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Claiming The Dispossession The Politics of Hi Storytelling in Post Imperial Europe 1St Edition Vladimir Biti Online Ebook Texxtbook Full Chapter PDF
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Claiming the Dispossession
Balkan Studies Library
Editor-in-Chief
Editorial Board
Advisory Board
VOLUME 19
Edited by
Vladimir Biti
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Cover illustration: Srđan Ivanković, with the artist’s permission.
Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.
issn 1877-6272
isbn 978-90-04-35392-3 (hardback)
isbn 978-90-04-35393-0 (e-book)
Introduction
Tua res agitur, tua fabula narratur: In Search of Lost Sovereignty 1
Vladimir Biti
Part 1
The Janus-Face of Dispossession
PART 2
The Politics of Post-imperial Hi/storytelling
Claiming the West for the East: Classical Antiquity as an Alternative Source
of Turkish Post-Ottoman Identity? 93
Petr Kučera
Andrić and the Bridge: Dispossessed Writers and the Novel as a Site of
Enduring Homelessness 116
Guido Snel
PART 3
The Post-post-imperial Retake
Davor Beganović
is Lecturer for Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian languages and literatures at the
University of Tübingen, as well as Adjunct Lecturer for South-Slavic cultures
and literatures at the School of Slavic Studies, University of Zurich. He stud-
ied comparative literature, Slavic languages and literatures and English in
Belgrade, Zagreb and Constance, where he took his PhD with the thesis on
cultural memory in the work of Danilo Kiš. He published three monographs:
Pamćenje traume. Apokaliptička proza Danila Kiša (Remembering Trauma:
The Apocalyptic Prose of Danilo Kiš, 2007), Poetika melankolije (Poetics of
Melancholy, 2009) and Protiv kanona (Against Canon, 2011). He edited, togeth-
er with Peter Braun, the volume Krieg sichten. Zur medialen Darstellung der
Kriege in Jugoslawien (2007) and, together with Enver Kazaz, an anthology of
post-Yugoslav literatures Unutarnji prijevodi (Internal Translations, 2011).
Vladimir Biti
is Professor of South Slav literatures and cultures at the Faculty for Literary and
Cultural Studies, University of Vienna. Author of nine books, Literatur- und
Kulturtheorie: Ein Handbuch gegenwärtiger Begriffe, Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2001
and Tracing Global Democracy: Literature, Theory, and the Politics of Trauma,
Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2016 among others, he has also edited or co-
edited seven readers as well as published over one hundred articles in a wide
range of journals and readers. Co-editor of arcadia: Journal of Literary Culture
and member of the editorial board of several international journals, including
Journal of Literary Theory and Journal of Literature and Trauma Studies. Since
2016, he is the Chairperson of Academia Europaea’s Literary and Theatrical
Section. His monograph Attached to Dispossession: Sacrificial Narratives in
Post-imperial Europe is under contract with Brill (forthcoming 2017).
Zrinka Božić-Blanuša
is Assistant Professor of literary theory at the Faculty of Humanities and Social
Sciences, University of Zagreb. Her research interests include poststructural-
ism, deconstruction, phenomenology, narrative theory, intersections between
literature and philosophy, the position of literature and literary theory in re-
lation to politics, theories of representation and problems of testimony. She
is the author of Iz perspektive smrti: Heidegger i drugi (From the Perspective of
Death: Heidegger and Others, 2012), a genealogical study of contemporary dis-
cussion on Heidegger’s concept of “Sein zum Tode” in relation to literature,
ethics and politics.
viii notes on contributors
Marko Juvan
is literary theorist and comparatist, Head of the ZRC SAZU Institute of Slovenian
Literature and Literary Studies, and Professor of Slovenian literature at the
University of Ljubljana. He is member of the editorial boards of Primerjalna
književnost and CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, as well as of
the Section Committee for Literary and Theatrical Studies of the Academia
Europaea. In addition to numerous articles and edited volumes—e.g., Prostori
slovenske književnosti (Spaces of Slovenian Literature, 2016), World Literatures
from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century (2013)—his recent book pub-
lications include History and Poetics of Intertextuality (2008), Literary Studies
in Reconstruction (2011), and Prešernovska struktura in svetovni literarni sistem
(The Prešernian Structure and the World Literary System, 2012).
Bernarda Katušić
currently teaches South-Slavic literatures at the Faculty for Literary and
Cultural Studies, University of Vienna. She is author of the monographs Slast
kratkih spojeva (2000) and Das literarische Pendel (2012) and co-editor (with
Vladimir Biti) of Märchen in den südslawischen Literaturen (2010). She has
published prolifically in Croatian and international journals. She has taught
courses on South-Slavic literatures at the universities of Salzburg, Innsbruck,
and Vienna. Her main fields of interest are intermediality, genre transforma-
tions and the formation of emotions in literary discourse.
Nataša Kovačević
is Associate Professor of postcolonial literature and theory at Eastern Michigan
University. Her research on Cold War Orientalism and (post)communist dis-
sident literature has been the subject of her book Narrating Post/Communism:
Colonial Discourse and Europe’s Borderline Civilization (Routledge, 2008). Her
essays have appeared in Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial
Studies, Cultural Critique, Modern Fiction Studies, and several collections.
Her current research explores challenges to multicultural discourses in the
European Union, specifically postcolonial and postcommunist immigrant texts
that imagine a subaltern transnationalism, interrogating traditional modes of
community based on filiative resemblance, racial, ethnic, or otherwise.
Petr Kučera
holds an M.A. in Turkish and Islamic studies and a Ph.D. in non-Western litera-
tures from Charles University in Prague. He held long-term scholarships at the
universities of Berlin, Ankara, Istanbul and Princeton and was postdoctoral
researcher at SOAS (London) and visiting researcher at Ludwig Maximillian
notes on contributors ix
Aleksandar Mijatović
is Assistant Professor of literary theory at the Faculty of Humanities and
Social Sciences, University of Rijeka. He has published two books in Croatian:
Personific(a)tions: The Literary Subject and the Politics of Impersonality (2013),
World without Man: Consciousness, Materialism and Literature (2012) as well
as edited a collection of essays titled Imaginary Languages: Visual Culture and
the Limits of Representation (2012). In English, he has published articles on
Agamben, Althusser, Benjamin, Bergson, Breton, Deleuze, Derrida and, most
recently, “Heteroessences: Community, Demonstratives and Interpretation in
Agamben’s Philosophy of Language” (2014).
Guido Snel
is Assistant Professor of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam.
He specializes in contemporary European literatures, with a specific focus on
Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. He also writes fiction (novels,
travelogue). His recent research deals with spatial metaphor and imaginary
European geographies, under the umbrella title Bridge and Wall: Persistence of
East-West and Balkan imaginaries in post-1989 Europe.
Stijn Vervaet
is Associate Professor of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and Balkan Studies at the
University of Oslo. He is the author of a book on the construction of national
identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian rule (Sarajevo
and Zagreb: Synopsis 2013). In addition to publications related to the cultur-
al and literary history of Habsburg Bosnia, he has published book chapters
and journal articles on the representation of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s
and of the Holocaust in (post-)Yugoslav fiction. He co-edited the volume
Post-Yugoslav Constellations: Archive, Memory, and Trauma in Contemporary
Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Literature and Culture (De Gruyter 2016, with
Vlad Beronja) and authored the upcoming monograph Holocaust, War, and
Transnational Memory: Testimony from Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Literature
(Routledge, 2017).
Introduction
Tua res agitur, tua fabula narratur: In Search of Lost Sovereignty
Vladimir Biti
1 As regards the Habsburg Empire, this was, in a sense, a logical continuation of the eighteenth-
century efforts to forge a unified empire with a unified purpose, which also “sought implicit
and sometimes explicit support from a very broad array of groups and social actors” and ul-
timately got it, at least from those who felt they were “the indirect beneficiaries of Habsburg
reform” (Judson 6). This time, however, the anticipated supporters (or feared rebels) were
not peasants or educated middle classes but ethnic constituencies. This confirms Judson’s
thesis that “imperial state building took place under and necessarily responded to radically
changing local, empire- and European-wide conditions, which demanded nimble strategies,
dependent upon the support of different allies in society” (6).
it with that between the protectors and those in need of protection (Amselle
12–13). New frustrations arose. In an attempt to assuage them, the Treaty of
Versailles implemented the Western “national trinity” of people-territory-
state as established in the course of the nineteenth century by translating
Herder’s pre-statist Kulturnation into the terms of the political nation-state. In
this way, Herder’s back-distilling of “primordial” linguistic and cultural purity
from the inextricable mixture of an imperial identity’s variables—which he
nota bene reserved for the “parochial” peoples commanded by myths and leg-
ends (Herder 1891, 510)—was consecrated politically.
Thus, in spite of the proud proclamations of the new nations’ representa-
tives, whose celebration of their ‘authenticity’ completely failed to notice the
humiliation implied by it, their ‘provably’ indigenous and primordial nations
were in fact an imported and modern invention.2 It could not have been es-
tablished, however, if the Western nation-state powers’ enforcement of tradi-
tions had not had been wholeheartedly embraced by the domestic elites. As
Mahmoud Mamdani remarks concerning the “indirect rule” introduced into
Western colonies around the mid-nineteenth century, Western nation-states
were the first to advance and put into practice two propositions: one,
that every colonized group has an original and pure tradition, whether
religious or ethnic; and two, that every colonized group must be made to
return to that original condition, and that the return must be enforced
by law.
Mamdani 50
2 In fact, imperial administrations of the second half of the nineteenth century paved the way
for the establishment of new nations by creating many institutional spaces for their develop-
ment. “Concepts of nationhood and ideas of empire depended on each other for their coher-
ence. As intimately intertwined subjects, they developed in dialogue with each other, rather
than as binary opposites.” (Judson 9–10) However, this means that the empire rather than na-
tions operated as the driving force in a region’s history, a conclusion that requires the engage-
ment of an alternative model different from the one currently implemented by the dominant
national historiographies. This volume is an attempt to establish such a large-scale, compara-
tive, and transnational model that explores shared experiences in East Central Europe.
3 According to Maria Todorova, “/e/ver since the fifteenth century (and in the case of England
much earlier), Western Europe has embarked on a huge homogenization drive with various
degrees of success (the Spanish reconquista, England’s expulsion of the Jews in the twelfth
Introduction 3
century, the religious wars in France and Germany), which, in conjunction with the strong
dynastic states, had laid the foundations of the future nation-states” (Todorova 175). But as
Ernest Renan puts it in his famous lecture “What is a Nation?”, the essence of a nation is that
its individual members erase attrocities committed by their compatriots from their memo-
ries. “Every French citizen has forgotten St. Bartholomew’s Day and the thirteenth-century
massacres in the Midi.” (Renan 46) Because the Western nation-states suppressed in such a
fashion the crimes committed long ago for the sake of the establishment of their nations,
they experienced the ethnic cleansings that were engaged in several centuries later by their
East Central European counterparts as a painful “return of the suppressed”, reacting to them
with disgust and repulsion. This unexpected reappearance of the Eastern within Western
Europe (in the traumatic past) and the Western within Eastern Europe (in the traumatic
present) confirms Aleksandar Mijatović’s thesis, as presented in this volume, of their com-
posite, closely intertwined character. They do not exist as separate autonomous entities.
4 biti
Hohenzollern and Habsburg Empires as the homelands of its identity. The de-
sire to compensate for these painful losses inflicted upon all sides involved gave
rise to their peculiar politics of trauma, represented in each of these cases by
particular narratives of dispossession. The traumatic constellation induced by
the delineated perpetuation of the power asymmetry did not pertain to each
of its constituencies in the same way; rather each of them developed a politics
connected to its specific position in the given entangled complex.4 Some of
the constituencies, unavoidably adapting to their circumstances, acted pub-
licly and collectively, some of them individually and clandestinely.
The first case spawned the collective political narratives of dispossession
that uncritically glorified the national past in order to mobilize the masses of
followers to sacrifice their short-term private interests for the long-term objec-
tives of these narratives’ “carrier groups”, which were of course presented as
being common and universal. What made these foundational myths so fasci-
nating is that they usually claimed “legitimate” historical rights for their nation
against that which was rendered as the nation’s “illegitimate” dispossession,
and thereby provided the domestic population with desperately needed conso-
lation. In defining pain, perpetrators, victims, and remedies in clearly bipolar,
antithetical terms, (Alexander 16–19), they remedially repossessed the national
past, present, and future. National state institutions (such as parliaments, uni-
versities, museums, archives, schools, etc.) orchestrated their dissemination
and reiteration via various scientific, pedagogic, and media discourses (such as
historiography, ethnology, literary and art history, pedagogy, political speeches,
memorials, TV-series, films, internet sites, etc.). This entailed a discriminating
regulation of established national spaces inasmuch as such narratives suppress
the rights of non-national compatriots and specific social and gender groups
as well as individual liberties. Moreover, they invigorate each other, thereby in-
tensifying aggravation and deepening divisions within and beyond the region,
continuously extending the number of their direct and collateral victims.
This explosive condition of the post-imperial political space induced, in its
turn, various forms of resistance like (1) counter-narratives of national minori-
ties that distance themselves from the new nation-states in which they live
and to which they are connected by a long historical heritage, via recourse to
external national homelands to which they now feel they most truly “belong”
(Brubaker, Nationalism 59–62), or (2) counter-narratives created by transna-
tionally oriented social, political, religious, gender and artistic groups in the
4 In Tracing Global Democracy, I interpret “traumatic constellation” “as a historically induced
political arena or dramatic tableau characterized by asymmetries along its many intersecting
and overlapping axes, each of them for its part a potential generator of trauma” (Biti 5).
Introduction 5
5 For the analogous strategy of analytical disaggregation of the robust and clear-cut categories
that are “conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading, and normatively problematic”
(Brubaker, Ethnicity 5), see Brubaker, who states that “common sense—the tendency to par-
tition the social world into putatively deeply constituted, quasi-natural intrinsic kinds—is a
key part of what we want to explain, not what we want to explain things with; it belongs to
our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit” (Ethnicity 9).
6 biti
Part One of the volume, The Janus-Face of Dispossession, contains three contri-
butions. In my paper “Ruling (Out) the Province: Sovereignty, Dispossession,
and Sacrificial Violence”, the transition from empires to nation-states is repre-
sented as a translation rather than a rupture, considering that the discrimina-
tion of the one constituency by the other(s) was equally constitutive of empires
as it was of nation-states. The empires’ retroactively and nostalgically celebrat-
ed multitude was equally placed at the service of an agency that operated as
its secret manager. This long-enduring asymmetry between the sovereign and
subordinate constituencies resulted, in late empires, with the distinction be-
tween the ‘educators’ and ‘barbarians’, which, due to an obstinate resurgence
of the latter within the former category, transformed the envisaged mentor-
ing into a persistent irritation by ‘barbarians’ and the concomitant blaming
and denigration of them. While attributing them a self-content with their ‘na-
tional spirits’, Herder envisaged for the Germans, in counter-distinction, a re-
lentless self-propelling. In Hofmannsthal’s reinterpretation, the German spirit
benefits from its openness to rejuvenation, with the important proviso that
only the Austrians can provide it in the same way that the Slavs rejuvenate the
Austrians. In other words, the ‘barbarians’ reach their true fulfillment only if
they put themselves at the service of the maintenance of their mentors’ supe-
riority. Being thus compelled to look at themselves through the contemptu-
ous perspective of their ‘educators’ that aimed at their exploitation, they were
left with practically no other choice but to nourish their sovereignty projects
through a paradoxical rubbing of salt into their open wounds. In the remaining
part of the paper, I investigate which forms of sacrificial violence entailed this
kind of self-exemption from the envisaged frame of recognition, primarily in
the works of Miloš Crnjanski and Miroslav Krleža. One form of violence was
directed toward the others and the other toward their own selves, which was
followed by other subtle ramifications.
In his article “The Time of Dispossession: The Conflict, Composition and
Geophilosophy of Revolution in East Central Europe”, Aleksandar Mijatović
raises the question as to whether the dissolution of the East Central European
states in 1989 was a revolution performed after the model of conflict forged
by Hegel and Marx. In opposition to this model, some scholars follow the
model of composition by regarding the event of 1989 as a rebirth that restores
8 biti
continuity with the past. In fact, as revolution could never be simply defined as
a ‘coming out of age’, but rather as ‘being born again’, revolution and rebirth are
not easily separable from one another. By internalizing the conflict between
the West and the East, the East Central European states perceive themselves
as being less ‘western’ than their mentors but more ‘western’ than their neigh-
bour states, which entails the typically transitional, not-quite-European char-
acter of the region. Mijatović objects that this kind of reasoning is typical of
the model of conflict according to which the type precedes its differentiations,
which is why this model is insufficient. It has to be corrected by the model
of composition, which represents both Western and Eastern Europe as com-
posites exposed to a constitutive “internal differing”. He attributes such a per-
petual re-introduction of external into internal difference to the philosophies
of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, stating that only with the help of their
argument in favour of a fundamental difference can we account for the coex-
istence of tendencies such as racism and nationalism with their counterparts
such as multiculturalism and individualism in both parts of Europe. “With the
notion of the composite, it is possible to reject ‘differences of degree in nature’
and affirm ‘only degrees of difference itself’. On the level of the difference of
degree, there is the opposition between the ‘two’ Europes engendered through
the struggle for recognition. Following a temporalized notion of difference,
Europe is internally differentiated into a multiplicity of compositions irreduc-
ible to the actual geopolitical and cultural entities.”
In her contribution “Manifesting Dispossession: Politics of the Avant-garde”,
Zrinka Božić-Blanuša investigates the avant-garde manifestos that, by almost
violently breaking into the artistic field in the post-imperial age, profoundly
altered the profile of art with their insistence on depersonalization. Manifestos
are public performances that establish the collectives of their adherents, or
their ‘we’, by their very staging. In fact, this ‘we’ challenges the bourgeois idea
of art as an individual and private affair by advocating a resumption of the
pre-modern status of art as an instrument of communitarian being. Georges
Bataille was the first thinker to put forward self-dispossession or self-sacrifice
as art’s underlying principle. In Blanchot’s interpretation, Bataille’s concept of
art amounts to the limitless abandonment of individuality. The subject dis-
solves itself in the wider subjectivity of a community by following the dan-
gerous ideal of a self-empowering self-dispossession that has been cogently
criticized in the philosophies of Jean-Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito. This
ideal reaffirms the sovereignty of the subject instead of questioning it. The
community belongs to no one, as it systematically expropriates all its propri-
etors; the common is what is improper, the opposite of property, of posses-
sion, and it exists only through their persistent undoing. One would therefore
Introduction 9
complex interplay between novelistic poetics and cultural politics in the work
of the Nobel laureate Ivo Andrić, which became all the more poignant after
the brutal dispossession of this writer and the cultural-political community
he was considered to embody. Andrić became uprooted after the educational
curricula and cultural policies of the new nation-states that emerged from the
former Yugoslavia dispossessed him of proper belonging, yet it is precisely
through this enforced homelessness that he shares the destiny of the novel
as the epitome of homelessness. Did Andrić not foresee his posthumous fate
when he, in various ways, inscribed the notion of homelessness into his nov-
els? However, as Edward Said cautioned, homelessness is not just a trait of cos-
mopolitan literature but also resides in the very heart of nationalism’s frantic
search for a home. This accounts for the ambiguity of the Yugoslav cultural
space, which displayed two different senses of homelessness, one national,
the other cosmopolitan. The post-WW1 Yugoslav cosmopolitanism, admittedly,
provided a home to all Yugoslav national identities, but what about those who
did not have them, such as Jews for example? This explains the horrified stance
of Max Löwenfeld, the character of Andrić’s story A Letter from 1920, as well as
the other outsiders of multinational communities in his novels. There is no
home that does not imply homelessness seems to be Andrić’s lesson, which
experienced serious distortions in its transmission to the literary canons of the
new South Slav nation-states. The same pertains to the image of the bridge that
in the reception of his work was frequently reduced to banality. In the conclud-
ing reading of Andrić’s story “The Bridge over the River Žepa”, Snel shows that
the bridge does not simply connect but, in a paradoxical gesture, enforces the
borders that it simultaneously denies. It owes this complexity to the mecha-
nisms of fictional performance.
Bernarda Katušić’s article “Anika’s ‘Big Other’ ” is also devoted to Andrić’s
oeuvre. It departs from Lacan’s distinction between the imaginary “small
other” as a projection of the ego and the symbolic “big Other” that, due to its
radical alterity, escapes all the ego’s attempts at its identification. Lacan con-
siders the (big) Other as the precondition of the subject’s (and, concomitantly,
its speech’s) constitution, which remains in the zone of this subject’s uncon-
scious. The task of the analyst is to unblock this unconscious “speech scene”,
i.e. to set free the “full speech” behind the “empty” one produced by the con-
scious ego. As one of the full speech’s characteristics is that speech of the one
is at the same time speech of the other, the analytical objective is to uncover
the truth which does not belong to either of the parties but exists between
them. Katušić’s analysis of the discourse of love in Andrić’s novella “Anika’s
Times” follows this objective. Due to the unrequited love in all love relation-
ships presented in the novella—and love is unrequited by definition because
Introduction 11
Part Three of the volume, The Post-post-imperial Retake, deals with develop-
ments after the Second World War and the Yugoslav wars and consists of three
contributions. It opens with Nataša Kovačević’s essay “Failures of Community:
Andrić in Andrićgrad”, which brings into conversation the conceptualizations
of community and dispossession in Ivo Andrić’s The Bridge on the Drina (1945)
and Emir Kusturica’s contemporary project Andrićgrad (2014). In the novel
the bridge epitomizes absence, which, after Roberto Esposito, forms the very
basis of community. It is an idealized artifact that substitutes for the (missing)
communal bond by allowing the narrator to historicize, compare the various
occupations, and highlight historical contexts in a peculiar cumulative narra-
tive strategy reminiscent of epic poem cycles. If history is imperially imposed
from above, then this cycling, mythic experience of time comes from below.
Andrić gives none of these conceptions the ultimate right but subverts one
by the other. Remaining resilient to all human imaginative domestications,
the bridge proves to be the most consistent agent of their demystification and,
concomitantly, the dispossessor of human communal dreams. This pertains to
the Yugoslav community too as the “novel symptomatically ends in a narrative
containment which implies the impossibility of imagining the plenitude of a
liberated community”. Andrić’s consistent skepticism concerning the possibil-
ity of community makes the mythical notion of (Serbian) community as epito-
mized in Andrićgrad, a cultural, educational, and tourist settlement intended
to celebrate Višegrad’s most famous resident, all the more grotesque. Višegrad
emblematizes the dislocations and exchanges of population that took place
following the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. Around 3,000 Muslim inhabitants,
who comprised sixty percent of the population before the war, were murdered
near or on the bridge, and many bodies were thrown off it into the Drina. The
building of Andrićgrad therefore violently dispossessed both Višegrad and
Andrić of their multiple national and cultural significations.
The next essay in Part Three is Marko Juvan’s “Literature and the Politics of
Denial: Slovenian Novels on the ‘Erasure’ ”, which discusses literary represen-
tations of the erasure of around 25,000 citizens, most of them born in other
Yugoslav republics, from the register of permanent residents of the Republic
of Slovenia in 1992. In the first part, the essay traces the genealogy of this scan-
dalous dispossession, which for its part responded to the Slovenian feeling of
dispossession in socialist Yugoslavia, followed by animosity towards members
of other Yugoslav nations. The threatening role of Germans and the German
language in the Slovenian imaginary of the Habsburg age was taken up by
Milošević’s Serbs and the Serbo-Croatian language at the onset of the 1990s.
Such a defensive attitude toward the ‘masters’ was combined with a sense of
Slovenian economic and cultural superiority by spawning an inconsiderate
Introduction 13
their novelistic presentation in the discursive and visual part (using photo-
graphs taken by Hemon’s friend Velibor Božović). Hemon thus consistently
interweaves two apparently conflicting aspects of dispossession.
As mentioned above, this volume emerges from the conference Claiming the
Dispossession: The Politics of Hi/storytelling in Post-imperial Europe organized
at the Institute of Slavic Studies, University of Vienna, on November 20–21,
2015. However, for one reason or another, not all conference participants are
represented in it. The represented participants have substantially extended
and modified their papers, while some of them have submitted completely
new ones. My gratitude goes to Bernarda Katušić for her help with organizing
the conference, to Melisa Slipac for her assistance with preparing this volume
for print, and to Sabina Folnović for creating the volume’s index. They have
done an excellent job. Last but not least, I wish to thank the contributors for
their splendid cooperation.
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Bakic-Hayden, Milica. “Nesting Orientalisms. The Case of former Yugoslavia.” Slavic
Review 4: 54 (1995). 917–931.
Barnard, Frederic. Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to
Nationalism. Oxford: Clarendon, 1965.
Barnard, Frederic M. Herder, Nationality, Humanity, and History. Montreal and London
and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003.
Berend, Ivan T. Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II.
Berkeley and Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998.
Biti, Vladimir. Tracing Global Democracy: Literature, Theory, and the Politics of Trauma.
Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2016.
Brubaker, Rogers. Nationalism Reframed: Nationalism and the national question in the
New Europe. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Brubaker, Rogers. Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press, 2004.
Butler Judith. Dispossession: Performative in the Political. Conversations with Athena
Athanasiou. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity, 2013.
Guha, Ranajit. History and the Limit of World-History. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002.
Introduction 15
Herder, Johann Gottfried. Auch eine Philosophie zur Bildung der Menschheit. Ed.
Bernhard Suppan. Sämtliche Werke. Ed. Reinhold Stieg. Vol. 5. Berlin: Adamant, 1891.
Judson, Pieter. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Cambridge, MA and London: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016.
Mamdani, Mahmoud. Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity. Cambridge, MA and
London: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Rancière, Jacques. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Julie Rose. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Renan, Ernest. “What Is a Nation?” Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. Becoming
National: A Reader. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 41–55.
Todorova, Maria. Imagining the Balkans. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997.
Part 1
The Janus-Face of Dispossession
∵
Ruling (Out) the Province and Its Consequences:
Sovereignty, Dispossession, and Sacrificial Violence
Vladimir Biti
At the time of decolonization and the rise in Holocaust awareness, the numer-
ous atrocities committed by Western European nation-states, both outside and
inside of Europe, compromised them in the eyes of their leading intellectuals.
Several decades later, the nation-states’ growingly bad reputations resulted in
a peculiar nostalgia for the “potentiality of the multitude” (Hardt and Negri
82) of replaced empires. This nostalgia’s chief engineers, the post-Marxist phi-
losophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, directed their critique primarily
at Hegel’s advocacy of the nation-state. Retroactively opposing it, they inter-
preted the establishment of the nation-state as the subjugation of an empire’s
multifarious and abundant possibilities (84).
Yet their celebration of empires’ unbounded freedoms neglects, above all
other things, the process of translatio imperii, which draws empires into com-
petition over their forebear’s legacy. In the transmission of this legacy, which
constitutes the core of translatio, successors claim the exclusive right of con-
tinuity against ‘illegitimate usurpers’. For example, all three of the ancient
Roman Empire’s successors, namely the Islamic, Byzantine and Carolingian
Empires, laid claim to being the sole proper heir to Roman sovereignty.1
Consequently, translatio presents itself as the sovereignty-legitimizing opera-
tion by a group of self-appointed representatives which is directed against their
external and/or internal rivals, i.e. other empires and/or the given empire’s
subordinate constituencies. The representatives of translatio use it to blame
these other pretenders for their disloyalty to what is supposedly the forebears’
genuine will. A case in point is the Serbian modern historiography’s notori-
ous portraying of Orthodox Christianity as the only proper heir to Byzantium
1 In a sense, an empire’s ‘barbarians’ sooner or later become another empire’s carriers. This
means that empires do not precede the division between the core and the periphery but fol-
low on from it; the power relationship inheres to them as their constitutive feature. (Motyl
21–24) A political unit free of divisions is always a compensatory back-projection. For the
‘barbarians’ drawn into the process of translatio imperii after the dissolution of Roman
Empire, see Ausenda 1995.
and the rejection of Ottoman Islam as its oppression and destruction, even
though the Orthodox Church clearly “benefited from the imperial dimension
of the [Ottoman] state, and its ecumenical character and policies are com-
prehensible only in an Ottoman framework. It is symptomatic that the seces-
sion of the emerging nations meant also an almost simultaneous secession
from the Constantinople patriarchate, that is, from the Orthodox church of
the Ottoman empire.” (Todorova 164) Even if they broke with the Byzanthine
legacy, the Ottomans seem to have done so to a lesser degree than the Serbs
when they broke from the Ottomans. In a word, Christianity and Islam are not
necessarily opposites. Constitutive of empires no less than for nation-states,
such external and/or internal discrimination explains why their claim to sover-
eignty is, from the very outset, controversial. However, if a controversial ambi-
tion for sovereignty is inherent in empires then these can hardly figure as the
epitome of unconstrained multitude. The grasp of one representative group’s
sovereignty at the expense of others dismantles it as a prefiguration for the
nation-state. Multitude is placed at the service of an agency that operates as its
secret but efficient manager in both an empire and this state.
This discrimination constitutive of empires has not escaped the attention
of prominent political philosophers dealing with imperial legacy. Consider
Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Roman cosmopolitanism for example. The
foreigner in the Roman empire, she says, was included among the contractual
allies not “out of mercy but for the sake of the expansion of the polis which,
from now on, was expected to affiliate even the most foreign members to the
new alliance of comrades” (Was ist Politik, 114–115).2 They were welcomed as
long as they accepted subordination to Roman law. Roman politics, engendered
on foreign soil, “came into being precisely at the point where for the Greeks it
reached its limit and end, in the in-between; that is to say, not between citi-
zens, but between peoples, foreign and unequally opposed to each other and
brought together only by conflict as they are” (108). Yet such a considerable
recalibration of a human community that, by this point, geopolitically extend-
ed substantially further than the Greek polis did not entail its liberation. As
the recent specialist in the field Greg Wolf has put it, we may conceptualize
this operation as the expansion of Roman society through the recruitment of
a colonized population to various underprivileged roles and positions in the
social order (105). The civilizing process of ‘Romanization’ entailed a recogni-
tion that not all races and regions were equally capable of the envisaged culti-
vation. Ultimately, the Romans privileged the South over the North, the West
over the East, the littoral over the continent and cities over the countryside.
In the regions where Roman assimilation succeeded, its end effect “might be
compared to the demolition of street upon street of old houses, materials from
which were used to create a tower-block to house the former inhabitants in a
new style” (Wolf 47).
Of course, with the Greek polis’s Romanization, translatio imperii all but
reached its conclusion. Under the guise of reconciliation, it kept on deepen-
ing the asymmetries of the global political space. The civilizing global design
of the Enlightenment, for instance, replaced the religious global design of the
Renaissance. Yet, however secular Enlightenment rationalism was, it shared
structural similarities with the “dogmatic” religion which it sought to displace
(Connolly 2000). The universal Christian mission of early European moder-
nity was underpinned by the colonialist exploitation of the Americas in much
the same way as its secular civilizing follow-up rested on the ongoing British,
Dutch, and French imperialist plunder of Asia and Africa (Mignolo 722, 725–
726). This may explain why modern cosmopolitanism rehearses the colonial
difference between European and non-European peoples. Far from eliminat-
ing this fundamental imparity, its founder, Immanuel Kant, gradually comple-
mented it and refined it with the geopolitical difference between the North,
South and East European nations. In the section of Kant’s Anthropology en-
titled The Character of Nations, we read that England and France “are the two
most civilized nations on the earth” (Anthropology 226). The German, however,
“has a fortunate combination of feeling, both in that of the sublime and in that
of the beautiful; and in the first he does not equal an Englishman, nor in the
second a Frenchman, yet he surpasses both in so far as he unites them” (“On
National Characteristics” 53–54).
Herder deserves special attention in the context of translatio imperii be-
cause he was the designer of new identity politics in both the non-European
and East-Central-European imperial regions. At the outset of the third collec-
tion of his early Fragments on the New German Literature (1766/7), he describes
the “colossus” of European literature as consisting of an Oriental head, a Greek
breast, a Roman belly, Nordic-Gallic legs and German feet (Frühe Schriften
374). Paying tribute to all European nations, he reserves the earthly fundament
and the only dynamic part of this colossal European body for the Germans
who are now expected to move the magnificent European whole forward.
Nonetheless, since ancestors with their complex mindsets are inscribed in the
memory of their descendants, without sensitively and meticulously research-
ing this rich genetic archive, descendants cannot realize who they really are.
That is to say, the Germans cannot properly identify themselves without devel-
oping the Einfühlungsvermögen for the deceased foreign cultures, i.e. ability to
enter into their mindsets. Their retroactive operation of self-finding acquires
22 biti
is “by its birth far removed from everything that is called divine, decent and
civilized” (703).
I am not only claiming that this generous advocate for humankind’s ethnic
diversity did not hesitate to denigrate and stigmatize its various branches but
also that discrimination was a genuine constituent of his cosmopolitan proj-
ect tout court. Herder involuntarily anticipated “one fine day” when, as Arendt
memorably put it, “humanity will conclude democratically—namely by ma-
jority decision—that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate
certain parts thereof” (Origins of Totalitarianism 299). While the Slavs celebrat-
ed him as the father of their national revivals, he attributed to these “itinerant,
auxiliary or serving peoples” (Ideen zur Philosophie 696) the “most cunning,
terrible slavish inertia” (698). “Despite their incidental deeds, they never were
as undertaking, belligerent and adventurous a people as the Germans; they
rather tacitly followed behind them, occupying the emptied places and lands”
(696). Nonetheless, Slavic nations’ intellectual elites embraced this humiliat-
ing attitude that lowered them to an object of grooming with the same enthu-
siasm as the elites in African colonies who embraced the shift in colonial rule
toward the enforcing of ‘native’ traditions. Around the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry, both perceived this “generosity” of their imperial centers to be the affirma-
tion of their genuine substance by misapprehending what it had really been.
Since it rested on “two propositions: one, that every colonized group has an
original and pure tradition […]; and two, that every colonized group must be
made to return to that original condition,” Mahmood Mamdani appropriately
designated it as “the first political fundamentalism of the modern period” (50).
Several decades later, this shift in the West European administration of
African and Asian colonies also entailed a restructuring of identity politics in
East-Central European Habsburg and Ottoman empires that, in the same way
as their colonialist counterparts, tried to rescue them from the approaching
catastrophe. This new identity politics introduced the category of the foreigner
in the place of the former category of the settler, which was more suitable to
the imperial conception of nationhood since it was usually rendered in ad-
ministrative rather than ethnolinguistic terms.3 This reorientation of mod-
ern empires deserves attention because, as is known, the French Revolution
3 For the changing paradigm of nationhood through the history of Habsburg Empire, see
Judson 48. As an example of the transition to a linguistic notion of the nation, with the con-
scription law of 1868, Austrian conscripts gained the right to be trained in their own lan-
guage but Austrian officers, prevented as they were from serving in their own regions and
frequently posted to new locations, were unable to learn so many local languages. The local
population treated them as foreigners on the basis of this linguistic inability.
24 biti
1.1 The Divided Identity: “One Man’s Meal, Another Man’s Poison”
In fact, Herder’s reconfiguration of the German imperial identity politics of his
time already aimed to outmaneuver the foreign cultural strata in the German
national formation. In order to understand his systematic disentanglement
of identity politics oriented toward national particularity, one has to bear in
mind that Germany was from 1648 onwards not only biconfessional but also,
for many centuries, a frontier state between Germans and Slavs (Brubaker
5–6). Whereas the Germans of Herder’s time were, along with various Slav na-
tions, politically affiliated to their empire by a ‘decision from above,’ he now
invented an indigenous ethnolinguistic affinity between the German past and
4 For the overlapping between the French republican model of national citizenship and that
of Joseph II, see Judson 77. However, by putting emphasis on the integrational force of the
Habsburg resp. Austrian Empire, Judson tends to underplay the explosive, disintegration-
al potential that inhered to these integrational efforts from the outset. To take an illustra-
tion from the French model, verse three of the Marseillaise (Quoi des cohortes étrangères,
Feraient la loi dans nos foyers) expresses the fear that “hordes of foreigners” would come and
dictate the law in the French “homeland”. Although oriented toward assimilation, the French
Empire excluded its colonies’ populations from the main benefits of French citizenship. They
were regarded as ‘foreign races’ and clearly distinguished from the French race. The same ap-
plies to the Habsburg ‘family model’ in which not all family members were equally welcome.
For the asymmetry between the core and its peripheries as the defining characteristics of
empires, see Motyl 1996, and Barkey 1996.
5 The Habsburg Empire supported (rather than opposed, as is usually assumed) the emergence
of nations, with the aim of governing them more efficiently (Judson 9). By following this
model, Soviet and Yugoslav socialist internationalism did not erase the boundaries between
nations but preserve them. In order to prevent the separatist claims of their constituencies,
both were established as federations of equal nations. See Brubaker, Nationalism 23–54 and
Hondius 122, 140, 145–146. For the parallels between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, see
Vujačić.
Ruling ( Out ) the Province 25
its present along a temporal axis, and between domestic and dislocated co-
nationals along a spatial axis. The idea was to separate the Germans from their
non-national co-fellows by establishing the German nation as an imagined
community of shared memory, solidarity and belonging, epitomized in the
concept of ‘national spirit.’ Herder expected the Germans to shape this com-
munity of fate ‘from below’ by re-discovering their past, always anew, from
their present. After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Hofmannsthal re-
sumed his idea of Germany as a nation on a relentless search for its spirit by
raising the Austrians to the status of its most appropriate carriers (“Reden und
Aufsätze I” 457). As the representative of the imperial nation “naturally en-
trusted” with the cultivation of the Slavs (456), Hofmannsthal profiled Herder’s
idea as the claim to supremacy not only over the small nations but also the
big ones (“Reden und Aufsätze III” 32). While these nations’ well-established
spirits remain self-content, the German spirit capitalizes its openness to reju-
venation. Stating that the Austrians represent for Germans the same that the
Slavs represent for Austrians and that America represents for Europe, i.e. an
“immeasurable quantity of the young and unused (impulses)” to be invested
for “higher purposes” of German and European self-propelling (“Reden und
Aufsätze I” 394), Hofmannsthal unwittingly uncovers this project’s exploitative
design. Taking up Herder’s legacy, in the manner typical of trauma narratives,
he turns the burden of German dividedness into an enormous advantage.
Wounded as they were after the breakdown of their empires, it was not only
Germans who were incredibly attracted to this re-uniting prospect but also the
representatives of all East-Central European nations. After their empires col-
lapsed, leaving their identities unsheltered, they embraced this “fateful” model
even more enthusiastically. The ideologies of sustained, collective sacrifice for
a common national future in the name of an allegedly common past find their
most fertile soil and evoke a most genuine commitment in traumatic political
constellations, in which social uncertainty becomes so pervasive that ordinary
actors are unable to stick to any consistent political strategy for an extended
period of time (Hanson). However fantasized it may be, the force of such af-
fective attachment promises a large-scale historical existence, which might
explain the recourse of numerous national liberation movements to it, from
German Romanticists to those of post-imperial East-Central Europe.
Yet there is an important difference between these two as regards the tran-
sition from empire to the nation-state. Germany was the successor to a long-
lasting empire and, in this sense, was ‘chosen’ by its past to inherit supremacy
over the others. By contrast, the populations of the post-imperial nation-states
were, for many centuries, relegated to the imperial “zones of indetermina-
cy” (Povinelli 3–4) in which, continually serving as the amorphous supplier
26 biti
6 For example, the main protagonist in the Bosnian Serb writer Petar Kočić’s satirical play The
Badger in Court ( Jazavac pred sudom, 1903), the peasant David Štrbac, does not ironize only
the Austrians but also the requests for more autonomy by the Serbian Action for Orthodox
Ecclesiastical-Educational Autonomy, because for him this meant collaborating with foreign
rulers instead of overthrowing them (186). In his view, not only foreigners are oppressors but
also compatriots who embrace their idea of national sovereignty.
Ruling ( Out ) the Province 27
7 Migrations of the Serbian population from Vojvodina to Russia, induced by their frustration
within the Habsburg Empire, are planned by Vuk Isakovič, the main protagonist of Miloš
Crnjanski’s Migrations 1 (Seobe 1, 1928) and materialized by Pavel Isakovič, the main protago-
nist of his Migrations 2 (Seobe 2, 1955).
8 This sacrificial politics that insists on the national dispossession of its carriers obviously
draws on the contemporaneous proletarian “wretched on the earth,” which in its turn re-
vivifies the much older pattern of Christian victimhood (for the upgrading of religious by
socialist and then nationalist sacrificial patterns, see Mylonas 7–8). Such amalgamation of
the victimhood’s heterogeneous forms as the mobilizing platforms of resistance was genuine
to the East-Central European post-imperial space in which consecutive strikes, upheavals
and revolutions induced a permanent state of exception (Berend 201). The former imperial
provinces’ typical condition of indeterminacy was thus unleashed from its previously iso-
lated zones. According to Agamben, “World War One (and the years following it) appear as
a laboratory for testing and honing the functional mechanisms and apparatuses of the state
of exception” (State of Exception 7). However, the state of exception had already entered the
public political sphere with the French Revolution and the sphere of private self-reflection
with Kant’s aesthetic (37–39). Although World War One contributed to its extension and
elaborated its mechanisms, Agamben claims that only today’s world “fully develops” its rule
(13). In fact, he undertakes his analysis of the state of exception as the spreading condition
of indeterminacy in the shadow of 9/11. Since then, “suicidal terrorism” refined its techniques
and globalized its effects, which makes it into the following analysis’ point of departure.
9 The poem “Hymn” (“Himna”), for example, declares: “We have got nothing. Neither God
nor master./ Our God is Blood.” And: “We had got neither home nor mother,/ We moved
our blood.” (Nemamo ničeg. Ni Boga ni gospodara./ Naš Bog je Krv.—Ni majke ni doma ne
imadosmo, /selismo našu krv.) (Lirika Itake 15). It is this utter deprivation of all material and
symbolic properties that, according to Agamben’s analyses in Homo Sacer, disaggregates
human subjects to the condition of bare life. Agamben’s concept, via Arendt, goes back to
the bloßes Leben from Benjamin’s essay Critique of Violence (“Zur Kritik der Gewalt” 202) that,
via Derrida’s discussion in The Force of Law (“The Force of Law”), inspires Agamben’s State of
28 biti
Exception (37). Authorized by bare life, Benjamin advocates the engagement of divine
“pure violence” against the oppression of “state violence” in fact in the same postwar time
(1920–21) that motivates Crnjanski and Krleža to take into protection the dispossessed.
His messianic argument, itself developed in the dangerous “zone of indeterminacy” be-
tween revolutionary liberation and violent annihilation, unwittingly testifies to a fascina-
tion with the “final solution” that haunts both Crnjanski’s and Krleža’s interwar works
(LaCapra). The general state of indeterminacy after the breakdown of empires shut the
door wide for this fascination.
10 The poem “Grotesque” (“Groteska”) addresses the “thousand time” repeated fake “seals of
the constitution and rights, / laws and statutes” (pečate ustava i prava, / zakona i štatuta)
(Lirika Itake 18–19).
11 See the poem “To the Slaves” (Robovima), published 1918, but astonishingly not included
in The Lyrics of Ithaca. It declares: “The glory will come/ When you will be led by killers”
(Slava će doći/ kad vas povedu ubice) (Lirika Itake 105).
12 This opinion is not only put forth in The Lyrics of Ithaca. Three stories from the collec-
tion Stories about Manly Affairs (Priče o muškom), namely “The Apotheosis” (“Apoteoza”),
“The Great Day” (“Veliki dan”) and “Paradise” (“Raj”) ironize the Serbian officers’ postwar
glorification, portraying them as immoral and grotesque figures (Priče o muškom 28–34,
35–52, 116–132). They ignore the tortured soldiers, it is suggested, in the same way that
the corrupt medieval noblemen disregarded the suffering peasants. However, Crnjanski’s
narrator also mocked the Serbian “Thessaloniki” officers’ cockiness, among other reasons,
because the Yugoslav army rejected his application for the officer position after the war.
As he lived in Vojvodina, he was an Austro-Hungarian conscript in the war and they were
despised by both the “Thessaloniki” heroes and the new Yugoslav officers.
Ruling ( Out ) the Province 29
nego majka obeščašćena … Znoj i sirotinja i mržnja što tinja/ u stidu zgarišta
i stena) (25). In the “Soldier’s Poem” (“Vojnička pesma”), the soldier uncovers
the adored national temples as the sites of slavery (27–28). The same goes for
other South Slav peoples, invited by the poet to proudly confront complete
dispossession as their true destiny. The poem “To Yugoslavia” (“Jugoslaviji”) ac-
cordingly reads: “No glass you drink/ no fluttering tricolor/ is ours.” “We are
true brothers / in shame, penance, and poverty” (Nijedna čaša što se pije/ ni-
jedna trobojka što se vije/ naša nije … U sramu pokoru bedi/ braća smo, braća)
(31–32).
The young poet sees history from below, putting the perspective of the de-
prived at the forefront. As opposed to the foreign and domestic oppressors who
are attached to possession, they are passionately attached to dispossession as
the only remaining belonging that obliges to abstinence rather than boasting.
The poet accordingly abhors the celebration of the medieval imperial courts
“full of Byzantine lust” (Ješić 65).13 If there are national heroes, then they are
not among the feudal nobility but rather the suffering peasantry. Opposing the
canonic poetry of Jovan Dučić and Milan Rakić that glorifies distant kings and
noblemen in its polished and elegant verses, the morally upset poetry of the
young Crnjanski takes the side of a “miserable bloody soldier who dies in the
mud among the carcasses of horses” (Ješić 64),14 a figure clearly reminiscent
of the tragedy that befell the Serbian army in the First World War. The poet
seems to be spontaneously projecting this victimized modern soldier onto the
Serbian medieval peasant, establishing in this way a ‘community of fate’ on
the continuous experience of dispossession. Based on the solidarity among
the silenced victims, his Schicksalsgemeinschaft substantially differs from the
German successors’ one that perceived itself as being authorized by the law of
history. Forging his community in clear opposition to the victors’ triumpha-
lism, young Crnjanski affirms the “silent and modest suffering of those who
died on the pale” (Ješić 65).15 After the First World War, showing respect to the
13 This quotation is from the review article “Ivo Andrić”, Jedinstvo (28 June 1919).
14 This quotation is from Crnjanski’s review of a minor Serbian contemporary poet Milan
Đurčić, Književni jug 11–12/1919.
15 Dying on the pale refers to an Ottoman mean of punishment, which means that the poet
associates the Serbian soldiers’ suffering in the First World War with the Serbian peas-
ants’ suffering under the Ottomans. In the poem “Grotesque” he also melts the Austro-
Hungarian cheating “promises” into the Ottoman deceitful “statutes” ( fermani). Such
application of the Serbian national identity onto the centuries that could not know it sur-
reptitiously endorses the continuity of Serbian martyrdom. At the same time, Crnjanski
explicitly claims that “our nationality begins with Karađorđe /i.e. Serbian uprisings
against the Ottomans in the first decades of the nineteenth century/, everything else
30 biti
is a false tradition” (Ješić 65). Such self-contradiction did not belong only to Crnjanski
but rather the post-imperial writers’ repertory in general. Even if, from the mid-1920s,
Crnjanski started to embrace the narrative of Serbian martyrdom with ever less hesita-
tion, he did not abandon its questioning. Like Krleža’s or Hoffmansthal’s and Kraus’s sub-
ject, his was on permanent trial as well.
16 See his review referred to in the footnote 5 in which he asks whether “in poetry there
is no responsibility and the feeling of shame” (Ješić 64). The narrator in The Diary
about Čarnojević, himself a returnee from the war, asks “Should I start celebrating with
the bastards and villains who will forget everything, dancing on the ashes”? (Dnevnik o
Čarnojeviću 75).
17 The poem “Dithyramb” declares: “The honorable banner of rebellions and killers./ My
people, you are their elect.” (Steg dičan buna i ubica./ O rode ti si izabranik njin.) (Lirika
Itake 26).
18 Recall the verses from The Mountain Wreath (Gorski vijenac): “Young grains bow your
heads, your harvest has arrived before its time!” (“Mlado žito navijaj klasove,/ pređe roka
došla ti je žnjetva!”).
19 Recall the verses from Fall, brothers (Padajte braćo): “Throw your children into the fire,/
throw away your slavery and shame!” (“Bacajte sami u oganj decu,/ stres‘te sa sebe ropstvo
i sram!”).
20 Toward the end of Joseph Roth’s The Radetzky March, where the First World War’s out-
break is described, its hero Carl Joseph Trotta confronts the dangled “traitors” every-
where in Ukraine (347–49). This topic is also addressed by Karl Kraus in The Last Days of
Mankind, in which Moaner, describing a hanged Ukrainian women, states that “Austria’s
highest majesty is the gallows” and that “la corde savonée is an Austrian specialty, its
Ruling ( Out ) the Province 31
after Jesus forgot his subordinates for long centuries, the only chance for them
to reach the heaven. Since they prefer honorable death over miserable survival,
they trust the gallows will embrace them firmer than any bride.21
While someone from the ‘center’ can ask oneself “How can one be what
one is?” and arrive at abstract philosophical conclusions, the same ques-
tion for someone outside the ‘center’ is “likely to be less abstract and
less serene,” as Matei Calinescu has aptly remarked. It more likely would
evoke feelings of envy, insecurity, inferiority, “frustration or distress at the
marginality or belatedness of his culture.” It can also trigger a mood of
self-abuse; finally, it could provoke resentment that could, in some cases,
be transmuted, by way of compensation, into a superiority complex.
Todorova 57
most famous export article” (505, 508, 511). In Crnjanski’s novel Seobe 1, that describes the
Habsburg Serbs’ warpath from 1744, it is said that the Austrians “started to hang soldiers
caught at thieving just a single head of cabbage in the field” (140, see also 149–50, 159–62,
204). However, both the narrator and various figures in this novel heartily embrace the
Serbian victimhood narrative, as if reinstating Crnjanski’s youthful fascination with it.
The scenes of cruel punishments against the Serbs by Austrians (flogging, 41–43, 202,
217, 223; walloping, 219) and Ottomans (impalement, 191; raping of women, stabbing of
children, and quartering, 201) agglomerate. Nonetheless Crnjanski did not stop mocking
this narrative even thereafter, as we will see in short. Neither did he renounce reaffirm-
ing it, as in the commentary to “Ode to the Gallows”, where he speaks about “the alleys
of gallows raised by Austria in Serbia,” the Austrian walloping of a young teacher and
bestial treatment of “our people.” (Itaka i komentari 99) Crnjanski depicts dangling as
usual means of disciplining in the Austrian army (64, 89, 95), but Austria “conducted a
war” especially “against our people” by treating them “as beasts, as bedbugs” (99). As he
himself repeatedly remarks, his patriotism was near to “madness” (99, 138). In this re-
gard Vojvodina Serbs, because located beyond the geopolitical border of ‘proper’ Serbia
(Prečani), were typically “more popish than the pope himself”. This does not mean, of
course, that the treatment of soldiers and civilians by the Austrian army was humane. The
Habsburg military law was “the most draconian in Europe” but “was not a special system
for Serbia designed by a vengeful army. Harsh penalties all came neatly packaged in the
Militärstrafgesetz and Standrecht (summary justice), old systems of legal coercion already
in place in parts of the Empire during the war” (Gumz 105). The thesis of a vicious system
of law designed specifically to terrorize Serbia, entrenched in Serb historiography, is also
resolutely rejected by Kramer 144.
21 Testifying to the endurance of the national victimhood narrative in the Serbian popu-
lation, the same self-sacrificial logics characterize this population’s famous response to
the Nazi threat in the Second World War: “Better the grave than a slave!” (“Bolje grob
nego rob!”). For the tradition of sacrificial salvation in the Serbian culture, see Mylonas
(147–177).
32 biti
As Lauren Berlant has shown in her book on “cruel optimism,” the passion-
ate salting of one’s own wounds functions in a deprived population as an in-
exhaustible source of not only pleasure but also hope. The more horrible the
pain, the more determined the sufferer is to search for the ‘final solution’ to
get rid of it forever. Compromises do not count. This seems to have been the
guideline of the subordinates’ behavior not only in post-imperial East-Central
Europe but also the U.S.-American postcolonial setting. According to Abdul
JanMohamed, the death-bound Afro-American subjects who, from their birth
onwards, lived under a constant menace of physical violence, responded to it
equally violently without fearing the cruelest execution.
22 However, this did not prevent Krleža from endorsing the narrative of permanent Croatian
victimhood in innumerous analogies drawn, in the 1920s and 1930s, between the awful
conditions of the Croats in the present and those in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries (“Nekoliko riječi” 106–110, “O patru dominikancu” 58–69, “O Kranjčevićevoj lirici” 29).
He used to contradict himself no less than Crnjanski.
34 biti
23 Krleža’s gallery of martyrs is huge and reaches far beyond the Croatian borders, comprising
for example St Augustine, Columbus, Michelangelo, Erasmus, Darwin and Lenin. In strict-
ly Croatian terms, alongside the aforementioned figures it contains the Bosnian Bogomils,
the language reformer Ljudevit Gaj, the bishop and donor Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the
poets Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević, August Harambašić, and Antun Gustav Matoš, the nov-
elist Ante Kovačić, the politician Stjepan Radić and the painter Vjekoslav Karas (“Teze za
jednu diskusiju” 496–97; “O Kranjčevićevoj lirici” 37).
24 The narrator, it is said (42), is much more attached to Heaven than to women or people
for that matter. The latter attachment would make him a modest particle of the material
world whereas the former enables his ascension, dematerialization, aloofness, a “gentle
smile” of indifference toward the ridiculous political struggle on Earth and thereby a “tre-
mendous power over the affairs of the world” (54). However, in the perennial alternative
of Serbian history between the earthly kingdom of Miloš Obilić and the heavenly king-
dom of Emperor Lazar, his depicted inclination toward Lazar is provisional as he con-
tinually oscillates between the two. At another place in the novel, for instance, he openly
glorifies murder (78).
25 Krleža ridicules this elite most exemplarily in “The Drunken November Night 1918” (Pijana
novembarska noć 1918) written in 1942 and published for the first time 1952. He ironizes
the former Austro-Hungarian officers among the Croats who, in post-war Zagreb, decided
to celebrate the victorious Serbian officers as if they had not hanged them during the war.
Whereas Crnjanski targeted the Serbian officers’ neglect of the fallen Serbian soldiers,
Krleža criticizes the Croat officers’ adulation for their former enemies that hypocritically
aimed at fostering their career in the Yugoslav army.
Ruling ( Out ) the Province 35
the lower social strata remained equally miserable. Krleža is convinced that
only uncompromising martyrs recruited from these strata can really act on
their behalf. To legitimize such revolutionary action, he is at constant pains
to invent the tradition of the dispossessed. Following this thread and using
uncritical retroactive projections like Crnjanski, he ultimately establishes the
‘true’ Croatian national identity on the sacrificial experience of ‘bare life.’
By inventing traditions one usually tries to materialize one’s dreams and
hopes, unavoidably committing violence to the subjects s/he claims to be un-
selfishly speaking for. Eric Hobsbawm has knowingly argued that the continuity
which such “invented traditions” establish with the historic past is largely facti-
tious (1), because “they are responses to novel situations which take the form
of reference to old situations” (2). Old situations are invoked to offer ‘suitable’
solutions for novel ones or to legitimize solutions that fit the inventor’s pres-
ent purposes. In a word, “invented traditions” are arbitrary interpretations that
place the past at the service of present needs. For example, when Krleža in 1935
describes the terrible oppression of the Croatian population executed by the
contemporary Yugoslav police apparatus, he associates it with the Islamization
of the Bogomils (in this particular case the adherents of the so-called Bosnian
Church who become “Croats” through Krleža’s back-projection of the much
later category of nationality) (“Teze za jednu diskusiju” 523–24). This, however,
contradicts the historical facts. Islamization was not violently imposed by the
Ottomans, but a pragmatically motivated voluntary decision by the local popu-
lation under the given circumstances; it was not a promptly executed conver-
sion but a lengthy and multi-staged process; it affected not only the Bogomils
but also the Bosnian Catholics and Orthodox; and Bosnian Bogomils converted
in Catholicism and Orthodoxy as well. (Donia and Fine 14–19) By transferring
all responsibility to the foreign oppressors, i.e. the Ottomans in the case of the
Bogomils and the Serbs in the case of his Croatian contemporaries, Krleža
conceals the involvement of the indigenous population’s carrier groups in the
process of ‘alienation.’ By taking the ‘innocent and oppressed’ Bogomils and
Croats under such generous protection from their ‘tyrants,’ he simultaneously
affirms the non-violent character of his own engagement. If they are nothing
but victims, his argument implies, then acting for them is unselfish. However,
such reasoning repudiates that victims owe their sacrificial profile precisely to
the ‘protector’s’ violent invention. The effect is taken to be the cause.
"I believe these cats are all white," said I; "the mother
is as white as snow."
"But these are not like common cats, you know," said I,
suppressing a laugh which I knew would mortally offend
Grace and perhaps lose me my holiday. "They are
outlandish cats, with long hair and bushy tails. I should
think that would be different."
† N. B.—nota bene
I did not hasten on my way, for it was early, and I found
my walk so pleasant that I had no desire to shorten it. The
bramble-berries and filberts that were ripening by the sides
of the lane had great attractions for me. There were late
autumn flowers to gather, and lizards to watch as they ran
to and fro on the walls or sunned their gilded sides on a
broad flat stone, vanishing like a shadow when one drew
near. A great wind had blown the day before and thrown
down many apples from the trees that overhung the lane.
"But I do care," said Lucille, and her eyes with tears. "I
am not a child like you. I am three years older, and I do
think they might trust me."
Lucille did not answer. She fixed her eyes once more on
the highway, and I let mine wander off over the sands and
the shore where people, looking like little black ants, were
busily collecting the precious seaweed, to Mount St.
Michael, whose turrets shone brightly in the sun.
"I was not speaking of the angel, but of his image," said
I; "that is quite another thing. Then I would spread my
wings and travel over to the islands yonder, and then to
England, where my uncles live."
As she spoke, she hid her face and burst into a flood of
tears and sobs.
"I know they say so," said Lucille; "but tell me, Vevette,
have you experienced any of these wonderful joys. Because
I know I never did."
"What is he like?"
"He said his kingdom was not of this world, else would
his servants fight," answered Lucille.
Much more she said, in the same wise and gentle strain,
and at last sent me to bed feeling somewhat comforted. The
night was warm, and my door was left ajar for air. I had
hardly fallen asleep, as it seemed to me, when I was waked
by voices, and heard my mother say:
"I do not like what she says about Lucille. I fear the girl
has been tampered with. Perhaps we should warn her
parents."
"I will give you directions which will lead you to the
entrance of the passage. Turn to your right after that, and
you cannot miss your way. When the good man is in safety,
you can come directly to your mother's room by another
passage, which I will also indicate to you. But, my child, I
must not conceal from you that there is danger in this trust.
Should you be discovered by any of our enemies in giving
help to this good old man, your life or your liberty must be
the forfeit."