China and Human Rights in North Korea Debating A Developmental Approach in Northeast Asia 1st Edition Baogang He (Editor)

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China and Human Rights in North Korea offers a fresh, thought-provoking
perspective on human rights that will surely stimulate lively debate among human
rights scholars and practitioners. In this important new volume, the editors
paradoxically turn to China as a potential model for advancing human rights in North
Korea. In particular, the editors and their contributors explore how a development-
based approach to human rights as adopted by China and practised in other East
Asian countries offers a viable path for improving rights in North Korea and beyond.
— Andrew Yeo, Professor of Politics at the Catholic University
of America and co-editor of North Korean Human Rights:
Activists and Networks
Intractable problems demand innovative solutions. This bold new volume brings
together a stellar group of leading experts to probe the potential for applying China’s
development-based approach to improve human rights in North Korea. Across eight
excellent chapters, the contributors thoughtfully weigh obstacles and risks before
concluding that effective engagement and positive change are possible. Clear-eyed,
ambitious and innovative, this book should be closely read by students, scholars and
policymakers seeking new ways to improve North Koreans’ human rights.
— James Reilly, Associate Professor at the University of Sydney and author of
Orchestration: China’s Economic Statecraft across Asia and Europe
Finally, a comprehensive and in-depth analysis on the viability of developmental

approach to North Korea’s human rights. A compelling collection work by
distinguished experts, the book painstakingly examines the pros and cons of a
Chinese development-based model to alleviate the human rights situation in
North Korea. This thought-provoking book is a must-read for anyone interested
in human rights in North Korea and elsewhere.
— Jaechun Kim, Professor of International Relations,
Sogang University, Seoul, South Korea
China and Human Rights
in North Korea
By exploring the “China factor” in the North Korean human rights debate, this book
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of applying the Chinese development-based
approach to human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The contributors to this book treat the relevance of the Chinese experience to the DPRK
seriously and evaluate how it might apply to easing North Korean human rights issues.
They engage with the debate about the relevance of the developmental or development-based
approach to North Korea. In doing so, they problematise, scrutinise and contextualise the
development-based approach in Northeast Asia, including China, and examine different
responses to such an approach and the influence of domestic politics on these responses.
This is a valuable contribution to discussions on possible ways forward for human
rights in North Korea and an insightful critique of the Northeast Asian development
model more broadly.
Baogang He is Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Alfred
Deakin Professor, Chair in International Relations, School of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Faculty of Arts & Education, Deakin University. He graduated with a PhD
in Political Science from the Australian National University in 1994. Professor He
has become widely known for his work in Chinese democratisation and politics, in
particular, the deliberative politics in China as well as in Asian politics covering Asian
regionalism, Asian federalism and Asian multiculturalism. His publications are found
in top journals, including Science, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Peace
Research, Political Theory, Political Studies and Perspectives on Politics.
David Hundt is Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University.
His research has a regional focus on the Indo-Pacific, especially South Korea and
Australia, and he has explored economic development, foreign policy, immigration
and inter-state relations in the region. He has published 3 books, 24 peer-reviewed
journal articles and 12 book chapters. The quality of his research has been recognised
in the form of awards, prizes and grants. He also has extensive experience in editing
academic journals. He has been Editor-in-Chief of Asian Studies Review since 2018.
Chengxin Pan is Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University
and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Technology Sydney. He is a
co-editor of the Global Political Sociology book series. His book Knowledge, Desire and
Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise (2012) was translated
and published in Chinese by the Social Sciences Academic Press (SSAP) and won an
SSAP Best Book Award in 2017. His latest publications have appeared in European
Journal of International Relations, Review of International Studies, Critical Studies on
Security and Millennium: Journal of International Studies.
Politics in Asia series
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Byung-il Choi and Jennifer S. Oh
ASEAN and Regional Order

Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia
Amitav Acharya
The United States’ Subnational Relations with Divided China

A Constructivist Approach to Paradiplomacy
Czeslaw Tubilewicz and Natalie Omond
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Timur Dadabaev
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New Approaches to Russian Foreign Policy
Gaye Christoffersen
China and Human Rights in North Korea

Debating a “Developmental Approach” in Northeast Asia
Baogang He, David Hundt and Chengxin Pan
For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Politics-

in-Asia/book-series/PIA
China and Human Rights
in North Korea
Debating a “Developmental Approach”
in Northeast Asia
Edited by
Baogang He, David Hundt
and Chengxin Pan
First published 2022
by Routledge
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© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Baogang He, David Hundt and
Chengxin Pan; individual chapters, the contributors
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003174844
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Table of contents
List of figuresxi
List of tablesxii
List of contributorsxiii
Acknowledgementsxv
PART 1
The global politics of human rights in North Korea1
1 A developmental approach to North Korea’s human

rights problem: lessons from China? 3
BAOGANG HE, CHENGXIN PAN AND DAVID HUNDT
1.1 China and the new politics of human rights 5

1.2 The developmental approach to human rights issues
in North Korea 7
1.3 The development-based approach and the study
of North Korea’s human rights 10
1.4 Aims and organisation of this book 14
2 North Korea and human rights: 22

the view from the United Nations
MICHAEL KIRBY
2.1 The United Nations and its role in human rights 22

2.2 The UN COI on DPRK 24
2.3 Change and the Trump administration 31
2.4 The ROK’s ambivalent stand on human rights 35
2.5 Where principle and realism meet 39
2.6 Conclusion 43
viii Table of contents
3 China’s roles in the UN Human Rights Council regarding
North Korea’s human rights 47
BAOGANG HE
3.1 Chinese engagements with the international human

rights regime 48
3.2 China’s development-led approach to human rights 50
3.3 China’s evolving role in the UNHRC 55
3.4 The DPRK’s human right issue in the UN and
support from China 61
3.5 The Universal Periodic Review, its application to the
DPRK and China’s role 63
3.6 Conclusion 67
PART 2
The developmental approach and regional actors73
4 A development-based approach to human rights: the

case of China and its implications for North Korea 75
CHENGXIN PAN
4.1 A critique of mainstream conceptualisations of human

rights 77
4.2 Reconceptualising human rights: a practice-theoretical
perspective 79
4.3 The development-based approach in the Chinese
context 82
4.4 Development and human rights in China: a work in
progress 85
4.5 To develop or not to develop? Promises and challenges in
North Korea 88
4.6 Conclusion 92
5 Development or human rights first? Japan’s approach

to North Korea 98
KIM KYUNGMOOK
5.1 Three approaches to Japan’s engagement with North

Korea 100
5.2 Post-war Japan and North Korea 102
5.3 Japanese NGOs and North Korea: from humanitarian
assistance to exchange programmes 105
Table of contents ix
5.4 The Japanese media’s growing role in North Korea: image
politics 110
5.5 Conclusions: human rights and the future of Japanese
leadership 116
6 Debating human rights and the development-led approach

in South Korea 121
DAVID HUNDT AND DANIELLE CHUBB
6.1 Approaches to human rights in South Korea 122

6.2 Public opinion about human rights policy in
South Korea 126
6.3 Competing approaches in practice 129
6.4 Another progressive era and another disappointment 134
6.5 Experimenting with the development-led approach? 136
6.6 Conclusion 139
PART 3
Prospects for the development-led approach in
North Korea145
7 North Korean domestic politics and the potential of

China’s developmental approach 147
BAOGANG HE AND DAVID HUNDT
7.1 The supply of human rights in North Korea: philosophy and

practice 148
7.2 Constraints on the demand for human rights in
North Korea 152
7.3 “North Korean-style” reform and its implications for human
rights 156
7.4 A development-led solution to the North Korean
problem? 159
7.5 Conclusion 164
8 Choosing a developmental approach for and in

North Korea 170
DAVID HUNDT AND BAOGANG HE
8.1 The human rights “war” 171

8.2 The limits of China’s leadership in the politics of human
rights in North Korea 175
x Table of contents
8.3 Lack of regional consensus about the development-led
approach 176
8.4 Three untried choices for North Korea 178
8.5 Conclusion 182
Index186
Figures
5.1 Chinese police remove a North Korean woman from the

Consulate General of Japan in Shenyang, China (2002) 112
5.2 A North Korean boy begging in the black market in Wonsan
(1998)113
5.3 North Korean children at a black market in Wonsan (1998) 114
6.1 The necessity of unification for South Korea 126
6.2 South Korean views of the North 128
6.3 South Korean views: North Korea is a country to . . . 128
8.1 Freedom of foreign movement, 1970–2020 179
8.2 CSO entry and exit, 1970–2020 180
8.3 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement, 1970–2020 181
Tables
3.1 Voting record for UNHRC resolution 35/21 57

3.2 Voting record for UNHRC resolution 37/23 58
3.3 Voting record for UNHRC resolution on the contribution of
development to the enjoyment of all human rights in 2019 59
3.4 Total numbers of in favour, against and abstaining between
2017 and 2019 60
Contributors
Danielle Chubb is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin Uni-

versity. She joined Deakin in 2012, after working as a Research Fellow at
the Honolulu-based security studies think tank, Pacific Forum CSIS. Danielle
completed her PhD at the Australian National University, in the College of
Asia and the Pacific. Chubb’s main research interests are the policy dynamics
of the Korean peninsula, the role of non-traditional actors in security arenas,
human rights activism and the interaction of policy and public opinion in Aus-
tralia. Her most recent publication is North Korean Human Rights: Activists
and Networks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, co-edited with
Andrew I. Yeo), examining transnational advocacy over the North Korean
human rights issue.
Baogang He is Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Alfred
Deakin Professor, Chair in International Relations, School of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts & Education, Deakin University. He gradu-
ated with a PhD in Political Science from the Australian National University
in 1994. Professor He has become widely known for his work in Chinese
democratisation and politics, in particular, the deliberative politics in China as
well as in Asian politics covering Asian regionalism, Asian federalism and Asian
multiculturalism.
David Hundt is Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin Uni-
versity. His research has a regional focus on the Indo–Pacific, especially South
Korea and Australia, and he has explored economic development, foreign
policy, immigration, and inter-state relations in the region. He has published
three books, 24 peer-reviewed journal articles, and 12 book chapters. The
quality of his research has been recognised in the form of awards, prizes, and
grants. He also has extensive experience in editing academic journals. He has
been Editor-in-Chief of Asian Studies Review since 2018.
Michael Kirby is International Jurist, Educator, and Former Judge. He served as
a Deputy President of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission
(1975–1983), Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission (1975–
1984), Judge of the Federal Court of Australia (1983–1984), President of
xiv Contributors
the New South Wales Court of Appeal (1984–1996), President of the Court
of Appeal of Solomon Islands (1995–1996) and Justice of the High Court
of Australia (1996–2009). He has undertaken many international activities
for the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the OECD and the
Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. He has also worked
in civil society, being elected President of the International Commission of
Jurists (1995–1998). He is currently Co-chair of the Human Rights Insti-
tute of the International Bar Association, based in London (2018–2021). His
recent international activities have included member of the Eminent Persons
Group on the Future of the Commonwealth of Nations (2010–2011); Com-
missioner of the UNDP Global Commission on HIV and the Law (2011–
2012); Chairman of the UN Commission of Inquiry on DPRK (North Korea)
(2013–2014); and Member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel
on Access to Essential Healthcare (2015–2016). He is also heavily engaged in
international arbitrations, domestic mediations and teaching law. He is Hon-
orary Professor at 12 Australian and overseas universities.
Kim Kyungmook (PhD, International relations, University of Tokyo) is Profes-
sor in the School of Culture, Media and Society, at Waseda University, Japan.
He has published his research work on North Korean problem from the per-
spective of Japanese Civil Society. His current research topics cover North East
Asia, Civil Society and Peace, with a research grant on A study of the transna-
tional civil networks in Japan–Korea relations.
Chengxin Pan is Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin Uni-
versity and Adjunct Associate Professor University of Technology Sydney. He
is a co-editor of the Global Political Sociology book series. His book Knowledge,
Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise
(2012) was translated and published in Chinese by Social Sciences Academic
Press (SSAP) and won an SSAP Best Book Award in 2017. His latest publica-
tions have appeared in European Journal of International Relations, Review of
International Studies, Critical Studies on Security, and Millennium: Journal of
International Studies.
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our sincere thanks for the Korea Foundation’s generous
support that has made this research possible and allowed it to be completed in a
smooth manner. We are grateful for the support given by Ambassador Sihyung
Lee, the President of the Korea Foundation, to this project, and to Ms Hyeun-
joo Lee (Korea Foundation) for her kind assistance, patience and flexibility at all
stages. We also express our sincere thanks and appreciation to Simon Bates, the
commission editor from Routledge for his constructive comments and sugges-
tions, and three anonymous reviewers for their sharp and critical comments that
have reshaped our book project.
We thank the presenters and participants of two workshops, one on China and
North Korea at Nankai University, Tianjin (21 October 2019), and the other
on China and Human Rights in North Korea: Part of the Problem or a Partial
Solution at Deakin University, Melbourne (29 November 2019). We also appre-
ciate the support from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and the
Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, the advice and help from Professor
Li Chunfu, and research assistance from Tom Barber, Matt Hood and Diarmuid
Cooney-O’Donoghue.
Finally, we thank our families for the support that they offered to us as we
completed this project. The most challenging parts of the work were completed
during the arduous pandemic year of 2020, which were disruptive for many peo-
ple, and especially those living in the state of Victoria in Australia. Without the
understanding of our families and colleagues, we could not have completed such
a complex body of work.
Part 1
The global politics

of human rights in
North Korea
1 A developmental approach
to North Korea’s human
rights problem
Lessons from China?
Baogang He, Chengxin Pan and David Hundt
North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) poses a sig-
nificant challenge to the international promotion of human rights. Being an
extremely closed society, its human rights record ranks among the worst in the
world (Kritsiotis, 2014). If China represents an uncomfortable thorn in the US
and Western efforts to promote democracy and human rights around the world,
then North Korea is an ultimate ‘hard case’ for outside powers seeking to develop
and improve human rights in an isolated and totalitarian state. This hard case is
further complicated by the deeply fraught strategic relationship between Pyong-
yang and Western capitals. Consequently, years of efforts of Western and, particu-
larly, US attempts to pressure North Korea to improve human rights have yielded
little in the way of tangible results. In this context, some have wondered whether
it is even possible to elicit progress on human rights in the so-called hermit king-
dom (Cohen, 2012).
In this chapter, we argue that progress is possible, but it will require us to
look to an apparently unlikely solution to this intractable challenge: China. The
conventional wisdom is that China is often part of the human rights problem.
Indeed, it is a serious problem in some respects. However, there are good reasons
to consider what can be learnt from China’s experience.
Firstly, China’s human rights record compares favourably to that of North
Korea and shows overall improvement vis-à-vis its own past in economic and
social rights. Its improvement in human rights can be attributed to a large extent
to what we call China’s development-based approach to human rights. Tackling
human rights issues in North Korea, we argue, would benefit from a better
understanding of this approach.
Secondly, there has been extensive research about the approaches that Western
policymakers and scholars advocate for democracy and human rights in North
Korea (Haggard & Noland, 2009, 2012; Hawk, 2014; Cha & DuMond, 2015;
Chow, 2016; Hilpert & Krumbein, 2016; Ryu, 2018), but far less is known
about whether and how China’s approach can be applied to this challenge.
Thirdly, the value of the development-based approach to human rights is not
that it presents China as an exemplar or model to which other countries should
aspire per se, but that its success in China, however limited and incomplete, offers
one of the few plausible options for North Korea. Given the privations experienced
DOI: 10.4324/9781003174844-2
4 Baogang He, Chengxin Pan and David Hundt
by North Korean citizens since 1945, it is essential that the outside world explore
all available options for improving the lives of the 24 million people who have
endured some of the most repressive conditions in recent world history. Given
the increasing leadership China has played in global human rights, it is timely to
understand and critically evaluate how practices and norms in the Chinese context
might diffuse to other countries and what their promises and pitfalls are.
With a specific focus on the human rights impasse in North Korea, this book
contributes to new thinking and informs policymaking, by bringing China’s
development-based approach into the equation. By introducing the “China fac-
tor” into the North Korean human rights debate, this book evaluates the advan-
tages and disadvantages of applying the Chinese variant of the development-based
approach to human rights in the DPRK context. In doing so, the contributors of
this volume also acknowledge and draw on the experiences and perspectives of
other East Asian societies, including North Korea itself (see Chapter 5), where
the development-based approach has been in various forms and practices. The
book therefore contributes important new thinking on the topic, which, if incor-
porated within better informed policy, might be able to break the deadlock and
lead to effective engagement with North Korea on the challenging subject of
human rights. Positive change is possible, albeit on a modest scale.
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that we use the terms “devel-
opmental”, “development-based” and “development-led” somewhat inter-
changeably in this book. The precise term used, however, varies in accordance
with how countries (or at least their governments) define the goals of the task
at hand. The descriptor “developmental” is usually associated with the actions
and intentions of the Asian developmental state, which in countries such as
South Korea and Japan has been credited with engineering a form of outward-
oriented capitalist economic development (see e.g., Hundt & Uttam, 2017),
which created the conditions for cautious and partial political opening and
democratisation (see Chapter 6). The term “development-led”, meanwhile, is
mainly used to stress that development itself is a driving force for – at some
future point – enhancing human rights. It has comparatively stronger reso-
nance in China, where there has been comparatively less political opening, and
where political leaders have consciously engineered a mode of capitalist devel-
opment that seems to deliberately control or limit the degree of political open-
ness and human rights available to citizens (see Chapters 3 and 4). The variant
of China’s developmental approach is compared with that of South Korea and
Vietnam in Chapter 8. Finally, the term “development-based approach” is
favoured when we talk about the theoretical foundations that guide how peo-
ple think about human rights. Conceptualisations of human rights in the West
and in China are discussed in Chapter 4. So, while there is analytical value in
trying to differentiate between these terms to the greatest extent possible, the
distinction will not always be clear.
This chapter has four sections. Section 1 introduces the background against
which the role of China is highlighted. Section 2 explains why the developmen-
tal approach to human rights in North Korea is needed. Section 3 locates the
A developmental approach to human rights 5
developmental approach in the literature on North Korean human rights and
explains how this approach can advance the alternative approaches in the litera-
ture on North Korean human rights. Section 4, finally, describes the aims and
outline of the book.
1.1 China and the new politics of human rights

In recent years, Beijing has sought to affirm, renew and establish as the domi-
nant paradigm the right to development (RTD) agenda – a discourse established
in 1986 that has since gained traction following its enshrinement in the 2005
United Nations World Summit outcome.1 This stewardship has manifested most
patently with China’s creation of the South-South Human Rights Forum, held in
2017 and 2019 (Worden, 2020). Beijing’s approach to human rights, therefore,
is one that is predicated on a form of economic development that prioritises
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) over civil and political rights (CPR).
It is an approach that has garnered significant support in the developing world.
While global powers such as the United States have been reluctant to accept
this development-based formulation of human rights, those like South African
scholar Serges Djoyou Kamga (2018: 1) have urged China to use its influence in
the G20 and the BRICS “to persuade other powerful stakeholders to give effect
to the RTD”.
The Trump administration’s withdrawal from United Nations Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) in June 2018 gave further impetus to China’s desire to carve
out an influential role in the Council and advocate its own RTD approach to
human rights. China has thus become an undeniable factor in the new global
politics of human rights, with its development-based approach poised to impact
and shape the global human rights regime, including in respect to North Korea.
Against this backdrop, this book examines the new politics of human rights
by scrutinising Beijing’s development-based approach and injecting it into the
debate over North Korean human rights. It asks whether China’s human rights
paradigm offers a (as opposed to the) solution to the DPRK human rights prob-
lem that, while not “ideal”, is nevertheless “good enough”.
The promotion of human rights in North Korea faces significant challenges,
considering the extremely closed nature of that society. Domestically, the regime
prohibits both the civil society and the intellectual infrastructure required for
human rights promotion (Fahy, 2018); furthermore, human rights-focused non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and networks are forced to operate extrater-
ritorially for similar reasons (Yeo & Chubb, 2018). In short, the DPRK remains
the world’s most closed society. The DPRK’s seclusion has been compounded by
the strategic distrust that exists between Washington and Pyongyang, as fomented
through the former’s complex and multilayered democracy-promotion pro-
gramme and the latter’s opposition thereto. Rightly or wrongly, democracy and
human rights are perceived by North Korea’s leadership as foreign instruments
for regime change and are thus anathema to Pyongyang. If China represents an
uncomfortable thorn in the side of American efforts to promote democracy and
human rights abroad, then North Korea is truly a hard case for those outside
powers wanting to improve human rights in an isolated state.
North Korea has shown itself to be largely impervious to external diplomatic
and political pressure. Successive US administrations have attempted to address
human rights in relation to the DPRK (see, e.g., Hundt, 2008; Kim & Hundt,
2011), but little discernible change on human rights has resulted. The Trump
administration’s engagement strategy and approach regarding North Korea’s
nuclear programme, for instance, largely ignored the issue of human rights.
Today, regardless of the new Biden administration’s position on North Korea (see
Chapter 8), a more flexible approach to human rights in North Korea is urgently
needed (Lee, 2012).
Such an approach might begin with economic reform. Indeed, Beijing has
tried to push Pyongyang to enact economic reform for years, but aside from
minor progress made in 2006, little has changed. In recent years, however, North
Korean leader Kim Jong Un has shown a willingness to reinvigorate his coun-
try’s development agenda by implementing some modest reforms. If this were
to materialise, it would offer a real opportunity to test the development-based
approach to human rights in the DPRK. The world will be watching any changes
with great interest because of the clandestine nature of North Korea’s record
on human rights issues (Kirby et al., 2014). The country may well come under
increasing pressure to be more transparent and open on this matter.
As a close neighbour and ally of North Korea, China has a critical role to play in
influencing and facilitating the possibility of both denuclearisation and improve-
ments in human rights in North Korea. While much attention has been paid to
China’s role in North Korean denuclearisation (Ha, 2018), there is little under-
standing of the role that China plays, or more precisely, the relevance of China’s
experience, in relation to North Korean human rights. In the existing literature,
China is often depicted as part of the human rights problem. To be sure, China is
no paragon of human rights virtue. It has clearly violated, often egregiously and
systemically, the principles of the most basic of human rights on numerous occa-
sions, particularly in relation to certain ethnic and religious groups. At various
points in contemporary Chinese history, the government has, for instance, sup-
pressed political dissidents, lawyers and right-defenders. The party propaganda
department regularly establishes a “correct line” that government officials, the
media, and the public are expected to use and adopt in respect to certain events.
And for many Western observers, China’s remarkable economic development and
opening up have failed to meet the expectations of either political democratisa-
tion or the improvement of civil and political rights. So, there are good reasons
to be sceptical about the promise of China’s development-based approach for
addressing the human rights challenge in North Korea.
Even in this context, however, certain types of rights activism and human rights
discourse have been possible (He, 1991, 1996; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Pan, 2008).
The practice of human rights in China may differ markedly from how rights are
understood in Western societies, but the situation has arguably progressed sub-
stantially since the government embarked on the path of economic development
and abandoned the ideological obsession with class struggle during the Mao era,
when China more closely resembled an impoverished totalitarian society, like
North Korea does today (Sautin, 2017).
Just as North Korea resembles China’s past, it may well be that in some respects
China represents North Korea’s future. There is no denying that China consti-
tutes part of the problem with respect to North Korean human rights. But that
does not mean that it cannot also offer a partial solution. While by no means
perfect, China’s human rights record has been demonstrably better at protecting
social and economic rights than that of North Korea, showing overall improve-
ment vis-à-vis China’s own past (see Chapter 4). In this context, tackling human
rights issues in North Korea can benefit from a better understanding of Chi-
na’s experience and approach. Therefore, Beijing’s development-based approach
offers a different and arguably more pragmatic way forward than the status quo.
1.2 The developmental approach to human rights

issues in North Korea
Drawing on its own experience in developing human rights, Beijing has actively
promoted the RTD originally advocated by South Africa in the 1970s and the
development-based approach to human rights through the UNHRC. China’s
development-based approach emphasises the priority of economic development
and associated social and economic rights. It favours a particular sequencing of
human rights development: economic development increases and improves social
and economic rights and then slowly improves CPR (see Chapter 3). Given that
the United States’ confrontational and external pressure has resulted in little pro-
gress, China’s developmental approach may offer a fresh and realistic approach to
human rights development in North Korea. Beijing rejects Washington’s regime
change as a fundamental solution to Pyongyang’s human rights violations. The
cost of regime change would be high, putting people’s lives at risk. As Baogang
He argues in Chapter 3, Beijing favours China’s developmental approach as it is
evolutionary and peaceful, despite its inherent problems and deficiencies.
Some readers will question whether China’s approach could be a potential
solution to human rights. Critics could rightfully note how China’s trajectory on
human rights has become distinctly worse since the ascent of Xi Jinping to the
leadership in 2012, which has invited great resistance to Beijing when it attempts
to reshape the human right agenda in the UNHRC. Even talking about Beijing’s
development-based approach could be seen as an apology for Beijing. There is a
moral dilemma of treating China as a model of sorts, especially given that Xi has
apparently adopted a more authoritarian approach to governance.
Nevertheless, there is value in distinguishing between Beijing’s recent retreat
in human rights and its developmental approach to human rights more broadly.
What is clear is that the recent human rights setbacks in China are not because of
its development-based approach, and therefore we should not throw out the baby
with the bathwater. Whatever Beijing proposes regarding human rights attracts sus-
picion and detracts from its capacity to advocate for human rights. Such a reaction,
as was evident in the Trump administration’s treatment of Beijing’s human rights
agenda in the UNHRC, is deeply problematic. It is to be hoped that the Biden
administration will adopt a merit-based assessment of the developmental approach
(see Chapter 8). While China’s treatment of specific groups of its people in Tibet,
Xinjiang and Hong Kong is controversial at best and reprehensible at worst, such
treatment, which often takes place against the backdrop of complex security and
geopolitical challenges, is not intrinsic to its developmental approach to human
rights.
Furthermore, it is worth distinguishing between the developmental approach
to human rights that China practices, and China’s political culture more gener-
ally. Or to paraphrase one of the editors of this collection (see Pan, 2009), we
could ask “What is (and isn’t) Chinese about the developmental approach”? Just
as the ideas that guide China’s ruling party are drawn from Western origins as
well as Chinese ones, so too are some of the ideas that inspire its developmen-
tal approach based on the experiences and perspectives of other countries. Even
the RTD, one of the key building blocks of the developmental approach, was
first promoted by South Africa in the 1970s. The developmental approach to
human rights has been successful in Japan and South Korea (see Chapters 6 and
7, respectively), as well as Taiwan. China, likewise, in recent years has promoted
its version of the developmental approach on a large scale through the UNHRC,
albeit with more authoritarian characteristics.
A final legitimate objection to China’s developmental approach is that even
if North Korea adopts the Chinese way in improving human rights in eco-
nomic and social areas, it would still end up in a situation where basic rights
are widely repressed. After all, the China of today is hardly a paragon of dem-
ocratic virtue. Might it not be preferable to wish for a total regime collapse in
North Korea, which could lead to greater freedoms, even if this took a long
time and entailed the loss of many lives? If North Korea avoided the China
example, could it instead follow the USSR path and end up like present-day
Russia? Would that not be preferable to the limited freedoms that Chinese
citizens now enjoy?
If asked to choose between this thought experiment and China’s record from
recent decades, we would opt for the China path. Despite the very real con-
straints on political and civil freedoms in China, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that Chinese citizens enjoy more freedoms in their daily lives than most North
Koreans have ever experienced. So, although China does not offer an ideal model
for North Korea in the long term, it does offer a reasonable prospect for some
discernible improvement in human rights in the near term. This might mean,
for instance, that millions of North Korean peasants could move to the cities to
look for jobs without official permits, and that workers could freely enter and/or
end their contracts in labour markets. It would allow ordinary citizens to partake
in mundane activities such as establishing social organisations to enjoy cultural
events. Above all, it would let people use the language of human rights to defend
their interests, by suing local governments or taking part in rightful resistance.
These would all be significant changes from the present for most North Koreans.
The development-based approach would not and should not remake North
Korea in China’s image, but we can plausibly claim that some of the events and
development in China over the past few decades could be replicated in tomorrow’s
North Korea if the developmental approach to human rights were to be adopted
and implemented. It is therefore hard to deny that even a partial, incremental and
non-ideal developmental approach would be some degree of improvement on the
current dire human rights situation in North Korea.
Buying into the China model?

The notion of human rights is not completely unknown in North Korea (see
Chapter 7), but it does take a form that is at odds with the dominant Western
interpretation. The international isolation of North Korea has meant that the
government’s propaganda has been effective in promoting its official discourse on
human rights (Kurbanov, 2019), to the point where a “human rights” discourse
(as it is understood in existing international normative frameworks) does not exist
(Goedde, 2018a; J. Song, 2010; Fahy, 2015). In this context, Western approaches
to the North Korean human rights issue have very little cut-through, and China
may offer a via-media of sorts as a “partial solution” to that very problem.
Perhaps most crucially, a development-based approach to human rights could
gain support from the socialist regime in North Korea (Agov, 2017). This is
because the country’s own discourse on human rights endorses the development-
based approach, with access to education, health care, and fair working condi-
tions all conceived of as rights “essential for a decent life” in the DPRK (Beer,
2009: 44, Hwang, 2014). Rudolph (2018) agrees that China’s approach to
human rights, which places emphasis on socioeconomic rights, aligns more
with North Korea’s disposition than does the Western approach that prioritises
CPR. Conceivably, Pyongyang would welcome such a change in approach from
the international community as feasible and desirable, given the urgent need to
develop its economy. Moreover, because it focuses on those social and economic
rights that do not challenge the regime’s pre-eminent position, such an approach
circumvents the regime’s fear of collapse (Son, 2018), and thus is more likely
to be accepted and supported by the DPRK leadership. A development-based
approach, therefore, has a higher likelihood of promoting mutually beneficial
cooperation in the field of human rights between the North Korean govern-
ment and international NGOs and agencies. Indeed, considering North Korea’s
defiance of, disregard for and non-cooperation with the current approach led by
Western democracies, lowering the bar, so to speak, might well allow for genuine
dialogue to take place where none currently exists.
The challenge for North Korea will be how it simultaneously engages the
human rights issue and carries out an open-door policy of reform. Like China,
the DPRK can adopt the language of human rights discourse as a means of par-
ticipating in international organisations. In this way, the regime can promote the
protection of the economic and social rights of its citizens through economic
development, while maintaining control of CPR to safeguard its hold on political
power. At the same time, it would be interesting to see to what extent North
Korea would emulate China. To be sure, it would not become a facsimile of
China; it is also possible that the DPRK would follow a different path and repli-
cate the models of South Korea or Vietnam rather than China (see Chapter 8).
After all, there is neither single development-based approach nor is it unique to
China. Ultimately, Pyongyang may strike a balance in forging its own path that
draws inspiration from China’s development experience as well as others’.
1.3 The development-based approach and the study

of North Korea’s human rights
To apply the development-based approach to human rights in North Korea
would represent a radical shift in the practice of foreign policy, but the origins
of the approach can be found in a wide range of sub-literatures in international
relations (IR). Nonetheless, it does represent a distinct, understudied and yet
practical solution to a pressing real-world problem. We argue that the approach
also provides novel solutions to the inter-related debates about the practice
of human rights promotion, including who (or what) is best placed to promote
human rights, how these rights should be promoted, how we should think about
human rights and which rights are in most need of promotion. What becomes
clear from the review that follows is that approaches to human rights are not mutu-
ally exclusive and some overlap with each other, but also that a novel approach is
required to respond to seemingly intractable cases such as North Korea.
The starting point for debates is which actors are best placed to promote
human rights, especially in other countries. One response to this question is that
states are the logical promoter of human rights, and especially great powers such
as the United States. In his historical analysis of US approaches to North Korea,
for instance, David Hundt explains how and why the DPRK has confounded
successive US administrations. North Korea has severely frustrated Washington’s
interests, and consequently, there has been no discernible progress on improving
human rights inside the DPRK (Hundt, 2008; Kim & Hundt, 2011). Goedde
(2018b), Song (2010) and Weatherley and Song (2008) have also conducted
detailed surveys of North Korea’s own discourse on human rights at the state
level. In the United States and South Korea, the North Korean human rights dis-
course is highly politicised, an issue which Danielle Chubb has examined in detail
(2014a; see also Yeo, 2018; Cha & DuMond, 2015; Reidhead, 2018; Moon,
2014).
Critics of this approach would contend that civil society networks are much
better placed to promote human rights. Many scholars have examined the
approaches of NGO actors to North Korean human rights since the publication
of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) report into North Korean
human rights in 2014 (see Kirby’s contribution, Chapter 2). Chubb in particular
has written at length about the role of transnational human rights actors in insti-
gating the COI, focusing particularly on normative diffusion within transnational
civil society (see, e.g. Chubb, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2018; Chubb & Yeo, 2018).
There are a variety of NGO actors who have different views of North Korean
human rights issues with different strategies ranging from advocating regime
change to promoting cooperation with the North Korea regime. Despite vast
differences, civil society groups and citizens are seen as main actors in the politics
of North Korean human rights.
The question of who (or what) is best placed to promote human rights leads
to a second and related debate: how to do so? What tactics or strategies are more
likely to succeed? One option is that sanctions and subversion are required when
seeking to promote human rights in closed societies such as North Korea. Despite
growing calls for a change in approach, the United States government (both the
legislative and executive branches) continues to see sanctions as a primary tool for
tackling human rights abuses (Rudolph, 2019: 331, also see Kang, 2019). This
is true not only in the case of North Korea; it is a consistent theme of US human
rights policy towards non-allies (Peksen in Rudolph, 2019: 331). Some civil soci-
ety actors also advocate a more direct approach, preferring to focus their energies
on information campaigns and other subversive mechanisms designed to provoke
grassroots revolutionary activity inside North Korea and, ultimately, bring about
regime change (Baek, 2018; Lankov, 2018).
Critics of sanctions argue that a policy of engagement is likely to be more effec-
tive. Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, for instance, argued in 2005
that coercive attempts to force communist countries to improve human rights
through sanctions had demonstrably failed. Instead, the instances in which pro-
gress had been made was won through engagement and economic and cultural
exchanges (Lee, 2005; Feffer, 2006). One interesting example of such ideational
entrepreneurship is the leveraging of disability rights. John Feffer (2017), former
PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University and co-director of For-
eign Policy in Focus, holds up disability rights as an example of how engagement
can yield positive results in particular areas in the DPRK. Indeed, the regime has
made progress in advancing the rights of the disabled, signed the UN convention
on the rights of the disabled and even allowed the UN’s Special Rapporteur (SR)
on Disability Rights to tour the country. Meanwhile, the United Nations SR on
the situation of human rights in the DPRK has never been allowed to visit. There
is even a nascent civil society focused on disability in North Korea, some mem-
bers of whom have been permitted to travel outside of the country. Former US
special envoy for the issue of North Korean human rights (2009–2017), Robert
King, reasons that Pyongyang is more open to disability rights issues because,
unlike other rights – for example, freedom of speech – they do not “undermine
the claims of legitimacy of the government” (Feffer, 2017). Feffer is under no
illusions of the scale and severity of North Korea’s human rights problems, but he
argues that the disability rights experience shows “how human rights work can
promote more connections with the international community rather than fewer”,
while also demonstrating that mutually beneficial outcomes are possible (Feffer,
2017).
A third debate centres on whether human rights need to be seen as univer-
sal (in which case, the same rights should presumably be pursued everywhere)
or particularistic (which implies that the promotion of rights might be tailored
to meet local conditions). Recent research into the circumstances under which
human rights are realised (see e.g., Hafner-Burton, 2013) finds that the linking
of international law to reliable local information can help create the legitimacy
needed for effective change. According to Goedde (2018a), the proposition that
situating universal human rights norms within local contexts in order to increase
the likelihood of successful diffusion enjoys widespread academic support. Such
localisation must involve the tailoring of language and approach and include an
effort to incorporate the particular interpretations of human rights that are a
product of North Korea’s political, social and historical development (Goedde,
2018a; see also Merry, 2006). Of course, when it comes to North Korea, the lack
of basic human rights institutions and civil society creates an added challenge
(Yeo & Chubb, 2018).
To better understand and address the North Korean human rights issue, many
argue that a regional approach that takes into consideration the particulars of
DPRK and Northeast Asian dynamics is crucial. Rudolph advocates an Asian-led
multilateral approach to North Korean human rights that, while not addressing
every aspect of human rights, would nevertheless allow for progress to be made in
certain areas (Rudolph, 2018). While Japan and South Korea have made progress
within their respective societies, there remains an absence of any “inter-regional
human rights institution” in Northeast Asia (Narayan, 2009: 1). Due to the “lack
of political will within the region towards dealing with fundamental human rights
issues, especially the sensitive issue of civil and political rights”, Rajiv Narayan,
who served as Director of Policy at the International Commission against the
Death Penalty and a former researcher at Amnesty International, is pessimistic
that North Korean human rights violations will remain commonplace until such
time as a regional strategy is formulated (Narayan, 2009: 5).
A final debate, which flows from the universal/regional distinction, is how
to think about human rights in the context of human security, which implies
that the preservation and improvement of human life is a valuable goal in and
of itself in international politics. Some scholars argue that we should approach
the issue of North Korean human rights through the lens of human security
rather than the human rights paradigm. Feffer (2011) identifies four strate-
gies that have been used to address the DPRK’s human rights deficiencies:
NGO “naming and shaming”; governmental action, usually legislative (i.e.,
money transfer restrictions, etc.); international mechanisms such as UN and
European Union (EU) resolutions; and direct actions like the smuggling in
of USBs and videos across the border. Each of these approaches, he argues,
has had limited success (Feffer, 2011: 1–2). Instead, he advocates a two-tiered
human security-centric approach that would lay out a human security frame-
work where human rights is seen alongside other North Korean human and
collective security issues; and that would identify “specific issues that are less
politically sensitive and that could serve to initiate discussions with North
Korean officials” (Feffer, 2011: 3).
This human security approach would presumably be perceived less antagonisti-
cally by Pyongyang. First, the DPRK understands security language since it thinks
more in terms of threats than in terms of rights. In addition, because of the con-
nection between the Helsinki Accords and the collapse of the USSR and Eastern
European communist regimes, the DPRK views the human rights framework as
inherently incompatible with its political system. Third, a human security framing
allows for the discussion and implementation of tangible economic investment
and development, rather than the more abstract signing of conventions (Feffer,
2011: 3). Finally, such an approach might also shift the debate away from the
sensitive issues of timing and sequencing of improvements in human rights and
towards the issues of direction and intent. That is, if all parties can agree that they
are committed to improving human rights, broadly defined, then some common
ground might be found to work together constructively. The issue of when such
improvements might be realised is still important, but it could be a matter to be
decided consultatively.
In a similar vein, Rachael Rudolph (2018), Assistant Professor of Social Science
at Bryant University, argues that the issue of denuclearisation should be decou-
pled and pursued separately from the human rights agenda. She proposes that
human rights be reframed along non-traditional security lines and Pyongyang
be engaged on economic security, energy security and food security – key issues
that directly underlie many of North Korea’s human rights problems. Addressing
these would, in her view, be in North Korea’s interest, as they correspond with
Pyongyang’s own human rights discourse and framing. The goal should be to
move ahead incrementally on several fronts, but to understand that the speed of
progress will vary from issue to issue.
The protection of social and economic rights has not been absent from the
agenda of international human rights organisations, Western governments and
NGOs, who have started a collaborative effort to engage on some of the trickier
political and civil rights issues, without necessarily using the kind of language
that appears anathema to the North Korean state. The most recent publication
by the UN COI office in Seoul (OHCHR, 2019)2 looks at the human rights situ-
ation from the perspective of food rights and has been accompanied by efforts to
engage the DPRK more closely on the sustainable development goals, such as the
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific’s (UNESCAP’s)
“North-East Asian Multi-stakeholder Forum on Sustainable Development Goals”
held in Vladivostok, Russia in October 2019.3 North Korea engaged productively
and proactively at this forum, reporting that its priorities were to tackle pov-
erty, stimulate economic development and encourage the growth of its science-
technology sector (Abrahamian, 2017, 2018, 2019). It is in such settings that we
are most likely to see genuine engagement from North Korea on international
agreements. Rather than viewing this sort of engagement as side-stepping real
human rights change, we should consider an expanded interpretation that under-
stands it for what it is – a step towards, rather than a dilution of, more compre-
hensive human rights ambitions.
Towards a development-based approach
This book is concerned with the development-based approach to human rights
and will combine and advance some of the aforementioned approaches within
the broader development-based framework. At the outset, it is important to note
that such an approach does not endorse the sanctioning or subversion of the state. On
the contrary, it advocates that the states play a central role in planning and imple-
menting a development agenda, and in so doing codify and protect the economic
and social rights (as well as relevant CPRs) necessary for economic development.
A development-based approach to human rights in and for North Korea would
offer civil society and NGOs an opportunity to enter the country, albeit with
restrictions, as was the case with China during the reform period. Given that
human rights NGOs must currently operate outside of the DPRK and are thus
limited in what they can observe and achieve, this could create the preconditions
for civil society to play active roles inside North Korea.
As noted earlier, the development-based approach gives more prominence to
the role of economic and social rights than civil and political ones. Were it to be
implemented, this approach would expand the scope for the type of engagement
called for by Kim Dae-Jung and John Feffer. Moreover, a development-based
approach shares many of the features and benefits of the localisation approaches
favoured by Hafner-Burton and Goedde. It also dovetails with the human secu-
rity framings of Rudolph and Feffer. Through a study of the variety of develop-
ment approaches in Northeast Asia, this book offers a new basis for realising
Narayan’s vision of a regional approach in addressing the DPRK human rights
problem. As well as demonstrating the benefits of a development-based approach
to human rights in North Korea, the ensuing chapters identify, scrutinise and
anticipate its problems and challenges.
China’s human rights record has been extensively dissected and criticised, but
whether and how its experiences and lessons are relevant to the North Korean
context is a topic that has been neglected. In this book, we address this gap by
bringing together our expertise on human rights in both North Korea and China;
examining the extent to which China can offer a partial solution to North Korea’s
human rights problem; and looking at how North Korea, South Korea, Japan and
the United States have responded to China’s approach in the past and might do
so in the future.
In summary, this book seeks to build on existing North Korean human rights
research (e.g., Song, 2010; Chubb, 2014a; Cha & DuMond, 2015; Fahy, 2015;
Yeo & Chubb, 2018) by bringing the Chinese experience into a central place
of inquiry and by scrutinising the Chinese development-based approach to the
North Korean human rights issue.
1.4 Aims and organisation of this book

This book has three aims. The first is to engage with the debate about the rele-
vance of the development approach to North Korea. The book proposes that the
developmental approach promoted by China (see Chapters 3 and 4) offers a “par-
tial solution” to the human rights problem in North Korea. What are the dilem-
mas associated with such a human rights promotion strategy in North Korea?
Who are the main actors regarding North Korean human rights? How would
a development-based approach to human rights be implemented in the DPRK?
The ensuing chapters address such questions.
The second aim of the book is to problematise, scrutinise and contextualise
the development-based approach in Northeast Asia. To do so, we first elucidate
how Beijing promotes its development-based approach to human rights within
the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and assess Beijing’s
UNHRC role apropos North Korean human rights (Chapter 3). We then inves-
tigate variations in the development-based model of human rights in Northeast
Asia and explain why and how the approaches of four countries (China, South
Korea, North Korea and Japan) have evolved as they have. The differences in tra-
jectory are striking (see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). Countries other than China may
not advocate for the development-led approach as forcefully as Beijing, but they
are likely to understand from first-hand experience its transformative potential,
and they could provide quiet support to North Korea if the regime commits to
a new path.
Third, the book examines different responses to the developmental/development-
based approach and the influence of domestic politics on these responses. It
offers perspectives from South Korea, the United States and Japan on how they
perceive the problem of human rights in North Korea, how this shapes their
respective policies and how they interpret and respond to the development-based
approach to North Korea’s human rights problem (Kim, 2010). Each of these
approaches has developed within an international context in which the approach
of the United States has set the terms of the debate on human rights. So we also
study how these approaches interact with the dominant Western approach that
the US espouses.
Outline of the book

This book is divided into three parts and eight chapters. Part 1 examines the global
politics of human rights in North Korea and consists of three chapters. In Chap-
ter 1 (this introductory overview), Baogang He, David Hundt and Chengxin Pan
introduce the background and explain why the development-based approach to
human rights in North Korea is needed. This approach, they argue, can advance
the existing approaches to the North Korean human rights.
In Chapter 2, the Chairman of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in the DPRK (2013–2014), Michael Kirby, offers a unique global per-
spective, presents an overview of the status of affairs of North Korean human
rights and examines the problems and challenges thereof. He provides a historical
review of the United Nations’ role in human rights in general and the situation
in North Korea in particular, as documented by the United Nations COI. Kirby
examines the parts that the United States and South Korea have played in the
politics of North Korean human rights. He thereby makes a compelling case for
change in North Korea.
In Chapter 3, Baogang He offers one response to Justice Kirby’s call to treat
the situation in North Korea as a matter of urgency, by examining China’s roles in
the UNHRC and especially how the PRC has set a new agenda for human rights
in developing countries. China’s efforts, the chapter illustrates, have received sup-
port from developing countries, including North Korea. The chapter discusses
Beijing’s influence and impact on the North Korean human rights issue: it sup-
ports North Korea in the UNHRC, it offers a model for North Korea to emulate
in improvement of its human rights, and it creates the potential for North Korea
to engage with other countries to improve human rights – even if that potential
has not been realised to a great extent.
Part 2, which consists of three chapters, investigates how three regional actors,
namely China, Japan and South Korea, view the developmental approach to
human rights from their own domestic political viewpoints. Chapter 4, written
by Chengxin Pan, argues that adopting a development-based approach to North
Korean human rights provides a more realistic, though not exclusive or perfect,
path towards improving human rights in North Korea. Pan discusses the merit of
this approach through a perspective informed by practice theory in IR. To illus-
trate this perspective, the chapter uses China as an empirical case study of how
a development-based approach helps to partly address human rights challenges.
In pointing to China as an example of how this approach has been practiced, the
chapter does not champion China’s human rights achievements per se or assess
the overall human rights situations in China. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate how
a development-based approach may effect positive changes in some key aspects of
human rights over time. The development-based or development-led approach
certainly has not and cannot solve all, even most, of China’s own human rights
problems, let alone those of other countries. Nonetheless, in some important
aspects, human rights have seen improvement as a result of the focus on develop-
ment in China in recent decades. So, it is logical to examine whether a similar
development-based approach can be brought to bear on the human rights chal-
lenge in North Korea.
In Chapter 5, Kim Kyungmook develops a Japanese perspective of the North
Korean human rights problem. The chapter first examines how the Japanese
government has used strategically a development/humanitarian approach and
a human rights approach towards North Korea. Kim illustrates that Japan has
adopted a “human rights-led approach” rather than a development-led one. The
government has deliberately chosen not to promote the “development” side of
the equation, despite Japan being the pioneer of the Asian developmental state
and the developmental logic being influential in Japanese statecraft. Secondly,
it sheds light on the non-governmental politics on the North Korea problem.
Some NGOs and media in Japan support certain aspects of their government’s
policy towards North Korea, while others criticise it and offer alternatives. In
this regard, development-oriented actors and human rights groups in Japan
often clash over how to best deal with the North Korea problem. Finally, the
chapter attempts to elucidate the potential role of Japan in the emerging regional
order. The North Korea problem cannot be solved by any single actor and is best
approached through a coordinated effort by outside powers, including Japan, the
United States and South Korea. Against the backdrop of US–China hegemonic
rivalry, Kim argues, smaller powers such as South Korea and Japan have a great
incentive to cooperate and see their preferred vision of reform emerge.
Chapter 6, written by David Hundt and Danielle Chubb, focuses on the
historical development of South Korea’s human rights policy towards North
Korea. It traces the influence of the left (progressive) and right (conservative)
approaches, and their degree of resonance with both public opinion in South
Korea and the preferences of key international allies such as the United States.
South Korea has also experimented with a third approach, which is synonymous
with the developmental/development-based ones discussed elsewhere in this
book. Overall, the conservative approach has been more influential in shaping
human rights policy and relations with North Korea, in large part due to the
support it has gained from external powers, especially the United States, and
its compatibility with the American position on North Korea. The possibility
of adopting a development-led approach to North Korea has some support in
South Korea, and it shares similarities with the China model. While it appears
unfeasible for South Korea to formally adopt such an approach to North Korea
due to the insufficient political constituency willing and able to champion such
an approach, the lived experiences of South Koreans with the development-led
approach does offer them a unique perspective on the potential of this approach,
and South Korean could be an important advocate for North Korea adopting a
similar approach to reform.
Part 3, consisting the last two chapters, returns to the key question of how
North Korea can improve its human rights record through applying and adopting
China’s developmental approach to human rights in North Korea. In Chapter 7,
Baogang He and David Hundt address the question of whether the Chinese
development-based approach is suitable for North Korea. The chapter develops a
novel “supply-and-demand” approach to the evolution of human rights to explain
why human rights have been so chronically underdeveloped in North Korea. It
depicts the human rights problem as a struggle between the state and its citizens
over the optimal level of rights that should be available and enjoyed: the state is
only willing to supply a limited degree and variety of human rights, despite there
being a much greater level of demand for such rights. The chapter illustrates that
the human rights (supplied) in North Korea have distinctive philosophical bases,
but that the regime has tightly restricted access to the types of rights that would
threaten its rule. It limits and dissuades demand for these rights, while national-
ism and a preference for reform over regime change also inhibit such demand
among North Korean citizens. A modest degree of reform by authorities has
produced similarly modest improvements in the availability of rights for ordinary
North Koreans, but the chapter concludes that the China model could further
reduce the gap between the supply of and demand for human rights in North
Korea.
In Chapter 8, David Hundt and Baogang He summarise the main findings
of the volume and reflect on the main lessons that can be drawn from previous
attempts to improve the human rights situation in North Korea, and especially
through the development-led approach. The chapter brings the debate about
the developmental/development-based approach up to date by examining its
achievements. The chapter concludes by considering the relevant paths for-
ward that North Korea could take, should it opt to embrace the developmental
approach in one of its many forms. The regime does not need to look far to find
viable and largely risk-free examples of how it could maintain political control in
North Korea while also delivering a substantial degree of improvement to the
everyday lives of its citizens. It is a question of will rather than capacity, and the
chapter concludes that it is now up to the regime to find the political courage to
embrace one of these viable paths to change.
Notes
1 A/RES/60/1
2 A/HRC/42/10
3 See www.unescap.org/events/north-east-asian-multistakeholder-forum-sustaina
ble-development-goals
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2 North Korea and human rights
The view from the United
Nations
Michael Kirby
The chapter has five sections. Section 2.1 examines the role of the United
Nations in promoting human rights. It is a normative approach against which the
development-based approach can be assessed (see Chapter 1). Section 2.2 dis-
cusses the role of the United Nation Commission of Inquiry concerning the
human rights situation in North Korea. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 investigate the roles
of the United States and South Korea in improving North Korea’s human rights.
This provides the background against which China’s role can be compared and
assessed (see Chapters 3 and 4). Section 2.5 discusses the peril of the current
approach, calling for a greater sense of urgency and realism to effect change.
2.1 The United Nations and its role in human rights

The ultimate origins of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) of the UN Human
Rights Council (HRC) on North Korea can be traced to the global response to
the Second World War and the particular fear over the destructive potential of the
atomic weapons that brought that war to a close.
The outcome of the war was the creation of the United Nations Organisa-
tion, following the adoption of the UN Charter (Charter of the United Nations
1945). In its opening paragraphs, that document identified saving future gen-
erations from “the scourge of war”; and reaffirmation of “faith in fundamen-
tal human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the
equal rights of men and women in nations large and small” as key commitments.
It sought to establish conditions “under which . . . international law might be
maintained; so that social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”
might be attained (Charter of the United Nations 1945, Opening Preamble). It
offered a grand vision for humanity.
In order to attain these ends, to practise tolerance and living together in peace,
to unite “to maintain international peace and security” and to ensure that “armed
force shall not be used, save in the common interest”, the Charter, in the name of
the Peoples of the world, created the United Nations. It defined its purposes and
principles (Charter of the United Nations 1945, chapter I). It provided for its
membership (Charter of the United Nations 1945, chapter II). It also identified
its principal organs (Charter of the United Nations 1945, chapter III).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003174844-3
North Korea and human rights 23
One of those organs was to be a “Security Council” (Charter of the United
Nations 1945, Art. 7.1). The Council was to consist of permanent and non-
permanent members. The permanent members were named (in terms that have
since been updated) as China, France, the Russian Federation, the United King-
dom and the United States of America (the “P5”). Primacy in attaining the stated
objectives of the new organisation was given to the P5, acting within the United
Nations, to protect human rights and the dignity of the human person. Those
objectives were mentioned even before the objective of uniting to maintain peace
and security.
No explicit machinery was adopted by the Charter to define and enforce
“fundamental human rights”. The task of giving meaning to that expression was
assigned to a committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the wartime
leader of the United States. That body recommended the adoption of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The draft was duly accepted nem
con by the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations, meeting in Paris, on
10 December 1948 (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 [217A(III)]).
No court or similar mechanism was created to enforce the UDHR. However,
in the years after 1945 important UN treaties, binding the states parties that
ratified them, were adopted. Agencies were created inter alia to monitor obser-
vance of the UDHR and subsequent treaty law. “Special procedures” were later
established to follow up complaints of infractions. These “special procedures”
eventually included the appointment of “SRs” and “COIs”. The latter proce-
dure involved a serious step towards the detailed investigation of, and report on,
alleged abuses of human rights.
Before the creation of the United Nations, “COIs” had a long history in
international law (see Pollock 1920; Kirby 2015). Initially, UN COIs on human
rights concerns were established by and under the then Human Rights Com-
mission on the initiative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
after that office was established in 1993. When, in 2006, the Human Rights
Commission was replaced by an HRC, the establishment of COIs was, in prac-
tice, reserved to the most serious cases of human rights abuses. Less serious
investigations were generally conducted by designated officials, such as SRs
of the HRC or special representatives of the UN Secretary General (see Kirby
2000, 24; Symonides 2003). The creation of a COI by the HRC invariably
contemplated a more solemn, better resourced, multi-member investigation.
Ordinarily, it addressed more serious and sensitive issues of fact-finding, judge-
ment and recommendations. Commonly, it was viewed as a more significant
political step. Invariably, a proposal to create a COI of the HRC led to a vote
in which, typically, the HRC was divided. Opponents or abstainers were either
countries that were opposed, in principle, to the creation of COIs because of a
risk they commonly presented of political division. Other opponents or sceptics
typically included allies or regional associates of the country concerned. Still
others included states that were inferentially mindful of the risk that they might
themselves run of being subjected to similar detailed investigation, leading to
condemnation. Yet, in the establishment of the COI on Democratic People’s
24 Michael Kirby
Republic of Korea (DPRK), uniquely, there was no call for a vote. The case of
DPRK was, from the start, different.
2.2 The UN COI on DPRK

Korea comprises a peninsula that lies between Japan to the East and China to
the West. That land mass contains a population with an ancient history, common
language, culture and traditions. It has been subjected, over the centuries, to con-
flicts often originating from its two major neighbours or, more rarely, from Russia
to the North. In pre-modern times, Korea was governed as a united polity. The
South was substantially agricultural. The North was mountainous, with valuable
mineral resources and most of the industry that had been created prior to the Sec-
ond World War. In 1910, the peninsula was annexed by the Empire of Japan. The
consequent Japanese colonial occupation lasted until the defeat of that nation in
August 1945, on terms requiring its unconditional surrender (COI on Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2014, 20, 90–94).
At a meeting of Allied leaders in Cairo in 1944, it was proposed that, on the
end of the War, Korea would be divided into two zones of influence: that of the
United States in the South and that of the Soviet Union in the North. This deci-
sion reportedly surprised and pleased Josef Stalin and the Russians. There were
similar plans for the imposition of spheres of influence in Germany and Austria,
to follow their defeat. As a former colonial people, the Koreans were theoreti-
cally titled to enjoy a right to self-determination, certainly under international
law as it later developed (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 1976, Art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, (ICESCR) 1976, Art. 1). However, the Korean people were never
consulted about their post-colonial governance. The division of Korea was simply
imposed upon them. It has never been affirmed by plebiscite or other act of self-
determination. It was imposed by three of the P5 members in the United Nations
and accepted by the rest.
Pursuant to the imposed division, two distinct nation states emerged as suc-
cessors to the Japanese colony and the earlier Korean empire. These were later
established and named the DPRK in the North and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
in the South. The dividing line, arbitrarily drawn within the US State Depart-
ment on a map marked at the 38th Parallel, established the two zones of control.
Occupying US and Soviet armies supervised the creation of the two client states.
Each presented strong elements of autocracy in their government: that of DPRK
being substantially political after the Stalinist model of communism; that of ROK
being substantially military, with a façade of electoral democracy.
On 25 June 1950, the leader of DPRK, Kim Il-sung, after finally securing con-
currence from Stalin and Mao Zedong (COI 2014, 23–24, n.10, 23–24 [102]–
[103]), initiated the Korean War. This was done by the invasion of ROK. The
United Nations Security Council met and resolved in favour of the creation of a
UN military force to repel the invasion. That resolution had only been possible
because of the temporary absence from the Security Council of the Soviet Union,
in protest over the refusal of the UN to accept a change in the credentials of
China in favour of the newly victorious Mao and the People’s Liberation Army.
Ultimately, DPRK forces were driven back towards China, only to be rescued by
the invasion of “volunteers” from China numbering hundreds of thousands of
troops (COI 2014, 25, [104]). A stalemate ensued ultimately coming to rest at
a point close to the original border which then became the Korean demarcation
zone. The Korean War concluded in an armistice reached on 27 July 1953. The
demilitarised zone (DMZ) that now divides the Korean Peninsula is the most
heavily militarised international border in the world. The legacy of the Korean
War remains unresolved. The wounds are still deeply felt in each of the Korean
states. There has never been a peace treaty or a formal end to the Korean War.
After the armistice, each of the Korean states continued to exhibit features
of even more autocratic governance. However, by the 1990s, ROK emerged as
a viable democracy. It changed its government at regular popular elections. It
observed the rule of law. It established powerful courts which even removed
defaulting presidents. It created a strong and inventive economy, growing to
be the eighth strongest in the world. DPRK, on the other hand, suffered long-
term economic misery; recurring famines; and increasingly disturbing reports of
human rights violations. Nonetheless, each of the Korean states was admitted
to membership of the United Nations on the same day, 17 September 1991.
In the Security Council since 1958, Japan has served on 12 occasions as a non-
Permanent member; and since 1991, ROK has been elected on two occasions
(in 1996 and 2013). However, DPRK has never been so elected. After joining
the United Nations, DPRK, like ROK, ratified a number of human rights treaties
sponsored by the United Nations, including the ICCPR. When it later asked how
it could terminate its irksome obligations under the ICCPR, it was told that there
was no facility of withdrawal, a position DPRK apparently accepted.
In 2004, the HRC established a mandate of Special Rapporteur (SR) on Human
Rights in DPRK to respond to the growing reports of serious abuses of human
rights occurring in that country. The original SR, Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn,
Thailand, attempted to fulfil his mandate. However, despite the resolutions of
the HRC urging cooperation on the part of DPRK, this was not forthcoming.
Professor Muntarbhorn was succeeded as SR in 2013 by Mr Marzuki Darusman
Indonesia. His efforts suffered the same fate. There was no cooperation. Admis-
sion to the country was repeatedly denied. DPRK condemned the mandate for
the SR and denounced the appointment as a hostile act. Faced with increasing
numbers of refugees (“defectors”) passing from DPRK often through China to
ROK and persisting complaints of serious wrongs in DPRK, Mr Darusman urged
the HRC to establish a COI (2014, 5, [7]). His report as SR argued for the
need for “an international, independent and impartial inquiry mechanism with
adequate resources to investigate, and more fully document, the grave, systematic
and widespread violations of human rights in the DPRK” (COI 2014, 5, [7]).
The result of this recommendation was consideration by the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (Ms Navi Pillay) in January 2013 of the proposal for
a COI. She referred to the extended record of complaints over decades and the
26 Michael Kirby
added seriousness of the fact that DPRK was by that stage apparently possessed
of nuclear weapons as demonstrated by reports based on seismic tests. The High
Commissioner’s proposal was conveyed to the HRC and brought before it by
its President (Ambassador Hertzel, Poland). For the first time in the history of
the HRC, a COI was established without a call for, or conduct of, a vote. Such
was the widespread concern about the human rights situation reportedly emerg-
ing from information on DPRK and the refusal of DPRK to cooperate in any
way with the United Nations special procedures. The uncooperative attitude had
been confirmed in 2009 when DPRK underwent its first cycle of Universal Peri-
odic Review (UPR). It participated in the process. However, it did not agree to
a single recommendation that was addressed to it for the improvement of human
rights in the country. At last, the United Nations had run out of patience. The
COI was established. Mr Darusman, as SR, and Ms Sonja Biserko (Serbia) were
named as members. The writer was designated Chair of the COI (2014, 5, [3]).
The mandate of the COI on DPRK included a requirement to investigate
and report, with relevant recommendations, on nine substantive areas of con-
cern. These included reported violations of the right to food; violations involv-
ing prison camps; torture and inhuman treatment; violations involving arbitrary
arrest and detention; discrimination, and the systemic denial and violation of
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; violations of freedom of expres-
sion; violations in the right to life; violations of the freedom of individual move-
ment; and enforced disappearances, including abductions of nationals of other
states, notably Japan.
The COI promptly went to work, holding its first meeting in Geneva on 1
July 2013. At that meeting, a methodology was agreed by the members, includ-
ing public hearings; engagement with the international media; and outreach
to DPRK and other countries most affected. Invitations for engagement were
addressed to relevant diplomatic missions in Geneva, including those of DPRK,
ROK, Japan, China, the Russian Federation, the European Union, the French
Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Full coopera-
tion was afforded by ROK, Japan, the European Union, France, the UK and the
United States. DPRK ignored the COI’s approach completely.
The Russian Federation and China agreed to receive visits in Geneva from
the members of the COI. So, eventually did the Lao DPR, Thailand and other
neighbouring states. From the start, there was a distinction between the respec-
tive responses of the Russian Federation and China. The Russian Government
received the COI and its secretariat with courtesy and at the level of its Ambas-
sador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva. China
agreed to a meeting but assigned a medium-level official in the Geneva Mission
to signify its disapproval of the mandate; its unwillingness to cooperate; its refusal
to permit the COI to visit border territories adjoining DPRK; or to meet Chinese
officials or experts in Beijing. The Russian Ambassador approached his interac-
tions with the COI in a candid and realistic way. He indicated that Russia had
been a major financial supporter of DPRK until the collapse of the USSR after
1989. It viewed some reports of human rights abuses in DPRK as a probable
left-over from a form of government which Russia itself had by now discarded
but understood from its shared history. The Russian Ambassador encouraged the
COI, where any reports of improvements in the human rights situation in DPRK
came to notice, to acknowledge these and to express praise and encouragement.
The COI accepted this advice. Later in New York, when an Arria briefing (Kirby
2015, 89, [ALJ 714 at 724]) was conducted with invited members of the Secu-
rity Council, the Russian Ambassador to the Security Council in New York sent
the Deputy Head of Mission to apologise for his “unavoidable” absence. She
insisted that no disrespect towards the COI was intended.
No such courtesy was exhibited by the People’s Republic of China or its rep-
resentatives at any level either in Geneva or in New York. From the start, China’s
attitude was hostile, antagonistic and basically disrespectful. The members of the
COI were, after all, simply performing functions conferred on them by a man-
date lawfully adopted by the United Nations HRC. The members of the COI
understood the position adopted by China, given that it was repeated emphati-
cally many times. The Russian diplomats were more professional. The Chinese
diplomats, by way of contrast, appeared petulant and unprofessional. Perhaps
this was because they were generally junior in rank, itself an apparently deliberate
snub towards the COI.
The methodology adopted by the COI on DPRK proved powerful and effec-
tive. A large body of oral testimony was received in public hearings. These were
conducted after the model of the Anglo-American tradition for the conduct of
public inquiries. The testimony addressed the nine subjects in the COI’s man-
date. It was recorded on film; uploaded to the internet; and supplemented by
transcripts produced from the original oral testimony and provided in the Eng-
lish, Korean and Japanese languages. The testimony was therefore available to
the United Nations and the international community, in particular, in ROK and
Japan. It was not generally available in DPRK. That country has established an
Intranet. However, it allows access to the Internet only to elite supporters or
beneficiaries of the regime. To contentions that the testimony was unreliable, the
COI responded repeatedly by offering to correct any established errors, request-
ing access to the country addressed to DPRK. The COI even invited DPRK to
arrange for representatives to present their evidence and arguments at the public
hearings. These responses were all ignored by DPRK.
At the conclusion of its hearings and deliberations, the COI provided an
advance copy of the manuscript of its draft report to DPRK by way of its repre-
sentatives in Geneva. Again, this was ignored. However, the draft report included,
as an annexure to the text, copy of the letter earlier sent by the COI Chair on
its behalf to Kim Jong Un, Supreme Leader of DPRK (COI 2014, 25). UN
officials questioned the sending of such a letter saying that it was not ordinary
UN practice. However, as the report contained allegations that had not been
answered, the requirements of due process obliged the COI to provide the text of
such allegations to those immediately affected, including the Supreme Leader
of DPRK himself. Specifically, the letter to Kim Jong Un contained a warning
of the findings of violations of human rights made by the COI, including the
28 Michael Kirby
findings of crimes against humanity. It included an express warning about the
“command” principle in international law. By that principle, a person in com-
mand of the actions of others, who knew or should have known that such grave
crimes were being committed yet failed to take all necessary and reasonable meas-
ures to prevent or redress their commission, could be rendered personally liable
for the breach [“including possibly yourself”] (see the letter to the Supreme
Leader dated 30 January 2014 in COI 2014, 25). A warning was also given of
the recommendation in the COI report drawing the situation in DPRK to the
attention of the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this letter and the draft
report attached, the COI received no direct reply. Later it received calumny and
criticism, both published and stated orally, before the HRC and the GA both in
Geneva and in New York when the report was tabled or referred to. However, the
opportunity to engage directly with the COI was ignored.
In response to particular inquiries addressed to the Mission of China in Geneva,
the COI received a letter concerning the treatment of persons claiming, or enti-
tled, to refugee status in China. China is a party to the Refugees Convention and
Protocol of the United Nations. The letter from China in response to the COI’s
inquiries came from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. and Ambassador in the Permanent
Mission of China to the United Nations in Geneva (Wu Haitao) (see the letter
to the Supreme Leader dated 30 January 2014 in COI 2014, 25). Its expressed
position was that DPRK citizens who had entered China illegally “do it for eco-
nomic reasons. Therefore they are not refugees” (Letter from Ambassador Wu
Haitao, 30 December 2013, in COI Report 2014, 33–36). The letter also stated:
I wish to reiterate that China does not support the establishment of the
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea by the Human Rights Council. China’s position remains
unchanged . . . China hopes that the Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in the DPRK can function in an objective and impartial manner, and
not be misled by unproved information. China requests this letter to be
included in the Commission’s report to the Human Rights Council.
It is worth noting at this point that the COI report rejected a number of
the complaints made to it concerning human rights violations on the part of
DPRK. These included allegations that the testimony established proof of the
international crime of genocide. The COI’s conclusion in this respect was based
on the lack of proof that the killing of a population or group of population was
deliberately inflicted “with intent to destroy in whole or part a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such” (COI Report 2014, 350). Specifically, the COI
concluded that the evidence did not prove that the established radical reduc-
tion of the Christian population of North Korea was a result of killing (COI
Report 2014, 351, [1159]). The Commission also rejected as unproved evidence
of the presence and use in DPRK of chemical weapons. It also accepted that
there had been improvements in DPRK’s treatment of persons with disabilities.
However, otherwise, the COI accepted much of the testimony received by it
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China and Human Rights in North Korea Debating A Developmental Approach in Northeast Asia 1st Edition Baogang He (Editor)

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China and Human Rights in North Korea Debating A Developmental Approach in Northeast Asia 1st Edition Baogang He (Editor)

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China and Human Rights in North

Korea Debating a Developmental

Stages of Industrial Development in Asia: A Comparative

Archaeology of East Asia The Rise of Civilization in

Regional Environmental Politics in Northeast Asia

Grounding Human Rights in Human Nature Szymon

A Transnational Human Rights Approach to Human

A Prison in the Woods Environment and Incarceration in

The Birth Of Digital Human Rights: Digitized Data

Education and Society in Post-Mao China (Routledge

Finally, a comprehensive and in-depth analysis on the viability of developmental

Politics of East Asian Free Trade Agreements

ASEAN and Regional Order

The United States’ Subnational Relations with Divided China

Deliberative Democracy in Asia

Chinese Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East

Decolonizing Central Asian International Relation

Russia in the Indo-Pacific

China and Human Rights in North Korea

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Politics-

1 A developmental approach to North Korea’s human

1.1 China and the new politics of human rights 5

2 North Korea and human rights: 22

2.1 The United Nations and its role in human rights 22

3.1 Chinese engagements with the international human

4 A development-based approach to human rights: the

4.1 A critique of mainstream conceptualisations of human

5 Development or human rights first? Japan’s approach

5.1 Three approaches to Japan’s engagement with North

6 Debating human rights and the development-led approach

6.1 Approaches to human rights in South Korea 122

7 North Korean domestic politics and the potential of

7.1 The supply of human rights in North Korea: philosophy and

8 Choosing a developmental approach for and in

8.1 The human rights “war” 171

5.1 Chinese police remove a North Korean woman from the

3.1 Voting record for UNHRC resolution 35/21 57

Danielle Chubb is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin Uni-

The global politics

1.1 China and the new politics of human rights

1.2 The developmental approach to human rights

Buying into the China model?

1.3 The development-based approach and the study

1.4 Aims and organisation of this book

Outline of the book

2.1 The United Nations and its role in human rights

2.2 The UN COI on DPRK

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2 North Korea and human rights: 22

3.1 Chinese engagements with the international human

4.1 A critique of mainstream conceptualisations of human

5.1 Three approaches to Japan’s engagement with North

7.1 The supply of human rights in North Korea: philosophy and

3.1 Voting record for UNHRC resolution 35/21 57

1.2 The developmental approach to human rights

1.3 The development-based approach and the study