International Phenomenological Society

Max Scheler's Phenomenology of Shame

Author(s): Parvis Emad
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Mar., 1972), pp. 361-370
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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 MAX SCHELER'SPHENOMENOLOGYOF SHAME

Among the numerousworks of Scheler, there are many essays which

present a phenomenologicaldescriptionof the witness of certain phe-
nomena. These essays, beyond doubt, are outstandingcases of applied
phenomenology.To such essays belong, for instance,those dealing with
phenomenahumility, resentment,repentance,' the sphere 'of the abso-
lute in consciousnessand freedom. The phenomenonof shame also be-
longs to the group of these essays. These shorter essays of Scheler are
highly revelatoryof the foremost characteristicsof his phenomenology,
namely, its desymbolizingquality and its interest in intuitively expe-
rienced life. What Scheler intuited and wrote regarding "Scham und
Schamgeftihl"uniquely reveals these two characteristicsof his pheno-
menology. Moreover, this essay immediatelyrelates to Scheler's most
eminent metaphysicalengagement,viz., the question of man. Thus it is
highly rewardingto see Scheler'sachievementsfor what they really are,
i.e., phenomenologicalinsightswhich he sharplydistinguishesfrom psy-
chological description.Scheler draws our attention to this crucial dis-
tinctionwhen he says:
The phenomenology of the psychic is totally and absolutely different from all
explicative (erkldrende) and descriptive psychology. There is no description
without observation of single processes (einzelner Vorgiinge). In the phenome-
nological attitude, however, what is-mneant (Gemeintes) is intuited. It is not
observed.2
It is precisely because of this intuitive source of phenomenologythat
Scheler regardsthe discursiveand argumentativeattitude at its best as
insufficient,and at its worst as misleadingand irrelevant.It takes little
reading in Scheler'swork to see that his thoroughgoingdissatisfaction
with definitions and prefixed conceptions compels him to approach
nearly every phenomenonin a negativefashion. This is even true td the
extent that he sometimesgoes so far as to comparethe phenomenological
method with the method of so-called negative theology.3
1 For a thoroughgoing discussion of these phenomena, cf. M. S. Frings "Person

und Dasein." in Phaenomenologica, Vol. 32, p. 62, 1969, Nijhoff, The Hague.
2 Max Scheler. Schriften aus dem Nachlass (hereafter Nachlass), Vol. 10 of the
Collected Edition, p. 388.
3 Cf. Max Scheler: Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Vol. 5 of the Collected Edition,
1954, p. 167.

361

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362 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

I. Shame and Related Feelings.

The above characterizationof Schelerian phenomenology may be
helpful in understandingwhy he places a critical evaluationof related
feelings before his own definitivearticulationof the intuitedphenomenon
of shame. This may, in fact, give an argumentativetone to his treat-
ment of this question. Yet his objective is not to persuadebut to help
prepareone to intuit.
First a close examinationof the whole range of life is necessary in
order to trace the genesis of shame. Can shame be consideredan evo-
lutionary necessity? Supported by the biological and anthropological
resourcesof his time, it seemed certainto Schelerthat shame cannot be
encounteredat every stage in the developmentof life. The organic con-
dition for the originationof the feeling of shame is, accordingto Scheler,
the increase in the degrees of individualizationof living beings (Masse
der Individualisierung lebendiger Einheiten). Whenever a new biological
entity is merely the manifestationof an indifferenttransmission(Durch-
gangspunkt)of life, the organic conditionsfor the appearanceof shame
are not presentat all. The gradualincreaseof the individualizationis to
be seen in the slow but determinatepreferenceof the quality of repro-
duction over its mere quantity.What at the lowest level of life seems
to be a totally nonselectiveprocess - almost similar to the combination
of two chemical elements - is replaced in higher levels of life by the
preferenceof quality of propagationto its mere quantity.It is in man
alone that the phenomenonof shame taking advantageof the hitherto
achieved preparatoryorganic phases -is clearly and distinctly mani-
fested as a feeling.4But what kind Zf feeling is shame?It is obvious that
Scheler, in answeringthis question, aims at a careful and precise artic-
ulation of his central intuition. However, before making any statement
as to the positive sense of the feeling of shame, we are told that shame
is neither a sexual feeling nor a social feeling, because in the absence
of all social realities (sexual partner included) we can be ashamed of
ourselves (Scham vor sich selbst). Shame belongs to- the group of those
feelings throughwhich we can feel our own selves.5 This point brings
Scheler a decisive step closer to a positive determinationof the feeling
of shame inasmuchas he refers to the specific act which takes place in
this feeling:
4 Cf., Nachlass, p. 74.
5 For questions concerning German Geffihl and English feeling, as well as vital-
feelings, feeling-states, etc., cf. M. S. Frings, Max Scheler, A Concise Introduction
in to the World of a Great Thinker, Duquesne University Press, 1965, pp. 50-51.

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 MAX SCHELER'SPHIENOMENOLOGY
OF SHAME 363
In all the experiences of shame there takes place an act which I would like
to call (the act of) turning back to a self (-Rfickwendungauf ein selbst).6
This "turningback" seems to be accompaniedby a sense of opposition
(Widerstreit)which results from a contact of higher levels of conscious-
ness with the lower biophysical centers. The significationaland inten-
tional aspects of this act of turningback to a self are the occasion for
Scheler to delve deeper into the problem of shame. Whenever the
direction of intentionalityoscillates (schwankt) towards something in
us generallyshared by all and somethingpurelyindividual(henceshared
by none), then the sense of shame is present.The fact that intentionality
may thus remain undecided and hesitant as to its choice can best be
observed in the insufficiency of concepts in expressing an entirely
unique lived experience (Erlebnis). The concepts are almost like the
"public"(rffentlichkeit) of our consciousness,where the unique expe-
rience of the individualis as out of place as our private life would be
in newspapers.7This is why sexual life, its extreme sensibility toward
shame notwithstanding,is not the origin of the sense of shame but just
one occasion of its applicability.Sex then, far from being something
individual,is that which we have in common with all brutes and living
organisms as the most common generality of all (Alleraligemeinste).
Seen in its significationalaspect, the sense of shame is revealed as an
individualfeeling for protection (Schutzgefjihldes Individuums)which
preventsthe uniquenessof individualvalues from being absorbedby the
sphere of generality.
The considerationof phenomenaassociatedwith "to be ashamed of
oneself," brought into focus the sense of shame as a feeling of pro-
tection directed toward the owned self. Yet there is also a feeling of
shame for someone else, and this feeling is as original and authentican
experienceas to be ashamedof oneself. In this way shame may be taken
to be like a feeling of guilt directedtoward a self, whether my own or
that of someone else. This leads to the insight that shame - unlike
sorrow (Trauer) and wistfulness (Wehmut) - is not a feeling adhesive
to the ego, i.e., it is not a quality of the ego (Ichqualitdt)at all. Shame
is an independentemotion which cannot be empathicallyfelt the way
sorrow and sadness can. This is why a differentiationof shame from
related emotions is required. The sense of shame stands in a unique
relationshipto pride (Stolz) and to humility (Demut). It seems as if
shame contains qualities from both of them. With pride it shares the
awarenessof one's own value, and with humility, the tendency toward

6 Cf., Nachlass, p. 78.

7 Ibid., p. 80.

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364 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

devotion and loyalty. Furthermore,shame is very close to repentance

(Reue) and to the feeling of honor (EhrgefUhl).In repenting, one is
also ashamed of oneself. A sense of shame is ordinarilyparalleled by
a sense of honor, while shamelessnessis accompaniedby an absence
of the feeling of honor. Moreover, shame dynamically opposes and
restricts ambition (Ehrgeiz), vanity (Eitelkeit), and thirst for fame
(Ruhmbegierde).
Scheler declares that these psychic forces (seelische Mdchte) would
have driven man to the point where he would have lost his true self to
the world, were it not for the sense of shame to save and justify man's
most intimate self. The analogical relations of shame to nausea (Ekel)
and aversion are an opportunityfor Scheler to uncover the essential
structureof these feelings. Nausea, aversion,and shame possess a vital
inhibitory effect (Hemrnungseffekt)on absorptionof food and sexual
drive. In a sense, the feeling of shame may be taken to be the mental
protectivityof the totality of our sexual life, insofar as sexual maturity
is possible under the dominance of shame. Finally, fear, dread, and
shame are closely studied in their relationshipand dependence.Shame
seems to have little to adowith dread; rather, it seems closer to fear
(Angst). Not only are the expressionalforms (Ausdruckserscheinungen)
of tremblingfor fear and tremblingfor shame identical, but the whole
emotional position in "shame"and fear are also similar. The sense of
shamefulfills a protectivefunctionprior to sexual intercourse,and here
is how fear and shame seem to be blended together.

II. Basic Forms of Shame.

The essence of shame appearedthroughoutthe foregoing analysis in
a twofold manner.It appearedas the sense of the act of turning-back-
to-a-self (Riickwendung)and then as a subjectivelylived (erlebt) tension
(Spannung)of higher and lower levels of consciousness.Based on this
twofold mode of appearanceof the essence of shame, Scheler now dis-
tinguishes between spiritual feeling of shame (geistiges Schamgefuihl)
and a bodily shame (Leibesscham).
These basic forms of shame are not reducibleto each other. Both of
them representthe index of tension (Spannung)which exists between
love and drive.Withbody, love appearsas vital love (vitale Liebe) whose
concentrationis reached in sexual love. With spirit, love appears as
spirituallove (geistige Liebe) which is directedtoward spiritualperson-
ality. With body, drive appearsas drive-impulse(Triebimpuls)which in
its sexual form is condensedin an erotic sensationof tinglingdesire (Kit-
zel der Wollust).With spirit, drive appearsas vital drive (vitaler Grund-

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 MAX SCHELER'SPHENOMENOLOGY
OF SHAME 365

trieb), involved merely in increasingthe power of life (Lebensmacht).

The connectednessof bodily shame and drive as well as the relatedness
of spiritualshame and vital drive (both lived as a tension) reveal the
phenomenonof shame as belongingto the constitutionof consciousness.
Thus, shame is an individual essence (Wesenheit). Its whatness (essential
should not be confused with its thatness (existentia). The inexcusable
mistakeof all theoriesof shamelies in this confusion.Supportedby these
phenomenologicalinsights Scheler is now prepared to examine these
erroneous theories. They represent in turn the educational and the
ecclesiasticalinterpretationsof shame.
First, Scheler critically scrutinizesthe theory (originatingin the 18th
Century)which regardsshame as the outcome of trainingand education
(Erziehung).Leaving the questionuntouched,as to how educatorsthem-
selves might have acquiredthe notion of shame, Scheler points to the
three types of confusion(Verwechslungen)upon which this theory seems
to rest. First, this theory mistakesthe expressionalform (Form des Aus-
drucks)of shame for its factual expression.Next, it confuses the natural
expressionof shame (e.g., blushing) with its artificial expression (e.g.,
bathing suit). Finally, this theory mistakes shame for its expressionsin
general. Closely related to these misconceptionsis also the one which
substitutesmoral interpretationsfor shame.
Regardingthe expressionalforms of shame, Scheler denies education
any determinabilityof these forms. Instead, he credits tradition with
determiningrole by pointing to the existing differencesin expressional
forms of shame among various ethnic groups. (What seems shamefulto
us regardingbathingis not shamefulto the Japaneseand vice versa). It
is-from his criticaltreatmentof the role of educationand traditionthat
Scheler examines prudery,cynicism, obscenity, flirtation, coquetry and
frivolity.The limited space of this paper does not allow for a thorough
discussion of the latter which, while associated with shame, are not
identical with the genuine feeling itself. Suffice it only to indicate that
prudery,for instance,seems to Schelerto be the outcome of the control
of education over the external expressions of shame. On the whole,
Scheler concedes that educationhas only a negative role which consists
in letting the feeling of shame develop and maturefreely, by preventing
its violations (Verletzung)and deformations.Educationdoes not appear
to Scheleras a positive generativeforce in the developmentof shame.8
In view of the intimaterelatednessof the sense of shame to sexuality,
a special ecclesiasticalinterpretation(kirchlicheDeutung)of shame now
comes underScheler'sscrutiny.This ecclesiasticalinterpretationhas been

8 Ibid., p. 98.

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366 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

expressedas a demand for chastity. This demand for chastity, under-

stood as a volitional repression of sexual impulse, is based on false
assumptions.The assumptionsare false because the sense of shame
usually associated with sexuality is nourishedby sexual impulse itself,
so that shamecan never repressthis impulse.At most, shame may divert
attentionfrom the sexual impulseand preventits consciousacknowledge-
ment. Once a repression(UnterdrUckung) of this kind has been intended;
it may result in a twofold disturbance.It can lead to an unusualincrease
of sexual sensitivity (Ubersteigerungder geschlechtlichenEmpfindlich-
keit) with regardto everythingwhich is distantlyand vaguely related to
sex.9 It may also distract the genuine sense of shame associated with
sexualityfrom fulfillingits positive function in sexual life.
Lastly, Scheler deals with those cases in which a reception
(Tduschung)in the feeling of shame is present. Self-deceptionregarding
shame is presentprimarilywheneverit appearsto the individualthat he
feels shame, yet does not actually experienceit. In these circumstances,
a certain socionoral code may be responsible for either exalting the
sense of shame, praisingmodesty (Schamhaftigkeit)or reproachingtheir
absence. It is Ressentimentwhich explains and clarifies the complexity
of deceptionregardingthe authenticfeeling of shame, for here as in all
cases of Ressentiment,the positive value of the imaginedsense of shame
covers the negative value of deficiency (der negative Wert des Man-
gels) 10 like a layer.

III. Shameand Sex

The unreflectiveassociation of shame and sex necessitates Scheler's
returnto the theme of bodily shame (Leibesscham)in order to seek the
essential structuresinvolved in this association. The feeling of shame
associatedwith body, with sexual impulses and with vitality (leibliches
Schamgefiihl)belongs to the group of vital feelings (Lebensgefiihle).The
states of vital feelings like weakness, illness, health, etc., are not the
same as feel-sensations(Geffihlsempfindungen) like itching, pleasantness
(Annehmlichkeit)or unpleasantness(Unannehmlichkeit).The states of
vital feelings are also not the same as spiritualfeelings like woe (Weh-
mut0, sorrow and joy. By belonging to the group of vital feelings, the
impulse toward shame also belongs to the group of vital impulses.Like
vital impulses,they are not localized in certainparts of the body. More-
9 In this connection Scheler notes: "It is told of Saint Alphons Liguori that he
would not give hand to greet any woman and it is told of Saint Aloysius that he
even refused to see his own mother." Cf., Ibid., p. 98.
10 Cf., Ibid., p. 100.

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 MAXSCHELER'S
PHENOMENOLOGY
OFSHAME 367

over, they are capableof checkingand stoppingthe naturalflow of drives

and urges. The mere presenceof an impulse towardshame is enough to
check and stop the strongestdrive of libido. The impulsestowardshame,
like vital impulses, are altogether beyond our volition, choice and
selection.
What does man attain throughthe sense of shame associatedwith his
sexuality?Scheler'sanswer develops in three stages which distinguisha
threefoldgoal attainableby the sense of shame.Bodily shameis primarily
designedto divert attentionfrom variousforces of drive (Trieb) in order
to preventtheir outrightexpression.In this respect, the sense of shame
felt in sexual matterspreventsand excludes the chancesof autoeroticism.
This could be also designated as the altruistic effect of the sense of
shame. Further,the sexually associated sense of shame fulfills a sym-
patheticfunctiontowardsthe opposite sex insofaras it contributesto the
developmentand shapingof sexual drive. The second goal achievableby
the sense of shame (felt in sexuality)is the postponement(Verschiebung)
of the satisfactionof sexual drive. To postpone the appeasementof the
sexual drive until a time of adequatesexual maturityand simultaneously
to regulatethe frequencyof the coitus are works of the feeling of shame.
The third goal accessible to shame is its unique performanceduring
(innerhalb)sexual intercourseitself. Thus, the sense of shame associated
with intercourseis differentiatedby Scheler according to its presence
before, during,and after coitus. Within sexual intercourse,the sense of
shame fulfills the following functions:1. It preventscoitus from striving
after consciousintentionor purpose;2. It preventsattentionbeing drawn
to the anatomyand mechanismof intercourse;3. It preventsthe apper-
ceptive isolationof sexually sensitiveparts of the body from the entirety
of the person;4. Under the influence of shame, the sexual parts of the
body are taken solely for expressionalsymbols of the initial affectation
of the psyche (seelischeBewegung).
Within the space given to the study of "shame"and "sex," Scheler's
critical discussion of Freud's views occupies considerablespace. From
the foregoing account it is evident that Scheler stands diametrically
opposed to Freud'snotion of libido. In the first place, Schelermaintains
that the actual sexual drive is not identical with libido. (It should be
noted that by libido he understandsonly those impulses which are
directedtowarderotic sensationof tinglingdesire (Kitzelgefiihlder Wol-
lust). On the contrarythe sexual driveis an edifice (Bauwerk)constructed
with the aid of three independentlyexisting powers, namely, libido,
shame and sympathy." Thus, shame fulfills a constructivefunction in

l Cf., Ibid., p. 111.

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368 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

the genesisof sexual drive and is not reducibleto it. The priorityof the
sense of shame over sexual drive appears to be the central phenomeno-
logical insight thus far. It is precisely from the vantage point of this
prioritythat Schelerdeals with Freud'sviews on shame. Schelerdeclares
that "shame" - according to Freud - appears to be nothing but one
means toward the achievementof the ongoing process of repression
(Verdringung). The technique of psychoanalysis should attempt to
elucidate this repression by neutralisingthe effect of shame, i.e., by
revealingthe masks with which "shame"disguisesour factual life. This
interpretationof "shame,"Scheler concludes, is the inevitableoutcome
of Freud's assumptionthat libido comprises the actual and real sub-
stance of human life.12 But things stand differently for Scheler. The
sense of shame,remarksScheler,mighthave a twofold functionregarding
sensual images and sexual representations.It can prevent the initial
originationof these images and fantasies, or else it can try to repress
those which have alreadybeen originated.In the first instance
shame is no repressive force as Freud mistakenly assumes.... Shame thus
spares repression. It is not that the original and pure function of shame con-
sisits in a reacting with feeling versus something presently given. (vorhanden
Gegebenes). Rather it consists in the prefeeling (VorgefUhl) of something
oncoming ... What in the second case ... is used to lead to a repression ...
is not at all the genuine sense of shame (echte Scham), but only fear and
dread with regard to possible social consequences... 3

At the end of his study,Schelerbrieflyconsidersthe intensityof shame

in man and in woman.Man, with respectto sexual or nonsexualmatters,
seems to possess a more refinedmentalsense of shame(seelischesScham-
gefuhl). However, Scheler emphasizes that women seem to possess a
refinedsense of bodily shame. The reason for these differencesmay be
soughtin Scheler'sstatementthat
... woman is ... an actual genius of life (Genie des Lebens) while man (is)
a genius of spirit (Genie des Geistes)...14

12 Regarding libido and human life, Scheler,maintains: "What we

ordinarily call
our 'consciousness' and its content, is indeed a mere sign (Zeichen), symptom and
epiphenomenon, but not a sign of our subconscious life or drive. It is rather a
sign of a deep and ongoing fight (Kampf) which our higher spiritual self ... is
fighting with the life of sensations (Empfindungsleben). The deceptive ... force
(Kraft) stems from that changing multiplicity of sensuous affectations (sinnliche
Regungen). Insofar as shame obscures (verdunkelt) these affectations and keeps
them at a distance from consciousness, it decreases their deceptive force at the
same time as it elucidates our deeper Being and Life ... Shame is not a form
of self-deception but merely a faculty (Kraft) to eliminate it." Cf. Ibid., p. 114.
13 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
14 Ibid., p. 147.

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 OF SHAME
MAX SCHELER'SPHENOMENOLOGY 369

IV. The MetaphysicalSignificanceof Shame

To better appreciatewhat &heler has accomplishedin his study of

the feeling of shame,we might note the metaphysicalimplicationsof his
phenomenologicalfindings. It should be noted, for instance, that the
phenomenologicalinsights into "shame" are quite in keeping with
Scheler'sviews on Spiritand Person.Far from introducinga new element
into his thought,his study of shame strengthensand confirmshis central
notions of Spirit and Person.'
What does Spiritmean to Scheler?Spiritis that which
possesses anything which belongs to the essence of act-being, and intentionality
and manifestation of meaning.15
It is the quintessence(Inbegriff) of acts nonexistent in the realm of
animallife.16 One may ask what, then, is act? Act (and its performance)
is that which makes objectificationpossible. While everythingcan be-
come an object for an act, act itself can never become an object. In the
phenomenonof shame,objectificationreachessuch an intensityand clar-
ity, that it can be taken to be the criterionfor the differentiationof man
not only from brutes but from the divine as well. It is an evident phe-
nomenologicalinsightthat the essence of animalityis not compatiblewith
the essence of the feeling of shame.By the same token, it is nonsenseto
ascribe shame to the divine. Thus, Scheler designatesthe locus of the
feeling of shame as the living contact which takes place between Spirit
and animality.That is to say, the climax of objectificationof all process
of life is the awarenessof the entanglementof Spiritin Nature and Life.
Scheler,like Nietzsche,uses the metaphorsof "bridge"(die Briicke) and
"transition"(Ubergang)to portray'his central intuition of man. Man is
a bridgeso stretchedbetween divinityand animalitythat he cannot give
up (preisgeben)either without simultaneouslygiving up his manhood.
Shame is alien to whateverexists "beyond"and "under"man. But it is
manifestby essentialnecessityin man himself, or it is he who:
has to feel shame. It is not because of this or that reason that he must do
so, and it is not that he feels shame because of his relations to an "other".
He feels shame as being this transition itself, conceived as an incessant
movement.17
Scheler'sstudy of shame is an excellent example of applied phenom-
enology. It is instructivenot only in the subtletiesof phenomenological
'5 Max Scheler. Der Formalismus in der Ethik and die material Wertethik,
Vol. 2 of the Collected Edition, 1954, pp. 399-400.
16 Cf., Nachlass, p. 67.
17 Ibid., p. 69.

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370 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

enterprisein general but also in Scheler'sparticularconception of phe-

nomenology.In additionto these merits, it also has special significance
for our understandingof Scheler'sthought in its entirety, for here, as
elsewhere, the unity and inner consistency of Scheler's thought come
clearly to the fore. The conceptionof man, for instance, in the light of
the duality of Spiritand Life is as plainly presentedhere as it is, say, in
Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. What is done in this study on
shame as a fundamentalphenomenologicalinsight, suffices in itself to
free us from the misleading and unphilosophicalidea of a "break"
(Bruch)in Scheler'sthought.
Here a few wordsmay be said about the interestexpressedin "shame"
by recent Germanphilosophers.Schelerwas not the first philosopherto
have taken "shame"seriously.Nietzsche, not to mention Schopenhauer,
has profoundinsightinto "shame,"especiallyin the period following his
Zarathustra.Yet the profundityof his insights is only representativeof
mere glimpses into the phenomenonof shame and is by no means an
adequateand exhaustiveaccountof this feeling. His outlook seems to be
conditionedby his psychologyof unmasking:he sees in shame mainly an
inventivemight.18What attractshis attentionis not shame qua shame,
but rather the modes of conscious equilibriumbrought about by this
feeling. Thus, properlyspeaking,he cannot be accused of having a basic
misconception of shame, since he did not study shame as such but
elaborated on shame's relevance to man's central concern with self
esteem.
Scheler,on the contrary,is not concernedwith shame for this or that
reason.His motive in studyingshameis to disclose its essentialstructure
and hence to work out its phenomenologicalfoundation.

PARVIS EMAD.
DE PAUL UNIVERSITY.

ACKN OWLEDGEMENT
I wish to thank Miss Carol Sikora for her stylistic suggestions.

18 Cf., F. Nietzsche, Werke in Drei

Binden, K. Schlechta, Edition of 1960, Vol.
2, p. 603.

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