Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History: The 'Ram Temple' Drama

Author(s): S. P. Udayakumar
Source: Social Scientist , Jul. - Aug., 1997, Vol. 25, No. 7/8 (Jul. - Aug., 1997), pp. 11-26
Published by: Social Scientist

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517601

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S. P. UDAYAKUMAR*

Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History:

The 'Ram Temple' Drama

Ayodhya had better be seen as a theater where the mythical lore are trans-
lated into modern metaphors, and the metaphorical translations are trans-
formed into various but related action-projects. Having invoked a commu-
nal understanding of 'national history,' established its validity by back-pro-
jecting it onto a popular story, and mobilized their adherents through insidi-
ous political manoeuvres, the Hindu communalists have set the stage for the
actual enactment of their drama. At this crucial juncture, the ideology, the
ideologues, and their cherished dream come together. This potent mix occu-
pies the centre stage and the whole drama begins to revolve around it. The
name of the drama is Ram Temple.
For most of the pre-independence era, the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya did
not simply exist for the majority of Indians. The mosque emerged as the
most bitterly contested terrain ever since the partition of the country prima-
rily because the issue was built up carefully by the Hindutva forces with an
eye on appropriating it for contemporary politics. The controversy is more
mythological than historical, and hence it is a matter more of faith than fact.
Since the issue stands on popular culture and not on recorded history, it
becomes even more prone to manipulation and politicization. The Hindutva
groups have turned the disadvantages of unspecificities and ambiguities of
the legendary problem into clear advantages. The conflict cannot be consid-
ered more concrete even from 1528 when the Babri Masjid was actually
constructed because the Hindutva groups claim that the mosque replaced an
existing Ram temple for which there has never been any tangible evidence.

AYODHYA: A CHRONOLOGY

Although much has been written about this controversy rather recen
of it is drenched in 'Hindu' piety and bias, and some other works are the
Hindu communalists' own propaganda. Being a secular voice, Gyanendra
Pandey's chronological scheme' could be followed to explain and describe
the Ayodhya controversy. A brief discussion of Ayodhya and the legends
surrounding it would be an appropriate start. It is not just the symbolic
significance of the Babri Masjid but also the larger mythical context of
Ayodhya that provides a perfect setting for this communal drama. Ayodhya

*Research Associate, Institute on Race & Poverty, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.

Social Scientist, Vol. 25, Nos. 7-8, July-August 1997

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12 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

is considered to be a holy place by both Hindus and

place of Ram for the Hindus, and Muslims believe th
by the Saryu river in Ayodhya where Shea, the gran
The Ayodhya of Ram is believed to have existed in
Hindu calendar, i.e. some 900,000 years ago. According to traditional his-
tory, Ayodhya was the capital of the Kingdom of Kosala, and with the rise of
Buddhism in sixth and fifth centuries BCE, Ayodhya was displaced as the
capital city. Scholars agree that Ayodhya was identical with Saketa, where
Buddha is said to have resided for some time.4 Ayodhya is said to be 'redis-
covered' by 'Vikramaditya,' who is identified by many scholars as
Skandagupta of mid-Sth century CE, when Buddhism began to decline as a
result of a Brahmanical resurgence.5 While Romila Thapar maintains
"Chandra Gupta II took the title of Vikramaditya or Sun of Prowess,"6 Sher
Singh ascertains that the claim that Skandagupta shifted his capital to Saketa
(Ayodhya) is baseless.7 No matter how contentious the historicity of Ayodhya
is, it is nonetheless one of the seven holy places of 'Hindus' because of its
association with Ram. Of the 6,000 Hindu shrines in Ayodhya, more than
4,000 are connected with Ram.8 This religious importance coupled with con-
temporary political significance leads the Hindu communalists to conclude:
"Ayodhya is the centre of our Hindu nationhood, and Lord Rama our na-
tional leader. Without Ayodhya, this nation cannot be a nation in the fullest
sense of the word, just as there can be no Christendom, which is what Eu-
rope is, without the Vatican.
The exact location of Ayodhya is yet another controversy. Archaeological
excavations at Ayodhya which is on the right bank of the Saryu river in
Faizabad district of Uttar Pradesh reveal that "the earliest settlement at
Ayodhya did not go back prior to the early stage of the Northern Black
Polished Ware (NBPW) Culture" which could be assigned to circa 700 BCE.
Thus if Ramayana episode was historical, it could not have taken place ear-
lier.10 Based on Valmiki's Ramayana and a few other sources, Sher Singh
contends that if Valmiki's description of Ayodhya is correct, it must be some
13 to 14 miles south of the river Saryu in Nepal.1" The traditional lack of
interest in cartography in India is not helpful to solve this riddle in any way.
The 'Muslim conquest' sets the next and most important stage in the con-
troversy. Emperor Babar's general, Mir Baqi, is believed to have destroyed a
Ram temple and built the Babri Masjid on the same spot around 1528 CE. If
there really existed a temple before the mosque was built is the core of the
controversy now. B. B. Lal who initiated and headed an archaeological sur-
vey of Ayodhya since 1975 and never once mentioned any evidence of a
temple at the disputed site made a surprising claim in the RSS magazine
Manthan in October 1990 to having found the pillar-bases of what may
have been a temple at the site.12 As historical and archaeological 'evidences'
fail to tell us anything concrete or something even remotely convincing, so
do the voices of faith. As Rajeev Saxena asks, if there was an actual demoli-
tion of a Ram temple, how come the famous poet Tulsidas, who sang the
glory of his beloved Ram during the early part of the 17th century, kept
silent on this issue. After all, the poet wrote about secular subjects such as

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 13

massive deaths in Banaras due to epidemic and unemployment, his arthritis

problem, brahmins' attack on him for his 'low caste' status and so forth.13
In the 18th century, Ayodhya once again became a major centre of Hindu
pilgrimage under the patronage of the Nawabs of Avadh, Shuja-ud-daulah
and Asaf-ud-daulah. Hindu revivalism which took root in Avadh consoli
dated its position after the British takeover of Ayodhya. At this time the
Nirmohis, a Hindu sect who had their establishment at Ram Ghat and Guptar
Ghat, lay their claim over the Babri Masjid. They contended that the mosque
stood on the spot of the Ramjanmabhoomi temple which was destroyed by
Babar. These claims led to the violent conflict of 1853-55.'4 In May 1883 the
Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad refused permission to Hindus to con-
struct a temple on the chabutara (platform) just outside on the left of the
gate following the objections raised by Muslims. In 1885 Mahant Raghubar
Das filed a suit with the Sub-judge at Faizabad for permission to build the
temple and in March 1886, the Sub-judge turned down permission to con-
struct a temple and appeals were dismissed.S Tensions mounted and Muslim
'shaheeds' (martyrs) gathered in the fortified Babri Masjid and the Hindu
counterparts thronged at the nearby Hanuman Garhi. Following a battle,
Hindus took the Babri Masjid leaving some seventy-five Muslims dead.16
It is only in the nineteenth century the temple-demolition/mosque-con-
struction story gets recorded. In 1822 Hafizullah, an official of the Faizabad
law-court claimed that "[t]he mosque founded by emperor Babur is situated
at the birth-place of Ram" and then the story gets into the records such as P.
Carnegy's historical sketch of Faizabad (1870), H. R. Nevill's Faizabad Dis-
trict Gazetteer, and as a footnote in Mrs. A. S. Beveridge's English transla-
tion of Babur's Memoirs (1922).17 The British often referred to the mosque
in their files as the 'Janmasthan Mosque of Ajoodhia' and put up a notice
board in front of the iron railings calling the monument, wiwad grast (dis-
puted). When the mosque was under the control of the Muslims through the
1920s and 1930s, it was mismanaged and neglected, and the Waqf (Muslim
endowment board) Commissioner of Faizabad condemned the muttwalii as
an opium addict in a report signed September 16, 1938.18
The installation of idols inside the mosque on the night of December 22,
1949 led to the attachment and closure of the building for both Muslims and
Hindus by an administrative order. Contrary to the 'Ram's miraculous ap-
pearance' theory, the First Investigation Report of the Station Officer of the
Ayodhya police station dated December 23, 1949 stated that three individu-
als (Abdy Ram Das, Ram Shukla Das, Sudarshan Das) and some 50 to 60
people had "desecrated (napak kiya hai) the mosque by tresspassing (sic) the
mosque through rioting and placing idol in it. Officers-on-duty and many
other people have seen it." Later some 5 to 6 thousand people tried to enter
the mosque raising religious slogans and kirtans but were stopped.'9
A civil suit was filed on January 16, 1950 by an individual, Gopal Singh
Visharad, for a declaration of the right to worship. The judge restrained the
removal of the idols and ordered no interference with the pu/a (worship).
The state of Uttar Pradesh filed an appeal against the injunction on April 24,
1950. According to historian Sushil Srivastava, "from 1951 to 1986, things

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14 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

remained relatively quiet in Faizabad."20 Just like the

1950 without any street or court battles, the period b
passed without any major incidents. Although All India Hindu Mahasabha
and Bharatiya Jana Sangh had included Ayodhya, Mathura and Kashi on
their programms ever since their inception, the present-day Sangh Parivar
stumbled upon the powerful symbols of Ram, Ramjanmabhumi, and Babri
Masjid only in the late 198 Os. Throughout 1983, for instance, the VHP along
with leaders of some 85 major sects of Hinduism was drifting aimlessly with
the Ekatmata Yagna (integration rite) that rallied the picture of Bharatmata
(Mother India) and the kalas (brass vessel) of 'holy' water from all different
rivers.

In October 1984 the VHP tried to make the mosque-temple question a

national issue through its Sri Rama Janma Bhoomi Mukti Yajna Samiti. It
was formed on July 27, 1984 with the sole aim of liberating the disputed site.
A 130-kilometre-long march was started on October 8, 1984 from Ayodhya
to Lucknow, the state capital. The yatra (march) participants reached
Lucknow on October 14, organized a public meeting, and called on the Chief
Minister "to fulfil the long outstanding demand of the Hindus." The next
day 'Sri Rama Janaki Ratha' (Ram-Sita chariot) began to tour the major
Uttar Pradesh towns so as to mobilize public opinion and to administer
'Janmasthan Mukti Pledge' to the public. Although the 'Ratha' reached Delhi
on October 31 in order to join the 'Hindu Convention' on November 2,
Mrs. Indira Gandhi's assassination forced the cancellation of the programme.21
As the Shah Bano controversy22 was raging across India in late 1985, the
District and Sessions Judge of Faizabad, K. M. Pandey, ordered to open the
locks of the mosque and indirectly allowed the priests to enter. The padlocks
were removed by the order of a district judge on February 1, 1986. After
giving in to Muslim fundamentalism on the Shah Bano case, the Rajiv Gandhi
government was keen on playing the 'Hindu card' for presumed electoral
gains. N. Ram contends that the assurances given to the Hindu communal-
ists before the court decision and the failure to appeal against the order re-
vealed the collusive hand of Rajiv's government.23 An explosive situation
emerged almost all over the country with Muslims protesting, and VHP ele-
ments celebrating and criticizing "Muslim objection to the judicial order on
the Babri Masjid." Rajiv's Minister for Wakf,,Rajindra Kumari Bajpai, ad-
vised Muslims "to take recourse to law and not to create disturbance."24
The Sangh Parivar's "National Thinkers Conferences" organized in vari-
ous places across the country in 1987, and the BJP's Palampur Resolution of
June 1989 consolidated the Ayodhya movement. The most critical stage of
the conflict, however, was the build-up to the 1989 elections which witnessed
the preparation and mobilization to demolish the mosque and build a Ram
temple with consecrated bricks brought from all over India and other coun-
tries. As N. Ram points out, just a few days before the 1989 general elec-
tions, the desperate Rajiv Gandhi regime allowed the VHP to perform
shilanyas (laying foundation stone) for the Ram temple on November 9,
1989 on disputed land which was temporarily declared to be undisputed.

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 15

This action boosted the VHP-BJP-RSS combine to advance its

Ramjanmabhumi campaign through changes of regime.25
The November 22-24, 1989 general elections witnessed the worst ever
communal violence in the independent India's electoral history and took a
massive toll of 800 lives in the Hindi belt. V. P. Singh became the Prime
Minister with the support of the BJP who had 88 seats in the new Parlia-
ment. The V. P. Singh regime ushered in the judicial process by establishing a
Special Bench on January 8, 1990 and pleading for a ban on construction till
the title to the disputed site could be decided and the site-plan approved. The
Special Court called upon the UP government to clarify the status of the site.
A Hindu priest filed a writ petition seeking relief to permit construction of
the temple on the spot of shilanyas performed on November 9, 1989. Hav-
ing been directed to file a counter-affidavit by the Lucknow bench of the
Allahabad High Court, the central government maintained that no construc-
tion could be allowed unless all the civil suits pending before the special
bench of the High Court were decided.26
In the meantime, on January 12, 1990, the Supreme Court allowed the
'Hindu' representatives to raise as a preliminary issue before the full bench
of the Lucknow High Court that the suit by the Sunni Waqf on behalf of
Muslims was not maintainable. The bench, however, decided it would not
interfere with the October 23, 1989 order of the Lucknow bench before
taking evidence for the trial of all the five suits which were from 28 to 39
years old in their pendency in the District Court. The VHP appealed before
the Supreme Court that the Sunni Waqf suit filed on December 18, 1961 be
dismissed on the grounds they cited. Meanwhile, the AIBMAC (All India
Babri Masjid Action Committee) revived its earlier demand in its December
25, 1989 meeting that if a negotiated settlement failed, the dispute should be
decided by high court judges "of some South Indian State, none of whom
should be either Hindu or Muslim." The RSS mouthpiece Organiser of Janu-
ary 14, 1990 took exception of this revived claim and V. P. Singh's meeting
with Muslim leaders, and claimed that it "was not a case about the title of a
place but of undoing a historical wrong and for that matter no court could
decide it." They would rather follow the guidance of the Dharmacharya
Sammelan (gathering of religious heads) to be held on January 27-28, 1990
at Allahabad.27
The 'auspicious' February 14 was chosen to begin temple construction
which V. P. Singh managed to change with great difficulty by pointing out
the grave situation in Kashmir and Punjab. As the Hindutva groups' June 8
deadline passed without government's settlement plan, the VHP meeting in
Haridwar decided to begin construction from October 30. At this backdrop,
V. P. Singh introduced the Reservation Bill in the Lok Sabha on August 7,
1990 and 'upper caste' Hindus rose up in revolt. With brahmin youths self-
immolating in northern India, Advani set out in September on his 10,000
kilometres 'rathyatra' (chariot procession) to converge on Ayodhya for con-
struction and to force the government to hand over the site to the Hindutva
forces. When Advani and his cohorts were arrested in Bihar on October 23,

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16 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

the BJP withdrew its support to government and V. P.

November 9.
Chandra Shekhar, who was in power from November 1990 to early March
1991, made a breakthrough of bringing both the VHP and the AIBMAC to
the negotiation table. They met first on December 1, 1990, presented the
'evidence' of their sides to the Indian government on December 23, obtained
copies of the 'evidence' of the other side from the government, and met again
on January 10, 1991. In that meeting they decided to set up four committees
of experts nominated by both parties to examine the historical and archaeo-
logical evidence and revenue and legal records collected as evidence. The
VHP released the summary of 'evidence' to the public, turned down the de-
mand of the other side for more time to study and evaluate the 'evidence,'
and made it known that they were not interested in an amicable solution.28
The ultimate stage of the conflict was Narasimha Rao government's inac-
tion even after the virtual announcement of the Hindu communalists of their
demolition plan in late October 1992. As N. Ram puts it: "If there is one
'theory' that this devotee of drift has contributed to national political life, it
is the non-secular rule of not opposing 'Hindu religious sentiment' under
any circumstances and of avoiding 'confrontation' with the saffron gentry
and their lay allies. "29
According to Rao's statement on Ayodhya, which he was not allowed to
make in Parliament, about 70,000 kar sevaks (volunteers) had assembled at
the Ram Katha Kunj for the public meeting and 500 sadhus and sants (reli-
gious figures) at the foundation terrace for the pooia. Between 11:45 and
11:50 a.m. some 150 kar sevaks managed to break the cordon on the terrace
and pelted stones at the police. About 1,000 kar sevaks broke into the Babri
Masjid structure and some 80 of them managed to climb on the domes of the
mosque and started demolishing them. In the meantime, they had damaged
the outer boundary wall. At around 12:20 p.m. about 25,000 kar sevaks
had gathered in the complex and by 2:40 p.m. a crowd of 75,000 was sur-
rounding the structure of whom many were engaged in demolition.30
Cases were registered against L. K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, and
Uma Bharati of the BJP (all of whom are central government ministers now),
Ashok Singhal and Vishnu Hari Dalmia of the VHP, and Vinay Katiyar of
the Bajrang Dal. They were all arrested and remanded to judicial custody. In
an elusive statement on December 8, Advani retorted: " [W]hen an old struc-
ture which ceased to be a mosque over 50 years back is pulled down by a
group of people exasperated by the tardiness of the judicial process, and the
obtuseness and myopia of the executive, they are reviled by the President,
the Vice President and political parties as betrayers of the nation, destroyers
of the constitution and what not! ...I wish to caution Government against
this approach. Their pronouncements against kar sevaks are only strength-
ening the movement.""' Quite evidently, the Babri Masjid demolition was
part of the Ayodhya movement.
The cryptic Rao government passed the Acquisition of Certain Areas at
Ayodhya Act 1993, a belated measure that preserved the post-demolition
status quo. The ordinance stipulated, among other things, that the disputed

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 17

land will be handed over to a trust formed only after the promulgation of the
Act. On October 24, 1994, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the
Presidential reference upholding the acquisition of the disputed 67 acres of
land in Ayodhya, and empowering the government to delegate a trust to
manage the property and to enable Hindus to worship in the makeshift temple
on the basis of 'comparative user' principle (viz. Muslims were praying less
often than Hindus in the disputed structure before demolition . However,
the judgment struck down section 4(3) of the Ayodhya Act which abated any
pending 'suit, appeal or other proceeding' as unconstitutional. This decision
revived the proceedings pending in the Allahabad High Court which will
decide if Muslims had the right to worship in the disputed area.32

HISTORY, MYTH AND NARRATIVITY

For the young and male kar sevaks, Ram is not only a favorite deity bu
a communal rendering of Indian 'national history.' Having been brainw
by the rhetoric of 'heroic heritage' of the past and the 'pathetic situatio
the present, the 'Hindu' youth are made to feel intensely the need for s
ning 'impotence' and 'weakness.' They are presented with a clear enemy
a visible symbol to destroy and establish their 'strength and glory,' an
gain their 'pride and hegemony'. The preamble of the constitution of th
establishes that the organization was created to, among other things, "
make them [Hindus] realise the greatness of their past," and "to bring
an all-round regeneration of the Hindu Samaj."33 Savarkar himself has
fied: "Hindutva is not a word but a history. Not only the spiritual or r
gious history of our people as it is sometimes taken to be by being con
with the other conjugate term Hinduism, but a history in full11."34
History, myths, and narrativity are integral parts of the holistic sche
a people's past memories and present identity. Myths do create a parti
discursive space for changes in the knowledge of the past, and this dis
siveness gains a divine ordination when religious symbols and sensibili
are added to it. A semiotic analysis with emphasis on the narrative str
will lead us to concur with Iqbal Ansari that the (religion-tainted) com
perceptions of history have got entrenched in the collective psyche of
Indians as myths and symbols, and that this 'mythic-psychic-folkloris
erant of the average Indian mind transforms the ordinary events and
dents in the social and cultural life affecting Hindu-Muslim relations i
and shape. This operant makes it possible for some politicians and bigo
religious leaders to manipulate and mislead people.35
Indla, as a matter of fact, is a 'context-sensitive society' and people
ceive "much of their behavior against a background of social, religious
historicolegendary contexts." The texts here are deliberately 'framed' b
thors-"that is, placed within contexts that provide the listener/reader
clues for interpreting its message." This kind of metacommunicative s
gies employed in 'cultural performances,' which include folk dances an
mas, recitation of folktales by professional bards, telling of parables a
jokes in everyday situations, religious sermons, construction of 'street s

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18 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

and so forth, "have an ability to transform and enhance

ence to impersonal values and experiences."36
After all, as scholars agree, historical interpretation
temporary ideology, which encourages the adoption of
theories about the past. Contemporary ideologies, histo
his choice of events, nature of his choice, his subjectivit
are all mutually inter-connected variables that give rise
myth, often called the 'national history.' When a myth
becomes the focal point of this contemporary myth, w
project of history writing. The Ramayana, a popular In
ploys metanarrative strategies, is an important text to d
tion between the popular mythological version and Hin
tion of Indian 'national history.'
With a "pervasive presence of Ram's name in North India" that is re-
flected in invocation in moments of distress, rural greetings (Ram-Ram), and
in the pallbearers' chant (Ram nam satya hai-Ram's name is truth),37 it is
no wonder why Hindu communalists try to appropriate the Ramayana and
come up with claims of historicity. According to V. D. Savarkar, "Some of us
worship Ram as an incarnation, some admire him as a hero and a warrior,
all love him as the most illustrious representative monarch of our race."38
Another Savarkar-like contends that the Ramayana is "a scripture of the
ancient Hindu Race" that reveals "picture after picture of fascinating beauty
in the life of India in that period in our history." He claims that dharma was
the essence of India then and interjects that "[flor the sake of dharma, my
countrymen of Sind have left their property, their lands, their native soil, and
have migrated to India." This author's "picture" gets even clearer when he
asserts that "pure-hearted brahmins" who were poor in material wealth but
rich in the wealth of the spirit were "the pillars cif the state" during Ramayanic
times.39
This allegedly homogenous 'Hindu' race, according to yet another Hindu
communal writer, speaks many languages with a single "vital breath" and
have vast and variegated culture with a "central spring of spiritual strength":
"the mystic spirit of India." When Judaic monotheism in its Islamic garb
invaded the land of the Vedas and challenged the outer logic of superior
revelations such as Valmiki's Ramayana, the inner coherence was fast for-
gotten by its inheritors.40 This kind of myth is then projected onto the 'na-
tional history' by the Hindu communalists giving rise to subsequent
sociopolitical myths. The Hindu communal forces' invocation of Ram and
Ramayana along the lines of Eurocentered taxonomies facilitates not just
the evocation of monolithic Hinduism and homogenous 'Hindu' samaj but
also the eradication of the Other, Islam and Muslims. This composition of
the inner cosmos makes sure that the 'pure old glory' of Hinduism prevails
and the 'polluting and invading' Islam becomes simply non-existent. This
kind of tales "continue to mould existence for their assenting possessors"
and initiate a process of acculturation in which the legatees absorb the pos-
sessors' legacy, viz. their 'historical knowledge and consciousness.'4'
In order to entrench this 'historical knowledge and consciousness' in

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 19

people's minds, Hindutva groups employ many ingenious schemes and de-
signs. The most important of them are the political translation of 'Ramarajya'
and the cultural translation of 'Ram Temple.'

RAMARAJYA

The earliest Ramarajya attempt took place in Rajasthan. In 1947 some of

the leading jagirdars of former Jaipur and Jodhpur states founded the Ram
Rajya Parishad (RRP hereafter) to organize the feudal-conservative elements
of the society. The party had the blessings and involvement of many religious
figures such as Swami Karapatri as the founder, Shankaracharya of Dwarka
as the patron, and Swami Swarupanand as the president. Although some
princes extended their sympathy to the new party in its mobilization of the
anti-Congress forces, none of the prominent Rajput princes joined the RRP.
This lack of dynamic leadership resulted in the failure of bringing all the
anti-Congress feudal-priestly-conservative elements into the RRP fold and
in a large number of independent candidates in the First General Elections in
1952.42
However, the real contest was between the Congress who stood for de-
mocracy and parliamentary institutions, and the RRP who wanted "to re-
vive Ram Rajya in which the concept of 'Dharma' was predominant." The
idea was to expose the relative weakness of the democratic order as opposed
to the feudal leadership and "to prove the superiority of the old order."
Ramarajya came in handy to represent the old order.43 Another author con-
tends that the RRP "is by far the most orthodox Hindu party." The party
wished "to return to the glorious days of Rama's rule, where everybody was
contented, prosperous and religious."44 The RRP was against "secularized,
anti-Shastric Hindu Code Bill," and "killing cows, monkeys, fish or locusts."
They supported the demand for Akhanda Hindustan (Greater India), arm-
ing "every deserving citizen," promoting Hindi, the right to own property,
and adequate compensation for land taken away. They were against any
reform of the caste system and wanted to give the 'untouchables' "high posts
in the management of sanitary departments, and the leather and hides and
allied trades."'45
The hardly one-year-old Jan Sangh also fielded candidates in the 1952
elections and raised India's partition, rising prices and Congress misrule as
the issues in its campaign. In the absence of crystallization of party ideology,
Jan Sangh did not look distinct from the RRP.46 The RRP which was the
major opposition party in the state assembly was reduced to insignificance
(see Table 1) in the 1962 elections. One major reason was that the leaderless

Table 1: The Electoral Performance of RRP48

Election
Year Seats Won
(Total) % of Seats Votes % of Votes

1952 24 (190) 12.6 399,958 11.4

1957 17 (176) 9.7 469,540 9.9
1962 3 (176) 1.7 102,987 2.0

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 20 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

RRP following got attracted by the conservative Swatan

Rajput leadership.47
Ramarajya was also used by another obscure outfit known as 'Akhil
Bharatiya Ramrajya Parishad' in Delhi.49 The BJP came to utilize the concept
of Ramarajya in the late 1980s. The party decided in June 1989 to endorse
the construction of the temple for Ram in Ayodhya. Their manifesto for the
1989 parliamentary elections, and for the 1991 parliamentary and state elec-
tions "clearly set Rama Rajya as the goal of the party and the nation.'"'0 The
BJP advertisements during the 1991 elections listed accusations and com-
plaints against other parties and exhorted the voters: "Let's go for Ramrajya,
Let's go with BJP." This was accompanied by three catch-phrases as though
they explained the Ramarajya: 'Ram, Roti, and Insaaf' (Freedom from fear,
Freedom from want, and Freedom from discrimination).5' Atal Behari
Vajpayee explained that the BJP will serve kheer (dessert) and not the usual
khichri sarkar (spicy mixed government) of the others.52
The BJP argued that "Rama and Rama Rajya are our national heritage
whose potentiality is being realised only now." The Ayodhya Ram temple
movement "was not just a plea for a temple for Sri Rama, ...instead it re-
flected a far deeper quest for recapturing our national identity."'S3 Thus the
Ayodhya movement "implies the recommencement of our national journey
as a politically independent state for the attainment of Rama- Rajya that is
Swarajya by Swadeshi as codified by Mahatma Gandhi."5S4
The BJP contended further that the Ayodhya movement defined the tenets
of Indian nationalism "in terms of the native idiom" and it was rooted in
plurality of both religious and secular thought rather than "Semitic intoler-
ance and exclusivism".55 The 'plurality' reflected in the crafty ploy of the
party was to make a political capital out of some famous national figures
and their popular imageries:

The movement for restoration of the Temple at the birthplace of Sri

Rama...developed into a massive protest against the derailment of all that
inspired the freedom movement-the elevating chant of Vande Mataram
which Maharishi Bankim Chandra gave to this nation, the goal of Rama
Rajya held out by Mahatma Gandhi as the. destination of free India, the
ideal of Spiritual Nationalism expounded by Swami Vivekananda, the spirit
of Sanatana Dharma which Sri Aurobindo described as the soul and na-
tionalism of India, and the mass devotion to the mother-land built around
the Ganapati festival by Bal Gangadhar Tilak (emphasis in original).56

The desperate Congress party also towed blatant communal lines in the
1980's and it got worse toward the end of the decade. They used Arun Govil,
the man who played Ram in the famous TV serial Ramayan, in their cam-
paign for the 1988 Allahabad by-election.57 Not to be outdone by the BJP in
the 1989 general elections and to please the larger Hindu community, Rajiv
Gandhi tacitly supported the VHP's Ramshila (foundation laying) campaign
and proclaimed that his party would usher in Ramarajya if they won.58 He
claimed that launching his Congress party's election campaign at Ayodhya
(Faizabad), "where Lord Rama lived, gave him immense satisfaction."5S9 He

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 21

was also reported to have said that "one should be proud to be a Hindu";
but he later denied making such a statement and clarified that he had re-
marked "one should be proud to be an Indian. "60
As the 'lords temporal' have either launched or redirected political parties
to attain Ramarajya, the 'lords spiritual' have been prating about it all along.
For instance, at the Sadhu Sammelan held in Delhi on April 2-3, 1991, the
'religious leaders' issued three appeals that every Hindu should rise to 'liber-
ate' and 'reconstruct' the three temples in Ayodhya, Mathura, and Varanasi
allegedly destroyed by Muslim invaders, that every Hindu should use his
vote to destroy the politicians who caved in to Muslim pressure, and that
every Hindu should realize the only way to herald Ramarajya was to vote
for the BJP.6'
Ramarajya has come to be identified predominantly with Ram worship
rather than imaging an ideal society. So every religious symbolism involving
Ram has become popular. For instance, the name of Ram is said to be even
more powerful than Ram himself just as the dust of his 'Lotus Feet' is more
influential than his person. It is because even the one or two defects that may
have existed in Ramarajya were not there during Padukarajya carried out by
Bharata.62 Ramdas or Samartha, one of the most famous saints of
Maharashtra, preached people to aspire after Ramarajya based on noble
principles. He wanted leaders to be dedicated to the praja (people) like Ram,
a king who protects the 'right' and fights against the 'wrong'. In order to
build Ramarajya, people should worship Ram and there is a clear need for
institutions that will spread the message of Ram. So he emphasized building
temples for Ram.63
In the final analysis, however, Mahatma Gandhi's passionate dreams of
future have come to be usurped and marketed rather recklessly by various
political and other actors. Unlike in Gandhi's universal humanism where
there was no Ravana, the Hindutva forces have effectively replaced him with
not just Babar or Aurangzeb but the whole Muslim community. Whereas
Gandhi wanted to bring about his Ramarajya through weaker sections of
the society such as women, 'untouchables,' and the poor masses, the modern
Ramarajya scheme is exclusively for men and their might. Above all, Gandhi's
Ramarajya was a vision leading the masses toward the future, but the
Hindutva scheme is a mission taking the masses backwards. The 'right'
Ramarajya can be summed up in a simple phrase: "retelling history." Lick-
ing their historical wounds and lacking all convictions about modern poli-
tics and socio-economic policies and programms for the ills of the nation,
the reactionaries reinterpret their 'glorious past' and retell it with money and
manipulation, power and pomp. As two commentators have put it, being
unable to spell out a grand national vision, the BJP (and the Sangh Parivar as
a whole for that matter) has banked on emotive, inflammatory and transient
gimmicks such as rath yatra, storming of masjids and the like.64

CONSTRUCTING RAM TEMPLE

Inevitably, the cultural translation of the 'historical knowledge and cons

ness' is being highlighted as the most important part of the so-called Ay

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22 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

movement. Now that the major impediment, the Babri Masjid, has been
demolished, and that a major political headway, the BJP's capturing power
both in the state of UP and at the centre, has been accomplished, it is only a
matter of time to install the temple and inscribe the glorious 'Hindu' history.
The Sangh Parivar laid the foundation for the temple by digging around
the Babri Masjid and filling the area with 10-feet-thick layer of reinforced
cement and concrete in July 1992. Even as Kalyan Singh's BJP government
called it a "platform" for performing bhajans, the VHP declared that it was
the foundation for the future Ram temple. The blueprint of the temple that
would stand 128 feet tall, occupy an area of 37,520 sq.ft., and last for 1,000
years had been prepared almost a decade ago and was widely advertised
during the Ayodhya campaign. The VHP expedited the temple work, which
was on a sluggish pace, as soon as the United 'Front government fell in No-
vember 1997 and the political equation seemed to favour the BJP.
Launching the party's election campaign in Faizabad (near Ayodhya) on
February 6, 1998, L. K. Advani reiterated the party's resolve to build the
temple. He reasoned: "The BJP has put the Ayodhya issue in its election
manifesto. We cannot overlook the popular sentiments for construction of a
Rama temple in the birthplace of Lord Rama."'65 Even as the BJP-led govern-
ment has avoided putting the temple issue on the 'National Agenda for Gov-
ernance,' the VHP has been pressing ahead with the pre-fabrication of the
temple. As the pace of the stone-cutting for the 212 pillars of the temple was
not satisfactory, the VHP selected sites in Kojra, Ajari and Pindwara villages
of Sirohi district in Rajasthan, another BJP-ruled state, to expedite the work.66
Ashok Singhal, the leader of the VHP, told The Week magazine recently that
1,75,000 cubic feet of pre-fabricated material was needed to build the temple
and 40,000 cubic feet had already been prepared.67
When opposition parties protest the secret construction of the Ram temple,
Advani, the Home Minister, simply assures the Parliament that "this Gov-
ernment will see to it that no court order is flouted,"68 and Prime Minister
Vajpayee announces that "my Government will not allow any organization
to violate the sanctity of the judicial process."69 Neither of them agrees to the
opposition parties' demand for government intervention in the matter. It is
also important to remember that both these leaders along with their party
colleagues had given similar assurances in December 1992 just before the
mosque was demolished. Despite all these 'assurances,' the RSS leader,
Rajendra Singh, has proclaimed that the temple should be built at the "very
place where the disputed structure was demolished." According to him, those
who opposed the temple construction had "perverted minds" and were "ap-
peasing Muslims" to get their votes.70
Living true to their 'family' legacy of various 'brotherly' organizations
pursuing 'parallel agenda' and 'fractured agenda,' the Sangh Parivar persists
with the Ram temple project in order to concretize the 'Hindu' historical
knowledge and consciousness and to usher in the Hindu millennium with all
its old glory and pomp. The mix of Ram and history has come to be a potent
weapon for the Hindu communal forces to reap the much desired political
dividends. In fact, Ram has been utilized in this capacity once before. Albrecht

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 23

Weber quotes Talboy Wheeler in his book On Ramayana (1873) claiming

that the "Rama legend represents the victory of Hinduism over Buddhism."
When Buddhism and Jainism held sway in the Subcontinent, the Vedic Hin-
duism realized the need for accommodating the 'common folks.'71 Srivastava
claims that it was during the fifteenth century that "the rituals and traditions
of Rama bhakti [devotion] were elaborated along orthodox Vedantic lines in
the Adhyatma-ramayana." When the Rama story "wove its way inextrica-
bly into the fabric of rural cultiire and religion" in the sixteenth century, the
"growing popularity of Rama forced Brahminism to accept him as an avatar
[incarnation]."72 The brahmanical orthodoxy could spread the message that
it would condescend a dark-complexioned non-brahmin practising certain
ideals to honor and worship, and condemn a brahmin scholar (Ravana) as
demon if found guilty.73 Ram is wooed once again to help consolidate the
brahmanical orthodoxy's political power base. The Hindutva forces prefer
militaristic manly Ram to nonviolent baby Ram. The lone warrior Jayaram
standing out in the field with bow and arrows is liked better than the be-
nevolent King Rajaram sitting in his court with Sita and others. While the
physical materiality of Ram is highlighted, the pervasive spirit of Ram-ness
is deliberately downplayed. Seen from the Hindutva angle, Ram is more of a
historical hero than a mythical God. Presenting a fantastic linear account of
the past that had no Muslims, no privileges to the weaker sections of the
society, and no politicization, Ram becomes, to borrow Savarkar's phrase,
"history in full." Homogenizing the Hindu samaj with one God, one temple
and one book, Ram is also 'religion in full.' Bringing the Akhand Bharat
(Greater India) that was overrun by invaders down to a specific location
(Ayodhya) where the invaders' 'descendants' and their intrusive mosque could
be pushed aside, Ram becomes 'geography in full.' When all these senti-
ments are combined and consolidated under the Sangh Parivar's leadership,
the unholy secular India turns into sanctified Rama-sthan, and the Ram temple
becomes the manifestation of true and sincere patriotism. If you are not part
of this self-construction, you are part of the Other-destruction.
Having translated mythical lore into modern mobilizing metaphors and
ideology, Hindu communalists transform the resultant frenzy into retalia-
tory corrective measures, and in the process of which they emerge powerful
with added strength to the accentuated status-quo. The Hindutva forces'
interpretation of Hinduism and history, and their understanding of 'great-
ness' and 'regeneration' are all deceitful and opportunistic. In sheer despera-
tion, they misappropriate Indian heritage, misrepresent Indian legends, and
manipulate the people. With these careful selections and calculated slips, the
brahmanical orthodoxy plays up the symbolic terrains of contest. The com-
munal drama unfolds. Both Hindu and Muslim communalists play their roles
religiously, the rest of the political entities participate as helpless side-actors,
and the civil society functions mostly as silent spectators. There is one collec-
tive villain and no hero in this drama.

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24 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

NOTES

1. See Gyanendra Pandey, "Ayodhya and the State," Seminar 364 (December 1
2. M. J. Akbar, Riot After Riot: Reports on Caste and Communal Violence in
Delhi: Penguin Books, 1988. p. 133.
3. In the Hindu cyclic theory of time, the cycle was called a kalpa equivalent to 4,320
million earthly years. The kalpa is divided into 14 periods; each of these periods is
divided into 71 Great Intervals; and every GI is divided into 4 yugas (period of time),
sata, dwapara, treta, and kali. The yugas contain 4,800, 3,600, 2,400, and 1,200 god-
years (one god-year being 360 human years) with corresponding dedine in the quality
of civilization. We are at present in the seventh of the 14 periods of the present kalpa
and in the fourth yuga called kaliyuga when the world is full of evil and wickedness.
Though we have several millennia before the end of the world, it is nonetheless immi-
nent. Romila Thapar, A History of India (Volume I). Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin,
1968. p. 161.
4. "The Babri Masjid Dispute," Spotlight on Regional Affairs 10/7-8 (July-August 1991
p. 8.
5. Pandey, 1989, p. 40.
6. Thapar, 1968, p. 140.
7. Sher Singh, "What History Says About Ayodhya," in Asghar Ali Engineer, Babri-Masjid
Ramianambhoomi Controversy. Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1990. pp. 79-80.
8. Spotlight on Regional Affairs, July-August 1991, pp. 7-9.
9. Jay Dubashi, The Road to Ayodbya. New Delhi: Voice of India, 1992. p. 57.
10. See "B. B. Lal's Report on Archaeology of Ramayana Sites Project," in Asghar Ali Engi-
neer, Politics of Confrontation: The Babri-Masjid Ramjanmabhoomi Controversy Runs-
Riot. Delhi: Ajanta, 1992. pp. 268-9.
11. P. S. Sridhara Murthy, Rama, Ramayana and Babar. Bangalore: Dalit Sahitya Akademy,
1988. p. 30.
12. The excavated site has been filled in and a reexcavation of the same site becomes very
difficult as the filling has disturbed the sequential layers. See "On Archaeological Evi-
dence of Demolition of 'Mandir': Joint Statement of Thapar, Gopal and Panikkar of
JNU," in Engineer, 1992, pp. 273-4. See also "Romila Thapar on Archaeological Find-
ing in Ayodhya," in ibid., pp. 277-8.
13. See Rajeev Saxena, "Tulsidas' Silence on Ram Mandir at Ayodhya," Mainstream, Janu-
ary 9, 1993. pp. 33-4.
14. Sushil Srivastava, The Disputed Mosque: A Historical Inquiry. New Delhi: Vistaar Pub-
lications, 1991. pp. 43-4.
15. K. L. Chanchreek and Saroj Prasad, eds., Crisis in India. Delhi: H. K. Publishers, 1993.
p. 77.
16. See Akbar, 1988, pp. 126-134.
17. Harbans Mukhia, "Ayodhya Dispute: Historical Evidence and BJP's Aim," in Engineer,
1992, p. 19.
18. Akbar, 1988, pp. 126-134.
19. J. C. Aggarwal and N. K. Chowdhry, Ram Janmabhoomi Through the Ages: Babri
Masjid Controversy. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., 1991. pp. 81-2.
20. Srivastava, 1991, p. 17.
21. "Vishwa Hindu Parishad's Liberation Agitation," in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Babr
Masjid Ramjanambhoomi Controversy. Delhi: Ajanta, 1990. pp. 228-30.
22. When the Supreme Court ruled that the divorce of a Muslim lady, Shah Bano, on th
basis of Islamic custom was not valid, it gave rise to anger and resentment among
Muslim groups. In May 1986, Rajiv government introduced the Muslim Women (Pro-
tection of Rights on Divorce) Bill in order to please and retain its Muslim vote bank.
23. N. Ram, "The Great Catastrophe," Frontline, January 1, 1993. p. 23.
24. "Events of February 1986-Seizure of Babri Masjid," in Engineer, 1990, pp. 201-4.
25. Ram, 1993, p. 23.
26. Spotlight on Regional Affairs, July-August 1991, pp. 82, 85-6.

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 Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History 25

27. Ibid., pp. 86-8.

28. The VHP gives its own account of the talks in History Versus Casuistry: Evidence of the
Ramajanmabhoomi Mandir Presented by the Vishva Hindu Parishad to the Govern-
ment of India in December-January 1990-91. New Delhi: Voice of India, 1991. pp. i-iv
For the VHP's evidence, see pp. 1-75. A member of the VHP team engaged in the
dialogue with the AIBMAC, Harsh Narain, has come up with more 'evidence' from
Muslim historical sources for the alleged 'existence and desecration' of the
Ramjanmabhumi temple and its replacement with the Babri mosque. See Harsh Narain,
The Ayodbya Temple-Mosque Dispute: Focus on Muslim Sources. Delhi: Penman Pub-
lishers, 1993.
29. N. Ram, "Hindutva's Challenge," Seminar 402 (February 1993). p. 25.
30. Chanchreek and Prasad, 1993, p. 109.
31. Ibid., p. 250. For the official stand of the BJP, see BJP's White Paper on Ayodbya and
the Rama Temple Movement. New Delhi: BJP, 1993.
32. Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996. pp. 544-46.
33. Dina Nath Mishra, RSS: Myth and Reality. New Delhi: Vikas, 1980. p. 207.
34. Quoted in T. C. A. Raghavan, "Origins and Development of Hindu Mahasabha Ideol-
ogy: The Call of V D Savarkar and Bhai Parmanand," Economic and Political Weekly
18/15 (April 9, 1983), p. 597.
35. Iqbal Ansari, "Hindu-Muslim Conflict in India: Causes and Remedies," in Ansari, The
Muslim Situation in India. New Delhi: Sterling, 1989. p. 173.
36. Philip Lutgendorf, The Life of a Text: Performing the Ramcaritmanas of Tulsidas. Ber-
keley: Univ. of California Press, 1991. pp. 23, 18, 33, 34.
37. Ibid.,p. 413.
38. Quoted in Tapan Basu, et. al., Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critique of the H
Right. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993. p. 9.
39. See T. L. Vaswani, Sri Rama: The Beloved of Aryavarta. Poona, India: Gita Publishing
House, n.d. pp. 5, 7.
40. Sita Ram Goel, "Rama-Man, or God?" Organiser, October 14, 1963. pp. 12, 14.
41. See G. W Trompf, "Macrohistory and Acculturation: Between Myth and History in
Modern Melanesian Adjustments and Ancient Gnosticism," Comparative Studies in
Society and History 31/4 (October 1989). p. 625.
42. K. L. Kamal, Party Politics in an Indian State: A Study of the Main Political Parties in
Rajasthan. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., n.d. pp. 75-7.
43. Ibid.
44. Horst Hartmann, Political Parties in India. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 19
112.
45. "Rama Rajya Parishad," The Times of India Directory and Yearbook 1954-55. Lon-
don: Bennett, Coleman & Co, 1955. p. 1122.
46. Kamal, n.d., p. 159.
47. Ibid.,p. 210.
48. Surindar Suri, 1962 Elections: A Political Analysis. New Delhi: Sudha Publicatio
1962. p. 142.
49. Hartmann, 1982, p. 345.
50. BJP's White Paper on Ayodbya and the -Rama Temple Movement. New Delhi: Bharatiya
Janata Party, 1993. p. 8.
51. The asterisk mark on Ram explains: "'To liberate all forms of life from fear, is my vow'
To Indians, Ram is an ideal, a symbol of integrity, justice and compassion." See the
advertisement in India Today, May 15, 1991, p. 48-9.
52. Madhu Jain and M. Rahman, "Flowery Fantasies," India Today, May 15, 1991. p. 34.
53. BJP's White Paper on Ayodhya and the Rama Temple Movement, 1993. p. 7.
54. Ibid., p. 15.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Inderjit Badhwar and Pankaj Pachauri, "Communalism: Dangerous Dimensions," In-

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26 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

dia Today, October 31, 1989. p. 29.

58. Inderjit Badhwar and Prabhu Chawla, "Moment of Truth," India Today, November 30,
1989. p. 24.
59. "PM lashes out at BJP," The Hindu, November 4, 1989.
60. "Congress (I) manifesto highlights unity theme," The Hindu, November 7, 1989.
61. Shahnaz Anklesaria Aiyar, "The VHP: Flexing Its Musdes," India Today, April 30,
1991. pp. 51-2.
62. Select Shrines of Sri Rama. Madras: Little Flower Co., 1964. p. 2. According to
Ramayana, when Ram was spending the 14-year exile in the forest, his brother Bharata
ruled the country by placing Ram's paduka (wooden slippers) on the throne.
63. Ramacandra Cintamana Dhere, Ramarajyaci Sphurtikendre (In Marathi). Poona:
Lalithbaibhav Prakashan, 1966. pp. 19-21. I owe thanks to Shailaja Menon for her
translation.
64. Dilip Awasthi and Shahnaz Anklesaria Aiyar, "RSS-BJP-VHP: Hindu Divided Family,"
India Today, November 30, 1991. p. 36.
65. "Advani reiterates resolve to build Ram temple," The Hindu, February 7, 1998.
66. J. P. Shukla, "VHP plan for Ram temple at Ayodhya on schedule?" The Hindu, May 24,
1998.
67. "Opposition dissatisfied with Advani's statement," The Hindu, June 6, 1998.
68. Ibid.
69. "Vaipayee says Govt. will go by court order," The'Hindu, June 8, 1998.
70. Inder Malhotra, "Mandir takes heat off n-issue," The Hindu, June 10, 1998.
71. Murthy, 1988, pp. 9-13.
72. Srivastava, 1991, p. 42.
73. Murthy, 1988, pp. 9-13.

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