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Stanisław Tosza
John A. E. Vervaele Editors
Combatting
Illicit Trade
in Tobacco
Products
In Search of Optimal Enforcement
Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products
Stanisław Tosza • John A. E. Vervaele
Editors
Combatting Illicit Trade

in Tobacco Products
In Search of Optimal Enforcement
Editors
Stanisław Tosza John A. E. Vervaele
Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance Faculty of Law, Economics
University of Luxembourg and Governance, RENFORCE
Luxembourg, Luxembourg University of Utrecht
Utrecht, The Netherlands
ISBN 978-3-030-67801-2 ISBN 978-3-030-67802-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67802-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland
AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by
similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Stanisław Tosza and John A. E. Vervaele
2 Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: Comparative
Analysis of Law and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Stanisław Tosza
3 Smoke and Mirrors: Empirical Research into the Illegal Trade
in Tobacco Products in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Brenda Oude Breuil, Dina Siegel, and Daan van Uhm
4 Enforcement of Policies Against Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products in Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Vanessa Franssen and Ana Laura Claes
Products in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Martin Böse and David Kober
6 Enforcement of Policies Against the Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Alessandro Bernardi, Valentina Felisatti, and Anna Francesca Masiero
Products in Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Peter Gjørtler and Laura Grava
Products in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Aart J. de Vries
Products in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
Witold Zontek
v
vi Contents
10 The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Policies in Combatting Illicit

Tobacco Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
Machiko Kanetake
11 Trends and Challenges in Combating Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
Matija Kajić and Stanisław Tosza
Editors and Contributors
About the Editors
Stanisław Tosza is an Associate Professor of Compliance and Law Enforcement at

the University of Luxembourg, where he researches and teaches compliance law,
comparative and European criminal law, white-collar crime, and cyberlaw, and
where he is also the co-director of the Bachelor program in Law. He is the Secretary
General of the AIDP (International Association of Penal Law).
John A. E. Vervaele is a Professor of Economic and European Criminal Law, as

well co-director of the Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe
(RENFORCE), at Utrecht University. In Bruges, he is a Professor of European
Criminal Law at the College of Europe. He has been the President of the AIDP
(International Association of Penal Law) since 2014.
List of Contributors
Alessandro Bernardi Department of Law, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy

Martin Böse Institute for Criminal Law, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Brenda Oude Breuil Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,
University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Ana Laura Claes University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
vii
viii Editors and Contributors
Aart J. de Vries Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,

Valentina Felisatti Department of Law, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy
Vanessa Franssen University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Peter Gjørtler Riga Graduate School of Law, Riga, Latvia
Laura Grava Riga, Latvia
Matija Kajić Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,
Machiko Kanetake Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,
David Kober District Court of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Anna Francesca Masiero Department of Law, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy
Dina Siegel Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE, University
of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Stanisław Tosza Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, University of Luxem-
bourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Daan van Uhm Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,
John A. E. Vervaele Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,
Witold Zontek Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
Chapter 1
Introduction
Stanisław Tosza and John A. E. Vervaele
Abstract This chapter provides the introduction to the book. It sets out the context
of the topic and explains the research presented in this book, the relevant legal
framework and institutional actors as well as the methodology of the research. The
chapter explains the structure of the book and provides brief summaries of each
chapter.
Producing and trading in illegal cigarettes is a very profitable business. It is relatively

easy to set up an illegal cigarette factory, while the revenues are elevated with a low
risk of being caught and punished. It is estimated that the first container of cigarettes
that such a factory can produce can yield about €1.5 million, meaning that the profits
already cover the costs of setting up that factory. At the same time, a functioning
factory can easily produce per day an amount of illegal cigarettes resulting in a loss
of €500,000 in unpaid fiscal duties.1 The illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP), be
they counterfeit major-brand cigarettes or new labels (so-called cheap whites), is a
very common practice both within the EU and emanating from third countries and
transported into the EU. It is however also a very dynamic market. Actors, drivers
and trading patterns have changed a great deal over the last decade. Cheap whites
produced legally in state factories in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, but smuggled into
the EU, have become much more important. The transferral of production locations
for counterfeit cigarettes to the Netherlands and Belgium is also a recent phenom-
enon. On the other hand, genuine cigarettes from the big four brands that are
1
Oude Breuil et al. (this volume), Sect. 3.2.5.
S. Tosza (*)
Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
e-mail: stanislaw.tosza@uni.lu
J. A. E. Vervaele
Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE, University of Utrecht, Utrecht,
The Netherlands
e-mail: J.A.E.Vervaele@uu.nl
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

S. Tosza, J. A. E. Vervaele (eds.), Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67802-9_1
2 S. Tosza and J. A. E. Vervaele
smuggled into and within the EU have decreased during the last few years. Many
specialised criminal networks have set up highly flexible smuggling patterns and
local production units and offer what the local black markets are demanding. Some
of them also invest in advanced technology and/or are very active in the digital
markets.
ITTP does not only have repercussions in the form of losses to the state and EU
budget. By offering cheap cigarettes, it fundamentally undermines health policies
oriented towards gradually diminishing the smoking population and exposure to
tobacco smoke through limiting the availability of tobacco products. Furthermore,
this relatively low-risk activity presents an excellent source of income for organised
criminal groups and fuels further crime.
At the same time enforcement efforts against ITTP are insufficient. Relatively few
cases relating to the illicit tobacco trade are detected—and thereby subsequently
prosecuted and/or sanctioned—in the European Union.2 So far, the EU legislator has
focused on the regulation of the licit market (recently with Directive 2014/40/EU of
3 April 2014 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative pro-
visions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of
tobacco and related products). The EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) plays an impor-
tant role in enforcement, namely by coordinating or conducting administrative
investigations throughout the EU. However, OLAF does not have the capacity to
investigate all cases of illicit tobacco trade in the EU and most of them are dealt with
at the national level. Furthermore, OLAF’s powers are limited: on the one hand, it is
often the case that OLAF cannot use autonomous investigative powers, but depends
on cooperation with national authorities; on the other hand, OLAF does not have
judicial investigative powers or administrative sanctioning powers at all. OLAF’s
investigations conclude with a report that is transmitted to the national authorities,
which undertake actions and sanctions that they consider appropriate.3
Two key international instruments set the regulatory and enforcement standard as
regards the tobacco market. As for the regulatory standard, the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control provides rules aimed at lowering the demand for
and the supply of tobacco products.4 It has a widespread global impact as the
countries which are parties to that Convention represent more than 90% of the
world population.5 The enforcement standard is set by the Protocol to that Conven-
tion (Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products), which entered into
force on 25 September 2018. The Protocol provides for a set of rules relating to
2
This will become clear in the research presented in this book, see Chaps. 2–9. See also: EU
Commission, ‘Stepping up the fight against cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit trade in
tobacco products - A comprehensive EU Strategy’ (Communication) COM (2013) 324 final, 11–16;
Gruszczynski (2013), p. 96.
3
Luchtman et al. (2019) and Vervaele (2019).
4
WHO (World Health Organization) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) adopted
on 21 May 2003.
5
Parties to the WHO (World Health Organization) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) www.who.int/fctc/cop/en, accessed 29 April 2021.
1 Introduction 3
supply chain control, as well as a list of unlawful forms of conduct which should be
addressed by State Parties (although not necessarily by means of criminal law),
procedural rules on investigation and international cooperation. This is of key
importance as it sets the enforcement standard at the national level. However, the
parties to that Protocol are much less numerous: only 62 State Parties at the time of
writing.6 One of the so far unanswered questions is to what extent this Protocol is
and will enhance enforcement against the ITTP at the national level and further
international cooperation in combating that phenomenon. However, it is still too
early to assess its full impact, as many countries have only very recently become
parties to the Protocol and have adapted their laws accordingly (e.g. the Netherlands
only in 2020). However, it already plays an important role in shaping national
enforcement and it is against this background that the research presented in this
book is set.
The foremost objective of this book, which has resulted from a 3-year research
project, is to understand the current state of ITTP, its modalities and factors con-
tributing to ITTP as well as to examine the enforcement of measures to prevent this
phenomenon. The aim of this book is to contribute to a reflection on the enforcement
of measures to prevent the illicit tobacco trade in the EU, with a particular focus—
but not limited to—smuggling from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. In order to
achieve these aims it is necessary to understand not only the underlying legal
framework, but also the modus operandi of criminal organisations engaged in
ITTP and the practice of enforcement authorities combating it in order to identify
obstacles to effective and optimal enforcement, and to provide recommendations on
how to overcome them.
The objectives of this research can be phrased as questions to which this book
intends to provide answers: How is the illegal tobacco trade in Europe organised?
How do national authorities enforce the prohibition of illicit tobacco trade, taking
into account their international and EU obligations? How does law enforcement
praxis in different EU countries impact on this trade? How can that praxis be
improved to address the illicit tobacco trade? How can the EU influence third states’
policies to diminish the smuggling of illicit tobacco products into the EU?
In order to provide answers to these questions, which is done in the ten chapters
constituting this book, a variety of methods have been applied: legal comparative,
qualitative and quantitative criminological research as well as policy analysis.
Besides a legal analysis (‘law in the books’), a key part of that research were
interviews with law enforcement authorities in order to study how the law is applied,
and what the factors behind enforcement gaps are (‘law in action’).
The book will start with a chapter which synthesises and draws conclusions from
the research undertaken in the framework of this study and critically examines its
results (Chap. 2). This chapter builds on the criminological research and presents the
results of a comparative analysis of the trends in the legal design and practical
6
The list of State Parties, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_
no¼IX-4-a&chapter¼9&clang¼_en, accessed 29 April 2021.
enforcement of policies against ITTP, including efforts to influence countries

neighbouring the EU, pointing out the best practices and the shortcomings and
suggesting where improvements can be made to better address the phenomenon of
the illegal production of and trade in tobacco products. It will be followed by the
chapters providing components of this study according to the following order:
Firstly, Chap. 3 will present empirical research combining qualitative and quan-
titative research methods that has been conducted in order to identify loopholes in
the prevention of the illicit tobacco trade. As for the latter aspect, descriptive
statistical analyses were carried out to scrutinize what investigating officers confis-
cate, the source and destination countries and what kinds of smuggling methods are
used. Clarifications on such analyses were sought through interviews with
law-enforcement officials and experts. As for the qualitative research, in order to
obtain an in-depth understanding of the illicit trade process, the team of criminolo-
gists conducted multi-sited ‘instant’ ethnography. Contrary to ‘normal’ ethnography,
instant ethnography focuses uniquely on the moment(s) that the illicit behaviour
actually takes place. It starts at the street vending point in one of the destination
countries; from there the road that the cigarettes have travelled is traced back through
techniques of observation, interviews with experts, and informal conversations with
people directly involved in the trafficking (e.g. vendors, business operators, enforce-
ment officials, local facilitators, etc.).
The criminological resarch will be followed by several chapters presenting
national legal enforcement systems combating ITTP (Chaps. 4–9, respectively).
This analysis includes such aspects as the national supply chain control mechanisms,
offences and available sanctions penalising ITTP-related conduct, administrative
and criminal enforcement mechanisms (the investigative techniques available, pre-
cautionary measures, seizure, forfeiture, and asset disposal, interaction between
administrative and criminal proceedings, out of court settlements, etc.) as well as
aspects of cross-border cooperation.
For this comparative analysis, we have selected six EU Member States: Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland. This selection offered excellent
opportunities to study countries which not only differ as regards their enforcement
mechanisms and adherence to the Protocol (four out of these six countries have
ratified the Protocol, Poland and Italy are still to do so), but which also have a
different legal history, economic and geographical conditions and cultural attitudes
towards smoking. Thanks to this selection, we can examine EU countries (Poland
and Latvia) which are the direct neighbours of countries where the significant
production of ITTP takes place (Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia). Belgium, Italy,
and the Netherlands are also significant points of entry for smuggled tobacco
given their significant maritime borders and major cargo ports (Antwerp and Rot-
terdam). Belgium and the Netherlands have also become important locations for
illegal factories under the control of criminal networks from Ukraine and Poland.
Finally, Germany is one of the key transit and destination countries with a significant
illicit market: the estimated annual tax damage to the German treasury has been more
1 Introduction 5
than €100 million in recent years.7 As will be demonstrated, these countries have
different approaches to enforcement mechanisms with different roles being played
by administrative and criminal authorities, and with agencies combining both func-
tions. This selection will offer the reader a panorama of problems and solutions
providing a good representation of ITTP-related issues in the EU.
This examination of national systems is complemented by an analysis of the illicit
tobacco market and its prevention in the U.S. This country is one of the biggest
producers of tobacco worldwide with a significant internal smuggling problem
resulting from important differences in prices between different states. Besides this
challenge, the U.S. situation is also characterised by numerous different agencies at
different levels (both state and federal) with potentially overlapping competencies,
resulting in a rather patchy enforcement strategy (Chap. 10).
Thirdly, an examination of EU policies towards Eastern neighbours has been
conducted. As already mentioned, a significant proportion of the production of ITTP,
subsequently smuggled into the EU, takes place in countries such as Ukraine,
Belarus or Moldova. Hence, the last chapter of the book will study and scrutinise
policies which aim to curb this production by enhancing enforcement efforts that are
already in place in these countries (Chap. 11).
The objective of this research is to provide valuable input for a policy assessment
by the EU and the Member States of the enforcement of measures to prevent ITTP
and to provide inspiration for further questions in this field: How can administrative
and criminal enforcement be improved, taking into account the important health and
tax issues at stake? What must be done to elaborate an EU-wide comprehensive
enforcement policy aiming at countering and dismantling the organised criminal
networks in the field and thus going beyond national tax enforcement efforts?
Should the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which just started on 1 June
2021, in cooperation with European enforcement agencies, like Europol and
Eurojust, and the national enforcement communities establish a new strategy for
combating ITTP? Should the countering of ITTP become an integral part of
European integrated border management by Frontex?
This research would not have been possible without institutional support from
Utrecht University and the hard work of members of the research team. We would
like to thank Utrecht University for its financial and structural support. The research
for and the preparation of this book have been done with no support from third
parties, including the tobacco industry itself; it was entirely financed by Utrecht
University.
We are extremely grateful for the dedication of the Utrecht University team
composed of the criminology section: Brenda Oude Breuil, Dina Siegel and Daan
van Uhm as well as Bart Berkhuysen and Melissa Prins who assisted them; and the
legal section: Machiko Kanetake, Aart de Vries, and Matija Kajić (who had already
greatly helped us as a student assistant and later joined the team). A big thank you is
extended to the experts who prepared the national chapters: Vanessa Franssen, Ana
7
Bundestag document No 19/17630, p. 11.
Laura Claes, Martin Böse, David Kober, Alessandro Bernardi, Valentina Felisatti,
Anna Francesca Masiero, Peter Gjørtler, Laura Grava and Witold Zontek. They
tirelessly collected precious information, which was not always easily available in
the countries researched in this book. We also extend our gratitude to all national and
EU practitioners, policy makers and academics who kindly agreed to provide us with
a great deal of extremely valuable information.
We are also grateful to former members of the Utrecht team, in particular to
Michele Simonato, who had a crucial impact on the original design of this project, as
well as to invaluable student assistants: Dārta Mendziņa and Solveig Kreinsen. We
would also like to thank our English-language proofreaders and editors from
Springer.
References
Bundestag document No 19/17630

EU Commission (2013) ‘Stepping up the fight against cigarette smuggling and other forms of illicit
trade in tobacco products - A comprehensive EU Strategy’ (Communication) COM 324 final,
11–16
Gruszczynski L (2013) The WHO protocol to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products: a next step
in international control of tobacco products. Eur J Risk Regul 4:91
Luchtman M, Karagianni A, Bovend’Eerdt K (2019) EU Administrative Investigations and the Use
of Their Results as Evidence in National Punitive Proceedings. In: Giuffrida F, Ligeti K (eds)
Admissibility of OLAF Final Reports as Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. https://orbilu.uni.lu/
bitstream/10993/40141/1/ADCRIM_final_report.pdf, Accessed 29 Apr 2021
Oude Breuil B, Siegel D, van Uhm D (this volume) Smoke and mirrors. Empirical research into the
illegal trade in tobacco products in Europe (Chapter 3). In: Tosza S, Vervaele JAE (eds)
Combatting illicit trade in tobacco products: in search of optimal enforcement. Springer, Cham
Vervaele J (2019) Lawful and fair use of evidence from a European Human Rights Perspective. In:
Giuffrida F, Ligeti K (eds) Admissibility of OLAF Final Reports as Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings. https://orbilu.uni.lu/bitstream/10993/40141/1/ADCRIM_final_report.pdf.
Accessed 29 Apr 2021
Stanisław Tosza is Associate Professor in Compliance and Law Enforcement at the University of
Luxembourg, where he researches and teaches compliance law, comparative and European criminal
law, white-collar crime, and cyberlaw, and where he is also the co-director of the Bachelor program
in Law. He is the Secretary General of the AIDP (International Association of Penal Law).
John A.E. Vervaele is Professor in economic and European criminal law, as well co-director of the
Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe (RENFORCE), at Utrecht University. In
Bruges he is Professor in European criminal law at the College of Europe. He has been the President
of the AIDP (International Association of Penal Law) since 2014.
Chapter 2
Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products: Comparative Analysis of Law
and Practice
Stanisław Tosza
Abstract Illicit production and trade in tobacco products—be they counterfeited

cigarettes of major brands, smuggled into or produced within the EU, or tobacco
products produced under new labels (so-called cheap whites) illicitly introduced to
the market—jeopardises the goals of tobacco policies and lowers the revenues of the
EU and of the national budget. It also fuels organised crime, providing it with—as
will be shown below—relatively easy opportunities for lucrative illegal business.
This chapter will analyse and synthesise the outcome of the research in this book. Its
aim is to show similarities and differences between national approaches and tenden-
cies in enforcement against the illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP). Furthermore,
its objective is to identify positive aspects of the current enforcement practice as well
as shortcomings hampering the fight against this phenomenon, resulting in
enforcement gaps.
2.1 Introduction
Illicit production and trade in tobacco products—be they counterfeited cigarettes of

major brands, smuggled into or produced within the EU, or tobacco products
produced under new labels (so-called cheap whites) illicitly introduced to the
market—jeopardises the goals of tobacco policies and lowers the revenues of the
EU and of the national budget. It also fuels organised crime, providing it with—as
will be shown below—relatively easy opportunities for lucrative illegal business.
This chapter will analyse and synthesise the outcome of the research in this book.
Its aim is to show similarities and differences between national approaches and
tendencies in enforcement against the illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP).
Furthermore, its objective is to identify positive aspects of the current enforcement
S. Tosza (*)
Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
e-mail: stanislaw.tosza@uni.lu
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 7

S. Tosza, J. A. E. Vervaele (eds.), Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67802-9_2
8 S. Tosza
practice as well as shortcomings hampering the fight against this phenomenon,

resulting in enforcement gaps.
In order to analyse the phenomenon of ITTP in its complexity, in accordance with
the objectives of this project (see Chap. 1), this chapter draws from all the other
chapters of this book. It is based on criminological findings presented in Chap. 3,
research into national systems in Chaps. 4–9, the analysis of the relationship between
the EU and its Eastern neighbours in combatting ITTP in Chap. 10 and the trends and
challenges in combatting ITTP in the US in Chap. 11. A large part of the analysis
will be based on the research into the legal systems of six EU Member States—
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland—representing differ-
ent legal traditions and presenting different challenges given their history, their
tobacco market and consumption practices, their geographical place on the ITTP
map, and differences in the prices of legal tobacco products as well as in legal and
enforcement traditions. As the key international law instrument against ITTP is the
WHO Protocol to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products (hereafter: the Protocol),
the compliance of the analysed legal systems with its requirements will be one of the
key focuses of this chapter. Two out of the six countries—Italy and Poland—are not
party to the Protocol, at least not yet, but they comply already, as will be shown, with
some of its elements, although not with all of them. The US is also not party to the
protocol and the ITTP and enforcement against it present different challenges and
different features, as can be seen in Chap. 6. For these reasons, the U.S. will not be
subject to a fully-fledged comparison in contrast to the other national chapters, but
will serve to show a different dimension of the complexity involved in combatting
ITTP (e.g., smuggling from Tribal lands). Finally, it should be noted that, as regards
trafficking into the EU, this research focused mainly on the ITTP linked with the
Eastern border of the EU.1
This chapter will start with a brief outline of the basic tendencies in smoking and
in the licit tobacco market in order to demonstrate the space for the illicit trade in
tobacco products (Sect. 2.2) and with a presentation of the complex legal framework
regulating enforcement against ITTP and the structure of that enforcement (Sect.
2.3). It will proceed by analysing the components of supply chain control (Sect. 2.4).
Next, the elements composing the panorama of enforcement action against ITTP will
be studied: definition of offences, sanctions and other consequences (Sect. 2.5), the
competent authorities (Sect. 2.6), procedural aspects of enforcement (Sect. 2.7), and
rules and practices of international cooperation (Sect. 2.8). The chapter will close
with some comparative conclusions (Sect. 2.9).
1
As to the trafficking of cigarettes, and other aspects of trafficking through the Balkan route, see in
particular: Closing the implementation gap. Criminal justice responses to illicit trade in South
Eastern Europe and associated challenges, Siracusa Institute. See also: Nowak (2021); Transcrime,
European Outlook on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, 2015.
2 Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: Comparative Analysis of Law. . . 9
2.2 Basic Parameters of Licit and Illicit Tobacco Trade

and Markets
We can observe two features of the tobacco market in the EU: a steadily decreasing
level of the population that smokes cigarettes and an increasing level of prices of
cigarettes composed mostly of different taxes. The former trend is influenced by the
high prices, with the price of cigarettes having an even bigger impact on youth
smoking than it has on adult smoking.2 It is not, however, the only reason, as quitting
or not taking up smoking is also influenced by the growing awareness of the
detrimental effects of smoking on health,3 and can also be a result of deliberate
anti-smoking policies, which include banning smoking in public places and increas-
ing the cost of cigarettes.4 Overall, in the countries under investigation here, the
recent level of smoking is around or slightly above 20% of the population.5 This is
lower in the US, estimated at around 14% of the adult population.6 This does not
have to mean, however, that this percentage of the population spends considerably
on cigarettes. For instance, in the Netherlands, only 2.8% of the population can be
considered heavy smokers, i.e., those who smoke more than 20 cigarettes a day.7 In
Latvia, this percentage is greater, at 8.1% of the population, but still significantly
lower than the overall smoking population of 24.1% of Latvians.8
Cigarettes are the most frequently consumed tobacco product. E-cigarettes are
still a relatively niche product: for instance in Germany long-term consumers of
e-cigarettes are rare, they are estimated at around 2.6%.9 The interviewed practi-
tioners pointed out shisha or water pipe tobacco as an emerging challenge on the
illicit tobacco market.10
What is crucial for the long-term development of the tobacco market, however, is
the evident decrease in the number of smokers among the underage population. For
instance, in Germany that number decreased from 27.5% in 2001 to 7.8% in 2015.11
Combatting ITTP is crucial as regards that sector of the population. As their buying
power is lower, they resort more often to cheaper illicit tobacco products. This may
very well result in addiction, making them consumers of licit or illicit tobacco further
on in life. Even though the advertisement of tobacco products is forbidden in the
2
National Research Council (2015), p. 26.
3
See for instance Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.2.1.
4
E.g., the Netherlands, de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.2.1.1.
5
Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.2.1; Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.2.1.1; de
Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.2.1; Gjørtler and Grava (this volume), Sect. 7.2.1. Zontek (this volume),
Sect. 9.2.1.1.
6
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 2021.
7
de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.2.1.
8
Gjørtler and Grava (this volume), Sect. 7.2.1.
9
Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (2018).
10
11
Orth (2016), p. 26.
10 S. Tosza
EU,12 the tobacco industry seemingly targets this group using, for instance,
influencers on social media.13
The prices of cigarettes in the EU Member States vary, but can in general be
considered high in comparison with the buying power of a given population. The
price of a pack of 20 cigarettes ranges from between €2.70–4 in Poland, through an
average of €6 in Germany, up to €9 in Belgium and in the Netherlands.14 The level
of prices is mostly affected by high taxation, to the point that, for instance in
Germany, it constitutes the second most profitable excise tax (taxes on energy
being the first).15 The prices are more varied in the US, where the combination of
state and local taxes results in significant differences. New York and Chicago have
the highest retail prices, with the state excise tax of $4.35 and $3 per pack for the
states of New York and Illinois respectively, to which must be added local taxes. In
comparison, the state excise tax in Virginia is $0.30 per pack.16 As a result, a pack of
cigarettes will cost around $12–13 in the state of New York or Illinois, while costing
only slightly above $5 in Virginia.17
This price variation creates two opportunities for illicit tobacco trafficking.
Firstly, it creates an opportunity to explore the price differences within one market
(intra-EU or US), where cigarettes legally sold in one (EU or US) state with lower
prices are transported and sold in the states with higher prices and corresponding
taxes (bootlegging or smuggling). Secondly, the high level of taxes creates an
incentive to avoid them altogether.
From the perspective of the consumer, it might not matter how the cheap product
has been obtained, as it is the low price that creates the demand, regardless of
whether the products come from cross-border smuggling, counterfeiting or illicit
manufacturing.18 From the perspective of the offer, we can differentiate several ways
of bringing tobacco products to the illicit market, which may also present different
legal issues. There is the smuggling (or bootlegging in the US) of legal cigarettes
from a country or state with lower taxation to the one with higher taxation. Smug-
gling (e.g., into the EU) may also concern illicit products: counterfeited brands or
cheap whites. Instead of being smuggled, cigarettes of both categories may also be
produced within the EU borders. As to cheap whites, they are new cigarettes brands
which are produced in a legal, non-clandestine manner (e.g., in Ukraine or Belarus),
but not licensed in the destination market (e.g. the EU), hence they become illicit
12
Article 3 of the Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May
2003 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member
States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, OJ L 152, 20.6.2003,
pp. 16–19.
13
Rowell (2020) and Marsh (2020).
14
Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.2.1; Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.2.1.2; de
Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.2.1.3; Zontek (this volume), Sect. 9.2.1.2.
15
Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.2.1.2.
16
Kajić and Tosza (this volume), Sect. 11.1.3.
17
https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/cigarette-prices-by-state.
18
once they are brought into and offered on that market.19 Finally, some cheap white
brands have become relatively long established, and they may also be
counterfeited.20
One of the significant tendencies is that, while illicit tobacco used to be mainly
produced outside the EU, growing numbers of factories are being found within the
EU and, in particular, increasingly in Western Europe. Production has moved closer
to the consumer, putting increasing pressure on law enforcement authorities in
countries like Belgium and the Netherlands.21 In terms of methods of selling, the
use of the Internet and postal order services were also named as an emerging
challenge.22
The illicit trade in tobacco products has several detrimental consequences justi-
fying the need, in consequence, for increased and effective enforcement. In the first
place, ITTP reduces the resources of the national (and EU) treasury by depriving it of
the excise and other taxes that should be paid on the cigarettes.23 For instance, the
annual loss to the German treasury is estimated at more than €100 million in recent
years.24 Secondly and more widely, ITTP jeopardises those health policies aimed at
lowering the demand for cigarettes by increasing their prices. This has not only a
short-term impact linked with immediate availability of cheap tobacco products, but,
given the highly addictive nature of these products, the possibility for underage or
young people to easily acquire cigarettes increases the chances that they will remain
smokers in later life. Thirdly, illicit tobacco products tend to be of a poorer quality,
with some containing significant amounts of harmful substances. However, cheap
whites are usually considered to be of a decent quality.25 Finally, ITTP constitutes a
lucrative source of income for organised crime, fuelling the commission of further
crime.26 The following sections will analyse the panorama of elements constituting
enforcement against ITTP.
19
Ellis (2017), pp. 5–6.
20
Oude Breuil et al. (this volume), Sect. 3.3.1.1.
21
22
Oude Breuil et al. (this volume), Sect. 3.5.1. This research does not focus on the illicit tobacco
trade carried out through postal services or the Internet. On that topic, see in particular: Babuta
et al. (2018).
23
INTERPOL (2014), p. 46.
24
Bundestag document No 19/17630, p. 11.
25
Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.1.
26
Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.1.
12 S. Tosza
2.3 Legal Framework and Strategies Against Illicit

Tobacco Trade
Tobacco policy enforcement at the national level is generally composed of two

elements: firstly, regulatory market surveillance, concerning the health and safety of
the product and consumer protection, which also includes advertisement, sale and
smoking restrictions and, secondly, the enforcement of fiscal aspects of tobacco
products.
The first element is typically under the supervision of the ministries responsible
for health, for instance in the Netherlands (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport) or
food, for instance in Germany (Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture).
Specialised agencies take care of enforcement, such as the Dutch Food and Con-
sumer Product Safety Authority or the Belgian Federal Public Service of Health,
Food Chain Safety and Environment (FPS Health), which contains a specialised
Tobacco and Alcohol Inspection Body. These agencies have punitive powers to
impose administrative fines.27
The market surveillance aspects are usually addressed in laws specifically
targeting tobacco, such as the German Act on Tobacco Products and Related
Products,28 or the Latvian Law on the Handling of Tobacco Products.29
The fiscal aspect is usually under the supervision of the ministries of finance and
is enforced by the specialised fiscal agencies, such as the German Federal Financial
Administration, the Belgian Federal Public Service of Finance (FPS Finance), the
Dutch Tax and Customs Administration or the Polish National Revenue
Administration.
Overall, the enforcement against fiscal and customs infringements prevails over
other aspects of ITTP, which is reflected in a more robust criminal enforcement and
in higher penalties for infringements. This is not necessarily linked specifically to
combatting ITTP, but rather to the place which tax and customs enforcement takes in
general. One should bear in mind that the engagement of customs authorities is not
necessarily linked only with recovering the lost state and EU revenue, but also with
non-financial tasks, such as countering illegal goods or smuggling. Moreover, in
cross-border situations, particularly common as regards ITTP, customs authorities
naturally play a central role.
As to the punitive aspect of fiscal and customs enforcement, investigation can be
in the hands of the Police, such as in Belgium, which has a special Division of
Economic and Financial Offences (EcoFin), which cooperates with the Public
Prosecutor’s Office or an investigating judge and is supported by the Federal Public
Service of Finance (FPS Finance).30 Another possibility is a specialised criminal
27
For instance the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, de Vries (this volume),
Sect. 8.2.2.1.
28
29
30
Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.2.2.
enforcement authority as in Italy, where Guardia di Finanza and the Agenzia delle
Dogane e dei Monopoli (ADM), have the competence to combat smuggling, with the
latter focussing only on customs matters.31 Finally, the Polish model provides a
specialised agency for the collection of fiscal duties (the National Revenue Admin-
istration) with a division organised in a manner similar to the police service (e.g. in
terms of hierarchical structure, wearing uniform, etc.) which conducts criminal
investigations with the support of regular police and other criminal enforcement
agencies.32 A similar model is in place in the Netherlands, where the Fiscal Intelli-
gence and Investigation Service (FIOD) is under the jurisdiction of the fiscal
authorities, and which investigates under the leadership of the Dutch Public Prose-
cution Service.33
It is reported that the countries studied do not have strategies particularly
designed to combat ITTP.34 However, combatting ITTP appears sometimes within
a larger anti-smoking policy.35 For instance, in the Netherlands the enforcement
authorities deliberately limit their efforts as regards protection of the interests of the
tobacco industry and prevention of anticompetitive practices in the tobacco products
market, even though trademark counterfeiting of tobacco brands is prosecuted by the
authorities.36 More often, combatting ITTP belongs to a more general strategy of
combatting tax and customs fraud which, for instance, in Poland and Belgium
particularly mentions ITTP. In Poland that strategy has been designed to realise
the 2nd Action Plan to fight the illicit tobacco trade 2018–2022.37,38 The Belgian
documents enumerated problems which are of particular importance for ITTP,
namely the smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes from China and of cigarettes from
Eastern Europe, as well as the smuggling of cheap whites, the illegal storage of
tobacco products in warehouses in Belgium for further shipping to other EU Member
States, and the smuggling of shisha.39 Interestingly, the illegal production of ciga-
rettes on Belgian territory has not yet been mentioned in these documents, which—
probably—can be explained by the fact that this is a rather recent phenomenon. The
strategy also does not address two important problems identified by the authors of
31
Bernardi et al. (this volume), Sect. 6.1.2.
32
Zontek (this volume), Sect. 9.2.2.1.
33
de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.2.2.1.
34
For instance: Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.2.2.2; de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.2.2.2.
35
36
37
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European
Economic and Social Committee 2nd Action Plan to fight the illicit tobacco trade 2018-2022,
COM/2018/846 final.
38
39
14 S. Tosza
the Belgian chapter, namely the lack of cooperation between competent agencies,
including cross-border and understaffed authorities, and the decreasing number of
personnel dedicated to combatting ITTP.40
The legislative framework reflects the above enforcement design. As to the fiscal
aspects, the most important legal acts are general laws regulating and enforcing fiscal
provisions, e.g. General Law on Customs and Excise and General Excise Act in
Belgium,41 or the German Customs Administration Act and the Fiscal Code.42 These
general provisions are complemented by sectorial fiscal regulations, such as the
Belgian Act on the tax regime for manufactured tobacco, or the German Tobacco
Duty Act.
As to criminal law enforcement, the criminal codes and codes of criminal
procedure are of key importance. Their rules are supplemented or modified by
more specific laws on economic or fiscal crime (e.g. the German or the Polish fiscal
codes) or by regulating a particular sector (e.g. the Belgian Consumers’ Health Act).
The national legal framework is also influenced by the EU and the international
legal framework, the latter depending on the accession to international legal stan-
dards. The international legal framework is composed of two instruments: the WHO
(World Health Organization) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
and the Protocol to this Convention. The Convention is of crucial importance as it
sets out the basic global regulatory framework providing rules on the reduction of the
demand and supply of tobacco products.43
The key element of the legal framework of enforcement is the Protocol which sets
the international standard in combatting ITTP.44 It was adopted in Seoul on
12 November 2012 and entered into force on 25 September 2018. It has been ratified,
at the moment of writing, by 62 countries, including the European Union, which
played a crucial role in its adoption.45 The Protocol is composed of a set of control
measures on the supply chain, some rules on liability, including criminal measures,
and rules on procedure and international cooperation (see Sect. 2.4).46
All of the countries which are the subjects of this research, namely Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland, are parties to the Convention as
of 7 June 2021. The US signed the Convention in 2004, but never ratified it.47 As to
40
41
42
43
WHO (World Health Organization) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) adopted
on 21 May 2003 (the Convention).
44
WHO Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, adopted on 12 November 2012 (the
Protocol).
45
The list of State Parties, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_
no¼IX-4-a&chapter¼9&clang¼_en, accessed 29 April 2021.
46
OLAF, ‘New Action Plan reaffirms Commission in leading role in fight against cigarette
smuggling’ (OLAF Press Release No 13/2018, 2018), On the Protocol see also: Tosza (2021).
47
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_no¼IX-4&chapter¼9&
clang¼_en.
the Protocol, Belgium, Germany, Latvia, and the Netherlands, are parties to the
Protocol, while Italy, Poland and the US have not even signed it.
At the EU level, the legal framework regarding tobacco products is composed
mainly of the Tobacco Advertising Directive of 2003 and the Tobacco Products
Directive of 2014. Mention should also be made of the agreements signed with the
four major tobacco producers, of which three are still in force.48 The Tobacco
Advertising Directive of 200349 has a less direct importance for ITTP enforcement.
It prohibits tobacco advertising in printed media and information society services
and—in general—also on the radio. This prohibition is further extended to all forms
of audiovisual commercial communications by the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive (2010/13/EU).50 It is the Tobacco Products Directive of 2014 which is
more important for the enforcement against ITTP, as it provides the track and trace
rules (Arts. 15 and 16).51 To these tobacco-focused instruments should be added
more general instruments, especially those regarding the protection of the EU’s
financial interests, namely Regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the European
Communities financial interests,52 and Directive 2017/1371 on the fight against
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law.53
2.4 Supply Chain Control
The Protocol provides a set of rules setting up the system of control of the tobacco
supply chain. EU legislation, in particular the Tobacco Products Directive, provides
some additional rules in that respect. Overall, as will be shown below, most of these
requirements are complied with, either directly, or through other provisions with
similar effect. The rest of this section will address the most important elements of the
control of the supply chain.
48
See more in details in this chapter, Sect. 2.4. On the Agreements, see also Tosza (2021).
49
Directive 2003/33/EC of 26 May 2003 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of
tobacco products.
50
Art. 9 (1) (d) of the Directive 2010/13/EU of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive).
51
Directive 2014/40/EU of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and
sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC (Tobacco Products
Directive).
52
Council Regulation No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European
Communities financial interests.
53
Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the
fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law.
16 S. Tosza
Licensing
Licensing may be focused on the quality of the product or on the fiscal aspect. A few
of the countries reported obligations linked to the quality of the product,
e.g. Germany and Poland. Poland, which is not part of the Protocol, does control
its producers as regards cultivation, production or sale of raw tobacco by requiring
an entry in the register of raw tobacco producers kept by the National Centre for
Agriculture Support.54 Germany limits the requirement for authorisation at the
regulatory level to new tobacco products (as required by the Tobacco Products
Directive).55
Otherwise, licensing is mostly linked to the fiscal aspect. In that respect among
the countries studied in this book, two models become apparent in terms of licensing.
Some countries issue licences to the actors involved in tobacco production and some
to the warehouses, where production and storage take place. The latter model is in
application in particular in the Netherlands where it is prohibited to produce tobacco
products (or any goods subject to excise duties) outside a location declared to be an
excise warehouse.56 Italy, which is not party to the Protocol, has adopted a similar
model.57
Different levels of control linked to the process of licensing are reported.
The Dutch licence may be refused to an applicant convicted of excise fraud within
the 5 years preceding the application.58 The Latvian licence may be refused if the
applicant has a record of carrying out activities without a licence.59 However, it is
reported that in Belgium the licensing process is fairly lax, sometimes without proper
background checks, and the licence is granted on a permanent basis.60
The enforcement of the licensing requirement does not always require that the
activity is prohibited when executed without a licence. For instance, lack of a fiscal
licence can lead to fiscal disadvantages. De facto, however, these disadvantages
should have a similar effect as prohibition of the activity and mandatory licensing;
hence it can be considered that Germany complies with the requirement of Article 6
of the Protocol.61
Production of manufacturing equipment which, in principle, should also be
subject to licensing, according to Article 6 (1) (a) of the Protocol, is not always
subject to that procedure. In Germany in particular manufacturing equipment is not
considered to be an excise good, hence fiscal licensing does not apply to it.62 Until
recently the Netherlands did not subject manufacturing equipment to the licensing
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
obligation either, if it was not part of the excise warehouse. However, a recent
change in the law also included manufacturing equipment, which is not used in an
excise warehouse but, for instance, is exported to a third country.63
Due Diligence
Article 7 of the Protocol requires that all natural and legal persons in the supply chain
of tobacco, tobacco products and manufacturing equipment ‘conduct due diligence
before the commencement and in the course of, a business relationship’, as well as
monitor the level of sales in order to verify that they correspond to the demand for
the sold products and, in addition, report to competent authorities if they have
evidence of contraventions of obligations arising from the Protocol.
While this obligation has been implemented in the Netherlands,64 it does not
seem that all countries which are party to the Protocol comply with this obligation. In
particular Germany has not implemented the obligation to check and monitor any
business partners, including their sales levels. To some extent the due diligence
obligation might be inferred from the general obligation to abide by the law, which
attaches potentially civil and even criminal liability in the case of the unlawful
conduct of business partners. It does not appear, however, that this addresses the
whole spectrum of the duties provided for by Article 7.65 Similarly Belgium does not
provide for the due diligence obligation of that Article.66 Countries which are not
party to the Protocol do not report having a due diligence requirement.67
It is important to note that due diligence obligations are incorporated into the
Agreements between the EU, its Member States and the biggest tobacco companies:
British American Tobacco,68 Japan Tobacco,69 and Imperial Tobacco Limited.70
This list notably excludes Philip Morris International (PMI),71 which was also part of
such an agreement, but it was not continued upon its expiry in 2016. In view of that,
the duties provided for by virtue of these agreements are of application as regards
63
64
65
Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.3.2.
66
67
68
Cooperation Agreement of 15 July 2010 between British-American Tobacco (Holdings) Limited
and the European Union as represented by the European Commission and the Signatory Member
States of the European Union.
69
Cooperation Agreement of 14 December 2007 between JT International S.A., JT International
Holding BV, and the European Community and the Participating Member States.
70
Co-operation Agreement of 27 September 2010 among Imperial Tobacco Limited and the
European Union represented by the European Commission, and each Member State listed on the
signature pages hereto.
71
Anti-contraband an anti-counterfeit agreement and general release of July 9 2004 among Philip
Morris International Inc., Philip Morris Products Inc., Philip Morris Duty Free Inc., and Philip
Morris World Trade SARL, the European Community represented by the European Commission,
and each Member State listed on the signature pages hereto.
18 S. Tosza
these three companies only.72 Therefore, compliance through agreements is not a

fully satisfactory solution, since it does not fairly distribute obligations on the
market, as PMI and smaller businesses are not subject to these agreements.
A Track and Trace System
A key element of the control of the tobacco products supply chain is the track and
trace system, required by Article 8 of the Protocol. Article 15 of the Tobacco
Products Directive also provides for this requirement.73 It is reported that these
requirements are fully implemented in Germany,74 in the Netherlands,75 and in
Belgium.76 Italy and Poland also report having the track and trace system in place.77
Keeping Records of the Relevant Transactions
Article 9 of the Protocol requires all persons engaged in the tobacco products supply
chain to keep records of all relevant transactions. This requirement is widely
fulfilled, e.g. in the Netherlands,78 Belgium79 and even Italy.80 German law does
not directly address the requirement as provided for by Article 9 of the Protocol, but
it is considered to be fulfilled as it is necessary to comply with the requirement to
keep records in connection with a unique identifier as required by the track and trace
system.81
Security and Preventive Measures
Article 10 of the Protocol lays down a set of requirements for persons in the tobacco
supply chain to take the necessary measures to prevent their products from being
diverted into illicit trade channels. These requirements include: the duty to report
certain cross-border cash flows and suspicious transactions; supplying tobacco
products or manufacturing equipment in amounts proportionate to the demand
from the market; as well as certain restrictions on payment methods.
Countries differ as to the implementation of this requirement. While the Nether-
lands reports having transposed them,82 Germany does not. That country has not
transposed Article 10 directly, but its requirements are fulfilled by other provisions
such as the ones on control of cash flows.83 Once Italy and Poland join the Protocol it
too will have to adopt the necessary provisions as current legislation on cross-border
72
Tosza (2021), p. 63.
73
To which should be added Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/574 and Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2018/573.
74
75
76
Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.1.3.12.
77
Bernardi et al. (this volume), Sect. 6.2.1. Zontek (this volume), Sect. 9.2.3.
78
79
80
81
82
83
transfers of cash or obligations to report suspicious operations (linked to money

laundering and financing of terrorism) will not be sufficient.84
Control of the Sale of Tobacco Products over the Internet
Article 11 of the Protocol requires the extension of the relevant obligations of the
Protocol to the sale of tobacco products through the Internet or similar technology.
Some countries reported compliance with this rule, as for instance Germany, where
this type of sale is simply not excluded from the relevant provisions and hence it is
fully covered by them. In addition, special rules on distance selling have been
provided.85 In the Netherlands as well, all rules extend, mutatis mutandis, to online
sales of tobacco products.86 There is no need for such an extension, however, in
countries that wholly ban the Internet sale of tobacco products, as is the case in
Belgium87 and Italy.88
Special Control Areas
Articles 12 and 13 of the Protocol provide additional rules regarding free zones,
international transit and duty-free sales. Free zones are also subject to EU legislation,
in particular the Union Customs Code (Articles 210 ff. UCC). These rules are
supplemented by national rules; however, national rules do not necessarily address
all the requirements of the Protocol.89 It may be that they are not necessary, as is the
case in the Netherlands which has no free-trade zones.90 As regards duty-free sales,
the Netherlands provides, however, that rules regarding supply chain control also
apply to this type of sale of tobacco products.91
2.5 Offences, Sanctions and Other Consequences
Defining the Offences

Article 14 of the Protocol provides a list of courses of conduct that should be
considered unlawful. State Parties are free to decide whether such unlawful conduct
is to be considered criminal or pursued by other means, in particular as administra-
tive offences (Art. 14 (2)).
84
85
Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.1.1 and Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.3.6.1.2.
86
87
Art. 13 of the Royal Decree of 5 February 2016 concerning the production and distribution of
tobacco products.
88
89
90
91
20 S. Tosza
The general provision requires that State Parties declare unlawful ‘manufacturing,
wholesaling, brokering, selling, transporting, distributing, storing, shipping,
importing or exporting tobacco, tobacco products or manufacturing equipment
contrary to the provisions of this Protocol’ (Art. 14 (1) (a)). The activities could be
carried out contrary to the provisions of the Protocol, if done for instance without the
necessary licence (Art. 6), in disregard of the due diligence obligations (Art. 7), of
the obligations of the track and trace system in place (Art. 8), of record keeping
obligations (Art. 9), or in disregard of security and preventive measures (Art. 10).
As countries must embed these provisions into domestic law and, as demon-
strated below, these obligations may be transposed in different ways and to a
different degree, the choices made by national legislatures also affect the definition
of and punishment for infringements of the rules of supply chain control.
In addition the Protocol provides a further list of courses of conduct that should be
declared illicit in any case (again without the obligation of deeming them to be
criminal offences):
– activities linked to tobacco, tobacco products or manufacturing equipment
performed without complying with fiscal obligations (Art. 14 (1) (b) (i)), includ-
ing using falsified fiscal stamps, unique identification markings, or any other
required markings or labels (Art. 14 (1) (c) (i) and (ii));
– smuggling or attempted smuggling (Art. 14 (1) (b) (ii));
– mixing of tobacco products with non-tobacco products during progression
through the supply chain, for the purpose of concealing or disguising tobacco
products (Art. 14 (1) (d));
– intermingling of tobacco products with non-tobacco products in the free-zones
(Art. 14 (1) (e));
– obtaining, by a person licensed in accordance with Article 6, tobacco, tobacco
products or manufacturing equipment from a person who should be, but is not,
licensed in accordance with Article 6 (Art. 14 (1) (g));
– obstructing any public officer or an authorized officer in the performance of duties
relating to the prevention, deterrence, detection, investigation or elimination of
illicit trade in tobacco, tobacco products or manufacturing equipment
(Art. 14 (1) (h));
– false statements (Art. 14 (1) (i));
– laundering of proceeds of unlawful conduct established as a criminal offence
(Art. 14 (1) (j)).
Compliance with the above requirements does not necessarily come through the
adoption by countries of detailed provisions addressing these specific courses of
conduct. It is reported that countries comply with them through more general pro-
visions. This is the case in Belgium,92 the Netherlands93 and in Germany.94 In the
92
93
de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.4.
94
last-mentioned country, for instance, the mixing and intermingling of tobacco

products (Article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the Protocol) is considered to be tax evasion
and the obstruction of public officers and misleading statements (Article 14(1)
(h) and (i) of the Protocol) are punishable under the general offence of resisting
enforcement officers.95
The most important provisions, as reported by practitioners, concern avoiding
fiscal duties and they are usually punished with criminal penalties.96 For instance in
Germany, the main offences are tax evasion and receiving, holding or selling goods
obtained by tax evasion. Gross negligence tax evasion, on the contrary, will be
punished with administrative fines. Even if the German system does not require
operators to hold a fiscal licence to operate, those tobacco related activities
conducted without a licence will trigger a number of fiscal obligations, the violation
of which might fulfil the definition of the respective fiscal offences.97 Many viola-
tions of the rules provided by the Protocol will fall into that general tax evasion
offence, such as, for example, the falsification of tax stamps. Such general provisions
also dominate enforcement in other legal systems, e.g. in Poland.98 These general
fiscal offences will serve to enforce other requirements of Article 14 of the Protocol,
as various courses of conduct enumerated therein (e.g. violation of notification
requirements or falsification of tax stamps) may lead to the reduction of the revenue
of the treasury and trigger liability for tax evasion.99
While several legal systems report the focus on fiscal crime, case law analysis in
the Netherlands demonstrates that, in most cases, investigations are also opened into
trademark counterfeiting, forgery of documents or participation in a criminal
organisation.100
So far as mens rea is concerned, while criminal liability for fiscal offences
depends in principle on intentional commission of the crime, liability for negligence
is also possible. For instance, in Germany, tax evasion committed by gross negli-
gence is punished as an administrative offence (Art. 378 AO).101 In Belgium, there is
uncertainty as to whether tax evasion can also be committed by negligence (where
culpa levissima would suffice), but in principle it is not excluded.102
In countries that opted for a system of excise warehouses (the Netherlands and
Italy), respective provisions are tailored accordingly. The Netherlands criminalises
producing an excise good outside an excise warehouse without a licence. It also
provides for a more general offence of possession of an excise good on which the
excise duty has not been paid. These offences must be committed intentionally, but
95
96
E.g., Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.4.5.
97
98
99
100
101
102
22 S. Tosza
conditional intention (dolus eventualis) suffices. That means that it is sufficient that
the perpetrator was aware of the risk that the production or possession was illegal,
but continued his/her actions accepting that risk.103 As the provision focusing on
production in excise warehouses does not adequately address illicit trade in
manufacturing equipment, a special offence of releasing into circulation, producing,
possessing, transporting to another Member State or exporting to a third country
manufacturing equipment without a licence was added.104
It is important to stress that in the Netherlands these offences do not discriminate
according to the source of illicitness. They cover cheap whites, counterfeit cigarettes
or counterfeit cheap whites, as the case law demonstrates.105 Similarly in Germany,
there is no discrimination and cheap whites are also targeted,106 as is the case in
Italy.107
As to other obligations regarding the control of the supply chain as provided by
the Protocol, violation of these obligations can be subject to administrative and
criminal sanctions. For instance, in the Netherlands, violating these obligations can
be an administrative offence leading to an administrative fine or a minor criminal
offence. Parallel prosecutions are forbidden, hence a choice has to be made about the
track (una via) to pursue in a given case.108 On the other hand, in Germany, several
violations enumerated in Article 14 of the Protocol are dealt with by regulatory
(i.e. administrative) offences. For instance, placing tobacco products without unique
identifiers and security features (hence affecting the track and trace system) is an
administrative offence.109
In line with the Protocol, some legal systems also contain offences of
counterfeiting or forgery of fiscal stamps which are expressly penalised, for instance
in the Netherlands110 and in Latvia.111 Germany also penalises such forgery, but it is
considered to be tax evasion and dealt with as such.112
Obstructing authorities, which also belongs to the catalogue of courses of conduct
provided for by the Protocol (Art. 14 (1) (h)), is usually penalised by more general
provisions not necessarily limited to tobacco, as is the case for instance in the
Netherlands.113
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
Gjørtler and Grava (this volume), Sect. 7.6.1.1.
112
113
The analysed legal systems also provide for offences of forgery of documents and
trademark counterfeiting.114 The latter offence does not apply to those cheap
whites.115 The Polish Criminal Code also contains an offence that could be of
application, if the ITTP in question contained dangerous substances detrimental to
health.116
Besides consummate offences, an attempt to commit fiscal offences is also often
criminalised. This is the case for instance in Germany117 and in the Netherlands
where, however, the case law demonstrates a certain difficulty in fulfilling the
criteria of an attempt to, for instance, produce or possess illegal tobacco products
due to the mens rea requirements, which either points towards a full commission of
the offence or, if lacking, leads to the suspect being acquitted.118 Preparatory acts are
generally not criminalised, as legal systems limit the criminalisation of preparation to
more serious crimes than the ones analysed above.119
The analysis of national legal systems did not show any decisive effect of the
regulatory framework on protecting the EU’s financial interests (PIF)120 at the
national level in the enforcement of this policy field.
Sanctions and Other Measures
Depending on whether the offence is of a criminal or a regulatory nature, it will be
subject to appropriate penalties. In the case of offences of a regulatory nature, these
will be pecuniary fines. In the case of criminal offences, the usual spectrum of
criminal sanctions applies, including imprisonment and fines as well as community
service. In general, ITTP activities do not trigger very high criminal penalties, with
the maximum length of imprisonment not exceeding in general 6 years for the most
serious offences and usually remaining at a much lower level. However, fines might
be quite high, as is the case in Belgium where they can go up to €500,000 multiplied
by eight.121
The research into the different national practices demonstrated that punishment
for ITTP activities is relatively low,122 even for the masterminds of criminal
organisations behind such activities. Such people are, in any case, difficult to identify
and convict, especially in view of the transnational aspect of these activities.123
Besides sanctions, a key element of enforcement against ITTP is confiscation, as
mandated by Article 17 of the Protocol, which is in general available in the studied
114
115
116
117
118
119
See for instance: de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.4.1.10.
120
See Sect. 2.3 in this chapter.
121
122
123
24 S. Tosza
legal systems. In Germany, criminal confiscation is considered to be of a restitutive

and not punitive nature, similar to the civil law concept of unjust enrichment.124
Despite this being confirmed by the German Federal Constitutional Court,125 prac-
titioners underline its repressive and highly deterrent effect.126 Non-conviction
based confiscation is also of application for proceeds linked to ITTP activities,
e.g. in Germany,127 Italy128 and Poland.129
As required by Article 18, tobacco products, which have been confiscated, should
be destroyed without the possibility of them being released back into the market.
This is the rule not only in the countries which are party to the Protocol,
e.g. Germany,130 Latvia131 and the Netherlands,132 but also in Poland.133 This is
also the case now in Belgium, where earlier cases were reported of seized cigarettes
ending up back on the market as they had not been properly destroyed.134
Confiscation can be also applied for regulatory (administrative) offences,
e.g. relating to tax evasion, in Germany, but only if no fine is imposed. If a fine is
imposed, its purpose is to take away the profits from that offence hence there is, in
principle, no need for additional confiscation.135
It has been also pointed out—in particular by the Dutch practitioners—that the
focus on seizures of illicit tobacco products might be counterproductive, as it is
virtually impossible in practice to seize more than just a fraction of these products,
while assessing the effectiveness of police operations on that basis jeopardises
operations with broader objectives, such as the dismantling of criminal organisa-
tions, in particular by means of controlled deliveries. For those reasons, the Dutch
authorities recommend abandoning that focus.136
Relationship Between ITTP Offences and Other Offences
Activities relating to ITTP may also potentially fall into the scope of other offences.
However, most countries report that offences such as corruption, obstruction of
justice, forced labour, human trafficking, illegal migration or terrorism play little
or no role in the enforcement against ITTP. The reason for that may simply be the
pragmatism of criminal investigation, where division of competences and additional
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
Gjørtler and Grava (this volume), Sect. 7.6.1.3.
132
133
134
135
136
de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.4.2.3.1.
complications result in the inclination of the authorities to favour simpler solutions

when investigating offences focused on ITTP activities.137
Two offences which have potentially the highest chances of being applied are
money laundering and participation in a criminal organisation. The former in
particular seems to be the most obvious offence linked to ITTP and indeed launder-
ing proceeds from that lucrative activity usually falls into the scope of the provisions
criminalising money laundering, which is in line with the requirements of Arti-
cle 14 (1) (j) of the Protocol. Such cases have been reported for instance in the
Netherlands, where the offence was also used to prosecute money couriers who
could not otherwise have been prosecuted as they were not involved in the produc-
tion or possession of illicit tobacco products.138 The offence of money laundering
can be also used in relation to proceedings from illicit tobacco products in Bel-
gium,139 Germany,140 Italy,141 Latvia142 and Poland.143 However, it is not used in
practice in Belgium and Poland.
Commission of activities linked to ITTP may also trigger liability for the offences
penalising participation in criminal organisations, e.g. in Belgium,144 Germany,145
the Netherlands,146 Latvia147 and Poland.148
Liability of Legal Persons
The countries under investigation offer ways—however different—to hold liable the
legal persons engaged in ITTP, as is required by Article 15 of the Protocol. This
liability may be administrative, as is the case in Germany, or criminal, which is the
model chosen by Belgium, the Netherlands, Latvia and Poland. The model chosen
by Italy is considered a ‘tertium genus’, somewhere between administrative and
criminal liability.149
Not only will the acts of the top ranks of management of legal persons trigger
liability, but also the acts of ordinary employees may be sufficient as is the case in
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
Zontek (this volume), Sect. 9.4.3.
144
145
146
147
148
149
26 S. Tosza
Germany,150 Belgium151 and the Netherlands.152 The examined legal systems differ
as to the link between acts of individuals and the liability of the legal person.
Whereas in Poland an individual must first be declared guilty before proceedings
against a legal person can take place,153 this is not necessary for instance in Belgium,
which opted for an autonomous (from the liability of the individual) corporate
criminal liability model.154
2.6 Authorities Responsible for Combatting ITTP
In general, most countries report that several authorities are engaged in enforcement
against ITTP. These are the administrative authorities and authorities responsible for
investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. They may be focused on the
product regulation (health and safety) and on the tax and excise enforcement. It is
reported that authorities responsible for the investigations in the area of health and
safety play a much more limited role in enforcement against ITTP. This is the case
for instance in the Netherlands, where the Netherlands Food and Product Safety
Authority (NVWA) does have a special investigation service responsible for the
investigation of breaches of regulatory rules in that area which may constitute a
criminal offence, but in practice criminal cases of that kind are less prominent.155
In all countries subject to this research, it is the fiscal and customs authorities that
play the most important role in the enforcement against ITTP, including its criminal
aspects (GER,156 NL,157 BE,158 IT,159 LV160 and PL161). They are not only respon-
sible for levying and collecting fiscal duties, but are also often (at least co-)
responsible for criminal investigations, with special units dedicated to that task.
That is, for instance, the case in the Netherlands, where FIOD closely cooperates
with the public prosecution office and is tasked with dealing with serious cases of
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
excise fraud and connected criminal offences.162 Similarly in Poland, the National
Revenue Administration (Krajowa Administracja Skarbowa—KAS) is responsible
not only for the administrative enforcement of the fiscal policy, but also for inves-
tigation of fiscal criminal offences, which they may also prosecute in court. They
cooperate with the public prosecutors who assists them especially with undertaking
more invasive investigatory measures (e.g. search of premises, lifting professional
secrecy).163
Even more so in Belgium, the General Administration of Customs and Excise
(GACE) is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of tax and excise
offences, having practically a monopoly in that domain.164 Italy stands out in this
comparison with a dedicated police authority having a military structure—Guardia
di Finanza—being at the same time dependent on the Ministry of Economy and
Finance and belonging to the Armed Forces. It focuses on combatting organised
crime, in particular tax evasion which includes combatting ITTP.165
In investigation, and especially prosecution of fiscal criminal offences, the public
prosecution service may play an important role, especially where it is the prosecutor
who has the right to bring charges and represent the case in court (e.g. Germany166).
Public prosecution services will play an even bigger role, where the cases are not
limited to fiscal offences, but include other crimes (see also Sect. 2.5).
The public prosecution service may also have specialised units dedicated to
excise fraud, in particular concerning illegal tobacco, as is the case in the Nether-
lands, where a National Public Prosecutor for Excise Fraud has been nominated.167
In Poland, the Prosecution Office has a special Department for Combatting Eco-
nomic Criminality.168
Enforcement against ITTP is usually shared between criminal and administrative
authorities, and administrative fiscal and customs authorities usually play the prime
role with certain competences, sometimes large, in criminal matters. The division
between administrative and criminal enforcement may be more or less clear. In
Germany criminal enforcement is reserved for the most serious offences according to
the principle of ultima ratio. If a course of conduct constitutes both a criminal and an
administrative violation, it will be punished as a criminal offence and the cumulation
of sanctions is not permitted. If a criminal conviction is not possible, however, an
administrative sanction may potentially be imposed. As regards regulatory aspects of
162
163
164
165
166
E.g. in Germany, Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.5.2.
167
168
28 S. Tosza
the market, administrative authorities deal with misconduct in the first place and
identify cases which require a criminal law sanction, which are then passed to the
public prosecutor. He or she may also refuse the case and send it back for admin-
istrative enforcement. He or she can also take over an investigation into a regulatory
offence, if it is connected with a case focused on for instance tax offences.169
However, the differentiation between administrative and criminal enforcement is
not always so straightforward, as is the case in Belgium, where GACE with
administrative and criminal competences may resort to any measures it has at its
disposal. In particular, it can decide to prosecute a criminal offence, or propose a
settlement, which is considered to be administrative in nature.170 Yet another
approach is also represented by Belgium, but in the area of health and safety: if
the proposed administrative settlement fails, then the case will be sent to the public
prosecutor, thus turning it into a criminal investigation.171
As already indicated, fiscal and customs authorities are more in control as regards
the criminal enforcement of tax and customs offences. In Germany these authorities
are allowed, under certain conditions (e.g. the case concerns exclusively a tax or
custom offence, no arrest warrant is issued), to investigate criminal offences. It will
be, however, the public prosecutor who will bring charges and prosecute the case in a
criminal court. Customs authorities closely cooperate with the public prosecutor in
any case, as he or she may take over investigation at any time. Transnational aspects
of the case will also be a reason to transfer the case to the public prosecutor.172
Similarly, the fiscal authorities play a key role in investigation of fiscal criminal
offences in the Netherlands.173
The role of fiscal and customs authorities is even more prominent in Belgium,
where GACE has the monopoly of the prosecution of customs and excise offences.
There is, however, one limitation to GACE’s role, namely the involvement of the
investigative judge, who is in charge of the judicial inquiry before the case goes to
trial (where it is again in GACE’s hands). It is reported that this creates tension
between specialised officers of GACE and investigative judges who work on all
kinds of cases and often have no experience in ITTP cases.174 GACE also plays a
role as regards the investigation of counterfeit offences.175 Outside the area of
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
customs and excise, it will be the public prosecutor who plays the key role in
criminal investigation and prosecution.176
German practitioners point out the difference between the priorities of the fiscal
authorities and the public prosecutors. While the latter might be rather interested in
cases where the time and resources engaged are limited and the prospect of convic-
tion high, the fiscal authorities would be inclined to invest in cases which may be
lengthier and have fewer prospects in court, but which would allow them to reveal
the structure of the criminal organisation engaged in the particular ITTP.177 An
opposite distribution of priorities is reported in Belgium. While GACE is more
focused on the quick recovery of evaded duties, the public prosecutors seem to be
more interested in the underlying and broader scope of criminal activity.178
Countries also report that use is being made of the cooperation obligations of
those tobacco producers subject to the agreements.179 They also report, however, a
certain reluctance in connection with that cooperation, citing different reasons: for
instance in the Netherlands180 it is because the authorities are focused on anti-
smoking policy; in Germany combatting crime is strongly considered to be the
task of the state;181 whilst in Belgium it is for fear for the authorities’ independence
from the private sector.182 On the other hand, a closer cooperation is reported in
Italy, where British American Tobacco Italia concluded memoranda of understand-
ing with the ADM and with the High Commissioner for Counterfeiting in their
respective areas of competences.183 Interviewed practitioners also pointed out the
higher capacities of laboratories owned by the tobacco industry in analysing the
tobacco of potentially illicit origin than the EU Commission’s official laboratory in
Geel, Belgium.184 Furthermore, Belgian practitioners pointed towards the positive
impact of that cooperation in combatting ITTP, despite its ambivalent character. In
particular, they report identifying an increase in illegal cigarettes of PMI brands after
the agreement with PMI expired in 2016.185
176
177
178
179
More in details: Tosza (2021).
180
181
182
183
184
Oude Breuil et al. (this volume), Sect. 3.2.8.3.
185
30 S. Tosza
2.7 Investigations in ITTP Cases
Investigative Techniques and Powers

The available scale of enforcement techniques depends on the enforcement regime.
Some of the investigative measures can be available both in administrative and
criminal proceedings. This is the case for instance in Germany as regards search and
seizure or examination of witnesses.186 Administrative authorities have powers of
inspection of business premises or means of transportation, including inspection of
the goods found there, and the power to request information.187
Application of certain measures—usually of a significant level of intrusiveness—
is limited to criminal investigations, which may require compliance with different
requirements (judicial authorisation, threshold of suspicion, limitation to certain
offences). These more intrusive investigatory measures might not be available for
minor ITTP offences (e.g. transportation of raw tobacco without a licence).188
Article 19 of the Protocol requires that at least controlled deliveries, electronic or
other forms of surveillance and undercover operations are made available, if they are
compatible with domestic law. These measures are also pointed out as being the
most important for ITTP investigations.189
Controlled deliveries are of key importance for combatting ITTP and are permit-
ted in criminal investigations in most of the legal systems analysed in this study. For
instance, the possibility of their application is provided for in Dutch law, and can be
used for ITTP offences.190 In Germany, they are included as part of the investigative
measures of long-term observations.191 They are also of application and reported to
be used in practice in Poland.192 However, controlled deliveries are not allowed in
Italy for ITTP cases (although they can be used in drugs cases).193
The analysed legal systems also provide for different surveillance measures. For
instance, systematic surveillance (consisting of an investigative official following a
suspect for a certain time observing his/her activities) in allowed in the Nether-
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
lands.194 It is also allowed and used in practice in Poland.195 In Germany, surveil-

lance of telecommunications is permitted, subject to authorisation by a judge (and, in
urgent cases, by a public prosecutor) and for certain listed offences. This list includes
ITTP offences, such as tax evasion, and certain other offences linked to smug-
gling.196 Acoustic interception of private speech outside private premises by tech-
nical means is also permitted.197 However, the German system does not allow the
use of online searches and acoustic surveillance of private premises to investigate tax
offences or other offences related to ITTP.198 A much wider scope of possibilities is
available to the Polish authorities, where wiretapping, broadly construed, is
allowed.199
Undercover operations are permitted in Germany. Their availability is not subject
to the listed criminal offence, but the offence has to be of substantial significance.200
However, undercover operations do not seem to be possible in connection with ITTP
in Italy,201 where infiltration is also not allowed.202 It is allowed, however, under
Dutch law, for instance for the illegal production or possession of tobacco products
constituting a serious breach of the legal order (a criterion that may be fulfilled if a
large amount of excise duty might otherwise be lost).
Many of these measures will require judicial authorisation, but sometimes the
power to use these measures is granted more widely. The possibility to employ
certain intrusive investigative measures is available to fiscal and customs authorities.
For instance in Germany the Customs Criminal Investigation Office may use long-
term observations and visual and acoustic surveillance outside private premises by
technical means, even without judicial authorisation.203
Belgium goes even further in this respect. A wide scope of measures is granted to
GACE (customs and excise investigations), and often does not require judicial
authorisation, e.g. to search private premises. Not only do officials of GACE have
a large spectrum of measures, they are also allowed to use coercive powers without
resorting to the Police to execute these measures, e.g. to carry out a search. They may
arrest a suspect without an official address in Belgium, even for offences that are not
punishable with imprisonment. Subsequent pre-trial detention will, however, require
the decision of a judge. The only limitation to these broad powers concerns more
modern measures, such as infiltration on the Internet, as the legislation granting these
powers is relatively old and does not address such measures. GACE may ‘borrow’
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
32 S. Tosza
the legal basis from the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there the requirement of
judicial authorisation may apply and is binding for GACE as well. As this system
grants quite far-reaching powers to GACE and significantly limits procedural safe-
guards, it is the subject of criticism in Belgium.204
Precautionary Measures
The analysed legal systems provide for pre-trial measures to seize illicit tobacco
products or manufacturing equipment as potential evidence and for potential further
confiscation. These measures may also extend to assets seized in order to execute
confiscation of the value of any illegal profit. In general, countries report frequent
use of these measures.205
These measures are available in criminal proceedings, but can be also used by
fiscal and customs authorities with competences in criminal law, such as GACE in
Belgium. Whilst under criminal procedure goods can only be destroyed following a
trial court confiscation order; GACE has the power, under certain circumstances, to
destroy goods without even starting judicial proceedings.206
In Germany, customs authorities may use seizure to prevent tax evasion. The
respective provision (Section 12e ZollVG) has recently been enacted specifically
with cigarette smuggling in mind. The application of that measure does not require
the criminal procedure level of initial suspicion, although there must be reasons to
believe that these goods may become the object of a tax offence.207 On the other
hand, it is reported that Latvian administrative procedures do not allow for seizure,
but only for confiscation.208
Statute of Limitation
Several countries reported that their statute of limitation does not present a signif-
icant obstacle to investigation and prosecution of ITTP offences, neither at the
criminal level nor at the regulatory level. Periods are sufficiently long and in
proportion to the complexity of offences. This is the case for instance in Germany,
where professional, violent and organised smuggling has statutory limitation of
10 years, which can be extended up to 20 years if certain investigatory or procedural
measures are undertaken.209 In Italy, statutory limitation can be as long as 20 years,
if used in the context of a criminal organisation.210 It is similarly the case in Latvia,
where most serious offences may have statutory limitation of up to 15 years, if they
are connected to organised crime.211 In the Netherlands the prosecution of
204
205
For instance: de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.6.2. Gjørtler and Grava (this volume), Sect. 7.10.2;
206
207
208
209
210
211
intentional illegal production or possession of tobacco products is time-barred after

12 years.
However, in Belgium, even though the time-limitation periods are relatively long,
it is reported that they might still not be sufficiently long due to lengthy procedures.
In that context GACE stands out as an exception, with its shorter procedures focused
on quick recovery of unpaid fiscal dues.212
In Poland statutory limitation for fiscal offences is linked with the recoverability
of unpaid fiscal dues, thus prosecution of fiscal crimes is time-barred if the tax duty
has lapsed.213
Principle of ne bis in idem
The investigated countries have in place rules aimed at avoiding double administra-
tive or criminal convictions in accordance with the ne bis in idem principle. They
also report that, for ITTP offences, their legal systems do not provide for the
possibility to punish a person for the same acts with an administrative and a criminal
penalty. This rule is most straightforward in the Netherlands, where the general una
via system requires the competent authorities to coordinate their investigations
where several courses of action are applicable and choose whether the criminal or
the administrative way will be followed.214
In Germany, a decision to fine by an administrative authority does not preclude
later re-opening of the proceedings and criminal prosecution. However, a criminal
sentence in that second procedure will result in the regulatory fine being rescinded
and so there will be only one way in which the offender will be punished. As a result,
an administrative decision to fine is not final if issued by an administrative authority.
However, if there is a final judgment by the court on such an administrative fine, a
subsequent criminal prosecution is precluded. The reasoning behind this rule is that
the same court is competent to punish the offender with an administrative or criminal
penalty, so if it did not opt for the criminal penalty initially, it cannot go back on its
decision in that respect.215
Similar reasoning prevents double punishment in customs and excise cases
investigated and prosecuted by GACE in Belgium. While there are no clear-cut
boundaries between administrative and criminal enforcement in that context, GACE
will have to opt for a certain way of proceeding thus precluding the other ones. The
situation is more complicated in mixed cases where, as well as GACE, other
authorities are competent (e.g. the public prosecution service). The reported lack
212
213
214
215
34 S. Tosza
of coordination leads to parallel proceedings and, as cases may very well be

“inextricably linked together”,216 one of the enforcement efforts will be wasted
because it will have been precluded by the final decision on the other one.217
Alternatives to Prosecution and Plea-Bargaining
All the analysed legal systems offer alternatives to a fully-fledged criminal trial.218
For instance in Germany, such possibilities exist in the pre-trial and in the trial phase.
In the pre-trial phase, the public prosecutor may use the power to discontinue
proceedings in exchange for the perpetrator complying with certain conditions. In
the trial phase, plea bargaining is used, although it still requires the court to be
convinced of the personal guilt of the accused.219 Plea-bargaining is also available in
Italy, especially for less serious offences. The outcome is negotiated between the
defendant and the prosecutor and must be validated by a judge.220 The Belgian
GACE often uses settlements which, in practice, have a rather take-it-or-leave-it
nature, with GACE having significant powers and discretion in their use.221
In the Netherlands, many criminal cases are resolved without the involvement of
the court but, instead of a negotiated outcome, a more commonly used out-of-court
tool is the penalty order which does not allow any input by the offender.222 Penalty
orders are applied in Germany as well. They do involve a judge, but without a
criminal trial. There are known cases of cigarette smuggling of up to €500,000 in
value that were dealt with by a penalty order.223
Whistleblowers and Incentives for Cooperation with Law Enforcement
Countries under investigation report very limited or no measures directed at the
protection of whistleblowers. It is important to underline, however, that at the time of
conducting the research the EU Directive on the protection of whistleblowers had
not been implemented throughout the EU Member States (e.g. in Germany or
Poland). However, protection is offered to whistleblowers in Italy, where there is a
legal framework in that respect which pre-dates the Directive.224
Many more possibilities are offered to offenders who opt for cooperating with
justice. Voluntary disclosure of tax evasion bars prosecution in Germany and so it is
a significant incentive to cooperate. It is, however, inapplicable to serious cases
(e.g. organised tax evasion), so its practical application to ITTP is limited, especially
216
CJEU Case C-524/15 Menci [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:197, para 35.
217
218
E.g. Latvia: Gjørtler and Grava (this volume), Sect. 7.10.6 and Poland: Zontek (this volume),
Sect. 9.6.5.
219
220
221
222
223
224
if the specific ITTP offence is committed by organised transnational groups, as it

does not apply to smuggling.225 On the contrary in Italy, in cases of smuggling,
offenders may count on a reduced sentence for collaboration with the investigation,
especially for taking steps to prevent further consequences of the criminal activity
and assisting the authorities in the collection of evidence or the apprehension of other
perpetrators.226 In 2018, Belgium created a so-called ‘pentiti’ regime offering
benefits to offenders who opt to cooperate with the authorities. Its application in
practice is so far very limited and not related to ITTP.227
Measures to protect witnesses may be very useful to combat criminal organisations
engaged in ITTP. These are of application for instance in Belgium,228 the Nether-
lands229 and in Poland.230 Latvia is part of a cooperation agreement with two other
Baltic states, Lithuania and Estonia, which offers the possibility to transfer witnesses
between these countries in order to protect their safety.231
2.8 Institutional and International Cooperation
As already mentioned, ITTP is very often a cross-border phenomenon. Furthermore,

the investigated legal systems extend their jurisdiction not only to offences commit-
ted within the remit of their borders, but also, under certain circumstances, to
offences committed abroad. In particular, offences committed by their nationals
abroad may be investigated and prosecuted, especially if the condition of double
criminality is fulfilled,232 and also if the offence is against the financial interests of
the state in question.233 Dutch jurisprudence provides an example of such a case,
where a Dutch citizen, carrying significant amounts of illegal cigarettes with the
intention of bringing them to the Netherlands, was caught by Lithuanian authorities.
Even though the cigarettes never reached the Netherlands, he was prosecuted in a
Dutch court.234
For all these reasons, cooperation, including exchange of information, between
the competent authorities—within the EU and beyond its borders—is of crucial
importance for an effective fight against ITTP. As can be seen from the above
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
E.g. Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.7.1; de Vries (this volume), Sect. 8.7.1. See also
Art. 111. § 1. of the Polish Criminal Code.
233
E.g. for fiscal offences in Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.7.1.
234
36 S. Tosza
overview, enforcement is in the hands of a patchwork of bodies of different types

and, quite often, with a complex set of mixed competences. In consequence, the rules
of cooperation will also be built up from a mix of different instruments of admin-
istrative cooperation of both a general and a sectorial nature, as well as from
instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (also called mutual legal
assistance). While the Protocol provides a number of articles dedicated to interna-
tional cooperation (Arts. 20–31), the EU legal framework offers a plethora of
specific cooperation instruments, which will be crucial for such cooperation.
In particular, authorities such as the Belgian GACE, which wears two—admin-
istrative and criminal—hats, will have a large spectrum of cooperation instruments at
their disposal. It is reported that this may, however, create friction with foreign
authorities, which may be reluctant to cooperate with GACE which is, first and
foremost, a customs authority, when using criminal law instruments such as the
European Investigation Order.235 The divergence of laws and responsible agencies
may also create difficulties in cooperation as enforcement priorities may differ when
building up a common strategy.236 Furthermore, the mere fact of having to work
cross-border, which always creates delays and inefficiencies, despite the possibility
of using satisfactory legal instruments and despite the good will of the cooperating
authorities, was pointed out as a major issue in enforcement against such an
international phenomenon as ITTP.237
Transnational Cooperation Between EU Member States
Several EU instruments are in place regulating administrative cooperation in cus-
toms and excise matters:
– Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administra-
tions (Naples II Convention).238
– Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance
between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation
between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law
on customs and agricultural matters.
– Council Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 of 2 May 2012 on administrative coop-
eration in the field of excise duties and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2073/2004
As regards the exchange of information, Council Decision 2009/917/JHA of
30 November 2009 on the use of information technology for customs purposes
and Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simpli-
fying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement author-
ities of the Member States of the European Union, should also be added to the list.
235
Franssen and Claes (this volume), Sect. 4.7.2. On administrative enforcement authorities as
competent authorities for the purposes of the European Investigation Order, see Vervaele (2019).
236
Koziolek (2015), p. 721, see also: Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.7.2.
237
238
Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on mutual
assistance and cooperation between customs administrations. OJ C 24, 23.1.1998, pp. 2–22.
The comparative research reveals that the Naples II Convention is clearly the key
instrument of customs authorities’ cooperation, and it was declared to be the most
important by interviewed practitioners in Germany,239 Belgium240 and the Nether-
lands.241 In particular, this Convention is the basis for cross-border controlled
delivery (Art. 22), which is preferred, for instance by the Dutch authorities, to
seizure in order to dismantle larger criminal organisations.242
Instruments of cooperation in tax matters, such as the OECD Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, seem to be used less fre-
quently.243 Furthermore, the German practitioners underline the importance of
similarities of organisational structures, as cooperation becomes difficult when
divisions of tasks differ greatly.244
The countries under investigation also reported participating in Joint Customs
Operations (JCO). For instance, Latvia and Poland took part in Operation Baltica
and Operation Magnum II, which led to the seizure of more than 10 million
cigarettes.245 The Netherlands and Poland took part in Operation Warehouse.246
Most countries did not report problems in participation in such operations.247
Belgian practitioners pointed out that cooperation is more difficult where there is
no EU involvement, as this results in lack of leadership.248 In addition, Joint
Investigation Teams (JIT) are also an available form of cooperation.249
As to the instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the most
important are:
– European Convention of 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters together
with its Additional Protocol.
– Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant.
– Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal
matters.
– Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams.
The interviewed Dutch practitioners regarded their experience with international
cooperation as positive.250 The practitioners from Germany deemed the instruments
of cooperation in criminal matters to be sufficient. It was the practical aspects that
they pointed to as potentially hindering effective cooperation: practical difficulties
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
PL, LV, NL and GER.
248
249
E.g., Böse and Kober (this volume), Sect. 5.7.5.
250
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
En tiedä, onko se kuvittelua, mutta minusta tuntuu, kuin näin
vuoden vaihteessa näkisin enemmän huolestuneita kasvoja kuin
tavallisesti muulloin. Mutta se on ainakin varma, että
kauppahuoneissa tehdään nyt tilinpäätöstä ja siksi ovat liikemiehet
huolestuneita. Voittoko vai tappio — se on hetken suuri kysymys.
On niin omituista, että päivän evankeliumi kehoittaa myös

tilinpäätöstä tekemään, sisäistä tilinpäätöstä, — tarkastamaan sitä
»varastosuojaa», johon elämän varrella keräämme henkiset
hedelmät: — sydäntämme.
Evankeliumissa on kaksi kohtaa, joihin huomiomme erikoisesti

kiintyy.
Ne ovat nämä: »Hän tuli etsimään hedelmää» ja: »Katso, kolmena
vuonna».
Hän tuli etsimään hedelmää. Niin — hedelmää Jumala meiltä

odottaa. Ja mikä se hedelmä on? Se ei ole yksinomaan uskoa eikä
parannuksen tekoa — niinkuin sitä tavallisesti selitetään — vaan se
on edistymistä kaikessa hyvässä.
Kuulen joidenkin sanovan: »Olen käynyt säännöllisesti kirkossa»,

»olen ollut säännöllisesti lähetysompeluseurassa».
Hyvä on! Mutta — onko sydämesi tullut jalommaksi kuluneen

vuoden aikana? Oletko kyennyt menestyksellisemmin taistelemaan
esim. kateutta ja ahneutta vastaan, turhamaisuutta ja panetteluhalua
vastaan — mainitakseni vain muutamia, henkisempiä syntejä.
Katso, ystäväni: eivätkö hyvät päätöksesi makaa kuolleina kuin

kukkaset tien varrella, — kukkaset, jotka lapset poimivat vainiolta ja
sitten viskasivat menemään? Ja moni niistä oli kaunis, niinkuin sinun
hyvä päätöksesikin, jota et jaksanut toteuttaa.
Kuinka on nyt? Evankeliumissa sanotaan: »Hän tuli etsimään

hedelmää, mutta ei löytänyt». Emmeköhän tunne itseämme näistä
sanoista?
Ja sitten: tutkinto käy ankarammaksi. »Katso, kolmena vuonna

olen käynyt etsimässä hedelmää tästä viikunapuusta, mutta en ole
löytänyt.»
»Kolmena vuonna» — eikö totta? Me muistamme edellisiä vuosia.

Samalla tavoin on käynyt hyvien päätöstemme: ne jäivät
toteuttamatta.
Oi, me näemme viinitarhan omistajan ankaran muodon. Hän

tuntee puutarhanhoidon, sillä hän on taloudellinen mies; hän ei halua
pitää hedelmättömiä puita tarhassaan.
Mutta sitten — tuo viinitarhuri. Hän on kasvanut puidensa parissa;

hän on seurustellut niiden kanssa. Hän muistaa erikoisesti tuon
pienen viikunapuun. Itse hän sen istutti ja jalosti. Hän muistaa
paikankin, josta hän sen löysi: muutaman vuoren rinteen, hiljaisessa
laaksossa. Ja puulla oli ollut kaikki jalostettavaksi kelpaavan puun
tuntomerkit. Hän oli kantanut sen olallaan ja toimittanut istutuksen
kaikkien sääntöjen mukaan. Nyt oli kysymys hänen kunniastaan
puutarhurina, hänen rakkaudestaan tähän yhteen puuhun, josta oli
tullut hänen »murhelapsensa». Eikö se vielä voisi kantaa hedelmää?
Totta kai.
»Herra, anna sen vielä tämä vuosi olla.»

Me olemme tämän ystävällisen, helläsydämisen puutarhurin
puolella. Me yhdymme hänen pyyntöönsä. Hänen kaunis uskonsa ei
saa joutua häpeään. Viikunapuun täytyy kantaa hedelmää.
Rakkaat ystävät! Mikä lohdullinen alku tälle uudelle vuodelle!

Taivaallinen viinitarhuri Jeesus Kristus luottaa meihin. Olemme liian
lähellä hänen sydäntään. Hän on liian paljon ajatellut meitä, Hän on
suuren vaivan nähnyt.
Eikö hän taistellut puolestamme muutamana kevätpäivänä

Golgatan kukkulalla? Aurinko nousi silloinkin loistavana ja kauniina,
mutta hänellä ei ollut aikaa ajatella sitä: hänen oli kuoltava.
Ja eikö hän luottanut meihin sanoessaan: »Isä, anna heille

anteeksi, sillä he eivät tiedä, mitä he tekevät»?
Mekö antaisimme nyt, tänä uutena vuotena, hänen kauniin

uskonsa meihin joutua häpeään? Ei, sitä emme tahdo!
Tiedätkö, kenestä nyt oikeastaan on kysymys?
Ihmislapsista ihanimmasta, jaloimmasta ja puhtaimmasta. Hän

luottaa sinuun ja minuun.
Olet kai kokenut, miltä tuntuu, kun hyvä, jalo ihminen luottaa
sinuun? Olet ehkä kurja ja onneton omasta mielestäsi. Et tunne
ansaitsevasi luottamusta. Joku on sanonut sinusta totuuden jossakin
seurassa: sellainen ja sellainen sinä olet. Mutta tuo ystävä on
puolustanut sinua. Hän on näyttänyt sinut toisessa valossa. Hän on
selittänyt, mistä heikkoutesi johtuu. Hän on kääntänyt kaikki parhain
päin.
Kuinka sinua rohkaisi tuo, kun sait siitä sattumalta kuulla. Sait
uusia elämän voimia. Tunsit, että maailma oli muuttunut hyvän
joukon kauniimmaksi entistään. Halusit yrittää uudelleen. Mutta —
ennenkaikkea iloitsit siitä, että maailmassa saattoi löytyä niin jalo
ihminen kuin tuo sinun ystäväsi. Jo yhden sellaisen ihmisen vuoksi
kannatti elää.
Ja entä sitten tämä, tämä Jeesus Kristus, joka rukoilee: »Anna sen
vielä tämä vuosi olla.» Kuka on jalompi kuin hän, täydellisempi kuin
hän? Hänellä on sinuun rakkauden oikeus sen yhden kevätpäivän
perusteella Golgatan kukkulalla. Häneen toki voit luottaa, koska hän
kerran luottaa sinuun.
Rakkaat ystävät! Me aloitamme nyt uutta vuotta. Emme voi enää

mitään sille, että viime vuosi oli sellainen kuin se oli. Mutta nyt
seisomme uudella avatulla portilla ja tie on suorana edessämme.
Olkoon kulkumme sillä tiellä vakaisempaa kuin viime vuonna.
Sisältyköön tuohon kulkuun lujempi luottamus taivaallisen Isän
johtoon ja apuun!
Yksikään meistä ei tiedä, istummeko tässä kirkossa vuoden

päästä, tahi ylimalkaan missään kirkossa, t.s. olemmeko yleensä
elossa. En tahdo sinua peloitella kuolemalla, mutta soisin vain, että
turvallisemmalla mielellä lähtisit nyt jatkamaan taivaltasi kuin vuosi
taaksepäin. Niin että jos ystävä- tai tuttavapiirissäsi sinusta tämän
vuoden kuluessa sanottaisiin: »Hänkin on nyt kuollut», — sinusta
olisi jäänyt sellainen muisto, että luotit elämään, ikuiseen elämään,
— ja että olet vain siirtynyt sinne — toiselle rannalle, missä voit
sydän riemua ja vapautuksen tunnetta täynnä tervehtiä — uutta
vuotta. Amen.
HÄVIÄMÄTÖN OMAISUUS.
Uudenvuodenpäivän jälk. sunnuntai. — Ps. 73, 23—28.
Taivaassa — sikäli kuin pystymme sitä ajattelemaan — on kaikki

sellaista, mikä miellyttää ja ihastuttaa meitä. Siellä on lukemattomia
ihanuuksia, joita ihmiskieli ei kykene edes kuvaamaan.
Ja maankin päällä on paljon kaunista ja näkemisen arvoista. Sen

ihanuuksia me paremmin pystymme käsittämään. Lyhyessä
tuokiossa on mahdotonta luetella edes vähäistä osaa siitä, mistä
ihmismieli voi maan päällä iloita. Näiden asioiden luetteleminen
täyttäisi kokonaisen kirjan, monta kirjaa. Ajatelkaamme esim.
matkoja vieraissa maissa. Olet kai joskus tuntenut halua päästä
matkustamaan. Olet ajatellut: »Ah, kun pääsisi kerrankin näkemään
maailman merkillisyyksiä!» Niin — paljon tuollaisella matkalla
varmasti näkisi. Jo yksin Euroopassa. Ajatelkaamme esim. Italian
taideaarteita, sen museoita, sen muita merkkipaikkoja.
Ajatelkaamme Roomaa, »ikuista kaupunkia», josta olemme kuulleet
ja lukeneet. Mitä kaikkea olisikaan siellä nähtävää ja kuultavaa.
Ja kuitenkin sanoo psalmin veisaaja: »Kun sinä, Herra, vain omani

olet, ei minua mikään taivaassa eikä maan päällä miellytä.»
Jos hän sanoisi vain »maan päällä», ymmärtäisimme sen
paremmin. Mutta — taivaassa? Sitä on hiukan vaikea käsittää.
Mitä hän tarkoittaa?
Hän tarkoittaa sitä, ettei Jumalan omistamista voida verrata

mihinkään taivaassa eikä maan päällä. Jumala on kaikki eikä mikään
muu ole mitään.
Eivät myöskään ajalliset kärsimykset.
Nyt tulemme tutulle maaperälle. Kärsimykset — niistähän sinäkin

jotakin tiedät. Ne eivät ole sinulle mikään »tuntematon seutu». Sillä
niitähän tarjoaa tämä elämä kyllin runsaasti jokaiselle ihmislapselle.
Tuossa on eräs, joka jo syntymässä on saanut arat hermot. Hänen

elämänsä on kuin kävelemistä pienten pistävien piikkien päällä.
Elämä tuntuu hänestä monesti vallan hirvittävältä. Aamulla
herätessään hänellä on se tunne, että olisi tuhat kertaa
onnellisempaa olla kuollut. Hän on kuin eräässä kreikkalaisessa
sadussa esiintyvä mies, joka on kytketty kallioon ja jonka maksaa
kotka nokkii. Sellaisilta tuntuvat joskus arkahermoisen ihmisen
kärsimykset. On, kuin olisi sielu alastonna, alttiina kaikille elämän
pistäville okaille. Totisesti: sellaisen ihmisen sydän on rikkirevitty ja
raadeltu.
Kuka voi luetella kaikki ihmiskunnan vaivat! Tämä maailmahan

tekee toisinaan sen vaikutuksen, kuin olisi se suuri sairashuone,
jossa ihmiset vaikeroivat tuskissaan. Mitä kuolettavaa toivottomuutta
mahtaakaan sisältyä esim. sellaisen ihmisen elämään, joka on
vuosikymmeniksi kahlehdittu tautivuoteeseen. Sen tietää ainoastaan
se, joka on sitä kokenut. Entä kaikki sodan ruhjomat ja raatelemat,
nuo monilukuiset invaliidijoukot, jotka matavat suurkaupunkien katuja
sotaa käyneissä maissa ja koettavat elättää itseään mikä milläkin.
Tuntuu siltä, kuin olisivat sielun kärsimykset sittenkin suuremmat
kuin ruumiin. Ja niin varmaan onkin.
Voimme lyhyesti sanoa: kärsivien huokaukset täyttävät maailman

kuin sumu syksyisen suon.
Nyt ehkä ymmärrämme paremmin, kuinka onnellinen on se

ihminen, joka voi psalmin kirjoittajan lailla sanoa: »Vaikka vielä
ruumiini ja sieluni vaipuisi, olet sinä, Jumala, kuitenkin aina
sydämeni turva ja minun osani.»
Voiko sellainen olla mahdollista? Eikö tämä ole vain runollista

haltioitumista, jonka vallassa kirjoittaja on unohtanut elämän kovan
todellisuuden?
Kyllä. Näiden sanojen kirjoittaja on varmasti ollut runoilija Jumalan

armosta, mutta sittenkään hän ei ole liioitellut. Hän on vain pukenut
kauniiseen muotoon oman sydämensä kokemukset. Tämä on elävää
todellisuutta. Ja sellaista se on jokaiselle, joka kerrankin on oikein
kokenut Jumalan läsnäoloa.
Mikä onni, että heikko ihmislapsi voi jo tässä maailmassa kokea

jotakin tällaista, päästä omistamaan tällaisen häviämättömän
omaisuuden! Silloinhan menettävät merkityksensä tämän elämän
vaivat. Ne muuttuvat niin äärettömän pieniksi. Ne ovat kokonaan
toisarvoisia. Totisesti: jos tämä on totta — ja monen ihmisen syvin
kokemus todistaa, että tämä on totta — niin silloinhan kannattaa
taistella tämän omaisuuden puolesta, kannattaa enemmän kuin
mikään muu tässä maailmassa.
Sillä silloinhan voi joka aamu ja ilta sanoa sielulleen: »Sieluni,
sinun onnesi on siinä, että Jumala on sinua läsnä.» Amen.
TOIVO.
Loppiainen. — Matt. 2, 1—2.
On jotakin sanomattoman viehättävää tuossa ajatuksessa, että

tähti johti Itämaan tietäjiä Vapahtajan seimelle. Se puhuu mitä
voimakkaimmin mielikuvituksellemme.
Kyllähän me — nykyajan ihmiset varsinkin — olisimme taipuvaisia

kysymään, kuinka tuo on käsitettävä. Ja voisimmehan kai
kysymykseemme jonkinlaisen selityksen myös saada: taivaalle oli
ilmestynyt uusi, tavallista loistavampi tähti tahi tähtikuvio, jonka
tähtitieteeseen perehtyneet Itämaan viisaat olivat erityisesti panneet
merkille. Nykypäivien tähtitiedehän voi tuontapaisesta kertoa. Mutta
— me emme välitä näistä kysymyksistä emmekä niihin annettavista
vastauksista. Tiedämme, että kysymykset särkevät kuvittelun, ja
tavallisesti sitä perusteellisemmin kuta terävämpiä ne ovat. Me
tahdomme kerta kaikkiaan vain ajatella tähteä, joka johti Itämaan
viisaat Betlehemin seimelle. Olkoonpa, että sellainen tähti on kerran
loistanut taivaalla taikka — se ei asiaa muuta. Me näemme
Betlehemin tähdessä vertauskuvan, jota emme mielellämme tahdo
menettää, koska siinä tapauksessa elämämme —tämä taisteluista
rikas elämämme, olisi paljon köyhempi.
Se tähti, joka meille loistaa keskellä tämän elämän taisteluja, on

toivo — toivo siitä, että kaikki kerran päättyy kauniisti ja me saamme
levätä Jumalan valtakunnan iätiviheriöitsevillä rannoilla.
Mutta — kysynee joku — eikö tällainen toivo ole samaa kuin

toivottomuus? Toisin sanoen, että meillä kristityillä on tässä
maailmassa niin tukala elää ja raskas työskennellä, että sen vuoksi
antaudumme toivomaan korvausta haudan toiselta puolen? Ja
epäilijä lisää: eikö ihminen siten heittäydy haaveen valtaan, joka
tosin voi olla viehättävä, mutta kuitenkin yhtä pettävä kuin esim.
tarina joulupukista? Sellainenhan ei enää sovi aikaihmisille.
Tiedän, että moni ajattelee näin. Minulla on ystäviä, joiden kanssa

kuljen pitkät matkat yhdessä, kunnes tässä kohden tiemme
erkanevat. He eivät usko elämän jatkumiseen kuoleman jälkeen, kun
minä taas olen siitä lujasti vakuutettu.
Mutta — vastatakseni äskeiseen kysymykseen — toivon tulevasta

levosta ei tarvitse merkitä toivottomuutta eikä siis sitä, että meillä
kristityillä olisi tässä maailmassa ylen tukala ja raskas elämä.
Sitähän se on kyllä monta kertaa, mutta toivottomuudeksi se ei
koskaan käänny. Sitä on kyllä selitetty niin ja se on ehkä kaikkein
tavallisin selitys. Mutta se ei pidä yhtä Jumalan sanan kanssa. Ei —
se toivo, josta tänään puhumme, tekee meistä juuri ihmisiä, jotka
iloisin mielin jaksavat täyttää tehtävänsä keskellä tuskaa ja
ahdistustakin.
Onko siinä mitään omituista, että matkamies silloin tällöin pysähtyy

lepäämään tien varrelle ja levätessään ajattelee matkansa
päämäärää, kotitaloa, josta on ollut kauan poissa? Eikö päinvastoin
ole aivan luonnollista, että hän ajattelee, miltä kaikki tulee
näyttämään, kun hän pääsee perille… onko vanha pihakoivu vielä
paikoillaan ja kasvaako ruohopenkin reunalla tuvan ikkunan alla vielä
lemmikki niinkuin hänen lapsuutensa aikana.
Ei siinä pitäisi olla mitään luonnotonta.
Samoin ei siinäkään pitäisi olla mitään omituista, että kristitty

silloin tällöin vaipuu ajattelemaan taivaallista kotitaloa… sitä hetkeä,
jolloin hän saa astua sen suuria portaita ylös… hetkeä, jolloin
Vapahtaja itse tulee häntä vastaan ja toivottaa hänet tervetulleeksi
pitkän, vaivaloisen matkan jälkeen. Kristityllä on silloin suunnilleen
samanlainen mieli kuin miehellä, joka kolmenkymmenen vuoden
perästä seisoo lapsuutensa kurkihirren alla ja sydän onnea tulvillaan
katselee vanhaa äitiä, joka laittaa hänelle ruokaa pöydälle, —
hänelle, väsyneelle kulkijalle. Sillä hän kulki jalan viimeisen
penikulman, koska ei malttanut jäädä odottelemaan kyytihevosta.
Niin suuri oli koti-ikävä.
Minä en ainakaan pitäisi minään tunteellisuutena, jos tuo

maailmalta palannut poika pyyhiskelisi silmiään istuessaan kotoisella
penkillä niin monen pitkän vuoden jälkeen.
Tämänkaltainen on meidänkin toivomme. Mekin toivomme kerran

pääsevämme vapaiksi kaikista tämän elämän rasituksista, kivuista ja
murheista ja saavamme astua taivaallisen kotitalon avaraan tupaan,
Silloin ei meitä enää vaivaa mikään. Ja tämä toivo auttaa meitä
ponnistelemaan täällä mahdollisimman sitkeästi.
Tiedän, etten kerro mitään satua julistaessani tällaista toivoa.

Tiedän, että puheeni vahvistaa todeksi jokaisen kristityn kokemus ja
elämän varrella saavutettu vakaumus. »Niin on kuin sanot, pappi…
meidän elämäämme kannattaa toivo Jumalan valtakunnan ikuisesta
kesästä. Emme me nuru emmekä napise täällä. Päinvastoin olemme
iloisia ja rohkeita kuin koululapset, jotka ponnistavat viimeiset
voimansa läksyjensä ääressä tietäessään kesäloman pian
koittavan…»
Eikö tällainen toivo ole jotakin oleellista… jotakin, joka kannattaa

tulla liitetyksi elämäämme lisäpurje elomme haahteen… niin, tai
oikeammin pääpurje?
Totta kai.
Ja mistä olemme tämän toivon saaneet?
Betlehemin lapselta, joka aikamiehenä lausui: »Minun Isäni

kodissa on monta asuntoa. Jos ei niin olisi, sanoisin teille, että minä
menen valmistamaan teille sijaa.»
Sellainen on meidän toivomme, sellainen se tähti, jota me

seuraamme. Se vilkuttaa meille yhtä ystävällisesti, yhtä kutsuvasti
kuin iltatähti, joka tuikkii huoneemme ikkunaan. Me katselemme sitä,
sen ihmeellistä väikettä, ja mielemme valtaa aavistus jostakin oikein
suuresta ja ihanasta… kirkkauden maailmasta, jota kohti olemme
matkalla.
Eikö Herran apostoli ole sanonut: »Toivo ei anna häpeään tulla»?
On.
Ja se on totta. Amen.
LAPSEMME.
1. Loppiaisen jälk. sunnuntai. — Luukk. 2, 42—52.
Joosefilla ja Marialla oli suuri huoli; he olivat palaamassa juhlilta ja

olivat kadottaneet poikansa. Jeesusta ei löytynyt siitä
matkaseurueesta, johon vanhemmat kuuluivat. He olivat käyneet
kokonaisen päivämatkan, etsien häntä sukulaisten ja tuttavien
joukosta. Saattoihan nim. helposti kuvitella, että vilkas poikanen oli
kulkenut edellekäsin ja oleili jossakin tuttujen joukossa. Tuollaistahan
kyllä sattui. Mutta turhaan: — poikaa ei löytynyt. Silloin palasivat
Joosef ja Maria Jerusalemiin syvästi huolestuneina.
Kesti kokonaista kolme päivää, ennenkuin he hänet löysivät. He

olivat etsineet kaikki mahdolliset paikat, kadut ja kujat, torit ja kaupat;
he olivat kyselleet tutuilta ja tuntemattomilta ja saaneet joka kerta
kieltävän vastauksen. Oi, kuinka monta kertaa he olivat saaneet
kieltävän vastauksen. »Ei ole nähty.» Ja sitten kylmä päännyökkäys.
Kukapa suuressa maailmankaupungissa kiinnitti huomionsa
kaksitoistavuotiaaseen poikaseen. Vihdoin, pitkän ja tuskallisen
etsimisen jälkeen he löysivät hänet temppelistä.
Me sanomme: kyllä on lapsista huolta. Ja se on totta. Mutta —
huolehdimmeko aina siitä, mikä on heille kaikkein tärkeintä?
Perheenisä, jolla on suuri lapsijoukko, tietää kyllä, mitä merkitsee

työnteko heidän hyväkseen. Rahaa ruokaan, kenkiin ja vaatteisiin,
rahaa kirjoihin ja koulunkäyntiin, rahaa mahdollisten
sairaustapausten varalle. Mutta onko siinä kaikki?
Moni isä ajattelee: kun tämän kaiken kunnolla täytän, olen tehnyt
velvollisuuteni. Mutta onko niin? Eikö ole mitään enää jäljellä?
Rakkaat kuulijani! Pääasia on vielä jäljellä: lapsen sielu. Kuinka

olet huolehtinut siitä?
Ei riitä vain se, että ansaitsemme lapsillemme jokapäiväisen

leivän. Tarvitaan vielä muutakin. Lastemme sielu odottaa myös
vaalijaansa. Ja se vaalija olet sinä, isä ja äiti.
Oletko koskaan tullut ajatelleeksi, että papinvirka on paljon

yleisempi kuin mitä yleensä otaksutaan? Jokainen isä on pappi
perheenä keskuudessa.
Mistä johtuu, että niin moni, joka kerran oli puhdas, on joutunut
turmioon?
Sinä sanot: se on tavattoman vaikea tehtävä. Koko tuo

kasvatuskysymys… se antaa päänvaivaa enemmän kuin tarpeeksi.
Ja kuinka pystyy siihen oppimaton isä ja äiti?
Ei ole kysymys opista eikä lahjoista. Nekin ovat kyllä kallisarvoisia,

mutta sittenkään ne eivät ole pääasia. On kysymys sydämestä t.s.
siitä, rakastatko lapsiasi koko sydämestäsi.
Se saattaa tuntua tarpeettomalta kysymykseltä. Kukapa isä tai äiti
ei rakastaisi lapsiaan, noita herttaisia, viattomia olentoja, jotka
antavat kodille sen oikean hengen. Niin — saattaa tuntua siltä. Mutta
sittenkin tahtoisin väittää, ettemme riittävästi rakasta lapsiamme, jos
jätämme heidän sielunsa viljelemättä.
Kuinka sitten voimme viljellä sitä?
Siihen kysymykseen annetaan kasvatusopin oppikirjoissa monta

viisasta vastausta. Mutta minä en nyt välitä niistä. Otan asian
käytännöllisemmin.
Sanon ensiksikin, että sinun on omistettava aikaa lapsillesi.
Kun tulet työstäsi ja olet hiukan levännyt, mene lastesi luo ja ota
selvää heidän puuhistaan. Kuuntele kärsivällisesti heidän pieniä
kertomuksiaan päivän menosta. Älä ajattele, että ne ovat
vähäpätöisiä tahi jonninjoutavia. Muista, että niihin kiinnitetään
huomiota sellaisessa paikassa kuin taivas.
Et usko, kuinka mielenkiintoiseksi muodostuu tuollainen iltahetki

lasten parissa. Kun osoitat huomaavaisuutta heille kuuntelemalla
heidän pikkujuttujaan, saavutat sen ehdottoman varman aseman,
että he luottavat sinuun kaikessa. Siten kykenet ohjaamaan heidän
pienet ajatuksensa myös näkymättömän maailman asioihin, pääset
käsiksi heidän sieluunsa.
Onnellisia ne lapset, joiden vanhemmat omistavat aikaansa heille.

Heidän pikku maailmansa portilla seisoo uskollinen vartija, joka
estää pahan sinne pääsemästä. Se vartija on oma isä ja äiti.
Leiki lastesi kanssa. Se on toinen kohta, johon tahdoin tulla.

Moni isä ja äiti ajattelee, ettei heille kuulu leikkiä lasten kanssa.
Lapset leikkikööt keskenään. Isä ja äiti korkeintaan valvovat, että
leikit pysyvät oikeissa rajoissa. Mutta — se ei vielä riitä. Sinun tulee
leikkiä lastesi kanssa.
Oi, kuinka leikki, iloinen, viaton leikki avaa lasten sydämen! Ja kun
isä ja äiti vielä ottavat siihen osaa! Minä luulen, että useimmat lapset
kuvittelevat Jumalan taivaassa leikkivän lasten kanssa.
Sitten voit puhua heille, kertoa jotakin Jumalasta ja Vapahtajasta.

Ja saat nähdä, kuinka tarkkaavasti sinua kuunnellaan. Tai jos et
osaa puhua, voit lukea heille. Ole varma siitä, että muisto tällaisesta
vanhemmasta, joka näin ottaa osaa lastensa elämään, säilyy lapsen
sydämessä vielä kauan senkin jälkeen, kun hän on jättänyt
lapsuutensa leikit, — niin — saattaa säilyä elämän loppuun asti.
Nämä ovat niin tavallisia asioita, mutta kuitenkin ne usein

laiminlyödään. Ja laiminlyönti tapahtuu lasten vahingoksi — ennen
kaikkea heidän sielunsa vahingoksi.
Joskus elämän varrella saattavat nämä laiminlyönnit ruveta

painamaan omaatuntoa.
Lähetyssaarnaaja David Livingstonesta kerrotaan, että hänet

kerran valtasi suuri murhe. Hän silloin kaukana Sisä-Afrikassa,
tuhansien penikulmien päässä kotimaasta. Se murhe, joka häntä
tuolla kertaa painoi, johtui siitä, että hän oli niin vähän leikkinyt
lastensa kanssa.
Ajattelepas — mies, jonka sydämellä on koko mustien maanosan

hätä, itkee sen vuoksi, että on niin vähän joutanut leikkimään
lastensa kanssa.
Eikö se ole merkillistä?
Niin — salaisuus on siinä, että suuri lähetyssaarnaaja tiesi, kuinka

leikki avaa lasten sydämen. Hän katui sitä, ettei ollut tarpeeksi
käyttänyt tuota keinoa päästäkseen käsiksi lastensa sieluun.
Katso: älä ota sitä taakan kannalta. Ethän tee niin, ahertaessasi
muuten lastesi hyväksi. Sinähän teet työtä ilolla, tietäen, kuinka
suurta on työskennellä jonkun hyväksi. Ota samalta kannalta tuo
muukin… ajanvietto ja leikit lastesi kanssa… koko tuo
sielunhoidollinen työ lastenkamarissa. Puhu sinä vain lapsinesi ja
jätä seuraukset Jumalalle. Tässäkin pitää paikkansa Raamatun
sana: »Toinen on, joka istuttaa ja toinen, joka kastelee, mutta Jumala
on se, joka kasvun antaa.» Amen.
KUULIAISUUS.
2. Loppiaisen jälk. sunnuntai. — 1 Moos. 12, 1—4.
Ei ole helppo lähteä omasta maasta vieraisiin, outoihin oloihin. Se,

joka väittää päinvastaista, ei ole koskaan mitään sentapaista
kokenut. Taikka sitten hän on kevytmielinen, pintapuolinen ihminen.
Voimme siis melko hyvin ymmärtää Abramin tunteet sinä hetkenä,

jolloin Jumala hänelle sanoi: »Lähde maaltasi ja syntymäpaikastasi
sille maalle, jonka minä sinulle osoitan.» Ei Abram varmaankaan
tervehtinyt ilolla tuota käskyä. Päinvastoin hän tuli murheelliseksi.
Olemme siitä aivan varmat, vaikkei sitä Raamatussa nimenomaan
sanotakaan.
Silloin — tuon käskyn saatuaan — hän nimittäin vasta oikein

huomasi, kuinka rakas oli kotiseutu. Tietysti hän oli rakastanut sitä
ennenkin, mutta ei ollut tullut sitä erikoisemmin ajatelleeksi. Vasta
sinä hetkenä, jolloin hänen käsketään luopua siitä, hän huomaa sen.
Niin on tavallisesti, että jonkin asian arvo ja merkitys selviää vasta
sitten, kun emme enää omista sitä.
Niin kävi Abraminkin. Vasta nyt hän huomasi, kuinka kaunis
saattoi olla laaja ruohotasanko, missä tuuli hiljaa heilutteli täydeksi
kasvanutta heinää. Vasta nyt hän havaitsi, kuinka runollisen kaunis
oli kylän ulkopuolella sijaitseva kaivo palmujen siimeksessä ja kuinka
hauskaa oli katsella, kun siellä karjaa juotettiin. Nyt hän näki tuon
kaiken avoimin silmin. Ja nyt hänen käskettiin se jättää.
Abram suri, mutta totteli kuitenkin. Ei olisi johtunut hänen

mieleensäkään ruveta Jumalan tahtoa vastustamaan. Vaikk'ei ollut
tietoa matkan suunnasta eikä päämäärästä, hän lähti. Hän luotti niin
lujasti Jumalaan ja hänen huolenpitoonsa.
Tässä kohden Abram on suuri, hän kohoaa niin paljon

yläpuolellemme, että on saanut uskon isän nimen. Hän sopii siis
esikuvaksemme.
Elämässä joudutaan monta kertaa sellaiseen kohtaan, jolloin

kysytään:
tahdonko tehdä, niinkuin Jumala käskee? Oma tahto panee vastaan,
mutta
Jumalan tahto, joka on omalletunnolle kirkastunut, vaatii ratkaisua.
Mitä teemme silloin?
On kysymys esim. köyhän ystävän auttamisesta. Hän kertoo

suoraan ja peittelemättä, millainen hänen taloudellinen tilansa on.
Rahasummalle, joka tässä on kysymyksessä, hän ei voi antaa muita
takeita kuin sen, että hän sen kyllä maksaa, jos saa elää. Siinä on
tuo pieni jos. Vastakkaisessa tapauksessa se kaiken
todennäköisyyden mukaan jää maksamatta.
Tämä ystävä on tuttu, hyvin tuttu. Tunnemme hänet kuin itsemme

ja luotamme häneen ehdottomasti Siinä on vain tuo pieni jos ja
rahasumma on suuri Mitä teemme?
Oma tahto ei olisi halukas taipumaan, mutta Jumalan tahto vaatii

antamaan. Jos meillä on hituisenkin Abramin uskoa, me annamme,
annamme arvelematta, iloisella, vapaalla mielellä. Olemme kuuliaisia
Jumalan äänelle omassatunnossamme.
Tai voi ratkaisu olla vielä vaikeampi. Se on niin vaikea, että tuntuu
siltä, kuin riistettäisiin rinnastamme sydän ja poljettaisiin maahan.
Silloin nousee kaikki meissä vastarintaan. Ei… me emme tahdo…
emme voi! Suostuminen sellaiseen on samaa kuin kuolema.
Mutta Jumalan tahto vaatii toisin. Se vaatii taipumaan, alistumaan,

uhraamaan. Silloin on taas Abramin ratkaisu edessä: — lähde
maaltasi!
Mitä teemme?
Kuuntelemme Jumalan ääntä, alistumme, taivumme. Tunnemme

kyllä seisovamme kuin jyrkänteen reunalla ja syvyys ammottaa
allamme. Mutta — jos luotamme Jumalaan — uskallamme
hyppäyksen ja saamme iloksemme havaita, että meidät otettiin
pehmeästi vastaan. Mahdoton muuttui mahdolliseksi.
Sinä, kuulijani, tiedät kyllä, milloin olet elämässäsi ollut

suorittamassa Abramin muuttoa. Tiedät, että minä puhun totta. Se
käy, se käy kyllä Jumalan ihmeellisellä avulla, jos vain ihminen
uskaltaa kokonansa heittäytyä Jumalan käsiin.
Mutta — ehkä on joukossamme niitä, jotka ovat tähän saakka

kiertäneet tuon kipeän paikan. Omatunto vie tavan takaa sen äärelle,

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Combatting Illicit Trade in Tobacco

Products In Search of Optimal

Around the World in 80 Days Dona Rice

In Search of Returns 2nd Edition John Looby

In Search of the Romans Second Edition James Renshaw

Progress in the Chemistry of Organic Natural Products

Innovative Strategies in Teaching Nursing: Exemplars of

Studies in Law, Politics, and Society (Volume 85) 1st

Wild and Free In search of his Vocation Sounak

In Search of Lost Futures 1st Edition Magdalena

Combatting Illicit Trade

ISBN 978-3-030-67801-2 ISBN 978-3-030-67802-9 (eBook)

10 The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Policies in Combatting Illicit

About the Editors

Stanisław Tosza is an Associate Professor of Compliance and Law Enforcement at

John A. E. Vervaele is a Professor of Economic and European Criminal Law, as

Alessandro Bernardi Department of Law, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy

Aart J. de Vries Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, RENFORCE,

Stanisław Tosza and John A. E. Vervaele

Producing and trading in illegal cigarettes is a very proﬁtable business. It is relatively

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

enforcement of policies against ITTP, including efforts to inﬂuence countries

Bundestag document No 19/17630

Abstract Illicit production and trade in tobacco products—be they counterfeited

Illicit production and trade in tobacco products—be they counterfeited cigarettes of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 7

practice as well as shortcomings hampering the ﬁght against this phenomenon,

2.2 Basic Parameters of Licit and Illicit Tobacco Trade

2.3 Legal Framework and Strategies Against Illicit

Tobacco policy enforcement at the national level is generally composed of two

2.4 Supply Chain Control

these three companies only.72 Therefore, compliance through agreements is not a

transfers of cash or obligations to report suspicious operations (linked to money

2.5 Offences, Sanctions and Other Consequences

Deﬁning the Offences

last-mentioned country, for instance, the mixing and intermingling of tobacco

legal systems. In Germany, criminal conﬁscation is considered to be of a restitutive

complications result in the inclination of the authorities to favour simpler solutions

2.6 Authorities Responsible for Combatting ITTP

2.7 Investigations in ITTP Cases

Investigative Techniques and Powers

lands.194 It is also allowed and used in practice in Poland.195 In Germany, surveil-

intentional illegal production or possession of tobacco products is time-barred after

of coordination leads to parallel proceedings and, as cases may very well be

if the speciﬁc ITTP offence is committed by organised transnational groups, as it

2.8 Institutional and International Cooperation

As already mentioned, ITTP is very often a cross-border phenomenon. Furthermore,

overview, enforcement is in the hands of a patchwork of bodies of different types

On niin omituista, että päivän evankeliumi kehoittaa myös

Evankeliumissa on kaksi kohtaa, joihin huomiomme erikoisesti

Hän tuli etsimään hedelmää. Niin — hedelmää Jumala meiltä

Kuulen joidenkin sanovan: »Olen käynyt säännöllisesti kirkossa»,

Hyvä on! Mutta — onko sydämesi tullut jalommaksi kuluneen

Katso, ystäväni: eivätkö hyvät päätöksesi makaa kuolleina kuin

Kuinka on nyt? Evankeliumissa sanotaan: »Hän tuli etsimään

Ja sitten: tutkinto käy ankarammaksi. »Katso, kolmena vuonna

»Kolmena vuonna» — eikö totta? Me muistamme edellisiä vuosia.

Oi, me näemme viinitarhan omistajan ankaran muodon. Hän

Mutta sitten — tuo viinitarhuri. Hän on kasvanut puidensa parissa;

»Herra, anna sen vielä tämä vuosi olla.»

Rakkaat ystävät! Mikä lohdullinen alku tälle uudelle vuodelle!

Eikö hän taistellut puolestamme muutamana kevätpäivänä

Ja eikö hän luottanut meihin sanoessaan: »Isä, anna heille