together with many others, to
become extinct. However, this cannot be said of the most striking
case (No. 11) from the Topeka limestone. It would seem that such
variations as are found in Nos. 3 and 11 would be decidedly
detrimental to the well-being of the animal, though the latter of the
two seems to have been a vigorous individual.
Indiana University, Bloomington,

April 8, 1902.
Explanation of Plate VI.
Drawings by Sydney Prentice, except No. 12, which is by C. McK.
Beede.
All specimens natural size.
Seminula argentia. Variation of spires.
Fig. 1. Specimen brachial side up.

Fig. 2. This specimen shows spires viewed with pedicle
side partly removed.
Fig. 3. Pedicle view, showing part of spire.
Fig. 3a. Above individual, brachial side up.
Fig. 4. Brachial side of fig. 4a.
Fig. 4a. Pedicle view of specimen, showing position of
spires.
Figs. 5 and 5a are the brachial and pedicle views of a somewhat
laterally compressed specimen.
Fig. 6. Pedicle view of specimen.
Fig. 6a. Brachial view of fig. 6.
Figs. 7 and 7a are the brachial and pedicle views of a specimen.
Fig. 8. This figure probably shows the brachial side of
specimen, while fig. 8a is the opposite side.
Fig. 9. Brachial view.
Fig. 10. The pedicle view of a specimen, and fig. 10a the
brachial side of the same.
Fig. 11. Brachial valve nearly ground away, to show spire.
The sickle-shaped structure is probably the base
of the opposite spire. Beede’s collection.
Fig. 12. Specimen with brachial valve largely broken away.
All specimens but No. 11 in collection of University of Kansas.
PLATE VI.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and
variations in spelling.
2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings
as printed.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE KANSAS
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Autonomy and Equality Relational

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Preface and Acknowledgmentsix

1. Introduction: A Relational Turn in Political Philosophy 1

2. Relational Equality and the Debate Between Externalist and

3. Could Friends of Relational Autonomy be Relational

4. The Wrongs of Relational Inequalities 80

5. Relational Autonomy, Equality, and Self-Respect 103

6. Autonomy, Relational Egalitarianism, and Indignation 125

7. Regarding Oneself as an Equal 145

8. How Being Better Off Is Bad for You: Implications for

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This collection brings together philosophers working on relational auton-

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The notions of relational autonomy and relational equality have become

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1.2 Relational Equality

1.2.1 Scope and Locus of Relational Equality

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express a status hierarchy in which the man is the protector and

1.3 Overlapping Themes

1.3.1 The Ideal/Nonideal Debate

1.3.3 Self-Regarding Attitudes

1.4 Normative Issues

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no such perfectionist claims are necessary to account for the intrin-

In other work, Schemmel (2015) defends what he calls “justice-based

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1.5 Chapter Summaries

2.2 Internalist and Externalist Theories

Title: The Kansas University science bulletin, Vol. I, No. 6,

Release date: August 25, 2023 [eBook #71486]

Original publication: Lawrence: Kansas University, 1902

Credits: Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE

(Whole Series, Vol. XI, No. 6.)

I.—New Fossils from the Upper Carboniferous of Kansas, J.

II.—Variation of the Spiralia in Seminula Argentia (Shepard)

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY,

Preface and Acknowledgmentsix

1. Introduction: A Relational Turn in Political Philosophy 1

4. The Wrongs of Relational Inequalities 80

5. Relational Autonomy, Equality, and Self-Respect 103

6. Autonomy, Relational Egalitarianism, and Indignation 125

7. Regarding Oneself as an Equal 145

2.2 Internalist and Externalist Theories