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China and Global
Governance
A New Leader?
Peng Bo
International Political Economy Series
Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw , University of Massachusetts Boston,
Boston, USA;
Emeritus Professor, University of London, London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades.
It has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South
increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also
reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on
indebted Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable
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talisms and connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies
and sectors, debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities as
the established trans-Atlantic North declines and ’the rest’, especially the
BRICS, rise. NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!
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Peng Bo
China and Global

Governance
A New Leader?
Peng Bo
Institute of World Economics and Politics
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Beijing, China
ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-030-70496-4 ISBN 978-3-030-70497-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70497-1
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Foreword: China’s Global Leadership
Moment
The reemergence of China as a significant world political and economic

actor since the end of the 1970s has been globally hailed as one of
the most important events in modern world history. China has experi-
enced impressive economic growth over the past 40 years, making China
the largest contributor to world economic growth. During the period
850 million people have been lifted out of poverty. China’s economic
reform and integration with the capitalist world economy and its dramatic
socio-economic and socio-political achievements have made the impact
felt worldwide across almost all domains, such as finance, currency, trade,
environmental issues, resource management, food security, raw material,
and commodity prices, etc. As a result, China is increasingly seen as having
the quality of the previous United States as an “indispensable country”.
In recent years the global expansion of Chinese outward investments
and outsourcing, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, has become a
source of major anxiety for the existing Western powers. In addition,
China’s technological advancement in some leading areas and the world-
wide attraction of the Chinese state-led development model are among
the real factors behind the ongoing China–US trade war which has a
strong intention to “restructure” or “remold” the Chinese economic
system and its mode of capital accumulation.
China’s economic rise is causing modifications of the classical strat-
ification of the world economy as conceptualized by world system
theory in terms of core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral relationships. In
v
vi FOREWORD: CHINA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP MOMENT
other words, China’s upgrade of its positions toward more sophisticated

production in global supply and value chains is seen as “affecting” and
“disturbing” the power structure of the existing world order. Historically
it has always been a sensitive but crucial issue on the nexus between the
rise of emerging powers and the existing hegemons. And historical lessons
show that rising powers’ position perceived as a status-quo or revisionist
power has been intrinsically in dynamic interactions with various world
order scenarios—disorder, new order, or reorder.
Since the beginning of the new millennium, the existing world order
has been experiencing deep crises in a few essential realms despite Fukuya-
ma’s “end of history” declaration. First of all, multilateralism in the post-
Cold War era of global capitalism and liberal hegemony has been harder
to achieve than liberal internationalists had anticipated. This is to suggest
that global governance has been in a crisis of functionality, and global
powers and international institutions have been unable to reach an agree-
ment over a whole range of issues, such as the coronavirus, terrorism,
energy security, environment protection, trade, nuclear weapons (North
Korea and Iran), and the Middle East peace and stability, democracy, and
human rights, etc. The differences and divergences on these global gover-
nance issues imply that the world order has been undergoing a crisis of
scope. In other words, it is beyond the order’s capacity to live up to the
expectations in providing a secure and just socio-economic and socio-
political order. Consequently, liberal hegemony and the liberal world
order are seen as suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. Finally, as major
shifts are taking place in the global power balance, shifting power from
the existing hegemons to the emerging powers, the world order may be
said to enter into a new era of crisis of authority.
In studying world politics and international relations, the concept of
“hegemony” is an indispensable notion applied to global leading powers
that are able to shape world order and international relations/system. It
denotes a kind of leadership formation in which the construction of an
internal socio-economic and socio-political order, driven by social forces
occupying a dominant position within a nation-state, is projected outward
on a world scale, leading to the shape of the world order. The United
States, after the Second World War, has been seen as the global hegemon
who paved the foundation of the postwar world order. If world order is
defined as the general acceptance of “norms, values, rules and practices”
that are shaped, often imposed, by the hegemonic powers, such as the
West in general and the United States in particular, then it is not difficult
FOREWORD: CHINA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP MOMENT vii
to understand why today the hegemonic powers are watching carefully

how the rising powers, such as China in particular, are influencing the
existing world order and even shaping the direction the new emerging
order is moving to.
China’s global rise is creating the emergence of a new incipient form
of hegemony—“interdependent hegemony.” The concept depicts the fact
that it is no longer viable to think of hegemony based on the domina-
tion of one single power or one universalization of norms and values. It
does not mean that hegemony does not exist. It exists, but in a different
form. Interdependent hegemony implies that the US/West is not able to
single-handedly sustain its historically monopolized structural power in
the areas of security and defense capacity, control of system of production
and goods and services, control of the structure of finance and credit, and
dominance of knowledge and ideas. These areas of structural power are
increasingly intertwined and diversified, which is brought about by the
rise of emerging powers in general, and by China in particular.
Interdependent hegemony denotes a dialectic relationship between
China and the existing US-led world order. China is one of the most
active players supporting globalization and transnational capitalism driven
by the existing hegemons. While China has been benefiting from the
existing world order, its economic success is at the same time chal-
lenging some of the order’s fundamental norms. In other words, China
has been vigorously participating in the US “neoliberal project”, i.e.,
globalization, marketization, and competition, while its state capitalism
has been successfully outperforming free market capitalism through what
Robert Wade calls a “governed market”. China’s success is opening for
multiple alternatives of norm and value regarding what makes nations
develop and succeed as well as the set of mutually dependent relation-
ships between property rights and economic growth, between the rule
of law and market economy, between free currency flow and economic
order, and, most importantly, and between democracy and development.
These alternatives of norm and value are also becoming “intertwined,”
open, less rigid, and non-universal. They are not supposed to be defined
by the existing powers alone. However, although the hegemony of the
existing hegemons is weakening, but the emerging powers, such as China,
have not yet succeeded in producing a unified culture and a new institu-
tional framework for global governance that is politically and ideologically
universal.
viii FOREWORD: CHINA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP MOMENT
Today, the world order is facing two sides of the same coin, with one
side revealing the return of “great power rivalry” characterized by conflicts
and wars, and another side showing “interdependent hegemony” charac-
terized by accommodation and integration. The existing and emerging
powers are intertwined in a constant process of shaping and reshaping
the international order in the nexus of national interest, regional orien-
tation, common political agenda, political alliance, and potential conflict.
Much of Western scholarship tends to focus on the debates among the
different schools of international relations in hypothesizing and theorizing
the binary choice faced by both the existing and rising powers: the former
is struggling to assimilate the latter to the existing order, while the latter
is endeavoring to benefit from challenging and changing the system.
Will China ever be able to fulfill Western expectations, whatever these
maybe? Ever since Napoleon warned the world that it would be better not
to wake the “sleeping giant,” China has been both a source of fascination
and disturbance for the West. Early Western missionaries from Europe and
America failed in their efforts of converting China into a Christian-like
continent. In China’s own history and civilization, it was once conquered
and ruled for centuries by its powerful minority groups such as the Mogols
and the Manchus. They tried to change China’s fundamental character,
but later were themselves changed and Sinicized.
In the past decades, either fascination or irritation with China has
always influenced Western scholarship and journalism, which often
produce abrupt sentiment from excessive approval and unqualified opti-
mism to unwarranted revulsion and deep pessimism. There was a hopeful
projection in most years of the 1980s about China’s economic reform as
the “second Chinese revolution” in leading the country into a Western-
like democracy; then there was deep antagonism toward China’s resis-
tance to political democratization in the aftermath of the Cold War; and
in recent years there have recurrently been either exaggerated predictions
of China’s threatening rise to the superpower status or unwarranted fore-
casts on the “the coming collapse of China” or “the endgame of commu-
nist rule in China.” From time to time Western academics, politicians and
opinion-makers selectively use the flux and reflux of China’s development
trajectory to justify their existing theories and ideologies in categorizing
China either as threat, or opportunity, or collapse, or superpower.
For a long time, the West has been struggling for Chinese hearts and
minds. Will China be a destructive or constructive world power? A status-
quo or a revisionist one? A force for continuity or a force for change?
FOREWORD: CHINA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP MOMENT ix
How will China apply its military and economic weight while adhering to
international norms? How to interpret the impact of China’s rise not only
in terms of structural hard power, such as economy, technology, trade,
finance, etc, but also in terms of normative soft power, such as ideas,
culture, thought, value system, scholarship, etc? How can the West under-
stand the kind of international leadership role that China is playing, and
how can the West better comprehend the historical and cultural fabrics
that underpin Chinese foreign policies and behaviors?
In the context of these crucial questions, Peng Bo’s book—China
and Global Governance—A New Leader?—shows a relentless endeavor to
study the relationship between the rise of China and the existing inter-
national order and global governance. One of the book’s unique charac-
ters is the author’s methodological approach—“a China-based interpretive
perspective”—to constructing a conceptual framework of “international
leadership with Chinese characteristics” (ILCC). The conceptual and
analytical framework of the ILCC is built on the combination of a variety
of interconnected components, such as the source of Chinese philosoph-
ical and cultural legacies, the formation of Chinese understanding and
perception of international relations and Chinese contribution to the
process and architecture of global governance.
The innovative contribution of the ILCC framework lies in the author’s
heuristic application of the “relational theory” and its “logic of relation-
ality” concept from which the author redefines the “international lead-
ership” concept (power, interest, and vision). Such a framework helps
readers to understand China’s different international leadership roles, such
as facilitative leadership, constructive leadership, and exemplary leader-
ship, under different situations and in different contexts. Empirically, the
applicability of the ILCC framework is verified by the author, who asso-
ciates China’s international leadership roles with four different situations
and contexts, such as the G20, the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), and the Belt and Road initiative (BRI).
The publication of this book is of timely importance. Following its
rapid rise in the past four decades, China now finds itself to be a “middle
kingdom” surrounded by jealousy, admiration, anxiety, worry, and even
resentment. Within the near future both China as the rising power and
the West as the existing power will have to find ways to accommodate
each other. In order to do so both will have to go through a consider-
able period of struggle, adjustment and tension. It seems that the current
x FOREWORD: CHINA’S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP MOMENT
mainstream line of scholarship in the West, both official and intellec-

tual, has been providing the dominant “expert” interpretations regarding
all historical, political, economic, and societal questions presented by
Chinese historical and contemporary evolution and especially its current
international role. The disturbing feature of Western China-scholarship
at present is its tendency of dissolving the so-called mainstream expert
interpretations into general public opinion. Therefore, alternative voices
are both necessary and indispensable. This book represents an integral
part of the ongoing effort, both inside and outside China, to incorporate
“Chineseness” into mainstream international relations (IR) theory.
Li Xing
Professor and Director
Research Center on Development and International Relations
Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg University
Aalborg, Denmark
Preface
Since the “Opening-up and Reform Project” launched in 1978, China’s

rise has been most clearly manifested in its dramatic economic growth
and its continued integration into the global economy. During the last
decades, China has gained a number of economic and development
achievements: China has lifted 500 million people out of poverty, which
is seen as a “great story in human story” by World Bank; China over-
took the United States to become the world’s biggest energy user in
2009, China’s increasing appetite for energy has significantly influenced
the global commodity price; China surpassed the United States as the
world’s largest manufacturing power in 2010 that makes “Made in China”
a key link in global value chain. In the meanwhile, China became the
world’s largest trading nation in 2013 and it became the biggest over-
seas investor in 2016. More important, in the issue area of international
finance, Chinese Yuan was officially added to the IMF’s Special Drawing
Rights (SDR) basket in 2016.
On the basis of its economic rise, China has increasingly been partic-
ipating in the process of global governance. Against the background of
the great transformation of global power structure and the major crises of
existing global governance, China aspires to play a greater role in global
governance as evidenced by its proactive participation in and reform of
the existing Western-based global institutions. More important, China’s
embrace of global governance can also be detected in its diplomatic focus
xi
xii PREFACE
on multilateralism and its active promotion of newly founded China-led

regional and global multilateral institutions.
Since then, China has actively participated in the building of a number
of regional multilateral groups and organizations, covering the global
governance of security, economy, finance, and development. In the secu-
rity area, China, Russia, and four other Central Asian countries (Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) co-founded the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, aimed at fighting terrorism
and separatism and reinforcing the regional/global security governance
mechanism; In 2009, in order to jointly cope with the global financial
crisis on the basis of a unified voice from emerging countries, China,
Russia, India, and Brazil transformed the BRIC from a loose economic
concept into a political consortium and a leader-level cooperation mecha-
nism. Since then, the BRICS (with the inclusion of South Africa in 2011)
has become an integral part of global financial governance in which China
has largely contributed to the establishment of the BRICS New Develop-
ment Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA);
in the same year, with the upgrade from G7 to G20 as the most impor-
tant mechanism of global economic governance, China, as the represen-
tative of the developing countries, has become an indispensable player in
the G20 and has gradually participated in the process of agenda setting
and framing of this mechanism; in 2013, China proactively proposed the
“Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) as a grand framework under which China
launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road
Fund (SRF) as the major financing mechanism for infrastructure construc-
tion. As one of the major driving forces of global development gover-
nance, during the last six years, the China-led BRI has been focusing on
the issue areas of improving connectivity among the concerned countries,
promoting economic cooperation, and reducing poverty, etc.
Under the circumstance of China’s enormous economic growth and its
increasing engagement in multilateral cooperation and global governance,
this book attempts to answer the following questions: how to understand
China as an emerging power? How to interpret China’s leadership role and
its leadership style in global governance? Would China exhibit a unique
type of leadership compared to the traditional Western-based ones? What
are the Chinese cultural and historical thoughts that shape China’s lead-
ership style? What are the implications of China-based leadership on the
process and architecture of global governance? What are the constraints and
PREFACE xiii
challenges in the relationships between China-based leadership vis-à-vis the

existing world order?
The major objective of the book is to provide some analytical tools
to answer the above questions. One of the key tools—the core contri-
bution of this book—is the concept of “International Leadership with
Chinese Characteristics” (ILCC). This book draws inspiration from a
number of sinicized terms, such as “socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics” and “market economy with Chinese characteristics”, to demonstrate
that ILCC is affecting and even shaping the process and architecture of
global governance.
The book argues that the ILCC is generated on the basis of a variety
of components, such as Chinese political culture, China’s involvement in
and contribution to the process and architecture of global governance,
and China’s understanding and perception of international relations as
well as other countries’ role expectations.
Empirically, the book employs four concrete examples (G20, BRICS,
SCO, and BRI) to verify this newly established concept of ILCC. Specif-
ically, the ILCC is applied by analyzing the interplay between a number
of variables, such as Chinese leaders’ and decision-makers’ speeches and
statements, China’s policymaking and external behavior, and Chinese
think tanks’ understanding and perception of China’s role in global
governance, etc.
Overall, one of the core values of the book is that it derives the
key notion of relationality from ancient Chinese cultural and political
thoughts. The notion of relationality is seen as the central tenant of
Chinese entire civilization, and it has been studied by many scholars
from different perspectives. The book argues that Chinese culture and
history play an indispensable role in building the abovementioned analyt-
ical tool of the ILCC. Thus, the major contribution of the book is to
bring the notion of relationality into the understanding of China’s lead-
ership role and leadership style, manifested in the concept of ILCC, in
global governance.
Beijing, China Peng Bo

Acknowledgments
My book journey has been full of ups and downs throughout the past
years. Without the invaluable encouragement and support of my Ph.D.
supervisor, my family members and colleagues, I can hardly imagine that
I would be able to reach the final destination. Everyone surrounding me
has sustained me with a great deal of understanding, sympathy, patience,
and encouragement throughout the entire process.
First and foremost, I would like to express my special appreciation
to Professor Li Xing for his persistent support during my book writing
by virtue of his patience, stimulus, and inspirational communication. His
conscientious scholarship and disciplinary character have, to a large extent,
encouraged and assisted me throughout the entire writing process.
More important, I would like to express my deep love and thankful-
ness to my family members: my parents, my wife, and my daughter. My
parents have devoted themselves to bringing me up and teaching me how
to become a righteous and hardworking person. My wife and my daughter
have also done a lot to support me emotionally and spiritually during my
writing, especially when I encountered difficulties and hardships.
xv
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Multifaceted Rise of China and Global Governance 1
1.2 The Deficiencies of the Major Western IR Theories 6
1.3 A Culture-Oriented Approach to China’s Role
in Contemporary IR 21
References 25
2 The Concept of ‘International Leadership with Chinese
Characteristics’ 31
2.1 Chinese Political Culture and the Major Features
of Chinese Worldview of IR 31
2.2 Relational Theory in Interpreting the Core Elements
of International Leadership 51
2.3 Three Components of the “International Leadership
with Chinese Characteristics” 72
References 83
3 Empirical Studies of “International Leadership
with Chinese Characteristics” in Global Governance 89
3.1 Role Theory as a Guideline for Empirical Studies 89
3.2 The Selection of Empirical Cases 93
3.3 The Operationalization of Cases: Case Study Materials
and Empirical Methods 100
3.4 A Four-Step Interpretive Process 107
xvii
xviii CONTENTS
3.5 Summary 110

References 112
4 Case I: Empirical Analysis of the ILCC in the G20 115
4.1 Historical Analysis and Stage Division 115
4.2 The Interpretation of China’s National Role
Conception of the ILCC in the G20 119
Performance of the ILCC in the G20 131
4.4 Summary 139
References 146
5 Case II: Empirical Analysis of the ILCC in the BRICS 149
Conception of the ILCC in the BRICS 154
Performance of the ILCC in the BRICS 163
5.4 Summary 171
References 177
6 Case III: Empirical Analysis of the ILCC in the SCO 181
Conception of the ILCC in the SCO 185
Performance of the ILCC in the SCO 193
6.4 Summary 203
References 210
7 Case IV: Empirical Analysis of the ILCC in the BRI 213
7.1 Historical Analysis and Stage Divisions 213
Conception of the ILCC in the BRI 216
Performance of the ILCC in the BRI 224
7.4 Summary 231
References 238
CONTENTS xix
8 Conclusion 241
8.1 The Applicability of the ILCC in Interpreting China’s
Role in Global Governance 241
8.2 Reflection of the Major Features of Chinese Worldview
of IR 251
8.3 The Explanatory Limitations of the ILCC 253
References 255
References 257
Index 281
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS A group of emerging countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CRA Contingency Reserve Arrangement
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
FDA foreign development aid
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
G20 The Group of Twenty
ILCC International Leadership with Chinese Characteristics
NDB New Development Bank
NRC national role conception
NRP national role performance
RATS Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDR Special Drawing Rights
xxi
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 The four crises of the US-led international order/global

governance (Source The author’s compilation) 3
Fig. 1.2 The logic mapping of the book (Source The author’s
compilation) 24
Fig. 2.1 The major features of Chinese worldview of IR (Source
The author’s compilation) 50
Fig. 2.2 Redefinition of the components of international leadership
through the logic of relationality (Source The author’s
compilation) 54
Fig. 2.3 Relational power (Source The author’s compilation) 66
Fig. 2.4 Relational interest (Source The author’s compilation) 68
Fig. 2.5 Relational vision (Source The author’s compilation) 71
Fig. 2.6 Conceptualization of “International Leadership with
Chinese Characteristics” (Source The author’s compilation) 74
Fig. 2.7 The facilitative leadership in the ILCC (Source
Fig. 2.8 The constructive leadership in the ILCC (Source
Fig. 2.9 The exemplary leadership in the ILCC (Source
Fig. 3.1 The layout of empirical analysis of the ILCC (Source
xxiii
xxiv LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 3.2 The four-step interpretive process of the ILCC (Source

Fig. 8.1 The overall assessment of the ILCC in the four cases
(Source The author’s compilation) 251
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 The Multifaceted Rise

of China and Global Governance
During the last two decades, there have been a huge number of excellent
academic publications on the topic of “the rise of China.” To be more
specific, “the rise of China” has been interpreted according to the three
major dimensions of economic development, diplomatic transition, and
global governance.
First and foremost, since the “Opening-up and Reform Project”
launched in 1978, China’s rise has been most clearly manifested in
its dramatic economic growth and its continued integration into the
global economy. In 2009, according to statistics from the International
Energy Agency (IEA), China became the world’s biggest energy user
by consuming 2.252 billion tons of oil equivalent, which exceeded
the United States’ 2.170 billion tons (Swartz & Oster, 2010). In
2010, China replaced the United States as the largest manufacturing
power (with an 18.9% share of the world’s manufacturing activities) and
continued to widen its lead in consecutive years (Mechstroth, 2015).
In 2013, with its trade surplus rising by 12.8% to almost $260 billion,
China became the world’s largest trading nation by overtaking the
United States (Monaghan, 2014). In 2014, according to IMF estimates
using purchasing power parity (PPP), China became the world’s largest
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
P. Bo, China and Global Governance,
International Political Economy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70497-1_1
2 P. BO
economy, worth $17.6 trillion compared to the United States’ $17.4 tril-
lion (Duncan & David, 2014). In 2015, the IMF added Chinese Yuan
to its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, with the Yuan having a
10.9% weighting in the basket, which ranks the third position after the
US dollar’s 41.73% and the Euro’s 30.93% (Mayeda, 2015).
Second, China is gradually transforming its diplomatic focus from bilat-
eralism to a combination of bilateralism and multilateralism. In 1996, a
positive transition was observed in China’s diplomatic strategy, signaled
by its first embrace of multilateralism through membership of the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Christensen, 2015: 22).
Since then, China has actively participated in the building of a number of
regional multilateral groups and organizations. For example, in the area
of security, China, Russia, and four other Central Asian countries (Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) co-founded the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, aimed at “fighting terrorism
and separatism and reducing mistrust and building confidence among
the members” (Christensen, 2015: 23). During the SCO Astana Summit
of 2017, India and Pakistan became full members of the organization,
“expediting the start of the organization’s historic expansion” (Hantke,
2016). Diplomatic multilateralism is considered by Beijing as a critical
means of reassuring its neighbors that they will benefit from China’s rise.
Last but not least, further evidence of China’s rise can be observed
through China’s increasing interest and participation in the making
of global governance. Due to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC),
the existing Western-dominated global governance system is seriously
under question and stands at a crossroads. Specifically, Western-based
global governance has experienced four major crises and is undergoing
a process of transformation (Pang, 2013; Tolarová, 2016; Wolfgram,
2011). During this process of transformation, there are clear signs
of “China’s aspiration to play a greater role in global governance as
evidenced by its proactive participation in global institutions and its
endeavors to make its voice heard by the existing powers in the West”
(M. Li, 2012: 6).
In the meanwhile, in addition to the multifaceted rise of China, the
other significant issue, since the beginning of the twenty-first century,
is that the abovementioned US-led international order, underpinned by
its combined political, economic, security, and normative powers, has
faced some rigorous challenges. According to Trine Flockhart and Xing
Li (2010), as shown in Fig. 1.1, these challenges can be abstracted into
“four crises” faced by the liberal world order, as follows:
1 INTRODUCTION 3
First, multilateral cooperation seems harder to achieve and sustain than

liberals had anticipated, suggesting that the liberal world order is in a “crisis
of functionality.” Second, while multilateral cooperation is difficult, there
is a growing need for multilateralism to meet an ever-expanding set of
new challenges in an increasingly globalized world, suggesting that the
liberal world order is experiencing a “crisis of scope.” Third, the uneven
record of liberal foreign policies in delivering a more secure and just world
order has challenged key liberal values and prevented the liberal world
order from living up to expectations. As a result, it is experiencing a “crisis
of legitimacy.” Fourth, major shifts are taking place in the global power
balance, shifting power from the United States and Europe to emerging
new powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). As a result,
Fig. 1.1 The four crises of the US-led international order/global governance
(Source The author’s compilation)
4 P. BO
the liberal world order is experiencing a “crisis of authority”. (Flockhart &

Li, 2010)
Inspired by the “four crises” argument, the thesis intends to draw on

Flockhart and Li’s analysis of international order to interpret the current
crisis/deficit in the existing sphere of global governance, since the post-
Cold War architecture and process of global governance is largely built
on the established US-led international order. Moreover, it witnesses that
the weakening of Western-based global governance has been accompa-
nied by the opportunities/challenges and new injections of energy and
ideas brought about by the rise of China. In other words, a rising China
is playing a complementary role to the existing Western-dominated global
governance from the perspectives of function, scope, legitimacy, and
authority.
In the first place, the “crisis of functionality” of the existing global
governance implies that the major Western-based multilateral interna-
tional institutions are failing to achieve the expected outcomes. This
crisis is mainly manifested in the three economic pillars (the IMF, World
Bank, and WTO) of the US-dominated global governance. For instance,
multilateral cooperation has seemed harder to achieve under the US-led
WTO over the last two decades. The 1999 Seattle Ministerial Confer-
ence collapsed against the backdrop of fierce protests in Cancun in 2003,
where the participants were unable to reach an agreement because of their
huge disagreement over Singapore Issues and Agricultural Trade Policy.
Further, in 2017, the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires
ended in failure due to divergence over the issue of subsidies in the
fisheries sector. Against this background, China’s rise has injected fresh
impetus into addressing the “crisis of functionality” of the existing global
governance. For instance, the China-proposed “Belt and Road Initiative”
aims to revitalize multilateral cooperation and shape a new and open
regional or interregional economy.
In the second place, the “crisis of scope” of the existing global
governance indicates that the established institutional arrangements are
insufficient to address the increasing number of global issues. This situa-
tion calls for new institutions to be established to deal with these urgent
concerns. For example, the major development aid agencies, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), have failed to fill the
massive Asian infrastructure gap. According to ADB, “a substantial infras-
tructure gap remains (in Asia), with over 400 million people still lacking
1 INTRODUCTION 5
electricity, 300 million without access to safe drinking water, and about
1.5 billion lacking access to basic sanitation” (Asian Development Bank,
2017). Under these circumstances, China led the establishment of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Devel-
opment Bank (NDB), aiming to address the huge funding shortfall in
Asian infrastructure construction and to play a complementary role to
the World Bank and the ADB.
In the third place, the “crisis of legitimacy” of the existing global
governance denotes that the established countries (especially the United
States) failed in their policymaking attempts or to shoulder their respon-
sibility to address the post-crisis development issues and to promote
the world economy. Given the growing influence of populism and
anti-globalization movements, the established countries are inclining to
protect their domestic interests rather than to preserve the outcomes
of globalization. For instance, since Donald Trump was elected as US
president in 2016, his administration has unilaterally withdrawn from a
number of critical treaties and organizations. Between January 2017 and
June 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). However, in the
meantime, as the largest beneficiary of the existing international order,
China has remained committed to upholding the existing international
order. For instance, in 2017, at the Davos World Economic Forum, Presi-
dent Xi Jinping argued that China is committed to becoming the guardian
of global governance and the open trading system. In addition, against
the backdrop of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,
China reaffirmed its commitment to this hard-won achievement.
Last but not least, the thesis argues that the previous three crises
led to the “crisis of authority” of the existing global governance. The
“crisis of authority” mainly arose for two reasons: (1) the distribution of
power between the developed and the developing countries is dramatically
shifting in favor of the latter. This situation endows the developing coun-
tries and emerging powers (especially China) with more material capabili-
ties and ambitions to transform themselves from the rule-followers to the
rule-makers, which objectively challenges the Western-based rule-making
process and architecture of global governance; (2) the abovementioned
three crises have exposed the lack of effectiveness and representative-
ness of the existing US-led global governance. Specifically, the “crisis of
6 P. BO
authority” stems from its failure to achieve effective multilateral coopera-

tion, to address the emerging global issues, and to commit to shouldering
due responsibility.
1.2 The Deficiencies

of the Major Western IR Theories
As the introduction shows, China’s multifaceted rise and the nexus
between China and the relatively weakening US-led global governance are
becoming the most eye-catching contemporary IR themes in political and
academic circles across the globe. Being closely related to these themes,
the China–US relationship is the most complicated and influential compo-
nent of world politics and economics today, given that the debate over
the relationship between the largest established power (the United States,
as the largest economy) and the largest emerging power (China, as the
second-largest economy) has never ended. As Graham Allison, recently
drawing on Thucydides’ Trap, argues “when a rising power threatens to
displace a ruling one, the most likely outcome is war” (Allison, 2017:
vii). Admittedly, Allison’s interpretation or prediction is just one of the
possible scenarios.
Consequently, with the purpose of sustaining its global hegemony and
dealing with the rise of China at regional and global levels, all sectors
of American society, from government to universities and from transna-
tional corporations to think tanks, have devoted themselves to studying
the implications brought about by the rise of China and the United
States’ feasible response and strategy. Moreover, by virtue of its supe-
rior hard power, the United States cultivates its soft power in the field
of IR research, and it has dominated the development of the IR disci-
pline for over half a century. Stanley Hoffman even claimed that “the
discipline of IR is American social science” (Hoffman, 1977: 41). There-
fore, it is argued that US IR research is at the cutting edge of this
discipline, having given birth to the mainstream IR theories—structural
realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and structural constructivism—that
have largely influenced global scholars’ and elites’ perceptions, interpreta-
tions, and even their decision-making. Thus, the thesis intends to review
the literatures/research on the striking theme of “the nexus between the
rise of China and the existing international system/global governance”
based on the three following mainstream IR theories.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
1.2.1 Structural Realism

On the basis of Edward Carr’s historical realism (Carr, 1939) and
Hans Morgenthau’s classical realism (Morgenthau, 1964), Kenneth Waltz
developed the theory of structural realism or neorealism (Waltz, 1979).
Compared to classical realism, according to Qin Yaqing, structural realism
is a highly scientific and contracted IR theory (Qin, 2005b: 143). The
scientificity of structural realism is manifested in its three major assump-
tions: (1) the international system is an anarchic structure; (2) the state is
the basic unit/actor of the international system; and (3) the structure of
the international system determines actors’ behavior. Waltz highlights the
significance of structure and defines structure as the distribution of power
among the nation-states (Waltz, 2010: 131). Thus, as structural realism
indicates, the distribution of material capabilities is the core independent
variable and the nation-state’s behavior is set as the core dependent vari-
able of the theory. In this respect, as Qin argues, structural realism is
characterized by the logic of “structural selection” (Qin, 2005a: 39). It is
a highly concise and falsifiable proposition, and it makes structural realism
highly scientific.
Broadly speaking, structural realists see China as a revisionist power in
the existing international system/global governance. A revisionist power
is “a state primarily concerned with its own power and prestige above
all other considerations, seeking to remodel the international system
and order for its own benefit and in its own interest. This makes a
revisionist power a staunchly realist one” (Combes, 2011: 5). This percep-
tion is mainly built upon the core assumption of structural realism: the
international system is anarchic, and there is no higher power authority
(world government) over the nation-state. Anarchy indicates that there
is no guarantee of a state’s survival and inter-state cooperation, and the
international system is a sort of self-help system. Thus, in an anarchic
system, a state emphasizes its own survival and security, and it tends to
adopt competitive and conflictual policies (Grieco, 1988). Seen from this
perspective, as the competitive power maximizer, a state always strives to
exceed others’ material capability, and it focuses more on relative gains
than absolute gains. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to
survive in a self-help system is to be as powerful as possible compared to
their potential rivals. In the light of this idea, states “often fail to coop-
erate even in the face of common interests” (J. M. Grieco, 1988: 488). In
this respect, structural realism holds a fundamentally pessimistic attitude
8 P. BO
toward the achievement of international cooperation and questions the

utility of international organizations. In the same vein, through the lens
of structural realism, a state is uncooperative and unwilling to comply with
the norms of the regime, since “it has little interest in achieving mutual
gains through cooperation and more in advancing its own interests in
relative term” (Combes, 2011: 5).
More specifically, in the context of the abovementioned striking
theme of “the nexus between the rise of China and the existing interna-
tional system/global governance,” structural realists mainly focus on the
China–US relationship, since the existing international system and global
governance are established and sustained by the United States’ hegemony.
Nevertheless, the thesis contends that the existing structural realism liter-
atures on the US-China relationship can be further categorized into
two major types. On the one hand, some neorealism scholars tend to
investigate the striking theme through the lens of “the relationship
between established and rising power” (Allison, 2017; Art, 2010; Bush,
2011; S. Zhao, 2016) in a general sense. In their eyes, the “structure” is
mainly constituted and shaped by established and rising powers in terms
of their dynamic distribution of power; on the other hand, other scholars
are inclined to place the US–China relationship within a regional context,
especially the regions of East/Southeast Asia. From their viewpoint, the
“structure” primarily refers to the (East/Southeast Asian) regional order
(Christensen, 2006; Kang, 2007; Ross, 2013) in which the United States
and China constantly compete with each other for regional hegemony. It
is clearly observed that these two types of research commonly emphasize
the implications of “structure” on states’ policy and behavior.
From the perspective of the “structure” constituted by established
and rising powers after the Cold War, China has come into the spot-
light in virtue of its growing comprehensive national strength, leading
to a controversial claim that China will inevitably play the role of a revi-
sionist power because of its largest rising power status (Feng, 2009). The
most representative of structural realists, Mearsheimer, argues that it is
doomed to be a clash between the existing hegemon (the United States)
and China, as the latter’s material capability is becoming prominent
in terms of its astonishing economic development, increasing military
modernization, and assertive diplomatic behavior (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Other structural realists insist that the dynamic distribution of power
between China and the United States is one of the best manifestations
1 INTRODUCTION 9
of power transition theory. Power transition theory (Chan, 2007; Lemke

& Tammen, 2003) basically depicts a situation where China, with its
increasing power, tries to use its growing influence to reshape the rules
and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests,
and other states in the system—especially the declining hegemon—see
China as a growing security threat. This situation inevitably leads to
tension, distrust, and conflict. In this respect, a rising China and a rela-
tively weakening United States are “locked in an epic battle over the rules
and leadership of the international system” (Ikenberry, 2008: 24). As the
largest emerging power with unprecedented economic growth, China’s
grand ascendance will lead to a shift in the regional and global power
structure and the onset of an Asian-based international order.
From the perspective of the “structure” manifested in the regional
order, since the end of the Second World War, the United States has
invested a lot in East Asia in terms of shaping Japan, South Korea, and
other Southeast Asian countries as the bridgehead against the socialist
camp dominated by the former USSR. By doing so, it has woven
extensive political, economic, and security networks throughout the
regional countries over the last decades. However, China’s dramatic
rise extensively changes the “structure” of the East Asian order. Specif-
ically, seen from the zero-sum perspective, China’s economic rise has
brought about negative security implications. Since China is becoming
the regional economic center in terms of its trade and investment with
its major neighboring countries, analysts have become “nervous about
whether these countries can be considered a reliable U.S. ally, particularly
in conflicts that might directly affect U.S. strategic interests, but not
their own” (T. J. Christensen, 2006: 97). Moreover, from the zero-sum
perspective, with its strengthening economic and diplomatic ties with
regional countries, China’s regional strategy aims to push the United
States out of East Asia and establish its own regional hegemony. This
perception is based on a historical policy—the “Monroe Doctrine”—
according to which America’s leaders in the nineteenth century were
“determined to push the European great powers out of the Western
Hemisphere” (Mearsheimer, 2010). According to Thomas Christensen,
China’s regional strategy will lead the regional countries to “bandwagon
with and accommodate a rising China, rather than balance against it by
drawing closer to the United States” (T. J. Christensen, 2006: 98).
In sum, this thesis argues that structural realists overemphasize the
conflictual aspect of the relationship between the rise of China and
10 P. BO
the existing world order/global governance system. They consciously or

unconsciously place the US–China relationship within the context of a
zero-sum game, and they tend to focus on the “structural contradiction”
between the two great powers at the regional and global levels. They
predict that the ascendency of China will inevitably lead to the decline of
the United States in a linear and direct causal manner. However, the inter-
dependent nature of the existing international system is often neglected by
this school. It ignores the reality that China’s economic success resulted
from its integration with the US-led international order. In this respect,
it is irrational for China to overthrow the established world order, and it
cannot be in China’s best interest. Given the interdependence of the inter-
national system, it is reasonable for China to take into account both its
own interests and other countries’ interests in order to achieve its peaceful
rise and maintain its sustainable development. In an era of globalization
and interdependence, there are no real winners in military or trade wars
between countries—especially between great powers.
1.2.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism

Compared to structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes the
significant influence of international institutions in resolving contentious
interstate issues and promoting interstate cooperative behavior (Barnett,
2009: 64; J. M. Grieco, 1990: 27; Mitchell, 2006). Neoliberal institu-
tionalists suppose that international institutions can promote nation-states
to cooperate by providing reliable information so as to reduce the side
effects of political market failure (Cogan, Hurd, & Johnstone, 2016: 39;
Rittberger, Zangl, & Kruck, 2012: 2). Like structural realism, neolib-
eral institutionalism is also a systematic theory, it insists on the basic
proposition of rationalism and establishes a concise theoretical system
characterized by the logic of “institutional selection” (Qin, 2005a: 87).
Neoliberal institutionalists generally contend that China is a status quo
power in the existing international system/global governance. As Randall
Schweller argues, the status quo power tends to “preserve the essential
characteristics of the existing international order” (Schweller, 1998: 24).
This perception is primarily based on the core assumption of neoliberal
institutionalism: “the world has become interdependent in economics,
in communications, in human aspirations” (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 3).
With the increasing economic interactions between nation-states, the
very nature of world politics changes. In other words, interdependence
1 INTRODUCTION 11
or complex interdependence “has changed the way states interact with

one another” (Keohane & Nye, 1989: 24). Thus, although the anarchic
international system inhibits the willingness of states to achieve cooper-
ation, “states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially
with the assistance of international institutions” (Grieco, 1988: 486).
In this respect, in the eyes of neoliberal institutionalists, international
institutions constitute “an important response to conditions of complex
interdependence” (Karns, Mingst, & Stiles, 2010: 38).
More precisely, with respect to the abovementioned striking theme
of “the nexus between the rise of China and the existing international
system/global governance,” neoliberal institutionalism, as a systematic
theory, interprets China as a status quo power from two “structural”
perspectives. On the one hand, neoliberal institutionalists contend that
the international institutions constitute the “structure” that “provides
a guaranteed framework for interactions and a context for bargaining”
(Karns et al., 2010: 39). Specifically, this “structure” is characterized by
the rules of international organizations/institutions and the principle of
multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalists do
not deny the role of power in international institutions and contend that
post-war US hegemony shapes the “structure” in which a small number of
established countries, by virtue of the existing institutional arrangements,
enjoy asymmetric benefits over a vast number of developing ones. More
importantly, the established “structure” keeps functioning even though
the hegemon declines.
From the perspective of the “structure” built upon international orga-
nizations/institutions, since adopting its reform and opening-up policy,
China’s involvement in international cooperation has been initially driven
by “the calculations of China’s domestic interests to create a peaceful
peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability”
(Zhao, 2011: 53). However, since it has progressively benefitted from
the existing system, China has shown increasing willingness and motiva-
tion to participate in the existing international organizations/institutions,
and China has been gradually integrated into this “structure,” i.e., China
has voluntarily accepted the “structure” and is largely shaped by it.
More precisely, China’s compliance with the rules of international orga-
nizations, its diplomatic transition from bilateralism to multilateralism,
and its increasing passive behavior in the United Nations are promi-
nent instances of China’s desire to maintain and follow the international
order of cooperation (Taylor, 2007). In the viewpoint of neoliberal
12 P. BO
institutionalists, integration is the core theme in the era of interdepen-

dence, and containment is out of date. According to Haass, “our goal
should be to make China a pillar of a globalized world, too deeply
invested to disrupt its smooth functioning. The aim is ambitious, even
optimistic, but not unrealistic” (Haass, 2008: n/a). According to this
viewpoint, China would play the role of status quo power and strength-
ening the existing “structure” built upon Western-based international
organizations/institutions.
From the perspective of the “structure” built upon US hegemony,
China’s role as status quo power is determined by the post-war US project
characterized by its institutional hegemony. Over the last decade, China
has become the largest rising power and the economic center of East Asia.
However, this does not fundamentally change the rules of the game in
this region, since the United States has plenty of experience and moti-
vations for “relying on multilateral institutions to bind and constrain
challengers or using institutions to countervail potential threats” (He,
2009: 145). Moreover, as a rising power, China is confronted with a
distinctive “structure” that profoundly differs from the previous ones.
Specifically, rather than merely opposing the United States, China is faced
with an open, integrated, and rule-based system that is embedded in deep
political, economic, and social foundations. According to Ikenberry, with
the purpose of maintaining its leadership of the Western order, the United
States strives to “strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that
order – making it even easier to join and harder to overturn” (Iken-
berry, 2008: 24–25). In this respect, the “structure” built on the US-led
Western historical bloc will continuously sustain China as a rule follower
rather than a rule-maker. The open and integrative nature of the Western
order shapes China as a satisfied status quo power that “accepts the
existing ordering principles of the international system” (S. Chan, 2004:
216).
Beyond the revisionist perspective, the neoliberal institutionalists
emphasize in particular the interdependence and cooperative aspect of the
nexus between the rise of China and the existing international system.
Thus, they argue that although an authoritative China has become the
second-largest economy with strong military capabilities, international
institutions and US hegemony constitute the “structure” that shapes
China as the vindicator or a rule-follower of the liberal world order. As
the status quo power, it is natural for China to uphold the existing rules
and institutions of the Western-dominated international system, and it
1 INTRODUCTION 13
would be too high a cost for China to make changes to this system.
However, the thesis draws on Brantly Womack’s viewpoint on neolib-
eral institutionalism. Womack makes a conceptual distinction between the
“status quo” and the “status ad quem.” The former literally indicates “the
situation at which” (we are at present), and the latter refers to “the situa-
tion to which” (we are moving in the future). According to Womack, “if
the status quo itself is moving and will not return then current concerns
about whether China is a status quo power or a revisionist power are
misplaced” (Womack, 2015: 135). In line with his conceptual clarifica-
tion, Womack interprets China as a status ad quem power in terms of
shaping a conducive neighboring environment at the regional level and
preventing a comprehensive confrontation with the United States at the
global level.
1.2.3 Structural Constructivism

The most important development in international relations theory (IRT)
in the 1990s was the emergence of constructivism. Among a myriad
of constructivist theories, Wendt’s structural constructivism is relatively
moderate when compared to the other variations, and it is also commonly
regarded as the mainstream approach within the scope of constructivism.
Wendt’s constructivism adopts the ontology of idealism, emphasizing the
significant role of ideational and cultural structure (Wendt, 1999). In
this respect, Wendt’s constructivism is coined as the logic of “cultural
selection” (Qin, 2005a).
Generally speaking, similar to the neoliberal institutionalists, structural
constructivists see China as a “status quo power.” Both of them high-
light the capability of the existing international system of accommodating
the rising power (China), and they insist upon the cooperative nature
of the relationship between China and other states. However, a major
divergence between the two schools is that the former emphasizes the
role of international organizations/institutions, while the latter focuses
on the significance of cultural and normative structure. In other words,
unlike neoliberal institutionalists, structural constructivists are confident
that China can be socialized to conform to the existing Western-based
culture and norm system, and they believe in “the strength of interna-
tional norms as sufficient constraints on rising powers such as China”
(Ikenberry, 2012; Johnston, 2007).
14 P. BO
More specifically, regarding the striking theme of “the nexus between

the rise of China and the existing international system/global gover-
nance,” as with the previous two mainstream IR theories, structural
constructivism construes China as a status quo power from two “struc-
tural” perspectives. On the one hand, Wendt highlights the top-down
socialization function of the international cultural system (Hobbesian
culture, Locke’s culture, Kantian culture) on the nation-state (Wendt,
1999). This perspective emphasizes the role of ideas in shaping national
identity and interests and stresses the importance of ideational “structure”
in socializing nation-states’ behavior. This branch of structural construc-
tivism research is mainly based on the study of the socialization impact
of international institutions. On the other hand, structural construc-
tivists underline the significance of normative “structure” in the existing
Western-based order. Within the normative “structure,” norm diffusion
plays a vital role in influencing states’ choices and behavior. According
to the prevailing understanding, an international norm has “a tripartite
structure, consisting of a problem, a value and a behavior” (Winston,
2018: 638). Normally, the process of norm diffusion is divided into three
stages—norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization (Finnemore
& Sikkink, 1998). This perspective insists that the existing normative
structure, built on the established norms, is shaped and sustained by
the existing powers and exerts implications on international relations.
The divergence between these two perspectives is manifested in Yang
Xiangfeng’s argument that “while the transnational approach relies on
social pressure to engender norm compliance, the institutional approach
instead understands socialization as a top-down process wherein social
learning by state elites is the key” (X. Yang, 2017: 81).
From the perspective of a top-down socialization process, China’s
role of status quo power is primarily socialized by the ideational “struc-
ture” that is embedded in the existing international institutions. Alastair
Iain Johnston’s Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–
2000 (2007) is one of the most representative works to focus on
research into China’s top-down social learning in international rela-
tions. Drawing on sociology, Johnston investigates the motivations and
consequences of China’s active participation in the existing international
institutions through the examination of three microprocesses of social-
ization—mimicking, social influence, and persuasion. By virtue of his
extensive research, Johnston illustrates the major argument of this book:
without any material impetus and external coercive pressure, Chinese
1 INTRODUCTION 15
elites were proactively involved in international security cooperation and

global governance in a cooperative and self-constraining manner, owing
to their increasing social interactions in international security institutions
(Johnston, 2007: 197).
From the perspective of norm diffusion, China’s role of status
quo power is manifested in its acceptance and strengthening of the
existing norm. According to Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, although
the socialization literature has extensively investigated the relationship
between global ideational/normative structure and its influence on
nation-state behavior, “it misses out key parts that are essential for
explaining norm diffusion” (Prantl & Nakano, 2011: 218). As a result,
Prantl and Nakano proposed a framework of norm diffusion loops, and
applied it to an empirical analysis of the norm diffusion of “respon-
sibility to protect” (R2P) from global level to regional and domestic
levels. R2P, defined as a transnational soft norm, is seen as one of the
core norms in the Western-based normative structure. In doing so, the
research discloses that norm diffusion of R2P has “softened the rigid
Chinese understanding of state sovereignty and non-intervention, which
has facilitated R2P acceptance” (Prantl & Nakano, 2011: 218).
In sum, although structural constructivism provides insights that allow
us to understand China’s role of status quo power in the interna-
tional system from the perspective of socialization and norm diffusion,
it attracted a number of critiques, as follows. First, Chinese Professor Qin
Yaqing criticized structural constructivism theory in terms of its top-down
unilateral and unidirectional socialization process, rather than paying due
attention to the mutual and reciprocal constitution between China and
the existing Western-based ideational structure (Qin, 2018). Second, by
questioning the existing literatures on the emergence and diffusion of
single norms, Carla Winston emphasized the importance of norm compo-
nents and clusters, and thus, she developed a new concept, known as
“norm cluster” that “allows for multiple combinations of conceptually
interlinked but distinct values and behaviors, offering multiple acceptable
solutions to similar and interlocking problems” (Winston, 2018: 638).
Winston’s research opens a door for the coexistence of diversified norms
in regulating international politics and global governance.
16 P. BO
1.2.4 The Common Problems of Western IR Theories in Explaining

China’s Rise
By reviewing the above literature on the theoretical connotations of struc-
tural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and structural constructivism and
their interpretations of the striking theme of “the relationship between the
rise of China and the existing international order/global governance,” it
can be argued that there are a number of substantive differences between
the three mainstream systematic theories. However, they still share several
common aspects. For instance, the three mainstream systematic theo-
ries adhere to the epistemology of positivism, and they generally adopt
the empirical study as their major research method. For a long time,
under the influence of behaviorism, mainstream scholars have put a lot of
effort into developing IR theory into a grand scientific theory, and they
believe that the construction of systematic theory can effectively achieve
this target. In this respect, Morten Kaplan and Kenneth Waltz have made
groundbreaking attempts in this area (Kaplan, 1957; Waltz, 2001).
Moreover, it is also apparent that neoliberal institutionalism and social
constructivism have been largely influenced by Waltz’s structural realism,
as articulated in his Theory of International Politics (1979). To be
more specific, neoliberal institutionalism, which was developed on the
basis of its criticism of structural realism (Keohane, 1986), has gradually
moved towards a “neo-neo synthesis” with structural realism in terms of
their common emphasis of systematic factors. The development of social
constructivism is seen as another achievement of systematic theory in
international politics, since Alexander Wendt has explicitly acknowledged
that he has been extensively inspired by structural realism’s “systematic
orientation” (Wendt, 1999). As Amitav Acharya argues, mainstream IR
theories commonly have a systematic bias that refers to “the tendency to
privilege systematic forces at the expense of regional and local or sub-
systematic ones. Waltzian structural realism, liberal theory in general and
the moral cosmopolitanism flavor in constructivist norm diffusion theory
are examples of this bias” (Acharya, 2004: 242).
According to Qin Yaqing’s analysis, the reason why systematic theory
has a higher possibility (than other theories) of providing the necessary
conditions for scientific research (Qin, 2002) is mainly based on the
following three features. First is the synchronicity of systematic theory.
The three mainstream systematic theories focus more on synchronicity
than diachronicity. The synchronicity indicates that the major objective of
1 INTRODUCTION 17
the analysis is seen as a system that surpasses time and space rather than a
historical product that evolves over time. For example, in the context of
systematic IR theory, a system is made up of states, and these states are
considered rational and stable units that are not affected spatiotemporally.
In this respect, system and state are studied from a non-historical perspec-
tive, which promotes the study of international political theory as a sort
of “hard science” research within the natural sciences. The second is the
objectivity of systematic theory. One of the basic conditions of scientific
research is to treat the objective of analysis as an objective reality. By doing
so (social or natural) scientists can objectively observe, test, and verify
the objective of analysis. Specifically, from the perspective of structural
realism, a system is shaped by the distribution of material capability, and
material capability can easily be observed and measured through objective
indicators and criteria. From the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism,
a system is established on and characterized by the institution. Although
institution does not belong to the material category, the existence and
implementation of the institution and the degree of institutionalization
are regarded as facts that can be observed and measured objectively.
From the perspective of social constructivism, Alexander Wendt adopts
Durkheim’s sociological approach of defining social facts as a social reality.
This emphasizes that “sociologists can study in a way similar to how other
scientists, such as physicists, study the physical world” (Durkheim, 2014).
The third is the simplicity of the systematic theory. Normally, scientific
theory has the feature of simplicity. In this respect, systematic theory, as
a sort of scientific theory, has a higher possibility of providing a simple
theoretical system. Systematic theory mainly focuses on the influence of
systematic factors on individuals. Therefore, systematic theory generally
sets system and individual as two basic variables and makes hypothetical
statements regarding the relationship between these two variables. As a
result, by focusing on the two variables, systematic IR theory is able to
meet the requirement of simplicity, as other natural scientific theory does.
Although systematic IR theories, by virtue of their abovementioned
defining features, interpret international relations and world affairs in
a more “scientific” manner, they are also faced with several limitations
because of these very features.
In the first place, although synchronicity is a major precondition
for constructing systematic IR theory as a scientific theory, it cannot
ignore the significance of diachronicity in understanding international
politics. In fact, it is inadvisable to merely emphasize the synchronicity
18 P. BO
of systematic IR theory and to neglect the historical origins and evolu-

tion of international politics. The contemporary international system and
the nation-state are products of historical development. Thus, the thesis
argues that although the international system before the Peace of West-
phalia and the pre-twentieth century Chinese Tributary system was not
an interstate system in contemporary terms, their significance is valuable
for understanding and interpreting contemporary international relations.
Specifically, as with the synchronicity of systematic theories, it neglects
the role of history in interpreting the rise of China. This “neglect” is
manifested in two aspects. First, mainstream systematic theories neglect
the crucial role of China’s long history. It is widely- acknowledged that
China has one of the oldest ancient civilizations in the world. This means
that China has rich historical and cultural legacies that extensively influ-
ence the Chinese way of thinking. To be more precise, in the field
of international relations, China possesses a great number of heuristic
ideas and political philosophies for dealing with the relationships between
states1 . For instance, during the pre-Qin period, a large number of strate-
gists, diplomats, and philosophers contributed their wisdom to the then
governors/zhuhou wang (诸侯王) in terms of identifying their inter-
state’s/zhuhou guo (诸侯国) strategy and making appropriate decisions
depending on various situations. Second, mainstream systematic theories
also neglect the history of interactivity between China and the rest of
1 In Chinese history, there are several manifestations and interpretations of “state”.

Before the Qin Dynasty (221–207 BC), China was in the feudalistic (封建) polit-
ical system. In the context of feudalism, “state” refers to “zhouhou guo” (诸诸侯国).
Zhuhou (诸侯) were the feudal lords, and their estates or states were named as “feudal
states”/“zhuhou guo.” For instance, during the Warring States Period (475-221 BC),
the term “states” represents the “zhuhou guo.” However, since Qin Shi Huang (秦始
皇) established a unified China, the Chinese political system transformed from feudalism
to a “unified and power-centralized state.” In this context, “state” refers to a powerful
central government and is governed by a supreme monarch without the existence of
“zhouhou wang” (诸侯王). From the Qin Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty, China witnessed
division and unification. During the period of division, such as the Three Kingdoms Period
(220–280 AD), there were several power-centralized states competing with each other for
the reunification of China. The 1911 Xinhai Revolution ended the last monarch-governed
centralized state in Chinese history. Since then, China has become a combination of
modern nation-state and civilization-state. The former implies that China accepts the
Westphalian nation-state system characterized by state sovereignty and international law,
while the latter indicates that durable Chinese ancient political thoughts and cultural
legacies largely influence its way of thinking and practices in contemporary international
relations.
1 INTRODUCTION 19
the world. The long-standing interaction between China and the world,
from “tributary system” to “hundred years of humiliation” to “reforming
and opening-up,” contribute a great deal to Chinese unique perception
and understanding of international relations. Thus, the neglect of China’s
historical experience is not conducive to the complete and holistic inter-
pretation of China’s policies and practices in the existing international
system.
In the second place, systematic theory’s overemphasis of objectivity
inevitably leads to the neglect of the mutual constitution between struc-
ture and agent. Systematic IR theory sees the international system and
nation-state as two separate objective realities. From this point of depar-
ture, systematic IR theory focuses on investigating the impact of the inter-
national system on the nation-state. Specifically, in order to simplify their
theoretical assumptions, structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism
deliberately avoid discussions of the role of the nation-state and, respec-
tively, emphasize “structural selection” and “institutional selection.” In
its initial stage, as Alexander Wendt illustrated in The Agent-Structure
Problem in International Relations Theory (1987), social constructivism
placed emphasis on the mutual constitution between the international
system and nation-state. However, since Wendt draws on the systematic
model (of structural realism) when reinterpreting social constructivism,
it undoubtedly weakens the bidirectional constitution between structure
and agent, and it highlights instead unidirectional constitution from the
international system to nation-state. With regard to China, defining it as
a “constrained emerging power” verifies this unidirectional constitution
process. In other words, social constructivism overemphasizes the role
of the existing norm and cultural structure in shaping China unidirec-
tionally rather than paying due attention to China’s agency in shaping
the norm structure. However, in the era of global governance, according
to Matthew Hoffmann and Alice Ba, “actors have always had the ability
and wherewithal to affect their own conditions” (Hoffmann & Ba, 2005:
254). Moreover, the dynamic era continuously creates opportunities for
agency. Although global governance consists of a set of hegemonic ideas
and institutions that sustain the power structure and the privilege of
the established powers, it does not imply that “those ideas and struc-
tures are not constantly undergoing contestation; nor is it to say that
non-core actors see themselves without agency” (Ba, 2005: 195). In
particular, globalization and regionalism offer the nation-state a platform
and opportunity to assert various ideas, solutions, and visions, etc.
20 P. BO
In the third place, the simplicity of systematic theory normally leads to

an oversimplified interpretation of complex international politics. When
undertaking analyses of foreign policy, systematic IR theories assume that
the nation-state is a rational and unitary actor. By doing so, systematic
theories aim to avoid interference from domestic factors and processes.
However, at this point, systematic theories encounter an unavoidable
dilemma. On the one hand, domestic political, and social processes clearly
play a crucial role in defining national identity, formulating national
interest, and shaping a country’s external behavior; on the other hand,
if domestic factors are considered, a universally valid systematic factor
for conducting analysis cannot be identified. Although systematic theo-
ries’ complete elimination of domestic factors helps to achieve a scientific
simplicity of analysis, they overlook a great number of problems and
phenomena that should not be ignored. In terms of China, system-
atic theories usually treat China as a rational and unitary actor without
seriously taking into account Chinese domestic political and social condi-
tions. For example, John Mearsheimer believes that Chinese leaders, given
the dramatic rise of China, will inevitably strive to establish regional
hegemony and seek to push the United States out of East Asia. This
indicates that China, as a rational actor, will mirror the United States’
logic of “pushing the European great powers out of the Western Hemi-
sphere” (Mearsheimer, 2010). However, it is misleading to argue that
one country’s policy and behavior are solely determined by the objective
environment shaped by the distribution of power, institutional, and norm
structure. In other words, a kind of mathematical or physical formula
cannot simply be applied to interpret a nation-state’s motivations and the
calculations that lie behind its foreign policy and practice. In this regard,
for the purpose of understanding Chinese policy and behavior, it is essen-
tial to explore domestic factors. In this thesis, China’s domestic factors
are manifested in China’s national role conception (NRC) and national
role performance (NRP).
Last but not least, in addition to the three major deficiencies outlined
above that are embedded in US-based mainstream IR theories with
respect to research into the rise of China, this thesis acknowledges that
there are also a number of different Western-based IR approaches that
place emphasis on the role of history and domestic issues in interpreting
international affairs, such as the English School and the Copenhagen
School. However, according to Amitav Acharya, Western-dominant IR
1 INTRODUCTION 21
approaches have four major tendencies when theorizing international

relations, as follows:
(1) Auto-centrism refers to the tendency of theorizing about key principles

of mechanisms of international order from mainly Western ideas, culture,
politics, historical experiences, and contemporary praxis, and disregarding
non-Western ideas, culture, politics, historical experiences, and contem-
porary praxis; (2) universalism refers to the tendency to view or present
Western ideas and practices as the universal standard, while non-Western
principles and practices are viewed as particularisms, aberrations or infe-
riorities; (3) disjuncture refers to the lack of fit between what passes for
IR theory and the experience of the non-Western world, although Western
scholars seldom see this as an obstacle to theory-building; (4) agency denial
refers to the lack of acknowledgment of the agency of non-Western states,
regional institutions, civil society actors in contributing to world order.
(Acharya, 2007)
In sum, this thesis argues that the existing US mainstream systematic

IR theories and other Western-dominant IR approaches possess the power
to define the rise of China (Huntington, 1996) and have limitations in
interpreting its implications for global governance. In other words, due
to their lack of Chinese characteristics, these mainstream IR theoretical
approaches cannot provide a holistic and dialectic picture that under-
stands the nexus between the rise of China and the existing international
order/global governance.
1.3 A Culture-Oriented Approach

to China’s Role in Contemporary IR
1.3.1 Ability-Based Leadership Embedded in Chinese Concept
of Meritocracy
The deficiencies of systematic IR theories—synchronicity, objectivity,
and simplicity—have led to misperceptions and incomplete interpreta-
tions of the rise of China and its implications. The book supposes that
these misunderstandings are mainly derived from the Western discursive
monopoly. This discursive monopoly is manifested in Western-dominated
IR paradigms that interpret international affairs, judge the appropriate-
ness of other countries’ behavior, and even influence other countries’
22 P. BO
policymaking, etc. This makes the contribution of this book an appli-

cable concept that would be more useful to interpret the rise of China
in a more holistic manner. However, it is also necessary to point out that
the critique of mainstream IR paradigms does not aim to de-legitimize
the applicability of these paradigms, but to point out their limitations in
terms of incompleteness and one-sidedness.
Therefore, with the purpose of producing a more comprehensive
interpretation of China’s rise and its implications for the existing inter-
national system, the main objective of this book is to make a contribution
that is based on a conceptual framework of “International Leadership
with Chinese Characteristics,” embedded in Chinese political culture, to
supplement mainstream Western IR paradigms and to interpret China’s
foreign policy and external practice in global governance.
Before constructing a framework that I have called “International
Leadership with Chinese Characteristics” (ILCC), it is essential to clarify
the concept of leadership as presented in this book. In the Chinese
context, the concept “leadership” (领导) has a number of different
connotations, such as leader (领导者), hegemony (领导权), the leading
class (领导阶层), and leadership ability (领导能力), etc. According to
Chinese historical and contemporary experience, the legitimacy of lead-
ership is mainly derived from and based on the ability of leadership
that is mainly manifested in the Chinese idea of meritocracy (精英治国).
As Daniel Bell argued, over the last decades, the legitimacy of China’s
government has been sustained due to the successful implementation of
China’s centuries-old meritocratic model (Bell, 2015). Furthermore, Bell
interpreted the basic idea of meritocracy as “everybody should have an
equal opportunity to be educated and to contribute to politics, but not
everybody will emerge from this process with an equal capacity to make
morally informed political judgements. Hence, the task of politics is to
identify those with above-average ability and to make them serve the
political community. If the leaders perform well, the people will basi-
cally go along” (Bell, 2015: 32). In this regard, meritocracy is rooted in
performance legitimacy that suggests that “the government has an obli-
gation to improve the people’s material well-being and intellectual/moral
development is a central part of the Confucian tradition” (Coicaud, 2017:
26).
Being influenced by these ideas of meritocracy and performance legit-
imacy, the thesis intends to adopt ability-based leadership, rather than
status-based leadership, in conceptualizing and interpreting the ILCC.
1 INTRODUCTION 23
First, the application of ability-based leadership, derived from the idea

of Chinese meritocracy and performance legitimacy, to the construction
of the ILCC is a culture-based conceptualization and interpretation. In
this regard, it indicates that the ILCC is closely associated with Chinese
traditional culture and political philosophies and with China’s ontolog-
ical assumption of IR, which is based on them. In other words, Chinese
decision-makers’ worldview, built on Chinese history and culture, has
a strong impact on the construction and implementation of the ILCC.
In addition, the ILCC is also undeniably influenced by China’s percep-
tion of the international situation and its involvement in the process and
architecture of global governance. As a consequence, the conceptual-
ization and interpretation of the ILCC contribute, to some extent, to
remedying the three abovementioned deficiencies (synchronicity, objec-
tivity, and simplicity) of the systematic theories on the rise of China, and
it provides more heuristic insights into an understanding and forecast
of China’s role in international relations and global governance in the
coming decades. It should also be noted that the culture-based approach
adopted in the thesis aims to explore “Chinese characteristics” rather than
to address the “China Exceptionalism” that isolates China from global
politics and academia.
Second, ability-based leadership helps the author to conceptualize the
ILCC outside of the traditional logic of the hegemonic transition that is
characterized by the status-based concept of hegemony/leadership. The
analytical paradigm of power transition habitually asserts that, with its
ongoing rise and accumulating capacities, China will inevitably replicate
the hegemonic transition that has occurred in the last several centuries
and seek to achieve its hegemonic status regionally and globally. However,
the construction of the ILCC, by virtue of its focus on ability-based lead-
ership, is a robust response to mainstream American-based IR theories
on discussing the repeated hackneyed topics of “China Threat” (Chang,
2018; Gertz, 2000; Peña, 2018; Roy, 1996), “China Collapse” (Chang,
2010; Mattis, 2018), and “Is China a revisionist power or a status
quo” (Johnston, 2003; Kastner & Saunders, 2012; Taylor, 2007). In
other words, the conceptualization and interpretation of the ILCC do
not set out to claim that China is becoming a new hegemon, rather it
aims to interpret China’s facilitative, constructive, and exemplary role in
improving and promoting international cooperation and global gover-
nance. From this perspective, it creates more opportunities for discussing
the positive implications brought about by the rise of China.
24 P. BO
1.3.2 The Logic of the Book

In line with the proposed research objective, the book raises the main
research question and several sub-questions which together constitute the
logic mapping of this book.
The main research question is shown as: How to conceptualize and
interpret the nexus between the rise of China and global governance through
constructing and analyzing the concept of “International Leadership with
Chinese Characteristics”?
With the purpose of better answering this main research question,
the project decomposes it into several sub-research questions by consid-
ering the relevant ontological, epistemological, methodological, theoret-
ical, and empirical issues. Since the thesis aims to interpret the impact
of “Chinese characteristics”/“Chineseness” on the understanding and
implementation of international leadership, and it adopts a culture-based
perspective, a number of sub-research questions are proposed as follows,
and they constitute the logic mapping of this book as shown in Fig. 1.2:
1. How do Chinese IR-related political thoughts and cultural heritage

impact Chinese (decision-makers’ and elites’) worldview of contem-
porary international relations?
2. How do Chinese decision-makers and elites, on the basis of their
worldview, conceptually construct and practically implement “Inter-
national Leadership with Chinese Characteristics” (ILCC) through
China’s involvement in a myriad of issue-areas/mechanisms in
global governance?
3. What are the implications of “International Leadership with Chinese
Characteristics” (ILCC) for world politics and global governance,
and what opportunities and challenges are faced in the construction
and implementation of the ILCC?
Fig. 1.2 The logic mapping of the book (Source The author’s compilation)
Another random document with
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mais ils espèrent des biens éternels, leur compte est en règle sur les
registres du Paradis. Que je sois plus pauvre que de la pauvreté des
saints ! Je recevrai de toi, de ton bon vouloir, de ta pitié chérie
chaque année, chaque mois, chaque semaine, chaque matin de
mon humble vie. Ah ! chaque nuit passée dans ta maison sera ma
victoire remportée sur le temps, l’oubli, la satiété, l’opinion du
monde, toutes les forces qui m’oppriment et que je hais. Tu le disais,
tu l’as dit, je l’avoue : hélas ! d’où vient cet orgueil que je ne puis
arracher ? Je l’arracherai ! D’où vient ce goût hideux d’une perfection
impossible, inhumaine, du renoncement, du martyre ! Je l’étoufferai.
Si c’est là mon âme, ange ou bête, je ne puis la supporter plus
longtemps.
— Ange ou bête, croyez-moi, Françoise ; elle a toujours raison de
nous.
— Il n’est pas si vrai que vous dites. Certes, je n’ai aucune idée
de Dieu, ni la moindre curiosité de lui. Je suppose qu’ils ont divinisé
leur crainte de la mort, ou je ne sais quoi. Qu’est-ce que cela nous
fait ? Nous ne craignons pas la mort.
— Je la crains, je ne crains qu’elle.
— Alors vous ne craignez rien. Que connaîtrez-vous jamais
d’elle, mon chéri ? Une minute d’angoisse bien vivante… Non, je ne
saurais croire en Dieu, ni aux âmes, mais je crois à un certain
principe en moi qui me blesse, qui usurpe ma volonté, ou cherche à
la suborner par ruse. Ah ! quand vous m’accusez de me contredire
et de me déchirer en vain, c’est contre lui que je lutte, et si je vous
parais souvent téméraire ou folle, c’est que je lutte en aveugle, car je
ne découvre cet ennemi que peu à peu, aux coups qu’il me porte.
Oui, je découvre peu à peu sa force, et la duplicité de sa force.
Toutefois, je pourrais le nommer par son nom : c’est l’orgueil,
Jacques, c’est ce même orgueil dont vous m’accusiez, il y a un
moment, d’être dupe, et qui me fait sage et insensée tour à tour,
prudente ou téméraire, jamais pareille. L’orgueil, mais pas le mien.
— Est-ce seulement l’orgueil, Françoise, un emportement si
lucide ?
— Oh ! vous ne savez pas ce que c’est d’être opprimée par sa
race, asservie, écrasée ! Vous avez vu quelquefois mon père, depuis
deux mois. C’est bien assez de le voir et de l’entendre un moment —
ce regard, par une contradiction inexplicable, rêveur et dur, ce
visage long, étroit, marqué de rides perpendiculaires, impassible
jusque dans le rire, ce menton hautain, la manière qu’il a de
détourner un peu les épaules en levant le front, ainsi qu’un homme
qui n’accepte pas de prendre parti, qui se dégage, qui se tient quitte
par avance des malheurs ou des sottises de son espèce, avec une
compassion insolente, plus insolente que le mépris. Jamais je n’ai
reçu de lui un avis, un conseil, un ordre, qui ne fût donné du bout
des lèvres. Il y a des politesses glacées : la sienne n’a même pas ce
froid qui fait mal. Je jure que tout est marqué, tout est en règle, dans
sa vie pourtant solitaire, si secrète : la pire malice n’y saurait mordre.
Ma mère est morte six mois après ma naissance, en pleine
jeunesse, en pleine beauté, et il m’a dit un jour qu’elle avait été
simple et parfaite (de quel ton !)… Hé bien, vous ne trouveriez pas
un seul portrait d’elle dans son appartement, ni — j’en suis sûre —
au fond de ses tiroirs. La jolie gravure de Mondoli est accrochée
dans le petit salon d’atours, où il n’entre plus. Que dire encore ? S’il
a rompu avec les siens, s’il se résigne à vieillir à quatre cents lieues
de son pays natal, c’est pour une raison que j’ignore, mais que je
pressens, pour une raison qui lui ressemble, par servitude stoïque à
quelque point d’honneur — son honneur, son honneur à lui, car il
n’est qu’un honneur à son usage, inaccessible aux autres hommes,
élémentaire et superstitieux, comme la religion des sauvages. Oui,
l’orgueil, le seul orgueil l’a mené ici, l’y fera mourir, pour quelque
cause que ce soit… Et toute sa race est ainsi, Jacques. Ne riez pas !
En France, vous ne savez plus guère ce que c’est qu’une race, vous
avez trop d’esprit, vous vous en tirez avec un éclat de rire — et c’est
vrai que le rire délivre, le vôtre, le rire à la française. Je n’ai jamais
pu rire comme vous. Je ne pourrais pas. Une race comme la nôtre,
quel fardeau.
— Un fantôme, ma chérie. Il eût suffi de le regarder en face. Un
fantôme qui traîne dans vos brouillards, sur vos pelouses… Mais
vous irez si loin avec moi que vous ne le rencontrerez plus, jamais.
— Mon Dieu ! puissiez-vous dire vrai, Jacques.
— Souhaitez-vous tellement que je dise vrai, ma pauvre amie ?
— Oh ! je sais bien ce que vous pensez ! Il y a toujours dans
votre pitié un peu de malice. Et certes, je ne connais rien des miens,
des plus proches. Ce que je sais de notre famille, je l’ai appris de la
vieille histoire de mon pays, et que m’importe aujourd’hui ces doges
et ces dogaresses ? Je me moque d’eux. Ils ne peuvent me faire
aucun mal. M’estimez-vous, sans rire, capable de la même vanité
nobiliaire que Mme de La Framette, ou le petit Clerjan, dont nous
nous sommes amusés hier ? Il est d’autres pauvres filles comme
moi, par le monde, qui sentent sur leurs épaules un poids aussi
lourd, bien qu’elles ne soient titrées ni nobles : le scrupule, l’intégrité,
la vertu roide et domestique d’aïeules et de bisaïeules, d’une lignée
de femmes irréprochables, obscures, tenaces dans le bien, à la fois
sages et ingénues, toujours prêtes à l’oubli de soi, au renoncement,
au sacrifice, enragées à se sacrifier. Me sacrifier à quoi ? disais-je.
Elles étaient pieuses, sans doute, craignaient Dieu, l’enfer, le péché,
croyaient aux Anges, résistaient aux tentations, les ont vaincues.
Elles ont emporté leur piété, ne m’ont laissé que leur sagesse. Que
puis-je faire de leur sagesse ? Elle découronne ma vie. Je n’ai
jamais été tentée. Ce qu’elles appelaient folie rebute encore mes
sens et ma raison. Leur dépendance était consentie, la mienne est
absurde, tyrannique, intolérable. J’ai cédé une fois, je me suis
donnée, non par amour, ni curiosité, encore moins par vice,
seulement pour franchir ce cercle magique, rompre avec elles, me
retrouver enfin, au fond de l’humiliation, du dégoût, de la honte, avoir
à rougir devant quelqu’un. Mais comment ai-je pu espérer d’anéantir
un orgueil dont les racines ne sont pas en moi ? Même le regard de
mon père ne me faisait pas baisser les yeux. Je sentais trop bien
que s’il eût pu lire dans mon cœur ma déception, ma fureur, il m’eût
reconnue sienne à ma manière de soutenir un tel défi.
Elle tourna vers lui sa bouche frémissante, et dit d’une voix
comme étrangère.
— Mais votre pardon, à vous, Jacques, votre pardon m’a
humiliée.
Il la reçut dans ses bras ; il sentit un court instant sur les siennes
ses lèvres froides et il osait à peine presser de la main le petit corps
tiède et tremblant. Déjà elle était debout à ses côtés.
— Ce n’est pas moi, c’est toi, fit-elle, qui auras raison de mon
âme… Une âme, vois-tu, c’est un grand mot, ça n’est pas si terrible
qu’on le suppose. Ne fais pas ces yeux sévères ! Es-tu si
superstitieux, mon amour ?
Elle lui échappa en riant.
— Je vous attendrai demain à Louciennes, demain matin… Et je
n’emporterai rien d’ici, vous savez ? rien de rien, non… les cheveux
tondus des Suppliantes, et les mains nues.
Par une longue déchirure à l’ouest, le ciel parut, d’un bleu pâle,
et les flancs épars des nuages s’allumèrent tous à la fois. La
dernière palpitation de l’astre errant brilla soudain aux mille facettes
de la pluie.
TABLE
Une Nuit 1
Dialogue d’Ombres 49
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Ebook China and Global Governance A New Leader 1St Edition Peng Bo Online PDF All Chapter

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China and Global Governance: A New

Leader? 1st Edition Peng Bo

Developing Digital Governance South Korea as a Global

A History of China in the 20th Century 1st Edition Lü

Populism Nationalism and South China Sea Dispute 1st

Global Strategy, 5th Edition Mike W. Peng

Public Administration and Governance in China 1st

Primary Mathematics 3A Hoerst

Contemporary China : A New Superpower? 1st Edition

General Theory of Social Governance in China

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China and Global

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

Cover credit: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com

The reemergence of China as a significant world political and economic

other words, China’s upgrade of its positions toward more sophisticated

to understand why today the hegemonic powers are watching carefully

mainstream line of scholarship in the West, both official and intellec-

Since the “Opening-up and Reform Project” launched in 1978, China’s

on multilateralism and its active promotion of newly founded China-led

challenges in the relationships between China-based leadership vis-à-vis the

Beijing, China Peng Bo

3.5 Summary 110

ADB Asian Development Bank

Fig. 1.1 The four crises of the US-led international order/global

Fig. 3.2 The four-step interpretive process of the ILCC (Source

1.1 The Multifaceted Rise

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

First, multilateral cooperation seems harder to achieve and sustain than

the liberal world order is experiencing a “crisis of authority”. (Flockhart &

Inspired by the “four crises” argument, the thesis intends to draw on

authority” stems from its failure to achieve effective multilateral coopera-

1.2 The Deficiencies

1.2.1 Structural Realism

toward the achievement of international cooperation and questions the

of power transition theory. Power transition theory (Chan, 2007; Lemke

the existing world order/global governance system. They consciously or

1.2.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism

or complex interdependence “has changed the way states interact with

institutionalists, integration is the core theme in the era of interdepen-

1.2.3 Structural Constructivism

More specifically, regarding the striking theme of “the nexus between

elites were proactively involved in international security cooperation and

1.2.4 The Common Problems of Western IR Theories in Explaining

of systematic IR theory and to neglect the historical origins and evolu-

1 In Chinese history, there are several manifestations and interpretations of “state”.

In the third place, the simplicity of systematic theory normally leads to

approaches have four major tendencies when theorizing international

(1) Auto-centrism refers to the tendency of theorizing about key principles

In sum, this thesis argues that the existing US mainstream systematic

1.3 A Culture-Oriented Approach

policymaking, etc. This makes the contribution of this book an appli-

First, the application of ability-based leadership, derived from the idea

1.3.2 The Logic of the Book

1. How do Chinese IR-related political thoughts and cultural heritage

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

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